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
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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USSR-Angola: Press Coverage Continues Heavy

Soviet press coverage of the civil war in Angola remains extremely heavy. *Pravda*, *Investiya* and the Soviet news agency Tass are hammering away at the alleged intervention by outside forces-- Chinese, South African, Zairian, former Portuguese "fascists," and "American mercenaries"--on behalf of the Popular Movement's rivals.

Moscow has reserved some of its heaviest brickbats for the Chinese. The Soviet central press recently blasted Peking for its criticism of Moscow's "expansion" and "interference" in Angola. Reflecting Soviet sensitivity to these charges, the commentary railed against Peking's own military, financial, and training support for anti-MPLA forces as well as its collusion with "Portuguese fascists, South African racists, and international monopolies."

Anti-Soviet vitriol has been a standard feature of Chinese commentary on the Angolan conflict for some time. The effort to embarrass Moscow for its involvement with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola has gained momentum, however, since Peking lowered the visibility of its own involvement by withdrawing Chinese advisers from Zairian training programs for the National Front late last month. Since then, *People's Daily* has carried two commentator articles lambasting Soviet meddling in Angola, and the traditional independence day editorial gave heavy play to the same theme.

NCNA has also carried several lengthy reports focusing on the Soviet role in Angola, and its daily broadcasts have been saturated with replays of anti-Soviet articles and statements from a number of African capitals. Chinese propagandists have had a field day rehashing the generally negative African reaction to Moscow's recognition of

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the Popular Movement in contravention of the OAU's call for neutrality in the Angolan dispute. In contrast, Peking has prominently identified itself as a strong supporter of OAU policies. A recent *People's Daily* editorial said the OAU's call for extension of recognition to all three Angolan liberation groups and for the rival organizations to unite was both "explicit and correct."

Pravda on November 17 carried Moscow's indignation over Chinese criticism one step further by claiming that "in the course of recent contacts in Peking," the Chinese made an approach to the US suggesting "paralleled or joint efforts" against the Popular Movement. In addition to raising the spectre of Chinese-US collusion in Angola, *Pravda* replayed a British press report that "American mercenaries"--"former veterans of Vietnam--were serving with the movement's adversaries. The latter charge, while not new, had been absent from Soviet commentary for some time. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Aid for Hanoi But
No Base for Moscow

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the Soviet Union will give Vietnam "very considerable" economic assistance for the restoration and further development of its national economy. As usual, neither side has divulged the value of the aid package.

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[REDACTED] the Soviets would install a metallurgical center and a petroleum refinery should preliminary explorations prove that enough ore and oil exist to make the projects worthwhile. Western companies discovered three oil deposits off shore in South Vietnamese waters last spring, but their commercial value was never determined. [REDACTED] did not comment on the new look in Hanoi's CEMA connection, although it is certainly another important facet of Moscow's effort to strengthen its economic ties with Vietnam.

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[REDACTED] denied that the Soviets are trying to obtain naval bases in Vietnam, but did acknowledge they are interested in the occasional use of Vietnamese ports for refueling and repair, particularly of "exploration" ships. [REDACTED] this would involve nothing more than the arrangement Moscow has with Singapore [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] tried to give the impression that only civilian ships would use Vietnamese ports, but [REDACTED] must be well aware that the routine appearance in

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Vietnamese ports of any Soviet ships for repairs and the like would be open to a quite different interpretation, particularly by Peking.

There is some evidence that Moscow may have been pushing Hanoi a bit harder on facilities [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the Soviets had asked for, and Hanoi had vetoed, the stationing of a "few" of their people in Cam Ranh bay to aid in the servicing of Soviet ships. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] almost certainly was trying to impress [REDACTED] [REDACTED] with Moscow's concern and willingness to counter the Chinese "threat" to Southeast Asia.

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[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~CEMA Summit in Mid-December?

Embassy sources in Moscow and Bucharest are uncertain when the CEMA summit will be held, although most are guessing it will be some time after mid-December.

Leaders of the CEMA countries are facing a crowded schedule over the next few weeks. Bulgarian leader Zhivkov is slated to visit West Germany November 24-28. Ceausescu is traveling in the Middle East November 24-December 1. Czechoslovak party chief Husak will go to Moscow before the end of November. The Soviets have scheduled important Central Committee and Supreme Soviet meetings for December 1 and 2, respectively. In recent years the Supreme Soviet session has lasted 3 days. That leaves open only the weekend of December 5-7 before the Polish party congress (opening December 8) or some time later in December, before or after the Cuban party congress.

If the CEMA summit is to be nothing more than a symbolic gathering, the timing is not all that important, but Moscow apparently does want the summit to make some important decisions. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the summit will take "particularly important" decisions on cooperation in raw material exploitation and agricultural production. The more comprehensive these proposals are, the more trouble the Soviets will have in balancing national economic interests. The summit will also discuss the troublesome issues of CEMA-EC relations and possible institutional changes within CEMA.

The Romanians, who have publicly dissented on the CEMA-EC issue and are wary of institutional changes, have engaged in procedural and other delaying tactics. Bucharest probably wants to clear up bilateral economic issues with the Soviets before any

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CEMA summit. The Romanians may also calculate that a delayed summit will give any other East Europeans who may object to elements of Soviet economic co-operation proposals time to firm up their own national economic plans and negotiating position before the summit. (CONFIDENTIAL)


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Yugoslavs Defend Their Role in the Latest
Postponement of the European Communist Conference

The Yugoslav party, although sticking to its conditions for participation in the proposed European Communist Conference, appears worried that the Soviets are becoming irritated by the protracted debates.

On Wednesday, as the latest preparatory phase in East Berlin was breaking up without agreement, *Vecerne Novosti*--a major Yugoslav daily--roundly denounced Western press speculation that Belgrade was acting from ulterior motives. The article flatly denied, for example, that there was any linkage between the internal drive against pro-Soviet cominformists in Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav party's independent tack in the Berlin preparatory meetings.

Upon returning from the GDR, the chief of the Yugoslav delegation, Aleksandr Grlickov, said that the continuing discussions involved points of principle that were of "basic significance" to the individual parties. Grlickov admitted the preparations were "somewhat long" but argued that the size of the task undertaken is the cause. Lest his position be read as a sign of Yugoslav willingness to back down, he reviewed his party's positions and re-emphasized that all thematic work must be completed before any conference can convene.

Yesterday, Milika Sundic--the foreign affairs correspondent for Radio Zagreb--expressed his confidence that "unless something unforeseen happens," the next preparatory meeting is "likely" to "completely overcome" existing differences. Sundic's note of optimism, however, was followed by a long review of the independent-minded parties demands of Moscow. He said that since no date has yet been

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set, there is still time for more talk. In conclusion, Sundic specifically denied that the Yugoslav party has any motives other than its clearly stated goals.

It is not yet clear if the defensive tone is a response to specific criticism of Belgrade at the meeting in East Berlin or if it is simply an instinctive Yugoslav reaction. In either case, the Yugoslavs will be watching the Soviets closely for a reading on how the Soviet leadership deals with the latest postponement. (CONFIDENTIAL)


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~~SECRET~~Yugoslavia-USSR

* Another senior Yugoslav party official has openly expressed reservations about the Soviet Union's intentions toward Yugoslavia.

Vladimir Bakaric, speaking to a Croat party plenum on Thursday, reviewed the "machinations" of all anti-Titoist emigre and domestic subversive groups, but hit particularly hard at pro-Stalinists. He said that although the Tito regime had repeatedly asked foreign governments whether they supported anti-Titoist subversion, it had received only verbal reassurances about which "we can be suspicious." He specifically said that Yugoslav desire for good relations with the "Eastern parties" rests on mutual acceptance of the right to have different foreign policies.

Bakaric attacked the pro-Soviet faction within Yugoslavia for intentionally spreading doubts about the country's stability in the post-Tito era. He said this was a tactic designed to undermine confidence abroad in Yugoslavia and to attract foreign support, without which the small and unpopular Stalinist faction cannot hope to challenge the system.

The Bakaric speech can be read as an appeal to the Soviets to take more forthright steps to disassociate themselves from the Stalinist faction. There is also an implied threat of a disruption in Yugoslav relations with the East and, perhaps, a more aggressive Yugoslav posture regarding divisions with the Soviet alliance system. Bakaric reasserted Yugoslavia's desire for good relations with all countries in the Soviet orbit, but his speech places the blame for the present chill in relations with the East squarely on the Cominformists and on the

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failure of the Soviet camp to wholeheartedly back the Titoist system.

Anger over the Soviets' bland denials of responsibility for the cominformists' activity has been simmering ever since the first major subversive group was arrested in April 1974. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Edvard Kardelj, one of Tito's closet lieutenants, said privately after a trip to Moscow last fall that the Soviets were like "vultures."

Whatever the views of Kardelj and Bakaric, the ultimate decision on how hard to press the Soviets remains in Tito's hands. Tito has so far refrained personally from direct expressions of anger at the Soviets, but his determination to keep the anti-Cominformist campaign on a purely internal plane may be flagging. (SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)

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Yugoslavs Sensitive to Changes in Albania

A prominent Yugoslav news commentator has complained that a recent Albanian press attack on Yugoslav "revisionism" serves the interests of foreign powers--read, Moscow--which want the two Balkan countries divided.

Milika Sundic, the foreign affairs commentator for Radio Zagreb, on Tuesday denounced an editorial in Tirana's *Zeri i Popullit* for its unwarranted revival of polemics against Yugoslavia. Sundic's criticism centered on the theme that well-known ideological and political differences should not obscure the common interest of Belgrade and Tirana in building a working relationship based on a mutual desire to preserve independence.

According to a version of the *Zeri i Popullit* editorial broadcast by Radio Tirana on Sunday, only one paragraph--in a nine-page editorial--specifically mentioned Yugoslavia. The rest of the article was a strong denunciation of Khrushchev's revisionist policies in terms that could also be read as anti-Yugoslav.

That Sundic should reply to this sally at all suggests concern in Belgrade about the rumored political changes at work in Tirana. A year ago, the Hoxha regime was emphasizing common Balkan interests in fending off Soviet influence in the region. The Yugoslavs welcomed this trend, and they would view a reversal in Albania's relations with its neighbors as a tactical gain for Moscow. Belgrade is also fully aware of the problems it would face if Tirana reverted to its former practice of exacerbating nationalist tension among Yugoslavia's Albanian minority. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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