


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STAFF NOTES:

Soviet Union Eastern Europe

DOS review(s)
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
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE



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Embassy Views on Current
Domestic Situation in Poland

The US embassy in Warsaw reports that the Gierek regime has taken effective steps to reduce both public tensions and short-term economic strains. Nevertheless, public anxiety over food shortages, prospective price rises, and possible belt-tightening measures persists.

The wave of arson rumors apparently peaked about mid-October, but others continue to crop up. There are, for example, unconfirmed reports of bomb hoaxes in public buildings in Warsaw, including the discovery of explosive devices at the site of one of the suspicious fires in early October. Responsible Polish officials have described stories of a self-immolation and of kidnappings by "Arabs" or "Germans" as "sheer idiocy." Another wild rumor says that a student took a potshot at Gierek somewhere in Warsaw in mid-October. The embassy has no evidence to confirm this, nor has it seen any signs of special security measures for Gierek.

Reports of worker dissatisfaction in the Warsaw area and on the Baltic coast have also circulated, but the situation generally appears calm. [REDACTED]

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The approach of the party congress in December has sparked reports of efforts to unseat Gierek. The embassy has heard [REDACTED] that an unspecified group within the top leadership advocates a policy adjustment to slow the pace of economic development. Gierek, however, appears firmly in control and in recent weeks has projected a renewed sense of direction and self-confidence.

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Meanwhile, the Gierek team has moved to increase market supplies to meet expanded consumer

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demand during the coming holiday period. The regime is trying to shift some of the blame for shortages to inefficient economic enterprises. Nevertheless, the leadership does not seem to have decided how and when to reveal to the public its answer to the fundamental question underlying much public concern--the future wage-price structure. Until it does, public uneasiness will continue.

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Soviet Media Focusing on Angola

The Soviet media are devoting increasing attention to Angola as the scheduled date for independence, November 11, draws near.

Several recent major commentaries in *Pravda*, *Isvestia*, and *Red Star* portray the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola as a group of beleaguered patriots struggling against an alignment of forces--Communist Chinese, American, and South African, among others--bent on reversing Angola's movement toward independence and retarding Africa's decolonization process.

Pravda comes down particularly hard on Peking, charging that Chinese military instructors are working "side by side with CIA advisers" in an effort to suppress the Angolan people. The Soviets clearly are attempting to embarrass the Chinese in Africa by such assertions. But Moscow is also using the Angola case to support a long-standing propaganda theme that the Chinese have aligned themselves with reactionaries and in some cases are cooperating directly with the US.

Although the articles end on an upbeat note by citing the optimistic view of Popular Movement leader Agostinho Neto that his group will eventually prevail, they clearly reveal Moscow's nervousness over the serious military reverses sustained by the movement in recent weeks. The Kremlin could be preparing its domestic audience for a setback to a client that Moscow has touted as a successful pro-Soviet liberation movement.

By emphasizing foreign intervention on behalf of the Popular Movement's adversaries, Moscow may be attempting to justify to a foreign audience its own stepped-up assistance to the Popular Movement.

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Poles Reassure Moscow on Western Ties

Soviet concern over Poland's expanding economic ties with the West has evidently led Warsaw to give increasing publicity to its commercial links with the bloc.

Party leader Gierek and Prime Minister Jaroszewicz have recently lavished attention on Poland's trade relations with the Soviet Union and other CEMA members. In some cases, they have even dropped their standard references to détente as the green light for closer economic ties with Western countries. Warsaw has also given wide coverage in Polish news media to a session of the Main Board of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society and to the recent visit of Soviet Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov.

The current Polish rhetoric is almost certainly aimed at calming Moscow's apprehension. [redacted]

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[redacted] recently told a US diplomat that the Soviets are unhappy with Poland's success in pursuing a "neo-Romanian" course in economic policy, and Soviet Premier Kosygin reportedly criticized Poland's "overly Western" economic policies during his August visit.

There are no indications, however, that Poland intends to abandon the difficult task of seeking an acceptable balance between greater economic integration with CEMA and expanded economic ties with the West. [redacted] said that the link with CEMA provides stability while the one with the West offers progress.

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Yugoslavs Press Independent Party
Views on European Communist Conference

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Belgrade is again strongly emphasizing the unity of views among the independent European Communist parties who most actively oppose Soviet pretensions to a leadership role in the communist movement

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Belgrade Tanjug on Tuesday broadcast a long review of a recent plenum of the Italian party Central Committee that had approved a report by the leadership on preparations for the European Communist Party Conference. According to Tanjug, Giancarlo Pajetta, secretary for interparty relations, presented conditions for Italian attendance that dovetail with the Yugoslav stand. Pajetta's view is that the conference "could be held" late this year or early next, but that many problems remain unsolved.

The Italians insisted that "it is necessary explicitly to confirm that a single center or a leading party cannot exist" and to reject "the importation of a foreign model of socialism." Moreover, Pajetta asserted that "all forms of organizational ties" with overtones of obligations must be rejected. Tanjug said the report stressed that the final conference document must be acceptable in toto to all parties, but quoted Pajetta as warning that it should not attempt to gloss over irreconcilable differences and thereby lead to ideological confusion. Belgrade's leading spokesman on inter-party matters last week repeated almost all of the Italian demands.

The Italian party has also introduced a new issue that the Soviets and their loyalist supporters will hotly contest. It wants any statement on European economic trends to stress that Eastern and Western economies are troubled by the same problems. This position clashes with Soviet propaganda that

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asserts the CEMA countries, thanks to their superior systems and beneficial economic links with Moscow, are better able than the West to resist economic shocks. Such a frank discussion of Eastern problems at a relatively open Communist forum would be political dynamite for many East European regimes, not to mention the Kremlin, and there is virtually no chance that Moscow will accede to this demand.

In addition to publicizing the Italian party's stand, the Belgrade party weekly *Kommunist* this week carried a long interview with Santiago Carrillo, the secretary general of the independent Spanish party. Carrillo stressed his party's admiration of Yugoslavia's successful break with Moscow in 1948 and stressed his party's independence from any foreign pressures. Carrillo, fresh from talks with Romania's Ceausescu, also restated his intention to pursue a role for his Communist party in a multi-party system in the post-Franco era.

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USSR: Kama Truck Plant

The USSR's Kama Truck Plant will not operate at full capacity before 1980, according to a recent statement by a high Kama official. At capacity the plant will build 150,000 heavy trucks and 250,000 diesel engines a year. This latest Soviet estimate was given to two US embassy officials who spent three days touring the plant in October.

The visitors also learned that the engine plant, the most nearly complete of the five unfinished production units, will turn out some engines by the opening of the 25th Party Congress in February. Three other units--forging, pressing, and assembly--will probably be ready for operation by mid-1976.

The foundry, troubled from the start, continues to be the major bottleneck. Foundry equipment, manufactured mainly in the US, is ready for installation, but Soviet engineers still are working to repair foundations of the large iron foundry that sank after building construction was finished last year. Kama officials expect to have the foundry operating in about 12 months, in time to meet the current goal of token production of trucks by the end of 1976.

Construction at Kama is running two years behind the original plan, which called for the plant to start building trucks in late 1974.

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CHRONOLOGY

October 28

Romanian President Ceausescu begins a four-day, state visit to Portugal and confers with President Costa Gomes. [REDACTED]

25X1

Soviet charge in Kinshasa delivers a note regarding Angola to the Zairian Foreign Ministry, which reports it contains "intolerable threats." [REDACTED]

25X1

A Soviet citizen, who is a UNESCO official, arrives in South Korea, only the second Soviet to visit there since the Korean war. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Deputy Premier Baybakov confers with visiting North Vietnamese Deputy Premier Le Thanh Nghi. [REDACTED]

25X1

October 29

Brezhnev confers at the Kremlin with visiting North Vietnamese party chief Le Duan. [REDACTED]

25X1

USSR and Japan initial a five-year trade agreement in Moscow. [REDACTED]

25X1

US and Romanian officials discuss in Washington prospects for cooperation in the nuclear energy field. [REDACTED]

25X1

Deputy Premier Kirillin arrives in Helsinki for talks on bilateral cooperation in science and technology; the occasion marks the 20th anniversary of the first Finno-Soviet agreement in this area. [REDACTED]

25X1

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October 29

USSR conducts an underground nuclear test at Semipalatinsk. [REDACTED]

25X1

GDR and the West Berlin *Senat* exchange letters of agreement to govern rescues on border rivers between the GDR and West Berlin. [REDACTED]

25X1

In separate speeches, President Tito and Croatian security official Pervan condemn the Cominformist element in Yugoslavia. [REDACTED]

25X1

Soviet-Malagasy trade and economic cooperation agreement is signed in Tananarive; Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Manshulo signs for the USSR. [REDACTED]

25X1

October 30

Three Soviet naval vessels, including the guided-missile helicopter carrier Moskova, begin an official port call at Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia. [REDACTED]

25X1

Warsaw Pact's military council concludes a four-day meeting in Bucharest. [REDACTED]

25X1

Soviet dissident Amalrik is detained for eight hours by KGB authorities after publicly supporting award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Andrey Sakharov; others involved in this public effort include historian Roy Medvedev, sculptor Ernst Neizvestny, and dissident former Major General Pyotr Grigorenko. [REDACTED]

25X1

Three Soviet naval ships begin a six-day, official port call at Lagos, Nigeria. [REDACTED]

25X1

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- October 30 President Podgorny confers with Iraqi special envoy Aziz, who conveys a "personal message" to Brezhnev from President Bakr. [redacted] 25X1
- Polish party chief Gierak confers with visiting Soviet Deputy Premier Arkhipov on bilateral economic cooperation. [redacted] 25X1
- Mozambique and Bulgaria sign in Sofia a protocol on economic cooperation and an agreement concerning scientific and technological cooperation. [redacted] 25X1
- October 31 Yugoslav party secretary Dolanc concludes a five-day, official visit to North Korea and begins a one-week, official visit to Japan. [redacted] 25X1
- North Vietnamese party chief Le Duan ends a five-day, official visit to Moscow; the communique indicates a more explicit endorsement of Soviet detente policy by Hanoi. Le Duan is to remain in the USSR for "a brief rest." [redacted] 25X1
- US and the USSR, after four days of talks in Washington, agree on 39 joint environmental projects to be pursued during the coming year; Soviet negotiator Yury Izrael meets with President Ford. [redacted] 25X1
- Romanian President Ceausescu concludes a four-day, state visit to Portugal; several bilateral accords are signed. [redacted] 25X1

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October 31 Romanian Premier Manescu ends a five-day, official visit to Poland; several bilateral agreements are signed in Warsaw before his departure. [redacted]

25X1

Hungarian President Losonczi ends a five-day, state visit to Somalia and begins a five-day visit to South Yemen. [redacted]

25X1

November 1 Swedish Foreign Minister Andersson concludes an official visit to Hungary. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Iraqi special envoy Aziz returns to Baghdad after a four-day, official visit to the USSR. [redacted]

25X1

Dress rehearsal for the USSR's annual November 7 military parade reveals a sharp cutback in its size, with none of the usual heavy weaponry on display. [redacted]

25X1

Pravda announces that work has begun on all sections of the 1,850-mile Orenburg natural gas pipeline, a CEMA cooperative project. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

November 2 Politburo candidate-member Demichev goes to Hungary for session of inter-governmental cultural cooperation committee. [redacted]

25X1

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- November 3 Congress of Romania's Union of Communist Youth convenes in Bucharest; President Ceausescu delivers the keynote address. [REDACTED] 25X1
- Yugoslav Foreign Minister Minc begins a three-day, official visit to West Germany, after which he will go to Norway. [REDACTED] 25X1
- Hungarian leader Kadar receives Soviet Marshal Yakubovsky and General Shtem-enko, who arrived in Hungary after the Warsaw Pact military council session in Romania. [REDACTED] 25X1
- US-Romanian Economic Commission convenes in Washington for a two-day meeting. [REDACTED] 25X1

FUTURE EVENTS

- November 5 GDR-FRG border commission to convene at Wiesbaden. [REDACTED] 25X1
- November 6-7 Soviets to mark the 58th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. [REDACTED] 25X1
- November 10 East German Foreign Minister Fischer to begin a three-day, official visit to Sweden. [REDACTED] 25X1
- FRG President Scheel to commence a one-week, state visit to the USSR accompanied by Foreign Minister Genscher, a fellow Free Democrat. [REDACTED] 25X1

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25X1

November 11 Hungarian Premier Lazar to begin a four-day, official visit to Italy. [redacted]

November 12 Czechoslovak Premier Strougal to begin a three-day, official visit to France.

25X1

November Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chnoupek to make an official visit to the Netherlands. [redacted]

25X1

mid-November Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov to make an official visit to Yugoslavia. [redacted]

25X1

November 16 Hungarian Defense Minister Czinege to begin a three-day, official visit to Austria. [redacted]

25X1

November 17 East German Premier Sindermann to arrive in Iran for an official visit of three or four days. [redacted]

25X1

USS Bigelow to begin a six-day, official port call at Rijeka, Yugoslavia. [redacted]

25X1

November 20 French Foreign Trade Minister Segard to begin an official visit to the USSR for talks on energy matters. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

November 23 Secretary of Agriculture Butz to visit Hungary. [redacted]

25X1

November 24 Bulgarian party/state leader Zhivkov to begin a five-day visit to West Germany. [redacted]

25X1

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25X1

October 24 Soviet-Norwegian talks on Barents Sea continental shelf to resume. [redacted]

25X1

November 25 Secretary of Agriculture Butz to begin a four-day, official visit to Poland. [redacted]

25X1

late November 25X1 Yugoslav Foreign Minister Minc to make an official visit to the Netherlands. [redacted]

25X1

Italian President Leone to make a state visit to the USSR. [redacted]

25X1

early December 25X1 US-Soviet committee on nuclear energy cooperation to convene in Washington. [redacted]

25X1

Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah to make an official visit to the USSR. [redacted]

25X1

December 2 USSR Supreme Soviet to convene in Moscow. [redacted]

25X1

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