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
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SOVIET UNION · EASTERN EUROPE

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR · Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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USA Institute Analyst Comments on
Vladivostok Arms Understanding

The senior strategic analyst at Moscow's USA Institute has described the Vladivostok arms understanding as the best possible under present conditions, even though it permits a "terribly high" level of warheads.

G. A. Trofimenko, a well-informed adviser to the leadership on strategic matters, offered his opinions to an embassy official late last week. His endorsement echoed an *Investia* commentary of December 4, which said the results were the best attainable "under present circumstances." Both reflect sensitivity to criticism in the US, and possibly also in the Soviet Union, of the ceilings negotiated at Vladivostok.

Trofimenko implied that the major impact of the agreement would be to limit the total number of launchers available to the USSR and the number of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) available to the US. He expressed surprise, however, at the limit placed on MIRV launchers (1320), saying he had expected a figure closer to 800. He saw little prospect of a reduction, however, as long as the USSR is faced by a hostile China.

Commenting on the exclusion from the Vladivostok accords of US forward-based systems--a perennial Soviet bugbear--Trofimenko said that the issue would have to be taken up at the MBFR talks in Vienna. He did not amplify on this but it could presage a new Soviet effort to have air forces and nuclear weapons considered in this venue.

Trofimenko's remarks on US targeting strategy--the so-called "Schlesinger doctrine"--were significantly less disapproving than those he and other members of the

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USA Institute have made over the past few months. Trofimenko said that although the Soviets were still critical of the doctrine, the summit had modified their chief objection--that the coverage of more targets would spur the acquisition of more warheads by both sides. In fact, he said, with warheads now fixed at high levels for both sides, the Soviets themselves might move to a similar strategy.

Trofimenko failed to repeat another favorite Soviet complaint that the Schlesinger doctrine seeks to make nuclear weapons "usable" by providing for their graduated use in time of nuclear war.

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Ups and Downs of Church-State
Relations in Poland

After a summer of what seemed to be progress, church-state relations in Poland are again on the down trend.

The latest incident involved the destruction of a chapel in Warsaw on November 23. The regime claims that it demolished the chapel only because it was a part of an old people's home that was unsafe for occupancy and that would be too expensive to renovate. The officials contend they notified the Curia of the planned demolition and, after receiving no response, had the sacraments removed before destroying the building.

Church officials admit that they had held discussions on the chapel with representatives of the regime, but say they proposed it be relocated instead of destroyed. They accuse the authorities of "unilaterally" destroying the chapel without prior notice.

Cardinal Wyszynski has seized upon the incident to intensify and broaden his criticism of the regime. A communique from the plenary session of the Polish Episcopate in late November stipulated that normalization of relations between Warsaw and the Vatican can become "full and lasting" only if preceded by "normalization" at home. The bishops added that although they will continue to cooperate closely with Rome, they "have direct responsibility for the Church in Poland."

Cardinal Wyszynski is suspicious of the rapprochement between the Vatican and the regime that was reached earlier this year. He is determined to

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be the arbiter between the Holy See and the Polish government, and insists that he will determine when "normalization" with the state has been achieved. He will no doubt continue to use such incidents as the chapel demolition to keep church officials militant. In the meanwhile, the regime will keep up its efforts to weaken church influence, but without risking a major confrontation.

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USA Institute Now
Formally Covers Canada

The Soviet weekly *Economica Gazette* (No. 48, signed to press on November 26) has identified Yevgeniy Shershnev as deputy director of the "Institute of the USA and Canada," indicating that the name of the institute has been changed. The addition of Canada to the institute's name has not yet been officially announced, but the next issue of the institute's monthly publication will probably confirm the change.

The institute has been involved in Canadian studies for at least the past two years. In the May 1974 issue of its journal, *USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology (SShA)*, a review of the institute's organizational structure and program of studies mentioned that, because of Canada's increasing role in the North American continent, the institute had created a new sector to cover Canadian socio-political and economic problems.

SShA began to publish frequent articles on Canada in 1973. This year the journal has covered Canadian-US conflicts of interest, Canada's inflation and unemployment, Canadian parliamentary elections, the 22nd National Congress of the Communist Party of Canada, Canada's growing patriotic movement, and the Canadian search for new markets.

We have no information on who heads the Canada sector nor of its membership. Institute personnel who have had experience related to Canada include:

--Boris Alekhin, a young member who did research in the US on American companies and their

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Canadian subsidiaries. He wrote an article on US capital in Canada for *SShA*'s November 1973 issue.

--Vladimir Fedorovich, 50, an economist and senior researcher, who has traveled to Canada. In 1968 he was editor of the Canadian edition of *Soviet Union Today*.

--Vladimir Krestyanov, 53, the institute's ubiquitous scientific secretary, who was assigned to the Soviet embassy in Ottawa for three years in the 1960s.

--Aleksey Nikolayev, 46, a member of *SShA*'s editorial board, who was a visiting professor of economics at the University of Saskatchewan in Regina, Canada, during the 1964-65 academic year. In the 1960s he was an economic adviser in the CPSU Central Committee apparatus, concentrating on North America and Western Europe.

--Yuriy Rigin, 42, an economist and senior researcher at the institute, who was a graduate student at the University of British Columbia in 1963.

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Belgrade Dissatisfied with
Vienna's Diplomatic Note

Belgrade's dispute with Vienna over Slovene minority rights in Austrian Carinthia threatens to worsen. Late last week, the Yugoslavs expressed strong displeasure over Austria's answer to their protest of October 29.

On December 6, a Tanjug editorial described the Austrian response as "absolutely unsatisfactory and negative." It accused Vienna of continuing the assimilation program begun after the Nazi Anschluss of 1938. The editorial warned that since Vienna has "closed the door" to bilateral talks, a solution will have to be sought in the international arena.

Despite this threat, Belgrade has apparently not yet firmly decided on its next step. One option is to appeal to the Four Power signatories to the 1955 Austrian State Treaty, which guarantees the equality of national minorities in the country. The Yugoslavs have already clashed with Austrian representatives in a UN sub-committee, and some Yugoslav officials may argue for taking the matter to the floor of the UN.

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Yugoslavia: The Search for National SecurityPart III: The Generals get their Chance

Tito's determined effort to cover all contingencies that could arise during the succession period has led to a major strengthening of the internal security complex. Professional military officers who have long criticized the civilian administration for failing to halt the deterioration of domestic discipline have been given the key jobs. They now face a complex task with many treacherous--but well-marked--pitfalls. Tito, trusting nothing to chance, has also seen to it that the top civilian leaders have adequate means to counteract over-zealous activities by the new uniformed watchdogs.

Tito's assignment of military officers to key internal security posts drops one of the regime's thorniest problems squarely into the laps of his generals. In the process of adjusting to Yugoslavia's assertive national minorities and diverse political and economic interests, Tito long ago abandoned attempts to rule by fear and fiat, and he does not intend to turn back. He wants the army to tighten internal security controls, but without inflaming special interest groups that would take umbrage at every genuine--or imagined--abuse of power.

The lowly state of the civilian security agencies is directly related to their failure in the first two decades after the war to strike a proper balance between protecting the federation and respecting the sensitivities of Yugoslavia's national

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minorities. When the civilian secret police (SDB) and its ambitious patron Aleksandr Rankovic fell from grace in 1966, the whole security effort was gradually undermined by a program of decentralization that atomized responsibilities for maintaining internal security. As the public lost respect for it, morale and effectiveness within the service deteriorated.

Throughout the early 1970s, military officers were among the most vociferous critics of the decaying of order in Yugoslavia. Additionally, the failures of the civilian services created openings for the elite military counter-intelligence organization (KOS)--which had neutralized the SDB for Tito during his showdown with Rankovic--and allowed it to accumulate more and more influence behind the scenes.

The heyday of back-stage power for the KOS probably extended from October 1971 through June 1973; during this time Colonel General Ivan Miskovic, the head of the organization, served as Tito's personal adviser on national security. Miskovic was purged in mid-1973, after recurring rumors of his excessive ambition and abuse of power.

However murky the details, the Miskovic affair did leave the clear impression that the power of the security apparatus, unrestrained by systematic political control, was an open invitation to serious political trouble. Although the experience with Miskovic did not sour Tito on his overall promise that generals make more efficient security directors than civilians, it probably did contribute to the heavy preponderance of civilians in the newly reorganized national defense council. This body appears to be the only credible check on potential abuses.

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For their part, the military managers of the new internal security system are presumably inclined to avoid the mistakes of their predecessors. Some steps have already been taken to upgrade the political reliability of the high command.

Even before the new system was introduced this fall, [redacted] several high-ranking officers, notorious for their advocacy of a "firm hand" in domestic affairs, had been weeded out of the service. Five generals--including Ivan Gosnjak, Tito's defense minister from 1953 to 1967--have reportedly been forced to retire. The circumstances of their removals suggest that they were tarred with allegations of collaboration with the Soviet-supported Cominformist plotters. All the retired generals, except for Gosnjak, were reportedly placed under arrest.

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These officers advocated a strong-arm federal presence similar in some respects to the Stalinist program of the Cominformists, but there is no hard evidence of any military involvement in the plot. It appears more likely that Tito wanted the high command to clean its own house of questionable influences before it assumed responsibility for the nation's internal security.

There are still serious questions about the army's ability to avoid the traps that have drawn past internal security managers into political error. The veterans and reserve officers organizations throughout the country are hotbeds of ultra-conservative sentiment. Their close relationships with active-duty officers may mean that the new system will not be able to work evenhandedly in politically sensitive disputes.

The other clear danger is that the military leadership--accustomed to the command relationships of army life--will demand more of civilians

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than the civilians are able to deliver.

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MOREOVER, the recent arrest and trial of the writer Mihajlo Mihajlov was a firm warning that the new caretakers will not go easy on dissident intellectuals.

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Some measures for checking abuse of power exist, but most of them appear to be functions centered on the federal regime in Belgrade. A committee of the parliament--chaired by the former minister of the interior, Luka Banovic, a civilian--is authorized to review the activities of the ministry. The new security law also leaves the power of review over the military security agencies to the commander in chief--Tito. But the law appears to limit the rights of local civilian officials to demand an accounting from the security services.

Belgrade's first interest in supervising the military-security complex is to ensure that the powerful men guiding the repressive arm of government avoid the sins of personal ambition and disloyalty. Since early summer, top party officials--most notably Stane Dolanc, secretary of the presidium's executive committee--have been active in briefing the party organizations of the security services. While the Cominformist affair undoubtedly loomed large in these talks, the party organizations almost certainly received orders to strengthen their role as the regime's in-house watchdog.

In sum, Tito's preoccupation with the whole area of national security has resulted in the creation of a predominantly civilian "high command"--the National Defense Council--that would run an

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all-out national defense effort against foreign aggression. Within that body, he has succeeded in creating a sense of unity and common purpose close to that which enabled the Yugoslavs to liberate themselves from Nazi occupation. In the field of internal security, however, the prospect for friction is evident. A serious misstep, by the new military managers or by their civilian overseers, could well pit them against each other and lead to the very political instability that Tito's organizational overhaul is designed to avoid.

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