


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STAFF NOTES:

Soviet Union Eastern Europe

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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome.

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Berlin: The Endless Negotiation

In a time of detente, Berlin is no longer the bunion that the Soviets, in Khrushchev's phrase, could step on whenever they wanted to give the West a pain. The passing of the age of sharp confrontation, and the signing of the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, do not mean, however, that the Berlin question has disappeared, merely that the debate is now conducted on a different level and in more muted tones. The Quadripartite Agreement incorporates each side's philosophy--stating with benign inconsistency that West Berlin is not a constituent part of West Germany and shall not be governed by it, but ties between West Berlin and the FRG shall be strengthened. Differences in interpretation of the agreement are therefore inevitable, and, in fact, were anticipated.

In recent weeks, the Soviets have made a number of complaints about Berlin matters in conversations with West German and Allied diplomats. They have protested:

--Plans to establish an EC vocational center in West Berlin. The Soviets maintain that since West Berlin is not itself a member of the EC, establishment of the center can be interpreted to mean that it is a constituent part of the FRG, a violation of the Quadripartite Agreement.

--Establishment last year of the FRG Federal Environmental Agency office in West Berlin. The issue here is similar to the EC vocational center, but more direct since it is a purely FRG institution. As far as the Soviets are concerned, the environmental office is still operating illegally, although they are not trying to keep it from functioning.

--West German extension of the 1972 FRG-Austrian consular treaty to "Land Berlin." The Soviets contend

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that the extension of this and other FRG treaties to West Berlin is illegal. They regard the designation "Land Berlin" as invalid because it implies that West Berlin is a constituent part of the Federal Republic.

--Nomination of West Berlin Governing Mayor Schucht as a plenipotentiary in cultural matters under the 1963 French - West German friendship agreement. The Soviets, as might be expected, protested the involvement of a West Berlin official in a Federal German agreement. The French have responded that the plenipotentiary has only limited functions and, at any rate, is appointed by individual *Lands*, not by the West German Federal Government.

--Decisions by the Western Allies to grant landing rights in West Berlin to airlines not three-powers.

This is a long-standing controversy. Occasionally the Soviets claim that the Allies are letting the commercial airlines of other countries use the established flight corridors to West Berlin, but generally their complaints are limited to the grant of landing rights in the city. This, then, raises the question of whether East Germany will grant overflight rights to these airlines; the result is often sterile debates over which permission should be obtained first.

--Allied toleration of the right-wing Bund Freies Deutschland party in West Berlin. The Soviets have suggested that this group should be banned as a fascist party, but have not pressed the issue when the Allies have denied it was fascist.

The Soviets have also expressed disappointment over the cool Western response to their proposals for a lavish celebration in Berlin of the 30th anniversary of V-E Day. The Soviets apparently intended these

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ceremonies to take place entirely in West Berlin, thereby strengthening their role there without a corresponding increase in the residual Allied presence in East Berlin.

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[redacted] the West Germans thought that Schmidt had obtained the Soviets' agreement that individual West Berliners would be covered by agreements the FRG made with third countries.

In a broader sense the sniping on Berlin issues reflects a nagging Soviet suspicion that the idea of a united Germany is still a long way from extinction in the minds of West Germans. Recent West German protests over the concept of an East German citizenship in the consular treaty between the GDR and Austria may have aroused underlying Soviet concerns that the German reunification issue can still influence West German policy and, indeed, may never vanish. The FRG-Soviet dispute over the "peaceful change" formulation at CSCE has probably had a similar effect, since the problem essentially concerns West German efforts to leave open a legal path to eventual reunification of the two Germanies.

The foreign policy line of detente and their desire for good relations with West Germany affect the means the Soviets employ, but Moscow's basic objective of defining West Berlin as a separate entity will remain unchanged. The Soviets may tolerate certain actions with which they disagree, such as establishment of the Federal Environmental Agency in West Berlin, but they will never legally recognize any step that seems to violate the dictum that West Berlin is not a constituent part of the FRG. In a sense, the adversary process of seeking precedents and establishing limits amounts to a continuous renegotiation of the Quadripartite Agreement.

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Moscow's Unofficial Artists
Plan Another Exhibit

Dissident artist Oscar Rabin told a US embassy officer on February 6 that an exhibit of works by Moscow's unofficial artists has been approved "in principle" by city officials. According to Rabin, who arranged two such exhibits last September

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[redacted] a group of unofficial artists has been negotiating over the past several weeks with the city Committee of Graphic Artists for authorization to stage an exhibit in Moscow's Exhibition of National Economic Achievements. At this stage, the major sticking point seems to be the selection of an exhibit hall. The hall offered by the committee, Rabin said, is not ideal for an art exhibit because of poor lighting and inadequate space. Rabin apparently believes this problem can be resolved soon, however, and he expects the exhibit to open the first part of next week.

Some 20 local non-conformist artists are expected to exhibit their works, and they have allegedly been promised that the exhibition will run for about one week. In contrast to September's art show at Izmaylovo Park, not all non-union artists will be allowed to participate. The artists' works are being reviewed, and only the "best" will be included. The city committee, also, has rejected the works of several artists.

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[redacted] some, if not all, artists who participate in the exhibit will be invited to join the Graphic Artists Committee, which is considered one step below the Moscow Union of Artists.

Authorization for the exhibit seems to be a positive step for the artists, but has caused further splits in the ranks of unofficial artists. Some have argued that

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the offer should be accepted only if all artists are allowed to participate. Others do not wish to miss the chance to attain greater acceptability in the eyes of the authorities and thereby more opportunities to show their works publicly. At this point, however, both groups seem to be willing to accept a compromise with city officials. The aim of the authorities seems to be to bring the most prominent artists into officially sanctioned structures in order to exert greater control over them.



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Polish Views on Soviet-US Relations

Immediately after Moscow's rejection of the 1972 US-Soviet trade agreement, Polish media were noticeably reluctant to discuss US-Soviet relations. In the last two weeks, however, the media have picked up the theme that detente prevails despite the temporary setbacks caused by a "minority of congressmen."

Although proclaiming the "correctness" of the Kremlin's decision to renounce the agreement as an unwarranted attempt at interference in Soviet internal affairs, the media have emphasized that the US administration is still working to improve relations with the Soviet Union.

Warsaw's low-key approach to Moscow's abrogation of the trade agreement was to be expected. Gierek has based his program of economic development and modernization on creating a balance between increased trade and contacts with the West and a strong alliance with the Soviet Union. The Poles will look for ways to play down the significance of any event that might make this balancing act more difficult.

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Bulgaria: Tightening the Screws on Youth

The Council of Ministers has recently announced tough new regulations to improve the "labor education" of Bulgarian youth. These restrictive measures seem indirectly aimed at two problems--a nagging labor shortage and a fear of ideological degeneration among Bulgarian youth.

Each young person upon completing his primary education or military service must now register with a bureau of manpower, which will give out job assignments according to the "needs of the national economy." Aspiring students must hold a "steady job" for at least eight months--and in some cases up to two years--before they are eligible to enroll in higher educational institutions. Failure to register or the abandonment of assigned positions makes either the young people or their parents liable to a sizable fine.

The regulations are designed to correct problems that the regime has recently stressed in press commentaries:

--The lax and parasitical attitude of young people who neither work nor study and who are supported by their parents.

--The distaste of youth for "socially useful labor."

--The growing gulf between young Bulgarians who consider themselves white-collar bureaucrats and "socialist workers."

--The need to improve labor productivity, which was stressed at a national party conference and several BCP Central Committee plenums last year.

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[REDACTED]

Sofia is worried about the commitment to Communism of Bulgarian youth, particularly in an era of expanding East-West contacts. "Idle youths" are thus warned against assimilating Western ways and losing their socialist militancy.

The new legislation also betrays the regime's concern with manpower problems. The country's chronic labor shortage has been aggravated because young Bulgarians remain in school longer and thus enter the labor force at an older age. The assignment to the USSR of some 15,000 Bulgarian workers, who could find employment at home, compounds the problem. The regime probably expects that the new decision will pump at least some new workers into the economy.

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Romanian Defense Minister in Yugoslavia

Defense Minister Ionita arrived in Dubrovnik on Thursday for what has been announced as three days of talks on cooperation between the "friendly armies" of Yugoslavia and Romania.

Ionita's visit follows on the heels of top-level party talks in Romania last weekend between Romanian party boss Ceausescu and the number-two man in the Yugoslav party, Stane Dolanc. Dolanc and Ceausescu probably discussed a wide range of issues of mutual concern, including:

- The state of US-Soviet relations and their implications for stability in the Balkans.
- Rumors about Brezhnev's health and Soviet leadership changes.
- Preparations for the European Communist Conference.
- The unstable situation in the Middle East.

Ionita is spending his time on the Adriatic coast, not far from Tito's current residence at a Montenegrin spa. The Romanian Defense Minister could meet the Yugoslav President before his departure on Saturday.

There is no firm explanation of the upsurge in Yugoslav-Romanian contacts, but we may soon have more information. Some Romanian chiefs of mission in the West have been recalled to Bucharest for consultations next week. When they return to their posts, their reading of the situation could filter out.

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