


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## Middle East - Africa - South Asia

# STAFF NOTES

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**MIDDLE EAST -- AFRICA -- SOUTH ASIA**

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Angola

*FNLA-UNITA Strain*

The alliance formed last summer and fall by Jonas Savimbi of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola and Holden Roberto of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola is badly strained by new fighting between forces of the two allies.

Even if the fighting stops and present strains ease, long-standing differences between the two groups will preclude the transformation of their marriage of convenience into something lasting.

Early last week, the National Front's senior representative in Huambo, the capital of their nominal joint government, reported that heavy fighting had broken out in that city between troops of the Front and the Union.


The Front forces in the Huambo fighting are loyal to Daniel Chipenda. Chipenda was a central committee member of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, but left it about a year ago after losing a bid to oust its leader, Agostinho Neto. Chipenda and a few hundred of his troops subsequently joined the National Front. How many of them took part in the clashes with the National Union is not known.

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✓ Chipenda's Role

Friction between the National Union and the Chipenda forces predates the current fighting.

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[redacted] the Chipenda forces are undisciplined, antagonistic toward the local population, and refuse to submit to command by National Union authorities, who were put in charge of military operations in central Angola under terms of an agreement between the two groups.

Chipenda is distrusted by both Roberto and Savimbi. Chipenda has refused to accept Roberto's authority and operates as a free agent, apparently obtaining much of his support directly from South Africa. He has never hidden his own political ambitions, and his efforts to oust Neto from the Popular Movement have made Roberto cautious.

Roberto apparently prefers to keep Chipenda in central Angola, where he cannot challenge Roberto, but where he can undermine Savimbi.

Chipenda, like Savimbi, is an Ovimbundu, the dominant tribe in central and southern Angola. Savimbi and other National Union leaders view

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Chiponda as a formidable political rival because of his family ties, his fame as a soccer player in Portugal prior to the insurgency, and his reputation as a military leader.

### Savimbi's Role

The National Union's alliance with the National Front nominally re-established an earlier association between Savimbi and Roberto. In the early 1960s, Savimbi was in charge of foreign relations for Roberto's group. In 1964, however, he led an Ovimbundu mutiny against Roberto when the latter refused to fight the Portuguese in southern and central Angola, fearing it would erode his own tribe's domination of the fight against the Portuguese.

Two years later, Savimbi established the National Union and began operations against the Portuguese in central Angola. Roberto apparently still believes that northern Angola, where his tribe is dominant, should be the main front against the Popular Movement.

Savimbi, however, regards the National Front as weaker militarily than his own group. The Front has not been able to maintain pressure against the Popular Movement from the north, even with Zairian support.

The National Union, with important help from South Africa, is bearing the burden of the military effort, and unless the National Front can resume the offensive, Savimbi may eventually conclude that the Front is irrelevant and end the alliance.

Savimbi has said on numerous occasions that he does not rule out political accommodation with the Popular Movement, a position that can only serve in the long run to increase Roberto's uneasiness. Roberto believes the struggle against the Popular Movement must be settled by military, not political, means.

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Savimbi undoubtedly will hold Roberto personally responsible for the disruption caused by Chipenda's forces in central Angola. So far, the feuding between the two sides does not appear to have extended to the National Union campaigns in eastern Angola, perhaps because of the South Africans.

Should the South Africans withdraw, however, a key element in the military effort against the Popular Movement will be lost, and Savimbi's control over operations in central Angola will be seriously affected. Then there would be even greater division between him and Roberto.

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## Ethiopia

### *Government Tries to Revive Lagging Rural Program*

The ruling military council has made clear that it is determined to continue its trouble-beset campaign to indoctrinate the rural population in the regime's socialist goals through the use of students.

In a proclamation on the year-old program issued in mid-December, the government publicly admitted errors and mismanagement. In an attempt to rally student support, the government promised to release students now imprisoned, exempted from punishment others who failed to complete their service, and made certain other concessions.

A government spokesman has admitted that 25 percent of the 57,000 young men and women who were sent to the countryside had deserted. An official connected with the rural campaign has privately put the desertion rate at 50 percent. The US embassy in Addis Ababa reports that the students still enrolled in the program have congregated in the larger towns because of peasant opposition to them.


The initial enthusiasm that at least some of the students had for the program has been eroded by the government's inability to provide them with direction and logistical support--and sometimes even food. In some areas, the government has been unable to protect the campaigners from landlords and other foes of the program.

Although the government is probably sincere in its expressed determination to continue the program, prospects are not bright that it will be any more successful in the future. It is not likely that the council will assign the necessary funds to the campaign, nor that administrative and logistical

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inadequacies will be overcome. Some students have been sufficiently cowed by fear of reprisals to return to their rural posts, but student enthusiasm will almost certainly remain low. The precarious security situation in many parts of the country is a further obstacle. 25X1



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