


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STAFF NOTES:

Middle East Africa South Asia

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MIDDLE EAST – AFRICA – SOUTH ASIA

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Pakistan-Afghanistan

Possible New Round of Accusations

The Afghan government reportedly plans to surface evidence that the government of neighboring Pakistan was involved in disorders in Afghanistan last month. Such a development could lead to a new round of hostile rhetoric between the two countries.

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According to the Afghans, interrogations of persons arrested during the disorders have yielded evidence that some of the participants were trained in Pakistan.



Islamabad has denied that it was involved in the disorders. Pakistan's ambassador to Afghanistan, in fact, has told the US chargé in Kabul that Prime Minister Bhutto personally expressed chagrin that the trouble had occurred at a time when Islamabad was hoping for some improvement in its relations with Kabul. US officials in Pakistan believe, nevertheless, that there is a possibility Pakistan may have had a hand in the disorders to retaliate for what many Pakistanis believe is Afghanistan's involvement in occasional violent incidents on the Pakistani side of the border.

Many of the rebels are said to be members of an Islamic-oriented movement that is unhappy about leftist influence in Daoud's government. Ethnic and economic grievances may also have played a part in the violence. According to the US embassy in Kabul, the disorders, which occurred in several parts of the country, caused Daoud's government considerable concern but do not appear to have posed a major threat to its survival.

Up to now, Kabul has kept its claims of Pakistani involvement in the disorders in a low key. Daoud, aware that Afghanistan's army is no match for Pakistan's,

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also has continued to keep his long-standing dispute with Islamabad over the status of Pakistan's two western border provinces from deteriorating to the point of open hostilities.

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Daoud may place some limitations on anti-Pakistani publicity accompanying any trials of the captured rebels, but he will not curtail such publicity completely, and it could well touch off a new round of recriminations by both sides.

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~~SECRET~~Rhodesia*Frictions in the African National Council*

Relations between the national executive of the African National Council and the provincial, district, and branch officials in Rhodesia have become seriously strained in recent weeks because of the national executive's failure to consult local constituencies on the selection of the Council's leadership.

Meeting last weekend, representatives from the Council's eight provinces in Rhodesia demanded that Council president Bishop Abel Muzorewa convene a national congress by September to elect a new executive. This amounts to a grass-roots rejection of the executive's decision in July that Bishop Muzorewa continue as president and that plans for holding a congress be indefinitely postponed.

The executive's decision for postponement was prompted by the fear that a breach might occur in the organization if Muzorewa were to be replaced by either of the principal factional leaders, Joshua Nkomo or Ndabaningi Sithole. The provincial officials have argued, however, that the Lusaka Unity Agreement reached in December specified that a congress be held by last March. Because the congress was not held, several provincial officials have charged that the present leadership is illegal and that its unilateral decision to postpone the congress amounts to a "dictatorship" of the national executive.

The protests of the provincial officials will not influence the Council's settlement talks with the Smith regime, to be resumed this month, and will probably not induce the national executive to call a congress. Members of the national executive are unlikely to risk their fragile unity at a congress before a settlement is reached with Smith. Apparently even Joshua Nkomo, who actively pressed for a congress in June when it appeared his People's Union faction would control the proceedings, has dropped the issue.

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Cabinda

Government Announced

The President of the Zairian-based Cabindan liberation front, Luis Franque, yesterday announced the composition of an independent "government" for the Angolan exclave. It includes Franque himself as President and a 12-member cabinet.

Franque had declared Cabinda independent of Angola and Portugal at an August 1 meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Kampala.

The new government is likely to remain in exile in Zaire. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which regards Cabinda as an integral part of Angola, is the dominant military force in the exclave, and Franque's group is in no position to challenge it.

The announcement, however, probably signals the beginning of an extensive publicity campaign for Cabindan independence that will add to tensions in Angola itself.

The front's only support comes from Zairian President Mobutu, who wants to keep the group alive in case the Popular Movement, which he opposes, eventually wins control of Angola. For the time being, however, even Mobutu will refuse officially to recognize the new government.

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