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## STAFF NOTES:

# Middle East Africa South Asia

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#### MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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#### Angola

Transitional Government Installed

The black-dominated transitional government that will prepare Angola for independence next November was formally installed in Luanda on January 31. The government is based on an uneasy truce among Angola's three rival nationalist groups that is sure to be subjected to severe strains in the coming months.

The new Angolan regime is headed by a Portuguese high commissioner and a presidential council composed of one member from each of the groups with the chairmanship rotated monthly. The high commissioner represents Portugal's interests, but has no vote on domestic issues. A cabinet of 12 ministers, with portfolios equally divided among the Portuguese and the liberation groups, was also installed.

The leaders of the three groups have appointed deputies to the presidential council in order to remain free to engage in political activities. They did not appear in Luanda for the installation procedure.

Signs of strain have already emerged between two of the groups. On January 25, an official of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola destroyed some equipment at the government-run radio station in protest against censorship of Front communiques by staff members sympathetic to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. The next day, Front members kidnapped the station's deputy director and beat him badly before releasing him. Both the Front and the Popular Movement subsequently issued communiques accusing the other of planning civil war.

After a decade of intense rivalry, sometimes marked by armed clashes, cooperation among the groups will not come easily, if at all. Indeed, antipathy

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between the National Front and the Popular Movement, based on the personal ambitions and conflicting ideologies of their respective leaders, is so strong that open warfare between them is a distinct possibility. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, the smallest of the three groups, has emerged thus far as an effective intermediary between the two organizations, but its ability to continue in that role is likely to be weakened by its own political preoccupations during the transitional period. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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#### Kenya

Pragmatic Foreign Policy

Nairobi's prompt approval of Washington's proposal that the <u>USS Enterprise</u> visit Mombasa early next month demonstrates the Kenyatta government's continued adherence to a pragmatic approach to foreign affairs despite its growing sensitivity to criticism from more militant African regimes. The government's assent to the visit—with the request that it be given minimum publicity—reflects the Kenyans' hope of securing US equipment and training for Kenya's armed forces.

The Kenyans know that the visit of the Enterprise is likely to draw extensive criticism from Tanzania and some other African states, as have earlier appearances of US Navy ships in Mombasa. Tanzania has berated Kenya on ideological grounds, blasting it for alleged close association with the US and the UK.

Over the last few months, Kenya has attempted to associate itself more closely with other African countries on broad issues. For example, Kenya has gone on record in favor of making the Indian Ocean a "zone of peace" and opposing a great power military presence there—themes embraced ardently by Dar es Salaam. Since taking office last October, Foreign Minister Munyua Waiyaki has stepped up contacts with African ambassadors in Nairobi, and made a trip to several southern African countries. He also arranged for Kenya to host the meeting of Angolan nationalists held in Nairobi in early January; Kenya's previous involvement in southern African matters had been minimal.

When the question of the Enterprise visit arose, however, the government's higher interest in obtaining US military items came to the fore. Nairobi has been discussing the purchase of F-5E fighter aircraft, A-4M attack bombers, helicopters, and training for its officers in US military schools.

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Until recently Kenya accorded its military establishment relatively low priority in allocating government resources. As a result, its 9,000-man armed force is much smaller and less well equipped than its counterpart in Somalia or Uganda--Kenya's potential adversaries. President Kenyatta's new-found concern over defense has been spurred by the deterioration of Kenya's relations with Ethiopia and the consequent weakening of its military alliance with Addis Ababa. The Kenyans have regarded the alliance as an important constraint on possible adventurism by Somalia, which covets part of Kenya's territory. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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