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1. CHINA-VIETNAM: PEKING'S SENSILLVITY OVER THE SECURITY OF ITS SOUTHEAST FLANK, AS WELL AS ITS INCREASING IMPATIENCE WITH HANOI, WAS VIVIDLY ILLUSTRATED LATE LAST MONTH IN A SHARP PEOPLE'S DAILY ATTACK ON "FOREIGN AGGRES-SORS" IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA-4

THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER TWO MAJOR IS-LAND GROUPINGS IN THE AREA--THE SPRATLYS AND THE PARACELS--HAS BEEN A MAJOR ANNOYANCE IN SINO-VIET-NAMESE RELATIONS SINCE THE CHINESE TOOK THE PARACELS FROM THE FORMER SALGON GOVERNMENT IN JANUARY 1974. BOTH PEKING AND HANOI HAVE PERIODICALLY REITERATED THEIR CLAIMS TO BOTH ISLAND GROUPS, BUT WEITHER SIDE HAD OPENLY PUSHED THE ISSUE IN PUBLIC. THE CHINESE EVEN DECLINED TO RESPOND TO HANOI'S ANNOUNCEMENT -LAST MAY THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES HAD CAPTURED SEVERAL OF THE SPRATLYS--500 MILES SOUTH OF THE -PARACELS--FROM THE FORMER SOUTH VIETNAM GOVERNMENT.Y DATE: ORIG:

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IN SEPTEMBER, THE CHINESE TURNED UP THE HEAT

ON THE ISLANDS ISSUE JUST PRIOR TO NORTH VIETNAM

PARTY CHIEF LE DUAN'S VISIT TO PEKING; THEY PUBLICLY

REITERATED THEIR CLAIMS TO THE DISPUTED ISLANDS AND

RECALLED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MONTHS THE 1974 TAKE—

OVER IN THE PARACELS.4

LAST MONTH'S BROADSIDE WAS BY FAR THE TOUGHEST CHINESE STATEMENT ON THE DISPUTE SINCE EARLY 1974. IT AMOUNTS TO THE FIRST DIRECT CHALLENGE OF HANOI'S CLAIMS TO THE ISLANDS AND EMPHASIZES THE SERIOUS—NESS OF PEKING'S DETERMINATION TO REGAIN ALL CONTESTED ISLANDS. THE ARTICLE ASSERTED THAT CHINA'S CLAIMS DATE BACK 2.000 YEARSAND CITED ARCHEOLOGICAL AND OTHER EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CLAIMS. CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL THE ISLANDS WAS DESCRIBED AS BOTH "SACRED" AND "INALIENABLE." PEKING'S DEMAND THAT ALL THE DISPUTED ISLANDS MUST BE RETURNED TO CHINESE CONTROL WAS JUXTAPOSED WITH ITS LONG-HELD

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PLEDGE TO "LIBERATE" TAIWAN. A CLEAR INDICATION NOT ONLY OF THE IMPORTANCE THE CHINESE ATTACH TO THEIR CLAIMS. BUT ALSO A SIGN THAT PEKING MAY BE PREPARED TO WAIT SOME TIME FOR A FINAL SOLUTION OF THE ISSUE --AS IT IS IN THE CASE OF TAIWAN. Y

IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO AVOID ANY CONFUSION

ABOUT THE PRIMARY TARGET OF PEKING'S BLAST, THE AR—

TICLE EMPLOYED LANGUAGE THAT PLAYED DOWN THE SIGNIFI—

CANCE OF CLAIMS OTHER PARTIES HAVE TO THE SPRATLY

ISLANDS. THE NATIONALIST CHINESE CLAIM ALLOF THE

ISLANDS AND MAINTAIN A MILITARY GARRISON ONONE, BUT

THE PEOPLE'S DAILY REFERENCE TO THE FACT THAT MANY

OF THE ISLANDS ARE STILL NOT "IN CHINESE HANDS"

RULES OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT PEKING WAS REFERRING

TO THE NATIONALIST PRESENCE THERE. PEKING IS DOUBT—

LESSLY CONFIDENT THAT NATIONALIST CLAIMS WILL BE RE—

#SOLVED WHEN THE MUCH LARGER TAIWAN QUESTION IS SETTLED.Y

THE PHILIPPINES ALSO CLAIM SOME OF THE ISLANDS

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IN THE SPRATLY GROUP. PEKING HAS NEVER MADE AN ISSUE OF MANILA'S CLAIMS, HOWEVER, AND, WHEN DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE ESTABLISHED
EARLIER THIS YEAR, BOTH SIDES AGREED TO SETTLE ALL
BILATERAL DISPUTES WITHOUT RESORT TO FORCE. PEKING
SEEMS PREPARED TO PUT ASIDE THE DISAGREEMENT WITH MANILA-Y

ALTHOUGH PEOPLE'S DAILY LEFT NO DOUBT THAT HANOI

WAS THE MAJOR OBJECT OF ITS WRATH, ITS ATTACK ON HANOI

WAS IMPLICIT: REFERENCES TO MOSCOW IN THE BLAST WERE

EXPLICIT AND VITUPERATIVE, LEAVING NO QUESTION THAT

PEKING BELIEVES THE VIETNAMESE ARE ABETTING THE SO
VIETS IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXPAND RUSSIAN INFLUENCE INTO

THE REGION. SIGNIFICANTLY THE ARTICLE WAS PUBLISHED

ONLY TWO DAYS AFTER LE DUAN RETURNED TO HANOI FROM

MOSCOW—WHERE HE RECEIVED A MUCH WARMER WELCOME THAN

HE HAD IN PEKING, GAINED A SOVIET AGREEMENT TO PRO
VIDE SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC AID TTO NORTH VIETNAM, AND

SECONDED MOSCOW'S VIEWS ON DETENTE AND ON INTERNA—

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TIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. PEKING INSISTS THAT BOTH

DETENTE AND THE RECENT HELSINKI SECURITY PACT ARE

SOVIET "TRICKS" DESIGNED TO FACILITATE WHAT THE CHI
NESE SEE AS SOVIET "EXPANSIONISM." LE DUAN'S EN
DORSEMENT OF DETENTE PUTS HANOI SQUARELY IN MOSCOW'S

CAMP ON AN ISSUE OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO THE CHINESE

AND WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY READ IN PEKING AS A DELIBERATE

PROVOCATION.Y

IN FACT, THE TREATMENT LE DUAN RECEIVED IN PEKING
LAST SEPTEMBER CONTRASTS SHARPLY WITH THE ROUSING
WELCOME HE GOT IN MOSCOW. THERE WAS NO JOINT COMMUNIQUE TO MARK HIS CHINA VISIT, AND THE HANOI LEADER
FAILED TO TENDER THE NORMAL FAREWELL BANQUET PRIOR
TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR HOME.Y

THE CHINESE CLEARLY SEE A CORRELATION BETWEEN

HANOI'S INCREASING TILT TOWARD MOSCOW AND THE LONG—

RANGE POSSIBILITIES FOR SOVIET "MEDDLING" THROUGH

VIETNAM IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AS WELL AS SOUTHEAST

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ASIA GENERALLY. IT ALSO IS APPARENT THAT THE CHINESE CONSIDER CONTROL OF ISLANDS IN THE AREA VITALLY IM-PORTANT TO THEIR SECURITY. THE PEOPLE'S DAILY AR-TICLE, IN FACT, REFERS TO THE REGION AS "AN IMPORTANT GATE OF CHINA" AND TO THE ISLANDS AS LOCATED ON MAJOR SHIPPING LANES.

FOR THEIR PART, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN SHARPLY CRITICAL OF THE CHINESE SEIZURE OF THE PARACELS. SINCE EARLY 1974, MOSCOW HAS ROUTINELY ATTACKED CHINA'S CLAIMS TO ALL OF THE ISLANDS AND ITS USE OF FORCE IN THE PARACELS. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, HAVE STOPPED SHORT OF PROVIDING OUTRIGHT SUPPORT TO HANOI'S COUNTERCLAIMS. SOVIET MAPS STILL SHOW THE ISLANDS AS BELONGING TO CHINA. ALTHOUGH RECENT PRESS COMMENTS "HAVE IMPLIED THAT THEY WERE VIETNAMESE. PEKING IGNORED THESE ATTACKS UNTIL LAST WEEK. THEN, THE PEOPLE'S DAILY ARTICLE ASSERTED THAT THE SOVIET DUNION, THROWING ASIDE EARLIER SUPPORT FOR CHINA'S

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CLAIMS MOUNTED A "VENOMOUS" ASSAULT ON PEKING
AFTER THE PARACELS INCIDENT. Y

PEKING'S LONG-TERM CONCERNS ALMOST CERTAINLY HINGE ON ITS VIEW OF SOVIET INTENTIONS AND ACTIVITIES. CHINESE LEADERS ALSO SEEM PERSUADED, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE SHORTER RUN HANOI COULD UNILATERALLY DISRUPT THEIR HOPES OF DEVELOPING A BLOC OF FRIENDLY COUNTRIES ALONG CHINA'S SOUTHERN BORDER. THE CHINESE AND VIET-NAMESE SHARE VERY FEW COMMON PERCEPTIONS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. THEY ARE CLEARLY ON OPPOSITE SIDES IN THE CUR-RENT DISPUTE BETWEEN THAILAND AND LAGS. HANOI HAS VIGOROUSLY DEFENDED THE LAO SIDE AND HAS LAUNCHED FREQUENT ATTACKS ON THAI "AGGRESSION." PEKING, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS REMAINED RELATIVELY QUIET ON THE "SUBJECT" PRIVATELY LOBBYING FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE DISAGREEMENT AND ENCOURAGING IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN BY FAR THE LARGEST CONTRIBUTORS TO CAMBODIAN RECONSTRUC-

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TION SINCE THE COMMUNISTS TOOK OVER THERE LAST SPRING.

PEKING HAS ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WAS ON CAMBODIA'S

SIDE IN HE BORDER DISPUTEWITH NORTH VIETNAM AND AP
PARENTLY ENCOURAGED THE CAMBODIAN COMMUNISTS TO OPEN

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THAILAND. ESECRETRY

2. CHINA: TWO TOP LEADERS HAVE RECENTLY REAPPEARED AFTER SIGNIFICANT ABSENCES. CHIANG CHING WAS PRESENT ON DECEMBER 1 AT THE MEETING AND PICTURE TAKING SESSION BETWEEN PRESIDENT FORD AND CHINESE HEAD OF STATE CHU

TE. HER LAST APPEARANCE WAS ON OCTOBER 15 AT THE CLOSING SESSION OF THE NATIONAL TACHAI CONFERENCE IN PEKING. CHIANG'S POLITICAL POWER HAS BEEN SHARPLY DIMINISHED THIS YEAR, AND HER APPEARANCES NOW SEEM TO BE UNDER THE CONTROL OF REGIME MODERATES AND DESIGNED TO PROMOTE AN IMAGE OF UNITY. IN THE PAST, MADAME MAO TENDED TO PUNCTUATE PERIODS OF NONAPPEARANCES

WITH PUBLIC ACTIVITIES THAT WERE DESIGNED TO RAISE

LRATHER THAN LOWER POLITICAL TENSIONS. HER ASSOCIATION

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WITH THE TACHAI MEETING WAS OBVIOUSLY MEANT TO PRESENT

A UNITED FRONT FOR THIS MAJOR UNDERTAKING. HER

PRESENCE AT THE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FORD IS DE
SIGNED TO CONVEY THE SAME MESSAGE—THE SUPPORT OF THE

POLITICAL LEFT FOR SINO-US RELATIONS.4

THE OTHER REAPPEARANCE WAS DEFENSE MINISTER YEH
CHIEN-YING, WHO HEADED THE CHINESE REPRESENTATION AT
THE PEKING CELEBRATIONS OF ALBANIAN NATIONAL DAY ON
NOVEMBER 29. YEH HAD NOT APPEARED SINCE OCTOBER 25
AND IS WIDELY RUMORED TO BE ILL. SURPRISINGLY, YEH
DID NOT SEE PRESIDENT FORD EVEN THOUGH HE PLAYED AN
IMPORTANT ROLE IN PAST MEETINGS WITH RANKING US OFFICIALS. YEH'S PLACE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY
ANOTHER CHOULEN-LAI STALWART, VICE PREMIER AND LEADING ECONOMIC SPECIALIST LI HSIEN-NIEN. CONFIDENTIALD

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 170-75.4

PARAGUAY: PARAGUAY, IN ITS BUFFER POSITION BETWEEN THE LARGE COUNTRIES OF ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL, HAS IN THE PAST GENERALLY DISPENSED SEPARATE BUT MORE OR LESS EQUAL TREATHENT. IT HAS NOT NECESSARILY BEEN TRYING TO PLAY ONE BIG POWER OFF AGAINST THE OTHER BUT HAS BEEN TRYING TO GARNER THE ADVANTAGES PROTECTION EACH RELATIONSHIP WITHOUT ALLOWING EITHER LARGER COUNTRY TO DOMINATE PARAGUAYAN AFFAIRS. TRADITIONALLY, THE PARAGUAYANS HAVE IDENTIFIED CULTURALLY WITH THE ARGENTINES. THE GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, VIEWS THE GOVERNMENT OF ISABEL PERON AS UNSTABLE, IS CONCERNED ABOUT A POSSIBLE TURN TOWARD THE LEFT BY ARGENTINA, AND IS NOW INDICATING A MARKED TILT IN THE DIRECTION OF BRAZIL, WHICH PARAGUAY VIEWS AS A FUTURE WORLD POWER BHOSE ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA COULD ASSIST PARAGUAYAN DEVELOPMENT.

THIS TILT WAS PARTICULARLY EVIDENT DURING THE VISIT TO PARAGUAY BY BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT GEISEL IN EARLY DECEMBER. POMP AND CEREMONY ATTENDED THE FIRST VISIT OF A BRAZILIAN CHIEF OF STATE IN 35 YEARS. AND THE GOVERNMENT DECLARED A THREE-DAY HOLIBAY FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES.

3

SECRET NOPORN

PREPARATIONS INCLUDED A CRACKDOWN ON COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS AND SUBVERSIVES. WITH THE NUMBER OF ARRESTS RUMORED AS HIGH AS 400 ALTHOUGH OFFICIAL PECONDS ACKNOWLEDGED ONLY ABOUT ONE-TENTH AS MANY.

PRESIDENT GEIGEL RECEIVED THE HIGHEST DECORATION PARAGUAY BESTOUS ON A FOREIGN OFFICIAL. AND HE RETURNED A PRICELESS GOLD BOOK CAPTURED BY THE BRAZILIANS IN THE WAR OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE SOME 100 YEARS AGO. MORE CONCRETE ACCOMPLISHMENTS INCLUDED THE BETTLEMENT OF A BOUNDARY DISPUTE. THE GRANTING TO PARAGUAY OF \$9.5 BILLION IN CREDITS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE ITAIPU HYDROELECTRIC PROJECY. AND THE SIGNING OF A NEW TREATY OF PRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION CALLING FOR EXTENSIVE 25X6 BRAZILIAN INVOLVEMENT IN PARAGUAYAN DEVELOPMENT. Y

PROJECT. BRAZIL WANTS TO BRAW PARAGUAY CLOSER INTO ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE BUT IS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT REACTION FROM ARGENTINA AND FROM BOLIVIA AS WELL. ALTHOUGH BOTH COUNTRIES HOPE TO AVOID NEEDLESS

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OFFENSE WITH THEIR NEW TREATY. THEY ARE NOT AT ALL SURE THIS IS
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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF 190-75.4

L. LEBANON: RADICAL MUSLIM FORCES HAVE GAINED CONTROL OF SOME PREVIOUSLY CONTESTED GROUND DURING THE REAVY FIGHTING IN BEIRUT THIS WEEK Y

THE CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM COMBATANTS AND THE LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES SEEK CONTROL OF KEY HOTELS TO GAIN A COMMANDING FIELD OF FIRE OVER DISPUTED TERRITORY IN ADJOINING MEIGHBORHOODS. THE LEFTISTS, WHO OCCUPIED THE ST. GEORGES HOTEL ON MONDAY, LATE ON TUESDAY WERE VYING WITH ARMY TROOPS FOR CONTROL OF THE PHOENICIA HOTEL - Y

RIGHT-WING PHALANGIST MILITIAMEN EVACUATED THE PHOENICIA DURING A BRIEF LOCAL TRUCE. THEY SUFFERED HEAVIER CASUALTIES THAN THEIR MUSLIM OPPONENTS, WHO APPARENTLY HAD MOVED IN HEAVIER WEAPONS, INCLUDING ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS SUPPLIED BY THE FEDAYEEN. THE PHALANGISTS, WHO CLAIMED LAST NIGHT TO HAVE MADE GAINS IN OTHER AREAS, ARE HOLDING OUT ALONG A FRONT THAT EXTENDS FROM THE HOTEL DISTRICT TO BEIRUT PORT. THEY USE THIS CORRIDOR TO SUPPLY THEIR FORCES IN THE HOTEL DISTRICT FROM MORE SECURE PHALANGIST DATE: ORIG:

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STRONCHOLDS SOUTH OF THE PORT.Y

THE LEFTIST FORCES ARE LED BY IBRAHIM QULAYLAT, A RADICAL
LEBANESE MUSLIM BACKED BY LIBYA AND SOME PALESTINIAN FEDAYEEN
GROUPS. HIS INDEPENDENT NASSERITE MOVEMENT HAS SOME 400-500
MILITIAMEN AND CAN DRAW ON SUBSTANTIAL BACKING FROM REJECTIONIST
PALESTINIANS, RADICALS WITHIN THE MAJOR FEDAYEEN GROUPS, AND
LEBANESE COMMUNISTS. QULAYLAT REPEATED CHARGES ON TUESDAY THAT
LEBANESE ARMY TROOPS WERE FIRING ON MUSLIM FORCES, AND SAID HIS
FOLLOWERS WOULD RETALIATE. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS
FROM BEIRUT, SEVERAL ARMY VEHICLES WERE FIRED ON BY MUSLIM
AND PALESTINIAN FORCES, AND AT LEAST TWO ARMY COMMANDOS WERE
KILLED.Y

LEBANON'S POLITICAL LEADERS SO FAR HAVE COME UP WITH NO

STRATEGY FOR ENDING THE RENEWED FIGHTING. THE BEST HOPE IS THAT

THE LEFTISTS—WHO ARE CLAIMING VICTORY—WILL CONVINCE THEMSELVES

THAT THEIR LIMITED MILITARY GAINS CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT REVENGE

FOR THE MURDER OF NUMEROUS MUSLIMS BY PHALANGESTS LAST WEEKEND.

THE ID AL-ADHA MUSLIM HOLIDAY THAT STARTS LATE THIS WEEK MAY

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EUROPEAN BRIEF 190-75-4

1. USSR: GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEVIS SPEECH AT THE POLISH
PARTY CONGRESS ON TUESDAY WAS SHORT ON SUBSTANCE. BUT REPEATED
RECENT CRITICISM OF THE WEST.Y

AS WAS APPROPRIATE TO THE OCCASION, BREZHNEV DEVOTED OVER
HALF OF THE SPEECH TO TALKING ABOUT THE STEPS TAKEN TOWARD
CLOSER ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN POLAND AND
THE USSR, AND, MORE GENERALLY, ABOUT THE BENEFICENCE OF THE
COMMUNIST COMMUNITY. HE REFERRED TO THE NORMS OF "SOCIALIST
INTERNATIONALISM"—WORDS THAT IN YUGOSLAVIA AND ROMANIA TRANSLATE
TO SOVIET HEGEMONISM—BUT HE QUICKLY FOLLOWED WITH A SENTENCE
ALLUDING TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATES THAT
MAKE UP THE COMMUNIST COMMUNITY.Y

IN COMMENTING ON RELATIONS WITH THE WEST, CSCE WAS CLEARLY
ON BREZHNEV'S MIND, PERHAPS BECAUSE THE POLISH PARTY CONGRESS
OFFERED AN APPROPRIATE VENUE FOR REPEATING A FEW "TRUTHS" ABOUT
THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT. HIS DEMAND THAT NO SINGLE ASPECT OF
THE AGREEMENT BE EMPHASIZED OVER ANOTHER AND HIS CRITICISM OF

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THE WEST FOR ITS ALLEGED FAILURE TO DISSEMINATE THE TEXT SUFFICIENTLY HAVE BEEN SAID BEFORE; SO, TOO, HAS HIS REFERENCE TO "IDEOLOGICAL PENETRATION" BY THE WEST. HE MADE EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO THE FOLLOW-UP CSCE SESSION IN BELGRADE IN 1977 AND SPOKE FAVORABLY OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ORGANIZING EUROPEAN CONGRESSES TO ADDRESS SUCH PROBLEMS AS THE ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS. THIS CLEARLY WAS MEANT AS A TRIAL BALLOON, AND MORE WILL PROBABLY BE HEARD FROM MOSCOW ON THIS MATTER-Y

BREZHNEV'S SPEECH, AS IS OFTEN THE CASE, IS AS INTERESTING FOR WHAT HE CHOSE NOT TO SAY AS FOR WHAT HE ACTUALLY SAID. THERE WAS NO REJOINDER, IMPLICIT OR EXPLICIT, TO CRITICISM REGARDING SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN ANGOLA. HE MADE NO MENTION OF A COMMUNIST DUTY TO SUPPORT LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, NOR DID HE REFER TO THE INEVITABILITY OF CONTINUED IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE. HE DID REPEAT THE FAMILIAR FORMULATION ON MOVING AHEAD WITH DETENTE DESPITE THE EFFORTS OF WESTERN CRITICS, BUT HE DID NOT SAY ANYTHING EXPLICIT ABOUT SALT.Y

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BREZHNEV'S REMARKS ATTACKING "SOME INFLUENTIAL CIRCLES IN
THE WEST" FOR THEIR CAMPAIGN OF "DISINFORMATION AND SLANDER"
AGAINST THECOMMUNIST CAMP ARE AMONG HIS MOST INTEMPERATE IN
THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS. {CONFIDENTIAL}

2. YUGOZLAVIA-UZZR: THE YUGOZLAV MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND OF FOREIGN TRADE ARE IN MOSCOW TO SIGN A LONG-RANGE
ECONOMIC AGREEMENT AND TO MAKE A FIRST-HAND ASSESSMENT OF PRE-CONGRESS POLITICS IN THE SOVIET CAPITAL.

THE CONCLUSION OF A FIVE YEAR TRADE AGREEMENT FOR 1976-80 WILL PROBABLY BE THE PUBLIC HIGHLIGHT OF THE VISIT.4

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ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, FOREIGN MINISTER MINIC'S

TALKS--POSSIBLY THE FINAL ONES AT THIS LEVEL BEFORE

THE CPSU CONGRESS MEETS IN FEBRUARY--PROMISE TO BE

LESS REWARDING. BELGRADE CLEARLY IS NOT SATISFIED

WITH RECENT SOVIET DENIALS OF INVOLVEMENT WITH

COMINFORMIST SUBVERSIVES. THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE

ALSO DEADLOCKED OVER CONFLICTING GOALS IN THE LONG
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POSTPONED MEETING OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES.4

BELGRADE AND MOSCOW BOTH SUPPORT THE MPLA IN ANGOLA, BUT THEIR STANDS ON THE LAST SINAI ACCORDS ARE IN CONFLICT AND COULD CAUSE TROUBLE. SIMILARLY, MINIC COULD FACE SOVIET DISPLEASURE OVER THE YUGO-SLAV PREMIER'S PRECEDENT-SETTING VISIT TO CHINA THIS FALL.Y

YUGOSLAV MEDIA ARE PLAYING SEVERAL TUNES ON

THE MINIC VISIT. FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE WEST, THE

PRESS IS INSISTING THAT RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS

ARE MORE OR LESS NORMAL—AND THUS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE

TO THIRD PARTY MANIPULATION. A COMMENTARY BROAD—

CAST TO MOSCOW LAST WEEK, HOWEVER, REASSERTED BEL—

GRADE'S NONALIGNED PRINCIPLES, INCLUDING ITS CON—

† TINUING STRUGGLE AGAINST "HEGEMONY" BY EITHER BLOC. {CONFI-

3. BULGARIA-YUGOSLAVIA: SOFIA HAS REPORTEDLY MADE A
FORMAL PROTEST TO BELGRADE ABOUT YUGOSLAV PROPAGANDA CLAIMS THAT
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BULGARIA HAS	USED TE	ERRORISM	ANS OL	PRESS	ZTI	MACEDONI	CANS	- 2			

BULGARIA HAS USED TERRORISM TO SUPPRESS ITS MACEDONI
DESPITE THE PROTEST, YUGOSLAV MEDIA ARE AGAIN STEPPING UP THE PACE OF ANTI-BULGARIAN COMMENTARY.Y

ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. THE YUGOSLAV AMBAS—
SADOR IN SOFIA WAS SUMMONED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
LAST MONTH TO RECEIVE THE PROTEST. THE BULGARIANS
REPORTEDLY DECRIED ALLEGATIONS THAT SOFIA HAD AR—
RESTED NUMEROUS MACEDONIANS AND HAD DEPORTED THEM
TO CAMPS IN THE NORTH. NEITHER SIDE HAS PUBLICLY
REFERRED TO THE PROTEST.Y

THE YUGOSLAV MEDIA HAVE NEVERTHELESS CONTINUED
TO REPEAT AND EVEN EMBELLISH THESE SAME ALLEGATIONS
IN THE WAKE OF THE BULGARIAN CENSUS LAST WEEK. THE
LATEST COMMENTARY FLATLY STATES THERE WAS NO CATE—
GORY FOR MACEDONIANS, AND NOTES THE SURVEY ONLY
SERVED SOFIA'S POLITICAL PURPOSES BY PROCLAIMING
THAT MACEDONIANS ARE ETHNIC BULGARIANS.Y
THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LONG-STANDING

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DISPUTE SHATTER THE CLIMATE OF UNEASY CALM THAT

LASTED BARELY TWO WEEKS AFTER BULGARIAN FOREIGN

MINISTER MLADENOV VISITED BELGRADE LAST MONTH.

MLADENOV AND HIS YUGOSLAV COUNTERPART, MILOS MINIC,

REPORTEDLY DISCUSSED THE ISSUE OF BELGRADE'S IN
FLAMMATORY POLEMICS, BUT WERE UNABLE TO AGREE ON

MUZZLING BELGRADE'S OUTSPOKEN NATIONALISTS. {CON
FIDENTIAL}

THE EFFORT SEEMS DESIGNED TO REINFORCE THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE REGIME BY ITS OWN POPULATION AND TO
PROMOTE ITS IMAGE IN THE DIPLOMATIC ARENA. THE NEW
STRESS ON LINKS WITH THE PAST MAY ALSO BE INTENDED
TO COUNTER PRAGUE'S WELL-DESERVED REPUTATION FOR SUBESERVIENCE TO MOSCOW.Y

ACCORDING TO A FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL - PARTY

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CHIEF AND PRESIDENT HUSAK HAS THE HISTORICAL LINKAGE IN MIND WHEN HE RECENTLY INVITED FOREIGN AMBASSADORS AND CHIEFS OF MISSION TO THE FIRST PRESIDENTIAL HUNT IN ALMOST 30 YEARS. THIS TRADITIONAL EVENT OF THE OLD REPUBLIC WAS ABANDONED AFTER THE COMMUNISTS TOOK POWER IN 1948-Y

FOREIGN MINISTER CHNOUPEK IS ALSO PROMOTING HIS-TORICAL CONTINUITY. IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE FEDERAL ASSEBMLY LAST MONTH, HE HARKED BACK TO THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC IN 1918 AND SEVERAL TIMES REFERRED TO CZECHOSLOVAK DIPLOMATIC "FIRSTS." HE ALSO DREDGED UP THE APPEAL OF MEDIEVAL BOHEMIAN KING GEORGE OF PODE-BRODY FOR AN INTEGRATED EUROPE.Y

IN ADDITION, PREMIER STROUGAL, DURING HIS CUR-RENT TRIP TO YUGOSLAVIA, LAUDED THE SUPPORT OF THE BYUGOSLAVS FOR THEIR CZECHOSLOVAK BRETHREN DURING THE LAGAR MUNICH DIKTAT PERIOD.Y

TO AVOID POSSIBLE CHARGES THAT THIS KIND OF

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STRESS ON PRE-COMMUNIST CZECHOSLOVAK HISTORY ENCOURAGES NATIONALISM. THE HUSAK REGIME HAS BEEN CAREFUL
TO PAY PROPER OBEISANCE TO THE SOVIETS AND TO CONTINUE TO BE ONE OF THE MOST VOCIFEROUS PROPONENTS OF
INTERNATIONALISM AND BLOC INTEGRATION. {CONFIDENTIAL}

5. USSR: DIPLOMATIC SOURCES HAVE CONFIRMED EARLIER REPORTS THAT FORMER DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER NIKOLAY
PEGOV. 70. HAS BEEN APPOINTED CHIEF OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE DEPARTMENT FOR CADRES ABROAD. IN ADDITION. IZVESTIA ON DECEMBER 4 IDENTIFIED PEGOV AS
"AMBASSADOR." NOT AS DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE CADRES ABROAD DEPARTMENT IS RARELY REFERRED TO BY NAME IN THE SOVIET PRESS.Y

THE DEPARTMENT OVERSEES--FOR THE PARTY--THE

"ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL SERV
"ING ABROAD. PEGOV AS A DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, WAS

RESPONSIBLE FOR PERSONNEL MATTERS IN THE MFA.4

LEADERS OF THE DEPARTMENT IN THE PAST HAVE. LIKE

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PEGOV, HAD DIPLOMATIC EXPERIENCE. PETR ABRASIMOV,

63, WHO APPARENTLY HEADED THE DEPARTMENT FOR A TIME

BETWEEN 1973 AND MARCH OF THIS YEAR, SERVED PREVIOUSLY

AS AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE, EAST GERMANY, AND POLAND, AND

IS CURRENTLY REASSIGNED TO EAST GERMANY. HIS PREDECES—

SOR, THE LATE ALEKSANDR PANYUSHKIN, HAD BEEN AMBAS—

SADOR TO THE US AND CHINA, AND PANYUSHKIN'S FIRST

DEPUTY CHIEF, ANDREY LEDOVSKY, HELD DIPLOMATIC ASSIGN—

MENTS IN THE FAR EAST FOR MANY YEARS. {CONFIDENTIAL}}

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