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Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010073-9

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BRIEF
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1. LEBANON: THE FIGHTING IN LEBANON DURING 1975 HAS BEEN THE MOST EXTENDED AND DESTRUCTIVE IN RECENT HISTORY. IT HAS LEFT PALESTINIAN FEDAYEEN AND LEBANESE MUSLIMS IN CONTROL OF THREE OF THE COUNTRY'S FOUR MAJOR CITIES--SIDON, TYRE, AND TRIPOLI--AND ~~BEIRUT~~ STRENGTHENED SIGNIFICANTLY THEIR HOLD ON BEIRUT. CONVERSELY, THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE RIGHT-WING CHRISTIAN MILITIAS HAS BEEN DIMINISHED, AND THE AREAS OF THE CAPITAL OVER WHICH LEBANESE GOVERNMENT FORCES HAVE EFFECTIVE CONTROL HAVE BEEN REDUCED ALMOST TO NOTHING.4

THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL DISLOCATIONS PRODUCED BY THE FIGHTING HAVE BEEN SO SEVERE THAT EVEN IF A CEASE-FIRE SHOULD TAKE HOLD, A RETURN TO LEBANON'S SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WILL PROBABLY PROVE IMPOSSIBLE. CHRISTIAN POLITICAL LEADERS MAY WELL BE FORCED TO MAKE POLITICAL CONCESSIONS THAT WILL ENHANCE THE ROLE OF LEBANESE MUSLIMS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMY.4

IF A DURABLE CEASE-FIRE PROVES ELUSIVE, THE FIGHTING COULD TURN SERIOUS ENOUGH TO FORCE THE RESIGNATIONS OF BOTH PRIME MINISTER

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

KARAMI AND PRESIDENT FRANJIYAH AND PERHAPS HASTEN POLITICAL CHANGE FAVORING THE MUSLIMS. NEW FIGHTING COULD, HOWEVER, PROMPT ARMY OFFICERS--MOST LIKELY CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIANS--TO ATTEMPT TO SEIZE CONTROL IN A LAST-DITCH EFFORT TO PRESERVE CHRISTIAN DOMINANCE.4

THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IN RECENT MONTHS HAS SHOWN ITSELF INCAPABLE OF FORCING AN END TO THE HOSTILITIES. PATROLS BY INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES, WHICH ARE NOT REGARDED AS A THREAT BY EITHER THE CHRISTIANS OR THE MUSLIMS, ARE NOT OPPOSED BY ANY MAJOR POLITICAL GROUP. ACTING ALONE, HOWEVER, THIS SECURITY FORCE IS INCAPABLE OF FORCING ANY OF THE OPPOSING PARTIES TO RESPECT A CEASE-FIRE.4

THE LEBANESE ARMY, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS VIEWED BY THE FEDAYEEN AS A DIRECT MILITARY THREAT AND FOR THIS REASON HAS NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO PLAY A FORCEFUL ROLE IN PUTTING DOWN THE FIGHTING. IN BEIRUT, IT HAS BEEN USED ONLY TO SECURE THE ROAD FROM THE CITY CENTER TO THE AIRPORT, TO CONTROL SELECTED GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND INSTALLATIONS, AND IN A VERY LIMITED WAY TO RELIEVE INTERNAL SECURITY UNITS ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE CITY. IN TRIPOLI, IT HAS BEEN USED TO PATROL A NEUTRAL ZONE BETWEEN MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN FORCES.4

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ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

IN RECENT MONTHS, CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN LEADERS LIKE PRESIDENT FRANJIYAH AND INTERIOR MINISTER SHAMUN HAVE FAVORED CALLING IN THE ARMY, BUT HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONVINCED MUSLIM POLITICAL LEADERS, NOTABLY PRIME MINISTER KARAMI, THAT THE CHRISTIAN-CONTROLLED FORCE WOULD PLAY AN IMPARTIAL ROLE.4

IN THE PAST IT WAS BELIEVED THE ARMY COULD ALWAYS BE BROUGHT IN AS A LAST RESORT TO IMPOSE A CEASE-FIRE OR TO DESTROY THE RADICAL LEBANESE LEFTIST AND PALESTINIAN REJECTIONIST GROUPS. IT WAS ALSO BELIEVED THAT THE ARMY COULD--IN TIME AND WITH DIFFICULT---OVERCOME THE MAJOR FEDAYEEN GROUPS AS WELL.4

THE ARMY CAN NO LONGER DO THIS. ARMY INVOLVEMENT NOW WOULD RESULT IN SO GREAT AN INCREASE IN THE ALREADY HEAVY CASUALTIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE THAT SIZABLE UNITS, REFLECTING THEIR DIVIDED LOYALTIES, WOULD SIMPLY REFUSE TO ASSUME ANYTHING MORE THAN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. SUCH AN ATTITUDE WOULD PROLONG, NOT END, THE FIGHTING.4

PALESTINIAN AND LEFTIST ARMED GROUPS ARE SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER AND BETTER EQUIPPED THAN THEY WERE THE LAST TIME THE ARMY STEPPED IN; THAT WAS IN EARLY 1973.4

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT THE ARMY WERE THREATENING TO DEFEAT LEFTIST AND PALESTINIAN FORCES IN LEBANON, UNITS OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY IN SYRIA AND OF THE REGULAR SYRIAN ARMY WOULD PROBABLY MOVE TO THE RESCUE. DAMASCUS WOULD NOT ALLOW LEBANON TO DEFEAT THE PALESTINIANS IN THE WAY THAT THE JORDANIAN ARMY DID IN 1970 AND 1971.4

SUPERFICIALLY, LEBANESE LEFTISTS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN THE BIG WINNERS FROM THE IMPOTENCE OF THE LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES, ARMY, AND GOVERNMENT. LITTLE-KNOWN RADICAL LEFTISTS LIKE IBRAHIM QULAYLAT ARE NOW IN PHYSICAL CONTROL OF IMPORTANT AREAS OF BEIRUT AND PUBLICLY CONSULT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.4

SOCIALIST KAMAL JUMBLATT, A DRUZE, HAS DISCARDED WHAT REMAINED OF HIS GADFLY IMAGE AND--ALONG WITH SHIA MUSLIM LEADER IMAM MUSA SADR--HAS ESTABLISHED HIMSELF AS A CENTRAL FIGURE IN THE BEHIND-THE-SCENES POLITICAL BARGAINING THAT USED TO BE THE SOLE PROVINCE OF MARONITE CHRISTIAN AND SUNNI MUSLIM LEADERS.4

THESE LEFTISTS HAVE MADE THEIR GAINS PRIMARILY BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN HEAVILY BACKED BY THE LARGE PALESTINIAN FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

IP FILES #

LEFTIST MILITIAS HAVE BEEN TRAINED BY THE PALESTINIANS, LEFTIST ARMS HAVE BEEN SUPPLIED BY THE FEDAYEEN, AND IN CRUCIAL BATTLES THE LEFTISTS HAVE BEEN BACKED UP BY FEDAYEEN FIGHTERS. WERE IT NOT FOR THIS SUPPORT THE LEBANESE LEFTISTS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVERWHELMED AGAIN BY THE POWERFUL LEBANESE CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM LEADERS. Y

THE PALESTINIANS HAVE BEEN THE BIG GAINERS. THE PRINCIPAL FEDAYEEN GROUPS HAVE LARGELY STAYED OUT OF THE FIGHTING, PARTLY BECAUSE THEY ARE SENSITIVE TO THE EFFECT INSTABILITY IN LEBANON HAS ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND LEBANON'S RELATIONS WITH SYRIA. THEY CERTAINLY RECOGNIZE THAT THE CLASHES THIS YEAR HAVE MADE ALMOST INEVITABLE LONG-TERM POLITICAL CHANGES THAT WILL DIRECTLY BENEFIT THE PALESTINIANS. Y

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION CHAIRMAN ARAFAT IS GIVEN CREDIT FOR HIS PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS, YET HE CAN LOOK FORWARD TO DEALING WITH LEBANESE GOVERNMENTS THAT WILL BE MORE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD MUSLIM, PALESTINIAN, AND GENERAL ARAB CAUSES. ARAFAT HAS, IN ADDITION, EMERGED AS A CENTRAL POWER IN LEBANESE GOVERNMENT COUNCILS; HE IS NO LONGER DEALT WITH AS AN OUTSIDER. ARAFAT AND KARAMI HAVE BEEN THE TWO

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

0 IP FILES #

MOST IMPORTANT FIGURES IN RECENT ATTEMPTS TO NEGOTIATE CEASE-FIRES, AND ARAFAT WAS OFFERED, BUT REFUSED, MEMBERSHIP ON KARAMI'S ALL-LEBANESE SECURITY COMMITTEE. 4

A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF ARAFAT HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN A SERIES OF TALKS ON POLITICAL REFORM WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF FRANJIYAH AND PHALANGIST LEADER JUMAYYIL, BOTH RIGHT-WING CHRISTIANS WHO HAVE GENERALLY DEALT WITH ARAFAT INDIRECTLY. 4

THE PALESTINIANS ACTUALLY BEGAN TO INCREASE THEIR PUNCH IN LEBANON IN 1969. THE CAIRO AGREEMENT OF THAT YEAR, FORCED BY AN EARLIER ROUND OF FIGHTING, GUARANTEED THE PALESTINIANS THE RIGHT TO LIVE IN LEBANON. 4

THE MELKART AGREEMENT THAT FOLLOWED THE STRIFE OF 1973 GAVE THE PALESTINIANS THE RIGHT TO CONTROL SECURITY WITHIN THE REFUGEE CAMPS--THE PREROGATIVE THAT SUBSEQUENTLY PROVIDED THE EXCUSE FOR A VAST INCREASE IN PALESTINIAN MILITARY STRENGTH IN LEBANON. 4

THIS YEAR, THE PALESTINIANS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY ARE MUCH BETTER ARMED THAN BEFORE AND THAT THEY HAVE THE ABILITY TO TURN THE TIDE OF BATTLE WHEN THEY SO DESIRE, AS THEY DID IN THE QANTARI AREA

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ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

OF BEIRUT LAST WEEK. THEY HAVE SHOWN THAT THEY CAN ALSO LIMIT THE VIOLENCE.4

HAVING DISPLAYED THEIR POWER, THE PLO HAS NOW MADE CERTAIN PROPOSALS TO THE LEBANESE NATIONAL DIALOGUE COMMITTEE, CREATED TO CONSIDER BASIC POLITICAL REFORMS. IF ACCEPTED, THESE PROPOSALS WOULD AMOUNT TO A RECOGNITION BY ALL LEBANESE, SPECIFICALLY INCLUDING THE PHALANGISTS, OF THE LEGALITY OF THE PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON. PRESENTATION OF THE PROPOSALS ON OCTOBER 13 WAS SUCH A POLITICALLY ASTUTE MOVE THAT EVEN JUMAYYIL WAS MOVED TO PRAISE ARAFAT.4

THE PROPOSALS WILL BE DIFFICULT TO REJECT. ALTHOUGH THE PALESTINIANS ARE UNLIKELY TO GET A ROLE IN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, THE TALKS NOW GOING ON WILL CERTAINLY REFLECT THE PALESTINIANS' INCREASED POWER AND RESULT IN CHANGES IN THEIR INTERESTS.4

THE CHRISTIANS WILL OFFER CONCESSIONS FIRST TO THE COUNTRY'S SUNNI MUSLIM AND SOCIALIST POLITICIANS RATHER THAN TO THE MORE DISADVANTAGED SHIA MUSLIMS OR THE RADICAL LEFTISTS. ALTHOUGH EVEN MODERATE CHRISTIANS DO NOT WANT TO MAKE CONCESSIONS, MOST NOW UNDERSTAND THAT POLITICAL AND SOCIAL REFORMS ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

LEBANON'S FUTURE STABILITY, EVEN ITS SURVIVAL.4

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SOME POWERFUL CONSERVATIVES, LIKE JUMAYYIL, HAVE SPOKEN VAGUELY OF THE NEED FOR REFORM AND HAVE CAREFULLY DISTINGUISHED THEIR POSITIONS FROM THE MORE INTEMPERATE FOLLOWERS OF FRANJIYAH. JUMAYYIL ALSO TAKES GREAT PAINS, ON THE OTHER HAND, TO MAKE SURE THAT NO ONE GETS AHEAD OF THE PHALANGES PARTY AS THE CHAMPION OF THE CHRISTIAN CAUSE. IT IS THUS DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO ENDORSE CONCESSIONS WITHOUT BEING ATTACKED BY WHAT IS, IN EFFECT, A "REJECTION FRONT" ON THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT.4

CHRISTIAN ULTRA CONSERVATIVES GENERALLY FOLLOW THE POLITICAL LEAD OF THE CIVILIAN MARONITE LEAGUE AND THE ORDER OF MARONITE MONKS. THESE TWO GROUPS ARE INFLUENTIAL FAR BEYOND THEIR SMALL SIZE; THEY HAVE CLOSE TIES TO FRANJIYAH AND HAVE LONG PROVIDED HEAVY POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND MILITARY AID TO THE CHRISTIAN MILITIAS.4

LAST MONTH, LEADERS OF THE TWO GROUPS PUBLISHED POLITICAL DEMANDS THAT IN EFFECT CALLED ON THE PRESIDENT TO DISMISS KARAMI, CALL IN THE ARMY, AND SHELVE PROPOSALS FOR POLITICAL REFORM UNTIL THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM HAD BEEN SOLVED.4

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ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

U IP FILES #

MARONITE PATRIARCH ANTONIOS KHREISH IS MUCH MORE TEMPERATE THAN THE EXTREMIST LEADERS, BUT NEITHER HE NOR LEADERS OF THE CHRISTIAN MILITIAS HAVE BEEN WILLING TO CRITICIZE THE EXTREMISTS IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THAT CONCESSIONS BY THE CHRISTIANS WOULD AT LEAST BRING A DEPENDABLE PEACE.4

DESPITE THE IMPASSE, CHRISTIAN LEADERS MOST LIKELY REALIZE THAT TIME IS ON THE SIDE OF THE MUSLIMS AND LEFTISTS. THIS REALIZATION IS ALREADY UNDERMINING PRESIDENT FRANJIYAH, WHO IS BEING PRIVATELY CRITICIZED BY EXTREME RIGHT-WINGERS FOR NOT BEING ASSERTIVE ENOUGH AND BY MODERATES FOR NOT BEING FLEXIBLE ENOUGH.4

INCREASING NUMBERS OF CHRISTIANS, SOME ALARMED AT THE STEADY EROSION OF INFLUENCE OF THE CHRISTIAN PRESIDENCY, ARE COMING TO BELIEVE THAT FRANJIYAH'S DEPARTURE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.4

CONCESSIONS TO MUSLIMS ARE MOST LIKELY TO COME IN THE OUTDATED SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONATE REPRESENTATION OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN ALL INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT.4

THE LAWS GOVERNING THE ELECTION OF PARLIAMENT AND THE PRESIDENT.4

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

0 IP FILES #

THE DISTRIBUTION OF EXECUTIVE POWERS BETWEEN THE
PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER.4

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.4

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM IS COMING/ IT WILL IN LARGE PART
ONLY ACKNOWLEDGE WHAT IS ALREADY A FACT: THAT LEBANON'S OLD GOVERNING
SYSTEM IS NO LONGER FUNCTIONING AND IS NOT ACCOMMODATING THE NEEDS
OF EITHER THE DISADVANTAGED GROUPS IN THE CITIES AND THE SOUTH OR
THE WEALTHY CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN THE CAPITAL AND
CERTAIN NORTHERN AND MOUNTAIN AREAS.4

THE OLD SYSTEM RESTED ON THE ABILITY OF THE LEADERS OF THE
POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS SECTS TO DEFEND THEIR FOLLOWERS' POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY INTERESTS. WITH PARLIAMENT UNWILLING TO
MEET, THE CABINET UNABLE TO TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION BECAUSE OF THE
SPLIT BETWEEN KARAMI AND SHAMUN, AND LEADERS OF SEVERAL CHRISTIAN AND
MUSLIM GROUPS UNABLE TO CONTROL THEIR FOLLOWERS, THOSE INTERESTS
CANNOT BE PROTECTED IN THE OLD WAY.

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2. SPANISH SAHARA: MOROCCO'S EFFORT TO DISSUADE SPAIN AND
- ALGERIA FROM SEEKING A UN-SPONSORED SOLUTION TO THE SPANISH SAHARA

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UNIT:
EXT:

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DISPUTE HAVE APPARENTLY NOT BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL.4

PRESS REPORTS FROM MADRID ON TUESDAY, CITING INFORMED SPANISH SOURCES, SAID MOROCCAN PRIME MINISTER OSMAN HAD FAILED TO STEER SPAIN AWAY FROM SEEKING A UN SOLUTION THAT WOULD PROBABLY INVOLVE A REFERENDUM IN SPANISH SAHARA. SPANISH LEADERS REPORTEDLY TOLD OSMAN THAT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN MADRID AND RABAT COULD CONTINUE ONLY UNDER UN AUSPICES AND ONLY IF MOROCCO CALLS OFF ITS PLANNED MASS MARCH INTO SPANISH SAHARA. AS HE LEFT MADRID, OSMAN SAID THAT TALKS WILL CONTINUE, BUT THAT THE MARCH WILL GO ON.4

A MOROCCAN EMISSARY TALKED WITH ALGERIAN PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE ON MONDAY. WITHIN HOURS OF THE TALKS, THE ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY ISSUED A STATEMENT REITERATING THAT ALGERIA COULD NOT ACCEPT A UNILATERAL MOROCCAN MOVE. THE STATEMENT ADDED THAT THE DECOLONIZATION PROCESS SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND SHOULD BE IN KEEPING WITH A RECENT UN REPORT AND AN ADVISORY OPINION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, WHICH IN EFFECT ENDORSED SELF-DETERMINATION FOR SPANISH SAHARA.4

UN SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM'S PERSONAL ENVOY HELD TALKS WITH

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

U IP FILES #

KING HASSAN ON TUESDAY. THE ENVOY WILL ALSO CONSULT WITH MAURITANIAN, ALGERIAN, AND SPANISH OFFICIALS.4

ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS FROM NEW YORK, WALDHEIM HAS SUGGESTED A SIX-MONTH COOLING-OFF PERIOD DURING WHICH THE UN COULD CREATE A TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION IN THE TERRITORY. KING HASSAN WOULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH A PROPOSAL UNLESS MOROCCO WERE THE ADMINISTERING POWER.4


MOROCCO IS STILL THREATENING TO GO AHEAD WITH ITS MARCH INTO SPANISH SAHARA. ONCE KING HASSAN GIVES THE GO-AHEAD, THE MARCH MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM OR ANYONE ELSE TO CONTROL.4

THE GOVERNMENT RECRUITED SOME OF ITS MARCHERS FROM THE RANKS OF THE UNEMPLOYED AND URBAN STREET ROUGHNECKS. THESE "VOLUNTEERS" ARE NOT LIKELY TO FOLLOW ORDERS OR BE ESPECIALLY PEACEABLE. THEY WERE DOUBTLESS RESPONSIBLE FOR SOME OF THE DISORDER THAT HAS OCCURRED AT ASSEMBLY POINTS IN SOUTHERN MOROCCO. [REDACTED]

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3. ANGOLA: THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA AND THE NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA ANNOUNCED IN KINSHASA ON MONDAY THAT THEY ARE SETTING UP JOINT COMMITTEES TO



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COORDINATE FUTURE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE COMMITTEES PROBABLY REPRESENT A FIRST STEP BY THE TWO GROUPS TOWARD IMPLEMENTING THEIR PLAN TO ORGANIZE A GOVERNMENT TO RIVAL THE ONE THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA IS EXPECTED TO PROCLAIM ON NOVEMBER 11.4

COOPERATION BETWEEN THE NATIONAL FRONT AND THE NATIONAL UNION IS POOR, HOWEVER, AND THEIR RESPECTIVE TROOPS DO NOT GET ALONG WELL IN THE FIELD. MILITARY LEADERS ON BOTH SIDES BELIEVE THE OTHER GROUP IS ATTEMPTING TO TAKE THE LION'S SHARE OF CREDIT FOR RECENT BATTLEFIELD SUCCESSES AND IS HOARDING SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT.4

THE TWO GROUPS ALSO EXPRESSED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONFER WITH THE POPULAR MOVEMENT IN KAMPALA, AS PROPOSED BY UGANDAN PRESIDENT AMIN, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY. THEY MADE NO REFERENCE, HOWEVER, TO THE CEASE-FIRE THAT AMIN CALLED FOR LAST WEEKEND WHEN HE INVITED THE THREE GROUPS TO MEET IN THE UGANDAN CAPITAL.4

WITH THEIR JOINT FORCE DRIVING TO RECAPTURE THE IMPORTANT BENGUELA-LOBITO RAIL AND PORT COMPLEX IN CENTRAL ANGOLA, THE NATIONAL

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

FRONT AND THE NATIONAL UNION ARE IN NO HURRY TO AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE. ^{IP FILES #}
HEAVY FIGHTING IS APPARENTLY TAKING PLACE IN THAT AREA, BUT THE
JOINT FORCE EVIDENTLY STILL HAS NOT REACHED THE ENVIRONS OF
EITHER TOWN. THE TWO GROUPS SEEM CONFIDENT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE
THEM SOON. SUCH A SUCCESS WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY STRENGTHEN THE
CREDIBILITY OF ANY GOVERNMENT THEY MAY PROCLAIM.4

THE HARD-PRESSED POPULAR MOVEMENT HAS ALREADY SENT A
REPRESENTATIVE TO KAMPALA. THE MOVEMENT NEEDS A RESPITE IN ORDER TO
BOLSTER ITS DEFENSES AT BENGUÉLA AND LOBITO AND ALSO AROUND LUANDA,
WHICH IS THREATENED WITH EARLY ATTACK BY A SEPARATE FRONT FORCE.

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EAST ASIA BRIEF 171-75.Y
NOTHING TO REPORT.Y

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Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010073-9

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SERVED AS SOCIAL WELFARE MINISTER FOLLOWING THE REMOVAL OF LOPEZ REGA. THE ACTION STEMS FROM AN INVESTIGATION IN THE LOWER HOUSE OF ALLEGED FINANCIAL MISDEALINGS. Y

THE LEGISLATURE AND THE JUDICIARY HAVE GENERALLY BEEN SUBSERVIENT TO THE PRESIDENT, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT MOST GOVERNMENT FIGURES WHO ARE NOT WHOLLY DEPENDENT ON PERON NOW SEE HER DEPARTURE FROM OFFICE AS THE ONLY POSSIBLE WAY TO PREVENT A MILITARY TAKEOVER. Y

ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PRESS, EVEN MEMBERS OF THE CABINET AGREE THAT SHE SHOULD STEP DOWN. THE LEADING POLITICAL OPPOSITION LEADER, RICARDO BALBIN, WHO HAS LONG COOPERATED WITH THE GOVERNMENT, NOW WANTS PERON TO GO. Y

PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THE GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN IN TO LABOR DEMANDS FOR A WAGE HIKE DESPITE THE EFFORTS ECONOMY MINISTER CAFIERO WAS MAKING LAST WEEK TO GET LABOR AND BUSINESS TO COOPERATE IN AN EFFORT TO RETARD INFLATION. THE SIZE OF THE INCREASE HAS NOT BEEN

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1. PORTUGAL: PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER AZEVEDO PAID A SECOND VISIT TO THE PROVINCES ON TUESDAY TO ENLIST POPULAR SUPPORT SHORTLY AFTER HIS CABINET CALLED FOR A MEETING WITH TOP MILITARY LEADERS TO DISCUSS THE COUNTRY'S CRISIS OF AUTHORITY.4

AZEVEDO'S TRIP TO THE SOUTHERN RESORT CITY OF FARO WAS AN EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE NEWLY INSTALLED NON-COMMUNIST CIVIL GOVERNOR AND FOR THE COMMANDER OF THE SOUTHERN MILITARY REGION. THE COMMUNISTS' EFFORTS TO REMOVE THE GOVERNOR TEN DAYS AGO FAILED WHEN THEY WERE DRIVEN FROM HIS OFFICES BY AROUSED SOCIALISTS AND POPULAR DEMOCRATS.4

THE TRIP WAS ALSO DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE THE AZEVEDO GOVERNMENT'S POPULARITY AT THE GRASS ROOTS. AN EARLIER VISIT BY AZEVEDO TO PORTO, WHERE HE WAS HAILED BY 100,000 SUPPORTERS, WAS AN IMPORTANT MILESTONE IN THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO RESTORE DISCIPLINE IN THE NORTHERN MILITARY REGION.4

AN ENTHUSIASTIC CROWD OF SOME 10,000 ATTENDED THE FARO RALLY. AZEVEDO TOLD THOSE ASSEMBLED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO ESTABLISH A

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

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STRONG AND STABLE CENTRAL GOVERNING AUTHORITY RECOGNIZED AND FREELY ACCEPTED BY ALL. EVEN AS HE SPOKE, SOME 100 FAR LEFTIST SOLDIERS BEGAN A COUNTER-DEMONSTRATION BUT MOST DISPERSED WHEN THE COMMANDER OF THE SOUTHERN MILITARY REGION APPROACHED AND CASTIGATED THEM.4

AZEVEDO HAD COMPLAINED TO A PRESS CONFERENCE EARLIER THAT THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO GOVERN BECAUSE OF A LACK OF DISCIPLINE AND DISSENSION WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES. AZEVEDO WAS HEARD COMMENTING TO LOCAL OFFICIALS THAT HE HAS BEEN PATIENT THUS FAR BUT WOULD NOW TAKE THE OFFENSIVE.4

BEFORE AZEVEDO LEFT, THE CABINET ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE THAT REAFFIRMED ITS DECOLONIZATION POLICY AND URGED RAPID REORGANIZATION OF THE NEWS MEDIA. THE CABINET ALSO ASKED TO MEET WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL TO LEARN HOW THE COUNCIL WOULD IMPLEMENT A PRESIDENTIAL DECREE ORDERING THE SURRENDER OF ALL ILLEGALLY HELD ARMS. A WEEK-LONG AMNESTY FOR TURNING IN THE ARMS WAS DECLARED FROM OCTOBER 17 TO 25, BUT ONLY A HANDFUL WERE SURRENDERED.4

THE COMMUNIQUE EXPRESSED ITS SOLIDARITY WITH THE DECOLONIZATION MEASURES THAT HAVE BEEN ADOPTED AND LABELED THOSE WHO HAVE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CRITICIZED THE MEASURES AS COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES. THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY IN ANGOLA HAS BEEN SHARPLY ATTACKED BY THE LEFT, WHICH WANTS TO TURN OVER POWER EXCLUSIVELY TO THE MOSCOW-BACKED POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA WHEN THE AFRICAN COLONY BECOMES INDEPENDENT ON NOVEMBER 11. ON MONDAY EVENING, LEFTISTS HELD A RALLY IN LISBON TO SUPPORT THE POPULAR MOVEMENT, BUT IT DREW ONLY 1,000 DEMONSTRATORS.4.

IN WHAT APPEARED TO BE A FURTHER STEP TO PURGE THE MEDIA OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE, THE CABINET URGED SOCIAL COMMUNICATIONS MINISTER R LMEIDA SANTOS TO SPEED UP THE RECENTLY ANNOUNCED MEDIA REORGANIZATION. THE CABINET ALSO RULED THAT THE DISPUTE BETWEEN COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST WORKERS OVER CONTROL OF THE NEWSPAPER O SEculo MUST BE SOLVED THROUGH LEGAL CHANNELS, AND IT ORDERED AN INQUIRY INTO THE CASE.

P. USSR: THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET WILL OPEN ITS REGULAR END-OF-THE-YEAR MEETING ON DECEMBER 2. NO AGENDA HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED, BUT THE SESSION WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY HEAR THE CUSTOMARY REPORTS BY GOSPLAN CHIEF

DATE:
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UNIT:
EXT:

BAYBAKOV AND FINANCE MINISTER GARBUZOV ON NEXT YEAR'S ECONOMIC PLAN AND BUDGET.4

THE DELEGATES MAY ALSO TAKE UP A NEW DRAFT LAW ON "USSR CITIZENSHIP." THE PROPOSED LAW WAS REVIEWED ON OCTOBER 24 DURING A JOINT SESSION OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS COMMISSIONS OF BOTH HOUSES OF THE SUPREME SOVIET, BUT ITS CONTENTS HAVE NOT BEEN PUBLISHED.4

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WILL PROBABLY MEET PRIOR TO THE SUPREME SOVIET TO FIX THE AGENDA FOR THE LEGISLATIVE SESSION. IT MAY ALSO ANNOUNCE THE SPEAKERS AND AGENDA FOR THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS, WHICH OPENS ON FEBRUARY 24, AND TAKE ACTION TO FILL SOME OF THE CONSPICUOUS VACANCIES IN THE PARTY APPARATUS.

3. POLAND: SOVIET CONCERN OVER POLAND'S EXPANDING ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE WEST HAS EVIDENTLY LED WARSAW TO GIVE INCREASING PUBLICITY TO ITS COMMERCIAL LINKS WITH THE BLOC.4

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

PARTY LEADER GIEREK AND PRIME MINISTER JAROSZE-
 WICZ HAVE RECENTLY LAVISHED ATTENTION ON POLAND'S
 TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER CEMA
 MEMBERS. IN SOME CASES, THEY HAVE EVEN DROPPED THEIR
 STANDARD REFERENCES TO DETENTE AS THE GREEN LIGHT
 FOR CLOSER ECONOMIC TIES WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES.
 WARSAW HAS ALSO GIVEN WIDE COVERAGE IN POLISH NEWS
 MEDIA TO A SESSION OF THE MAIN BOARD OF THE POLISH-
 SOVIET FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY AND TO THE RECENT VISIT OF
 SOVIET DEPUTY PREMIER IVAN ARKHIPOV.4

X1 THE CURRENT POLISH RHETORIC IS ALMOST CERTAINLY
 AIMED AT CALMING MOSCOW'S APPREHENSION. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THE SOVIETS ARE
 UNHAPPY WITH POLAND'S SUCCESS IN PURSUING A "NEO-ROMANIAN"
 COURSE IN ECONOMIC POLICY, AND SOVIET PREMIER KOSYGIN
 REPORTEDLY CRITICIZED POLAND'S "OVERLY WESTERN" ECONOMIC
 POLICIES DURING HIS AUGUST VISIT.4

THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, THAT POLAND

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INTENDS TO ABANDON THE DIFFICULT TASK OF SEEKING AN
ACCEPTABLE BALANCE BETWEEN GREATER ECONOMIC INTEGRA-
TION WITH CEMA AND EXPANDED ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE
WEST. [REDACTED] THE

LINK WITH CEMA PROVIDES STABILITY WHILE THE ONE WITH
THE WEST OFFERS PROGRESS. [REDACTED]

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4. EUROPEAN COMMUNIST CONFERENCE: BELGRADE IS AGAIN
STRONGLY EMPHASIZING THE UNITY OF VIEWS AMONG THE INDEPENDENT
EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES WHO MOST ACTIVELY OPPOSE SOVIET
PRETENSIONS TO A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT.4

BELGRADE TANJUG ON TUESDAY BROADCAST A LONG RE-
VIEW OF A RECENT PLENUM OF THE ITALIAN PARTY CENTRAL
COMMITTEE THAT HAD APPROVED A REPORT BY THE LEADER-
SHIP ON PREPARATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY
CONFERENCE. ACCORDING TO TANJUG, GIANCARLO PAJETTA,
SECRETARY FOR INTERPARTY RELATIONS, PRESENTED CONDI-
TIONS FOR ITALIAN ATTENDANCE THAT DOVETAIL WITH THE
YUGOSLAV STAND. PAJETTA'S VIEW IS THAT THE CONFER-

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ENCE "COULD BE HELD" LATE THIS YEAR OR EARLY NEXT,
BUT THAT MANY PROBLEMS REMAIN UNSOLVED.4

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THE ITALIANS INSISTED THAT "IT IS NECESSARY EX-
PLICITLY TO CONFIRM THAT A SINGLE CENTER OR A LEAD-
ING PARTY CANNOT EXIST" AND TO REJECT "THE IMPORTA-
TION OF A FOREIGN MODEL OF SOCIALISM." MOREOVER,
PAJETTA ASSERTED THAT "ALL FORMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL
TIES" WITH OVERTONES OF OBLIGATIONS MUST BE REJECTED.
TANJUG SAID THE REPORT STRESSED THAT THE FINAL CON-
FERENCE DOCUMENT MUST BE ACCEPTABLE IN TOTO TO ALL
PARTIES, BUT QUOTED PAJETTA AS WARNING THAT IT SHOULD
NOT ATTEMPT TO GLOSS OVER IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES
AND THEREBY LEAD TO IDEOLOGICAL CONFUSION. BELGRADE'S
LEADING SPOKESMAN ON INTER-PARTY MATTERS LAST WEEK
REPEATED ALMOST ALL OF THE ITALIAN DEMANDS.4

THE ITALIAN PARTY HAS ALSO INTRODUCED A NEW IS-
SUE THAT THE SOVIETS AND THEIR LOYALIST SUPPORTERS
WILL HOTLY CONTEST. IT WANTS ANY STATEMENT ON EURO-

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PEAN ECONOMIC TRENDS TO STRESS THAT EASTERN AND WEST-
ERN ECONOMIES ARE TROUBLED BY THE SAME PROBLEMS.
THIS POSITION CLASHES WITH SOVIET PROPAGANDA THAT
ASSERTS THE CEMA COUNTRIES, THANKS TO THEIR SUPERIOR
SYSTEMS' AND BENEFICIAL ECONOMIC LINKS WITH MOSCOW,
ARE BETTER ABLE THAN THE WEST TO RESIST ECONOMIC
SHOCKS. SUCH A FRANK DISCUSSION OF EASTERN PROBLEMS
AT A RELATIVELY OPEN COMMUNIST FORUM WOULD BE POLITI-
CAL DYNAMITE FOR MANY EASTERN EUROPEAN REGIMES, NOT
TO MENTION THE KREMLIN, AND THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO
CHANCE THAT MOSCOW WILL ACCEDE TO THIS DEMAND.4

IN ADDITION TO PUBLICIZING THE ITALIAN PARTY'S
STAND, THE BELGRADE PARTY WEEKLY KOMMUNIST THIS WEEK
CARRIED A LONG INTERVIEW WITH SANTIAGO CARRILLO, THE
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE INDEPENDENT SPANISH PARTY.
CARRILLO STRESSED HIS PARTY'S ADMIRATION OF YUGO-
SLAVIA'S SUCCESSFUL BREAK WITH MOSCOW IN 1948 AND
STRESSED HIS PARTY'S INDEPENDENCE FROM ANY FOREIGN

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PRESSURES. CARRILLO, FRESH FROM TALKS WITH ROMANIA'S
CEAUSESCU, ALSO RESTATED HIS INTENTION TO PURSUE A
ROLE FOR HIS COMMUNIST PARTY IN A MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM
IN THE POST-FRANCO ERA.

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