


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BRIEF

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**Secret**

JORDAN-SYRIA: JORDAN AND SYRIA HAVE TAKEN FURTHER STEPS TO INCREASE COOPERATION IN A NUMBER OF FIELDS. 4

IN A COMMUNIQUE CAPPING KING HUSAYN'S FIVE-DAY VISIT TO SYRIA, THE TWO COUNTRIES ANNOUNCED THE FORMATION OF A "SUPREME SYRIAN-JORDANIAN COMMAND COUNCIL" COMPOSED OF HUSAYN AND SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASAD. THE COUNCIL IS SUPPOSED TO MEET AT LEAST ONCE EVERY THREE MONTHS TO ACT ON RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FORMED AT THE TIME OF ASAD'S VISIT TO JORDAN LAST MONTH. 4

THE COMMUNIQUE AVOIDED ANY MENTION OF A JOINT MILITARY COMMAND, AND ITS SPECIFIC LABELING OF THE NEW COUNCIL AS "POLITICAL" SEEMS DESIGNED TO RELIEVE ISRAELI AND US APPREHENSION THAT JORDAN AND SYRIA HAVE ESTABLISHED A MILITARY COMMAND. THE COMMAND COUNCIL WILL, HOWEVER, REVIEW PLANS FOR "COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION" BETWEEN THE TWO ARMED FORCES. 4

THE PREROGATIVES OF THE COMMAND COUNCIL APPEAR TO BE SUFFICIENTLY BROAD TO PERMIT HUSAYN TO KEEP HIS OPTIONS OPEN

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AND MOVE TOWARD CLOSER MILITARY COOPERATION AT HIS OWN PACE. ALTHOUGH THE KING SEES BENEFITS IN CLOSER COOPERATION WITH SYRIA, HE WILL BE CAREFUL NOT TO ALIENATE THE JORDANIAN ARMY, HIS MAJOR POWER BASE. FOR ITS PART, THE ARMY REMAINS SKEPTICAL OF SYRIAN MOTIVES, FEARING THAT ASAD WILL PREVAIL ON THE KING TO ALLOW THE FEMUDAYEEN TO RE-ESTABLISH A PRESENCE IN JORDAN. THE PRO FORMA TREATMENT OF PALESTINIAN ASPIRATIONS IN THE COMMUNIQUE MAY REASSURE THE ARMY FOR THE TIME BEING. 4

THE COMMUNIQUE LISTS SEVERAL OTHER AREAS IN WHICH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE TO WORK TOGETHER. IN ADDITION TO PLANNING FOR A "UNIFIED FOREIGN POLICY," PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO ARAB ISSUES, THE COMMAND COUNCIL WILL DISCUSS COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS, THE FORMATION OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMPANIES, UNIFICATION OF MARKETS, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFIED CUSTOMS POLICY. [REDACTED] 25X1

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FOREIGN MINISTERS OF NONALIGNED MEET TODAY: THE LIMA CONFERENCE OF NONALIGNED STATES THAT BEGINS AUGUST 25, 1975 WILL SHOW HOW THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WEIGH PROSPECTS FOR COMPROMISE WITH THE DEVELOPED WORLD. THE MEETING WILL PROVIDE A PREVIEW OF RADICAL STRENGTH ON ISSUES THAT WILL COME BEFORE THE UN BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 2, 1975.4

THE DELEGATIONS LIKELY TO TAKE THE LEAD AT LIMA HAVE HELD THEIR CARDS CLOSELY. THE MORE PASSIVE DELEGATIONS, WHICH ANTICIPATE THAT ALGERIA AND ITS ALLIES WILL DOMINATE THE CONFERENCE AGAIN, ARE ALREADY TELLING WESTERN GOVERNMENTS THEY WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OUTCOME.4

THE AGENDA DEMONSTRATES DIVERSE INTERESTS. IT CALLS FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF NEW MEMBERS; A REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, INCLUDING THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, AND INDOCHINA; THE ADOPTION OF A STRATEGY FOR MUTUAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AMONG THE NONALIGNED; A POST-MORTEM ON THE EFFECT OF DECISIONS TAKEN

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SEEM KEEN FOR BATTLE.4

ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, MANY, ANXIOUS TO SEE WHAT PROPOSALS THE INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS WILL BRING TO THE SPECIAL UN SESSION ON DEVELOPMENT, WOULD PREFER NOT TO ANTAGONIZE COUNTRIES THAT MIGHT BE WILLING TO ASSIST THEM. BUT THEY, TOO, SEEM RESIGNED TO FOLLOW THE ALGERIAN LEAD, EVEN IF IT TAKES THEM FURTHER ALONG THE PATH TOWARD CONTENTION.4

ALGERIA PLAYS ON THE DISTRUST THAT THE NONALIGNED FEEL FOR THE INDUSTRIALIZED STATES. THE POOR COUNTRIES SUSPECT THE RICH ARE PLAYING FOR TIME AND HAVE NO REAL INTENTION OF MAKING GENEROUS OFFERS.4

THE ECONOMIC ISSUES MAY NOT BE SO EASY FOR THE ALGERIANS NOW THAT CUBA HAS COMPLAINED THAT ARABS ARE AS NIGGARDLY AS THE WEST.4

THERE IS CONCERN AMONG SOME DELEGATIONS THAT THE RADICALS MAY PULL OUT ALL THE STOPS AT LIMA.4

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-■HAVING LOST MOMENTUM ON THE DRIVE TO EXPEL ISRAEL FROM THE UN, SYRIA AND LIKE-MINDED STATES MAY MAKE A GREATER EFFORT TO ■TRAMPLE EGYPT'S AND THE AFRICANS' CASE AGAINST EXPULSION. ISRAEL WILL BE A HIGHLY DIVISIVE ISSUE THAT COULD BREAK DOWN THE APPEARANCE OF UNITY THAT THE NONALIGNED HAVE TRIED TO MAINTAIN.4

-FOLLOWING THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE PUERTO RICAN "LIBERATION" ISSUE BY THE DECOLONIZATION COMMITTEE OF THE UN, CUBA MAY PRESS HARDER FOR SUPPORT ON THIS ISSUE AT LIMA. DESPITE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT HAVANA WILL WANT TO MAKE A FRIENDLY GESTURE FOLLOWING WASHINGTON'S PARTIAL EASING OF SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA, HAVANA WILL BE TEMPTED TO KEEP THE PUERTO RICAN PROPAGANDA ISSUE ALIVE.4

EVEN THOUGH MANY AMONG THE NONALIGNED PRIVATELY AGREE THAT RADICALS IN THE GROUP ARE PUSHING THE DEVELOPED-UNDER-DEVELOPED SPLIT TOO FAR, THEY WILL BE INHIBITED BY THE STRONG PRESSURE FOR UNITY. MANY WOULD BE PLEASED TO SEE LESS STRIDENT POSITIONS IF THE RADICALS WOULD JUST BACK OFF A

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LITTLE, BUT MOST SEEM PREPARED TO GO ALONG.

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1. PORTUGAL: ON SUNDAY NIGHT PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES DISAVOWED TWO PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNIQUES ISSUED EARLIER THAT DAY THAT HAD MADE IT APPEAR HE WAS BACKING A CONTINUATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER VASCO GONCALVES. BOTH COMMUNIQUES WERE RELEASED BY THE FIFTH DIVISION OF THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF, THE COMMUNIST-DOMINATED PROPAGANDA AND INFORMATION SERVICE.4

THE COMMUNIQUES COULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED WITHOUT THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORIZATION IN A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT BY THE COMMUNISTS TO MISLEAD THE PUBLIC ABOUT DECISIONS REACHED EARLIER AT A MEETING OF THE THREE-MAN MILITARY DIRECTORATE AND KEY MILITARY FIGURES AND TO PROVIDE MOMENTUM TO A LAST-DITCH EFFORT TO SCUTTLE THE PLANS OF THE ANTI-COMMUNIST ANTUNES GROUP AND SAVE GONCALVES.4

ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WERE PRESS REPORTS DURING THE WEEKEND THAT THE ANTI-GONCALVES FORCES WERE SPLIT BY A DISAGREEMENT, AND WE CANNOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT COSTA GOMES AUTHORIZED THE COMMUNIQUES IN AN EFFORT TO AGGRAVATE

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DIVISIONS IN THE ANTI-COMMUNIST CAMP. IF SO, IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE SCHEME HAS BACKFIRED.4

THE COMMUNIQUES WERE CARRIED BY THE OFFICIAL STATE RADIO AND TELEVISION BEFORE THEY WERE RETRACTED. THEY CONTAINED DECISIONS SUPPOSEDLY REACHED AT THE MEETING:

--THE GOVERNMENT HEADED BY GONCALVES MUST CONTINUE TO RUN THE COUNTRY.4

--THEREVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL WOULD BE RESTRUCTURED, AND THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL ASSEMBLY WOULD DETERMINE THE FATE OF NINE ANTI-COMMUNIST OFFICERS REMOVED FROM THE COUNCIL FOR THEIR OPPOSITION TO GONCALVES.4

--A NEW POLITICAL PROGRAM FOR THE COUNTRY WOULD BE BASED ON A DOCUMENT DRAWN UP BY OFFICERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES AND A PROGRAM ALREADY SET FORTH BY THE GONCALVES GOVERNMENT.4

--THE POLITICAL PROGRAM SUPPORTED BY THE ANTI-COMMUNIST GROUP LED BY MAJOR MELO ANTUNES WAS DECLARED UNACCEPTABLE.4

--FIRM ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN BY MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES AGAINST THOSE INSTIGATING ANTI-COMMUNIST INCIDENTS

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THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.4

THE FIRST COMMUNIQUE, ISSUED EARLY SUNDAY MORNING, ELICITED A WARM RESPONSE FROM THE COMMUNISTS, FROM A FELLOW-TRAVELING PARTY, AND FROM THE COMMUNIST-DOMINATED TRADE UNION FEDERATION. SUNDAY EVENING, THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE ORDERED A SUSPENSION OF BOTH THE COMMUNIQUE AND ANY COMMENTS ON ITS CONTENTS.4

THE SECOND COMMUNIQUE, WHICH PROVIDED ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF THE DECISIONS SUPPOSEDLY REACHED AT THE HIGH-LEVEL MEETING, WAS DECLARED NULL AND VOID BECAUSE IT SUPPOSEDLY WAS DRAWN UP AND PUBLISHED WITHOUT THE PRESIDENT'S KNOWLEDGE.4

THE ANTUNES GROUP IS NOW LIKELY TO BE EVEN MORE INSISTENT IN ITS DEMANDS FOR AN END TO THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT.4

OVER THE WEEKEND, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF FABIAO—WHO HAS BEEN SELECTED BY THE ANTI-COMMUNIST GROUP TO REPLACE GONCALVES—ISSUED AN OUTSPOKEN COMMUNIQUE OF HIS OWN WHICH SOUNDED VERY MUCH LIKE A BID TO RALLY PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE MOVE AGAINST GONCALVES. FABIAO, IN AN INDIRECT CRITICISM OF THE PRIME MINISTER, SAID IT WAS WRONG TO LABEL THOSE WHO CRITICIZE THE REVOLUTION AS

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REACTIONARIES. HE SAID THE TIME HAS NOW COME TO CORRECT THE MISTAKES OF THE REVOLUTION.

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2. USSR-PORTUGAL: ON AUGUST 8, PRAVDA REPRINTED AN ARTICLE BY K. I. ZARODOV CONCERNING LENIN'S ANALYSIS OF THE ABORTIVE 1905 REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA. THE ARTICLE HAS ATTRACTED CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION, PARTICULARLY IN WESTERN EUROPE, FOR ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES, FOR THE SOVIET UNION, AND EVEN FOR BREZHNEV HIMSELF.4

ZARODOV BEGINS: "IT IS THE SUMMER OF 1905. RUSSIA IS ENGULFED IN THE FLAMES OF REVOLUTION. ALL CLASSES AND PARTIES ARE ON THE MOVE." HE GOES ON: "SEVENTY YEARS HAVE PASSED, BUT LENIN'S WORK READS TODAY AS IF IT REFERRED TO EVENTS DEVELOPING BEFORE OUR VERY EYES." CLEARLY, ZARODOV IS REFERRING TO PORTUGAL.4

ZARODOV'S LINE IS TOUGH, ORTHODOX LENINISM. HE EMPHASIZES THAT A COMMUNIST PARTY MUST MAINTAIN

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ITS HEGEMONY, ITS SEPARATENESS FROM OTHER PARTIES,  
AND ITS COMMITMENT TO LEAD THE REVOLUTION. IT  
IS PRECISELY THIS HEGEMONY, HE SAYS, THAT MAKES  
IT POSSIBLE FOR A COMMUNIST PARTY TO APPLY THE  
"SPECIFIC LEVERS" THAT TURN A "DEMOCRATIC REVOLU-  
TION" INTO A "SOCIALIST REVOLUTION."Y

ZARODOV IS SCORNFUL OF "MODERN CONCILIATORS"  
WHO BELIEVE THAT GAINING CONTROL OF THE "LEVERS OF  
POWER" IS THE FINAL ACT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PRO-  
CESS, WHICH COMES AFTER SOME KIND OF "REFERENDUM"  
THAT EXPRESSES THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY. LENINISTS,  
ZARODOV SAYS, KNOW THAT THE POPULAR MAJORITY IS A  
POLITICAL, NOT AN ARITHMETIC, CONCEPT; I.E., THE  
COMMUNIST PARTY EXPRESSES THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY,  
WHATEVER THE BALLOT BOX RESULTS MAY BE.Y

ZARODOV IS PROVIDING AN IDEOLOGICAL RATIONALE  
FOR CUNHAL'S TACTICS IN PORTUGAL. IT JUSTIFIES  
THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY'S INFILTRATION OF

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THE STATE MACHINERY AND THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.  
IT SANCTIONS THE ASSERTION OF COMMUNIST CONTROL  
OVER THE UNIONS, THE SHUT-DOWN OF REPUBLICA, AND  
THE USE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THE PARTY'S OPPONENTS.  
AT THE SAME TIME, THE ARTICLE IS NOT AN UNQUALIFIED  
ENDORSEMENT OF CUNHAL'S TACTICS. SOME OF ZARODOV'S  
OBSERVATIONS CAN BE INTERPRETED AS GUARDED CRITI-  
CISM OF THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY. 4

ZARODOV'S WIDER PURPOSE IS OPEN TO DIFFERENT  
INTERPRETATIONS. HIS ARTICLE WOULD HAVE BEEN  
APPROPRIATE EARLIER--HOWEVER INAPPROPRIATE NOW--  
AT A TIME WHEN THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY WAS IN  
REASONABLY GOOD SHAPE, WHEN IT APPEARED TO HAVE AN  
EXCELLENT CHANCE OF ACHIEVING POWER IN PORTUGAL  
DESPITE ITS POOR SHOWING IN THE APRIL ELECTION, AND  
WHEN ITS HEAVY-HANDED TACTICS WERE BEING OPENLY  
CRITICIZED BY THE ITALIAN COMMUNISTS AND OTHER

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WEST EUROPEAN PARTIES POLITICALLY EMBARRASSED AND DISCOMFITED BY THEIR PORTUGUESE COLLEAGUES' NAKED DISPLAY OF POWER.4

HENCE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ZARODOV'S PURPOSE WAS TO TELL THE ITALIANS AND OTHERS THAT IT WAS THEY, NOT CUNHAL, WHO WERE THE APOSTATES AND INDEED, THAT THE PORTUGUESE SITUATION MIGHT SERVE AS THE MODEL FOR THE COMING TO POWER OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN WEST EUROPE.4

ZARODOV MAY ALSO HAVE HAD AN INTERNAL AUDIENCE IN MIND. HIS ARTICLE CAN BE INTERPRETED AS PART OF AN ONGOING DEBATE AMONG SOVIET THEORISTS ON THE APPROPRIATE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF NON-RULING COMMUNIST PARTIES DURING THE CURRENT STAGE OF THE "CRISIS OF CAPITALISM." IN PLACING HIS EMPHASIS ON THE "HEGEMONY" OF COMMUNIST PARTIES, ZARODOV IS REFUTING THEORISTS WHO HAVE GIVEN HEAVIER WEIGHT TO THE UNITY OF ACTION BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST AND OTHER PARTIES.4

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IN PRINTING THE ZARODOV ARTICLE, PRAVDA SEEMS TO BE INTERVENING ON THE SIDE OF THE HARDLINERS, THUS RAISING THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN A FUNDAMENTAL SWITCH IN MOSCOW AWAY FROM COUNTENANCE OF THE QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO ACHIEVING POWER, AS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE ITALIAN COMMUNISTS, TOWARD A MORE ORTHODOX APPROACH EXEMPLIFIED BY THE PORTUGUESE.4

ONE PROBLEM WITH THIS THESIS IS TIMING. WHEN PRAVDA PRINTED IT, THE PORTUGUESE PARTY WAS UNDER VIOLENT ATTACK AND IN MORTAL DANGER. IT IS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD COMMEND TO THE WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS AND THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AN ORTHODOX REVOLUTIONARY MODEL AT EXACTLY THE TIME WHEN THE LEADING EXEMPLAR OF THAT MODEL TOTTERS ON THE BRINK OF DISASTER.4

IT WOULD TAKE SOME FAST, AND PROBABLY UNCONVINCING FOOTWORK, FOR MOSCOW TO ARGUE THAT THE REACTION

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AGAINST CUNHAL IS AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE ITALIANS AND FRENCH COMMUNISTS IF THEY WERE ON THE BRINK OF GAINING POWER. CUNHAL HAS CLEARLY BEEN PLAYING A DIFFERENT GAME THAN BERLINGUER OR MARCHAIS.4

ONE ALTERNATE HYPOTHESIS IS THAT PRAVDA'S MESSAGE WAS MORE MODEST: THAT THE WEST EUROPEANS AND OTHERS SHOULD NOT INTERPRET A DEFEAT FOR CUNHAL AS VINDICATION OF THEIR OWN APPROACH TO ACHIEVING POWER.4

IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT MOSCOW REPRINTED ZARODOV IN PRAVDA MERELY AS A TOKEN OF ITS "SOLIDARITY" WITH THE BELEAGUERED PORTUGUESE COMRADES. THE SOVIETS ALWAYS FEEL THEMSELVES UNDER SOME OBLIGATION TO PROTECT THEIR REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS. THE ZARODOV ARTICLE MAY HAVE BEEN VIEWED AS SOUNDING A MILITANT NOTE AFTER THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE, AND WHILE MOSCOW PREPARES FOR A EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY MEETING.4

THE SOVIETS ARE MAKING A VALIANT EFFORT TO

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HAVE IT BOTH WAYS. THUS, THEIR LINE ON PORTUGAL HAS CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED CUNHAL'S GRAB FOR POWER EVEN WHILE IT SUPPORTS THE UNITY OF ACTION BY THE COMMUNISTS AND OTHER PARTIES. AND THUS ZARODOV'S BOSS, CANDIDATE POLITBURO MEMBER PONOMAREV, LAST YEAR WROTE A WIDELY DISCUSSED ARTICLE ON THE LESSONS OF CHILE THAT EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTROLLING THE LEVERS OF POWER, BUT LAST MONTH WAS EXTOLLING THE APPROPRIATENESS AND IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNISTS AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATS. INDEED, PONOMAREV, AND HIS SUPERIOR, SENIOR IDEOLOGIST SUSLOV, WERE SPEAKING AT A CONFERENCE COMMEMORATING THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE POPULAR FRONT.4

THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE SITUATION IN PORTUGAL AND ZARODOV'S ARTICLE DO NOT RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DETENTE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE. THE SUPPORTERS OF THE CURRENT SOVIET DETENTE POLICY HAVE CITED PORTUGAL

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AS A CASE WHERE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRESS HAS BEEN  
POSSIBLE AS A CONSEQUENCE OF DETENTE. IF THE  
PORTUGUESE COMMUNISTS COME TO A BAD END, THOSE WHO  
ARE LESS ENAMORED OF DETENTE WILL HAVE GAINED  
ANOTHER STRING TO THEIR BOW.



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