CIANIO MEMO 750624

Memorandum for the Senior Review Group CIANIO

24 Jun 75

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Office of the Director

24 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Senior Review Group

SUBJECT Portuguese Policy and Role in Angola

1. At the SRG meeting last week on the Angola problem, Deputy Secretary Clements asked for an assessment of Portuguese policy and attitudes in Angola. The attached response was prepared in CIA and has been discussed with State/INR and with DIA.

- 2. Briefly, it concludes that:
 - -- The more moderate leaders in Lisbon favor Savimbi, and the more radical ones the MPLA. The FNLA has virtually no support among Portuguese leaders.

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-- This reflects Lisbon's awareness of its diminishing ability to affect events and its desire to be on good terms with the new Angola no matter who is in charge.

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Attachment

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
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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT

Portuguese Policy and Objectives in -Angola

- Insofar as the AFM has an agreed policy on the subject, it perceives its ties with Angola after independence on November 11 as a bridge between Europe and the Third World. By developing a favored relationship with its former colony, it hopes to preserve its economic interests there, which are major, to gain special access to African and other Third World markets for Portuguese trade, and in general to chalk up a plus for Portugal in the Third World.
- Portuguese objectives will of course be more easily realized if Lisbon can withdraw gracefully and on good terms with whatever group is in charge in Luanda. But the recent fighting in Angola and the prospect of more to come complicates Lisbon's task.



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- 5. Despite publicly adhering to the doctrine of neutrality, different elements within Portugal's military leadership privately support those factions in Angola which most closely represent their own political style.
 - --Thus, moderate officers in the Movement, for example, favor Jonas Savimbi of UNITA. These moderates, most notably President Costa Gomes and Foreign Minister Antunes, believe Savimbi is more likely to deal even-handedly with the white population of Angola. They also hope that the emergence of Savimbi over Neto's Communist-backed MPLA would discredit the Communists and radical Movement leaders in Lisbon.
 - --A substantial minority, however--probably including Prime Minister Goncalves and Admiral Rosa Coutinho, who as former high commissioner in Angola was principally responsible for setting up the decolonization machinery there--would still prefer to see the MPLA prevail over its rivals, but they probably will not press this point as long as it continues to be a minority position.
 - --The third major Angolan faction, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), is viewed as a puppet of Zaire President Mobutu and the US and has virtually no political support in Portugal.

- of. The Portuguese people in the metropole overwhelmingly want the country to put its military involvement in Angola behind it. Portuguese citizens in Angola see their livelihoods and families threatened both by the violence and by independence itself. Salaried workers and small entrepreneurs are expected to get out as soon as possible. Those with a larger economic stake in the territory will probably stay on and attempt to strike the best bargain they can with the new government.
- 7. A resumption of the fighting will only increase the "white flight" from the territory. It is estimated that as many as one-third of the 300,000-400,000 Portuguese in Angola have already left, with many returning to Portugal. This mass exodus of Portuguese technicians and administrators lessens the chances of post-independence stability in Angola, and greatly exacerbates Portugal's domestic unemployment. It also introduces into Lisbon's highly charged political atmosphere elements who are alarmed in general by Portugal's drift to the left and upset in particular by the new leadership's decolonization policy.
- 8. During the most recent flareup of violence, Portuguese Foreign Minister Antunes reminded the Portuguese public that Portugal's military forces in Angola-which number 24,000-are obligated to play a more active role in controlling the fighting. This is not a popular view, however. It is generally acknowledged that the Portuguese troops in Angola have neither the will or the wherewithal to do much but protect their own nationals. This attitude was painfully obvious recently when a token group of military reinforcements initially refused embarkation. No Portuguese soldier wants to die in Africa at a time when his country is in the process of disengagement.
- O. Faced with the danger of civil war in Angola, Portugal can be expected to pursue a policy which will seek to protect its future economic interests in the territory and discourage a further influx of embittered

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refugees. Therefore, it will probably do what it can to help restore the political and military balance in Angola, but its capacity to affect events is diminishing. The weakness of its military force there leaves little that Lisbon can do other than exhort the rival factions toward an amicable settlement of their differences and hope for the best.