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Trends in Communist Propaganda

14 May 75

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F B I S

TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

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INDOCHINA

MAJOR DRV, PRG LEADERS DUE TO APPEAR AT SAIGON VICTORY FETE

Media evidence suggests that in the next few days high-ranking PRG/NFLSV leaders will at last make their first public appearance in Saigon since its conquest and probably use the occasion for their first authoritative speeches outlining postwar communist policies for the South. This is suggested by announcements on festivities to celebrate the communist takeover scheduled to begin 15 May, and the planned first public visit to Saigon by a high-level DRV delegation. The PRG/NFLSV leadership clearly will have every reason, including protocol requirements, to welcome the DRV delegation with a PRG/NFLSV leadership turnout of comparable stature.

The DRV party-government delegation, announced by Vietnamese communist media on 14 May as having departed for Saigon, includes DRV President Ton Duc Thang and Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Politburo members Le Duc Tho, Le Thanh Nghi, and Van Tien Dung. Hanoi radio's account of the DRV delegation's departure noted that it was seen off by VWP Politburo members Truong Chinh and Pham Van Dong. No mention was made of VWP First Secretary Le Duan or Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, both of whom are last known to have appeared at Hanoi's May Day celebrations.

The celebrations in Saigon which the North Vietnamese delegation will attend are part of delayed victory ceremonies proclaimed throughout Vietnam that will precede by a few days the 19 May anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birthday. The festivities were announced in "decisions" by DRV and PRG authorities broadcast on the 10th by Hanoi and the Front radios. The PRG decision was the first authoritative public PRG pronouncement on developments in South Vietnam since the war's end on 30 April.

The DRV and PRG decisions on the victory celebration followed a VWP Secretariat directive of the 5th, released on the 7th, that announced a celebration was to be held without indicating its timing.* While the undated DRV decision was ascribed to the DRV premier and was "in accordance with" the earlier VWP directive, the 8 May PRG announcement was issued as a decision of the PRG

* For a discussion of the VWP directive, see the TRENDS of 7 May 1975, page 1.

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Council of Ministers and signed by its chairman, PRG President Huynh Tan Phat. According to the PRG decision, the Council of Ministers met on the 7th, but no details of the meeting's agenda were disclosed. Since January 1972, PRG Council sessions have followed a pattern of meeting twice a year--in winter and summer--and have customarily been followed up with a communique describing the proceedings.

According to the PRG decision, "a grand ceremony" is to be held "in all localities of South Vietnam for a period of three days, from 15 to 17 May," during which time military and government personnel are to be released from work. The PRG decision also made special note that those who "previously served in . . . the puppet Saigon army and administration, as well as foreigners" would be allowed to participate. At the same time it cautioned those who might "harbor schemes or commit acts of sabotage against the celebrations" that they would be "severely punished." The briefer DRV decision only designated the 15th and 16th as "official holidays" for the celebration.

COMMUNISTS TIGHTEN CONTROL IN SAIGON, WARN "REACTIONARIES"

Saigon radio has continued to report communist efforts to impose control over the city and has broadcast accounts of "people's revolutionary committees" being established at the precinct level. While the overall impression conveyed by the media is one of order and acquiescence by the citizens, there are indications that some persons are refusing to fully cooperate and in some cases are taking advantage of what must be the initial confusion of the sudden communist takeover.

The Saigon-Gia Dinh Municipal Military Management Committee,* headed by Lieutenant General Tran Van Tra, has been issuing a flurry of communiqués ordering various categories of residents to report to work, supplying detailed information on where former Saigon military personnel and GVN officials are to register with communist authorities and turn in weapons, and establishing registration procedures for foreigners still in the city. In addition, communiqués have been broadcast providing guidelines on postal and telegraphic services, currency

* For a discussion of the establishment of the committee, see the TRENDS of 7 May 1975, pages 1-3.

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regulations, printing and publishing prohibitions, registration and collection of firearms and explosives, and the proper disposition of real estate abandoned by those who have fled.

A 12 May military management committee communique prohibiting the use of "improperly prepared" flags and insignia indicated that "some bad elements" have been impersonating certain officials by using flags and armbands to "commit illegal acts against public order and security." An 11 May editorial in the new Saigon newspaper GIAI PHONG, entitled "Develop the People's Collective Mastership, Resolutely Track Down and Punish Stubborn Reactionaries," had also indicated that some have refused to conform with the communists' efforts at control. Following an essentially conciliatory recapitulation of PRG policy toward those who cooperate, the editorial launched into a severe condemnation and warning to those "many reactionary and wicked elements still remaining" who "in a number of areas . . . refuse to report, hide weapons, and perform scattered acts opposing the revolution . . . or setting up phony revolutionary committees."

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PRG, DRV ASK THAILAND, OTHER STATES TO RETURN PLANES, SHIPS

Vietnamese communist media in the past two weeks have issued a barrage of comment calling upon Thailand, Singapore, and other Southeast Asian nations to return aircraft, ships, and cargo taken out of South Vietnam by refugees fleeing the communist takeover. The PRG stopped issuing foreign ministry spokesman protests critical of Thailand after 6 May, perhaps because it had reached an agreement with Bangkok on private negotiations. A Hanoi broadcast on 14 May quoted a LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY announcement that the PRG Foreign Ministry had appointed Ambassador Nguyen Minh Phuong* to go to Bangkok to "take over the property" of the former GVN embassy and "retrieve" the South Vietnamese ships and aircraft.

Hanoi continued as late as 13 May to authoritatively criticize Thailand; but a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest on that date against anti-Vietnamese demonstrations in Thailand echoed earlier references to the possibility of normalizing relations between the two countries. Hanoi's posture is consistent with its basic policy in the months prior to the communist takeover in South Vietnam, when the DRV seemed bent on pressuring Bangkok--through a conditional offer of talks on improving relations--to end its cooperation with U.S. policies in Indochina.** There has been no public acknowledgment by the Vietnamese of Bangkok news reports on 13 May that Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai Chunhawan had stated that a DRV delegation would arrive at the end of the month to discuss bilateral relations.

The campaign to gain custody of the planes and ships for the PRG began promptly on the heels of the fall of Saigon with the release on 1 May of a PRG Foreign Ministry statement, dated 30 April, which announced that the PRG is "now exercising its full sovereignty in the whole of South Vietnam, is the only authentic and legal representative of the Vietnamese people, and has full power to solve the international affairs of South Vietnam." The PRG's claim to be the only legal authority in South Vietnam was not

* Nguyen Minh Phuong served as PRG Ambassador to Cuba from 1969 to mid-1972.

** For a discussion of North Vietnamese policy toward Thailand since January 1973, see the 20 March 1975 FBIS SPECIAL REPORT No. 309, "North Vietnamese Relations with Thailand: Evolution of DRV Policy Since the Paris Peace Agreement."

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reiterated in a 2 May DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement endorsing the 30 April PRG Foreign Ministry statement, nor in subsequent official DRV statements; but the claim was echoed in Hanoi press comment, including a 2 May commentary in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. The PRG also issued a foreign ministry statement on the 2d restating its right to property taken out of South Vietnam.

On 3 May Vietnamese media released notes on this issue from both the PRG and DRV foreign ministries. The PRG Foreign Ministry note, which was sent to Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore, restated the PRG claim to be the only legal South Vietnamese representative and mildly requested that the nations "help" in the transfer of the planes and ships to the PRG. The DRV note, sent only to Thailand, asked that Bangkok respond positively to the PRG and held out the hope that "correct" Thai action on the issue would be "an important contribution to the normalization of relations" between Thailand and the DRV and to peace in the region. The possibility of a "quick improvement of relations" between Bangkok and Hanoi was raised in a 4 May NHAN DAN commentary. Setting the pattern for later comment, the commentary contrasted statements by Thai Prime Minister Khukrit Pramot, favoring the return of the planes to South Vietnam, with remarks by Thai Defense Minister Praman Adireksan opposing such a move. It observed critically that a number of persons in Thai ruling circles want to continue a "reactionary policy."

Reports that the U.S. aircraft carrier Midway had removed some of the South Vietnamese planes from Thailand prompted the next official PRG comment, in a foreign ministry spokesman's statement on 6 May which condemned the "seizure" by the "Ford Administration" and asserted the right to claim all property which had been brought into Thailand. A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the same day, by contrast, focused its criticism on the Bangkok government, claiming that statements by the Thai Foreign Ministry had accommodated the U.S. "plot" to seize PRG property. It reiterated that transfer of the aircraft and ships to the PRG would "serve to benefit the friendly relations between the DRV and Thailand." The DRV spokesman warned that the Thai Government must be responsible for "all consequences of its actions" if it "colludes with America and permits the latter to forcibly seize" the PRG property.

The Vietnamese were slow in responding to Bangkok reports on the 6th that Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai Chunhawan had asked the United States to halt the removal of weaponry and had sent a cable

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to the PRG asking it to send emissaries to Bangkok to negotiate the return of the ships, aircraft, and weapons. A 9 May NHAN DAN commentary set the tone for the reaction. It charged that the United States had removed more than 100 aircraft prior to the Thai embargo, claimed that Bangkok had colluded in this U.S. move, and declared that "this was a hostile act by the Ford Administration and the Thai Government . . . and a robbery of the South Vietnamese people's property" The paper scored "pro-U.S. authorities in Bangkok" as "hypocritical."

A Liberation Radio commentary on the 10th echoed NHAN DAN's harsh criticism of Bangkok and demanded that the Thai Government "clarify its attitude by taking action, not by issuing statements." Another PRG radio commentary on the same day demanded that Bangkok "pay" South Vietnam for the property which it has "allowed the United States to take away," but this demand has not been publicly repeated at an authoritative level.

Perhaps reflecting a movement of PRG-Thai negotiations into private channels, the PRG has released no further foreign ministry statements on the question of returning ships and planes. Hanoi on the 11th released a foreign ministry spokesman's statement dated the previous day, responding to a statement by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew on the 9th, which pointed out that it would be in the interest of relations between Vietnam and Singapore if the latter returned South Vietnamese aircraft and ships to the PRG. Hanoi, but not the PRG, also issued a foreign ministry spokesman's statement on 13 May accusing "Thai reactionaries" of "engineering" demonstrations against Vietnamese residents in Thailand.

PHNOM PENH ACCUSES U.S. OF SLANDER, SABOTAGE; EXTOLS PEKING

Phnom Penh radio, while remaining silent thus far on the reported Cambodian detention of a U.S. freighter and other foreign ships over the past week, has revealed sharp sensitivity to Western accounts alleging that the new regime is pursuing repressive internal policies and mistreating foreigners who were in the capital at the time of its surrender. A 10 May statement by RGNU Information and Propaganda Minister Hu Nim and a 10 May communique released by the Ministry of Information and Propaganda both attacked "dishonest propaganda" allegedly spread by the United States. In other comment Phnom Penh has extolled its relationship with Peking while playing down its relationship with Hanoi and has reaffirmed its longstanding position on the acceptability of unconditional foreign aid.

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Speaking on behalf of the RGNU, Hu Nim ridiculed alleged U.S. pretensions to humanitarianism when, he said, the United States actually was "the bloodiest supermurderer . . . in the history of mankind." Hu Nim charged that the United States has engaged in propaganda efforts against the new regime and has "planted traitorous forces" to continue "subversive and sabotage activities." Hu Nim warned that his regime would not allow "U.S. imperialism, its allies, or its hirelings" to continue their "anti-Cambodian activities" with impunity. The 10 May Ministry of Information and Propaganda communique similarly accorded primary responsibility for unfavorable Western press reports to the United States, accusing the U.S. "propaganda apparatus" of trying to "distort the truth" of Cambodia's efforts to deal with foreigners who remained in Phnom Penh despite the Front's repeated warnings that they evacuate. Neither the statement by Hu Nim nor the communique specifically referred to President Ford's remarks on Cambodia at his 6 May press conference, and they both avoided referring by name to the Ford Administration, in line with Phnom Penh's practice since the Front victory.

A 10 May commentary on foreign reaction to the Front's victory hailed Peking's relationship with Phnom Penh as "a radiant model" of international relations "based on sincere support and mutual respect." The commentary warmly noted the PRC leaders' message of 18 April to the Front leaders and other signs of Chinese friendship. It gave only perfunctory attention to Phnom Penh's relationship with Hanoi, mentioning assistance by Vietnam only in conjunction with support rendered by Laos and the DPRK and identifying the three nations as the "other close comrades-in-arms of the Cambodian people in Asia." Phnom Penh commentaries have continued to affirm that Cambodia is willing to accept aid from foreign countries so long as it is unconditional, accords with the regime's policy of self-reliance, and is not a subterfuge for subversion or interference---a stand set forth at the Front's second national congress in February and at the special national congress held on 25-27 April.

DOMESTIC AFFAIRS Phnom Penh radio continues to provide little concrete detail on the regime's efforts toward political consolidation and economic reconstruction. There has been no acknowledgment of the deportation of Cambodia's urban populace to the countryside nor any report on the fate of former GKR leaders Long Boret and Sirik Matak, but radio commentaries have indirectly touched upon these questions. A 12 May Phnom Penh radio commentary announced that the regime was carrying out the second congress' "political stand of solidarity" with former GKR

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officials and military personnel. The commentary noted that, except for the seven "supertraitors" condemned by the February national congress, all connected with the former administration are currently "vigorously cooperating to build a new Cambodia." A 10 May radio commentary stated that "anybody going the wrong way by mistake or by past habit will be given a gradual moral and political reeducation by the people until he or she is totally reformed and purified," adding that "only those who continue to sabotage our nation" will be punished in the future.

Phnom Penh broadcasts since the special national congress have also highlighted the regime's attempt to restore communication and transportation facilities, efforts apparently being undertaken primarily under the direction of the army. Separate broadcasts have reported work on several of Cambodia's major highways and rail lines, on Pochentong airport outside of Phnom Penh, and at the major port of Sihanoukville.

PATHET LAO HAIL RESIGNATIONS, PLEDGE SUPPORT FOR 1973 ACCORD

Pathet Lao broadcasts have welcomed the 9 May resignation of five leading "rightists" members of the coalition Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU), but have given no indication that the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) has altered its policy of participating in the governing of Laos under terms of the 1973 Vientiane peace agreement. The tone and content of the comment suggest the LPF is concerned with maintaining its image as a strict adherent to the Vientiane accord in order to avoid giving the impression they are seizing control of the government. Initial Pathet Lao reaction to the resignations, in an 11 May radio commentary, was restrained, depicted the resignations as the result of mass pressure exerted by the Lao people, and charged the former officials with attempting to subvert the PGNU and its counterpart, the National Political Council of Coalition (NPCC). The commentary noted that despite the "schemes" of the rightists, the PGNU and the NPCC would "continue to run the affairs of state." Subsequent Pathet Lao radio announcements reported the replacement of Defense Minister Sisouk na Champassak by General Khamouane Boupha, a member of the Pathet Lao-aligned Patriotic Neutralist Forces. The radio quoted Premier Souvanna Phouma to the effect that all members of the armed forces should obey the new defense minister and urged the population to maintain unity and public order.

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The resignations of Defense Minister Sisouk, Finance Minister Ngon Sananikon, and several other officials were preceded by several weeks of strong Pathet Lao radio criticism of the rightist leaders, particularly of Sisouk and Meo General Vang Pao, who were personally singled out for condemnation for their alleged initiation of recent attacks on LPF-controlled areas. Such personal attacks on Sisouk and other rightist officials have occurred periodically since the formation of the PGNU a year ago. The most recent denunciations began on 22 April, two days after an LPF Central Committee spokesman issued a statement condemning the "reactionary clique" for launching attacks in the Sala Phoukoun area, and three days after Hanoi had issued a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement which "strongly refuted" Sisouk's "fabrications" concerning North Vietnamese troops in Laos. In addition to commentaries attacking the rightists, the Pathet Lao radio carried reports of demonstrations in Vientiane in late April and early May by the "21 Organizations," a coalition of front groups who demanded that the PGNU force the rightists to comply strictly with the Vientiane accord.

While criticizing Sisouk and Vang Pao, the Pathet Lao has suggested that the LPF has acted with restraint in the face of constant provocation by the rightists, at the same time warning that its patience was wearing thin. Thus, a 6 May commentary stated that the patriotic forces were capable of wiping out Vang Pao's forces but that "this is not our primary goal . . . because we want to preserve the spirit of national concord called for in the peace accords." The commentary closed with a threat to "duly punish or wipe them out" if the situation became more intolerable. A later commentary directed at Sisouk, on 8 May, suggested that Pathet Lao patience had been exhausted, asking rhetorically if the "people" should sit idly by in the face of repeated rightist provocations, and answering its own query in the negative. Citing Pathet Lao willingness to employ its "legitimate right to self-defense" as a "solemn warning," the commentary pointedly suggested that Sisouk follow the example of Lon Nol and Thieu and leave the country with his family.

MOSCOW, PEKING,
HANOI TREATMENT

Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi have all reported on recent developments in Laos, relying primarily for their information on Pathet Lao sources, although differing in the level of attention they have devoted to the situation. Moscow, in a 12 May TASS report citing the Pathet Lao news agency (KPL), reported Vientiane was

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calm in the wake of the resignations; and an unattributed 12 May Moscow domestic service commentary noted that the developments in Laos were aimed at eliminating the "last obstacles" to the full implementation of the Vientiane agreement. Peking gave extensive replay to news reports from Laos on the resignations and Sisouk's replacement with Khamouane Boupha, repeating without elaboration or comment several Radio Pathet Lao commentaries highly critical of the former government officials. Hanoi's VNA English-language transmission have not yet reported the resignations, but did carry reports on earlier developments in Laos, including a 12 May item citing KPL reports that Sisouk and others were planning a "reactionary coup."

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V - E DAY

MOSCOW WINDS UP CEREMONIES WITH BREZHNEV SPEECH, PEACE APPEAL

Moscow's extraordinary three-month campaign to celebrate the 30th anniversary of V-E Day wound up rather anticlimatically, with a bland, relatively brief speech by Brezhnev and an equally bland peace appeal signed by the three top Soviet governing bodies. In contrast with the generally militant and even jingoistic rhetoric that has characterized much of the campaign, these documents were mild in tone and clearly intended to accent the peaceful aspects of the Soviet Union's international posture. On some of the peripheral political questions raised by the campaign--such as its implications for Brezhnev's political status--the evidence remains ambiguous. The brevity of Brezhnev's speech--under an hour--seems to be a minus for him, but the award of marshal's stars signifying his promotion to the rank of General of the Army is clearly a plus.

BREZHNEV'S IMAGE MIXED The brevity of Brezhnev's speech meant that he did not dominate the press coverage of the event as he did 10 years ago on the occasion of the 20th anniversary in 1965. On that occasion his speech was not only lengthy, extending from the first to the fourth page of PRAVDA, but it bristled with passages of great political interest. That was the speech which signaled the post-Khrushchev partial rehabilitation of Stalin; it was harshly critical of U.S. policy in Vietnam; it contained one of the rare acknowledgments by a Soviet leader of the domestic social impact of defense expenditures (in a statement declaring that the Soviet people understood the need for such expenditures.) By contrast, this year's speech was largely a panegyric to wartime heroism and, aside from its expression of hope that the end of the war in Indochina would bolster U.S.-Soviet detente, carried little of political substance. Furthermore, this year Brezhnev shared the first four pages of PRAVDA with a half-dozen other speakers, none of political rank. While the briefness of his remarks may have been due to health reasons, the effect was still to diminish the public impact of his speech.

The announcement on 9 May of the award of marshal's stars to Brezhnev confirms the accuracy of Grechko's reference in his 18 April speech to Brezhnev as a "general of the army". Nevertheless, the absence of an official announcement of Brezhnev's promotion, plus the failure thus far of speakers other than Grechko to refer

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to him by his new rank, suggests that the promotion may have been pushed through against opposition. Some support for this suggestion is provided by some curious changes made last year in Soviet procedures for appointing Generals of the Army.

According to the 6 November GAZETTE OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET, it was decreed on 1 November that the rank of General of the Army would henceforth be conferred by the Supreme Soviet Presidium, rather than by the Council of Ministers, as provided for in the law of 12 October 1967. This meant that authority to confer the rank was removed from Kossygin's jurisdiction and put in the hands of Podgorny. It is notable that only the rank of General of the Army--the presumptive next rank for Brezhnev--was affected by the change in procedure. In a second decree issued the same day, the Supreme Soviet Presidium provided that the "marshal's star" could henceforth be awarded to Generals of the Army. Podgorny signed both decrees.

"MILITARY COOPERATION" A recheck of the historical evidence also throws some new light on the significance of a curious phrase which began to crop up in Soviet statements on the war anniversary several weeks ago.* In his speech on 18 April Marshal Grechko had observed that the wartime alliance confirmed the possibility of effective "political and military cooperation" between states with different social systems. Since Grechko seemed to be implying that the wartime experience might serve as a model for the future, his use of the phrase raised questions concerning his intentions. However, when other Soviet speakers began to use the same phrase, it became apparent that the words were being drawn from a common source. This source, the evidence shows, was the original CPSU decree of 9 February calling for the start of the anniversary campaign. The context indicates that it was used in a historical sense and was intended simply to describe the actual nature of the wartime alliance relationship.

* For a brief discussion of use of this phrase see the TRENDS of 7 May 1975, pages 22-23.

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PRAGUE, EAST BERLIN SPEECHES UNDERSCORE SOVIET VICTORY ROLE

Speeches by Honecker and Husak were the featured events of the 30th V-E Day anniversary ceremonies in East Berlin and Prague, both on 7 May. In addition to V-E Day, the festivities commemorated the 30th liberation anniversaries of the GDR (8 May) and Czechoslovakia (9 May). The highest-ranking Soviet representatives at V-E Day observances in Eastern Europe were CPSU Politburo member Kulakov, who attended the GDR ceremonies, and Politburo member Kirilenko, who performed the corresponding honors in Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev had attended the 25th anniversary festivities in Prague in 1970. According to Western news reports, plans for a repeat visit this year were canceled because of the renewed tensions surrounding Dubcek and the question of whether further measures may be taken against him.

In their speeches, Honecker and Husak paid the conventional deference to the Soviet Union's role in defeating Hitler, barely mentioning the role of the other members of the "anti-Hitler coalition." Husak's silence on the U.S. war role may have been more a mark of restraint than of disdain, however, since the Czechoslovak press had been carrying harsh anti-American articles in the buildup for the anniversary ceremonies. Brezhnev was singled out for praise several times, particularly by Kirilenko in his speech in Prague. He reminded his audience that Brezhnev had "participated directly in the fighting for the liberation of your country."

DUBCEK AFFAIR The Dubcek controversy was reflected in veiled terms in the speeches of Husak and Kirilenko. Thus, in an obvious reference to Dubcek, whom he had accused of "treason" in his 16 April speech, Husak now spoke of "individuals" who, in contrast to the majority, "lost their enthusiasm, or even committed treason" in the complicated difficulties experienced by the CPCZ in the past and present. Kirilenko, in praising Husak, portrayed the CPCZ leader as exemplifying "Czechoslovak reality," in contrast to "all degenerate politicians who would like to smear" the country's outstanding achievements. Soviet approval of the current anti-Dubcek campaign has heretofore been registered only indirectly in favorable Soviet reportage of Husak's 16 April speech and of public support for the attacks on the purged leader.

In the wake of the Prague festivities, a CTK report on the 12th denounced "fabricated reports" in Austrian, West German, and French media about recent arrests of 1968 liberals in Czechoslovakia. The sole aim of such reports, CTK charged, was to "disrupt the dignified atmosphere" of the 30th anniversary celebration.

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PARTY CONFERENCES Husak in Prague and Kulakov in East Berlin both mentioned the all-European communist party conference planned for this year, preparations for which have apparently encountered serious difficulties. While the conference was not mentioned in the speech by Honecker--chief of the SED, which is scheduled to host the conclave--Kulakov's speech, following Honecker's, noted that "It is Berlin where the conference of European communists is being prepared," adding that European communists are now, as 30 years ago, in the vanguard of the fight for peace.

In Prague, Husak declared that his party was participating in preparations for a European communist party conference and supporting "the initiative for convening a world conference." This formulation seems surprisingly provocative, since it appears to challenge the Yugoslav declaration that the LCY would not attend a European CP conference which is convened as a prelude to a world party conference.

BELGRADE REVEALS CONTINUED PIQUE OVER SOVIET ARTICLES

Yugoslav comment surrounding the 30th anniversary of V-E Day has indicated continued official pique over recent articles by top Soviet military leaders which failed, in the view of Yugoslav leaders, to give due credit to Tito's army for the liberation of Yugoslavia. From Belgrade's viewpoint, the issue raised by the articles involved not only historical accuracy but the current political issue of Yugoslavia's independence from the Moscow-dominated bloc. Yugoslav spokesmen professed to see in the Soviet articles an attempt to justify Soviet interference in Yugoslav affairs. Thus, in responding to the articles, the Yugoslavs have stressed that Yugoslavia remains an independent and self-reliant country.

The theme of self-reliance was stressed in virtually all media comment and leaders' speeches on the 30th anniversary. Serbian party leader Vlastalik, for example, noted that "we must constantly keep in mind the fact that, as in the past, no one will make a gift to us of anything . . ." Perhaps the strongest claim to self-reliance was provided by a Belgrade radio report on the 9 May anniversary parade which repeatedly stated that a majority of the weapons on display were developed by Yugoslavs in Yugoslav factories. The report did not acknowledge that a substantial number of the sophisticated military weapons on display, according to Western military observers, came from Moscow, although it did note Romania's contribution to the development of the new Orao fighter plane.

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In the highest-level comment on the anniversary, a statement by Tito issued by IANJUG on the 8th, the Yugoslav leader vehemently defended the partisans' wartime record. Acknowledging that the Soviet Union had borne the brunt of the war against Germany, Tito nevertheless asserted that "we . . . liberated our country ourselves." Although his reminiscences were obviously intended to rebut the Soviet military leaders' version of the liberation of Yugoslavia, Tito's criticism of Moscow was more muted than the criticisms he had made in a 2 April speech which keyed the earlier Yugoslav rebuttal efforts. Moreover, his sharpest criticism was directed at Western distortions of history rather than at Moscow.

MOSCOW CORRECTS RECORD

In an apparent effort to assuage Yugoslav feelings, Moscow went out of its way in the recent anniversary observances to pay public honor to Yugoslavia's role in the war. Brezhnev listed the Yugoslavs first in enumerating the contributions to the defeat of Hitler by "national liberation" armies. Yugoslavia was similarly honored in other such listings. Politburo member Mazurov, leader of the Soviet delegation to the Belgrade celebration, issued a statement to IANJUG on 9 May which noted Tito's "exceptional role" in organizing the partisans as well as his "heroism and courage."

Despite these moves toward reconciliation, Belgrade continues to express indignation over what it regards as hostile articles in the press of the Soviet bloc countries. On 12 May Zagreb commentator Sundic asserted that the Czechoslovak press has continued to publish offensive articles by the Soviet military, including one by Gretchko reportedly published in the Czechoslovak theoretical journal NOVYA SVETL. Sundic also complained that an 11 April RUDE PRAVO article on World War II by Yugoslavia's Dolanc was altered prior to publication by the Prague editors in order to emphasize the Soviet role.

PEKING ASSAILS BREZHNEV'S "HITLER-TYPE" FASCISM ON V-E DAY

Peking, which had not marked the V-E Day anniversary last year or on the last quinquennial in 1970, commemorated this year's 30th anniversary with a 9 May PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial denouncing in harsh, but not unprecedented language the "Ghuchchev-Brezhnev renegade clique" for subtleting the Soviet victory in the war against Hitler and establishing a dictatorship of "Hitler-type fascism."

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The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial attacked Moscow for attempting to "negate" the role played by Stalin in the war, charging that this represented the "grossest insult" to the Soviet people and was an ill-disguised effort to nullify the "socialist system under the dictatorship of the Soviet proletariat at that time." Pointing to current Soviet media praise for Brezhnev, Peking said that Moscow's leaders are attempting to take credit for the victory over Hitler in order to cover their "ugly features" as "renegades" to Leninism and the October Revolution, and to intensify their pursuit of "social-imperialism" abroad and "social-fascism" at home. It also took issue with Moscow's stress on the USSR as the "liberator" of Europe, asserting that Moscow is ignoring the "contributions" of other European peoples in order to justify its continuing dominance over a number of East European countries.

This year's Chinese reaction follows the pattern of Peking's response to the 20th anniversary in 1965, when a lengthy PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial also assailed the policies of the Soviet leadership, some six months after the ouster of Khrushchev. However, the 1965 editorial had focused on the United States as the successor to Hitler's Germany and as the main threat to world peace, but had not then viewed the Soviet leadership in that context. The editorial this year depicted the "superpowers" as the successor to Hitler, focusing on the USSR as particularly ambitious and expansive while characterizing the United States as "increasingly vulnerable and strategically passive." In 1965 Peking had reported lengthy speeches by Chinese vice premiers attending receptions on the anniversary date hosted by the Soviet, GDR, and Czechoslovak envoys in Peking. By contrast, MOXA this year issued only terse reports on these receptions, which were attended by Chinese delegations led by officials at the ministerial level or below.

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CUBA - U. S. RELATIONS

HAVANA MEDIA HIGHLIGHT MCGOVERN SUPPORT FOR LIFTING EMBARGO

Cuban media coverage of the 5-8 May visit to Cuba by U.S. Sen. George McGovern was much more extensive and prompt than that accorded the last comparable visitors--Senators Javits and Pell, who visited Cuba in September 1974--suggesting that Havana now has more confidence in dealing with such U.S. visitors and exploiting such occasions to publicize its views on the obstacles to reestablishing Cuban-U.S. relations.* The Havana media gave special attention to the senator's criticism of the U.S. trade embargo and to Fidel Castro's statements favoring a normalization of relations. Soviet media linked the McGovern trip to the 8 May opening of the OAS General Assembly in Washington, noting that the OAS' chief topic would be "the removal of discriminatory sanctions against Cuba." Feking media, which had ignored completely the 1974 visit by Senators Javits and Pell and normally pay little attention to Cuban affairs, on this occasion offered a single report on the McGovern visit, linking it to an expected easing of the U.S. trade boycott which, MCONA cited McGovern as saying, "has only served to make Cuba more dependent upon the Soviet Union."

CASTRO REMARKS ON
U.S. EMBARGO

Castro, in a press conference with U.S. newsmen accompanying McGovern reported by *PUNSA LATINA* on 8 May, said that "Cuba wishes to improve its relations with the United States" but reiterated the Cuban regime's position that the U.S. embargo should be lifted first because Cuba could not "negotiate under pressure." Acknowledging previous "small gestures" made by the United States, such as easing of travel restrictions on Cuban diplomats at the United Nations, Castro asserted that Cuba had made more "valuable" overtures including cooperation on the skyjacking problem, and called for a U.S. "gesture of similar importance," such as lifting the ban on export of foodstuffs and medicines to Cuba. Apparently avoiding a direct statement on what the United States might gain in return, Castro said only that a partial lifting of the embargo would lead to a "reconsideration by the Cuban side of its relations with the United States."

* Cuban and Soviet media coverage of the Javits-Pell visit is discussed in the *TRENDS* of 2 October 1974, pages 18-19.

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Citing other factors which augured well for better relations, Castro mentioned the resignation of President Nixon and the end of the Vietnam war--often a feature in Cuban denunciations of U.S. "imperialist" policy. He added that the visits of Senators Javits, Pell and McGovern were also "appreciated," and he praised McGovern as a man whose opposition to the war in Vietnam had demonstrated that he was a "loyal defender of peace." In September 1974 Castro had not mentioned the visit then by Senators Javits and Pell in delivering a harshly anti-U.S. anniversary speech.

Queried, as usual, about alleged CIA plots against him, Castro replied--as he has in the past--that the "plots" had been "known for a long time" in Cuba. "Dozens of plots" had been discovered, he claimed, some of them involving the use of weapons "from the Guantanamo Naval Base."

HEMISPHERIC RELATIONS

Castro's remarks about relations with his Latin neighbors were conciliatory, in line with the regime's indications of a desire to improve Cuba's status vis-a-vis other nations in the hemisphere. Castro said that "we are ready to abide by international norms and respect all countries that respect us," and, although he expressed his hope that the Chilean people would "rid themselves of the fascist yoke," he added that "this is a matter to be decided by the Chileans themselves." As if dismissing the idea that such mild remarks could be tied to the current session of the OAS, several of whose members have stated a willingness to lift sanctions against Cuba if the Cuban government would guarantee non-interference in other countries, Castro said that the OAS had "played a very sad role" and that "the best decision it may make is to dissolve itself."

MOSCOW MEDIA ON MCGOVERN, CASTRO

PRENSA LATINA's treatment of Senator McGovern's remarks on the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba appeared to set the pattern for a similar Moscow handling. The Cuban agency had reported on 8 May that McGovern had "agreed with the Cuban Prime Minister" on the latter's suggestion that the U.S. should lift its ban on the export of foodstuffs and medicine to Cuba as a step which would "pave the way for improved relations" between Cuba and the United States. TASS reported on 10 May that McGovern had "called for lifting the embargo the United States imposed on trade with Cuba." As Moscow comment had done in the case of the Javits-Pell visit in September 1974, its treatment of the McGovern visit also linked it with the idea of growing prospects for improved U.S.-Cuban relations.

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For example, Moscow radio's "International Diary" program commentator Yevgeniy Kachanov noted on 7 May that McGovern's visit was "directly linked by foreign observers" to an "increasing trend among Washington political circles" favoring a review of relations. In further tying the visit to an overall upgrading of Cuba's status, Kachanov observed that the trip came on the eve of an OAS meeting whose "chief topic" would be the sanctions "imposed on the OAS countries 11 years ago by the United States." Kachanov, touching lightly on the failure of last year's OAS foreign ministers' meeting to lift the sanctions because of voting rules requiring a two-thirds majority, noted simply that "it is not beyond possibility" that new voting procedures being discussed "will correspond to the real state of affairs" and allow for a removal of the minority-supported sanctions.

In the only available Soviet reaction to Castro's press conference, TASS on 10 May focused on his remarks about the blockade and U.S.-Cuban relations, noting Castro's statement that a "sufficiently wide" opening in the embargo would lead to a "reassessment by the Cuban side of relations with the U.S.A." TASS also reported that Castro had "expressed hope that the Chilean people will throw down the yoke of fascism," but made no mention of his other statements on hemispheric relations.

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CHINA - JAPAN

JSP LEANS TOWARD PEKING STANCE IN COMPROMISE JOINT STATEMENT

A 12 May joint statement signed by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) delegation that visited Peking 5-12 May brings the JSP into public agreement with the Chinese on the question of opposition to "hegemonism of the two superpowers," meaning the United States and the Soviet Union. Previously, the JSP had tried to steer a middle course between the Soviet Union and China. Increasing Chinese satisfaction as the visit progressed was evident in NCNA coverage. While NCNA did not characterize the atmosphere at the initial 5 May banquet for the delegation, later it described the 11 May farewell banquet as "permeated with a warm atmosphere of friendship." China-Japan Friendship Association President Liao Cheng-chih credited the visit's success to the "courage and resolution" of JSP Chairman Narita, thus identifying Narita even more closely with the communique.

The joint statement is unabashedly a compromise document, stating that both sides decided to seek "common grounds instead of stressing the differences between them" and thus reached agreement on "a number of major questions." On their part the Chinese expressed "admiration" for the JSP's struggle against the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, a struggle Peking has virtually ignored in recent years as it has stressed the Soviet threat.

While the JSP made a decided tilt in its position toward the Chinese side, it did make some attempt to assert that it was not opposing the Soviet Union, but rather certain specific actions by the superpowers. Thus, at the 11 May farewell banquet for the delegation, Narita tried to rationalize the JSP's virtual capitulation on the hegemony issue by stating that agreement had been reached on opposition to the two superpowers' hegemonism by discussing "concrete facts," implying that JSP agreement was not aimed at countries, but at particular actions or policies. In this connection, the joint statement criticized U.S. efforts to "hang on" in South Korea and "further strengthen" military bases in Japan and also attacked the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, its occupation of Japanese-claimed islands, and Soviet attempts

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to "peddle" an Asian collective security treaty.* In the statement the JSP side also carefully noted its willingness to "develop relations with all countries."

Both sides held that a China-Japan friendship treaty must be concluded "at an early date," and they followed the Chinese position in stating that the treaty must be "a step forward" from the 1972 joint government statement establishing diplomatic relations. Peking propaganda has assailed efforts to drop the hegemony clause as a "backward step" and the communique stated that "no backward step is permissible."

The joint statement's recording of Chinese "admiration" for the Japanese struggle to abrogate the Japan-U.S. security treaty and to dismantle unspecified military bases is unusual in recent practice, and moreover represents a dilution of China's position as stated in November 1970, in the last previous joint statement with a JSP delegation in Peking. On that occasion the Chinese had not only expressed "heart-felt respect" for the struggle against the treaty, but had also specified support for struggle against U.S. military bases, against nuclear armament for Japan, and for Japan's "neutrality," all of which were omitted from the current statement. Chinese support for such measures has dropped off as Peking propaganda has increasingly stressed the Soviet danger. In the past year there have been only two monitored Chinese media references to Japanese opposition to the security treaty, both of them NCNA replays of Japanese reports.

* The negative current reference to the Soviet plan for an Asian collective security system contrasts with another JSP position of October 1974, when a JSP-CPSU communique stated that both sides agreed that "an Asian peace and security system" could be created "by both collective and bilateral efforts." Moscow was probably surprised by the JSP's decision to follow the Chinese lead; Moscow radio commentaries on 4 and 5 May had confidently predicted the JSP would not succumb to Chinese pressure.

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CHINA - EUROPE

PEKING MOVES TO STRENGTHEN TIES WITH WESTERN EUROPE

China's desire to strengthen relations with Western Europe was sharply illustrated during the past week by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's departure for an official visit to France and Peking's agreement to establish formal relations with the European Economic Community. Teng, also a CCP vice chairman, is the highest-ranking Chinese leader to make an official visit to a Western state since the cultural revolution. Peking's agreement on relations with the EC came during a 4-11 May visit to China by EC Vice President Christopher Soames, the first official EC representative to visit China. Peking media comment on both visits has carefully underlined Chinese interest in West European unity as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in Europe.

TENG VISIT Teng Hsiao-ping's visit to France, which reciprocates former French President Pompidou's September 1973 visit to China, has thus far been highlighted by discussions with President Giscard, who hosted a banquet for the vice premier on 13 May, and by talks with Prime Minister Chirac, who feted Teng at a banquet the previous evening. As PRC Premier Chou En-lai had done during Pompidou's visit to China, Teng has stressed in his banquet speeches the longstanding friendly relations between China and France, established personally by Chairman Mao and former French President DeGaulle, has played up both sides' common resolve to maintain national independence against superpower interference, and has pointed to the Soviet Union--without explicitly mentioning it--as the main threat to West European security. Teng has shown greater deference to French sensitivity about anti-USSR rhetoric than did Chou, however.

In his speech at the welcoming banquet on 12 May, Teng voiced an unusual Chinese interest in the establishment of a "relatively favorable international environment," but he warned that even though "the trees may prefer calm," the "wind" of superpower rivalry will not subside. In a 13 May banquet speech Teng reaffirmed that U.S.-Soviet contention is centered in Europe, and he focused criticism on the USSR, warning that the superpower "who talks the loudest about peace and security is the very one who flagrantly imposes military threats on the people of the world, the European peoples in particular."

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Teng's speeches have stressed a common Sino-French emphasis on national independence and resistance to "monopolization of world affairs by the superpowers." Praising President Giscard D'Estaing's efforts to promote unity in West Europe, Teng explained in his 13 May speech that China has established ties with the EC and encouraged European unity mainly as a strategic measure. He stated that through unity West Europe would be able to safeguard its independence, play a "more positive role in world affairs," and move the developing world situation in a "favorable direction." He did not mention the economic benefits of Chinese ties to the EC, but noted in his 12 May speech that China has far to go in economic and technical fields and said that China welcomed foreign economic contacts within a general framework of Chinese self-reliance.

SOAMES DELEGATION The EC delegation to Peking led by Christopher Soames held substantive discussions with Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and also met with Chou En-lai and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien. Peking formally revealed the establishment of official PRC-EC relations in a 10 May NCNA report reviewing the delegation's visit. The report replayed Foreign Trade Minister Li Chiang's remarks, at an 8 May banquet for the European guests, which presented the EC as a framework for strategic West European unity against external pressure and a "positive development." The report also highlighted Soames' 8 May press conference statement in Peking in which he stated that the EC has no ties with Taiwan.

Peking's interest in promoting unity within the Common Market as an anti-USSR bulwark was explicitly set forth earlier, in a 24 April NCNA report on the 21-24 April summit meeting of French President Giscard and FRG President Scheel in France. The report cited Scheel's call for common EC foreign and defense policies--as well as economic--in order to protect against "foreign hegemony." Peking's view that EC unity should be directed mainly against the USSR was reflected by NCNA's replay of Scheel's stress that a unified West Europe must "continue the alliance with the United States," and by its pickup of a West German newspaper comment that the summit meeting had shown that the Franco-German commitment to West European unity would serve to block Soviet efforts to isolate the FRG and extend Moscow's "imperialist influence westward."

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NOTE

PRC-TAIWAN: A 7 May signed article carried by Peking's Fukien Front radio beamed to Taiwan explicitly linked the collapse of the pro-U.S. regimes in Indochina with the situation faced by the Chiang government in Taiwan. Equating the former Thieu regime in Saigon with the Taipei authorities, the article said that Thieu's failure stemmed from his reliance on the United States and opposition to the will of the "people," and claimed that Taipei was continuing a similar policy that would only "shorten one's life." The broadcast carefully noted that the United States consistently gave "full support and backing" to shore up Saigon, but that its efforts were in vain since the popular will cannot be checked by "imperialism." The article called upon Taipei officials to draw appropriate "lessons" from the Vietnamese example, "return from the wrong road," and work for the "liberation" of Taiwan. A 26 April Peking broadcast to Taiwan had noted in passing the "lesson" of Phnom Penh and Saigon for Taipei authorities but without such explicit suggestions.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 5 - 11 MAY 1975

<u>Moscow (2273 items)</u>			<u>Peking (874 items)</u>		
V-E Day 30th Anniversary	(12%)	53%	"Liberation" of South Vietnam	(16%)	7%
[Brezhnev Speech	(--)	6%]	UN Law of the Sea Confer-	(2%)	7%
[Podgorny Speech	(--)	4%]	ence, Geneva		
[Party/Government Appeal	(--)	4%]	Cambodia	(10%)	6%
Vietnam	(8%)	3%	V-E Day 30th Anniversary	(--)	6%
China	(4%)	3%	Japan	(3%)	5%
Soviet-Czech Friendship Treaty 5th Anniversary	(--)	2%	[Japanese Socialist Delegations in PRC	(1%)	3%]
Laos Delegation in USSR	(--)	2%	Mao 7 May Directive 4th Anniversary	(--)	5%
			EEC/PRC Establishment of Relations	(--)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.