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Trends in Communist Propaganda

9 Apr 75

No. 14

**Confidential**



# **TRENDS**

**In Communist Propaganda**

**Confidential**

9 APRIL 1975

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## VIETNAM

Hanoi and PRG media maintain that the massive communist gains in South Vietnam have decisively changed the balance of forces and laid the groundwork for "greater victories." However, there have been no predictions of imminent, total military victory. There has been no call for the immediate "liberation" of Saigon as had accompanied earlier communist assaults on Danang and other areas, but a 4 April appeal called on the people in Saigon to "rise up" and overthrow Thieu and to "be ready to participate" in the revolution.

The media continue to advance the January 1973 Paris peace agreement as the basis for a settlement, but there is no evidence of flexibility on terms. Thus, the communists repeat their standard offer to negotiate with Saigon only after Thieu has been removed from office. Neither the PRG nor Hanoi has acknowledged Western reports that PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh had indicated that France or other countries might contribute to a settlement.

Vietnamese communist comment on the U.S. position, including propaganda pegged to President Ford's 3 April press conference, claims Washington is stubbornly clinging to old policies and is confused and pessimistic over GVN losses. U.S. steps to assist in evacuations have prompted particularly bitter comment, including a 7 April PRG statement which denounced efforts to evacuate Vietnamese and labeled Americans in Vietnam as "disguised" military personnel who must be immediately withdrawn.

Communist efforts to bring order to newly captured areas were reflected in a 10-point PRG policy, released on 3 April, which provided a blueprint for occupation and the establishment of new local administrations. Liberation Radio has also reported the dispatch of PRG officials, including President Huyen Tan Phat, to visit the new areas of control. Authoritative PRG and DRV statements have reiterated appeals for international assistance for these areas, and communist media have reported the arrival in Danang of the first shipment of aid from the NFLSV/PRG.

Soviet commentators continue to applaud the communist military advances but stress the desirability of reaching a peaceful solution. Peking media attention to events in South Vietnam is mostly limited to replays of Vietnamese and other foreign media reports.

## PLAF COMMAND COMMUNIQUE LAUDS UNPRECEDENTED COMMUNIST GAINS

The Vietnamese communists officially evaluated the magnitude of their military achievements in the fourth in a series of PLAF Command

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communiqués. The latest communiqué, released on 6 April, jubilantly cited specific details on the GVN losses of territory, military personnel, and equipment, and it maintained that the communists have achieved a position of unquestionable military superiority. Earlier PLA<sup>7</sup> communiqués on 30, 26, and 20 March, marked the capture of Danang, Hue, and the central highlands, respectively.\*

According to the 6 April communiqué, "all the manpower, weapons, technology, and other means of war in the whole of Military Regions I and II have been annihilated and broken up." The communiqué asserted that 270,000 troops were put out of action, six divisions "wiped out or completely disbanded," and that the five major cities of Hue, Danang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang and Dalat and 16 provinces have been "liberated." As a result of these latest gains, the PLAF now claims communist control over 9.3 million people "from the 17th parallel to the southernmost tip of Ca Mau."

The tremendous military advances detailed in the communiqué of the 6th give an impression of unbounded optimism for additional PLAF battlefield successes and the imminent collapse of GVN control over the remaining portion of the country. In describing the communist forces' current advantage, the 6 April communiqué was replete with such characterizations as the "sure-to-win position," while it depicted the GVN as being in a position of "irretrievable failure," and on the verge of "ignominious defeat." Averring that recent military gains have brought about "an obvious change in the balance of forces between us and the enemy," the communiqué went on to flatly declare that "we are now stronger than the enemy."

The other three recent PLAF Command communiqués had been more reticent in evaluating the shift in the balance of forces between the GVN and the communist forces. Only the communiqué of the 20th--issued after the fall of the highlands--broached the issue, but with the less categorical claim that "today the strength and position of our armed forces and people are stronger than ever." Past discussions of the balance of forces in Vietnamese communist propaganda have ordinarily been couched in phraseology suggesting an ever-increasing advantage accruing to the communist forces in the South, and have stopped short of the unequivocal assertion of superiority that was contained in the 6 April communiqué.

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\* For a discussion of the communiqués of 20 and 26 March see the TRENDS of 26 March 1975, pages 6-10. The communiqué of the 30th is discussed in the TRENDS of 2 April 1975, pages 1-4.

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HANOI COMMENT        The 6 April PLAF communique's evaluation of the balance of forces in South Vietnam has been echoed in other comment, including editorials in the major Hanoi papers on 7 April. The North Vietnamese army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN claimed that victories in the South had "led to a fundamental change in the balance of forces . . . in which the revolutionary position is much superior to that of the enemy." The party paper NHAN DAN compared the situation in the South to that at the time of the 1945 general uprising that led to the establishment of the DRV.

Hanoi announced on 8 April that the situation in South Vietnam had been discussed that day at a special session of the DRV National Assembly Standing Committee. The meeting was said to have heard a report on the "offensive and uprising" by DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, but no details on his remarks have been reported. The communique on the session noted that the Standing Committee had affirmed that the Southern victory had created "new, extremely favorable opportunities . . . to continue to advance toward still greater victories and to lead the southern revolution to total victory." It called upon northerners to "do their best to provide support and assistance" to the South.

#### PRG, DRV ASSAIL U.S. ROLE IN EVACUATION OF REFUGEES

Hanoi and the PRG have reacted to U.S. evacuation efforts in South Vietnam with an outpouring of wrathful indignation, culminating in a government statement from the PRG on 7 April and a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the following day. Vietnamese communist invective on the evacuation issue has been harsher than language used in recent comment reacting to U.S. officials' statements on other issues and seems to reflect communist distress at the widely publicized exodus of the South Vietnamese population in advance of the communist troops. U.S. actions were also authoritatively protested in a 3 April DRV Foreign Ministry statement, a PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of the 4th, and a NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 5th.

The 7 April PRG statement recapitulated earlier complaints directed against the United States for aiding the Saigon government by transporting refugees fleeing from the war zone. It described the rescue operation as a "large-scale forcible evacuation" and an attempt to "rake in manpower and material resources to continue the war." The statement also accused the United States of "kidnaping" thousands of South Vietnamese children and assailed Washington for involving other governments and international organizations in the operation.

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The 7 April PRG statement also called attention to White House comment on the possibility of employing U.S. troops for the protection and removal of U.S. personnel in Vietnam, terming this "a new scheme aimed at intervening in South Vietnam." It charged, in this connection, that Americans in Vietnam were "military personnel disguised as civilians and illegally introduced." When a spokesman of the PRG military delegation stationed at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut airbase had been queried at a 15 March press conference on the possible capture of Americans at Ban Me Thuot, he replied: "Foreigners, including honest Americans, will be well treated and released if they are captured, but this treatment will not be given to U.S. military advisers. They are special cases because they have violated the Paris agreement."\*

(Charges that U.S. military personnel were being secretly assigned to South Vietnam have been standard communist fare since almost immediately after the final 29 March 1973 withdrawal of U.S. servicemen from South Vietnam under the terms of the Paris agreement. Current communist propaganda claims the continued presence of some 25,000 such individuals.)

The 8 April DRV Foreign Ministry statement reached an even higher pitch of stridency than the PRG statement in reiterating charges of "forcible" evacuation of refugees by the United States, comparing U.S. actions with "the genocidal crimes perpetrated by the Hitler fascists." In this same vein, a 9 April NHAN DAN editorial in support of the DRV Foreign Ministry statement termed the evacuation operation and removal of South Vietnamese children to the United States "a major crime of history, a sordid, filthy maneuver, and a most despicable move." The refugee question was also discussed at length in a commentary in the army paper on the 7th which flatly denied that the communists had terrorized or retaliated against people in the captured territory and assailed the "Ford clique" for raising the possibility of "imaginary blood baths." The commentary also charged that U.S. evacuation efforts were serving as a pretext for the Administration to get more military aid for Thieu and as a cover for the mobilization of U.S. military forces "to serve as deterrent force in South Vietnam," "check the advance of the revolution," and save Thieu.

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\* For a discussion of the possible capture of Americans at Ban Me Thuot, see the TRENDS of 19 March 1975, pages 8-10.

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The 5 April NHAN DAN Commentator article\* cited a Western press agency to make the claim that the United States was studying plans to move as many as one million people from South Vietnam and that a U.S. senator had asked President Ford to deploy the "entire Seventh Fleet" to move two million Vietnamese within seven days. The Commentator article likewise characterized the transfer of Vietnamese orphans to the United States and the children killed in the C-5A crash as "crimes" against the Vietnamese people. The immediate goal of these moves, according to Commentator, is to provide evidence alleging that the Vietnamese people are anticommunist and to give the United States a "pretext to prolong its involvement." And then without further elaboration, he cryptically added: "The imperialists' plan to use force to bring many people away is also designed to implement their future sinister schemes."

REACTION TO U.S. STATEMENTS President Ford's 3 April press conference remarks on Vietnam prompted a PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of the 4th that took issue with the Administration's ordering of U.S. ships to the coastal waters of Vietnam to help in the refugee evacuation. A 5 April Hanoi radio report on a NHAN DAN article of the same date on the President's press conference said that he had "regretted he could not use the U.S. Air Force and admitted that he had no intention of sending American forces back to South Vietnam since that is banned by law." The article was quick to point out, however, that U.S. contingency plans exist to protect and evacuate Americans in South Vietnam and Cambodia, and these could include the use of U.S. troops. The same article claimed that "Ford blamed the military debacle in South Vietnam on Thieu's inept command, but everyone knows that any military plan applied by Thieu was drawn by his U.S. advisers themselves."

Secretary of State Kissinger's 5 April press conference was discussed by Hanoi radio on the 7th in a broadcast that derided his remarks on Indochina as revealing the "confusion and embarrassment of the White House in the face of the irremediable collapse of the Thieu clique in Saigon and the country-selling clique in Phnom Penh." A NHAN DAN

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\* Commentator is an authoritative byline which has appeared only irregularly in NHAN DAN since the signing of the Paris agreement. For further background on Commentator, see the TRENDS of 29 January 1975, pages 1-4.

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article of the 6th pegged to Thieu's speech two days before was equally caustic in characterizing Walt Rostow as a "nitwit" for his recent proposal to land U.S. marines in North Vietnam.

General George Brown's remarks in Indonesia concerning possible direct U.S. intervention into Vietnam failed to elicit any significant response from the PRG or Hanoi. While a spokesman for the PRG delegation to the La Celle-Saint-Cloud consultative conference released a statement on the 7th denouncing Brown's speculation as a "serious violation" of the Paris agreement, it was essentially low-keyed. A Hanoi radio broadcast of the 8th on Brown's "threats" quoted Western press agency reports that Congress would "prevent such an intervention at all costs."

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## MOSCOW SCORES U.S. AID FOR THIEU, PRESSES PRG STAND ON TALKS

Moscow media have continued to acclaim communist advances in South Vietnam while stressing that a political settlement should be reached on the basis of the terms offered by the PRG. The U.S. role in supporting the Thieu Government was predictably attacked by Soviet commentators, but criticism was restrained. Moscow commentators have avoided direct criticism of President Ford or Secretary Kissinger, instead deploring the desire of "certain circles" in Washington and the Pentagon to continue or expand U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Moscow's circumspection regarding the President was strikingly illustrated in the TASS accounts of official Vietnamese statements: explicit references to the "Ford Administration," were changed to "U.S. Government." On the other hand, the President's position has been fully reflected. For example, TASS and PRAVDA accounts of his 3 April press conference reported his remarks on continued U.S. support for Thieu, his appeal for congressional approval of more military aid, and his announcement of the dispatch of U.S. ships to the Indochina coast and other steps "under the pretext of a possible evacuation of retreating Saigon troops."

ZHUKOV IN PRAVDA      The most authoritative current Soviet comment on Vietnam was a 5 April article by PRAVDA political commentator Yuriy Zhukov. He typically portrayed current military action as a popular South Vietnamese uprising against the Thieu government, denying the view of "some people in the West" that the GVN was the victim of an offensive launched by the DRV or that congressional reductions of aid to the GVN had brought about its present deterioration. Zhukov supported the Vietnamese communist contention that refugees in South Vietnam were not fleeing from the advancing communist forces but rather had been forcibly resettled by the Saigon government, and he endorsed PRG protests against the movement of U.S. ships to aid in evacuation.

Rejecting as "false allegations" speculation that the communists were planning to capture Saigon, Zhukov cited NFLSV-PRG protestations that they were "only striving for strict fulfillment of the Paris agreement, which has been and is being violated most flagrantly by the Thieu clique and its patrons." Like other Soviet comment, the Zhukov article reiterated the PRG proposal for resumption of political talks with Saigon after Thieu has been removed, adding: "The new situation taking shape in South Vietnam opens up a clear prospect for the establishment of peace."

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## MIDDLE EAST

## MOSCOW ADDS CAUTIONARY NOTES TO STANDARD CALL FOR GENEVA TALKS

Having for months urged the "immediate" reconvening of the Geneva talks when this seemed a distant prospect, the Soviet Union is now advocating the need for adequate advance preparations to insure the success of the conference.\* Predictably, Moscow has pointed to Israeli "reservations and conditions" as the chief complicating factors. But it has also intimated uncertainty over the attitude of the United States as its fellow conference cochairman as Washington reappraises its Mideast policy, and has cited statements by President Ford as indicating U.S. reluctance to turn to Geneva. By omission, Moscow has underlined the complex problem of getting the Arab participants into line; comment has skirted these difficulties, merely sketching a broad picture of Arab support for resumption of the conference.

PREPARATIONS FOR GENEVA      Cautionary Moscow remarks about the necessity for preliminary preparations began to appear at the end of March. One of the first to indicate such concern was Mideast specialist Igor Belyayev, on Moscow radio's 30 March observers' roundtable. The moderator, noting that to reconvene the conference "say, tomorrow or the next day" would not assure its success, asked Belyayev what were the preconditions for a successful Geneva conference. Belyayev answered that its success would depend primarily on a "positive approach by all sides involved" and noted in this regard that there was a "broad range of problems" connected with a Mideast settlement--such as determination of participants, particularly Palestinian representation-- and that "consequently, it is essential that much preparatory work be done." He stressed that the Geneva conference must be resumed, but only after the "necessary prerequisites" for its success had been created.

Also on the 30th, Kolesnichenko's international review in PRAVDA implied the need for advance preparations, remarking that a return to Geneva was the practical path in the quest for a Mideast peace, but "at the same time farsighted observers stress the importance

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\* Moscow's initial comment on the breakdown of Secretary Kissinger's mission pointed to resumption of the Geneva conference as the logical step, but had made no mention of any necessary prerequisites. See the FBIS TRENDS of 26 March 1975, pages 1-3.

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of insuring that the Geneva conference does not have a dry run." And an international review by Mikhaylov in the 1 April IZVESTIYA called it necessary "to prepare and organize the work of the conference" to insure that the fundamental problems are resolved.

Moscow also gave a notably lukewarm reception to Egypt's official request to the United States and Soviet Union--announced by Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi on 1 April--that the two cochairmen undertake to reconvene the conference. The first monitored Soviet acknowledgment of the Egyptian request came in an unattributed commentary on Moscow radio's Arabic service on 2 April. Although describing the request as "the most important element in the current Mideast situation," the broadcast dwelt at length on the difficulties involved, emphasizing in particular Israel's "negative attitude" and alleged U.S.-Israeli "plans to undermine or postpone" the conference. Moscow apparently did not publicly mention the Egyptian request again until PRAVDA on the 5th carried a brief Glukhov dispatch from Cairo reporting without comment that Fahmi had announced the request. The Glukhov dispatch also noted that Fahmi had stated Egypt's readiness to send representatives to Geneva and had expressed Cairo's support of participation in the talks by Great Britain, France, and one nonaligned country.

Scanty Soviet attention to Egyptian activities included a roundup in ZA RUBEZHOM (No. 15, signed to press on 3 April) of news reports on the Mideast which cited the Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF to the effect that Egypt had begun "intensive diplomatic contacts to reconvene the Geneva conference" and that the Egyptian foreign minister was currently preparing the necessary documents, including "a joint working document with Syria on all the questions to be discussed." TASS on the 7th noted that the Egyptian ambassador to the USSR had met with Foreign Minister Gromyko to discuss "topical problems" concerning the Middle East, "including resumption of the Geneva peace conference."

U.S.-SOVIET ROLE      Belyayev was the first Soviet commentator to work out the details of the Geneva talks. Referring in the 30 March roundtable program to the need for preparatory work, he went on to say: "Incidentally, there is also a mechanism for this. At one time there were special ambassadors of the Soviet Union and the United States in Geneva and they had to discuss and resolve the essence of those problems which it was essential to resolve before the resumption of the work of the Geneva conference."

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This idea was picked up by PRAVDA's Kolesnichenko in a 1 April Moscow radio broadcast to North America. Kolesnichenko recalled that joint U.S.-Soviet efforts had created the Geneva conference as a mechanism for solving the Mideast crisis and that, under present circumstances, "Soviet-American contacts in seeking a Mideast peace settlement should in my opinion be stepped up and not terminated." And TASS on the 28th, reporting President Ford's 24 March Hearst interview which was released on the 27th, noted that the President had expressed the view that U.S. relations with the Soviet Union would help avoid an aggravation of the Mideast situation. TASS quoted him as saying he was of the opinion that in this situation detente would make things easier.

U.S. POLICY Treatment of the President's interview, however, generally underlined the United States' lack of enthusiasm for renewing the conference. The TASS account highlighted his statement that with the collapse of the step-by-step approach the United States "has no other choice" than to return to the Geneva conference. The President in fact said "I don't believe we have any other choice now other than to go to Geneva. I regret it but . . . there appears to be no alternative." Also citing the remark on "no other choice," TASS director general Zamyatin observed, on Moscow radio's 29 March "International Situation" program, that the President's remark was "not very definite." And Matveyev, on the 6 April Moscow radio roundtable, pointed to the "hint of regret" with which President Ford seemed to indicate that the Geneva conference "was now inevitable" and "there was no other way out."

Limited and restrained comment on the U.S. Mideast policy review has in the main suggested skepticism about any significant change in Washington's relations with Tel Aviv. A Yefremov commentary on Moscow's domestic service on the 28th did claim that with the failure of the Kissinger mission and the subsequent U.S. policy reassessment, "a serious obstacle on the path to resumption of the Geneva conference has been removed." But TASS director general Zamyatin, without mentioning the policy review, asserted on Moscow radio on the 29th that the United States continued "to evade a solution" of the key questions of a settlement, talking of "the complicated nature of the problem, of Israel being unprepared for an all-round settlement, and so forth." Kolesnichenko in the 30 March PRAVDA review declined to speculate on the outcome of the policy reassessment, saying that "time will tell" what the results might be.

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On 1 April a Moscow domestic service commentary said that the U.S. policy review had had no visible effect on Israeli leaders, who believed that U.S. support would continue as before. PRAVDA noted on the 5th that, despite "talk in Washington" of a policy review and a more balanced policy toward the Arabs, the United States was continuing to deliver huge supplies of weapons to Israel and, according to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, remained committed to deliver more. PRAVDA claimed that these considerations caused the Arab states to ask: "Just what does the reexamination of Washington's Mideast policy entail?"

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## V - E DAY

## SOVIET ARTICLES ON WAR ANNIVERSARY DIFFER ON DETENTE ISSUES

The early articles that have appeared in this year's lengthy Soviet campaign to celebrate the 30th anniversary of victory in World War II reflect differing viewpoints regarding current policy issues. Some of the articles take a pro-detente stance, citing the history of allied cooperation during the war as a model for the present. Others are clearly intended to stress the importance of maintaining a strong defense posture, and they cite the alleged primacy of the Soviet Union's contribution to the victory as an object lesson in this regard. Others take a still more conservative line, stressing the role of the party as the organizer of victory, or even the role of Stalin in this regard. It is still too soon to say whether these differences reflect a reemergence of internal Soviet debate over the detente-defense issue or merely the normal range of nuances to be expected in this kind of campaign.

PRO-DETENTE ARTICLES      The February CPSU Central Committee decree announcing the start of the national celebration of the 30th anniversary signaled no particular orientation regarding current policy issues. It omitted any mention of Stalin, which seemed to suggest a pro-detente orientation, but on the other hand it gave no more than a perfunctory bow to the role of the allies in the war. The Moscow domestic radio carried a summary of the decree on 9 February, and KOMMUNIST carried the text in issue No. 3, signed to the press on 11 February. The decree's publication in PRAVDA was unaccountably delayed, however, until 28 February.\*

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\* Moscow radio this year began to give significant coverage to the 30th anniversary of V-E Day as early as the second week of February and has maintained a substantial level of attention to the subject since. This represents a much earlier and much heavier stress on the anniversary than obtained for either the 25th anniversary in 1970 or the 20th in 1965, when the campaigns began only in April.

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The pro-detente line of commentary on the anniversary was typified by a 12 March editorial in IZVESTIYA. It was couched in high-flown rhetoric about the anti-Hitler coalition and expressed hope that the memorialization of the victory would provide a new stimulus to detente. More recently, Moscow has sought to link the anniversary with its current policy of calling for a world disarmament conference. A TASS commentary on 5 April reporting the conclusion of the UN committee session on preparing for the conference noted that the initiative was appropriately timed to coincide with the 30th anniversary.

**MILITANT ARTICLES** Articles published in the military press or written by military authors have generally taken a much harsher line on the lessons to be drawn from the anniversary observances. This can be attributed in part to the circumstance that the start of the campaign coincided with the annual celebration of Armed Forces Day (23 February)--an occasion traditionally marked by bold declarations from military spokesmen. Yet even allowing for this, such articles as Maj. Gen. S. Baranov's essay on economic preparedness in RED STAR on 27 February stand out as unusually assertive of military interests. Focused largely on Soviet economic policy in the prewar and war years, the article uses some of the most unqualified formulas from Lenin's writings to stress the importance of preparing the country for war. It puts a fine topical point on the message, moreover, by pointing out that the party must take into consideration not only the present detente situation but other "possible" situations, and by declaring that "we will continue to be prepared for any change in the development of events."

**CONSERVATIVE ARTICLES** A third track taken by some commentators on the anniversary has been to stress the role of the traditional party organs in the achievement of victory. This is the line taken by chief of the Lenin Military Political Academy, Gen. Ye. Ye. Maltsev, in a 4 April article in PRAVDA. Asserting that "all fundamental questions of conducting the war were decided by the Central Committee--the Politburo, Orgburo, and Secretariat," he went on to say that the policy of the CPSU and its Leninist leadership has been, is, and will remain the decisive condition guaranteeing the invincible defense capacity of the Soviet state, the military might of the armed forces."

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The Maltsev article also illustrates a fascinating sub-theme which may become more prominent as the anniversary approaches. This has to do with the treatment of Stalin--a subject which still is unsettled in the Soviet Union despite repeated regime efforts to strike a balanced assessment. Maltsev, by his unusual recitation of the names of the top party bodies, managed to avoid recalling the extraordinary party-state-military bodies with which Stalin was more intimately associated, and indeed failed to mention Stalin's name at all. Other recent articles, however, have mentioned Stalin's role, although these articles appear to be in the minority thus far. Lt. Gen. S. Bobylev, writing in the 1 April RURAL LIFE, referred to "Secretary General I.V. Stalin" as head of the wartime State Defense Committee, and Maj. Gen. M. Kir'yan, writing in the 4 April RED STAR, noted as well that Stalin was head of the Supreme Command as well as of the State Defense Committee.

Even before the current anniversary campaign, pressure to give Stalin more credit had become apparent from several quarters. The most blatant example was Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy, who hailed Stalin's role in an 18 October 1974 speech celebrating the 30th anniversary of the liberation of the Ukraine. Other spokesmen in the Ukraine have followed Shcherbitskiy's lead. In the meantime, the film of Aleksandr Chakovskiy's novel on the war, which contains extensive descriptions of Stalin's leadership, is currently running in Moscow and Leningrad theaters, and installments of the novel have appeared in the last four issues of the journal ZNANYA.

Conservatives have also lately been pressuring writers to stress the victories in the war, rather than the embarrassing initial defeats. Belorussian First Secretary Masharov, in a 27 February speech to writers reported in the March KOMMUNIST BELORUSSII, complained of "one-sided" and "erroneous treatment" of the initial period of the war and declared it "completely intolerable" to undermine the people's pride in their "heroic victory." Similarly, at a 14 March Moscow writers union meeting reported in the 16 March MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, Moscow First Secretary Grishin complained that some periods of the war have been described in dozens of books while other periods were being ignored.

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## USSR - YUGOSLAVIA

## MOSCOW TRIES TO MOLLIFY TITO ANGER OVER OFFENSIVE ARTICLES

Yugoslav-Soviet relations were considerably exacerbated in the week before Premier Bijedic's scheduled 9-15 April visit to the USSR, as President Tito and Yugoslav media reacted angrily to newspaper articles by Warsaw Pact commander Yakubovskiy and Soviet Defense Minister Grechko which, according to Belgrade, "belittled" the wartime role of Tito's partisan army. Moscow attempted to improve the atmosphere for Bijedic's visit, but perhaps insufficiently, with an 8 April TASS interview of a low-level Soviet official who praised the partisans' contribution to defeating Nazi Germany and acknowledged that the partisans deserved the credit for liberating Yugoslavia, but did not mention the offending articles.

Yakubovskiy's article, in the 25 March CSSR party daily RUDE PRAVO and apparently pegged to next month's 30th anniversary of V-E Day, was sharply criticized by Tito in a 2 April speech in Skopje, although he eschewed direct reference to Yakubovskiy or the article. Related media comment on the other hand was both direct and more vitriolic, denouncing Yakubovskiy as well as Grechko, whose supposedly similar article appeared in the 3 April issue of the CSSR Defense Ministry's OBRANA LIDU, not yet available in Washington. Yakubovskiy heaped praise on the Red Army's role in liberating East Europe while minimizing the contribution of other East European forces. Particularly offensive to Belgrade was his characterization of the various liberation movements as one individual movement and his implication that all resistance movements in East Europe owed their success to the Red Army.

Tito seemed particularly disturbed that Yakubovskiy's generalized treatment of the liberation movements in effect equated the Yugoslav partisans' campaign against the Germans with that of the Bulgarians. Belgrade recently has shown increased sensitivity to implicit Soviet support for Sofia's contentions that Bulgarian troops liberated Macedonia, which Belgrade interprets as a Bulgarian effort to lay claim to Macedonian territory. Questioning the political motivations behind the article, Tito took the occasion to recall last year's Corinformist affair in noting that Belgrade would continue to resist those "mini-groups" and individuals who "take the same stands as those who assert that they liberated

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us . . . ." Tito also seemed to be warning Moscow that its "falsification" of history could influence Belgrade's foreign ties, maintaining that it would be a "disgrace" for the partisans' wartime record to be recognized by the West but not by their closest wartime allies.

Yugoslav media were more explicit in presenting Belgrade's fears regarding the implications of Yakubovskiy's and Crechko's articles. For example, Zagreb commentator Sundic on the 3d questioned rhetorically whether such articles could be written by officials who favored good relations with Yugoslavia. And POLITIKA, as reported by TANJUG on the 5th, argued that conceding that an outside force had liberated Yugoslavia would mean giving that force "an opportunity to lay claim on our present and future." Belgrade comment in an 8 April Russian-language broadcast was more restrained, referring only to "foreign" attempts to belittle the partisans' wartime record and to "falsify" history. The same commentary acknowledged the Soviet Union's contribution to defeating Nazi Germany but added that Soviet aid to the partisans did not begin until 1943 and that the partisans liberated Yugoslavia "mainly with our own forces."

Moscow's efforts to smooth over the trouble caused by the two articles was relegated mainly to Vladimir Zelenin, a historian obviously lacking the status of the two marshals. Zelenin, identified as a representative of Moscow's Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies, was a former military adviser to the partisans in 1944-46. He was called on during the 1950's to broadcast several commentaries to Yugoslavia hailing Soviet-Yugoslav wartime cooperation and wrote a handful of similar articles in the 1960's. Zelenin's TASS interview was rich in praise of the partisans; he was also careful to point out that Yugoslav communists began their operations against the Germans in 1941, thus "earlier than other European peoples." Zelenin also conceded, in effect, that at least in the early years of the war, the partisans fought the Germans in Yugoslavia on their own. In addition to the Zelenin interview, an IZVESTIYA article, as reported in a Serbo-Croatian broadcast to Yugoslavia on the 8th, welcomed Bijedic's visit with a positive assessment of relations between the two countries and highly praised the "heroic struggle" of the Yugoslav partisans.

In addition to concern about Bijedic's visit, Moscow's sensitivity to Belgrade's pique over the two articles may reflect its interest in creating a harmonious atmosphere for the 30th V-E Day observance in Moscow next month. The CPSU Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet Presidium have extended an invitation to Tito's number two man, Stane Dolanc, according to a 17 March TANJUG report.

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## USSR - HUNGARY

## LOW-KEYED ANNIVERSARY OBSERVANCE SUGGESTS CONTINUED TENSIONS

Delivery of the main address at Hungary's 30th liberation anniversary observance on 3 April by the figurehead President Losonczi and the attendance of only a second-level Soviet figure, CPSU Secretary Kapitonov, suggest that Moscow-Budapest tensions over the latter's liberal economic policies may be persisting, despite the appearance of cordiality during Brezhnev's attendance at the recent MSZMP congress.\* Brezhnev and Hungarian party First Secretary Kadar had been the main speakers at the 25th anniversary festivities in Budapest in 1970, while both countries' presidents, Mikoyan and Dobi, spoke at the 20th anniversary in 1965. Losonczi's figurehead status is underscored by the fact that he is the only president of an East European Soviet ally who is not at the same time a member of the party Politburo.

Top leaders of the two countries participated in Hungary's 30th liberation anniversary only peripherally: An interview with Kadar was carried on Moscow and Budapest TV on the 2d, and Premier Fock was in Moscow on the 7th, three days after the anniversary date, for the opening of a Hungarian exhibit, also attended by Kosygin and Podgornyy. The Soviet leaders' anniversary message to their Hungarian counterparts appeared to take into account conjectures regarding Moscow-Budapest tensions when it stressed "the indestructible unity of views" of the CPSU and MSZMP "on all fundamental matters in the construction of socialism and communism." The Soviet leaders' anniversary messages to their Polish, Bulgarian, and East German counterparts had merely underscored bilateral friendship and solidarity rather than stressing indestructible ideological unity.

The keynote address by Losonczi at the Budapest meeting on 3 April paid due tribute to the USSR's liberation of Hungary and subsequent friendship and support for his country. Among other things, Losonczi expressed appreciation to the CPSU and the Soviet Government for their help in shielding the Hungarians from the effects of

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\* The top three Soviet leaders had attended 30th liberation anniversary observances in other East European countries during the past year: Brezhnev was in Warsaw in July, Kosygin in Bucharest in August, and Podgornyy in Sofia in September. Brezhnev also attended the GDR's 25th anniversary observance in October.

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spiraling world market prices for energy. Endorsing detente, the Hungarian president declared that the task of Hungarian foreign policy was to promote the success of "the socialist countries' peace policy" and underscored Budapest's contribution to strengthening the forces of "socialism, national independence, peace, and detente." Losonczi's speech did not include any mention of Brezhnev, unlike Kadar's address at the recent party congress and his anniversary TV interview on 2 April. At the congress, Kadar had thanked Brezhnev personally for helping the Hungarians on the oil-price issue, and his TV interview praised Brezhnev as a world leader in the quest for peace.

Regarding the 1956 "counterrevolution," the Hungarian president paid due tribute to "the internationalist aid of the Soviet Union and the international working class" in saving socialism. Stressing the Hungarian communists' own role, he recalled that "we managed to conquer the dark forces of counterrevolution because the party pursued a consistent struggle against both sectarianism and revisionism, and we reestablished Leninist norms." While not directly mentioning the controversial new economic management system, Losonczi was in tune with Budapest's current de-emphasis of that system in registering the Hungarians' determination to strengthen the party's leading role, the planned economy, and "systematic" economic development. Underscoring Budapest's membership in CEMA, he declared that his country would utilize "primarily international socialist economic integration."

Losonczi's failure to mention Brezhnev was made the more obvious by Kapitonov's twice recalling the Soviet leader's participation in the recent Hungarian party congress and conveying Brezhnev's personal greetings, in addition to reading the anniversary message from the three Soviet leaders. The brief speech, much shorter than Losonczi's, firmly underscored the primary Soviet role in detente, pointing to the USSR's implementation of the peace program of the 24th CPSU Congress and stressing that "the socialist countries, coordinating their efforts," were jointly working for this cause.

Putting the best possible face on Moscow-Budapest relations, Kapitonov acknowledged Losonczi's expression of gratitude for Soviet liberation of Hungary, voiced satisfaction with the current state of Soviet-Hungarian ties, and approvingly noted the MSZMP congress' assertion of the party's leading role--a key feature of Budapest's current retrenchment from its liberal economic management system. In contrast to Losonczi's failure to mention Brezhnev, Kapitonov included a tribute to "Janos Kadar, loyal son of the Hungarian people."

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KADAR INTERVIEW      Kadar's interview with Moscow radio and TV correspondent Kaverznev, aired in Moscow and Budapest on the 2d, was notable for his strong praise of Brezhnev and for his modest estimate regarding the prospects for achieving the goal of completing the building of socialism, set by the MSZMP congress' program declaration published on 9 March. Asked about the program declaration's goal of completing socialist construction in Hungary in the next 15-20 years, Kadar replied that "we cannot really say whether we are two-thirds of the way [in the 1945-1990 time span] toward building a developed socialist society." To achieve such a goal, he added, Hungary faces "major tasks" in the form of two to three-fold increases in such areas as national income and industrial and agricultural production. He insisted that the Central Committee and the party congress had made their estimates "responsibly and, as far as was humanly possible, set realistic targets."

In praising Brezhnev, Kadar went beyond Brezhnev's contributions to USSR-Hungarian relations and referred to "that eminent and outstanding fighter for the cause of socialism and peace known throughout the world, Comrade Leonid Ilich Brezhnev." Apparently attempting to discredit reported Soviet-Hungarian differences, Kadar added that Brezhnev's speech at the Hungarian party congress and the welcome given him in Budapest had demonstrated "our cloudless and unshakable friendship."

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Chen, the highest-ranking Chinese official ever to visit Latin America, began his stay by reiterating Peking's support for the Echeverria-initiated Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS), which was endorsed at the last UN General Assembly session and by which Echeverria hopes to enhance Mexico's status as a Third World leader. As reported by NCNA on 28 March, Chen characterized the charter as "the just call of the Third World countries against imperialist plunder and exploitation" and added that China "firmly supports the just struggle of the Mexican Government and people." Stressing the usual Chinese theme of solidarity with developing countries, Chen said that "in the long struggle against imperialism and colonialism" Mexico and China "have always sympathized with and supported each other." Noting that this historical tradition had been accelerated since President Echeverria's April 1973 visit to China, Chen said that the two nations had "not only supported each other politically, but have also learned from and helped each other in the economic field."

Elaborating on the theme of economic cooperation at a PRC-hosted banquet reported by NCNA on 4 April, Chen indicated what might be one of the concrete results of the trip when he noted that his visit to Mexico had shown him many opportunities for cooperation, "especially in the exchange of agricultural sciences and technologies." Chen concluded that "our future common struggle to defend national sovereignty and develop the national economy" would strengthen the "traditional friendship and relations of friendly cooperation between the two countries."

The only monitored Moscow mention of Chen's Mexican visit came in a TASS dispatch from Mexico City on 7 April which reported that the Mexican socialist party had demanded that the PRC break diplomatic relations with the "fascist regime" in Chile. This demand, TASS said, was conveyed "to PRC Deputy Premier Chen Yun-kuei during his visit to Mexico."

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## C H I N A

## CHANG WARNS PARTY MEMBERS TO FOLLOW MODERATE ECONOMIC LINE

A major, authoritative article by CCP Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao in the April RED FLAG underscores Peking's resolve to use the current ideological campaign to strike a cautious balance between the pursuit of economic goals and adherence to ideological principles. Signed press articles by Politburo members have been extremely rare in recent years, but a new pattern now seems to have developed, linked to the start three months ago of the campaign to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat. Chang's article, entitled "On Exercising All-round Dictatorship Over the Bourgeoisie," follows by only a month another article in RED FLAG by Politburo member Yao Wen-yuan, who called for order and discipline to meet China's economic goals set by Chou En-lai in his report to the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) in January.\* Chang's article elaborates on this theme, charting a moderate economic course for meeting Chou's ambitious objectives. He argued that communist economic reforms must be postponed to allow sufficient time "to build China into a powerful socialist country before the end of the century." Indicating that errant cadres from both the right and the left should move toward the center on the issue of economic reform, Chang warned party members who have joined the party organizationally but not ideologically that "it is dangerous to stop half-way! The bourgeoisie is beckoning you. Catch up with the ranks and continue the advance!"

Much authority is attached to any pronouncement by Chang, who shares the daily duties of operating China's government with party Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping. At the beginning of the cultural revolution Chang was a party secretary in Shanghai, having risen to the post through the municipal literary bureaucracy in the years since 1949. He supported Chiang Ching's cultural reforms and played a role in launching the struggle that produced the cultural revolution. In 1967 the central authorities entrusted Chang with running Shanghai, and he was named to the Politburo at the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, moving up to the standing committee of the Politburo at the 10th Party Congress in 1973. Chang was named a vice premier at the

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\* Yao's article is discussed in the TRENDS of 5 March 1975, pages 15-18.

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Fourth NPC, where he delivered the report on the new constitution. Shanghai media reports on Chang's activities during his tenure in the city suggest he is an economic moderate who favors central planning and central allocation of resources, an impression strengthened by the current RED FLAG article.

COMMUNIZATION Much of Chang's article seemed to be addressed to left-leaning cadres holding the mistaken idea that China should quicken the pace of communization and thus speed the transition into a communist state. Discrediting this approach, which was tried during the late 1950's and resulted in serious economic shortfalls, Chang indicated that rapid communization was not desired at this time and he criticized cadres who spread "rumors about a wind of 'communization' being stirred up." Making it clear that the current stress on meeting production goals in 1975 should not be misinterpreted by local cadres as a signal for rapid communization, Chang declared that "the wind of 'communization' as stirred up by Liu Shao-chi and Chen Po-ta shall never be allowed to rise again." He ruled out any attempt to rapidly increase the current level of communization by arguing that "our country does not yet have a great abundance" of commodities. Chang developed the thesis that until communes were able to "offer a great abundance of products for distribution according to need among our 800 million people," it would be necessary to take proper measures to "curb the harm caused" by those remaining capitalist practices affecting the development of a socialist economy.

While throwing cold water on any plans to quickly expand the current level of communization, Chang reported approvingly that there was a gradual trend toward a higher degree of public ownership in rural areas. Chang used a commune near Shanghai as an example of this trend, the commune cited apparently being a model showing how China could eventually realize the theoretical objective of shifting a higher share of production to the large commune base, leaving less for the smaller levels of brigades and production teams. Chang noted that in the year from 1973 to 1974, the commune-level income share of total income here rose from 28.1 to 30.5 percent and the brigade-level share rose from 15.2 to 17.2 percent, while the income share of the smaller production teams dropped from 56.7 to 53.3 percent.

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Screening the need to increase slowly the production share at the commune level, Chang noted that in the rural people's communes just outside Shanghai, where the economy at the commune and production brigade levels has developed with "good speed," the production teams still accounted for 50.7 percent of the total fixed assets owned by all three levels. Putting any major economic changes far into the future, Chang argued that "it will take a fairly long time to effect the transition from the team to the brigade and then to the commune, functioning as the basic accounting unit." He explained that "even when the commune is made the basic accounting unit, it will still remain under collective ownership," thus necessitating the "inevitable" continuation of "commodity production, exchange through money, and distribution according to work."

**BOURGEOIS RIGHTS** Turning his attention to those holding rightist views on the question of economic reform, Chang indicated that "bourgeois rights" must eventually be removed, but he made it clear they should play a limited role in strengthening socialist economic development. Chang argued that the harmful effects of certain "bourgeois rights" should be tolerated temporarily during the current socialist stage in order to help develop the state's economic potential, strengthen the economic base, and provide the necessary conditions for the eventual transition into a communist society.

Material incentives do not appear to be among those "bourgeois rights" which will be allowed to play a role in the current socialist economy. Evidence of this was Chang's attack on Lin Piao and Liu Shao-chi for taking "advantage of the inexperience of young people" and "peddling among the youth the idea that material incentive is like fermented bean curd: although it smells bad, it tastes delicious." Emphasizing the call for cadres to make greater efforts to substitute ideological production incentives for material ones--a major theme of the current dictatorship campaign--Chang quoted a passage from a previously unpublicized 1969 Mao speech: the passage criticized party leaders in some factories for "resorting to material incentives, putting profits in command and, instead of promoting proletarian politics, handing out bonuses, and so forth." Spelling out the current dilemma facing party leaders charged with increasing production levels, Chang called upon cadres to learn how to balance the goal of "building a powerful country" with a concern for maintaining proper ideological objectives. Illustrating this point, Chang pointed to the "Khrushchev-Brezhnev

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renegade clique" as a negative example, warning that "at no time should we forget this historical experience in which the satellites went up to the sky while the Red flag fell to the ground."

DISORDER In setting forth a go-slow, middle-of-the-road approach to reforming the economy, Chang's article appears to reflect Peking's concern to keep the dictatorship campaign under tight central control, thus preventing social disruptions and shortfalls in economic production. Peking's fears appear to be well-grounded: recent Hefei broadcasts have revealed that Anhwei party officials are engaged in struggling against the actions of "active counterrevolutionaries and bad elements sabotaging rail transport." A 7 April Hefei broadcast reported that the central authorities had issued instructions for local railway workers and army men living along the railways "to take prompt action . . . to deal heavy blows at the handful of class enemies carrying out the criminal activities of sabotaging rail transport." Arguing that "rail transport is of utmost importance in the national economy," the broadcast focused on the need to "maintain order in railway stations and on trains" in order to "promote stability and unity."

Problems with Anhwei's transportation network appear to date back at least to 27 March, when the local radio reported that a rally of 100,000 people had called for "strengthening social security and maintaining good social order for the successful development of both revolution and production." The rally concluded that it was "imperative" to arouse the masses to struggle against class enemies "who sabotage industrial and agricultural production or communications and transport services."

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## NOTES

CHINESE LEADERSHIP: The death of CCP Politburo member and former acting Chief of State Tung Pi-wu at the age of 90, announced by NCNA on 3 April, leaves Mao Tse-tung as the only living founder of the CCP. Neither Mao nor Chou En-lai attended the memorial meeting for Tung on 7 April in Peking. The memorial was presided over by Wang Hung-wen, the party's third-ranking leader under Mao and Chou. Yeh Chien-ying's memorial speech eulogized Tung as a "great revolutionary fighter" and urged "translating our grief" over his death to the campaign to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat and "building China into a strong and modern socialist country." Mao has been absent from public view since 16 January, when he received West German CSU leader Strauss while the National People's Congress (NPC) was in session in Peking. Mao has made no reported public appearances in Peking since May 1974, when he apparently left the capital. Chou En-lai has not appeared outside the hospital since 15 January when he attended the funeral for Vice Premier Li Fu-chun, although he continues to receive a steady flow of foreign guests in the hospital.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK DEATH: A low-key 6 April NCNA report on Chiang Kai-shek's death expressed Peking's confidence that Chiang's demise would enhance movement in Taiwan toward reunification with the mainland. In contrast to Peking's past expressions of "hope" that people and leaders in Taiwan would work for reunification, NCNA said emphatically that Chiang's passing "will certainly" encourage "people" in Taiwan to "further efforts" to liberate the island. NCNA also claimed that "military and administrative personnel" in Taiwan "will have a clearer view of the situation" and will actively contribute to Taiwan's reunification. The report characterized Chiang's named successor, Yen Chia-kan, as a "puppet president," but avoided all mention of the critical role now played by Chiang's eldest son, ROC Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, who has been criticized by Peking in the past. The report contained only a passing reference to Chiang Kai-shek's reliance on "U.S. imperialism" while in Taiwan. Moscow has thus far not commented on Chiang's death, confining its coverage of the event to a one-sentence 5 April TASS report noting news agency reports on his passing.

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CAMBODIAN NEGOTIATIONS DENIED: The rejection of any negotiations with the Phnom Penh regime by the Cambodian Insurgent Front (NUFC) has been reaffirmed in statements by the Insurgents' commander and by head of state Prince Norodom Sihanouk. An 8 April statement by Front military commander and RGNU Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan, broadcast by the Voice of the NJFC of Phnom Penh on 9 April, denied recent Western press reports that GKR Premier Long Boret had met in Bangkok with Front representatives on 7 April while he was en route to Phnom Penh. Denouncing the reports as a "deceitful maneuver," Khieu Samphan declared that the Front has "absolutely not negotiated with" and "will never accept negotiations with the traitorous clique" in Phnom Penh. In a 4 April statement available thus far only in an NCNA report, Prince Sihanouk also reaffirmed Front intransigence on negotiations with Phnom Penh, stating that any hopes such negotiations might be arranged arose "from blind ignorance of the unswerving stand" of the Front.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 31 MARCH - 6 APRIL 1975

<u>Moscow (2769 Items)</u>			<u>Peking (938 Items)</u>		
Upcoming V-E Day 30th Anniversary	(9%)	11%	Tunisia Prime Minister Nouira in PRC	(--)	12%
China	(6%)	6%	Vietnam	(2%)	7%
Hungarian Liberation 30th Anniversary	(--)	5%	Cambodia	(15%)	7%
Soviet-Finnish Friendship Treaty 27th Anniversary	(--)	4%	Vice Premier Chen Yung-kuei in Mexico	(1%)	5%
24th CPSU Congress Fourth Anniversary	(2%)	4%	USSR	(2%)	5%
Vietnam	(1%)	3%	Cancellation of PRC Performing Arts Troupe U.S. Tour	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.