

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

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
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**F B I S**

# TRENDS

## In Communist Propaganda

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26 FEBRUARY 1975  
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## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## MOSCOW HITS CHINESE CONGRESS'S FOREIGN POLICY PRONOUNCEMENTS

An authoritative Soviet response to PRC foreign policy pronouncements at the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) in January has come in a 22 February PRAVDA editorial article which rejected Chou En-lai's proposal in his NPC report that the USSR "do something" to solve "abit" of the border problem and accused Peking of fomenting global unrest. Earlier, on 5 February a PRAVDA article carrying similar authority under the byline "I. Aleksandrov" had focused on Chinese internal developments in discussing the new PRC constitution.\*

Linking the "Maoist leadership" with the most "aggressive" imperialist forces who oppose the "dominant" trend toward relaxation of international tension, PRAVDA criticized virtually all PRC foreign policies. It denounced the PRC concept of "Three Worlds," attacked the Chinese position on the inevitability of war, and condemned alleged PRC border provocations against neighboring states. The article also pointed up China's different approach to relations with the United States and with the USSR, especially as shown in China's support for a U.S. presence in Asia, and in Chou En-lai's relatively positive assessment of Sino-U.S. relations in contrast to his bleak outlook for Sino-Soviet ties.

SINO-SOVIET BORDER In Moscow's first authoritative response to Chou's NPC challenge to the Soviets to meet Chinese demands on the frontier, PRAVDA bluntly held Peking responsible for blocking normalization of relations through "the repetition of deliberately unacceptable preliminary conditions." Showing no sign of willingness to "do something," PRAVDA countered by telling the PRC leaders that if "they had serious intentions" in proclaiming at the NPC a desire for normal state relations, they "should finally take really constructive steps in this direction." The article quoted Brezhnev's November speech in Mongolia as an expression of the Soviet position--that the USSR claims no Chinese territory, has no preliminary conditions for normalization of

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\* The article is discussed in FBIS TRENDS, 12 February 1975, pages 13-14.

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relations, and is willing to sign a treaty of nonaggression and nonuse of force.\* While accusing China of "border provocations" against neighboring socialist states, the article did not specifically recall Sino-Soviet border clashes.

WAR AND PEACE        According to PRAVDA, Peking's current line is designed to "undermine the cause of peace and to kindle enmity and hatred among the peoples," and it accused China's leaders of trying to foment international tension in order to make China a leading power. Recalling that at the NPC Chou had stated the goal of bringing China "into the first rank of the countries of the world" by the end of the century, the article accused China of basing its planned rise to power on the misfortune of other peoples." PRAVDA quoted alleged Mao remarks in the late 1950's that a nuclear war "will not be so bad," and noted that "Peking is once again buzzing with speeches about the fatal inevitability of a new world war" and suggesting that such a development would be favorable. The article said Chou's NPC statement that "there is no relaxation in the world" was contrary to fact, and it noted that neither Chou nor the PRC constitution "mention the need to uphold the cause of peace" included in the previous constitution.

WORLD ALINEMENT       PRAVDA linked China's war orientation with its current theoretical division of nations into "Three Worlds," with the two superpowers composing the First World, other developed countries the Second World, and the developing countries the Third World. The article portrayed the superpower thesis as being aimed primarily against the Soviet Union in an effort to break up the socialist community and incite other peoples against the USSR. While accusing the Chinese of seeking to push the United States and the Soviet Union into a thermonuclear war, the article noted that Chou's report presented "completely differently" the prospects of developing PRC-USSR and PRC-U.S. relations. It noted Chou's statement that relations with the United States have "improved to some extent," and contrasted that with his statement about "controversies 'on fundamental questions' with the USSR."

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\* Brezhnev's speech had rejected China's 1974 October Revolution anniversary message, in which China first publicly raised the claim that a "mutual understanding" at the September 1969 border talks had provided for mutual nonaggression and nonuse of force as part of a preliminary package accord to be reached before starting overall border negotiations. Brezhnev's speech is discussed in FBIS TRENDS, 27 November 1974, page 5.

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The article ignored Chou's standard statement that "fundamental differences" exist between China and the United States, but made a token effort to dispel the implication of Sino-U.S. collaboration against the Soviet Union by remarking that the "constructive shift" in Soviet-U.S. relations has caused "bitterness" in Peking.

PRAVDA seemed to show some concern over Peking's success in attracting elements of the Second and Third Worlds. It noted that China was "flattering the young developing states" by calling itself a member of the Third World and warned that such tactics seek only to "use the developing states as a tool" in implementing China's great-power designs. It saw in the Chinese maneuverings a desire to weaken these countries and divert them from the path of strengthening their political and economic independence. The article linked alleged internal disruption of developing countries by China with its alleged appeals for "preservation of the U.S. military presence" in Asia, seeing the Chinese as "nurturing hopes of winning control of raw materials and sales markets in Asia and Africa from the imperialist monopolies in the future, but not feeling strong enough to achieve this yet." According to PRAVDA, the Chinese are now seeking to preserve the status quo in developing countries until their strength increases. The article saw Chinese opposition to an Asian collective security pact as proof of their dreams of hegemony and territorial acquisitions.

PRAVDA presented Peking's relations with the Second World as an attempt to ally with "reactionary militarist-revanchist forces" in opposition to world socialism. In standard terms, the article accused the Chinese of trying to sabotage peace efforts in Europe by asserting that the Soviet Union is "making a feint to the East and will strike its blow in the West." It recalled recent visits to the PRC by conservative European leaders, and admonished Chinese leaders that the "aggressive imperialist circles" have their own goal of fomenting military confrontation between China and the socialist community. The article noted "Peking's desire to complicate Soviet-Japanese relations," but it did not specifically refer to current Sino-Japanese and Soviet-Japanese treaty negotiations.

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## ENERGY

### EAST EUROPEANS REPORT PRICE INCREASES FOR IMPORTED SOVIET OIL

Moscow's CEMA partners waited a month before acknowledging in scattered public comment that a late January CEMA agreement means East European countries will pay higher prices for petroleum imported from the USSR for 1975 and the 1976-1980 period. Thus far, of Moscow's allies, only Hungarian, East German, and Polish commentators are known to have discussed the impact of the oil price increase, in articles and talks publicized on 22 and 23 February. The only Soviet comment on the new CEMA oil prices available thus far came in a 23 February Rodionov talk on Moscow radio that denounced alleged efforts in a New York TIMES article to set oil-producing and oil-importing socialist countries against one another. Rodionov pointed out that the TIMES article had admitted that the 1975 prices for Soviet oil sold to East European countries were below worldmarket prices. The initial East European comments do not deal with Western allegations of friction and differences within CEMA on the oil price issue, but emphasize that CEMA members still will obtain oil at prices far below those paid by Western importing countries.

The Soviet oil price increases now beginning to be discussed were foreshadowed in the communique on the 21-23 January CEMA Executive Committee meeting in Moscow. The communique had not, however, specifically acknowledged that Soviet oil prices would go up, but noted vaguely that to insure "favorable conditions" for future goods exchanges within CEMA, the committee had "approved recommendations concerning contractual prices to be applied in trade" among the CEMA member states during the next 5-year period. The new pricing mechanism also provides for annual price revisions, allowing Moscow to avoid getting locked in again to a long-term oil price unfavorable to the USSR.

East European commentators, like Moscow, stressed that the planned CEMA price increases for oil and other raw materials would still result in a price level "considerably" below current world market prices. Thus, Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG on the 23d pointed out that under the new price schedule for 1975, a ton of crude oil imported by Hungary from the USSR would cost 37 rubles (about \$50) compared with a price of \$110 per ton on "the capitalist world market." The current exchange rate is \$1.34 per ruble. NEPSZABADSAG added that the world market price for pig iron was much higher than the price

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for Soviet pig iron, in a ratio of two and one-half to one. The 1975 price increases for Hungarian imports from the USSR, it noted in this connection, would increase 52 percent for "energy" and other raw materials, compared to only 3.3 percent for machines and equipment. On the subject of the CEMA pricing mechanism for the next 5-year period, 1976-80, the article reported that the previous system of fixed prices for an entire 5-year period would be replaced by one whereby prices would be established each year on the basis of "the main market prices" in trade between the CEMA countries during the preceding five years. The system as described thus permits annual increases for Soviet oil, but with accompanying safeguards to keep these prices well below the world market level.

An East Berlin radio talk by Gerstner on the 23d pointed out that CEMA countries had "always" taken into account the world market prices of principal products, but that the prime reason for the CEMA price increases lay within the socialist countries themselves. Thus the Gerstner commentary attributed higher Soviet oil prices to the cost of developing new petroleum sources in Siberia. The Rodionov talk the same day had mentioned only in general terms that the East European people were "well aware" of the USSR's efforts to exploit "Siberian natural resources." Gerstner envisaged prices for Soviet oil during the next few years reaching a level half as high as those on the capitalist market. Anticipating a negative reaction, the commentator added that "this is the situation, dear listeners, which has objectively emerged for us and to which we must adapt."

In more generalized but candid comment, the Warsaw weekly POLITYKA of 22 February observed that CEMA's previous system of setting prices, a "stop price" system, had ceased working at the end of 1973, when steep rises in world market prices for oil "began to hamper the growth of cooperation and integration." This, it said was the reason for the present conversion to a "progressive price" system for the coming 5-year period. In 1975, POLITYKA said, CEMA prices would still be well below world prices, "but the difference will no longer be so glaring."

ROMANIA, ALBANIA      A Ceausescu speech on foreign trade on 14 February in Bucharest was used by the Romanian leader for what appeared to be a new expression of independence from Moscow. Ceausescu noted that while "some" raw materials were imported from the USSR and other socialist countries, Romania imported oil "exclusively" from nonsocialist countries at world market prices. This, he added, resulted in a negative trade balance with nonsocialist

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countries and a trade surplus with socialist states, each amounting to about \$200 million. He called for measures to correct both imbalances.

Tirana's ATA on the 25th viewed the CEMA price increases as a new example of Moscow's plundering and exploitation of its East European trading partners. The principal vehicle for such exploitation, it stressed, was the "Friendship" oil pipeline, which it said was constructed with the money and labor of the East European countries for Moscow's benefit.

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M B F R

## MOSCOW, ALLIES PUBLICIZE WARSAW PACT TROOP FREEZE PROPOSAL

Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies have again broken the confidentiality of the Vienna force reductions negotiations (MBFR) by publicizing the Pact's formal proposal that the 11 direct participants in the talks issue a joint statement declaring a freeze on the numerical strength of their armed forces in the region under negotiation while the talks are in progress. The idea of a Pact freeze proposal had been broached once before, in a low-level Moscow Radio Peace and Progress commentary on 17 December. Media silence on the issue was ended on 13 February, following the third plenary session of the talks since their resumption on 30 January, suggesting that the Pact had decided on a concerted publicity effort to press the West for a satisfactory response. The proposal was revealed by a Czechoslovak spokesman in a press conference reported by Czechoslovak media and by TASS, and was promptly played up by Soviet and other East European media.

The TASS dispatch on the 13th reporting the spokesman's press conference remarks pointed out that the freeze proposal would not be to the disadvantage of either side. Brezhnev the following day, in his speech at the luncheon for visiting British Prime Minister Wilson, made no reference to the proposal in repeating the standard charge that the "persistent attempts of some countries to obtain unilateral advantages" and "to outplay the other side are unfortunately still seriously impeding the progress" of the talks.

Predictably, Moscow has not discussed the data on which any freeze would be based, and has ignored criticism by Western spokesmen of this aspect of the proposal. The thrust of the comment by Moscow and its Pact allies has again been that the Pact states are demonstrating their flexibility and sincerity through a readiness for compromise in an effort to get the talks out of their current impasse. Calling for NATO good will, the comment as before has taken the Western states to task for their negative response to this new Pact initiative. Three advantages of the freeze have been pointed out in a series of Czechoslovak media interviews by Prague chief delegate Klein, as well as by PRAVDA's I. Melnikov on the 17th and by other commentators. The proposal, its proponents have claimed, would be an obstacle to the arms race in central Europe, would improve the atmosphere surrounding the talks, and would move the negotiations forward by taking the first step toward reductions. With regard to the last point, comment has recalled the various successful first steps taken in reaching other arms control agreements, such as the nuclear nonproliferation agreement and the convention on bacteriological weapons.

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## P O R T U G A L

## PRAVDA EDITORIAL ARTICLE ADVISES LEFTISTS TO MAINTAIN UNITY

Soviet media's first authoritative discussion of developments in Portugal since the coup of last April came in a 22 February PRAVDA editorial article--carried textually by TASS and Moscow radio in Portuguese and Spanish. The article, entitled "The Portuguese People--Master of Its Destiny," purportedly was pegged to the upcoming first anniversary of the coup, a remarkably early anniversary observance. The timing of the article would seem to reflect Soviet concern over developments as Portugal moves toward the projected 12 April constituent assembly elections. It comes against the background of considerable Western press speculation about the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) role and the party's reported influence on leaders of the Armed Forces Movement, the uncertain outcome of the April elections, and the reported decision of the Armed Forces Movement to continue indefinitely to play an active role in the government after the April and subsequent legislative elections.

The editorial article might also be setting the stage for justification of a poor PCP showing at the polls, by professing to see threats to the PCP from reactionary forces as well as from the Portuguese Socialists. PCP leader Cunhal himself has already publicly laid the groundwork for questioning the results of the April elections if the communists do poorly.

Since the April coup, Soviet media have reported cautiously on developments, frequently by replaying PCP comment and statements. In general, the steady flow of Moscow press and radio comment has been of routine nature and unexceptional content. Soviet leaders in their speeches have repeatedly, but briefly, praised the coup, remarking favorably on the successful overthrow of "fascism," democratization of the internal political situation, and the rapid decolonization process, and cited the coup as an example of the benefits of Moscow's policy of detente.

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ADVICE TO LEFTISTS      The PRAVDA editorial article was notable for its warning that "if all the progressive forces" in Portugal did not remain united, favorable opportunities would be created for "revenge on the part of reaction and fascism." The warning was primarily directed at the Portuguese Socialists and other left-of-center parties. But PRAVDA also seemed to be cautioning the PCP that if leftist unity was not maintained, and if the party moved too far and too rapidly in the present circumstances, the "democratization" process would be endangered. Perhaps also implicitly chiding the PCP, which reportedly has demonstrated some opposition to the recently announced Portuguese economic development program, PRAVDA stated firmly that the program's implementation "requires the consolidation and activization of all democratic forces."

While not mentioning the example of the downfall of the Allende regime in Chile, PRAVDA intimated that a similar, if unidentified, "instructive historical experience" could be repeated in Portugal if unity of the left was not safeguarded--a point made repeatedly in the past year in Soviet theoretical discussions of strategy and tactics for Western communist parties.

PRAVDA offered its advice to the leftists in observing that

it seems that many leading figures are forgetting the instructive historical experience which convincingly shows that the strength of democracy is in the unity of all progressive forces, and, conversely, wherever this unity is ruptured, wherever action is dictated by the wish to gain positions at the expense of communists and the striving to remove them from active work in the national interest, a split is made in the left forces' ranks and favorable opportunities are created for revenge on the part of reaction and fascism.

PRAVDA immediately added a disclaimer, asserting that it was "far from making any advice and recommendations" because "each people is the master of its destiny and each political party bears responsibility for its own action." The article concluded by stating that the "close alliance" between "the working masses" and the Armed Forces Movement was the guarantee for the Portuguese people's "democratic gains" and that the Portuguese only wanted to be left alone, without any interference, while they decided their affairs.

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NATO, WEST EUROPEAN  
"INTERFERENCE"

The editorial article had earlier spelled out this interference in cataloging recent "alarming" attempts by "external forces" to influence Portugal's political life. PRAVDA identified these external forces as a motley and "strange coalition" ranging from "belligerent NATO circles" to "quite a number" of West European Social Democrats. PRAVDA professed to see recent NATO naval maneuvers off the Portuguese coast, along with statements by Dutch, West German, and British Social Democrats, as examples of direct interference in Portugal's internal affairs. Summing up, PRAVDA "regrettably" concluded that enormous pressure from "outside" had been brought to bear on the Portuguese Socialist Party "to make it unfold an anticommunist campaign."

The article also routinely decried the efforts of "reaction" to retrieve its lost positions and thwart the process of democratization. It cited three such attempts: "last summer," when former prime minister Palma Carlos attempted to "retard the process of democratic development"; on 28 September, when "reactionary forces" relying on former president Spínola attempted to "reverse the country's development 'legally'"; and in late January-early February, when "certain quarters" attempted to cause a government crisis.

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## INDOCHINA

## DRV, PRG FOREIGN MINISTRIES PROTEST U.S. AIRLIFTS TO CAMBODIA

The U.S. decision, announced on 24 February, to begin an emergency airlift of food from Saigon to encircled Phnom Penh prompted protests on the 26th from both the PRG and the DRV in the authoritative form of foreign ministry statements. Presumably the protests were issued at this high level because these new U.S. flights are from Vietnam. Earlier, on 19 February, the DRV and PRG had issued less authoritative foreign ministry spokesman's statements assailing the U.S. airlift of supplies from Thailand.

The DRV Foreign Ministry statement claimed that the Saigon-Phnom Penh airlift is transporting weapons, munitions and fuel as well as food, and it charged that the Ford Administration's aim is "to help the puppet Lon Nol clique intensify the war and massacre the Cambodian people." The PRG statement was less specific in describing the airlift, but both it and the DRV statement called the U.S. action a new violation of the Paris agreement. Both statements also sharply castigated President Thieu as well as the United States. The PRG "sternly warned" that Americans and "the bellicose Nguyen Van Thieu clique" that the airlift was "an act of war" against the Cambodian people and a "brazen violation of Vietnam's sovereignty." The DRV statement for its part charged that the "Nguyen Van Thieu clique's" agreement to the airlift constituted "an extremely grave act of aggression against Cambodia."

The foreign ministry spokesmen's statements on the 19th had voiced no similar criticism of the Thai Government. Thus, the DRV spokesman merely called on Bangkok to "stop lending a hand to the United States in its aggression" in Indochina.

## DRV PARTY HISTORY CONTAINS ATYPICAL HARVEST STATISTICS

In a departure from years-long practice of avoiding precise figures for its annual harvests, Hanoi has boasted of an astonishing 5.6 million metric tons in food production for 1971--the year of floods which had been described as the worst in nearly 100 years. The claim appears in the new lengthy history of the Vietnam Workers Party, issued to mark the party's 45th anniversary on 3 February and broadcast by Hanoi radio in 19 installments. The history indicated that the figure of 5.6 million tons actually

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represented an equivalent tonnage of paddy--unhusked, unmilled rice--and that, of this total amount, "nearly 5 million tons" was paddy itself, with other grains and vegetables accounting for the remaining portion.

Earlier DRV media discussion of the 1971 crop had typically failed to provide annual figures and had given the impression that the crop fell considerably short because of the extremely serious floods during the growing season for tenth-month rice. As recently as last August First Secretary Le Duan, in his report delivered to an agricultural conference, recalled that "in 1971 and 1973 alone, natural calamities caused the loss of more than 1.5 million tons of paddy . . . ."

In the early 1960's Hanoi media regularly publicized figures for annual agricultural production; however, the new figure for 1971 is the first annual total known to have been released since escalation of the war in 1965. During the past 10 years the media have customarily used such generalizations as "higher than normal" to characterize agricultural progress, and have sometimes cited percentage increases over other, unspecified production totals for previous years.

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## CHINA

## IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN STRESSES DISCIPLINE AND PRODUCTION

China's central and provincial press continue to give dominant attention to the study campaign on proletarian dictatorship, a drive reflecting Peking's need for controlled, orderly economic development to meet the ambitious goals set by Chou En-lai in his report to the Fourth National People's Congress in January. The campaign was launched early in February by a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial citing a new Mao Tse-tung instruction.\* An example of the concentration on this campaign was the 22 February PEOPLE'S DAILY, which devoted three and a half pages--nearly the entire issue--to a list of quotations from Marx, Engels, and Lenin on the dictatorship of the proletariat. The quotations evidently were carefully selected and compiled to stress party discipline and the need for strong central control to insure the transition to communist economic forms during the interim period following the fall of capitalism. A PEOPLE'S DAILY-RED FLAG editor's note accompanying the quotations stated that studying the theory of proletarian dictatorship should now "draw top attention" from everyone.

As part of the study campaign, Peking radio and NCNA have carried four articles from a "special column" on the dictatorship of the proletariat published in the February RED FLAG. On 21 February Peking broadcast excerpts of the last of these RED FLAG articles, which confirmed authoritatively that the campaign will be run according to central directive, not mass initiative. The article noted that Lin Piao had used the slogan "the mass movement is naturally justified" to negate centralism and split the party. It called for balancing centralism and democracy, stating that freedom must be "freedom under guidance." Urging that a balance be found between democracy and centralism, the article warned that "without unified revolutionary discipline and forceful but proper executive orders, revolutionary order cannot be maintained" and "the masses cannot engage in effective production and in orderly study and living."

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\* The editorial and related articles are discussed in the TRENDS Supplement "China on Need for Proletarian Dictatorship in Socialist Stage," 14 February 1975.

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PROVINCIAL RESPONSE Provincial radios have responded to the centrally initiated campaign with a flurry of reports on local meetings to discuss the need for strengthening "dictatorship" and ending various remnant capitalist practices. Nanchang radio on 24 February broadcast an unusually comprehensive report on a local rally of 8,000 people which concluded that "it is necessary to strike hard at the corrupt officials, embezzlers, speculators, and leaders of criminal gangs." Kiangsi's first secretary, Chiang Wei-ching, spoke at the rally, noting that Mao's recent instruction on proletarian dictatorship "should draw the top attention" of all party members within the province.

Chiang commissioned local party leaders to organize "small but competent teams" to go to factories, rural villages, stores and schools and "see to it that the party's principles and policies are adhered to and that the task of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat is fulfilled." Endorsing moderate methods to overcome remaining problems, Chiang tasked the teams with "putting facts on the table and reasoning things out." Chiang instructed the teams to deal "steady, accurate, and hard blows at the handful of class enemies, with the emphasis on accuracy," to suppress "class enemies who resist the socialist system and sabotage the socialist economy." Spelling out the need for strengthening party authority, Chiang called upon officials to "strengthen security work" and "guard against trends to undermine the unity of the party."

The relationship between the new study campaign and meeting production goals was highlighted by several provincial reports on spring farming tasks. A 24 February Wuhan report on a recent provincial conference on spring farming suggested that mass energies generated by the campaign will eventually be turned toward production objectives. The broadcast stressed the need to study Mao's instruction on dictatorship of the proletariat and "deal accurate blows at the sabotage activities of a small handful of the class enemy. . . and make a success of spring farming." The report urged local party leaders to "protect the masses' activism" and to "seriously arrange the masses' daily life, since spring farming is a very busy time and production is tense." A 21 February Foochow report on provincial efforts to study Mao's recent instruction lauded a local county party committee for resolving to carry out study plans "before spring farming begins in the county," indicating that study meetings may be curtailed during the busy planting period.

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## NOTES

CHOU RECEIVES SIHANOUK: On 24 February NCNA reported that PRC Premier Chou En-lai had received Prince Norodom Sihanouk in the hospital that evening. Sihanouk had returned on 15 February from his annual visit to Hanoi for the Tet holiday. On Sihanouk's Tet visits in 1971, 1972, and 1973, Chou saw Sihanouk off at the Peking airport and greeted him on those occasions when he returned directly to Peking; last year Sihanouk departed from and returned to Canton. Since Chou became ill in the late spring of 1974 there had been no reports of meetings between the two leaders, other than Sihanouk's appearance at the PRC National Day banquet reception on 30 September 1974 hosted by Chou. The recent Chou-Sihanouk meeting is the first publicized private meeting between the two since August 1971.

EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE PREPARATIONS: A Zholkver commentary broadcast by Moscow on 21 February indicated that the previously announced timetable for the planned European communist party conference was still in effect. The commentary, which said that the all-European CP gathering "is to take place in the first half of this year," was pegged to a 17-19 February East Berlin preparatory session of a "working group" of the editorial commission. Moscow's concern to preserve an aura of democratic procedure and open debate was reflected in the fact that the 16 parties reported by TASS as participating in the working group session included seven independently oriented CP's--those of Romania, Yugoslavia, Britain, France, Italy, Spain, and Sweden. TASS added that the working group meeting was marked by "a detailed and constructive exchange of views" on the conference documents and on the next stage of preparations.

YUGOSLAV DISSIDENT ORGAN: PRAXIS, the anti-regime journal for Yugoslavia's disaffected Marxist intellectuals, has ceased publication. The closing, according to TANJUG on the 20th, was announced by a Croatian party official who stressed that the editorial board--rather than the state--had made the decision to shut down the 11-year-old bimonthly journal of the Croatian Philosophy Society. He did, however, acknowledge that the editors had been under increasing pressure to reorient their "anarcho-ultraleftist" perspective. PRAXIS, which had appeared only twice during the past year, reported in its latest issue that the state had cut off its subsidy. Western media have also reported that pressure was applied on publishing houses not to handle the

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journal; in a speech against PRAXIS last December, Croatian party leader Dragosavac had warned of such pressure. The announcement on the closing reiterated longstanding regime charges that the journal had attacked Yugoslavia's "self-managing socialism" and had denied the basic role of the working class and the vanguard role of the party. Tito himself revived earlier party complaints against the journal's links with circles in the West. Speaking at a party meeting on ideology on the 25th, he criticized foreign ties "with some people abroad" and the "growing hue and cry" by foreign media regarding PRAXIS, the 28 January ouster of eight Marxist professors at Belgrade University, and the regime's prosecution of writer Mihajlo Mihajlov, who went on trial on the 25th on charges of publishing several anti-Yugoslav articles. Tito brushed aside such criticism as failing to recognize the "right" of the party "to put out of action" those who stand in the way of party policy.

SOVIET ANTI-CHILEAN COMMENT: Moscow media have publicized two recent anti-Chilean events in continuing the steady stream of Soviet denunciations of Chile's military government. Expressing support for imprisoned Chilean "communists and patriots," Moscow again assailed the Chilean Government in the course of comment and reportage on a 12 February WFTU-sponsored "international day of solidarity with workers and people of Chile" and an 18-21 February meeting in Mexico City of an "international commission to investigate the crimes of the military junta." IZVESTIYA noted on the 13th that the 12 February demonstrations proved the "growth of solidarity throughout the world" in support of the Chilean people who were suffering "under the heel of the fascist junta," and added that the "voice of the Soviet people" would continue to be heard on behalf of "Chilean patriots." Reporting the meeting in Mexico, TASS on 22 February said that the commission had condemned the "mass murder of helpless people" which had been "unleashed" in Chile and had urged all governments to break diplomatic ties with the military regime. TASS also noted that the commission had "stigmatized" the United States for involvement in Chilean matters and had written President Ford expressing concern about the attempts of "certain American circles" to justify "the interference of the CIA in the internal affairs of Chile."

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## A P P E N D I X

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 17 - 23 FEBRUARY 1975

<u>Moscow (2577 items)</u>		<u>Peking (999 items)</u>	
British Prime Minister Wilson in USSR	(8%) 15%	FRELIMO President Machel in PRC	(-- ) 11%
[Joint Statement	(-- ) 2%]	World Table Tennis Games, Calcutta	(8%) 5%
Soviet Armed Forces Day	(-- ) 9%	USSR	(2%) 4%
[Grechko Order of the Day	(-- ) 3%]	Laos Peace Accord Second Anniversary	( -- ) 3%
China	(4%) 7%	Developing Countries Ministerial Conference, Algiers	(-- ) 3%
Upcoming V-E Day 30th Anniversary	(10%) 6%	NCNA on U.S.-Soviet Mideast Policies	(-- ) 3%
Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chnoupek in USSR	(-- ) 3%		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.