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Trends in Com. Media

24 Dec 75

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
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Trends in Communist Media

~~Confidential~~

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ANGOLA

MOSCOW REACTS CAUTIOUSLY TO U.S. CRITICISM OF SOVIET ACTIONS

Moscow media thus far have reacted circumspectly to high-level U.S. criticism of the Soviet role in the Angolan civil war and continue to reflect reluctance to publicly acknowledge the nature and extent of Soviet military involvement in the conflict. However, Soviet news reports on President Ford's 19 December statement acknowledged for the first time that he has criticized Soviet policy toward Angola. In recent weeks, Moscow propaganda had directly attacked UN Ambassador Moynihan for his statements censuring Soviet involvement in Angola, but had avoided reporting similar criticism at a higher level by Secretary of State Kissinger.* As of this writing Moscow media had not yet been heard to acknowledge Secretary Kissinger's 23 December press conference, in which he reiterated the Administration's intention to counter Soviet intervention in Angola.

Soviet caution was apparent in its careful media handling of President Ford's 19 December statement deploring the U.S. Senate decision to cut additional funds for Angola and his press conference remarks on the 20th, in which he warned that the involvement of the Soviet Union in Angola with weapons and Cuban troops was harmful to detente and destroyed any opportunity for improved U.S.-Cuban relations. President Ford's 19 December statement was noted by Moscow radio on the 20th and in a TASS report in PRAVDA on the following day, but the Soviet accounts did not acknowledge his specific references to Soviet introduction into Angola of Cuba troops and massive amounts of military equipment. While observing generally that the President's statement contained "remarks unfriendly to the Soviet Union and its policy toward Angola," PRAVDA carefully avoided explicit criticism of the President. It noted instead that "certain political circles in the United States" would like to "hide their support for armed intervention in the People's Republic of Angola (PRA) by deliberating on the so-called threat of Soviet intervention and so forth."

A 21 December TASS English dispatch from Washington on the President's press conference the previous day made no mention of his remarks on the Soviet Union, merely reporting that he had "admitted" the United States was "undertaking secret actions in

* For a discussion of earlier Moscow comment on Angola, see the TRENDS of 17 December 1975, pages 1-2.

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Angola." The President's comments on Cuban involvement were reflected, however, in the 23 December TASS English account of Fidel Castro's speech on the 22d to the closing session of the Cuban party congress. TASS reported that Castro "dwelt on a recent statement by President Gerald Ford to the effect that Cuban aid to the Angolan people closed the prospect of improving relations between Cuba and the United States," and it said that Castro responded that Cuba would "never renounce solidarity with the Angolan people and will continue rendering support to their struggle." TASS did not report Castro's admission that Cuban aid to "progressive and revolutionary movements in Africa" has included weapons, men, and military instructors.

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CUBAN PARTY CONGRESS

CASTRO TOUTS MPLA, DEMANDS U.S. APOLOGY FOR "MURDER" PLOTS

In speeches winding up the first congress of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), Prime Minister and PCC First Secretary Fidel Castro scored President Ford's warning that Cuban involvement in Angola "destroys any chance" for improved bilateral relations, and he vowed to continue "to help by all possible means, and with all possible means, the heroic people of Angola." Rejecting U.S. warnings on Cuba's support for Puerto Rican independence as well, he said that "we will never abandon our brother Puerto Ricans, even if there are a hundred years without relations with the United States." And Castro demanded, in turn, that the President apologize for the "unscrupulous, dirty, obscene manner in which that state has devoted its time to planning the murder of Cuban revolutionary leaders." The Prime Minister's remarks underscored earlier indications that he is holding a firm line on foreign policy and showing no willingness to make concessions in order to further U.S.-Cuban relations.

Castro's tough words climaxed the 17-22 December congress, attended by 86 foreign delegations, including a Soviet contingent led by CPSU Politburo member Mikhail Suslov. China, which had been harshly criticized during a June 1975 conference of Latin American communist parties in Havana, did not send any representatives. The congress featured a "main report" which took Castro the best part of two days to read. It focused primarily on domestic issues but also discussed details of U.S. attempts to assassinate Cuban leaders--a subject heretofore played down by Cuban domestic media.* Castro touched only very briefly on Angola in his main report, but he did explain that "the starting point" for Cuban foreign policy was support for "national liberation of the peoples," and he promised that Cuba would "continue to fulfill its duties toward the world revolutionary movement."

ASSASSINATION PLOTS In his 17-18 December formal report to the congress, Castro dealt at length with reported CIA-backed plots to assassinate Cuban leaders, reading extensively from the U.S. Senate committee report on the subject. Castro said that "these activities have no precedent in the history

* Castro's discussion of domestic issues and other matters dealt with at the congress will be discussed in a forthcoming issue of the TRENDS or a SPECIAL REPORT.

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of any modern state" and added that "they show the cynical, rotten and perverse makeup of imperialism." He added, however, that "we consider the revelation of the report a positive move by the Senate committee" even though "much information was omitted because of pressure from the CIA itself and from the President's office."

In his 22 December speech at a public rally--which followed President Ford's 20 December warning on Angola--Castro again referred to the plots, and this time had much harsher words for the President. He dismissed as insignificant President Ford's "cancellation of his hypothetical hopes for improvement of relations" and focused instead on the assassination attempts as proof of "how uncivilized they are, what barbarians they are, and what criminals they are." Indicating that it was the United States--not Cuba--which should make amends, Castro said that "what Ford has to do is send apologies to the Cuban Revolutionary Government for the dozens of crimes that were planned by the CIA for many years against the leaders of the revolution."

ANGOLA Directly addressing publicly the question of Cuban involvement in Angola for the first time on the closing day of the congress, Fidel Castro said that the Cuban revolution's early survival had depended upon outside help and that Cuba consistently had offered similar aid--"sometimes we have sent arms, other times we have sent men"--to other members of the "revolutionary family." Castro claimed that "imperialists" aimed at seizing control of Angola's oil-rich province of Cabinda or, if possible, gaining control of all Angola, and that "in order to carry out that plan the U.S. Government unleashed the South African troops against Angola" and "the CIA organized the FNLA." The Prime Minister stated flatly that "we will not just stand there" but "will continue helping the Angolan people" against this "very stupid" U.S. policy.

Referring specifically to the President's 20 December warning that Cuba's support for the MPLA "destroys any opportunity" for improved relations, Castro rhetorically asked "what does imperialism want, for us to break with this [revolutionary] family?" He vowed that "at this price, there will never be relations with the United States." Castro's comments amplified the Cuban regime's recent public justification of its Angolan involvement, an issue which earlier had been ignored or sidestepped in public statements.* For example,

* Havana's earlier treatment of Angola is discussed in the TRENDS of 26 November 1975, pages 14-15.

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Cuba's UN Ambassador Ricardo Alarcon, in a 10 December speech reported by the Havana domestic service, had asserted that "Cuba has always aided all African liberation movements, among them the MPLA," and that "helping the legitimate Angolan government is an obligation that Cuba has fulfilled and will continue to fulfill."

PUERTO RICO Prime Minister Castro also ridiculed U.S. "outrage" at Cuba's support for Puerto Rican independence, portraying U.S. complaints about a recent Havana-sponsored conference of solidarity with Puerto Rico as another ineffectual "threat."* As President Dorticos had done at the solidarity conference, Castro promised that "we will never renounce our solidarity with Puerto Rico," and, falling back on old rhetoric, added that "this is the new Cuba, it is a different country, and until they get that in their heads I do not see the likelihood of improving our relations."

* Cuban President Dorticos' comments following Secretary Kissinger's 9 September criticism of Cuban support for Puerto Rican independence are discussed in the TRENDS of 10 September 1975, page 23.

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PARIS ECONOMIC CONFERENCE

USSR DECRIES "SOCIALIST" ABSENCE AT "NORTH-SOUTH" TALKS

In comment on the 16-18 December ministerial-level Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) in Paris, Soviet commentators have expressed Moscow's first complaints about the lack of "socialist" representation in the Western-Third World dialog. Despite this sudden intimation of affront that the Soviet role has been overlooked, Moscow has still shown little enthusiasm to become entangled in the wrangling between the industrialized and underdeveloped countries. During the year-long discussions leading up to the CIEC, Moscow has seemed content to stand aloof and criticize the West for trying to dictate to the Third World, while piously proclaiming the benefits of the USSR's economic relations with foreign countries on the "basis of equality and mutual interests."*

The mainstream of Soviet comment on the 27-nation CIEC has continued to follow previous patterns in questioning the West's sincerity and voicing support for the "economic independence" of the developing countries. Comment has expressed skepticism that any results could be expected from the work of the four CIEC commissions, which are to discuss energy, raw materials, development and financial problems during the coming year.

"SOCIALIST" ROLE It is unclear why Moscow suddenly chose to call attention to the absence of a socialist representation at the "North-South" dialog. While the complaints suggest Soviet sensitivity to exclusion from a major forum, Moscow's diffident approach has stopped well short of any expression of a genuine desire to participate. Moscow might merely be moving to cover the bets, staking a claim should the negotiations prove fruitful but avoiding involvement if--as Soviet commentators anticipate--they bog down over inherent "contradictions."

The most explicit previous suggestion of Soviet interest in participating in such international conferences came in Foreign Minister Gromyko's April 1974 speech at the UN General Assembly special

* Soviet comment on preparations for the conference is discussed in the TRENDS of 22 October 1975, pages 6-7.

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session on raw materials. Gromyko then voiced support for the discussion of world economic problems "within a broad circle of states" and professed Moscow's "readiness to participate in both bilateral and multilateral discussions." But Moscow did not follow up Gromyko's suggestion in subsequent comment. Brezhnev, in his 9 December speech at the Polish party congress, while speaking generally in the European context, also touched on the idea of "international conferences." After complaining about actions by Western "circles" contrary to the spirit of the Helsinki declaration, he asserted the socialist states' readiness for "concrete actions" and went on to remark favorably--if ambiguously--on European congresses and international conferences on cooperation on the environment, transportation, "energy, and so on."

The first of the complaints about socialist exclusion came on the eve of the conference, in a foreign-language commentary by Dmitriy Vasilyev on 15 December. Vasilyev asserted that the conference organizers were claiming to "solve world problems" even though they failed to invite "the forces of peace." Underscoring the "extremely important" role of the socialist countries in world affairs, Vasilyev concluded that no international economic or political problems could be resolved without the "views, voice and participation" of the socialist countries.

The most authoritative comment came from IZVESTIYA's Vikentiy Matveyev, on Moscow radio's weekly observers roundtable program on the 21st. Matveyev asked rhetorically how pressing economic problems could possibly be examined in a "broad international context" without the participation of the socialist countries. Noting that French President Giscard d'Estaing referred in his conference opening speech to the absence of socialist countries, Matveyev failed to press the issue, ignoring Giscard's remark on "considering ways that they can be informed of our work or invited to participate." He seemed instead more interested in questioning Western motives, asserting that "obviously" the Western countries had "set themselves goals which did not wholly coincide with those they proclaimed from public tribunes." Elaborating on his suspicions, Matveyev pointed out that the Western delegations at the conference "started dictating their claims" and "demands" to the developing countries.

In a commentary on Moscow's domestic service on the 20th, Vladimir Dmitriyev took a somewhat different tack, this time suggesting Soviet interest through the device of citing unnamed "objective observers and the democratic press in the West" to the effect that the "establishment of the new international economic order is not possible without the socialist community." A Georgiy Skorov article in PRAVDA on the 21st accused the West of trying to solve--"in its own

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interests, of course"--only one issue, that of oil prices, while "creating the appearance" of conducting an in-depth examination of world economic problems. Skorov charged that the West hoped to achieve this aim by shifting the discussion of these problems from the "broad forum" of the United Nations to a conference with a "far more limited and carefully selected group of participants." Claiming that the contradictions evident at the Paris conference showed the irreconcilability of Western and developing countries' economic interests, he concluded that "only with the participation of all interested states" could world problems be solved.

COMMENT ON CIEC Moscow uniformly portrayed the three-day Paris meeting as contributing nothing to bridging the gap between the Third World and the West. A 19 December PRAVDA article by B. Orekhov and V. Sedykh typically described the West as "patently not interested" in constructive solutions to the problems of the developing countries. And Skorov in his 21 December PRAVDA article echoed other commentators in asserting that the West was trying to play off the backward states against the oil exporters by blaming the latter for oil price increases and inflation.

Comment also stressed the inability of the two sides to agree on guidelines for the four commissions. (The conference cochairmen and commission cochairmen are to meet 26 January in an attempt to reconcile the Western insistence on flexible guidelines and the Third World insistence on specific agendas.) Predicting that the "difficulties are just beginning," TASS' Yevgeniy Yegorov contended on the 19th that the Western delegations had aroused the "legitimate suspicions" of the developing countries regarding the work of the commissions. Similarly, Dmitriyev's 20 December Moscow domestic service commentary said "Paris observers" characterized the compromise to hold the January meeting as "fragile and ambiguous" and declared that "many complicated problems" remained to be solved.

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PACIFIC DOCTRINE

USSR SEES U.S. PLAN TO SHORE UP ASIAN PRESENCE, PRC SUPPORT

Soviet media have been strongly critical of the new U.S. "Pacific Doctrine" announced by President Ford in a 7 December speech in Honolulu, with press comment alleging that the United States was seeking through the new doctrine to reverse the decline of its military presence in Asia.

Betraying sensitivity to the President's exclusion of the Soviet Union from his list of countries considered important for guaranteeing security in the Pacific area, Moscow commentators have complained that the new doctrine attempts to set some Asian countries against others, and that a realistic plan for a stable peace in the area should incorporate all states, as does the Soviet-backed proposal for an Asian collective security system. Soviet media have asserted that Peking supports the U.S. Pacific Doctrine and implied that Sino-U.S. discussions on the matter may have occurred during the President's early December visit to the Chinese capital. (Monitored Peking media are not known to have even mentioned the Pacific Doctrine thus far.)

The most significant commentary so far, by IZVESTIYA observer Vladimir Osipov on the 16th, noted the "choice of potential parties" to the U.S. plan and concluded that Washington was apparently attempting to "reanimate military-political blocs and rejuvenate its military presence in Asia." Osipov suggested a system of collective security incorporating all states in the area as an alternative. PRAVDA's Vladimir Larin said the same day that the rebirth of a policy tailored to the interests of only a "narrow group of countries" was contrary to the "main trends of international development."

Osipov linked the Pacific Doctrine and President Ford's China visit, claiming unambiguous if tacit approval of it by Peking. In this connection he cited White House press secretary Nessen's comment to journalists in Peking that they would be "making a mistake" to concentrate solely on Sino-U.S. disagreement over detente, since "there are many other factors in relations between the United States and China." Radio Moscow broadcasts to China and the rest of Asia have stressed Sino-U.S. agreement on at least the spirit of the Pacific Doctrine: one commentary said it was "not just coincidence" that the doctrine was proposed just after the President's visit to Peking. Soviet commentary on the Sino-U.S. summit had emphasized Sino-U.S. accord on the need for a continued U.S. military presence in Asia as well as their disagreement on detente.

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U S S R - J A P A N

MOSCOW HITS JAPAN MILITARY "BUILDUP," TIES WITH UNITED STATES

Soviet media treatment of Japan on the eve of USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko's Japan visit scheduled to begin 9 January has continued a consistently hard line, including Moscow's standard portrayal of Japan as a potential threat to Asian peace, evidently with a view to discouraging Japanese hopes of any Soviet concessions on disputed issues. Recent comment was highlighted by a 17 December RED STAR article harshly critical of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and a 21 December radio commentary beamed to Japan, also critical of the SDF, which argued that the Pacific Doctrine presented by President Ford in Honolulu on 7 December was a thinly veiled attempt by the United States to reinforce its position in Asia by strengthening its military ties with Japan.

The RED STAR article went beyond standard Soviet criticism of increases in Japanese military spending by specifically charging that "militarist circles" in Japan were attempting to interfere in Soviet-Japanese relations, which RED STAR characterized as "developing positively on the whole." The article claimed the SDF were being educated in the ideas of "revenge" and "anti-Sovietism," and charged that the Japanese military was being prepared for the possibility of "military action against the armies of socialist states in close interaction with U.S. troops." Citing a trend toward "glorification" of the campaigns and traditions of the Imperial Army and the rehabilitation of "war criminals," the article suggested that the growth of the SDF was connected to an ideological revival of Japan's "militaristic past." In line with Moscow's inflexible stand on the issue for the past few years, RED STAR also accused Japanese "military propaganda" of conducting a "revanchist campaign" for the return of the northern territories--islands off Hokkaido claimed by Japan but held by the Soviet Union since the end of World War II.

The 21 December Moscow radio commentary to Japan, lumping together "opponents of detente" and proponents of strengthening the SDF, charged that those supporting an SDF buildup were "importing" the Pacific Doctrine, which it labeled an attempt by the United States to "revive" its "military-political bloc" with Japan's help. The commentary claimed that recent comments by Japan's Defense Agency head indicated that the government had changed its views on the possibility of sending Self-Defense Forces overseas, notably to Korea.

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Earlier, a report by an IZVESTIYA commentator broadcast by Moscow radio on 19 December charged that the flight of U.S. B-52's to Okinawa in November--described by U.S. spokesmen as a typhoon evacuation flight--had been a "preliminary notice of the announcement of the Pacific Doctrine," and claimed that by urging Japan to help finance projects in South Korea, including the modernization of the South Korean army, the United States was creating a "Tokyo-Seoul channel" which it intended to use for its "selfish purposes" within the framework of the Pacific Doctrine.

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EAST - WEST RELATIONS

USSR FIVE-YEAR PLAN FORESEES EXPANDED FOREIGN ECONOMIC TIES

The draft guidelines for the USSR's 1976-80 five-year plan indicate that Soviet leaders still consider valid the premises of the landmark April 1973 CPSU Central Committee plenum decision to expand greatly the role of foreign trade in the Soviet economy.* The guidelines, published in the Moscow papers on 14 December, acknowledged that such expansion would require improvements in the quality and competitiveness of Soviet goods produced for export, and they revealed that possible organizational changes to facilitate foreign trade are still under discussion. Decisions made at the April and December 1973 plenums had brought forth a public campaign by Soviet leaders and prominent economic officials justifying efforts to expand economic and scientific interchange with the West that lasted into early 1974. Since that time, however, little has been heard from Moscow on the subject, and major structural changes to facilitate trade have yet to be announced.

The Central Committee guidelines revealed that steps were planned to achieve a "broader participation by the Soviet Union in the international division of labor," including a further expansion of trade and scientific-technical cooperation with advanced Western economies, "taking into account the present relaxation of international tensions." The guidelines acknowledged that Moscow hoped to utilize foreign economic ties in the solution of internal economic tasks and in "accelerating scientific-technical progress." They spoke specifically of possible measures to improve the "planning, management and organization" of foreign trade, including an increased role to be played by "branch ministries and departments."

From the April 1973 plenum until early 1974, prominent Soviet economists such as N.N. Inozemtsev, director of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, and Oleg Bogomolov, head of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, wrote major articles for the Soviet press which advocated greater Soviet participation in the "international division of labor" and frankly acknowledged what the Soviet economy stood to gain. They argued that the increasingly global nature of economic and social problems made it impossible for any one country to solve them on its own. Some economists spoke of the need to increase the direct role of relevant ministries and industrial associations in foreign trade, thus arguing implicitly for

* Internal debates on Soviet policy in this area are discussed in the FBIS SPECIAL REPORT, "Pressures for Change in Soviet Foreign Economic Policy," 5 April 1974.

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a diminution of the virtual monopoly enjoyed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Brezhnev, though more cautious than the institute spokesmen, lent support for the campaign in speeches through the summer of 1973 as in a West German television address in May rejecting the concept of autarky, and during his June visit to the United States when he acknowledged bureaucratic resistance to needed changes.

Other spokesmen, including CPSU Secretary Konstantin Katushev and Central Committee section chief Sergey Trapeznikov, countered at the time with warnings of the political and ideological dangers inherent in expanded interchange with the West. By the summer of 1974 public discussion of possible internal changes to facilitate foreign economic ties had virtually disappeared, though a general emphasis on expanded trade remained.

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MIDDLE EAST

USSR NOTE HITS U.S. STAND ON PLO, AGREES TO TALKS ON GENEVA

Moscow, in an official note to the U.S. Government on 18 December and in related media comment, has continued to urge resumption of the Geneva Mideast conference, at the same time holding that U.S. opposition to participation by the Palestine Liberation Organization makes resumption of the conference "impossible." The note is the latest in the Soviet-U.S. exchange on the Geneva talks, initiated by Moscow in a 9 November note which called for resumption of the Geneva conference with PLO participation "from the very beginning," and followed by a U.S. note of 1 December which suggested a preparatory meeting of the original Geneva participants and expressed readiness to hold bilateral consultations with the Soviet Union. The current Soviet note confirmed Moscow's rejection--clearly implied in a speech by Gromyko on 2 December--of the U.S. idea of a preparatory meeting; but it indicated Soviet agreement with what it called "the U.S. proposal to hold bilateral consultations on matters connected with the resumption of the Geneva conference."

At the same time, Moscow is continuing to play up endorsements of PLO participation at Geneva in a continuing series of discussions with Arab states and Palestinians. Thus, TASS on the 23d reported that Gromyko received a Jordanian delegation for talks in which both sides "stressed the necessity" of resuming the Geneva talks, with the presence of PLO representatives "from the very beginning." And a Moscow Arabic-language report on the 12-19 December USSR visit by a delegation of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), headed by its secretary general, Nayef Hawatimah, said the delegation noted the "great importance" of the 9 November Soviet note to the United States calling for resumption of the Geneva conference with PLO participation.

PLO ROLE AT GENEVA The 18 December Soviet note, continuing to press for Geneva talks with PLO participation, dismissed the U.S. argument that no decision on Palestinian participation was taken at the original conference in December 1973. "Naturally," the Soviet note said, "this cannot be a reason against solution of this question now." Moscow claimed that the U.S. position on the PLO "makes it, in fact, impossible to convene the Geneva conference." And it asserted that Washington's stand contradicted the proclaimed U.S. approval for reconvening the Geneva conference.

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The note in effect argued that the PLO's "broad international recognition" justified its participation at Geneva and maintained that the Soviet position offered "the most effective method for the cardinal solution" of the Mideast problem on the basis of "appropriate" UN decisions. Moscow offered no comment on the view expressed in the U.S. note that Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 should serve as the basis for negotiations and that it would be inappropriate to introduce other resolutions "not accepted by all parties." Soviet commentators have tended to avoid offering any views on periodic Arab suggestions to alter-- or replace--Resolution 242 so as to obtain a reference to Palestinian rights.

The Soviet note also brushed aside the U.S. suggestion that, "as a practical way of proceeding," a preparatory meeting of the original participants could discuss "agenda, procedures, and the matter of participation in a subsequent full conference." Offering the same objection that Gromyko had made on the 2d at a dinner honoring the visiting Kuwaiti foreign minister, the note said the U.S. proposal to hold "some sort of preparatory conference," again without PLO participation, indicated an intention to avoid convening the Geneva talks.

U.S.-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS Despite its objections to the U.S. stand on the PLO, the Soviet note conveyed Moscow's concurrence with the U.S. proposal to hold bilateral talks with the USSR "on matters connected with the resumption" of the Geneva conference. The U.S. note had in fact contained two references to the possibility of bilateral consultations: one had indicated U.S. readiness to discuss with the USSR "how best to prepare the agenda and procedures for a reconvened conference and to deal with the question of participation in the conference"; the other reference had stated U.S. readiness, in the context of proposing a preparatory conference, to consult with the USSR "in advance of such a preparatory conference."

TALKS WITH PDFLP Moscow apparently gave no publicity to the recent USSR visit by a PDFLP delegation other than a report, broadcast in Arabic on the 19th, on the conclusion of the visit. Soviet media have only infrequently publicized Soviet contacts with the PDFLP, one of the three main "moderate" groups in the PLO (together with Yasir 'Arafat's Fatah and the Syrian-backed as-Sa'iqah, led by Zuhayr Muhsin). PDFLP leader Hawatimah, head of the recent delegation, apparently also led a "military-political delegation" to Moscow in November 1974, according to Beirut's AN-NAHAR on 5 November last year.

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Moscow briefly acknowledged that visit in an Arabic broadcast a week later, noting that it had been under Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) sponsorship. Additionally, the Lebanese Communist Party organ AN-NIDA' reported on 20 March 1975 that a Hawatimah-led delegation held talks last spring with a touring AAPSO delegation led by the Soviet deputy chairman of AAPSO, V. Kudryavtsev. In a 15 April IZVESTIYA article on the Palestinians, Kudryavtsev described Hawatimah as "a politically experienced and erudite figure" with whom he had "very useful talks, profound in content."

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V I E T N A M

DRV RELEASES AMERICAN BODIES; PHAM VAN DONG SEES CONGRESSMEN

The DRV's release of the remains of three American pilots on 21 December has occasioned a reaffirmation by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong of Hanoi's longstanding demands for implementation of the Article 21 provision of the Paris agreement calling for U.S. aid in the postwar reconstruction of Vietnam. The Premier voiced the now standard DRV condition for normalizing relations with the United States at a meeting with the House delegation from the Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, following their attendance at the Hanoi repatriation ceremony.

In the VNA report of the meeting with the Premier, Pham Van Dong assured the delegation that "responsible DRV organs" would continue searching for information on American personnel still missing, but at the same time he repeated Hanoi's demand for U.S. aid. According to the VNA account, the U.S. Congressional delegation "also saw the U.S. responsibility . . . and obligation" to heal the wounds of war in Vietnam. A much briefer Hanoi radio version of the repatriation ceremony and the Pham Van Dong meeting did not, however, cite the delegation's agreement in this regard.

The names and vital statistics of the formerly missing American pilots involved were originally publicized in a 22 April 1975 VNA report, which noted that the same information had been sent earlier that month to Senator Kennedy as a further response to a letter he had written to DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. Trinh's initial answer to Kennedy--dated 21 January but not released by VNA until 16 March--contained the disclosure that the DRV was taking positive action in finding missing Americans and noted that "DRV services" responsible for such a task were in existence.*

SPEECH ON ANNIVERSARIES NOTES PLAN TO MERGE FRONT GROUPS

Hanoi has marked its three major December anniversaries with standard propaganda, including reports on a 20 December meeting jointly marking the 31st anniversary of the army, the 29th anniversary of "national resistance," and the 15th anniversary of the founding of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV). The intention in the future to merge the South's NFLSV with North Vietnam's comparable

* For a discussion of Nguyen Duy Trinh's reply to Senator Kennedy's letter, see the TRENDS of 11 June 1975, pages 6-8.

front organization, the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF), was revealed in a speech at the Hanoi meeting, but available media reports of the Saigon celebration of the NFLSV anniversary on the 19th took no note of the planned merger, and were concerned mainly with eulogizing the NFLSV's past achievements.

The announcement of the prospective NFLSV-VFF union came in a speech by Nguyen Van Tien, head of the PRG Special Representation in Hanoi, who followed Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Politburo member and Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung to the podium at the Hanoi celebration. According to Nguyen Van Tien, the NFLSV is now making every effort to fulfill the "last task" in its political program--"the peaceful reunification of the fatherland." Once this is accomplished, Tien declared, "the NFLSV will be happy and proud to merge with the VFF so there will be a strong and firm national united front."

The 20 December Hanoi meeting marking the anniversaries was essentially a low-keyed affair, with VWP Politburo members Hoang Van Hoan and Van Tien Dung the highest-ranking members of the DRV hierarchy present. Although the usual keynote speaker, Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, was away attending the Cuban party congress, past practice suggests that a greater turnout of Politburo members would have been expected. The 1974 Hanoi meeting observing the 30th anniversary of the army was attended by the top Politburo members, including Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, and Vo Nguyen Giap--who keynoted the festivities. The 1973 joint celebration in Hanoi of the army anniversary and Resistance Day was marked by the presence of Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, and Van Tien Dung. The highest-ranking member of the DRV leadership to attend the 1973 and 1974 Hanoi celebrations of the NFLSV anniversary was Hoang Van Hoan.*

The southern celebration of the NFLSV anniversary in Saigon commanded a full turnout of the top southern leadership, including VWP Politburo member and COSVN Secretary Pham Hung, NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, and PRG President Huynh Tan Phat. The 20 December Saigon radio report--the longest version available--of the main speech delivered at the Saigon meeting by Nguyen Huu Tho indicates that he broke no new ground and hewed to the standard rhetorical line in his discussion of the spring victory and the need to socialize the South.

* The anniversary celebrations for 1973 and 1974 are discussed in the TRENDS of 28 December 1973, pages 14-17, and 24 December 1974, pages 10-12, respectively.

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CAMBODIA - LAOS

LAO DELEGATION RECEIVES WARM WELCOME DURING PHNOM PENH VISIT

The Cambodian and Lao media have given cordial and extensive attention to the 15-18 December official visit to Phnom Penh by a Lao party-government delegation led by LPDR Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Phoun Sipaseut. The visit was the first such high-level exchange between the two countries since a Cambodian delegation, headed by RGNU Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan, visited Laos in June 1974.*

The Lao delegation was greeted on its arrival on 15 December by RGNU deputy prime ministers Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, and Son Sen. On the same day it had talks which Phnom Penh radio said were replete with "profound sentiments of great friendship, militant unity, and revolutionary brotherhood" and which included "all members of the Cambodian cabinet present in Phnom Penh." That evening there was a banquet for the delegation attended by RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth and addressed by Ieng Sary and Phoun Sipaseut. Phnom Penh reported that the delegation had "cordial talks in an atmosphere permeated with a spirit of great friendship and militant unity" with Ieng Sary on the 16th, and had a conversation "in an extremely cheerful, cordial and warm atmosphere" with Penn Nouth, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Son Sen, and other RGNU officials on the following day. A joint communique on the visit was signed on 18 December and broadcast in full by the Cambodian and Lao radios on the 19th.

Phnom Penh's extensive and cordial media treatment of the Laotian visitors is comparable to that which it gave to visits by Cambodia's own delegation, headed by Khieu Samphan and Ieng Sary, to China and North Korea last August. Such treatment also contrasts with Phnom Penh's cursory attention--confined to a terse 3 August communique--to a visit to Cambodia by a Vietnam Workers Party delegation headed by First Secretary Le Duan, the only other high-level foreign leader known to have paid an official visit to Phnom Penh since its "liberation" in April.**

* The 5-8 June 1974 visit by Khieu Samphan to the Lao "liberated area" is discussed in the TRENDS of 3 July 1974, pages 9-10.

** The Cambodian delegation's visits to China and North Korea are discussed in the TRENDS of 20 August, pages 12-14; Le Duan's visit to Cambodia is discussed in the TRENDS of 6 August 1975, pages 16-17.

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JOINT COMMUNIQUE The 18 December joint communique on the visit was notable for the warmth of the language used to describe relations between the two sides, going beyond the cordial language used in the press communique marking Khieu Samphan's June 1974 visit to Laos. The present communique expressed "satisfaction" with the talks, said to be held in an atmosphere of "militant unity and fraternal friendship," and called the visit "completely successful." It noted that Lao-Cambodian friendship "has never been blemished" and that both sides "unanimously respect" each other's territorial integrity on the basis of the present border. The communique pledged both sides to develop their mutual relationship "in all fields" and to strengthen "the long-standing great friendship and militant unity" between them. While the press communique on Khieu Samphan's and Ieng Sary's 1974 visit had described that visit as "crowned with success," it had hailed the state of Lao-Cambodian relations with less overall enthusiasm, describing the talks at that time as only "cordial."

Phnom Penh and Radio Vientiane accounts of the 18 December joint communique differed slightly in their rendering of some passages, although it is not clear whether the discrepancies were deliberate. Thus, the Phnom Penh version maintained that both U.S. bases and the "Lao and Cambodian traitors" in Thailand constituted a "threat to the peace and security of Laos and Cambodia," while Vientiane cited only the U.S. bases as such a threat. Similarly, the Lao text demanded that "the camps of the Lao and Cambodian traitors in Thai territory be dismantled," while the Cambodian version maintained that "no remnants of the Lao traitors and Cambodian traitors be allowed in Thailand." Both accounts called for the removal of U.S. bases from Thailand and reiterated standard expressions of willingness to "live in peace and friendship with the Thai people."

Phnom Penh radio had not previously referred to the problem of Cambodians living in Thailand, but the issue of foreign bases in Thailand had been addressed in the 31 October Thai-Cambodian communique establishing bilateral diplomatic relations, in which both sides agreed to refrain from allowing the use of their territory "by any third country in any form" in violation of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.* Prior to that, Phnom Penh had last referred to the issue of U.S. bases in Thailand in criticizing U.S. policy over the Mayaguez incident last May.

* The Thai-Cambodian communique is discussed in the TRENDS of 5 November 1975, pages 24-25.

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PRC - TAIWAN

PEKING RELEASES MORE EX-KMT OFFICIALS, PERMITS TAIWAN RETURN

China's third release this year of former Nationalist officials was disclosed on 23 December in an NCNA report that Chinese "judicial organs" had decided to pardon 72 high-level military and political leaders of the former Kuomintang government on the mainland. The current move follows Peking's release in March of almost 300 former KMT "war criminals" and its freeing in September of 144 "agents" of the Taiwan government captured during raids on the PRC in the 1960's.* Peking has noted in each case that those pardoned were free to return to Taiwan and that they would be provided with travel expenses, reflecting Chinese efforts to publicize PRC support for such unofficial interchange and to discredit Taipei's policy opposing contacts with the mainland.

As in previous announced pardons, the 23 December NCNA report noted that those released--identified this time as "all former Kuomintang party, government, military and special agency personnel at or above the county or regimental level"--had made "varying degrees" of progress in reforming themselves under the "lenient" CCP guidance. It said that all would be given citizenship rights and assigned jobs, while those who wished to return to Taiwan were free to do so and would be provided with "conveniences." Like the previous pardons, Peking's most recent release was depicted as an expression of China's stability and unity.

BACKGROUND Following its release of former "war criminals" in March, Peking gained considerable propaganda mileage out of Taipei's unwillingness to accept 10 of those released who had gone to Hong Kong seeking permission to return to their families in Taiwan. In the wake of the September release of former Nationalist agents, Taipei moderated its past opposition and announced that former agents who managed to "escape" the mainland would be received at special "reception centers" set up on some of the small, Taipei-controlled offshore islands. NCNA reported on 8 October that 60 of the released agents left Amoy harbor that day by boat for Quemoy island, in order to return to their families on Taiwan. Subsequent low-level PRC media comment attempted to undercut Taipei's surprise acceptance of those released, claiming that the former agents' reception on arrival in Quemoy amounted to their being placed under arrest, as they were forced to disembark in single file, "their hands over their heads," and that they were "frisked" by heavily armed nationalist soldiers and taken away in military trucks under heavy escort.

* The release in March is discussed in the TRENDS of 19 March 1975, pages 27-28, and the one in September is reviewed in the TRENDS of 24 September 1975, pages 17-18.

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

FRENCH, BRITISH CP'S QUESTION SOVIET TREATMENT OF DISSIDENTS

Longstanding tension between the CPSU and the French and British communist parties has flared up anew over the issue of Soviet treatment of dissidents and conditions in Soviet prison camps. The current Soviet-French party dispute was triggered by the showing on French television of a program on Soviet prison camps which clearly disturbed the French communists, while the British Communist Party's criticism of the Soviets is centered on Russian dissident Andrey Sakharov's charges concerning political prisoners.

On the day following an 11 December French television program on Soviet prison camps, a French Communist Party (PCF) Politburo statement coupled its criticism of French television officials' motives in showing the program with a declaration that if Soviet authorities did not publicly refute the conditions portrayed in the program, the PCF would express surprise "and most formal reprobation." It added that "such unjustifiable conditions could only be harmful to socialism and to the fame the Soviet Union has justifiably won" throughout the world.

Moscow's annoyance over the PCF statement was registered in an Alekseyev commentary reported by TASS late on the 18th and published in PRAVDA the next day. The commentary, entitled "Gross Fabrication," followed up its criticism of the French television program with the remark that "it is even more surprising that some persons who have always given a due rebuff to anti-Sovietism and anticommunism were taken in" by the program and thus wittingly or unwittingly promoted the spreading of the alleged provocation. The PCF kept the controversy alive with a direct response to the Alekseyev commentary in an article in L'HUMANITE on the 20th which asserted that, while the PCF has always fought anti-Sovietism, it could not condone the survival of "Stalinist" conditions in Soviet prison camps, adding that the French party considers socialism to be inseparable from "ever-increasing freedom for all members of society."

Perhaps encouraged by the PCF's outspoken stance, the British Communist Party daily MORNING STAR on the 23d similarly coupled a criticism of Soviet dissident Sakharov's latest book with a demand that the Soviet Government give "an authoritative answer" to Sakharov's charge that there are 2,000-10,000 political prisoners in Soviet prison camps, in addition to "even more" suffering for their religious beliefs. The paper cited the British Communist Party program document, "The British Road to Socialism," for the

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assertion that suppression of political expression and religious freedom is intolerable, harms socialism, and helps its enemies.

While the two Western parties' independent proclivities had been relatively muted in the years following their expressed disapproval of the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, these parties during the past year have figured prominently in the controversy surrounding the preparation of a document for the proposed European communist party conference. The French party (PCF) on 17 November joined the Italian Communist Party in issuing an apparently gratuitous joint statement underscoring the principle of autonomy of communist parties and rejecting "all" interference.*

* See the TRENDS of 26 November 1975, pages 3-4.

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U S S R

DEBATE GROWS ON ISSUE OF CENTRAL VS. REGIONAL PLANNING

There has been recent evidence in the Soviet media of a rising debate between advocates of strong central ministries and their opponents, who favor greater authority at the regional level. Some of the evidence suggests the possibility that in the current round--unlike the last public debate on this issue in 1972-73--the regionalists may now be on the offensive and presenting a growing challenge to the centralists, with the regionalists perhaps inferring that they have support from Brezhnev, whose recent published statements touching on the question appeared sympathetic to the idea of greater latitude for regional planners. Such a challenge also would be consistent with the continuing decline in support for the 1965 Soviet economic reform, a reform that had been accompanied by the restoration of a system of strong central ministries. The current round in this debate was touched off by an article in the October issue of KOMMUNIST by Ukrainian planning official A. Yemelyanov, who argued for increased authority for republic planning organizations at the expense of central branch ministries.*

The debate centers on the so-called "branch principle" of planning--in this context, meaning the strong all-union ministries for individual branches of industry that were reestablished in September 1965 with the abolition of the regional administrative bodies (Khrushchev's sovnarkhozes). While this restoration of ministries corrected the "localism" inherent in the sovnarkhoz system, according to many complaints it has also allowed central ministries to ignore local interests. This trend appeared to reach a peak in 1972-73, when some central officials, who already were frequently ignoring or overriding regional officials' rights, proposed totally eliminating the regional planners from the planning process.

Local planners reacted sharply to the centralizers' campaign and have increased complaints about the neglect of territorial planning under the present branch planning system, citing as examples the construction of new plants by central ministries without the approval of local authorities, and without considering or providing for the impact on local housing, schools, labor resources and

* For details on the Yemelyanov article, see the TRENDS of 19 November 1975, pages 20-22.

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environment. The local planners are advancing their cause under the banner of "complex territorial planning" to overcome narrow "departmental" planning inherent in the branch system. As indicated by RSFSR Gosplan Deputy Chairman N. Zenchenko in the June 1975 PLANNED ECONOMY, some local officials are directly urging creation of new planning organs for local economic regions.

RECENT ARTICLES The public debate, directly revived by Ukrainian planning official Yemelyanov's October KOMMUNIST article arguing for a reversal of the present system by giving regional planners preference over branch planners, has been followed by other, if less polemical, articles on the subject.

The November issue of Gosplan's organ PLANNED ECONOMY carried four articles on territorial planning. In one, an Armenian, R. Badalyan, complained that the republics' complex plans are presently compiled only after ministry plans already have been confirmed and that hence the republic plans were simply a projection of ministry figures. To restore republican authority, he called for simultaneous preparation of ministry and republic plans. (The Yemelyanov article had gone further, urging that republic plans be actually prepared first and ministry plans then based on them.)

V. Meleshchenko, director of the RSFSR Gosplan's planning institute for the Northwest region, wrote in PLANNED ECONOMY about Leningrad's complex regional plan--the USSR's first such plan. He explained that work on it had begun in 1972, after Brezhnev had publicly endorsed the idea in December 1971, and that despite difficulties caused by lack of progress on the new national five-year plan it had been completed and approved by the USSR Gosplan in May 1974.

This same issue of PLANNED ECONOMY also carried a review of a 1975 book on territorial planning by V.F. Pavlenko, who urged strengthening of republic planning authority. One of the reviewers was V. Kistanov, who had ignited the 1972-73 public debate by proposing that republic borders be changed to facilitate economic planning. Centralizer Kistanov was critical, but he conceded that Pavlenko was not as extreme as some in trying to substitute "regional economics" (which he explained as the "economics of individual regions") for the economic approach to geography (placing economic efficiency above regional boundaries). Kistanov noted that "the concept of 'regional economics'" has become "quite widespread" recently.

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This issue of PLANNED ECONOMY also reported on a conference concerning territorial and branch administration which heard various proposals on how to improve consideration of territorial interests and change the present branch-dominated system.

On the other hand, the branch principle was defended by A.I. Gladyshevskiy in the November-December issue of the Academy of Sciences' ECONOMIC SERIES (No. 6). Citing Gosplan Chairman Baybakov's warning in the March 1974 PLANNED ECONOMY that the complex approach to planning should not be set against the branch principle, he argued that despite the growth of complex planning and the "possibility of creating new organizational forms" of complex planning, the branch principle would retain its importance. He approved of the present situation wherein, he explained, complex plans are compiled only after branch plans and can at most only bring about some amendments to branch plans, and he declared "the task is not to abolish or alter the branch principle" but to improve coordination of branch plans.

BREZHNEV, PODGORNYY,
KOSYGIN STANDS

From the record, it would appear that all three top Soviet leaders--Brezhnev, Podgornyy and Kosygin--oppose any shift of power to regional organs. In the wake of the 1972-73 public debate, Brezhnev at the December 1973 Central Committee plenum declared that "we will continue to uphold the branch principle of administration," and only days later, Podgornyy in a 26 December 1973 speech denied that there would be "any kind of radical reorganization of the present system of administration" since "the branch principle has stood the test of time." As for Kosygin, he was closely associated with and actually announced the original restoration of the branch principle at the September 1965 plenum.

Nevertheless, Brezhnev in his December 1973 speech balanced his endorsement of the branch principle with a statement that "it should be improved, territorial aspects should be more fully considered, and more attention given to interbranch questions." His December 1973 statements, only recently made public with the issuance of Brezhnev's collected economic speeches in mid-1975, may encourage decentralizers to press their causes. Moreover, there are good reasons to suspect that Brezhnev would favor some shift of power to territorial organs, since this would increase the party apparat's influence over economic decisions and thereby reduce Kosygin's power, and it would also enhance Brezhnev's popularity among regional politicians. Furthermore, as evidenced by the Meleshchenko article, Brezhnev is credited with sponsoring Leningrad's "complex plan for economic and social development"--the most-publicized example of complex territorial planning.

NOTES

CHINESE LEADERSHIP: Recent PRC media reports have shed some light on the current status of several Chinese leaders. NCNA's 21 December report on the Peking funeral for Politburo member Kang Sheng, who passed away on the 16th due to a prolonged illness, revealed that Vice Chairman Wang Hung-wen has retained his number three ranking in the central party hierarchy after an unexplained stay of at least five months in his old Shanghai bailiwick. Wang headed the list of all active Peking-based Politburo members turning out for the funeral. The report on Kang's funeral also listed Chou Jung-hsin, the minister of education, as attending the ceremony. Chou, reportedly under poster attack for his outspoken criticism of cultural revolutionary educational reforms, was listed without a title along with several other "leading members of departments" under the central committee. In PRC provinces, a 19 December Chengtu report on a mobilization rally on rural work identified former Kwangtung party leader Chao Tzu-yang as Szechwan's new party chief. Chao had disappeared from public view last October, when Politburo member Wei Kuo-ching was transferred from his post as party chief in Kwangsi to become the top party man in Kwangtung. The transfers appear to be part of a larger plan designed to fight provincialism and to strengthen central party control. A new rehabilitee was revealed in a 20 December NCNA report, on an Albanian military delegation visiting in Nanking, which indicated that Wang En-mao has reappeared and been given the post of deputy political commissar of the Nanking Military Region. Wang, the top party and military leader in Sinkiang for many years prior to the cultural revolution, had not appeared publicly since 1969.

REAPPEARANCE OF AGITPROP OFFICIAL: Agitprop first deputy head G.L. Smirnov, whose name disappeared from the press several months ago, was mentioned again in the 19 December PRAVDA, where he was identified as deputy head of a Central Committee section while addressing a Higher Party School course. This would indicate that he has not been removed as acting Agitprop chief, as was suggested in a 5 December TRENDS Supplement article, but had apparently just dropped out of sight for an unusually long time. Prior to this PRAVDA report, Smirnov's last reported activity in the press came at the end of June--nearly six months ago. Since becoming Agitprop deputy head in late 1969, he had never gone unmentioned in the press for more than two or three months, and his name had usually appeared at least once a month. While apparently still holding his post, Smirnov's continued leadership of Agitprop these past months seems questionable, as other deputy heads have been conducting conferences at which Smirnov normally would have been expected to preside.

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MOSCOW ON OPEC INCIDENT: Criticizing the 21-23 December terrorist incident in which OPEC oil ministers were kidnapped from the organization's Vienna headquarters, Moscow media were quick to stress that the Palestine Liberation Organization was not involved. Soviet comment insinuated at the same time that anti-OPEC "circles behind the terrorists" included the United States and international oil monopolies. The criticism is in line with Moscow's longstanding opposition to international terrorism. Moscow has also been sensitive to publicity about pro-Palestinian international terrorist acts that might implicate the PLO and discredit it as a politically responsible organization. As with past terrorist acts, Soviet media this time have mainly replayed Palestinian and Arab comment to dissociate the PLO from the episode and cast suspicion on the United States. For example, Moscow domestic and Arabic broadcasts on the 22d cited in particular a statement by the PLO political department head, Faruq al-Qaddumi, describing the attack as part of a broader "imperialist and Zionist" operation to destroy OPEC. Similarly, TASS on the 23d publicized a PLO statement released in Vienna alleging that the attack was "backed by the United States and Israel" to discredit the PLO prior to the UN Security Council debate on the Mideast question in January. Additionally, a commentary in Arabic by A. Zlatorunskiy on the 22d strongly suggested U.S. involvement, stressing an "increasing resentment of OPEC by imperialist circles and international monopolies" in past months and recalling in this regard "threats of military invasion" against Arab OPEC member states.

EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE PREPARATIONS: The apparent disarray surrounding preparations for the projected all-European conference of communist parties was demonstrated by the holding of an unscheduled--and evidently inconclusive--meeting in East Berlin on 16-19 December of the editorial commission charged with working out a final conference document. A cryptic East Berlin radio report on the 19th said only that the editorial commission had ended a four-day meeting and had "agreed to continue the work" on the conference document "at the beginning of next January." There had been no mention of a scheduled December meeting in the communique issued at the end of the 17-19 November editorial commission session in the GDR capital. That communique had said that the commission would meet "next" in January to consider a revised document and discuss a date for the final conference. TASS on the 16th, however, portrayed the December meeting as having been convened in accordance with an "agreement reached at the November meeting" of the editorial commission. Progressively lower-ranking Soviet delegates have attended the last three preparatory sessions: An October "working group" meeting was attended by CPSU Politburo

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Candidate and Secretary Ponomarev, the November editorial commission meeting by CPSU Secretary Katushev, and the latest editorial commission by V.V. Zagladin, member of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission and first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 15 - 21 DECEMBER 1975

<u>Moscow (2496 items)</u>			<u>Peking (917 items)</u>		
CPSU Central Committee	(6%)	15%	UNGA 30th Session	(5%)	5%
1976-1980 Draft			USSR	(5%)	4%
Economic Plan			PRC Satellite Launched	(--)	4%
First Cuban CP Congress	(2%)	12%	Kang Sheng Death	(--)	3%
China	(3%)	5%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.