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Trends in Communist Media

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Trends in Communist Media

~~Confidential~~

24 SEPTEMBER 1975
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FBI'S TRENDS

24 SEPTEMBER 1975

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MIDDLE EAST

GROMYKO URGES GENEVA TALKS, USSR CAUTIOUS ON KISSINGER IDEAS

Soviet criticism of the Sinai accord has continued to be limited and, for the most part, indirect. Moscow has offered no suggestions of its own on procedures to continue the search for a Mideast settlement other than Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's renewed advocacy, in his 23 September address at the UN General Assembly, of resumption of the Geneva peace conference. And TASS briefly reported Secretary Kissinger's 22 September UNGA address in such a fashion as to suggest that he too was supporting a renewal of the Geneva talks. Moscow has thus far not acknowledged Kissinger's idea of an "informal multilateral meeting" to assess the Mideast situation. Moscow media have currently been focusing on the issue of prospective military aid to Israel, in a spate of comment apparently prompted by the publication in U.S. newspapers of "secret" U.S.-Israeli documents, as well as the concurrent visit to Washington of Israeli Defense Minister Peres. The comment has professed to see a contradiction between Israel's consent to the new Sinai accord and its simultaneous attempt to acquire more sophisticated U.S. weaponry.

KISSINGER ADDRESS In the only account thus far of Secretary Kissinger's address, a TASS dispatch on the 22d reported him as having "spoken for resuming the Geneva conference on the Middle East" and as saying that the United States and the Soviet Union "bear special responsibility as cochairmen of that conference." The Secretary actually said that the United States "intends to consult over the coming weeks with all concerned regarding the reopening of the Geneva conference."* The TASS dispatch made no mention of Kissinger's new suggestion that "we are prepared also to explore possibilities for perhaps a more informal multilateral meeting to assess conditions and to discuss the future." Nor did TASS mention the third possible approach, the Secretary's affirmation that the United States was prepared to "make a serious effort to encourage" Israeli-Syrian negotiations.

TASS misrepresented Kissinger in reporting that he "admitted" that a step-by-step policy could not lead to a final Mideast settlement, and passed over the first part of that sentence: "While we have

* Soviet comment dealing with the recently published U.S.-Israeli understandings has apparently passed over in silence the memorandum of agreement relating to the Geneva conference.

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had important differences with the Soviet Union, our two countries have held parallel views that the situation in the Middle East poses grave dangers and that partial steps must be part of and contribute to progress toward a comprehensive settlement."

While the TASS dispatch did not include Kissinger's remark that discussions had begun with the Soviet Union with a view to "weighing possible diplomatic approaches," TASS earlier had briefly reported Foreign Minister Gromyko's meetings with President Ford on the 18th and with Secretary Kissinger on the 19th and 21st. Typically, the TASS accounts mentioned only the broad topics of discussion, noting for instance that the Ford-Gromyko talks were on U.S.-USSR relations, including strategic arms limitation, and on "certain international problems of mutual interest"; the reports did specify that the Middle East was a topic in the Kissinger-Gromyko talks. Soviet media generally tend to be uncommunicative on the substance of such meetings; the Libyan media have offered an explanation for Moscow's usual reticence, suggesting that Moscow did not want Gromyko's meetings to be construed by foreign audiences, especially Arab, as implying Soviet endorsement of U.S. Mideast diplomacy and the recent Sinai accord.*

GROMYKO ADDRESS According to short TASS accounts of Gromyko's UNGA address, he reiterated Moscow's established three-point stand on the Mideast, calling for full Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories, the insuring of Palestinian rights--including their right "to establish their own state"--and guaranteeing the right of all Mideast countries to independent development. Gromyko made no specific mention of the new Sinai accord, judging from the TASS summaries, but in an implicit reference said that "no palliative measures and camouflage" can obviate the need to satisfy these basic problems.

* Tripoli's ARAB REVOLUTION NEWS AGENCY claimed on the 21st that Kosygin told the Libyan delegation to the 12th AAPS0 meeting in Moscow that the Gromyko-Kissinger meetings "did not mean that the Soviet Union had endorsed American surrender solutions in the Arab region." Soviet references to Kosygin's 19 September meeting with the Libyan delegation, in a TASS item on the 19th and in an Arabic-language broadcast on the 21st, merely reiterated that the USSR has long advocated the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories and the assurance of Palestinian rights as essential elements of a comprehensive Mideast settlement.

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Saying that the "main problems" still awaited a solution, Gromyko characterized the Geneva conference as an "appropriate mechanism" for examining them, and revived the call for resumption of the conference with the participation of "all, we emphasize, all" sides concerned, including Palestine Liberation Organization representatives. While routine comment just prior to the initialing of the new Sinai accord on 1 September had called it "beneficial" to resume the Geneva conference, Moscow since then had said virtually nothing about reviving the talks in Geneva.

U.S. ARMS TO ISRAEL Moscow's current attention to the matter of further U.S. arms deliveries to Israel appears to have been sparked by the 16-17 September publication in the Washington POST and New York TIMES of "secret" U.S.-Israeli understandings involving U.S. assurances to Israel on defense, energy, and economic requirements. Some such comment would normally have appeared in any case in connection with Israeli Defense Minister Peres' Washington talks, since Moscow generally portrays Israeli ministerial visits to Washington as portending increased military and financial assistance.* In the present instance, Peres' visit has been used as a peg for discussion of "some of the details of these secret documents," with some commentators--as in the weekly Moscow radio observers roundtable program on the 21st--in effect questioning the worth of what was called the Egyptian-Israeli "provisional peace treaty" when it was being followed by plans for new U.S. weapons deliveries to Israel and new U.S. military airlifts in the event of a new war.

Moscow comment has been especially critical of suggestions that the United States would be responsive to Israeli requests for advanced weapons, seizing in particular on Washington POST and New York TIMES articles to portray the U.S. press as denouncing the potentially "destabilizing" effect on the Arab-Israeli military balance should the United States supply such weapons as the F-16 aircraft and medium-range ground-to-ground Pershing missiles. TASS and Moscow radio commentators Orlov and Kornoyev both noted on the 19th that the Pershing was designed for nuclear warheads, both indicating that Israel could fit its own nuclear warheads to the missiles. And TASS Deputy Director General Sergey Losev, in a broadcast to North American audiences the same day, noted with reference to a Washington POST article on the Pershing's capabilities

* Moscow comment on Prime Minister Rabin's September 1974 visit, for instance, focused on U.S. agreement to satisfy Israeli demands for more arms supplies, and comment on Foreign Minister Allon's January 1975 talks in Washington viewed the visit as the latest in a long line of Israeli requests for more assistance. See the TRENDS of 18 September 1974, pages 4-5, and 22 January 1975, pages 15-17.

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that it could hit targets throughout Egypt and Jordan, most of Syria, and "vast areas" of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Losev warned that "in the face of such a threat, the Arab countries will be compelled to take appropriate steps to neutralize it," with the implication that they might seek to obtain weapons with comparable capabilities.

Moscow's Arabic-language service has not broadcast the commentaries dealing with the Pershing missile question, but broadcasts in Arabic on the 17th did report a PRAVDA article that day by Kuznetsov on Peres' Washington visit to discuss Israel's financial and military "demands." Kuznetsov claimed that the arms aid was Tel Aviv's "price" for its consent to return "a few dozen square kilometers" of Arab land, and cited U.S. press reports that the United States was promising to supply the "latest types of armaments," with schedules for deliveries worked out "for a number of years to come."

U.S. SINAI In other comment Moscow has indicated its continued
PRESENCE displeasure over the proposed U.S. presence at early-
 warning stations in the Sinai. A Moscow radio
Arabic commentary on the 17th, for example, insinuated that the
envisioned U.S. activity would be only thinly disguised electronic
intelligence collection, of immense benefit to Israel but harmful
to Arab interests. Describing the long-time collaboration between
U.S. and Israeli intelligence purportedly revealed by "recent"
congressional hearings, the commentary asserted that U.S. intelligence
on Arab military capabilities had been indispensable to Israel in
the past two Arab-Israeli wars. The broadcast clearly implied that
such U.S.-Israeli cooperation had received a new boost with the
recent Sinai accord.*

* Such criticism is almost certainly directed against Egypt for its role in the disengagement agreement, as well as against Israel and the United States. President as-Sadat defended himself against such charges in a 15 September speech before Arab Socialist Union and trade union leaders in Cairo.

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THREATS TO FORD

SOVIET MEDIA LINK ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS TO U.S. SOCIAL ILLS

Soviet media have drawn on standard descriptions of U.S. society and politics in commenting on the two recent attempts on the life of President Ford. Both episodes have been linked to the increasing prevalence of violent crime in the United States and the easy availability of firearms to the would-be assassin.

Brief reports in PRAVDA and RED STAR on the earlier 5 September assassination attempt were largely factual, though both referred to a U.S. "cult of violence" behind the incident. Other less prominent papers, as well as some radio commentaries, went on at greater length about the "pistol politics" said to have become a regular part of U.S. election campaigns. A Moscow radio observer on 23 September, commenting on the 22 September assassination attempt, noted that "tens of millions of firearms of all types" are owned by private citizens in the United States and cited the widespread opinion that "a law should be passed immediately limiting the spread" of such weapons.

In general, Soviet commentators have avoided attaching any political significance to the two attempts. However, regular radio and television observer Valentin Zorin recalled for his North American radio audience on 13 September the "slander campaign" that had preceded the 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Zorin wondered whether a similar "propaganda campaign" in the past few weeks against President Ford's detente policy and his participation in the CSCE finale in Helsinki was not somehow connected with this 5 September attempt. An IZVESTIYA commentator also implicated the U.S. press in a 13 September article, claiming that such acts could be abetted by the tendency of the press to "savor the details of criminal acts."

Zorin, too, was critical of the press, in claiming that "American newspapers were in too much of a hurry when they wrote that Lynette Fromme was acting on her own in Sacramento." Soviet media have long been receptive to "conspiracy theories" with regard to earlier U.S. political assassinations. They have been quick to report expressions of similar sentiments in the United States, including Senator Schweiker's recent call for Congress to open a new investigation of President Kennedy's assassination, as well as accusations that the FBI and the CIA could have been involved in some fashion.

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

BREZHNEV ENDORSES THEORIST OF HARDLINE REVOLUTIONARY TACTICS

Brezhnev's interview on 17 September with Konstantin Zarodov, controversial theorist of hardline revolutionary tactics, raises far-reaching questions concerning the continuity of Soviet policy and even Brezhnev's status.

Zarodov, editor of PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, the Prague-based theoretical journal of international communism, gained wide attention by an article in PRAVDA on 6 August which implicitly challenged the "unity of action" tactics which most West European communist parties, as well as the Soviet party, have publicly proclaimed in recent years.

Brezhnev, by identifying himself with Zarodov, has in effect also identified himself with a militant interpretation of communist tactics which is sure to complicate Soviet efforts to convoke a conference of European communist parties and may damage the credibility of the Soviet Union's detente policy. These obvious liabilities of Brezhnev's action suggest the possibility that he may have been acting out of need--such as the need to preempt the position of a potential challenger--rather than deliberate choice.

The Soviet media handled the interview in a way calculated to draw maximum attention to Brezhnev's identification with the controversial editor. PRAVDA carried an account of the interview on the front page on 18 September--a highly unusual placement given the nature of the event. The headline, "A Conversation with Comrade L.I. Brezhnev," seemed clearly calculated to catch the eye. Moscow radio carried accounts of the interview on its domestic service on the 17th and on a wide variety of foreign beams on the 17th and 18th. Monitored broadcasts included most European languages although, surprisingly, none in Portuguese.

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EAST - WEST RELATIONS

MOSCOW: NATO AUTUMN MANEUVERS CONTRARY TO SPIRIT OF HELSINKI

Current NATO strategy and this autumn's military maneuvers in West Europe have been the subject of considerable Soviet comment over the past few weeks. While criticism of the annual fall exercises is customary, this year's expanded series of national and multinational maneuvers and staff exercises, coming after this summer's conclusion of the European security conference in Helsinki, has apparently prompted Moscow to more than double the volume of comment and reportage devoted to last year's maneuvers.*

Commentators have uniformly questioned NATO adherence to the spirit of the CSCE accord. Thus Moscow has persistently asked why it was necessary to undertake such large-scale exercises at a time when, following the successful conclusion of the CSCE summit, the peoples and states of Europe were looking forward to a future of growing security, peace and progress. Comment has made the standard assertions that NATO feels threatened and weakened by the deterioration of its "southern flank." Therefore, the alliance, according to Moscow, has undertaken "massive" maneuvers in an effort to demonstrate solidarity and strength, while at the same time endeavoring to undermine peace and progress in Europe by stirring up mistrust and fear.

A Yuriy Kharlanov article in PRAVDA on 15 September provided Moscow's only acknowledgment, in all the comment on the autumn exercises, that the NATO countries had adhered to the prior-notification provision of the Helsinki accord. But Kharlanov went on to assert that living up to the letter of the document was not enough: "Some people," he said, "are trying to prove in the Western press that the current NATO maneuvers are in full accordance with the decisions adopted in Helsinki. Since these exercises were announced in advance, they maintain, this means that one of the points of the final act is being fulfilled. Yet an understanding was reached in Helsinki to be guided not only by the letter but also by the spirit of the conference. The present NATO campaign has nothing in common with the spirit."

Similarly, IZVESTIYA on 23 September described this year's "intensified military preparations" as being clearly contrary to the "spirit of the times." The Soviet military newspaper RED STAR asserted on 21 September

* Moscow has not publicized any major multinational exercises of the Warsaw Pact since the five-country maneuvers held in Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1972.

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that such an "unprecedented series" of military maneuvers could only arouse "legitimate alarm" and reflect a desire to "block" and "hinder" the processes of easing tension in Europe. Earlier, RED STAR on 30 August, having noted that this year's maneuvers coincided "for the first time" with operations in the North Sea of nuclear-powered ships of the U.S. Navy, called the coming maneuvers an "unprecedented demonstration of the NATO machinery."

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P O R T U G A L

MOSCOW RESERVES JUDGMENT ON SIXTH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

Moscow has taken a "wait-and-see" attitude toward Portugal's sixth provisional government, formed by Premier Azevedo on 19 September, cautiously saying that "only the future will show" whether the new government will follow the path of revolution, the "only guarantee" of success in its mission. In the light of the Portuguese Communist Party's considerably reduced role in the new government, Moscow has put the best face on the situation, praising the PCP for "putting the interests of the revolution above party interests" in agreeing to join the government, while at the same time warning that solutions to the country's problems were "inconceivable" without PCP participation.

Foreign Minister Gromyko, in his 23 September UNGA address, became the first Soviet leader to speak out on the Portuguese situation and, in effect, to respond to admonitions in August by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger against Soviet interference in Portugal. According to TASS' summary of his speech, Gromyko deplored "frank attempts from outside" to force the Portuguese people to abandon their chosen path, but he did not identify the authors of such attempts. He called for calm to allow Portugal to tackle its complex political and economic problems, and said it was the Soviet position that "no one should be allowed to trample underfoot" the Portuguese people's right to decide their destiny without outside interference.

AZEVEDO GOVERNMENT Prior to the formation of the government-- in which the PCP is represented by only one communist minister--Moscow had displayed concern over the PCP's declining influence and indicated willingness to accept the government arrangement only as a necessary evil to avoid the threat of reaction. On the 17th, PRAVDA correspondents Yermakov and Kotov had rejected extreme leftist criticism of the PCP's participation in the cabinet by noting that the forthcoming government was "the sole possible--under the present conditions--solution to the crisis." Similarly, ZA RUBEZHOM said on 18 September that "it is the realization that a real danger of overt action by reaction exists in the country which is forcing attempts to achieve a compromise." ZA RUBEZHOM added that PCP leader Alvaro Cunhal had warned that "if it proves necessary, we will start a struggle with different means and victory will be the revolution's all the same."

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Yermakov and Kotov gave a lukewarm welcome to the new government in PRAVDA on the 20th, observing that "it seems that the protracted government crisis has been resolved," largely due to the PCP's "sense of high responsibility for the fate of the revolution's achievements" and to the "renewed dialog between the communist and socialist parties." The correspondents noted with approval that the government's plan "envisages measures to consolidate the revolution's basic achievements and speaks of Portugal's socialist path." But they warned that stability and success "can be insured only if the government's efforts coincide with the aspirations of the working masses."

A TASS report in PRAVDA on the 21st praised the PCP for "putting the interests of the Portuguese revolution above party interests" in supporting Azevedo's efforts, but indicated unhappiness over the PCP's lot, reporting that the party considered that the composition of the government "far from corresponds to the influence held in the country" by the various political forces. In another caveat, TASS warned that "any government can succeed only to the extent that it accords with the interests of the revolutionary process." Further underscoring Moscow's wait-and-see attitude, a 22 September Kotov dispatch in PRAVDA, as reported by TASS, added that the sixth government's platform "reflects contradictory tendencies" and that "only the future will show which of them takes the upper hand." Kotov added that "the masses are now on the move" and that commentators "stress that the government will find it impossible to ignore this new weighty factor."

Commentators on Moscow radio's weekly observers' roundtable on the 21st, summing up the stages in the "antifascist democratic revolution" represented by the five previous provisional governments, described the sixth as a compromise including representatives of "various tendencies" within the military as well as "socialist and communist ministers" and Popular Democratic Party representatives. Without further analysis of the makeup of the cabinet, IZVESTIYA's Matveyev and Moscow radio's Dunayev analyzed the past failures to implement "truly good measures" aimed at satisfying the aspirations of the peasantry, particularly in the north, in effect calling on the new government to follow the line established by the cabinets of ousted Prime Minister Goncalves.

LITERARY GAZETTE
ON PS, PDP

While recent Soviet comment on the Socialist Party has tended to be moderate--on the 18th, PRAVDA, for example, specifically noted Cunhal's recognition of the need for a PS role in the government--a 17 September LITERARY GAZETTE article by radio commentator Igor

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Fesunenko revived earlier criticism of the PS.* Fesunenko observed that Portugal's current problems "have been caused by the sharp turn to the right" of the PS and PPD leadership. And, while some Soviet observers had been almost appreciative of Soares' remarks in a L'EUROPEO interview on the threat of a rightwing coup, Fesunenko noted only that "Soares was forced to admit" that such a danger existed. Reserving the worst words for the socialist-allied People's Democratic Party, Fesunenko said that the PPD "actually refused to cooperate with the communists" and claimed that the PPD, "in alliance with openly counterrevolutionary groups," had "instigated the escalation of violence, terror and pogroms which befell the local PCP committees this summer."

* LITERARY GAZETTE's earlier attacks against the Socialist Party and PS leader Mario Soares are discussed in the TRENDS of 2 July 1975, page 25 and of 6 August 1975, page 23.

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PRC-VIETNAM RELATIONS

PEKING WELCOMES LE DUAN AMID SIGNS OF CONTINUED DIFFERENCES

While presenting an appearance of cordial, correct Sino-Vietnamese solidarity, Chinese handling of the current visit to Peking by a Vietnamese party-government delegation led by VWP First Secretary Le Duan has been noticeably less effusive than it had been for Le Duan's last visit as head of an official delegation in June 1973. The current visit began on 22 September. Peking comment has moderated previous expressions of unity and friendship and has given more attention to assessments of the world situation potentially offensive to Vietnamese sensitivities than it had during the 1973 stay. Such Peking treatment serves to underline recent signs of coolness in relations with Hanoi since the latter's "liberation" of South Vietnam last spring.* Vietnamese treatment, by contrast, has thus far reiterated testimonials to Sino-Vietnamese friendship used in 1973, although Hanoi media have deleted Chinese comment at odds with Vietnamese positions in the course of reporting on the visit.

The current delegation, which includes one other Vietnamese politburo member, DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, is lower-ranking than that led by Le Duan in 1973, which included DRV Premier Pham Van Dong as well as Le Thanh Nghi. The present delegation's several DRV economic and planning officials suggest it has come to conclude an economic assistance agreement, as did the last Le Duan delegation in 1973. The Vietnamese visitors include Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Ban, who has been in Peking since mid-August, when he accompanied a DRV delegation led by Le Thanh Nghi to initiate talks on Sino-Vietnamese economic cooperation in Peking.**

Chinese hospitality protocol for the Vietnamese thus far has followed closely the pattern employed in the 1973 visit. The guests were greeted on arrival by five CCP Politburo members led by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, were welcomed at a 22 September reception attended by nine CCP Politburo members, and were feted at a banquet that evening hosted by Teng Hsiao-ping and addressed by Teng and Le Duan.

* The 4-11 June visit by Le Duan as head of a VWP and DRV government delegation was discussed in the TRENDS of 31 May 1973, pages 1-4; 6 June 1973, pages 1-3; and 13 June 1973, pages 1-7. For discussion of recent signs of Sino-Vietnamese coolness, see the TRENDS of 20 August 1975, pages 17-19, and of 4 September 1975, pages 17-18.

** That delegation's visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 20 August 1975, pages 17-19.

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On the 23d Le Duan and Le Thanh Nghi opened talks with Teng and Li Hsien-nien and also met Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary, who has been in Peking since the 18th. The Vietnamese delegation was received by Mao on the 24th.

CHINESE COMMENT Expressions of Sino-Vietnamese friendship and solidarity in Teng's 22 September banquet speech were less elaborate than those in the speech by PRC Premier Chou En-lai welcoming Le Duan in 1973 when the Vietnam military conflict continued despite the Paris agreement. While Chou had characterized the two nations as "close comrades-in-arms and brothers" who "shared weal and woe" and had gone through "thick and thin" together, Teng now called the PRC and Vietnam "fraternal socialist neighbors" sharing a "longstanding traditional friendship." In his speech Chou had noted that a "profound revolutionary friendship," nurtured personally by Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh and based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, had been forged between the two nations and that the "great friendship and militant unity" between them had been "further enhanced and consolidated." Chou had pledged that China would continue to perform its internationalist duty to resolutely support Vietnam's "just struggle." This time Teng merely noted that the Chinese people have "always treasured their revolutionary friendship" with Vietnam, that the preservation and development of their friendship on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism was in keeping with the "common desire" and "fundamental interests" of the two peoples, and that the Chinese people would "spare no effort" to do so.

The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial greeting Le Duan's latest arrival similarly dropped most of the expressions of friendship that had been recited in the editorial greeting his 1973 visit. It pledged only that the Chinese "will, as always, actively contribute their share" to strengthening Sino-Vietnamese friendship. Atmospherics in the NCNA reports on the delegation's arrival and its reception by the Chinese leadership were also moderated. While the Sino-Vietnamese talks in 1973 had been opened in a "warm atmosphere overflowing with revolutionary friendship and militant unity," talks this time were characterized simply as "fraternal, cordial, and friendly."

Like other PRC spokesmen before Vietnamese audiences in recent weeks,* Teng on the 22d stressed, without specifically mentioning the United

* Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, at a 13 August 1975 welcoming banquet speech for Le Thanh Nghi, and Vice Premier Chen Hsi-lien, in a 3 September speech at the Thai Nguyen steel complex near Hanoi during the 1975 DRV National Day celebrations, had similarly admonished Vietnamese audiences on the dangers from superpower hegemonism for peace in the world today.

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States and the Soviet Union, that the hegemonism of the "superpowers" was the primary cause of world tension today. He warned his listeners that the superpowers were subjecting the Third World to "aggression, subversion, interference, control, and plunder," and pledged that China would "stand unwaveringly" at the side of the Third World countries as the "main force" of resistance to imperialism, colonialism, and hegemonism. During Le Duan's 1973 visit by contrast, Chou En-lai did not comment on the world situation, discussing only the "completely new situation" in Indochina in the wake of the Paris peace agreements.

VIETNAMESE TREATMENT
OF VISIT

Le Duan's 22 September banquet speech echoed his previous testimonials to Sino-Vietnamese solidarity and appreciation for PRC aid in the war, employed in his 1973 visit. The party leader lauded the "militant solidarity" between the Vietnamese people and Chinese people, "our close friends," and he praised the "great support and multiform assistance" given by the PRC "in a spirit of proletarian internationalism."

As he had done in 1973, however, Le Duan also underscored Vietnamese differences with China on the international situation. He stressed the importance of solidarity among the "socialist countries" and the international communist movement, castigating the United States alone as the "ringleader" of international imperialism, and praising aid to Vietnam from "other fraternal socialist countries" as well as that from the PRC--but without specifying thanks to the "Soviet people" as he had done in his 1973 speech. VNA's 23 September report of the 22 September banquet also reflected Vietnamese differences with China on sensitive Sino-Soviet issues by pointedly omitting that part of Teng Hsiao-ping's address which dealt with condemning the "superpowers" for their international rivalry.

PRE-VISIT COMMENT
ON DISPUTED ISLANDS

Immediately prior to Le Duan's arrival, Peking media took pains to underline an intransigent Chinese position on islands claimed by both Vietnam and China in the South China Sea. A Peking radio report by the station's correspondent, broadcast to Taiwan on 19 September and to Vietnam on 20 and 21 September, reaffirmed China's claims to the disputed islands and recalled--for the first time in Chinese media in several months--the PRC victory over Saigon forces in the Paracel (Hsisha) Islands in January 1974. Focusing on Chinese accomplishments on the Paracel Islands, the report noted the development of modern industrial, transport and fish-processing facilities there, adding that one of the islands had become "a base" with "various modern facilities for fishery, shipping industry and national defense in the South China sea." This report is not known to have been carried in other Chinese media.

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PRC - DPRK RELATIONS

PYONGYANG REPORTS CHANG'S ANTI-SOVIET REMARKS IN NORTH KOREA

On 24 September KCNA replayed attacks on "superpowers" and "hegemonism" made by visiting CCP Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao at a 23 September rally in Nampo, the first time such anti-Soviet remarks have been replayed by Pyongyang. The KCNA version was even more complete than the NCNA report on the speech. In the past the North Korean media have carefully refrained from replaying any overtly anti-Soviet references in Chinese statements; the most recent illustration of this occurred on 21 September, when DPRK media dropped a Chang reference to "modern revisionism" in a speech at a banquet welcoming him to Pyongyang.*

The 24 September replay of anti-Soviet references does not seem to indicate that North Korea has become willing to burn ideological bridges with the Soviet Union, however, as Pyongyang displayed caution in replaying only those anti-Soviet remarks made outside the capital, and Korean speakers themselves continue to refrain from making anti-Soviet remarks. In addition, KCNA reported the presence of Soviet officials at a wreath-laying ceremony on 22 September while NCNA failed to do so, in line with the pattern followed when then CCP Vice Chairman Li Te-sheng made a National Day trip to North Korea in September 1973.

Chang is in the DPRK as head of a party delegation which arrived in Pyongyang on 21 September, the first high-level Chinese group to visit the DPRK other than on a major anniversary since Chou En-lai's trip to Pyongyang in April 1970. There has been no indication the PRC delegation has any special substantive aim, and thus far the visit seems mainly to have fostered an image of Asian communist unity--which may, in fact, be its intended purpose.

NCNA reported the delegation was on a "friendly visit" at the invitation of the Korean Workers Party, while KCNA has called the visit a "goodwill mission" of "great significance in further strengthening Korean-Chinese friendship" and for attaining the "common goal." The delegation was received by Kim Il-song on the

* Over the past two years, Pyongyang has alluded to but never publicly embraced Peking's current scheme of "three worlds," which lumps the United States and the USSR together. DPRK media have widely discussed the "Third World" and referred in passing to a "Second World," but have never mentioned the "First World" of the "superpowers."

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24th, but there have been no reports of any formal talks. Thus far the delegation's activities have included the banquet in Pyongyang, visits to Kim's birthplace and various monuments, and the mass rally on the 23d in Nampo.

Speaking at the banquet on the 21st, Chang Chun-chiao closely followed the public position on Korea that Peking espoused during Kim Il-sung's visit to China in April.* Chang supported Kim's three principles and five-point program as the correct path for Korean reunification, condemned the United States and the Pak regime for attempting to perpetuate the division of Korea, and offered Chinese support for the Korean demand for "complete withdrawal of U.S. troops" from South Korea.

In his speech at the banquet, KWP Political Committee member Yang Hyoung-nop also strongly emphasized Korean-Chinese unity, noting that it was based on "complete equality and independence." Yang paid scant attention to the Korean question, noting only that it was the Korean people's "supreme national task" to force the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and achieve the independent and peaceful reunification of the country, and that both North and South Korean people would defeat the "two Koreas plot" and struggle to implement Kim's three principles and five-point policy.

* Peking's views on Korean issues as reflected in the April visit are discussed in the TRENDS of 23 April 1975, pages 19-23, and of 30 April, pages 8-9.

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PRC - TAIWAN

PEKING RELEASES NATIONALIST AGENTS, PERMITS RETURN TO TAIWAN

Peking on 22 September announced the release of 144 agents of the Taipei government captured during sabotage raids against the PRC in the early 1960's. The NCNA account of the release noted that those pardoned would be permitted to return to Taiwan and would be provided with travel expenses.

This latest Peking initiative follows Taiwan's earlier rejection of 10 Nationalist "war criminals" whom Peking had pardoned in March and given permission to go to Taiwan. Peking got considerable propaganda play when the Chiang government refused to allow those former Kuomintang army officers into Taiwan. The current release seems designed to gain Peking further favorable publicity for its efforts to foster people-to-people interchanges with Taiwan against the wishes of the Taiwan government.

The 22 September NCNA report disclosed that "Chinese judicial organs" had decided to release "all the 95 armed special agents and 49 crew members . . . of the Chiang Kai-shek clique in custody," marking the "completion of the disposal of all the cases of the U.S.-Chiang armed agents and crew members" who were captured between 1962 and 1965. NCNA noted that some of the captured personnel had been released earlier "in four batches" since July 1963. It said that the newly released agents had been granted citizenship rights and jobs and would be allowed to return to Taiwan if they wished. The report also noted that two Japanese and two South Koreans captured on the boats carrying agents were also released. NCNA repeatedly called the saboteurs "U.S.-Chiang agents," but it did not elaborate on the role the United States played in the 1960 raids.

MARCH AMNESTY Peking announced last March the release of almost 300 former KMT "war criminals" and subsequently gave considerable propaganda support to 10 of those released who traveled to Hong Kong in April to petition Taipei authorities for permission to return to their families on Taiwan.* In early September NCNA and Peking radio reported that three of the group had returned in frustration to the mainland, two had gone to the United States, and four remained in Hong Kong. NCNA earlier had reported the suicide in early June, caused by the "Chiang clique's

* Peking's 18 March announcement and subsequent propaganda on the issue are discussed in the TRENDS of 19 March 1975, pages 27-28, and of 30 April 1975, page 13.

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heartlessness," of one member of the group in Hong Kong. Speakers at meetings sponsored by the CCP United Front Work Department in Canton and Peking to welcome the three returnees expressed hope that eventually they would be able to return to the island and sharply denounced Premier Chiang Ching-kuo and other Taiwan officials for their "perverted" stand.

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VIETNAM

PRG ORDERS OLD SAIGON CURRENCY REPLACED BY NEW

A major exchange of former GVN currency for new "National Bank of Vietnam" banknotes at a rate of 500 old piasters for one new unit was reported to have been carried out on 22 September throughout South Vietnam. According to a series of communiques released that day, the exchange was necessary for both economic reasons and to halt "espionage" activities and disruption of the market and the people's livelihood. The various announcements from the PRG, bank authorities, and the Saigon Military Management Committee explaining procedures and rules for the exchange include several indirect acknowledgments of resistance and difficulties the PRG has faced since its 30 April takeover in the South.

Elimination of the old GVN currency, use of which had been permitted since the takeover, appears to be a major step in the campaign, announced in a 10 September PRG statement, to "eliminate" certain categories of big businessmen and institute new forms of economic organization.* Announcements to date provide no evidence of the new currency's relationship to the existing DRV currency, or on any fixed currency exchange rate between the North and South or with foreign currencies.

The 21 September PRG communique ordering the exchange--first monitored from Saigon radio on the 22d, the day of the exchange--justified the step on grounds that "an independent and sovereign currency" that served the people's interests was needed to replace the old GVN money, which it said had been a "brazen tool for exploitation" and had become "dependent and seriously devalued by serious inflation." The communique added that the PRG had decided to take "economic and financial measures"--not spelled out further--aimed at building "an independent and sovereign economy of the revolutionary administration," overcoming inflation "left behind by the enemy," and preventing continued use of old GVN banknotes "to undermine the economy," to carry out "acts of espionage to disrupt security and order" and to "upset the market and the people's livelihood."

The exchange rate for old currency into the new, 500 "Saigon administration" piasters for every new banknote unit, was announced in a 21 September communique of the National Bank of Vietnam, also first monitored on the 22d. The communique pointed

* See the TRENDS of 17 September 1975, pages 16-17, for a discussion of the 10 September PRG statement and the new campaign.

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out that only old banknotes in denominations of 1,000, 500, 200, and 100 piasters (dong)* would be exchanged, with the smaller denominations "temporarily" continuing in use as "small change." The communique specified restrictions on amounts that could be exchanged for households--limited to 100,000 old piasters, individuals up to 15,000, and larger amounts for businesses up to 500,000 piasters. All amounts above the limits were to be deposited in bank savings or other accounts, from which withdrawals could be made "gradually" for small depositors and based on need for businesses.

Evidence that in Saigon, at least, authorities greatly underestimated the scope and complexity of the exchange program was provided by revised announcements on the Saigon exchange hours and travel restrictions. The initial announcement by the Saigon Military Management Committee called for the exchange to be completed between 0600 and 1100 Saigon time on the 22d, and announced that workers would be authorized absence from work until 1100, a period during which vehicular travel and trading restrictions were put into force. But a second announcement some 11 hours later announced that because of the "practical situation," the Saigon currency exchange committee had extended the deadline by 12 hours, to 2300 on the 22d. Another indication of the problems facing the authorities effecting the exchange came in a 24 September communique issued by the National Bank of Vietnam, warning people to be on the lookout for bogus currency bearing the inscription "NFLSV Central Committee." The bank communique cautioned people not to confuse them with the genuine new ones and to report any information they might have about the circulation of the bogus bills.

The importance of the currency exchange in the PRG's new campaign against the "comprador bourgeoisie" and disruptive elements was reflected in initial commentaries on the Saigon radio and in an article in the 23 September Saigon GIAI PHONG newspaper. Repeating the key justifications of the 21 September PRG communique, the article stressed that the "comprador bourgeoisie" had continued, since the South was "liberated," to "speculate in" and hoard goods, increase prices, and "disrupt the market" with prices increasing "every passing day," thus undermining the economy and causing "political disturbances." The article urged vigilance against "slandorous arguments and acts of sabotage" by the "enemy and his lackeys" to maintain security and order during the currency exchange period.

* In the original Vietnamese, the term "dong" has always been, and continues to be, used to refer to the monetary unit in both the North and the South. However, translators have traditionally retained dong in speaking of Hanoi currency but have rendered the word as "piaster" when referring to GVN currency.

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A questions and answers broadcast on the currency exchange by Saigon radio on the 23d explained why the new administration had waited until now--nearly five months--to replaced the old Saigon currency. It cited "many other big tasks" such as maintaining public order and security, building and consolidating administrative machinery at various levels, and added that issuing currency required a "preparatory period."

NOTES

EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE PREPARATIONS: Recent references in the Polish and Czechoslovak press suggest that the projected all-European conference of communist parties is still planned this year, despite Western press speculation that disagreements might force a postponement until after the 25th CPSU congress in February 1976. The Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU on 10 September referred to the conference as taking place "this autumn," and Bratislava PRAVDA on 26 August said it would be held "this year." High-ranking East European figures have been less specific as to the timing. Bulgarian Premier Todorov, in an 8 September Sofia speech, and SED Politburo member and Secretary Axen, in a Milan L'UNITA festival speech on the 14th, indicated that preparations for the European communist party conference were still going on, but refrained from saying when the conference would be held. That the preparations have been difficult was indicated by the fact that communist media have not reported any preparatory meetings since the one held in East Berlin on 8-10 April. Bratislava PRAVDA called the preparations "arduous" and "not easy or simple." The Yugoslav paper Ljubljana DELO on the 13th stressed that the most basic disagreement during the conference preparations was between Moscow and the independent Italian Communist Party, which--along with the Polish party--is one of the organizers of the planned conference. Concern over the Italian party's independent attitude may have been a factor in the SED's decision to send an exceptionally high-ranking figure such as Axen to the L'UNITA festival in Milan.

PEKING ON SPY SATELLITES: A 22 September NCNA commentary bluntly derided U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space, alleging that there is evidence of an increasingly fierce superpower "spy war" in space. The commentary claimed, for the first time in PRC media, that the USSR has been developing satellites capable of searching out and destroying U.S. spy satellites covering Soviet military deployments. Citing a 16 August AFP report from Bonn, NCNA alleged that a Soviet satellite had "recently torpedoed a U.S. spy satellite in orbit," noting that this "technological breakthrough" stemming from a three-year Soviet testing program poses a "grave danger" to the West. The commentary also broke new ground when it declared that the United States, in order to counter the USSR, has stepped up test production of weapons to protect its satellites and is planning to put "synchronized spy satellites" into a high orbit beyond the reach of Soviet interception. The NCNA commentary explicitly ridiculed the July 1975 U.S.-Soviet "space handshake," but--like other Peking media--it failed to mention the visit to the USSR of the U.S. astronauts who were received by Brezhnev on 22 September--the day the NCNA commentary was released.

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GROMYKO ON NEW WEAPONS BAN: On 23 September TASS publicized a letter from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to UN Secretary General Waldheim submitting a proposal for banning the development and production by all states of new types of mass destruction weapons. Gromyko spoke in support of the proposal in his UN General Assembly speech the same day. Such a Soviet proposal had been expected since Brezhnev raised the matter informally in his RSFSR Supreme Soviet election speech last June. Although Gromyko, like Brezhnev, failed to specify any particular weapon systems, he indicated Soviet willingness to clarify the proposal "in a concrete discussion of this question." Gromyko also acknowledged that it was "above all the great powers" that Moscow hoped would conclude such an agreement. Perhaps anticipating Western demands for verification procedures considered intrusive by Moscow, the Gromyko letter said that an agreement "must not create obstacles to the economic, scientific and technical development of participating states."

PRC PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP: Peking and Shenyang accounts of a North Korean acrobatic troupe's 23 September performance in Shenyang identified Tseng Shao-shan as "first secretary and chairman of the Liaoning provincial CCP and revolutionary committees and political commissar of the Shenyang PLA units." Tseng was previously party second secretary in this province. The first secretary's post has been vacant since Chen Hsi-lien was transferred to Peking in late 1973. Chen was replaced as military region commander by Li Te-sheng, but like other military region commanders transferred at the time, Li was not given a provincial party committee post. Li last appeared publicly on 1 August Army Day in Shenyang. With Tseng's assumption of the new post, all PRC provincial party secretary vacancies caused by the mass transfer of military commanders have been filled, though it is likely that other vacancies still exist in Heilungkiang and Tsinghai.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 15 - 21 SEPTEMBER 1975

<u>Moscow (2440 items)</u>			<u>Peking (905 items)</u>		
China	(8%)	7%	UN	(12%)	10%
AAPSO Council 12th Session, Moscow	(--)	7%	[UNGA 7th Special Session	(12%)	7%]
[Brezhnev Greetings	(--)	2%]	[UNGA 30th Session	(--)	3%]
UNGA 30th Session	(--)	5%	Zambian Goodwill Delegation in PRC	(1%)	5%
[Gromyko Arrival Statement	(--)	3%]	Tanzanian and Zambian Government Delegations in PRC	(--)	3%
USSR Nuclear Test Ban Proposal	(5%)	2%	Angola	(--)	3%
			Papua-New Guinea Independence	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.