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Trends in Communist Media

27 Aug 75

No. 34

~~Confidential~~

**FBIS** FOREIGN BROADCAST  
INFORMATION SERVICE

# Trends in Communist Media

~~Confidential~~

27 AUGUST 1975  
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## CONTENTS

### MIDDLE EAST

USSR Reserved on Kissinger Tour, Critical of "Partial Steps". . . 1

### PORTUGAL

Moscow Questions Western Intentions in Light of CSCE. . . . . 5  
Italian Communists Shift Position, Attack Socialist Soares. . . . . 9

### U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS

Havana, Moscow Welcome Partial Lifting of U.S. Trade Embargo. . . 11

### SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

KOMMUNIST Sees Consolidation of Anti-Soviet Course in China . . 14

### EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Prague Issues Protest to FRG on Helicopter Flights. . . . . 16

### CAMBODIA

Sihanouk Leaves North Korea for PRC With RGNU Delegation. . . . 18

### BANGLADESH

PRAVDA 'Observer' Urges Dacca Loyalty to Mujib Policies . . . . 20

### USSR

Masherov Promotes Innovations in Economic Management . . . . . 22  
Collective Leadership Discussed in Republic Journals. . . . . 25

### NOTES

Korean Front Anniversary; Romania on Nonaligned Conference. . . 27

### APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . i

- 1 -

## MIDDLE EAST

### USSR RESERVED ON KISSINGER TOUR, CRITICAL OF "PARTIAL STEPS"

Moscow has treated the current Kissinger diplomatic shuttle to work out a new Israeli-Egyptian Sinai accord in much the same fashion as the previous round in March.\* The Secretary's activities have been reported only briefly and sporadically, as in items on Moscow radio's Arabic-language service on the 21st and 22d noting his arrival in Israel to begin his Mideast tour "to continue discussions on a partial settlement" and reporting his trip to Egypt the next day. Indirect criticism has been clearly conveyed through occasional swipes at the value of "partial" agreements which, as before, are portrayed as benefiting Israel and delaying settlement of the main issues--withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and assurance of Palestinian rights. Unlike the comment in March, however, Moscow has not called for resumption of the Geneva conference as an alternative to inadequate "partial measures."

Soviet comment has also sought to imply that U.S. diplomacy is at variance with Arab interests by stressing reports that Washington will supply Israel with vast amounts of military and economic aid after a new Sinai accord. Explicit criticism of the anticipated Sinai agreement and of U.S. diplomacy has been confined to the low "unofficial" level of Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress, a vehicle used on occasion to convey a more strident tone than appears in Moscow radio's regular language services. Radio Peace and Progress comment has been critical to the point of describing the prospective Sinai accord as "capitulatory" and advocating Arab economic pressure against Israel and the United States to counter alleged diplomatic pressure tactics.

**KISSINGER MISSION** In sparse direct references to Secretary Kissinger, Moscow has reported his travels briefly and occasionally cited some of his remarks on prospects for the negotiations. The point of the selective citations has apparently been to play down the significance of a new Sinai interim agreement by contrasting it to the remaining problems involved in achieving an overall Mideast settlement. PRAVDA's international review by T. Kolesnichenko on the 24th, for example, claimed that some Western commentators had predicted the Secretary's current mission would "bring peace and tranquillity" to the Middle East, but that Kissinger himself disputed this assessment. Kolesnichenko recalled

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\* Soviet treatment of the March round is discussed in the TRENDS of 12 March 1975, pages 1-2, and 19 March 1975, pages 5-7.

- 2 -

that the Secretary said prior to his departure for the Middle East that "of course, it is not a matter of a peace agreement; it is a question of an intermediate step on the way to establishing peace between Egypt and Israel--if this attempt is indeed crowned with success." In a similar vein, TASS on the 26th, reporting from Alexandria on Kissinger's press conference there, noted only that he said he hoped a new agreement would be reached but that if it was not signed soon he would go to New York for a special session of the UN General Assembly, returning to the Middle East later. TASS then selectively reported remarks by an Egyptian spokesman and--under Algiers, Washington and Paris datelines--foreign press comment designed to minimize the prospective Sinai agreement. It was variously assessed as "purely a military document to defuse the explosive situation," "inciting a split in the Arab world," "says nothing about Syria or Jordan" or the Palestine Liberation Organization and Jerusalem, and "includes only secondary political considerations."

**U.S.-ISRAELI TIES** While Moscow has again displayed a measure of reticence about Secretary Kissinger's mission, it has portrayed the United States to Arab audiences as a constant ally of Israel, implying that U.S. diplomacy is sharply biased against Arab interests. Comment has focused in particular on reports of American readiness to extend Israel some 2.8 billion dollars in economic and military aid, as in an Arabic-language broadcast on the 22d which, in reporting Kissinger's arrival in Egypt, pointedly cited his remark in Israel the previous day that Israel could continue to rely on American friendship. Similarly, Moscow's Arabic-language service and Radio Peace and Progress in broadcasts on the 21st singled out a statement by Y. Navon, chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in Israel's Knesset, that the United States had promised Israel over two billion dollars in financial aid, as well as future supplies of oil and weapons. TASS on the 23d attributed to the Boston GLOBE a report that the United States had agreed to deliver "large consignments of the latest armaments," including several hundred jet fighters, a hundred Lance missiles, and a thousand laser-guided bombs.

Radio Peace and Progress on the 22d linked Israel's anticipated acquisition of new U.S. military aid with the prospects of a new Sinai accord, indicating that Tel Aviv, with Washington's support, would be able to pressure Egypt into signing a new agreement disadvantageous to Arab and Palestinian interests. It quoted Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasir 'Arafat to the effect that since the October 1973 war Israel had increased its armed forces from 80,000 to 120,000 and that Israeli "infantry, navy and air force had been doubled." It went on to cite TIME magazine on the large amounts of military aid the United States was expected to

- 3 -

give Israel soon. According to "observers," the broadcast said, "the new military operations being planned by Israel will facilitate the conclusion of a separate agreement being negotiated between the aggressor and Egypt on Sinai."

ARAB COUNTER-  
ACTIONS

Some Soviet comment has suggested that the Arabs counter the alleged U.S.-Israeli diplomatic offensive with pressure of their own. The most notable example was a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Arabic on the 22d, which referred approvingly to the notion of increased Arab economic pressure against "Israel and its protectors." The broadcast cited an undated call by Iraq's Saddam Husayn for a new Arab oil embargo to be imposed against the United States and its allies to force Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab territories. The commentary also predicted, as did a Moscow radio broadcast in Arabic on the 25th, that the ministerial conference of nonaligned countries, which convened in Lima on the 25th, would urge economic pressure "on Israel and the foreign powers supporting it."

In stressing the conflict between Arab and Israeli interests, Moscow has sought to capitalize on the closer cooperation between Jordan and Syria, reflected by President al-Asad's 10-12 June visit to Jordan and King Husayn's 18-22 August visit to Syria. Radio Peace and Progress on the 21st, for example, remarked on the realization by Amman and Damascus that their eastern front against Israel must be strengthened "at a time when imperialism and Zionism are intensifying their attempts to impose capitulatory solutions" on the Arabs. The commentary maintained that unless a "firm line" was pursued, a large part of Arab territory would remain under Israeli occupation--a danger it attributed chiefly to "U.S. and Israeli attitudes during the new round of U.S. shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East." The broadcast cited a report in Israel's HA'ARETZ that after a new Sinai accord, a "U.S.-Israeli 40-point document will be secretly signed" obliging the United States not to try to obtain Israeli withdrawal from any Jordanian territory and not to try for more than "minor adjustments" to present disengagement lines on the Golan Heights. Radio Peace and Progress claimed that such plans on the part of the United States and Israel had "naturally" compelled Jordan and Syria "to raise their fighting capacity adequately to repulse possible Israeli attacks and liberate the occupied territories." TASS on the 22d, reporting the joint communique issued at the end of King Husayn's visit to Syria, noted that the two countries had agreed to formation of a "Supreme Command Council" composed of Husayn and al-Asad which would coordinate the two countries' "foreign policy activities and those in the economic and military spheres, and the taking of joint measures to protect national security."

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- 4 -

CRITICISM OF ISRAEL Moscow has continued to impugn Israel's sincerity in the current talks with Egypt and to accuse it of militaristic policies. PRAVDA's international review column on the 24th, for instance, charged Tel Aviv with engaging in various "maneuvers" to disregard UN resolutions on the Arab-Israeli conflict and continuing to count on a military solution to the conflict "while professing peace." PRAVDA also claimed that Israel sought "to prolong the Middle East crisis as a whole by separate agreements"--implying criticism of U.S. and Egyptian diplomacy, as well, for being parties to such agreements.

Moscow has dismissed internal Israeli dissent and demonstrations against a new Sinai accord as "hypocrisy" and a deliberate ruse to create the impression that Israel is making serious concessions. A Moscow Arabic-language broadcast on the 21st, for example, denouncing demonstrations against the "expected agreement," maintained that Israel was not making any concessions because any land it might relinquish belonged to the Arabs anyway. The broadcast added that Israel, moreover, would soon obtain large amounts of U.S. aid and that a new agreement would allow Israel "to postpone for some time the solution of larger and more difficult issues." It cited the 18 August CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR to stress that Israel's withdrawal "by a few more kilometers in Sinai is a limited objective when compared to more important issues such as withdrawal from the Colan Heights, the rights of the dispersed Palestinians to have a homeland, and the future of Jerusalem." It was in this context, the commentary said, that Israeli demonstrations against "so-called concessions on the Sinai agreement" should be viewed in order to realize what was behind "the facade of hypocritical noises."



- 5 -

## PORTUGAL

## MOSCOW QUESTIONS WESTERN INTENTIONS IN LIGHT OF CSCE

While Moscow has ignored President Ford's and Secretary Kissinger's recent public admonitions to the USSR against interference in Portugal, it has in the past few days lodged countercharges against Western intervention in Lisbon's affairs. Although the 19 August PRAVDA Observer article on Portugal did not mention the Helsinki document in the context of Western interference in Portugal, some comment has again made this connection, complaining that "some people in the West" are trying to portray the Soviet Union as violating the CSCE principle of nonintervention, when in fact "it is the other way around."

Following Observer's call for solidarity with the Portuguese "political forces" struggling against reaction, Moscow has rounded up expressions of support from various countries. But, other than a statement by the Soviet trade unions, Moscow has not as yet begun publicizing declarations of support by Soviet "public" organizations, factory workers and private individuals, in the style of previous solidarity campaigns. PRAVDA on the 24th did assert that the socialist countries and communist and workers parties were "acting in support" of the Portuguese revolution, a more cautious pledge than IZVESTIYA's 16 July statement that Portugal could count on the socialist countries' "active economic and political cooperation."

On the Portuguese domestic scene, Soviet commentators have continued to criticize the leadership of the Socialist Party while presenting the Goncalves government as settling in and working constructively for Portugal's "progressive" development. Reportage has reflected the fluctuating political situation, acknowledging divisions within the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) and "passivity and connivance" on the part of some army authorities, while portraying the working people as reacting "enthusiastically" to progressive developments, such as the recent formation of a leftwing front of eight organizations including the Portuguese Communist Party.

APPLICATION OF  
CSCE PRINCIPLES

Moscow's renewed attacks on alleged Western interference in Portuguese affairs would seem to be in response to President Ford's

19 August remarks in his Minneapolis speech. The President said that detente does not mean a license to fish in troubled waters, and that Portugal is one of the situations "we are carefully watching" for indications of Moscow's attitude toward detente and cooperation in European security. Soviet accounts of the speech,

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- 6 -

by TASS and in the central press, relegated the remarks on Portugal to a final one-sentence paragraph noting only that the President had described the Portuguese situation "as a process of 'a clash between ideologies' which 'must be given the opportunity to find a solution in an atmosphere free of outside pressure.'"\*

PRAVDA's Kolesnichenko replied in the paper's international review on the 24th and in a broadcast for North American listeners the next day, rejecting the notion that the Soviet Union was violating the CSCE principle of nonintervention by its attitude on Portugal. In the international review, he noted assertions by "some people in the West" that events in Portugal were the first test of the CSCE nonintervention principle with respect to "different concoctions on 'plans' of the Soviet Union and other socialist states" toward Portugal. Everything is "the other way around," he said: "If" the principle is being tested in Portugal, "th's is by no means the Soviet Union's fault," but a result of the designs of "international reaction and imperialism."

In his English-language commentary on the 25th, Kolesnichenko remarked on controversy in the United States over the Helsinki summit, saying that "some observers" were ready to accuse the Soviet Union of violating CSCE principles by their attitude toward Portugal. Without mentioning the recent Ford and Kissinger statements, Kolesnichenko aimed his criticism at remarks by former defense secretary Laird to the effect that "there is ostensibly a fairly considerable Soviet influence in Portugal." Kolesnichenko agreed that, "unfortunately," there was interference, not from the Soviet Union but from those "frightened" by the course of Portugal's revolution.

PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA observers also noted the relevance of the CSCE document to Portugal but steered clear of the question of Soviet involvement. IZVESTIYA's Mikhail Mikhaylov, on Moscow radio's weekly observers roundtable on the 24th, cited Portuguese President Costa Gomes' speech at the Helsinki summit as calling for application of the principle of nonintervention to his country. Mikhaylov stressed that this principle, like all other provisions of the CSCE document, "cannot be applied selectively, though this is precisely the way those involved in the internationally coordinated campaign against the democratic forces of Portugal would like to apply it." PRAVDA's Yuriy Kharlanov, in an article on the 27th reported by TASS, commented that "all true

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\* Soviet treatment of Secretary Kissinger's warning to the USSR vis-a-vis Portugal in his 14 August Birmingham speech is discussed in the TRENDS of 20 August 1975, page 6.

friends" of Portugal were concerned over the "open interference and pressure" against Portugal and wondered "how all this is to be understood following the solemn obligations" on nonintervention assumed in Helsinki.

WESTERN "INTERFERENCE" Soviet commentators have amassed a growing list of "capitalist circles of the West" arrayed against revolutionary Portugal. Along with such stereotyped stalking horses as international monopolies and "NATO's military-political machine"--accused of plans for economic sanctions, psychological pressure, and "gunboat diplomacy"--Moscow has added the EC to the list (for employing "sheer economic blackmail" by conditioning its aid to "how Portugal conducts its internal policy") as well as the "so-called European economic council" in Strasbourg.

The West European social democrats have been a target at least since their meeting in Stockholm after the Helsinki summit when, according to PRAVDA on 10 August, they formed a committee to support the leadership of the Portuguese Socialist Party. Mikhaylov took up the cudgels in the roundtable program on the 24th, asserting that in Stockholm the Socialist International politicians "virtually identified themselves with the international reactionary plot" against the "new Portugal" disguised as friends, albeit "false friends." And a Kononov commentary broadcast in Italian on the 26th claimed that the Western European socialist leaders were not confining themselves to advice and moral support to "antigovernment forces" in Portugal; citing the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, the commentary added that the socialists, particularly the French and West German leaders, were also "giving financial aid" to the Portuguese socialists. Kononov maintained that unidentified "slanders" about Soviet interference in Portuguese affairs were merely an effort to hide the "gross interference" by enemies of Portugal's revolution.\*

COMPARISON WITH CHILE Following up on the 19 August PRAVDA Observer's statement that the "reactionary sorties" in Portugal were reminiscent of what happened in Chile, PRAVDA's Kolesnichenko has also professed to see similarities in the two situations. And commentator Viktor Shragin, in a

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\* Moscow has thus far ignored recent U.S. press reports that the Soviet Union has transferred funds to Portugal through a Soviet-Belgian shipping company in Antwerp; such stories are sometimes rejected by Soviet media in rebuttals decrying "outright fabrications" as anti-Soviet propaganda.

- 8 -

foreign-language broadcast on the 26th, elevated the comparison to "a new slogan born in the broad movement of solidarity" with Portugal: "Portugal must not be another Chile." Shragin claimed that "imperialists and forces of internal reaction" were using the same methods in Portugal that they had used in Chile--financial and economic measures amounting to "an invisible blockade," as well as subversive and terrorist actions internally. He warned "Mario Soares and other socialist leaders" to remember the fate of Chilean Christian Democratic Party leader Eduardo Frei, who "raised the banner of anticommunism" and cleared the way for the fascist junta, thinking he would become president again but "losing all."

DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS Soviet commentators have continued to criticize the leadership of the Socialist Party for "playing into the hands" of counterrevolution and reaction, but have avoided blanket condemnation of the socialists, pointing out that not all members subscribe to the policy of "some" of their leaders, and some have left the party. Moscow has again replayed expressions of support for Prime Minister Goncalves, while citing Portuguese Communist Party warnings of a possible coup by reactionary forces, calls for solutions to basic problems "starting with the problem of political power," and appeals for unity of "patriots." Reporting the establishment by eight leftist organizations--including the PCP--of a "provisional secretariat" on the 25th, TASS offered no comment of its own but cited O SECULO for a positive comment with somewhat dubious overtones: The agreement by the eight parties, "who succeeded in overcoming disagreements" in order to unite, was a first step in the target of uniting the working class and all working people. Moscow's domestic service on the 26th carried a more approving report from TASS' Lisbon correspondent that the Portuguese working people had reacted "enthusiastically" to the call of the "leftwing progressive parties" to set up a single national front. The report cited Lisbon shipyard workers as saying that "at present" this was the only forum for rebuffing counterrevolutionary attacks.

27 AUGUST 1975

- 9 -

## ITALIAN COMMUNISTS SHIFT POSITION, ATTACK SOCIALIST SOARES

The Italian Communist Party--a frequent critic of the hard line pursued by Portuguese Communist Party leader Alvaro Cunhal--on 13 August came to the defense of the Portuguese communists and at the same time launched an unprecedented attack on Portuguese Socialist Party leader Mario Soares. This shift in the PCI's stance--the attack on Soares in particular--would suggest the PCI was greatly alarmed over the growing anticommunist violence and the threat to the Portuguese left, thus the expression of solidarity with Cunhal and the tongue-lashing for Soares for his apparent indifference to the violence. Whatever the PCI's motive, it is noteworthy that L'UNITA's more strident tone and expression of sympathy for the Portuguese communists followed close on the heels of a visit to Moscow by a high-level PCI delegation led by foreign policy expert and theoretician Giancarlo Pajetta. The PCI's position on Portugal was further obscured when, two days after the attack on Soares, the PCI came out with a joint statement with the Italian Socialist Party calling for the "speediest establishment" of a "government of national unity" composed of "democratic and antifascist forces" in Portugal.

**CRITICISM OF SOARES** In its attack on Soares, L'UNITA noted that the "anti-fascist forces" in Portugal were "split by violent polemics." Therefore, the paper went on, Italian communists cannot "pass by in silence or without firm criticism the fact that socialist leader Mario Soares has been agitating violently against the communists . . . while at the same time failing to condemn the wave of fascist violence." The editorial denounced those who "out of party sectarianism or provincial narrowmindedness, incurable anticommunist hatred or mediocrity of political vision" can stand by passively "or even with ill-conceived satisfaction" and watch or "even encourage and justify" fascist violence. This is blindness, L'UNITA said, because if Portuguese reaction prevails it will destroy "all democratic forces." The editorial concluded by reiterating the PCI's "greatest possible firmness" in condemning the acts of violence, expressed "solidarity with the Portuguese communists" and denounced "all the attitudes of complicity, toleration and silence" regarding the violence.

**DIFFERENCES WITH PCP** The PCI's position on Portugal has tended to be much closer to the line espoused by Soares and his socialists than that of the Portuguese communists, with L'UNITA and PCI leaders frequently taking strong exception to Cunhal's dogmatic policies and engaging in polemical exchanges with him in the press. As recently as 29 July L'UNITA was taking sharp issue with the Portuguese communists for their

- 10 -

failure to realistically assess the Portuguese situation and understand the views and wishes of the Portuguese people. L'UNITA at that time recalled that the April elections provided ample proof of the country's massive backing for democracy and demonstrated that it was not the Communist Party that had extensive links among the proletariat. "Our disagreement" with the Portuguese comrades, said L'UNITA, starts with the conviction that the "democratic factor" cannot be viewed simply as some kind of "concession" to the moderate forces. Democracy is an "indispensable component of the revolutionary process," the paper stressed, adding that fundamental political freedoms must be preserved and defended, not just "tolerated."

The 15 August joint PCI-PSI statement, like the L'UNITA editorial, expressed concern for the "exacerbating" situation in Portugal, but in general took a low-key approach and stuck to the familiar themes espoused by the PCI over recent months--that there must be unity of all democratic forces and guarantees of basic freedom. When alluding to the recent physical attacks on Portuguese communists and party premises, the statement said only that the "first and foremost task" was to "put an end to the acts of violence."

## U. S. - CUBAN RELATIONS

### HAVANA, MOSCOW WELCOME PARTIAL LIFTING OF U.S. TRADE EMBARGO

Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro has welcomed the U.S. State Department's 21 August announcement of a partial lifting of the ban on trade with Cuba as a "positive gesture" of "great satisfaction" to Cubans.\* Apparently interested in responding in a positive way to the U.S. action, but still reluctant to begin negotiations without a complete lifting of the blockade, Castro equivocated on the significance of the State Department decision. In press conference remarks reported on the 22d by Havana radio, Castro reiterated his view that the embargo must be entirely removed before "there is a truly healthy atmosphere in which to discuss differences," but he added that "this is not a condition, I would call it the essential requisite for discussion with dignity." Later, when pressed by U.S. newsmen, Castro stated that now "there can be negotiation on how to negotiate," seemingly indicating for the first time that conditions for preliminary talks had been met.\*\*

Moscow's straightforward coverage was exemplified in a 22 August commentary by TASS observer Anatoliy Medvedenko, who assessed the State Department move as indicative of "Cuba's growing international prestige" and as evidence of U.S. domestic support for a revised Cuba policy. Regarding Castro's press conference remarks, Medvedenko reported the prime minister as saying that the complete lifting of the blockade would have to precede "genuinely effective bilateral talks."

**CASTRO PRESS CONFERENCE** Questioned about the State Department action at a 22 August joint press conference with visiting Mexican President Luis Echeverria, Castro see-sawed between praising the action and urging further steps by

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\* The State Department action permits foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms to trade with Cuba, but does not affect the prohibition on direct U.S. trade.

\*\* On 7 May, Castro had urged the United States to respond to his past overtures with a "gesture of similar importance," and he vaguely suggested that lifting the ban on export of foodstuffs and medicines would lead to a "reconsideration by the Cuban side of its relations with the United States." Castro's 7 May press conference is discussed in the TRENDS of 14 May 1975, pages 17-19.

27 AUGUST 1975

- 12 -

the United States. Referring to the U.S. role at the 30 July OAS session--which removed sanctions against relations with Cuba, and which the State Department cited as the basis for its 21 August announcement--Castro said that, at the OAS meeting, the United States "behaved realistically and voted with most of the Latin American countries." Tying that conference to current developments, Castro said: "I sincerely regard these steps as positive" but added that "nevertheless, in its essence, the economic blockade persists." Declaring that Cuba was willing to negotiate with the United States "with absolute seriousness, frankness and responsibility," Castro explained that "we would not like to do so with a dagger at our throat"--his frequent characterization of the blockade--and insisted that "a climate of dignity, equality and honor has to be created" if negotiations are to be conducted in a "truly healthy atmosphere."

Asked if this meant that "the entire lifting of the blockade" was a precondition for discussions, Castro first answered: "I believe so," but went on to say that this requirement was "not a condition" but simply "the essential requisite for discussion with dignity." However, when further pressed as to whether he was excluding even preliminary discussions under present circumstances, Castro said: "I believe there can be negotiation on how to negotiate," quickly adding that, at any such meetings, Cuba would "always maintain that conditions of equality must exist to negotiate." Seemingly concerned to appear reasonable, Castro explained:

This does not mean that we object to holding talks. But we maintain the principle that in order to engage in deep negotiations, it is necessary that the economic embargo imposed against Cuba by the United States be lifted.

Castro also avoided inflammatory rhetoric on the export of revolution, as he has done for some time. Responding to a question, he stated flatly that "the revolution cannot be exported," and asserted that Cuba had "adhered strictly to the norms of international coexistence." However, he then went on to cite several examples of the United States' "innumerable attempts to export counterrevolution" in Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America. In toto, his 22 August statements underscored his recent tendency to give cautious encouragement to U.S. steps in his direction, while continuing to flail United States foreign policy.

MOSCOW COMMENTS Moscow's reaction to the State Department announcement has been low-key and couched in predictable terms. In a 21 August dispatch, TASS promptly acknowledged the announcement, noting that the step "does not mean

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- 13 -

any change in bilateral relations since the decision only applies to third countries." Later reports also emphasized the limited scope of the action and suggested the need for further steps, again drawing on statements by American political figures who favor a more "realistic" Cuba policy.

Along these lines, a commentary by TASS observer Anatoliy Medvedenko, broadcast by Moscow's domestic service on the 22d, noted that the State Department move was both a tribute to Cuba's "growing international prestige" and "an indication of the current trend in the United States toward a revision of its relations with Cuba." Medvedenko remarked that the limited nature of the action demonstrated that "influential forces in the United States" still opposed normal relations. The TASS commentator indicated that such a position must change, because, as Fidel Castro had noted, "a full lifting of the embargo is necessary for a start of genuinely effective bilateral talks."

## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## KOMMUNIST SEES CONSOLIDATION OF ANTI-SOVIET COURSE IN CHINA

An editorial in the most recent issue of KOMMUNIST concludes that "Maoism" has reached a new stage in China, characterized by the institutionalization of Peking's anti-Soviet course. According to summary reviews issued by TASS, the editorial asserts that this development will make more difficult China's return to socialism and to improved relations with the USSR.\* The editorial is Moscow's most authoritative statement on China since its assessment of the results of the January 1975 National People's Congress (NPC) in a PRAVDA editorial article last February.\*\*

The editorial repeats a series of now-familiar charges concerning China's hostility toward the USSR and the socialist community, its opposition to detente, its desire for rapprochement with the most reactionary elements in the West, and its alleged interest in fomenting conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. But in asserting that China's anti-Soviet course is now formalized and consolidated in the new state constitution adopted by the National People's Congress in January 1975, Moscow seems to be acknowledging implicitly that the possibilities for a significant improvement in Sino-Soviet relations are more remote than ever. The timing of this most recent assessment of the dispute also suggests that Moscow does not expect any foreseeable leadership changes in Peking to materially affect China's policy--a view consistent with its long-standing position that the struggle between "leftist" and "moderate" factions, associated with Chiang Ching and Chou En-lai respectively, has no direct bearing on relations with the USSR.

The new stage in China, according to KOMMUNIST, involves a switch from political and ideological confrontation with the socialist community to "interstate hostility on all fronts." Available summaries of the article have not mentioned the Sino-Soviet border problem or implied that Moscow perceives any increase in the immediate military threat from China. Indeed, a 16 August article in SOVIET RUSSIA by G. Apalin making similar charges went on to

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\* Based on past experience regarding the intervals between the publication of TASS reviews and the actual issuance of the journals, it may be several weeks before the latest issue, No. 12, is available for inspection.

\*\* Moscow's assessment of the NPC is discussed in the TRENDS of 26 February 1975, pp. 1-3.

- 15 -

note that, while Peking is interested in conflict among its opponents, "it is at the same time doing all it can to have these conflicts break out as far as possible from Chinese borders."

The article warns that a neutral or conciliatory attitude on the part of other communist parties toward Peking's policies would only serve the "antisocialist purposes of the Chinese leadership." The impression that this warning was aimed at independent-minded parties, such as the Romanian party, was strengthened by the appearance of an article in the GDR party organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, summarized by TASS on 25 August, which echoed KOMMUNIST's charges about the new stage in Chinese policy. This criticism of neutralism suggests that Moscow is in no mood to compromise with those communist parties in East and West Europe that are reluctant to participate in the European and world party conferences unless there is advance agreement that the China problem will be soft-pedaled.

There is some evidence to suggest that Moscow's renewed harshness toward China may be accompanied by a peace offensive in the West aimed at taking advantage of the favorable momentum created by the CSCE. PRAVDA's Yuriy Zhukov recently wrote of a new "worldwide campaign for disarmament" and a "second Stockholm movement," a reference to a Soviet propaganda campaign of 25 years ago which, according to Zhukov, "prevented the use of nuclear arms in Korea and rallied the people in the struggle to prevent a new world war." Apalin stressed the linkage between the two aspects of Soviet policy in his SOVIET RUSSIA article, asserting that "the struggle against Maoism is inextricably linked with the struggle against imperialism and against the threat of a new world war."

## EAST - WEST RELATIONS

### PRAGUE ISSUES PROTEST TO FRG ON HELICOPTER FLIGHTS

The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry has formally charged West Germany with responsibility for the 15 and 17 August helicopter flights which airlifted East German refugees to West Germany. The foreign ministry note, issued on 20 August and broadcast by Prague on 21 August, formalized an earlier verbal protest, which was conveyed to the FRG charge d'affaires in Prague on 19 August and which presumably was the unattributed protest aired by Prague radio the same day.\*

The foreign ministry protest to Bonn is the first such Czechoslovak action taken in regard to West Germany since diplomatic relations were established on 11 December 1973. The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry had handled an earlier comparable incident--the hijacking of a Czechoslovak plane to the FRG in May 1972--through the U.S. Embassy in Prague, which was representing the FRG at that time. The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry has routinely issued annual statements protesting the holding of "revanchist" meetings of Sudetan Germans in the FRG.

The protest note said the recent helicopter flights "amount to a gross violation of international law, for which the FRG Government is responsible" and were "contrary to the spirit" of the European security conference final document. The note demanded that the FRG Government take appropriate action to punish the offenders and prevent a repetition of the incidents and added that the CSSR Foreign Ministry reserved the right to claim compensation for damage caused by the exchange of gunfire during the helicopter's departure on the 17th.

The protest note stopped short of alleging an active FRG role in the helicopter incidents, claiming only that they had been "prepared and organized in advance." However, a Czechoslovak Interior Ministry spokesman, as reported by CTK on the 21st, as well as subsequent Prague comment, declared that the incidents had been "prepared by the military and security bodies of the Federal Republic of Germany."

The 20 August note identified the helicopter pilot as "former American Air Force pilot Meeker," but did not mention the fact that the refugees flown out were from East Germany. However, a Prague radio commentary on the 20th described the escapees as "a number

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\* The Prague radio 19 August protest is discussed in the TRENDS of 20 August 1975, page 33.

- 17 -

of citizens of a third state" and, in referring to Meeker's "records at the CIA center in Langley," implied that he was an agent of the CIA.

NOTE TO AUSTRIA      The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry conveyed on the 25th a milder note to the Austrian ambassador expressing Prague's "deep concern" that Austrian authorities had not prevented the helicopter from entering Czechoslovakia via Austrian airspace. The note, which was carried in part by CTK on the 25th, followed a 21-22 August session of the Austrian-Czechoslovak border commission, which had been requested by Prague to discuss the helicopter incidents. Citing the Austrian side's expressions of "regret" over the incidents and assurances that it would seek to prevent similar incidents in the future, the foreign ministry asserted that it expects Vienna to "consistently fulfill" its pledges.

While Prague has given heavy publicity to the incidents, Moscow has limited its coverage to brief TASS reports on the Czechoslovak diplomatic actions vis-a-vis West Germany, and a broadcast to Austria citing Prague's request to convene the Austrian-Czechoslovak border commission.

## CAMBODIA

## SIHANOUK LEAVES NORTH KOREA FOR PRC WITH RGNU DELEGATION

Prince Norodom Sihanouk has ended his three-month stay in North Korea and returned to Peking in the company of an RGNU-NUFC delegation led by RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth and Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan. The visit of the Cambodian delegation in North Korea provided the occasion for Sihanouk's first meeting with Khieu Samphan since the Front victory in April, but communist propaganda has given no clear indication about the prospects for Sihanouk's return to Cambodia or his future relationship with the Cambodian-based leadership.

The only indication thus far that Sihanouk may return to Cambodia with the RGNU delegation, apparently including Penn Nouth, was contained in Kim Il-song's 20 August banquet speech. As reported by KCNA on the 20th, Kim noted that the delegation had come "to accompany Samdech Norodom Sihanouk home." While Sihanouk has not acknowledged that he is returning to Phnom Penh, he has been quoted twice by KCNA--in his 20 August banquet speech and in a 23 August message of gratitude to Kim--as stating that he intends to lead an "important national delegation" back to Pyongyang for the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Korean Workers Party on 10 October. Although both Phnom Penh radio and NCNA have closely followed the activities of the delegation in the DPRK, neither reported either Kim's reference to Sihanouk's return "home" or the prince's statement that he would be returning to North Korea in October.

The enthusiastic reception given the Cambodian delegation during its 19-22 August visit in Pyongyang, following a warm reception in Peking, closely paralleled the attention accorded a visit to the DPRK last year of a Cambodian delegation led by Khieu Samphan.\* On 19 August the RGNU-NUFC delegation was greeted on arrival by DPRK Vice President Kim Tong-kyu, had a "cordial and friendly" talk with Kim Il-song in the presence of Sihanouk, and was feted at a banquet hosted by Kim Tong-kyu, addressed by Kim and Penn Nouth, and attended by Kim Il-song and Sihanouk. Sihanouk did not participate in bilateral talks between Kim Tong-kyu and Penn Nouth and Khieu Samphan on the 20th, but he hosted a banquet that

\* The visit of the Cambodian delegation to Peking is discussed in the TRENDS of 20 August 1975, pages 12-14. The visit of the Cambodian delegation to Pyongyang on 5-8 April 1974 is discussed in the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, pages 11-15.

evening for Kim Il-song at which both he and Kim spoke. Khieu Samphan addressed a DPRK Ministry of the People's Armed Forces meeting hosted by Yi Yong-mu, director of the General Political Bureau of the KPA, on 21 August. Sihanouk and the delegation were given a high-level send-off from Pyongyang on the 22d, and KCNA released a lengthy 22 August joint communique on the 23d. The Cambodian leaders were greeted on arrival at the train station in Peking on the 23d by PRC Vice Premiers Teng Hsiao-ping and Li Hsien-nien, in an otherwise low-key reception.

The 22 August Cambodia-DPRK communique employed virtually the same expressions of warmth and Khmer-Korean solidarity that were used in the 8 April 1974 joint communique capping Khieu Samphan's visit last year. Thus both communiqués included similar expressions of gratitude for mutual aid in past struggles and assurances of support and solidarity in the future. Each communique evaluated the significance of the visits by the respective delegations in similar terms, the present communique stating that the current visit has "greatly contributed to further consolidating and developing the militant friendship and unity and cooperative relationships" between the two peoples. Similar to last year's communique, the current communique noted that bilateral talks proceeded in "an atmosphere of militant friendship and mutual trust" and that there was "a complete unanimity of views on all the problems discussed." The invitation extended by the Cambodian delegation for a reciprocal DPRK delegation to visit Cambodia, included in the communique last year, was dropped in the current communique. The present communique expressed support for the admission of the DPRK to the movement of nonaligned nations, as both Sihanouk and Penn Nouth had done earlier in their banquet speeches.

Phnom Penh radio covered the visit of the delegation to Pyongyang in somewhat less detail and depth than it reported on the delegation's earlier visit to Peking. While the radio had carried the full text of both Khieu Samphan's 15 August banquet speech and of the 18 August Sino-Khmer joint communique, it carried only excerpts of Penn Nouth's and Sihanouk's banquet speeches and of the 22 August Khmer-Korean joint communique, and did not cite any of Khieu Samphan's remarks in reporting his 21 August DPRK Defense Ministry meeting speech. The radio also reported many of the delegation's activities in Pyongyang only in passing, in contrast with its fuller accounts of the delegation's activities in China. The radio did, however, include all due expressions of warmth and cordiality.

- 20 -

## BANGLADESH

### PRAVDA 'OBSERVER' URGES DACCA LOYALTY TO MUJIB POLICIES

Moscow's first authoritative reaction to the 15 August coup in Bangladesh, contained in a 22 August PRAVDA "Observer" article, reflected both vexation over the death of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and skepticism concerning assurances by the new president that Bangladesh's foreign policy orientation would remain unchanged.\* PRAVDA Observer articles have traditionally been regarded as representing official Soviet views; they rank below the editorial-article level in importance but above the level of routine signed articles. The last article under the Observer byline, in the 19 August PRAVDA, dealt with the current situation in Portugal.

Eulogizing the former president for his contribution to the national liberation movement, Observer stated that the "slaughter" of Mujib and his family had evoked "legitimate indignation" throughout the world and that the "Soviet people share the feelings of grief" over his "tragic death."

In discussing Bangladesh's foreign policy, Observer acknowledged that newly installed President Ahmad had proclaimed an "unchanged foreign policy line" and "loyalty to treaties and agreements previously concluded with other states." The article noted, however, that "political observers in different countries" were questioning whether "forces having a hostile attitude," such as "imperialism, Maoism and internal reaction," would "exert an influence on the country's future development." Hailing the "positive trends" of Bangladesh's recent foreign policy, Observer recounted that Soviet-Bangladesh relations had "progressed significantly" and were an "important factor in peace in the region." The article concluded that Bangladesh's "friends" hoped it would "remain loyal to the fundamental trends of its foreign policy" and continue to cooperate "with its neighbors and other countries" in the interests of world peace.

Subsequent routine Soviet media comment on Bangladesh has predictably echoed the Observer article. Political commentator Druzhinin, speaking on the 24 August edition of Moscow radio's weekly

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\* Initial Soviet and Chinese reports on the coup are discussed in the TRENDS of 20 August 1975, page 29. Peking media have continued to carry reports on developments in Bangladesh, but have not as yet commented on the new government.



international observers roundtable program, reiterated verbatim the Observer article's apprehension concerning the influence of "forces with hostile intentions" toward the national liberation movement and the "hope" of Bangladesh's "friends" that it continue its previous foreign policy line.

## U S S R

## MASHEROV PROMOTES INNOVATIONS IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

P.M. Masherov, the ambitious party first secretary of Belorussia, appears to be currently riding high as a successful and innovative economic leader. Belorussia's industrial growth is far ahead of the plan and Masherov has been publicizing this and attributing it to more efficient economic management introduced under his leadership. What is more, he has recently introduced new experimental systems in construction, transportation and agriculture aimed at further increasing efficiency of management. He is one of the few leaders to regularly stress the need to extend economic reform and his experiments appear to conform to the ideas of Premier Kosygin (as well as his onetime patron, First Deputy Premier Mazurov). Masherov's construction experiment was recently endorsed by the USSR Council of Ministers, and if the plan is successful it could greatly enhance his prestige, since all earlier attempts to solve the chronic problems of construction have failed.

The construction industry is plagued by chronic failures to complete construction projects, a condition partly caused by peculiarities in the planning system which make it relatively more profitable for construction organizations to start new projects than to finish existing ones. Kosygin and others have repeatedly demanded faster completion of construction and have attempted to facilitate this by drastic cuts in the number of projects permitted. The Soviet Government had extended economic reform to the construction field already in 1970, after adoption of a June 1969 Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree on improving planning and incentives in construction.\* But, as pointed out in a July 1975 OUR CONTEMPORARY article by A.N. Chekalin, even though half of all construction organizations now work with the new system, "it has still produced little noticeable effect"--partly because of restrictions hampering implementation of the reform. Chekalin, deputy editor of STROITELNAYA GAZETA's department of economy, added that in 1974 the main construction ministries--construction, industrial construction, construction of heavy industrial enterprises, and rural construction--all failed to fulfill their plans.

Last year the Belorussians came up with a new system, which Chekalin declared "opens a new page in the development of the economic reform."

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\* See the FBIS SURVEY of 31 July 1969, pages 10-12.

The system revises planning procedure and makes payment depend on final completion of a project, rather than on completion of various stages of construction or on calendar periods. The number of planning indicators is to be reduced and the builders are to have more rights to adjust their work schedules and manipulate their own resources. Starting in January 1976 construction organizations will work on the basis of credit from banks: if they fall behind schedule in completing a project, they are penalized by having to pay high interest rates; if they complete the project ahead of schedule they receive a considerable incentive reward.

Chekalin described how Belorussian Industrial Construction Minister N.T. Arkhipets successfully proposed this system as an experiment at a meeting in the CPSU Central Committee's construction section at the end of September 1974 and how an interdepartmental commission (headed by Gosstroy First Deputy Chairman M.G. Chentemirov) was created, which carried the proposal "through hell and high water" past Gosplan and the various other ministries until it was approved. The system, basically one of economic self-sufficiency, conforms well to Kosygin's ideas, and in May 1975 a USSR Council of Ministers decree (announced in the 5 June IZVESTIYA) approved the proposal to adopt the system for the Belorussian industrial construction ministry. On 20 May the Belorussian Council of Ministers adopted a decree on improving planning and economic methods, and on 10 June Masherov visited the republic industrial construction ministry's computer center and stressed the importance of the new system. At the 4 July Belorussian Central Committee plenum, Masherov described the new system in detail and again stressed its importance.

At the same July plenum, an extensive reorganization of agricultural administration was unveiled, aimed at improving efficiency by increased specialization in interfarm organizations.\* These two new experiments come on top of a recent economic reform experiment in Belorussia's vehicle transport ministry, which was lauded by Masherov in his 30 May 1974 election speech and his 4 July 1975 plenum speech. Masherov has also vigorously pushed economic reform by creating 100 production associations in industry and transferring 23 plants to the Shchekino system of raising labor productivity and reducing the work force (as indicated in Masherov's May 1974 and July 1975 speeches). He has also introduced and promoted other agricultural innovations, such as the "shop" (tsekh) system,

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\* This system is described in the Supplementary Article "Reorganization of Soviet Agricultural Administration Underway" in the TRENDS of 16 July 1975, page S 6.

- 24 -

which puts specialists in direct command of production, and a system of concentrating rural construction in local construction departments.\*

In contrast to the generally lackluster Soviet economic performance, Belorussia has been achieving remarkable growth. At the July 1975 plenum Masherov could boast that by increasing efficiency Belorussia had increased industrial production by 63 percent during the present five year plan instead of the planned 53-56 percent, had raised labor productivity by 42 percent instead of the planned 38 percent, and had produced over one billion rubles' worth of consumer goods above the plan. He bragged that Minsk had already completed its five year plan goals in June 1975 and was greatly exceeding the planned growth of labor productivity. Demographer Viktor Perevedentsev in the 30 April 1975 LITERARY GAZETTE declared that during the first three years of the five year plan industrial production in Minsk grew 34 percent--far faster than any other city of one million population. He also noted that Minsk is growing in population far faster than any other major city and said that "specialists are even talking about a special "Minsk phenomenon."

In the light of such economic success, it is hardly surprising that last year's Central Committee rebuke to Belorussia for inadequate ideological work appears to have had little visible effect on the republic leaders.\*\* There have been no shakeups as a result of the decree.

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\* Both these experiments are described in the TRENDS of 1 June 1972, pages 39-40.

\*\* For background on the Central Committee decree on Belorussia, see the TRENDS of 9 October 1974, pages 25-26.

## COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP DISCUSSED IN REPUBLIC JOURNALS

For the first time this year full-scale articles on "collective leadership" have been published in the Soviet press. The August issues of the Ukrainian and Estonian party journals carry articles on the subject written by P.A. Rodionov, author of one of the last notable comments on the subject in PRAVDA early this year. A prolific publicist on the issue and a long-time defender of "collective leadership," Rodionov has tailored his articles this time to the political leanings of the respective republic party bosses. In KOMMUNIST UKRAINY, the organ of Brezhnev's protegee, Shcherbitskiy, Rodionov stresses the importance of combining collective leadership with strong personal leadership; in KOMMUNIST ESTONII, organ of Estonian First Secretary Kebin, a regional leader who appears to be distant from Brezhnev, Rodionov stresses the predominance of the collective over any individual leader. The articles were clearly written with each individual republic in mind, since after discussing general principles they both deal with party activities peculiar to the respective republics.

Rodionov's article in KOMMUNIST UKRAINY bore the same title as his early 1974 book: "Collectivity--A Very High Principle of Party Leadership." Although the article includes several of Rodionov's usual statements on the importance of collectivity, it omits the sharp warnings against a leader permitting himself to be exalted or assuming one-man leadership which appeared in his book. What is more, the article includes several paragraphs arguing the need for a strong leader--a theme played down by Rodionov in the past. His choice of terms calls to mind terms used for Brezhnev in recent months, and his statements carefully and curiously use more than one term for leader: vozhd, rukovoditel, lider, avtoritet. Thus, he declares that "the people and party need rukovoditeli, lidery, able to correctly express their interests and will . . ." and "Marxism-Leninism is alien to anarchic denial of the role of avtoritety, rukovoditeli." "Vozhdi, rukovoditeli, armed with Marxist-Leninist theory, experience, political feeling, ability to see better than others the course and prospects of movement, relying in this on the experience of the masses, play a very important, outstanding role in public development." He states that the "authority of a leader (rukovoditel) and the cult of personality are not the same," since the latter means "belittling the role of the masses" while the "authority of rukovoditeli, lidery, vozhdy is based on recognition of the deciding role of the masses. on collectivity in work, on common interests of leaders and le and correct, deep understanding of these interests by both."

Rodionov's article in KOMMUNIST ESTONII is entitled "Collectivity--The Determining Feature of Leninist Style in Party Work." In it, he stresses that Lenin strictly observed collectivity, never forced his views on his colleagues, never decided important questions singlehandedly, rejected exaggeration of his role and insisted that the Central Committee's secretary can only carry out collegial decisions of the Politburo, Orgburo or Central Committee. Rodionov refers readers to his pro-collectivity book (which he does not even mention in the Ukrainian article) and does not include the paragraphs on the need for a strong leader included in the Ukrainian article. The only bow he makes in the direction of a strong leader is to state that criticism of the cult of personality does not mean denying the role of leaders and that "if leading figures, lidery, vozhdy, invested with the trust of the masses and by their collective will set at the head of the party or of some party organ, keep pace with the times and place their wisdom, their knowledge and their organizational talent at the service of the party and people--the role of such figures is significant and important."

**BACKGROUND** Rodionov, as party second secretary of Georgia, turned out numerous articles on collectivity during the second half of the 1960's, articles with an implicitly anti-Brezhnev bias. Hence, it was not surprising that in 1971, as Brezhnev's power grew, Rodionov was removed from party leadership work, dropped from Central Committee candidate membership, and reduced to academic work at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Although his articles became less frequent and more innocuous than before, his book on collectivity, set in type August 1973 and signed to press February 1974, still reflected his antileader bias. Rodionov appeared to return to prominence during the period of Brezhnev's illness earlier this year, when PRAVDA on 21 January carried an article by him briefly discussing collectivity. The appearance of this sensitive theme in the press during a difficult time for Brezhnev stirred some speculation at the time. However, the article was rather bland in its formulations and did not appear to be a sharp jab against Brezhnev.\* While the present KOMMUNIST ESTONII article reflects his old views, the KOMMUNIST UKRAINY article suggests that he is now willing to occasionally bend his principles to accommodate Brezhnev's predominant position.

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\* See the TRENDS of 29 January 1975, pages 20-22.

27 AUGUST 1975

## NOTES

KOREAN FRONT ANNIVERSARY: Pyongyang marked the anniversary of the 25 August 1969 founding of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification (RPR), the DPRK-backed party in the South, as it did last year with a NODONG SINMUN editorial article. The only available version of this year's editorial article, a 25 August KCNA summary, praised the party for its success in strengthening its ranks through adoption of Kim Il-song's ideological principles. The editorial article claimed that on the basis of Kim's "chuche" ideas the revolutionary ranks have been "constantly expanded and strengthened." It noted RPR attempts to block the alleged U.S.-backed "two Koreas plot," to achieve the country's "independent reunification," and to establish a "national coalition" government, and offered standard North Korean support for the "struggle" of the South Korean people for "winning democratic freedom" and reunifying the country. The KCNA summary contained no mention of the "colonial rule of U.S. imperialism" in the South, which has been mentioned in Pyongyang comment on the anniversary in previous years and is supposedly one of the main targets of the RPR.

ROMANIA ON NONALINED CONFERENCE: The Romanian leadership welcomed "with satisfaction" the 25 August decision of the ministerial conference of the nonalined countries meeting in Lima, Peru, 25-29 August to allow Romania to attend as a "guest." A 26 August session of the RCP's Executive Political Committee, as reported by AGERPRES that day, indicated no sign of pique that the invitation, in effect, amounted to a rejection of Romania's bid to gain "observer" status at the conference. According to Belgrade's TANJUG on the 25th, "guests" have no definite status within the nonalined movement and are not automatically invited to future conferences. The Executive Political Committee session portrayed the invitation as "fresh proof" of Bucharest's increasing solidarity with the developing countries. At the same time, it stressed Bucharest's socialist links in declaring that Romania would continue to develop relations of "fraternal cooperation" with all socialist countries and in asserting that the participation of Romania and other socialist countries at the nonalined conference demonstrates the solidarity of socialist and Third World countries against "imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism."

- 1 -

A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 18 - 24 AUGUST 1975

<u>Moscow (2547 items)</u>		<u>Peking (853 items)</u>	
University Association	(-- ) 7%	Cambodia	(14%) 21%
6th International Conference, Moscow		[Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary in PRC	(11%) 14%]
[Brezhnev Greetings	(-- ) 4%]	[Sihanouk, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary in DPRK	(-- ) 5%]
European Security Conference	(12%) 7%		
Portugal	(4%) 6%	USSR	(2%) 4%
Romanian Liberation 31st Anniversary	(-- ) 6%	Japan	(4%) 3%
China	(4%) 5%	European Security Conference	(2%) 3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.