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Trends in Communist Media

20 Aug 75

No. 33

~~Confidential~~

**FBIS** FOREIGN BROADCAST  
INFORMATION SERVICE

# Trends in Communist Media

~~Confidential~~

20 AUGUST 1975  
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## CONTENTS

### MIDDLE EAST

USSR Seeks to Minimize Import of New Kissinger Mission. . . . . 1

### PORTUGAL

PRAVDA Observer Criticizes Western Meddling, Urges Leftist Unity. 4

### INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

PRAVDA Warns Against Dangers of Compromising With Socialists. . . 7  
West European CP's React to PRAVDA, Cite Independence . . . . . 10

### PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

Cambodians Visit PRC, DPRK on Way To Escort Sihanouk Home . . . . 12  
Peking Gives Restrained Welcome to Hanoi Economic Delegation. . . 15  
Peking Portrays U.S. Ties to Japan, Hits Soviet Threat. . . . . 17

### KOREA

DPRK Foreign Ministry Elaborates on Government UN Statement . . . 20  
DPRK Anniversary Comment Reflects Cool Relations With USSR. . . . 21

### LAOS

Daily Party Newspaper Presages Greater Visibility for Lao CP. . . 24

### VIETNAM

Hanoi's Top Leaders Turn Out for Security Forces Anniversary. . . 27

### BANGLADESH

Peking, Moscow Report Coup But Avoid Official Comment . . . . . 29

### CHINA

Industrial Factionalism Target of Unity, Production Campaign . . 30

### USSR

Conflict Evident Over Ukrainian Ministry of State Farms . . . . . 32

### NOTES

Prague Protest on Helicopter Flights; Peking on Thai  
Struggle Anniversary; Peking-South Asia . . . . . 33

(continued)

20 AUGUST 1975

CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: New Solzhenitsyn Book Discusses  
Political, Cultural Leaders . . . . . S1

APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . i

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CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
20 AUGUST 1975

- 1 -

## MIDDLE EAST

## USSR SEEKS TO MINIMIZE IMPORT OF NEW KISSINGER MISSION

As with previous rounds of U.S. diplomatic efforts to facilitate a new Sinai disengagement agreement, Moscow thus far has given meager attention to Secretary Kissinger's current Middle East mission. TASS in a one-sentence dispatch from Washington on the 18th reported that a White House spokesman had officially announced that the Secretary "is to make a trip to the Middle East as part of his shuttle diplomacy in the area." While scattered comment has continued to express standard criticism of "partial" Arab-Israeli agreements, Moscow had been reserved on the specific subject of a new Sinai accord in the first half of August.

As it became apparent that negotiations through the United States were intensifying and that Kissinger might undertake a new Mideast trip to conclude an accord, Moscow began to prepare the ground by minimizing the significance of any new agreement. On the 13th, a commentary carried by the "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress--the lowest level of Soviet media--explicitly criticized U.S. Mideast diplomacy, American "intermediaries," and "maneuvers for a partial settlement." Following up on the 18th, a Moscow radio commentary in Arabic, sharply critical of a new disengagement accord, attacked not only Israel but implicitly Egypt as well by pointing out various alleged disadvantages of a new accord for Egypt, Syria and the Palestinians. The commentary also viewed with distinct distaste the proposal for a U.S. presence in the Sinai to man an early warning system as part of a new agreement. Other comment has cast doubt on Israeli intentions underlying any new accord, continuing to maintain that Tel Aviv seeks to retain possession of as much Arab land as possible and to avoid the issue of satisfying Palestinian rights.

U.S. DIPLOMACY      Criticism of the U.S. diplomatic role in facilitating the Israeli-Egyptian talks has been implicit in Moscow's overall treatment of a possible new accord, but comment directly critical of the United States has been rare--a treatment generally in line with Moscow's handling of Secretary Kissinger's last Mideast trip in March 1975.\* One such attack, however, came in the 13 August Radio Peace and Progress broadcast, which remarked that a new Sinai accord was

\* See the TRENDS of 12 March 1975, pages 1-2, and 19 March 1975, pages 5-7.

CONFIDENTIAL

20 AUGUST 1975

- 2 -

"quite possible" in view of Secretary Kissinger's previous remarks that he would not otherwise undertake a new Mideast mission. The Peace and Progress commentary recalled remarks by Syrian President al-Asad that an interim Sinai agreement prior to a Geneva conference and not linked to the Golan and West Bank situations "could only hamper peace efforts." The commentary asserted that such a view was confirmed by the failure of previous attempts "secretly made" to solve the Arab-Israeli problem, adding that "nor has the step-by-step policy produced any substantial developments--yet the maneuvers for a partial settlement continue, as we can see." The broadcast also noted that Israel had requested U.S. aid in building a new defense line in the Sinai, and charged that such a plan "confirms that the American intermediaries want, by means of the disengagement between Egyptian and Israeli forces, to create greater possibilities for maneuver by Israeli diplomacy."

CRITICISM OF EGYPT While Moscow has been emphasizing the ultimate price to be exacted by Israel in return for a small territorial withdrawal in the Sinai, it has at the same time implicitly questioned Cairo's wisdom in cooperating with U.S. diplomacy and allowing itself to fall into the "snare" of separate agreements. A Moscow radio commentary in Arabic on the 18th, for example, employed scarcely veiled sarcasm even as it conceded that Secretary Kissinger's new round of shuttle diplomacy might result in Egypt's recovery of the Mitla and Jiddi passes and the Abu Rudays oilfields. The commentary observed that neither the Arabs themselves nor "their loyal friends" object to "the liberation of even an inch of Arab territory"--a favorite expression of Egyptian President as-Sadat's. But it went on to remark that many Arabs "and their friends" were troubled about the price to be paid for this "not very extensive withdrawal." Citing the views of unidentified Arab papers, the commentary maintained that Israel's policies gave ample cause for skepticism that a new accord would help, rather than hinder, resolution of the basic issues--complete Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories and assurance of Palestinian rights. The commentary repeated the oft-expressed Soviet allegation that Israeli strategists sought a new Sinai accord "to isolate Egypt from the joint Arab front," and added that Israel wanted a "buffer zone" along the new disengagement line which could "greatly hinder any counteraction by Egypt" in a new Arab-Israeli war.

The 13 August Peace and Progress commentary was more forthright in its criticism of Egypt, asserting that Israel, "with the support of U.S. diplomacy," was attempting to dupe the Arab states--"starting with Egypt"--into making "significant political concessions which have been described as amounting to a degrading capitulation." The commentary asserted that "all the patriotic

20 AUGUST 1975

- 3 -

forces in the Arab world," in implied contrast to Egypt, were criticizing both the notion of separate accords and the objectives underlying them. Referring to the Damascus ATH-THAWRAH, but also closely paraphrasing part of a Yu. Glukhov PRAVDA article on the 12th, the commentary cited as objects of the Arab criticism an alleged U.S. refusal to exert effective pressure on Israel for a genuine Mideast settlement, along with a simultaneous U.S. supply to Israel of weapons and "every possible economic and financial assistance."

U.S. PRESENCE IN SINAI As another example of the price Egypt could pay for a new disengagement accord, the Moscow Arabic-language broadcast on the 18th referred to reports that "a foreign presence" might be allowed on Arab territory and, specifically, that "American technicians" might man the "so-called warning system" near the Sinai passes to monitor compliance with a new agreement. The broadcast saw such an arrangement as complicating the issue of Israeli occupation of Arab territory, since the proposal would inject "the question of a relationship with foreign machinery--in this instance American--that has no connection with the United Nations and its emergency forces." The broadcast charged that "this machinery will only be linked with the forces of the aggressor and will serve his aims."



- 4 -

## PORTUGAL

### PRAVDA OBSERVER CRITICIZES WESTERN MEDDLING, URGES LEFTIST UNITY

Moscow has elevated the level of its comment on Portugal with a 19 August PRAVDA Observer article, only the second time since the April 1974 coup that Portuguese events have received authoritative treatment in PRAVDA. A PRAVDA editorial article last February, ostensibly marking the forthcoming first anniversary of the coup, had seemed timed to coincide with preparations for the April constituent elections.\*

The present Observer article reflects Soviet concern over the deteriorating situation of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), as well as uncertainty as to the eventual resolution of what Moscow commentators have been calling "the most serious and complex crisis." The Observer article and other current comment seem calculated to keep Moscow's options open. Observer attacked both domestic reaction and Western "interference," but did not repeat recent charges that alleged Western intervention was incompatible with CSCE obligations. Observer's remark--highlighted in the TASS summary of the article--that the Soviet people "firmly defend the principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs of other countries" was perhaps an indirect response to Secretary Kissinger's 14 August Birmingham address in which he warned the Soviet Union against interference in Portugal.

OBSERVER ON DOMESTIC EVENTS      Despite the criticism of the Socialist Party (PS) leadership and the call for "support" of the PCP, Observer's chief message appeared to be the article's concluding appeal for leftist and military unity. Underlining this point, TASS quoted this final sentence as the lead in its summary of the Observer article. The Soviet people, Observer declared, "regard with profound sympathy the Portuguese democrats' desire to insure the unity of actions of the MFA (Armed Forces Movement), the communists, the socialists, and all leftwing progressive forces who advocate the strengthening of the antifascist democratic regime in the country and are defending the Portuguese people's revolutionary gains." Thus, Moscow on its own account reaffirmed in almost identical language a position taken jointly by the CPSU and the Italian Communist Party in an 8 August communique--apparently the first time Moscow had mentioned unity since Portugal's government crisis began developing late this spring. The February PRAVDA editorial article had advised

\* The 22 February PRAVDA editorial article is discussed in the TRENDS of 26 February 1975, pages 8-10.

20 AUGUST 1975

- 5 -

"all progressive forces" to maintain unity, but this idea was pursued only sporadically in subsequent comment.

Observer appeared to be making a careful effort to place Moscow on record with support for any of the "progressive forces" which might come out on top in the current power struggle. Thus, the article said that "no true friend" of the Portuguese people could "remain indifferent to reaction's intrigues." Observer then went on to stress the importance of "mass solidarity" with the "political forces" in Portugal struggling against reaction, subordinating to this a less emphatic call for "support" specifically for the Portuguese communists. (The Observer article did not repeat the pledge in a 16 July IZVESTIYA article by Kamynin that Portugal could "count on active economic and political cooperation with the socialist countries.")

In the same cautious vein, Observer portrayed the Socialist Party (PS) leadership as responsible for the present situation, but at the same time contrived, along the lines of other recent comment, to suggest that whatever its true intentions, the party's actions were being exploited by "reactionary forces." "Like it or not," Observer said, the PS leaders were rallying "all the reactionary forces in Portugal, including those who have recently tormented communists, socialists, and other democrats and patriots." Like other commentators, Observer did not identify the "reactionary forces" but described the perpetrators of disturbances and "pogroms" against the PCP as terrorist detachments, hooligan elements, unruly thugs and hired terrorists. Holding up the Chilean example--as had a Moscow radio foreign-language commentary on the 15th--Observer noted that the present attacks by reactionaries "remind us of the things that happened just before the fascist coup in Chile."

The Observer article's critical, yet measured, handling of Portuguese moderates had been foreshadowed in the 17 August Moscow radio observers roundtable, in which Moscow radio political observer Dunayev recalled the "leading role" played in the revolution by former foreign minister Melo Antunes and wondered how a man like Antunes--whose "motives and sincerity" were not in question--had now "permitted his name and popularity to be used by the enemies of the revolution." Dunayev saw PS leader Mario Soares--welcomed "triumphantly" in Lisbon after the 1974 coup--as a "similar although somewhat different case," and speculated whether PS "excuses" for withdrawal from the government, like Soares' "personal conflict" with Prime Minister Goncalves, did not "hide something more substantial."

- 6 -

TREATMENT OF  
KISSINGER ADDRESS

Soviet sensitivity to Secretary Kissinger's warning to the USSR vis-a-vis Portugal in his 14 August Birmingham address was demonstrated in Moscow's handling of the speech. Not until the 16th did TASS selectively report the speech, in a New York-dated dispatch which relegated his remarks on Portugal to a brief final paragraph. A version carried by RED STAR and Moscow radio further compressed TASS' paragraph on Portugal, while PRAVDA omitted this paragraph entirely, along with two other deletions.

The TASS report, of course, made no mention of Secretary Kissinger's remark that the United States has "never accepted that the Soviet Union is free to relax tensions selectively," and his specific caution that the Soviet Union "should not assume that it has the option, either directly or indirectly, to influence events contrary to the right of the Portuguese people to determine their own future." TASS' editorialized account said he declared U.S. sympathy with "the 'moderate elements,' which, as is well known, oppose the policy of the Revolutionary Council." TASS said Kissinger "admitted at the same time that 'the events in Portugal are the result of the development of Portuguese history itself.'" The Secretary did say that events in Portugal have their origin in the dynamics of Portuguese history; but he went on to add that 80 percent of the Portuguese people had declared their desire for a democratic system, and "the attempt by an antidemocratic and doctrinaire minority to thwart this desire is meeting inevitable and growing resistance."

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- 7 -

## INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

## PRAVDA WARNS AGAINST DANGERS OF COMPROMISING WITH SOCIALISTS

In a striking reassertion of Soviet hardline revolutionary doctrine, PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM Chief Editor K.I. Zarodov warned in a 6 August PRAVDA article that communist parties must maintain "hegemony" in bourgeois democratic revolutions in the West and be willing to suppress resistance by force if necessary. Ostensibly commemorating a 1905 essay by Lenin, Zarodov was clearly aiming at present-day "opportunists," "moderates," and "conciliators" within the communist movement who, according to him, were willing to compromise communist revolutionary goals for the sake of preserving tactical alliances with socialist parties. Although there was no reference to Portugal in the text, the article will no doubt be read in the West and in the communist movement generally as an endorsement for a policy of forceful measures to preserve the communist position in Portugal. Whether it should also be read as a broader change of line by Moscow, implying a repudiation of its carefully cultivated policy of encouraging alliances with socialist parties, remains to be seen. At this point, there is much evidence to suggest a less dramatic interpretation.

**POLICY AND IDEOLOGY** in the first place, the article is an isolated statement. The bulk of Soviet media comment continues to express support for the coalition of leftist parties in Portugal and for the united front policy in general. As recently as 19 August a PRAVDA "Observer" article reaffirmed Soviet support for the "unity of action" program in Portugal. An "Observer" article involves a much more formal commitment of official authority than an article signed by an individual such as Zarodov. Moreover, official support for "unity of action" was reaffirmed by world communist specialists Suslov and Ponomarev in speeches last month before a Kremlin conference commemorating the 40th anniversary of the 7th Comintern Congress, which had ratified a policy of seeking broad antifascist united fronts in the face of the growing threat from Hitler's Germany. Ponomarev in particular asserted, in his speech on 4 July, that "the cause of defending peace" occupied an even larger place in the activity of communist parties today than it did in the 1930's, as he pointed to the "topicality of the conclusions and ideas" of the 1935 Congress for "the unity of the workers' movement and, above all, relations between communists and social democrats."

In the second place, there is an alternative explanation which would appear to account both for the character of Zarodov's article and the fact that it is not being seconded by other public declarations.

Classified by 000073  
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20 AUGUST 1975

- 8 -

The article appears to be part of an ongoing debate among Soviet theorists over the strategy and tactics of communist parties at the current stage of the "crisis of world capitalism." The Zarodov article itself contains many indications that it is aimed at other theorists who have been pushing a soft line on these questions. One of the more prominent of these, Timur Timofeyev, director of the Institute of the International Workers' Movement of the USSR Academy of Sciences, seems to be a particular target of Zarodov.

THE STAGES OF REVOLUTION      In articles in KOMMUNIST in April 1975 and in PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY in May 1975, Timofeyev presented an extensive theoretical justification for the policy of united action with "democratic" forces. A key issue for Timofeyev was the question of distinguishing the first, "democratic," stage of the revolution from the second, "socialist," stage. In his view, only the first, "democratic" stage was called for by the current world situation. He labeled as "'leftist' opportunists" those who would "deny the inevitability and necessity for a general democratic stage in the antifascist, antimonopolist struggle." Interestingly enough, Timofeyev specified Portugal as one of the places where such "leftists" could be found.

The same issue was addressed by Zarodov in his commentary on Lenin's article. But unlike Timofeyev, Zarodov sought to blur the distinction between the two stages, recalling Lenin's statement that there was no "wall" between the democratic and socialist stages, and insisting that the tasks of both stages could be "resolved simultaneously." He criticized as "opportunist" the view that the "seizure of the levers of power should be merely a final act for the proletariat and its party."

Although the conflict between the two articles is so sharp as to leave little doubt that the one is intended as a rebuttal of the other, the issue probably reflects a broader debate within the communist movement as well. Timofeyev expresses what has thus far been the majority view--that the formation of united fronts with socialist parties is the best way to influence the policies of capitalist states in preferred directions and to prepare the way for eventual socialist revolution. Zarodov expresses a dissenting view--possibly reflecting nothing more than the perspective of a Prague-based chief editor of a journal that is supposed to reflect the views of a diverse group of world parties--most without the responsibilities of exercising political power.\*

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\* Zarodov was editor of SOVIET RUSSIA in the early 1960's before moving to PRAVDA as first deputy editor in 1965. He moved to Prague to assume his current position about the time of the August 1968 Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
20 AUGUST 1975

- 9 -

THE BREZHNEV CONNECTION      These observations do not, of course, answer all the questions raised by the Zarelov article. It remains a puzzle why PRAVDA should have chosen to publish the article at this time, when the fortunes of the Portuguese communist party seem to have reached their lowest ebb since the April elections. It cannot be entirely ruled out, then, that some faction in the leadership might be using the current embarrassment of the Portuguese Communist Party to challenge the whole concept of "unity of action" as the appropriate strategy for the current stage of the world communist movement. Such a challenge would presumably involve a rebuke to Brezhnev, who is closely identified with the "unity of action" policy--a point which Timofeyev strongly emphasized. Such a hypothesis is purely speculative, however, since there is no indication that any other leader has opposed the "unity of action" program.

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six months from date of issue

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
20 AUGUST 1975

- 10 -

## WEST EUROPEAN CP'S REACT TO PRAVDA, CITE INDEPENDENCE

Major West European communist party leaders have reacted gingerly to the Zarodov PRAVDA article, apparently recognizing that it puts at issue both their credibility as national leaders and the viability of the alliances they have been developing in recent years with moderate socialist parties. But the "directive" tone of the article compelled the West European communists to reemphasize that their policy "is not made in Moscow," as French party leader Georges Marchais put it in his 8 August press conference, according to L'HUMANITE on the 9th.

Marchais' reassertion of independence from Moscow echoed his remarks in late June when he responded to the much-publicized, so-called "Ponomarev directive" to West European communist parties which was printed in LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS on behalf of the beleaguered Portuguese Socialist paper: REPUBLICA. On that occasion Marchais said "once again the independence of our party has been called into question," and "we will react strongly each time the charge is made against us."

Marchais attempted to minimize the importance of the Zarodov article by noting its commemorative nature. But he nonetheless went on to take issue with Zarodov about the need for a dominant communist party role in leftist coalitions when he emphasized that the PCF's strategy was "founded on the alliance of the left" and "it is completely out of the question that we should change our strategy." Marchais also further emphasized that the PCF's "attitude toward democracy and personal and collective freedoms . . . is well known." This attitude, he said, "does not stem from an existing model or models."

The Italian Communist Party's initial reaction--a short article in the 9 August L'UNITA--also tended to softpedal the polemical intent of Zarodov's views. L'UNITA acknowledged that some of Zarodov's views seemed "partly correct," but took issue with his attempt to reduce Lenin's thought to a "single concept, limited to a few questions and to short formulas."

L'UNITA took a more forceful position on 12 August when it stated that "the presumption of dictating rigid and general rules is unfounded," not only because "monolithism has been over for some time in political practice and in relations between communist parties" but because of the "variety of today's situations and problems." The 12 August L'UNITA article also disputed Zarodov's "doctrinaire" view of the "relationship between democracy and socialism," apparently an allusion to his reference to the "Leninist conclusion" that "there is no 'wall' between the democratic and socialist stages of revolution in the new era."

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
20 AUGUST 1975

- 11 -

British Communist Party press spokesman George Matthews said on 13 August that his party's policy was "independently decided by our party and by no other" and "the time has long since passed when communist parties subscribed to a single political center." According to the London MORNING STAR on 14 August, Matthews went on to suggest that this was also the position of the CPSU and therefore "we have no reason to believe that PRAVDA intended that this anniversary review of Lenin's book should be considered as a 'directive' to other parties."

Given the historical nature of the article, said Matthews, Zarodov had paid too little attention to the changes that have taken place since 1905. Zarodov, according to Matthews, failed to take into consideration the many different conditions that exist for the advance of socialism, and he dealt with tactics applicable to Russia at the time in which Lenin wrote "as if they were universally applicable today." Like his fellow West European communists, the British party spokesman stressed that the transition to socialism must be achieved by "democratic political struggle" and that unity of socialists and communists was "indispensable" if rightwing ideas and influence were to be defeated.

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CONFIDENTIAL



- 12 -

## PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

### CAMBODIANS VISIT PRC, DPRK ON WAY TO ESCORT SIHANOUK HOME

The first official Cambodian delegation to leave Phnom Penh since the 17 April victory visited China from 15-19 August, where it was joined by RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth before proceeding to Korea to escort Prince Sihanouk back to Cambodia. During the Chinese portion of the trip, the delegation was led by RGNU Deputy Prime Ministers Khieu Samphan and Ieng Sary. Sihanouk has participated in delegation activities in Korea, and he gave a banquet for DPRK President Kim Il-song on 20 August at which Kim announced that Sihanouk would return to Cambodia with the delegation.

**KHIEU SAMPHAN IN CHINA** Chinese and Cambodian testimonials to their close mutual solidarity and friendship during the Khieu Samphan delegation's visit were similar to those expressed during the extraordinary treatment accorded Khieu Samphan during his April-May 1974 visit to China. There was, however, no repetition of last year's meeting with Mao, perhaps because of the absence of Sihanouk, who led the delegation at last year's meeting. The effusive Chinese and Cambodian media treatment of the visit stands in vivid contrast to cursory Cambodian-Vietnamese coverage of the recent visit to Cambodia, acknowledged early in August, of a DRV delegation led by VWP First Secretary Le Duan, and it serves to underscore recent signs of Cambodia's differentiated relationships with its two most important communist allies.\*

Though the visit to China of the Cambodian delegation overlapped with that of a high-level DRV aid delegation led by Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, there was no report of any meeting between the Cambodians and Vietnamese.\*\* By contrast, when Le Thanh Nghi traveled to China on a similar aid mission last August, he was reported meeting separately with Cambodian "head of state" Prince Sihanouk and with RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth. This year the Cambodians also did not follow their practice in 1974 of stopping first in Hanoi before visiting China, but traveled directly from Phnom Penh to China.

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\* The Cambodian delegation's 1974 visit to China is discussed in the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, pages 11-15; 24 April 1974, pages 19-20; and 30 May 1974, pages 10-12. Le Duan's recent visit to Cambodia is discussed in the TRENDS of 6 August 1975, pages 16-18.

\*\* For a discussion of Le Thanh Nghi's visit to China, see the following article in this TRENDS.

- 13 -

The Khieu Samphan delegation's visit was highlighted by a meeting with Premier Chou En-lai on 16 August. Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping headed the Chinese side at other meetings with the delegation, including their arrival on 15 August and their departure on the 19th. Teng feted the delegation at a banquet on the 15th at which both he and Khieu Samphan spoke and held talks with the delegation, together with Hua Kuo-feng, on the 15th and 16th. Khieu Samphan and Teng Hsiao-ping signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement at an 18 August Peking ceremony also attended by Hua and Li Hsien-nien. Khieu Samphan hosted a farewell banquet on the 18th. RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth was present at all of the delegation's activities except for the bilateral talks; Phnom Penh reported on 16 August that he had flown to Peking from Pyongyang especially to meet the delegation. On 19 August NCNA released a joint communique dated the 18th.

**SINO-CAMBODIAN AGREEMENTS** The 18 August joint communique employed essentially the same expressions of warmth and solidarity between the two countries that were in last year's communique, hailing the growth and progress of the "great revolutionary friendship and militant unity" between them, though again failing to note a complete unanimity of views. Both communiqués similarly hailed the conclusion of the respective aid agreements as "another vivid manifestation of the friendship and unity" between the countries, and in both communiqués the Cambodian delegation acknowledged Chinese assistance to the Cambodian liberation struggle in the past. Both communiqués also assessed similarly the importance of the respective visits, the current communique stating that Khieu Samphan's visit this year had made "an important contribution to strengthening the great revolutionary friendship and militant unity" between the two peoples and to "further developing the friendly relations and cooperation" between the two nations.

Going slightly beyond last year's effusive language, the present communique recorded that the current delegation had been accorded a "grand and enthusiastic welcome and an extremely cordial and friendly reception"; last year the communique had noted "a warm welcome and a grand and cordial reception" for the delegation. Bilateral talks were described in the current communique as proceeding in a "very cordial and warm atmosphere" and both sides "expressed great satisfaction with the results"; last year's communique did not characterize the atmosphere of the talks between the two sides. This year's communique repeated last year's condemnation by both countries of international maneuvers of the "superpowers," and Cambodia reinforced its anti-Soviet credentials by lauding China as a "steel bulwark" of the "socialist movement."

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six months from date of issue.

- 14 -

NCNA's 18 August report of the agreement on economic and technical cooperation signed by Teng Hsiao-ping and Khieu Samphan on the 18th did not provide details on the intended cooperation, but Khieu Samphan in referring to the accord on the 18th thanked the Chinese for their "unconditional and gratis aid." The aid agreement concluded last year and signed by Chou En-lai and Khieu Samphan had called for "gratis provision of military equipment and supplies" to the insurgent Front for "1974."

DELEGATION IN KOREA Under the leadership of both Penn Nouth and Khieu Samphan, the Cambodian delegation departed Peking on 19 August for Pyongyang, where it was greeted on arrival by DPRK Vice President Kim Tong-kyu. Accompanied by Prince Sihanouk, the delegation was received by Kim Il-song on the 19th and was feted at a welcoming banquet hosted by Kim Tong-kyu and attended by Kim Il-song. Vice Premier Ieng Sary did not accompany the delegation to Korea, but according to NCNA on 19 August departed Peking that day for Lima as head of Cambodia's delegation to the ministerial conference of nonaligned nations.

Sihanouk gave a banquet for Kim Il-song on 20 August, at which Kim formally noted that Sihanouk would return to Cambodia. Kim referred to the Penn Nouth-Khieu Samphan delegation as having come to visit Korea "in order to accompany Samdech Norodom Sihanouk home."

PHNOM PENH COVERAGE Phnom Penh radio's coverage of the delegation's visit to Peking has thus far followed the past practice of Front media in reporting the delegation's activities in detail and carrying texts of speeches and of the final communique, in striking contrast to its terse coverage of the recent visit to Phnom Penh by VWP First Secretary Le Duan, which was noted only by a brief communique on 3 August. Thus, Phnom Penh radio reported on 15 August the delegation's departure from Phnom Penh's Pochentong airport, and noted its arrival in Peking with a 16 August report.

On 17 August Phnom Penh radio carried the full text of Khieu Samphan's 15 August banquet speech--the first time since Cambodia's "liberation" that the radio has carried the full text of a RGNU leader's speech--and reported Teng Hsiao-ping's speech at some length in its "weekly international news feature." On the 17th the radio also carried an editorial hailing Chinese support for Sihanouk and the Front since its inception, specifically singling out the efforts of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, and acknowledging anew that the PRC has "continued to provide unconditional support" since the liberation. The radio reported the signing of the aid agreement, the departure of the delegation for Pyongyang, and the departure of Ieng Sary's delegation to Lima, all on 20 August.

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- 15 -

## PEKING GIVES RESTRAINED WELCOME TO HANOI ECONOMIC DELEGATION

Peking media treatment of the 12-17 August visit by a DRV economic delegation led by Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi has provided new evidence of coolness in Sino-Vietnamese relations by omitting almost entirely the customary cordial descriptions of visit atmospherics applied to similar visits by Le Thanh Nghi in July, August, and October last year.\* The delegation was greeted on arrival on the 12th and feted at a welcoming banquet on the 13th by PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, who had welcomed Le Thanh Nghi on his visits last year. The delegation also met PRC Premier Chou En-lai in the hospital; last year's delegation did not meet Chou on its first visit, but had a meeting with him after signing an economic and military aid protocol on 26 October. Hanoi's VNA on the 18th announced that the delegation had gone on to the Soviet Union on the 17th; DRV Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Ban has remained in Peking, presumably to continue negotiations as he did last year.

Characterizations of atmospherics were notably lacking throughout the delegation's visit this year as compared with its initial visit in July last year. While NCNA had reported that Li Hsien-nien had "warmly greeted" the delegation on arrival in July last year, NCNA reported that Li only "greeted" the delegation on 12 August this year. Initial talks between Le Thanh Nghi and Li last year had proceeded in a "very cordial and friendly atmosphere" according to NCNA, but this year initial talks between the two leaders were not characterized by NCNA. In NCNA's report on the 13 August banquet and speeches, Li did not express confidence that Sino-Vietnamese relations would "be consolidated and constantly develop on the basis of proletarian internationalism," as he had in his 5 July banquet speech last year. While Le Thanh Nghi was "warmly" sent off on his 7 July departure by Li Hsien-nien last year, NCNA did not characterize his sendoff this year.

By contrast, Hanoi media continue to describe the tone and atmosphere of Le Thanh Nghi's meetings with PRC leaders in terms similar to those applied to his visits to the PRC last year. Thus, a 14 August VNA report had stated that "an atmosphere of militant solidarity and great friendship completely pervaded" the 11 August banquet.

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\* The successive visits of the DRV delegation last year were discussed in the TRENDS of 10 July 1974, page 19; 14 August 1974, pages 18-19; and 31 October 1974, pages 15-17.

- 16 -

Last year, Peking reports showed sensitivity about Chinese aid to Vietnam; the pattern continued in NCNA's report of this year's 13 August banquet speeches by Li Hsien-nien and Le Thanh Nghi, which deleted several references to Chinese backing that were included in Hanoi's 14 August VNA report of the banquet and speeches. The only references to such backing retained by NCNA in summarizing Li's speech dealt with Chinese sympathy and support for Vietnam in the past and his pledge of continuing Chinese support for the "just struggles" of the Vietnamese people. While NCNA did record Le Thanh Nghi's remark that China has always supported Vietnam out of "bounden internationalist duty," NCNA deleted Nghi's mention of current talks on economic aid to Vietnam, his recognition that Chinese aid had constituted an "important factor" in the communist victory in Vietnam, and his expectation that "an increase" in PRC aid would be of "great importance" and have a "great effect" on Vietnamese reconstruction. NCNA's coverage of the banquet speeches by Li and Le Thanh Nghi during Nghi's successive visits last year had similarly omitted most references in Peking's own name to aid the Vietnam.

NCNA's report of the banquet speeches deleted all but two references to the United States, both made by Le Thanh Nghi. While reporting Li's assessment of the "great international significance and historic importance" of the Vietnamese victory, NCNA omitted Li's elaboration--reported by Hanoi--on the future importance of the victory to other liberation struggles. Hanoi predictably omitted Li's assessment of the current international situation with its references to "hegemonism" related to the Sino-Soviet polemic exchange.

20 AUGUST 1975

- 17 -

## PEKING PORTRAYS U.S. TIES TO JAPAN, HITS SOVIET THREAT

Consistent with the Peking media's increasingly positive treatment of developments suggesting that the United States maintains a strong strategic presence in Asia to guard against Soviet inroads, Chinese media have virtually dropped criticism of U.S.-

Japan ties while increasing their attacks on Soviet intentions regarding Japan.\* Peking's NCNA reported the 5-6 August talks between President Ford and Prime Minister Miki without the usual reproaches on U.S.-Japanese defense ties. At the same time, Chinese reports on 14 August sharply criticized Soviet military and economic pressures, instead of criticizing U.S. military involvement in Japan as had been customary in the past on that date, the anniversary of V-J Day, an anniversary which Chinese media usually have not acknowledged explicitly.

**FORD-MIKI TALKS** A 7 August NCNA report highlighted passages from the U.S.-Japanese joint announcement following President Ford's talks with Prime Minister Miki which emphasized the importance both sides attach to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and noted that "the continued maintenance of the treaty serves the long-term interests of both countries." NCNA replayed the announcement's affirmation that the United States would continue to abide by its defense commitment to Japan, and cited without adverse comment President Ford's statement that the United States "would continue to play an active and positive role in that region and would continue to uphold its treaty commitments there." By contrast, Peking's coverage of the last official visit by a Japanese prime minister to the United States, a 3 August 1973 report on former Prime Minister Tanaka's talks in Washington with then President Nixon, had ignored both sides' stress in their joint communique on the importance of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

In reporting that the two leaders had discussed "a wide range" of economic problems, NCNA avoided references to U.S.-Japanese friction over trade and financial matters that in the past had been a staple of Chinese comment. Peking even noted with apparent approval that both leaders had "welcomed" a dialog between oil producers and consumers. By contrast, the 3 August 1973 NCNA report on former Prime Minister Tanaka's talks had cited alleged "contradictions"

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\* For background on Peking's recent line on the superpowers in Asia, see the TRENDS of 6 August 1975, pages 13-14.

20 AUGUST 1975

- 18 -

between the two leaders on trade and fiscal policies, noting news reports that Tanaka felt the United States and Japan were "both partners and competitors."

The current NCNA report on the Ford-Miki talks did criticize the passage in the joint announcement which voiced both sides' support for the security of South Korea, but Peking's rebuke was predictably milder than its reaction to the last U.S.-Japan summit communique to focus on Korean security--the November 1969 joint communique following former Japanese Prime Minister Sato's talks with former President Nixon. That communique had prompted an outpouring of strident Chinese comment, including a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, accusing "chieftain of U.S. imperialism" Nixon and "his faithful lackey" Sato, among other things, of plotting to drive "Japanese militarist forces" to promote "aggression and war" in Korea and elsewhere in Asia.

V-J DAY ANNIVERSARY      The Chinese media, as usual, have not explicitly acknowledged the 14 August 30th anniversary of the defeat of Japan in the Pacific war, but NCNA did use the date to issue two sharply worded reports attacking Soviet military threats and pressure against Japan. On the last quinquennial of the date in 1970, Peking similarly had avoided explicitly acknowledging V-J Day but had issued a lengthy NCNA attack on the United States for its alleged military occupation and pressure on Japan.

The current NCNA reports reiterated recent wide-ranging Chinese criticisms of Soviet policy toward Japan, claiming that Moscow was employing "tough and soft tactics of military threat and economic lure" to bring Japan into its sphere of influence. One report broke new ground regarding both tactics by depicting Soviet military bases on the Japanese-claimed "northern territories" as "a dagger directed against Japan" and by pointing to a "new trick" regarding alleged efforts by Moscow to get the Japanese involved in a so-called "new plan for developing Siberia" following its failure to get involvement in exploitation of the Tyumen oil field in Siberia. The report stressed the Soviet military threat to Japan, stating that Moscow only needed to move its forces "slightly" in order to land troops on the main northern Japanese island of Hokkaido, "as the troops of the old tsar did in the past." It added Japanese press comment that Japan's air space from "Hokkaido to Okinawa" and the "whole of Japan" have been "put under the shadows of Soviet naval and air force might."

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- 19 -

Though the articles duly portrayed Moscow's efforts as designed fundamentally to contend with the United States for hegemony in Asia, NCNA carefully avoided all reference to the U.S. bases or military presence in Japan. It even went to some pains to depict the United States and Japan as mutually threatened by Soviet expansion. For instance, one report said that Soviet naval maneuvers around Japan "pose a threat to the U.S. Pacific fleet and directly to Japan's security" and also stated that Soviet bases in the northern territories were targeted for use against the United States as well as Japan.

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- 20 -

## K O R E A

## DPRK FOREIGN MINISTRY ELABORATES ON GOVERNMENT UN STATEMENT

Pyongyang has reiterated its support for a pro-DPRK draft UN resolution on the Korean question, in a 17 August foreign ministry memorandum elaborating on arguments contained in an earlier DPRK Government statement of 11 August.\* Like the government statement, the foreign ministry memorandum rejected a U.S.-backed proposal to have U.S. and ROK officers assume the duties of the UN Command, and it repeated the contention that the end of the UN Command would mean the end of the armistice. The memorandum added that the ROK cannot become a signatory to the armistice because it was not one originally, because it has "consistently opposed the armistice agreement itself," and because the U.S. Army has "all the real power" in South Korea, making Seoul's signature "meaningless," an argument Pyongyang has used against Seoul in the past on other issues.

Pyongyang had previously issued lengthy official memoranda in preparation for the UN debates in 1973 and 1974. Those documents, however, were wide-ranging propaganda attacks on the United States and ROK, whereas this year's stuck more closely to the issue of the opposing UN draft resolutions.

Supporting the pro-Pyongyang draft's proposal for a peace agreement among the "real parties" to the armistice to replace that accord, the DPRK Foreign Ministry memorandum said explicitly what the government statement had clearly implied--that the peace agreement should be between the DPRK and United States. Like the government statement, the memorandum did not even raise the subject of a North-South peace agreement. In citing the DPRK's March 1973 five-point proposal as a way to improve North-South relations and reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula, the memorandum listed the five points in their entirety, except for omitting that part of the fifth point calling for a North-South peace agreement.

The memorandum criticized the U.S. position that U.S. forces would remain in South Korea under the U.S.-ROK defense treaty even if the UN Command was disbanded, as did the government statement, but added that the treaty was a violation of the armistice agreement

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\* For a discussion of the DPRK Government statement, see the TRENDS of 13 August 1975, pages 1-2.

- 21 -

and "unlawful." The memorandum also observed that with the dissolution of the UN Command, it would be "natural and reasonable that U.S. troops stationed in South Korea under the cloak of the 'UN Forces' should also withdraw."

PEKING, MOSCOW REACTION NCNA on the 18th carried lengthy excerpts of the memorandum. The NCNA version--like an NCNA version of the DPRK statement of the 11th--omitted the claim that the UN Command's dissolution would mean the end of the armistice and that it was not possible to consider changing the signatories to the armistice. NCNA noted the memorandum's claim that it was "logical" that U.S. troops in South Korea under the UN signboard should pull out after dissolution of the UN Command. It also included the memorandum's call for a U.S.-DPRK peace treaty. Monitored Soviet media have not yet acknowledged the DPRK memorandum.

#### DPRK ANNIVERSARY COMMENT REFLECTS COOL RELATIONS WITH USSR

DPRK treatment of the 30th anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japan reflected the cool state of Pyongyang-Moscow relations by dropping much of the once-obligatory rhetoric concerning the Soviet contribution to the liberation. Pyongyang comment played down Soviet assistance to Korea, either in 1945 or subsequently, while emphasizing DPRK independence and self-sufficiency. Soviet comment emphasized USSR aid to the DPRK over the years, but offered only the standard, perfunctory Soviet support for Pyongyang's reunification efforts. Unlike past quinquennial liberation anniversaries, this year no high-level Soviet delegation traveled to North Korea for the occasion.

The North Korean leaders' message to their Soviet counterparts on the 14th omitted even the standard, cursory greeting to Soviet army men for their participation in Korea's liberation. Likewise, the 16 August KCNA version of DPRK Minister of People's Armed Forces Choe Hyon's anniversary message to Soviet Defense Minister Grechko did not include any reference to Soviet assistance in Korea's liberation.

The anniversary was marked in the DPRK by a 14 August lecture meeting in Pyongyang and a rally on the 15th in Chongjin addressed by DPRK Vice President Kim Tong-kyu. (The main rally on the last decennial of the liberation had also been held outside of Pyongyang.) KCNA on the 15th reported a banquet arranged by a provincial people's committee, but there was no cabinet-level banquet on the anniversary, possibly because there was no high-level Soviet

- 22 -

delegation to merit such treatment. By contrast, there had been cabinet-level banquets in 1965 and 1970, when Shelepin and Mazurov led delegations to North Korea for the anniversary. Kim Il-song did not attend any of this year's anniversary functions; he had appeared on the 20th and 25th liberation anniversaries. NODONG SINMUN greeted the anniversary with an editorial, as it customarily does.

In his 15 August rally speech, Kim Tong-kv noted the Soviet army's participation against the Japanese but did not refer to Soviet assistance in the Korean War or in postwar economic rehabilitation. However, he did acknowledge the "precious assistance" from the USSR in "carrying out projects," and specifically expressed appreciation for "successful efforts" by Soviet comrades in the Kimchaek Iron Mill expansion project.

Kim's address included standard references to DPRK self-sufficiency achieved under Kim Il-song's "chuche" philosophy, but also added remarks about Korean independence clearly aimed at Moscow. The DPRK, noted Kim, "has exercised its sovereign rights to the fullest in internal as well as external activities." "We do our own thinking," he continued, "and make our own judgments; we formulate our own lines and policies and implement them by our own efforts," with the result that the Korean people are moving ahead "on the road of our own choosing."

MOSCOW TREATMENT      The anniversary was marked in Moscow with a public meeting on the 13th attended by Politburo member Pelshe and addressed by USSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman Novikov. PRAVDA on the 14th carried a TASS article reporting brief excerpts from Novikov's speech and even briefer ones from the DPRK ambassador's remarks. Moscow radio reported a reception given by the DPRK envoy on the 14th, also attended by Pelshe, but Soviet media have not carried any speeches from that function.

Soviet media coverage of the anniversary included a series of Korean-language broadcasts on the exploits of the Soviet army in liberating Korea and low-level treatment in the central press. A 15 August RED STAR article reviewed Soviet assistance to the DPRK during the liberation, the Korean War, and after, and noted that the consolidation of Soviet-Korean friendship and the insuring of peace in the Far East were "reliably served" by the 1961 USSR-DPRK treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid.\* An article in

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\* The Soviet leaders' anniversary message this year also noted the treaty had consolidated Soviet-Korean friendship.

- 23 -

SOVIET RUSSIA, also on the 15th, reviewed DPRK proposals for Korean reunification, pointing out that the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and the conclusion of a North-South peace agreement were "indispensable conditions" for successful solution of the Korean problem. The reference to a North-South peace agreement is curious, since Pyongyang has not raised that proposal in some time, emphasizing instead a DPRK-U.S. peace agreement as a means of settling the Korean question.

- 24 -

## L A O S

## DAILY PARTY NEWSPAPER PRESAGES GREATER VISIBILITY FOR LAO CP

The recent emergence of a new daily newspaper in Laos, SIANG PASASON (Voice of the People), and its subsequent identification by Pathet Lao sources as the official organ of the communist Lao Revolutionary Party (LRP), strongly suggests that the Laotian communist party intends to shed its clandestine image and take an increasingly active and visible role in Laotian politics.\*

The appearance of the new paper was preceded by an unusual number of references to the role of the LRP in Pathet Lao media during the latter part of July, in which the LRP was credited with providing "leadership" to both the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) and the Lao People's Liberation Army (LPLA). The timing of the media references to the party and the appearance of the party paper also suggests that the LRP leadership may have discussed the question of surfacing the party during June, when senior officials of the party and the LPF were known to be in Viengsay, reportedly for a meeting of the LPF Central Committee.\*\*

NEW PAPER ANNOUNCED      Radio Pathet Lao announced on 30 July that the "patriotic forces" would publish the new daily paper SIANG PASASON throughout the country beginning 11 August. On 6 August the radio reported that the newspaper would replace the daily Khaosan Pathet Lao news bulletin, published by the Pathet Lao News Agency (KPL) in Vientiane and Luang Prabang. LPF Central Committee member and KPL director Sisana Sisan disclosed the paper's true parentage in a 9 August Radio Pathet Lao broadcast, when he noted that the paper "belongs to the Lao Revolutionary Party" and was intended to "disseminate the policy, line and resolutions adopted by the Lao Revolutionary Party, the LPF and the PGNU . . . ."

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\* Originally called the Lao People's Party (LPP) at its founding on 23 March 1955, the Laotian communist party was renamed during the early 1970's as the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), and has also been referred to as the Lao Revolutionary Party (LRP), or simply the Lao Party.

\*\* For a discussion of results of the June meeting of the LDP Central Committee, see the TRENDS of 9 July 1975, pages 12-13.

- 25 -

SIANG PASASON's first editorial, carried by the Vientiane domestic radio on 11 August, made no mention of the LPF or the Provisional Government of National Union in describing its own role as disseminating the "policy, guidelines and stand of the Lao Revolutionary Party," adding that in addition to the KPL editorial staff the newspaper would have the "close guidance of the party central committee." The paper's first edition was also discussed on the 11th by Radio Pathet Lao, which announced that Kayson Phomvihan, the secretary general of the LRP, had written a lengthy article for the "political feature" column.

**BACKGROUND** The public appearance of the party organ SIANG PASASON in August was presaged by an unusual increase in July in the number of references to the Laotian communist party in the Pathet Lao media, which customarily in the past have only occasionally carried party materials or references. LPLA Supreme Commander and LPFCC Standing Committee member Khamtay Siphandon made several references to the LRP in a welcoming speech at a 17 July "grand rally" in Viengsay for a visiting Japanese Communist Party (JCP) delegation. The Japanese delegation also met with party chief Kayson, who received them in his capacity as a vice chairman of the Lao Patriotic Front Central Committee. As has been standard practice in the past with other visiting communist delegations, the Front was portrayed as the host and the party leaders were listed only by their positions in the Front Central Committee. The 21 July communique on the JCP visit, carried by KPL on the 24th, recorded the JCP delegation's satisfaction with the successes of the Lao people who were said to be "united under the LPF Central Committee and enjoying the leadership of the Lao Revolutionary Party," and hailed the militant solidarity between the two "parties."

Several Pathet Lao radio editorials during July also made direct reference to the LRP. Two editorials, on 19 and 26 July, discussed the relationship between the LPLA and the party, stressing the need for the LPLA and the people to be "loyal to the party central committee's teachings," to "firmly and profoundly grasp the party's political, military, strategic and tactical tasks," and to "heighten the party leadership in all branches." A third editorial, broadcast on 27 July and pegged to the upcoming 12 October celebration of the 30th anniversary of Lao independence, urged the people to conduct emulation campaigns and to "closely unite under the banner of the LPF, which is under the wise, clear-sighted leadership of our party." Similar themes and references to the party were also contained in a 3 August KPL commentary and a 5 August Radio Pathet Lao article.

- 26 -

Although the current spate of publicity for the LRP is unusual, references to the party have occasionally appeared in the Pathet Lao media in the past. For example, Radio Pathet Lao, in a 22 March 1974 broadcast, ran the first part of a two-part letter from the secretary general of the LRP Central Committee to all party committees and members on the party's 23 March 19th anniversary.\* The second part of the letter was carried on a Pathet Lao radioteletype transmission on 21 March 1974, but was not known to have been subsequently broadcast by Radio Pathet Lao. Similar letters, on the 17th and 18th anniversaries in 1972 and 1973, were also carried then on this Pathet Lao service. Pathet Lao media are not known to have carried an anniversary letter this year.

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\* For background information on past anniversary letters see the TRENDS of 28 March 1973, pages 12-13.

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- 27 -

## VIETNAM

### HANOI'S TOP LEADERS TURN OUT FOR SECURITY FORCES ANNIVERSARY

Hanoi's observance of the 30th anniversary of the founding of DRV public security forces has been the focus of a greater degree of attention than in the past, even for a quinquennial celebration. This year's 19 August anniversary was marked by a Hanoi meeting that drew public appearances by most of the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Politburo--their first time together in public since the opening of DRV Fifth National Assembly on 3 June.\* According to the 20 August Hanoi radio version of the meeting, the participants heard Premier Pham Van Dong deliver the opening and closing remarks, and National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh and Minister of Interior Tran Quoc Hoan give addresses praising the public security forces for their achievements. While the leadership remarks were mostly ceremonial, Tran Quoc Hoan struck something of a serious note in his passing reference to South Vietnam as a region where the maintenance of "political security and public order" was "especially" needed.

The DRV leadership turnout at the meeting included VWP Politburo members Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Le Duc Tho, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Hoang Van Hoan, and Tran Quoc Hoan. Of the three remaining Politburo members not accounted for at the meeting, two of them, South Vietnam party organization Secretary Pham Hung--who until his appearance at the Saigon victory celebration in mid-May had not been noted in Vietnamese communist media since 1967\*\*--and Deputy Minister of Defense Van Tien Dung, were last reported by Liberation Press Agency on 29 July as being in Saigon visiting a military hospital on the occasion of war invalids day. The third, Le Thanh Nghi, is currently leading a DRV economic delegation visiting China and the Soviet Union.

Since 1970, the last time Hanoi reported a meeting to celebrate the public security forces anniversary, media acknowledgement of the event has been meager. In 1973 the party newspaper NHAN DAN published an editorial and in 1971 there was a Hanoi radio commentary pegged to the anniversary. There is no record of DRV media having mentioned the anniversary in either 1972 or 1974.

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\* For a discussion of the leadership turnout at the National Assembly session, see the TRENDS of 4 June 1975, page 11.

\*\* See the TRENDS of 21 May 1975, pages 1-4, for a discussion of Hung's resuming a public role as a member of the DRV hierarchy.



- 28 -

Although the 25th anniversary meeting in 1970 was similarly addressed by Tran Quoc Hoan, it was apparently a more modest affair than the present celebration, there being no mention in the Hanoi radio report at the time of other leaders being present.

## BANGLADESH

### PEKING, MOSCOW REPORT COUP BUT AVOID OFFICIAL COMMENT

Initial Moscow and Peking reports of the 15 August coup in Bangladesh which overthrew the government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman have treated events there with caution, but have reflected their differing views of the Rahman administration. Neither Moscow nor Peking has yet provided authoritative comment. Peking's prompt reaction to the coup, in NCNA reports of 16, 18, and 19 August, avoided any explicit depiction of the coup as a setback for India and the USSR on the subcontinent, but strongly implied Chinese approval by playing up the undisguised approval of the new regime declared by the PRC-aligned Bhutto government in Pakistan. Moscow coverage has consisted mainly of short, factual TASS reports and news items in Moscow broadcasts to India and South Asia.

Moscow's concern over events in Bangladesh was reflected in 17 August radio broadcasts beamed to India in Urdu, Bengali, and Hindi which cited the Indian Government's statement that "it cannot view these events with indifference," but noted that the Indian Government had "no intention to interfere in the internal affairs of Bangladesh." In the 17 August edition of Moscow radio's weekly international observers roundtable program, political commentator Dunayev said it was "difficult to comment" on the coup but that the situation would "probably become clearer in the next few days."

NCNA's 16 August report noted that the Mujibur Rahman government had been overthrown the previous day in a coup d'etat staged by military forces, but avoided reference to Rahman's death. The report played up the new government's announced determination to pursue a "nonaligned policy," to maintain friendly relations with "Islamic countries and nonaligned nations," and to oppose unspecified "outside interference." It also implied popular acceptance of the new government by noting that "calm" prevailed in the capital after the coup. A 19 August NCNA report cited foreign news agency reports that the situation in Bangladesh has "returned to normal" after the coup. On the 18th NCNA played up Pakistan's prompt recognition of the new government and its "immediate" dispatch of material aid. The report noted that the new regime had also been recognized by other Moslem countries, citing in particular a joint Saudi Arabian-Sudan declaration expressing hope that the new regime would achieve success on the "road of strengthening Islamic solidarity."

## CHINA

## INDUSTRIAL FACTIONALISM TARGET OF UNITY, PRODUCTION CAMPAIGN

In the wake of Peking's decision last month to use the PLA to insure order and production in Chekiang factories, an unusually frank ideological commentary by Chiang Lan, broadcast by Heilungkiang province's Harbin radio on 13 August, appears to signal the start of a new crackdown to end "all factional struggles without principle" in Heilungkiang.

Taking a hard line on factionalism, Chiang argued that it was necessary to launch a "tit-for-tat struggle," since "bourgeois factionalism is a spring which yields only to power." Factional problems in Heilungkiang, appear to have been severe, as Chiang revealed that "factionalism has greatly disrupted and undermined our revolution and production" and he warned that "facts show clearly that leniency toward bourgeois factionalism is treading down the proletarian party spirit, an act of irresponsibility toward the people." Indicating that some high-level officials in Heilungkiang may be targets of an intensified attack on factionalism, Chiang declared that if "a handful of leading cadres and leaders of various groups" fail to correct their mistakes, "we are going to touch them all" even if "they are a tiger or a lion whom no one dares to touch."

Heilungkiang party chief and military commander Wang Chia-tao has not appeared in Heilungkiang since early in 1974, and he may have already lost his provincial party responsibilities. Ending an extended stay in Peking, Wang recently appeared in Shenyang for Army Day celebrations, but he was listed without title among Shenyang Military Region officials. During Wang's absence from Heilungkiang, party affairs have apparently been run by Second Secretary Liu Kuang-tao.

Chiang's article, picking up on a theme briefly touched upon by Fukien's party boss Liao Chih-kao at a Foochow meeting earlier this month, characterized the current wave of factional problems as "essentially different" from the type of factionalism that formed between mass organizations in the cultural revolution. Chiang indicated that the current factional threat originated among industrial workers who are unwilling to work harder to meet higher production goals without the rewards offered by a material incentive system. In this connection, he criticized "a handful of persons" who sought to practice "capitalism" and who devoted themselves to "both fame and profits" by demanding "independence from the party." Chiang cited some units where "the proletarian party spirit" has "completely disappeared."

- 31 -

The problem of factionalism among factory workers was discussed more explicitly in a 14 August NCNA report detailing how a factory in Hangchow, Chekiang's capital, overcame erroneous trends and increased production. NCNA revealed that in the past year, during the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, "a very small number of persons in the plant, who were influenced by bourgeois factionalism, acted wrongly to weaken and break away from the leadership of the party." The report credited the plant's party committee with helping workers to resist "erroneous trends with concrete actions" by taking "part in voluntary labor to solve production problems without consideration of time or remuneration."

Similar provincial-level reports included a 14 August Hangchow broadcast which lauded a party unit in another plant for helping to strengthen the party's centralized leadership in the factory by allowing workers to take an active part in factory management. All production sections in the plant now have a "worker-manager" in charge of "wages and efficiency ratings, and welfare" in order to "effectively promote revolution and production throughout the plant." An 18 August Canton broadcast of a SOUTHERN DAILY editorial stressed the need for strict rules and organizational discipline to "achieve continuous stable and high output." It warned that "wherever the evil wind and noxious air of bourgeois factionalism are rampant in a certain locality, revolution and production become backward there for a long time."

## U S S R

### CONFLICT EVIDENT OVER UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF STATE FARMS

In a series of strange reversals suggesting conflict, the Ukraine has reasserted its intention of retaining its own separate ministry of state farms (sovkhozes), thus marking itself unique among Soviet republics. All other republics have recently abolished their sovkhoz ministries, implementing a new Moscow policy to end separate administration of sovkhozes.

The Ukrainian ministry's position had first appeared to be strengthened in late April with the appointment of a new minister, V.I. Fedan, head of the Ukrainian Central Committee's agriculture section and a full member of the Ukrainian Central Committee. However, only two months later the ministry's future was put in doubt by the disappearance of the new minister's name from the press and by the failure to mention the ministry at all when the new Ukrainian government was announced in early July.

Fedan was last mentioned in the press when he was identified as sovkhoz minister in the list of newly elected Supreme Soviet deputies published on 19 June. The newly elected Ukrainian Supreme Soviet met on 4 July to organize, but neither Fedan nor anyone else was announced as sovkhoz minister in the newly appointed government. Nor was Fedan even appointed to membership in any of the Supreme Soviet commissions, as other deputies were. Then, after over a month without a minister, the appointment of deputy minister I.I. Shmatolyan as minister was announced on 7 August. Contrary to established practice, there was no announcement of Fedan's release, then or earlier.

While Fedan's sudden removal suggests some problem with him personally, the failure to name a successor in the new government and for the next month may also have reflected uncertainty over whether the ministry was to be abolished.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

20 AUGUST 1975

- 33 -

## NOTES

PRAGUE PROTEST ON HELICOPTER FLIGHTS: The Prague radio on 19 August carried a protest, not attributed to any official Czechoslovak government organ, describing recent helicopter flights aiding refugees to escape through Czechoslovakia into West Germany as a "gross violation" of Czechoslovak territory. The Prague protest, while lacking the authority of a formal foreign ministry statement, is the strongest Prague attack on the FRG since ratification of their bilateral treaty on 19 July 1974; it referred to the latest incidents as being in conflict with the recently concluded CSCE Helsinki summit agreement. Prague warned, among other things, that "the relevant Czechoslovak bodies" were taking the necessary steps to prevent a repetition of the "criminal" incursions. In addition to the 17 August helicopter flight reported by Western news media, the Prague broadcast charged that an earlier helicopter flight on the 15th had landed and picked up four persons in Cesky Krumlov district on the Vltava River, near the convergence of the Czechoslovak, Austrian and FRG borders. That is the same area where three persons were picked up on the 17th, under fire from Czechoslovak personnel. The Prague protest fixed responsibility on the West German regime in pointing out that the "previously planned and prepared" flights originated in the FRG and in refuting alleged Western reports that "no official circles in the FRG had or have knowledge" of the affair.

PEKING ON THAI STRUGGLE ANNIVERSARY: On 15 August Peking belatedly marked the 7 August 10th anniversary of the beginning of the armed struggle led by the Thai Communist Party, reporting in heavily censored form a 6 August Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) statement originally broadcast by the China-based clandestine Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT). Last year Peking marked the ninth anniversary with a replay of a VOPT editorial marking the date and a VOPT report on Thai PLAF battle successes; in 1973 Peking did not mark the occasion at all. The fifth anniversary of the Thai armed struggle in 1970 had occasioned an NCNA correspondent's report on the progress of the struggle in Thailand. Peking's replay this year generally followed the pattern of its report on the VOPT editorial last year. It deleted all references to the Khukrit government by name, just as last year's report avoided references to the Sanya government by name, and it highlighted the Thai statement's references to seizing political power by force as the correct path to power while again excising a lengthy discussion in the original Thai version of the role of urban-based mass movements as auxiliary forces. NCNA did include the Thai PLAF statement's criticism of

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CONFIDENTIAL

20 AUGUST 1975

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- 34 -

the United States, for aiding Thai government suppression of the people's armed struggle and for colluding with "Soviet social-imperialism" to suppress revolutionary movements throughout the world. The VOPT editorial last year had included no references to the United States or the Soviet Union.

PEKING-SOUTH ASIA: Peking's growing interest in expanding its ties with the smaller states in South Asia was reflected in visits to China this month by the first Sri Lankan military delegation known to have visited China and by the first delegation to Peking from the Seychelles, an Indian Ocean island country scheduled to gain independence from Britain next year. Sri Lankan army commander Lt Gen Don Sepala Attygalle and his delegation received effusive, high-level Chinese attention during their 8-19 August stay in China, meeting with PRC military leaders Chen Hsi-lien in Peking and Li Te-sheng in Shenyang and being feted at banquets in Peking attended by PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Ho Cheng-wen on 8 and 18 August. Speaking on the 8th, Ho lauded Sri Lanka's "unyielding spirit" to defend national independence and claimed that in recent years Sino-Sri Lankan friendship and "friendship between the armed forces of the two countries" has had a "new development." NCNA on the 10th cited General Attygalle's remarks to Peking PLA troops stressing common PRC-Sri Lanka efforts to raise military training and preparedness against the danger of "imperialist aggressive war." Though no aid accord was mentioned during the visit, both Ho and General Attygalle stated on the 18th that the visit had further strengthened relations between "the two countries and their armies." Meanwhile, NCNA reported that PRC Vice Foreign Minister Ho Ying feted a Seychelles delegation led by F.A. Rene, minister of works and land and head of the Seychelles People's United Party, on 9 August, and that Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping had a "cordial and friendly" talk with the delegates on the 10th.

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## SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

## NEW SOLZHENITSYN BOOK DISCUSSES POLITICAL, CULTURAL LEADERS

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's latest book, Bodalsya Telenok s Dubom (The Calf Butts Against the Oak Tree) is a fascinating autobiographical account of the Russian author's dealings with Soviet officialdom from the time he sent his novel One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich to the journal NOVY MIR in November 1961 up to his final arrest and deportation early in 1974. The book describes in detail Solzhenitsyn's problems in gaining publication in the USSR as well as his opinions of some important Soviet political figures such as Shelepin, Suslov and Demichev. The 623-page book was published in Russian by the YMCA Press in Paris earlier in 1975 but has not yet appeared in English translation. It apparently was the only one of Solzhenitsyn's writings the KGB was unable to find in its various searches. Ironically, the book contains more information about contemporary Soviet political and cultural leaders than any of Solzhenitsyn's other works.

TVARDOVSKIY AND NOVY MIR As might be expected, a central figure in the book is Aleksandr Tvardovskiy, the former editor of NOVY MIR who strongly defended Solzhenitsyn and published his first writings. Solzhenitsyn characterizes Tvardovskiy as a fighter for intellectual freedom but also as party-minded, loyal to the regime, and all too willing to compromise to avoid martyrdom. This, plus Tvardovskiy's tendency to treat Solzhenitsyn as his own "discovery" and exclusive property, generated frequent conflicts between them. But as the regime cracked down harder and harder on Solzhenitsyn and NOVY MIR, and as Tvardovskiy became increasingly alienated from the regime, he and Solzhenitsyn became increasingly close.

In 1968 Tvardovskiy changed considerably, according to Solzhenitsyn. Up until then Tvardovskiy had been fiercely hostile to anything published in samizdat or in the West; in 1968, says Solzhenitsyn, Tvardovskiy began listening to the BBC and enthusiastically reading samizdat. When, in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the authorities pressed Tvardovskiy to sign a letter condemning Czech writers for defending counterrevolutionaries, Tvardovskiy stoutly refused, agreeing to do so eventually only when his deputies persuaded him that it was the only way to save NOVY MIR from extinction. Shortly thereafter, in November 1968, Tvardovskiy was nominated for membership in the Academy of Sciences, but pressure from above blocked his election, leaving him even more bitter.



Solzhenitsyn describes in detail Tvardovskiy's eventual fall, how Tvardovskiy finished his anti-Stalin poem "By Right of Memory" in the spring of 1969, and how it was soon passed on to the Russian emigre journal POSEV, presumably by the KGB.\* POSEV's publication of the poem in October 1969 was then used by Soviet authorities to attack Tvardovskiy and remove his chief assistants at NOVY MIR (deputy chief editor A.I. Kondratovich and liberal board members V. Ya. Lakshin and I.I. Vinogradov) on 10 February 1970. In addition, Tvardovskiy was forced to accept A.I. Ovcharenko as a board member. According to Solzhenitsyn, only shortly before, Ovcharenko had called Tvardovskiy a "kulak poet." As a result of all this, Tvardovskiy resigned as chief editor on 11 February.

Solzhenitsyn's portrait of Tvardovskiy is far from entirely flattering, however. Along with acknowledging Tvardovskiy's struggles with the regime, Solzhenitsyn condemns him for his occasional compromises and for his personal weaknesses. This aspect of the book was attacked by Tvardovskiy's daughter, V.A. Tvardovskaya, in a letter to the Italian Communist paper L'UNITA. The letter, published in the 24 June 1975 issue of the paper, assailed the book for portraying Tvardovskiy as "weak and bewildered," cowardly and servile toward the authorities, overly concerned with his official position, and surrounded by opportunists and cowards. She accuses Solzhenitsyn of downgrading NOVY MIR and calling Tvardovskiy no better than the neo-Stalinists V.A. Kochetov and A.V. Sofronov. Furthermore, she assails Solzhenitsyn's portrayal of himself as strong and wise and she suggests that Tvardovskiy may have rejected some of Solzhenitsyn's works because they were poorly written, rather than for reasons of expediency.

Tvardovskaya was clearly disturbed by Solzhenitsyn's impugning of both NOVY MIR and Tvardovskiy, and his implying that neither deserve any great praise, as well as by his graphic and disdainful descriptions of Tvardovskiy's frequent drinking bouts. At perhaps the low point of Solzhenitsyn's relations with Tvardovskiy in late 1965, Solzhenitsyn broke off the relationship and took his writings to Tvardovskiy's "sworn enemies," MOSKVA editor M.N. Alekseyev and OGONEK editor A.V. Sofronov, both of whom were eager to accept his works, despite their ultraconservative stance. Alekseyev, one of the prime literary defenders of the orthodox version of collectivization, told Solzhenitsyn privately that the history of collectivization was built on lies and had to be revised, while Sofronov lauded One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich and had OGONEK's whole staff enthusiastically greet him. Hence,

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\* For background on Tvardovskiy's poem, see the FBIS SURVEY of 27 February 1970, pages 1-3.

20 AUGUST 1975

- 5 3 -

Solzhenitsyn concluded that even these ultraconservatives were not really as different from Tvardovskiy as they seemed in public.

But eventually Solzhenitsyn also acknowledges in his book that he has sometimes been too harsh on Tvardovskiy and the NOVY MIR staff, and had failed to give them credit for the intense pressure and suffering they underwent. Solzhenitsyn even forgives Tvardovskiy's heavy drinking as a necessary escape from pressure and frustration. Tvardovskaya is nevertheless close to the mark in her attack on Solzhenitsyn's self-portrait, since the book betrays little modesty in this regard.

OTHER NOVY MIR FIGURES Solzhenitsyn also had extensive dealings with other members of the NOVY MIR editorial board and describes their roles. A.G. Dementyev, first deputy editor until early 1967, was the man Tvardovskiy relied on most heavily, and he was the only member of the board who dared contradict and argue with Tvardovskiy. The emotional, unorthodox Tvardovskiy, with his poet's temperament, needed a deputy who could restrain him and keep him and NOVY MIR out of political trouble. This role was filled by Dementyev, who was far more conservative and often able to change Tvardovskiy's mind. Dementyev feared from the start that Solzhenitsyn would get NOVY MIR into trouble, and so he became Solzhenitsyn's main foe and obstacle in NOVY MIR, trying to dissuade Tvardovskiy from printing One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich and virtually all other Solzhenitsyn writings. Tvardovskiy was very close to Dementyev but considered him too rigid, and when Dementyev was removed from the board in 1967 during the first purge of NOVY MIR, Tvardovskiy turned to his young protege Lakshin, whom Tvardovskiy liked even better than Dementyev.

The liberal Lakshin always agreed with Tvardovskiy, according to Solzhenitsyn, and was his particular favorite. The hostility of the Writers Union Secretariat prevented Lakshin's designation as first deputy chief editor, but in fact, says Solzhenitsyn, he was Tvardovskiy's top deputy. (Actually, Soviet media never formally identified Lakshin as more than a member of the board at NOVY MIR.) Solzhenitsyn portrays Lakshin as a very talented literary critic, good at "tightrope walking" and at maneuvering around the censor. At first Lakshin was quite liberal and acted as one of Solzhenitsyn's main allies in getting things published. Later, having become NOVY MIR deputy editor, he became more cautious, taking up Dementyev's role of protecting NOVY MIR and Tvardovskiy from excesses and viewing Solzhenitsyn as a threat to NOVY MIR's existence.

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- S 4 -

Among others on NOVY MIR's board, Solzhenitsyn considered deputy chief editor A.I. Kondratovich (ousted in early 1970) and responsible secretary B.G. Zaks (ousted in 1967) as cautious and conservative, but anxious not to oppose Tvardovskiy's opinions, while board members A.M. Maryamov and I.I. Vinogradov were quite liberal. Thus, during the June 1966 editorial discussion over whether to publish Solzhenitsyn's novel, Cancer Ward, Dementyev, Zaks and Kondratovich were opposed, while Tvardovskiy, Lakshin, Maryamov and Vinogradov favored it. When NOVY MIR was pressed to produce a letter backing the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Vinogradov refused to sign, but Lakshin, new responsible secretary M.N. Khitrov, and Kondratovich did, and also eventually persuaded Tvardovskiy to sign.

ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL LEADERS      Since Solzhenitsyn also had occasional contacts with Soviet political leaders (including the historic confrontations between Khrushchev and the intelligentsia on 17 December 1962 and 7-8 March 1963), the book also presents some interesting sidelights on important political figures, notably Shelepin, Suslov, Demichev, and Khrushchev's cultural adviser, V.S. Lebedev.

Solzhenitsyn's strongest remarks were directed toward Shelepin. Although Solzhenitsyn did not know Shelepin personally, he considered him orthodox and very dangerous and the driving force behind the 1965 movement to rehabilitate Stalin. He states that if "iron Shurik," as he calls Shelepin, had come to power, "it would have meant my immediate end." He tells of an August 1965 ideological conference which laid down a new, softer line on Stalin, which asserted that Stalin was only guilty of violating collectivity and carrying out illegal repressions. He claims that Shelepin made a bid for power in August-September 1965, on the basis of a program which included a cultural crackdown, a return to the Stalinist system of economics and administration, and concessions to Mao. Solzhenitsyn declares that in September 1965 the Shelepin faction brought about the arrest of writers Sinyavskiy and Daniel (which marked the start of the cultural crackdown) and began a new, much more serious campaign against Solzhenitsyn. He tells how a campaign of slander against him began and how the KGB raided a friend's house in September 1965 and seized Solzhenitsyn's novel First Circle. The atmosphere at this time was such that Solzhenitsyn feared imminent arrest and began hiding all his writings.

Solzhenitsyn had already had a taste of the Shelepin faction's hostility under Khrushchev. Shelepin's protege, Komsomol First Secretary S.P. Pavlov, had denounced Solzhenitsyn in April 1964 when Solzhenitsyn was under consideration for a Lenin Prize.

- S 5 -

Pavlov, a member of the Lenin Prize committee, asserted that Solzhenitsyn had been jailed for a common crime, not on a political charge. Although Tvardovskiy soon produced evidence proving the contrary and forced Pavlov to retract his charge, the charge helped dissuade the committee from presenting the prize to Solzhenitsyn.

Solzhenitsyn is more uncertain in his opinion about Suslov. Though inclined to view Suslov as ultraconservative, he relates how during the December 1962 meeting of intellectuals and party leaders, Suslov for no discernible reason came up to Solzhenitsyn, enthusiastically shook his hand, and spoke of "his extreme satisfaction with One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich."

Solzhenitsyn blames the then Central Committee ideology secretary, Demichev, for much of the official opposition to his writings. Shortly after assuming responsibility for ideology, Demichev in July 1965 told Tvardovskiy he wanted to meet Solzhenitsyn. This was arranged, but at the meeting Solzhenitsyn deliberately misled Demichev, assuring him that he was not writing much more and might return to being just a math teacher. Later, while visiting friends, Solzhenitsyn described how he had fooled Demichev. His friends' apartment had been bugged, and the KGB delivered a recording of the conversation to Demichev, who was infuriated and according to Solzhenitsyn, "became my eternal sworn enemy." Solzhenitsyn declares that Demichev was the one who had to decide whether Solzhenitsyn's name could be mentioned in the press, describing how LITERARY GAZETTE editor A.B. Chakovskiy went to Demichev for such a decision in late 1965.

Solzhenitsyn also describes a 21 October 1965 meeting with Demichev's adviser on culture, I.T. Frolov. Frolov told Solzhenitsyn that publication of his works could not be permitted because his style was so much more vivid than that of other writers--even Sholokhov--and would attract many readers to his negative ideas.

Solzhenitsyn includes a number of references to Khrushchev's cultural adviser, V.S. Lebedev, whom he regarded as a "secret high-level liberal." Lebedev was a good friend of Tvardovskiy, and it was to Lebedev that Tvardovskiy gave Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich in 1962. Lebedev enthusiastically read the work to Khrushchev and secured its acceptance. What is more, Lebedev even insisted that Solzhenitsyn put Stalin's name in the book at least once, instead of just using allusions. Dropped from power along with Khrushchev, Lebedev died in 1966 at the age of 50. Tvardovskiy was the only Central Committee member to attend his funeral according to Solzhenitsyn.

A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 11 - 17 AUGUST 1975

<u>Moscow (2892 items)</u>			<u>Peking (850 items)</u>		
European Security Conference	(32%)	12%	Cambodia	(--)	14%
			[Khieu Samphan,	(--)	11%]
Kosygin in Poland	(--)	5%	Ieng Sary in		
U.S. Congressional Delegation in USSR	(--)	5%	PRC		
[Meeting with Brezhnev	(--)	3%]	International Swimming and Diving Meet, Peking	(10%)	12%
DPRK Liberation 30th Anniversary	(--)	5%	Vietnam	(1%)	4%
Portugal	(1%)	4%	[Le Thanh Nghi in PRC	(--)	3%]
Cuban CP 50th Anniversary	(--)	4%	Japan	(1%)	4%
China	(5%)	4%	Korea	(1%)	3%
			European Security Conference	(20%)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.