

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160004-0

TCM 75-28

C 1 of 1  
TCM 75-28

Trends in Communist Media

16 Jul 75

~~Confidential~~

**FBIS** FOREIGN BROADCAST  
INFORMATION SERVICE

# Trends in Communist Media

~~Confidential~~

16 JULY 1975  
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 28)

**This report is based exclusively on foreign media materials and is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.**

**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions**

Classified by 000073  
Automatically declassified  
six months from date of issue.



## CONTENTS

### U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

PRAVDA "Observer" Raps Schlesinger "First Use" Remarks. . . . . 1

### MIDDLE EAST

USSR Noncommittal on Arab Pressure for Israel UN Ouster . . . . . 3

### SOMALI BASE ISSUE

USSR Claims Base Charges Prompted by U.S. Indian Ocean Plans. . . . . 5

### PORTUGAL

Moscow, PCP Back MFA, Assail Socialist Withdrawal From Cabinet. . . . . 8

### KOREA

DPRK Marks Anniversaries of Treaties With PRC, USSR . . . . . 10

### SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

PRC Continues To Push Asian "Antihegemony Front" Against USSR . . . . . 11

Peking Notes Planned Europe Summit, Warns of Soviet Threat. . . . . 13

### VIETNAM

Strategy of Communist Offensive Reflected in Giap-Dung Article. . . . . 15

### COMMUNIST RELATIONS

USSR Silent on Ponomarev Role in "Directive" to Western CP's. . . . . 18

### NOTES

European CP Conference Preparations; Romanian Bid for  
Nonaligned Status; DPRK on North-South Contacts;  
Chinese Education . . . . . 20

SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: Reorganization of Soviet Agricultural  
Administration Underway . . . . . S1

### APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . i

- 1 -

## U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

## PRAVDA "OBSERVER" RAPS SCHLESINGER "FIRST USE" REMARKS

A 12 July article by PRAVDA's Observer (Obozrevatel) has added an authoritative ring to recent Soviet media criticism of Defense Secretary Schlesinger's statements concerning circumstances in which the United States could be the first to use nuclear weapons.\* Observer placed Schlesinger's statements in the context of the arguments of those in Washington who feel that potential adversaries should be put on notice that the communist victories in Indochina would not affect U.S. readiness to use military force if need be. His criticism of the Secretary was accompanied by expressions of satisfaction with the general state of U.S.-Soviet relations and detente, and by reaffirmations of Moscow's interest in pursuing bilateral discussions of sensitive strategic issues.

Observer complained that Schlesinger's statements about the possibility of "selective strikes against the Soviet Union" and of using nuclear weapons even in "minor crises" were in sharp contradiction to the official U.S. policy of improving bilateral relations and to the 1973 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War. Moscow's real concern seemed apparent in Observer's linkage of Schlesinger's recent statements with what he termed "the turbulent debate inside America about the way U.S. foreign policy should be restructured following the 'agonizing withdrawal' from Southeast Asia." He concluded that Schlesinger represented those "influential forces" in Washington who thought the best response to such setbacks was to "show force" around the world, and particularly in Europe, in order to underscore U.S. resolve. Other commentaries since early May have made even more explicit Moscow's concern that the communist victories in Indochina might negatively affect Washington's interest in detente. Soviet leaders, including Brezhnev and Kosygin, expressed their concern about Washington's foreign policy course in speeches during the election campaign for republican supreme soviets in June.

Observer leavened his criticism of the Secretary's "bellicose statements" with general approval for the recent course of U.S.-Soviet relations and the "constructive dialog" at SALT in

\* U.S. policy last drew a response from PRAVDA's "Observer" in a February 1974 article which criticized the U.S.-UK agreement providing for expansion of U.S. military facilities on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. For earlier Moscow treatment of the Schlesinger statements, see the TRENDS of 9 July 1975, pages 1-2.

- 2 -

particular. He reaffirmed Moscow's belief that the limitation of strategic arms is the "central problem" in U.S.-Soviet relations and thus an area where progress is particularly important. He went on to attach "great significance" to Brezhnev's forthcoming visit to the United States, although he did not directly link this to conclusion of a SALT agreement.

Secretary Schlesinger and his predecessors at the Pentagon have always represented something of an exception to Moscow's general-- but not rigidly adhered to--policy in recent years of eschewing direct criticism of top Administration officials. Schlesinger's 1974 remarks on retargeting U.S. strategic weapons and the need to plan for possible limited nuclear exchanges with the USSR have previously evoked criticism from Soviet analysts of strategic affairs along quite similar lines.

Classified by 000073  
Automatically declassified  
on 09/26/1999

- 3 -

## MIDDLE EAST

## USSR NONCOMMITTAL ON ARAB PRESSURE FOR ISRAEL UN OUSTER

Moscow has thus far barely alluded to the move afoot in Arab diplomatic circles to raise the issue of sanctions against Israel, including suspension of UN membership, for failure to comply with UN resolutions calling for withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories. Nor has Moscow reported Secretary Kissinger's Milwaukee speech on the 14th in which he implied that Israel's ouster from the United Nations could prompt the United States "to depart the scene." Such a call for efforts to deprive Israel of UN membership was adopted by the 40-nation sixth conference of Islamic foreign ministers at a 12-15 July meeting in Jidda; a similar move is expected during the Lima conference of nonaligned countries in August; and Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmy on 15 July said the September session of the UN General Assembly "must decide whether Israel shall remain a member of the United Nations."

Moscow's only reference to the issue has come in a Moscow domestic service commentary by N. Yefremov on the 12th which, in reporting the arrival of Israel's new UN representative in New York, noted that his predecessor's farewell remarks had charged that the UN was increasingly "under Arab domination" and had indicated that Israel might have to resign. Characterizing these remarks as a "diplomatic counterattack," Yefremov remarked, without explanation, that "as is known, Israel is threatened with expulsion from the UN." He added that this was "insisted on" by the "coordinating committee of 75 African, Asian, and Latin American countries"--an apparent reference to the Havana conference of nonaligned countries held 17-22 March 1975. Yefremov summed the issue up as a "very sorry business."

**BACKGROUND** Moscow has maintained a low profile on the issue of sanctions against Israel since late 1973. Since then the few favorable Soviet references to sanctions were indirect, replaying various Arab or international organization resolutions. TASS on 23 April 1974, for example, reported a World Peace Council message to the UN Security Council calling for "immediate and effective sanctions against Israel" to normalize the Mideast situation.

Between the June 1967 and October 1973 wars, however, Moscow had frequently voiced support for economic and political sanctions against Israel, as provided for under Article 41 of the UN Charter, to compel Israel's compliance with UN resolutions--chiefly Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, calling in part for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the

- 4 -

June war, but also those resolutions in 1968-1969 calling for cessation of Israeli military attacks against Arab and Palestinian targets in reprisal for terrorist activities. Such advocacy of sanctions against Israel was normally pegged to UNGA or Security Council deliberations on the Mideast situation, rather than presented as a Soviet initiative. To explain why sanctions were not implemented, Soviet comment pointed out from time to time that U.S. opposition in the Security Council had persistently prevented their adoption.

Moscow's position on sanctions extended at times to calls for Israel's expulsion from the United Nations. A June 1971 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS article by E. Dmitriyev and V. Ladeikin, for example, stated that Israel's refusal to promote a Mideast settlement would justify political and economic sanctions; and it recalled that Article 6 of the UN Charter provides that a member which has persistently violated the Charter principles may be expelled. Other references to Israel's expulsion were made in a May 1972 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS article by V. Aleksandrov and in a 4 December 1972 PRAVDA article by D. Yevgenyev. Additionally, a 14 April 1973 statement by Soviet UN representative Y. Malik, that the USSR would support "effective sanctions against Israel to the extent of dismissing it from UN membership," was widely reported by TASS, Moscow radio, and the central press.

Soviet references to sanctions have also at times included suggestions that, as provided for in Article 42 of the UN Charter, a UN-sponsored use of force could insure Israel's compliance with UN resolutions. An M. Kremnov NEW TIMES article on 1 January 1969 and a 10 September 1969 Moscow foreign-language broadcast, for example, recalled that "use of force" was allowable under the UN Charter to compel such compliance. And, in the fullest Soviet discussion of sanctions against Israel, an I. Blishechenko NEW TIMES article of 10 December 1971 invoked various precedents in international law--including the statutes of the Nuremberg Tribunal--to cite appropriate sanctions for "political, material and moral responsibility," as distinguished under international law and applicable to Israel as an "aggressor state." Included in the examples was "dispatch of a UN force to the Middle East to restore peace."



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JULY 1975

- 5 -

## SOMALI BASE ISSUE

## USSR CLAIMS BASE CHARGES PROMPTED BY U.S. INDIAN OCEAN PLANS

Moscow for over a month has been issuing a steady flow of routine-level comment and reportage designed to counter U.S. charges that the Soviet Union is developing a new naval and air facility in Somalia. The current spate of comment was prompted by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's testimony on 10 June before the Senate Armed Services Committee defending the Administration's plan to expand naval facilities on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The Secretary told the committee that the "significant expansion" of Soviet facilities at Berbera showed the USSR's serious intent to establish a naval presence in the Indian Ocean. In the pattern of past treatment of assertions of Soviet bases in the Indian Ocean area, Moscow has again sought to portray such charges as U.S. justification of its own plans to develop facilities in the area.\*

The greater volume of Moscow comment than on past charges would seem to result from the continued widespread publicity about the Soviet installations--including the release of U.S. reconnaissance photographs, and the Somali Government's invitation to foreign newsmen and U.S. Congressional delegations to inspect the site. Moscow has refrained from issuing any formal denial, although it had done so on two occasions during the 1960's. (In November 1968 TASS said it "had been instructed to categorically refute" Western press allegations about the creation of a Soviet naval base at Mers-el-Kebir and a network of Soviet rocket installations in Algeria. At a somewhat higher level, in October 1966 an unidentified Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, as reported by TASS, "denied" a London DAILY MIRROR story that the USSR intended to set up a naval base in Egypt.)

TREATMENT OF CHARGES      Even before Secretary Schlesinger's testimony, TASS had reported on 6 June that the Administration was trying to convince Congress to approve additional appropriations for "the construction of a big military

---

\*. Moscow's reaction last fall to what TASS called the "regrettable inaccuracy" of President Ford's remark, in a 28 August news conference, about three Soviet naval operating bases in the Indian Ocean is discussed in the TRENDS of 5 September 1974, pages 5-6. An earlier flurry of Soviet comment on charges and countercharges of Soviet and U.S. naval bases in the area is treated in the TRENDS of 21 February 1974, page 19.

Classified by 000073  
Automatically declassified  
six months from date of issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

base" in Diego Garcia, noting that "the world public" denounced the Pentagon's plans for an Indian Ocean base, which the countries of the area considered a threat to their security. TASS' 10 June account of Schlesinger's testimony said that in requesting the Senate to speed up allocation of funds for an expansion of the Diego Garcia base, Schlesinger "proceeded to scare the Senators anew with the so-called Soviet menace, alleging that the Soviet Union was intending to build up its military might" in the Indian Ocean.

On the 9th TASS had reported a denial by the Somali embassy in Kenya of "Western propaganda" reports that the USSR was building a missile base in Somali territory. Moscow continued to focus on a series of denials by Somali officials in Mogadiscio and elsewhere, while simultaneously countering "rumors"--advanced by Egypt--about possible Soviet bases in Libya.

The Soviet military organ RED STAR joined the fray on 20 June, acknowledging--and ridiculing--the United States' high-altitude reconnaissance "photographs of the territory of a sovereign state" and remarking that "the Pentagon prefers to see what it wants from where it wants." RED STAR maintained that photographs of "strictly peaceful installations" such as residential areas and port installations had been interpreted as barracks, a landing strip, and a control center. The reason for the "latest Pentagon mirage," RED STAR concluded, was the Pentagon request for further funds to enlarge the Diego Garcia naval and air base into a "really enormous military center."

In a commentary on 27 June tailored for American audiences, Moscow attempted to make light of reports of the presence of Styx missiles in Somalia. Commentator Pozner, in an English-language broadcast, noted that the Pentagon had "officially admitted" that "the missiles photographed in Somalia and made an issue of by Defense Secretary Schlesinger were of the so-called Styx type, introduced around 1959." Pozner tried to convey the implication that these were Somali weapons, adding that the Styx missiles "serve as standard armament for patrol boats of about a dozen navies around the world." And he attempted to discredit the photographic evidence, remarking that he wouldn't be surprised to learn the photographs were not even taken in Somalia, and wondering if "the esteemed secretary of defense planted a couple of obsolete missiles in his own back yard and had them photographed by the air force."

With the visits of American and other foreign correspondents to Somalia in early July, IZVESTIYA on the 3d maintained that the newsmen had not discovered anything "remotely resembling the 'discovery' of the Pentagon purveyors of false information." The

Classified by 000073  
Automatically declassified  
six months from date of issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

"hullabaloo," IZVESTIYA insisted, stemmed from Pentagon efforts to strengthen its argument for additional budget allocations. In reporting the correspondents' tours, TASS again focused primarily on denials by Somali officials, citing President Mohammad Siad Barre as declaring that Somalia does not allow foreign powers to establish bases and the Soviet Union never made such a request to the Somali Government.

A Moscow domestic service report on 9 July cited Barre as saying in a Washington POST interview that Somali was willing to let ships from all friendly states make business calls at the port of Berbera, and "if Americans come as friends, Somalia is ready to accord this service to American ships as well and to let them refuel and carry out repairs in the port."

Moscow has hedged on the touchy question of the findings of a U.S. delegation led by Senator Bartlett in early July. A Gerasimov commentary broadcast in Polish on 9 July contended that U.S. and Lebanese journalists had found no trace of any foreign bases in Berbera and "Bartlett did not dare say that a Soviet military base existed in Berbera, either." Gerasimov made an elaborate effort to convey the idea that the Bartlett mission found Somali, not Soviet, installations. He claimed that Bartlett was not interested in the problem of a foreign base, but rather in "the local defense capabilities" of Somalia, and that the senator counted the "Somali" naval buildings in Berbera. In reporting Bartlett's remarks on his return, Gerasimov was half accurate and half deliberately ambiguous. Thus, Bartlett said that his inspection "absolutely confirmed" Pentagon claims that the Soviet Union was installing a military facility in Somalia. In Gerasimov's version, Bartlett said his visit "confirmed the information provided by the U.S. Defense Department about military buildings in that region." Touching on the issue briefly in the weekly Moscow radio observers roundtable on 13 July, IZVESTIYA's Mikhaylov maintained that the American congressmen and the journalists who had "literally overrun" Somalia "failed to find any trace" of a Soviet base.

Classified by 000073  
Automatically declassified  
on 09/26/1999



16 JULY 1975

- 9 -

TASS dismissed the REPUBLICA issue as a "pretext" for the Socialists' latest "attempt to aggravate the political situation."\* TASS reported that "observers" in Portugal said that the PS action actually was based on opposition to the plan for popular assemblies, a plan which has "wide approval of the entire democratic public and trade unions." Suggesting PS isolation from the people, PRAVDA on 16 July insisted that Mario Soares and other Socialist Party leaders were "at variance with the will of the Portuguese masses" and must bear a heavy responsibility for "aggravating difficulties" rather than rallying to the support of democracy and social progress during "this hard period of the Portuguese revolution." More outspoken in its criticism, a Moscow radio Portuguese-language commentary on 11 July labeled the Socialist withdrawal "nothing but sabotage aimed at undermining the revolutionary transformation in the country" and asserted that PS actions were "just further moves by local and foreign reactionaries, who are trying to frustrate Portugal's advance along the path of socialist democracy."

A PCP "note" of 11 July, reported by Lisbon radio, also glossed over the REPUBLICA issue as only a "pretext" for the PS decision, which was said to be the culmination of the Socialist Party leaders' domestic and international activity aimed at the "division of the MFA and the setting up of a new coalition government of rightwing forces." Against the background of the government's precarious position following the withdrawal of the major party, the PCP insisted that a rightwing government would never be acceptable to the Portuguese people and that, should the present coalition "become unworkable," the only alternative would be "another government which will pursue the policy of democracy toward socialism already mapped out." Appealing to the PS rank and file, the PCP urged "Socialist militants" to note that their leaders' resignation was a "venture against the revolutionary process" which "gravely endangers the Portuguese revolution and their own party." As for the PCP's own role, the note denounced "slanders" accusing the Communist Party of seeking to take power and reiterated the PCP's "intransigent" support for a democratic Portugal in which "freedom of the press and freedom for political parties" would flourish.

---

\* REPUBLICA's fate has been hanging fire since 18 May, when communist-dominated workers refused to print the paper. The government's failure to enforce a Press Council verdict restoring the paper to its socialist owners, and the subsequent decision to "intervene" the paper and permit its publication by a new worker-controlled management board, represented a major setback for the Socialist Party. The REPUBLICA issue is discussed in the TRENDS of 29 May 1975, pages 10-12, and of 2 July 1975, pages 24-26.

- 10 -

## K O R E A

## DPRK MARKS ANNIVERSARIES OF TREATIES WITH PRC; USSR

PEKING Breaking with standard, past practice, DPRK media marking the anniversary of the 11 July 1961 DPRK-PRC treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance failed to characterize the treaty as defending "security interests" of the two countries. Pyongyang's downplaying of the treaty's security aspects places DPRK comment on the anniversary more in line with the tone of Chinese media treatment of the event for the past several years. This year both Chinese and Korean banquet speakers characterized the treaty as a symbol of the enduring nature of PRC-DPRK friendship, while eschewing references to the military nature of the alliance. Both Peking and Pyongyang marked the anniversary with routine banquets and press comment.

Unlike last year, the issue of U.S. troops in South Korea was not raised by Chinese speakers at the anniversary banquet in either capital. Banquet speeches by the Chinese last year touched on the issue of the U.S. troop presence in South Korea.\* This year the PRC ambassador in Pyongyang simply denounced the "U.S. imperialists" for "criminal obstruction" of Korean reunification, a charge not specifically made last year. PRC Vice Premier Chen Hsi-lien, speaking at the Peking banquet, gave Chinese support to the Korean struggle against "foreign intervention" and he predicted the inevitable failure of "U.S. imperialism . . . no matter what schemes they plot to create 'two Koreas.'"

MOSCOW Reflecting the cool state of Soviet-DPRK relations, both Soviet and North Korean treatment of the 14th anniversary of the 6 July DPRK-USSR treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance was even more muted than last year's subdued treatment. As in 1974, there were no reports of a rally in Moscow, and this year neither Soviet nor DPRK media reported that the usual reception had been held by the North Korean ambassador--an event both had reported last year. KCNA did not carry any DPRK press comment on the anniversary this year, and only briefly noted the Soviet ambassador's 3 July banquet in Pyongyang for the anniversary, without reporting any speeches.

\* As reported by KCNA, at the Pyongyang banquet the Chinese charge demanded that U.S. troops "quit South Korea at once." NCNA, however, had not reported this demand. For further details, see the TRENDS of 17 July 1974, pages 16-17.

- 11 -

## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

### PRC CONTINUES TO PUSH ASIAN "ANTIHEGEMONY FRONT" AGAINST USSR

Recent warnings in Peking media against Soviet expansionist intentions in Southeast Asia have contained a new element: NCNA has picked up Bangkok comment on the 1 July establishment of Sino-Thai diplomatic relations stressing the importance of an Asian "anti-hegemony movement" to "frustrate all schemes of the hegemonists." This goes beyond earlier reports in Peking media which said merely that the establishment of relations between the PRC and Southeast Asian countries would strengthen the unity and cooperation among the Third World.

Peking's current reportage is unusually explicit in portraying Chinese efforts to include "anti-hegemony" clauses in recent communiques with states throughout the Asia-Pacific region as an effective means to counter alleged Soviet ambitions to dominate the area under the cover of the Soviet-fostered "Asian collective security system." It also conforms with recent shrill Chinese warnings of Soviet attempts to expand its influence in the area following the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina,\* and it indicates China's intention to use the anti-hegemony issue to fuel its attempt to establish a pro-Peking East Asian diplomatic order in opposition to the USSR.

Recent NCNA reports of Thai comment focused on the antihegemony clause as "the most important thing" contained in the 1 July joint communique. NCNA on the 4th quoted a Thai editorial applauding the Sino-Thai joint statement because it had "further strengthened" "the antihegemony front." After duly warning against "intensified Soviet expansion in Southeast Asia," NCNA cited the Thai editorial's observation that "the surest guarantee for security and peace in Southeast Asia" is to "reinforce the antihegemony movement" in the area.

Peking reports of Thai comment on 9 and 10 July depicted the Sino-Thai communique, as well as Peking's proposed inclusion of the antihegemony clause in its planned peace treaty with Japan, as an effective rebuff to Soviet attempts to meddle in Asian affairs and use the Soviet Asian collective security proposal to dominate the continent. The articles warned that Asians must

---

\* For example, see the discussion of Chinese warnings against the USSR during the Thai Prime Minister's recent visit to China in the TRENDS of 2 July 1975, pages 13-14.

- 12 -

be more wary of Soviet intentions in the wake of the U.S. pullback from the area, and they portrayed Peking's establishment of relations with Thailand as "beneficial to the security and peace in the region" because this had caused the USSR, "seeking hegemony everywhere," to become "greatly panic-stricken."

BACKGROUND ON "ANTIHEGEMONY" Peking thus far has included the antihegemony clause in joint communique signed with the United States, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, and it is attempting to include the clause in its proposed peace treaty with Japan. The clause states that the countries are opposed "to any attempt by any country or group of countries to establish hegemony or create spheres of influence in any part of the world." Moscow has publicly warned that Peking is using the clause to establish anti-Soviet feeling in Asia.



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

16 JULY 1975

- 13 -

## PEKING NOTES PLANNED EUROPE SUMMIT, WARNS OF SOVIET THREAT

While acknowledging that recent East-West agreements apparently will produce the summit-level European Security Conference (CSCE) long sought by Moscow, current Peking comment stresses that this in no way reduces the Soviet threat to Europe. Chinese media at the same time have muffled past criticism of the U.S. role in the CSCE negotiations, which Peking has long opposed. Peking media have denounced the planned summit as an "illusive deception" fostered by Moscow, have strongly supported the efforts of small and medium-sized countries to protect their interests against Soviet ambitions at the conference, and have stridently warned that Moscow's mouthings about "detente" have not reduced the Soviet threat to Europe.

Current Peking comment treating the CSCE issue recalls earlier practice in warning the small and medium-sized European states that the CSCE was contrary to their best interests, while supporting their demands upon the major powers. But recent comment has dropped previously customary charges against the United States, while focusing on Moscow as the main danger to Europe. For example, a signed article in the 12 July PEOPLE'S DAILY by prominent foreign affairs commentator Mei Ou warned that Moscow wanted to use the European summit to consolidate its East European "empire" and make it a base for further expansion in West Europe at the expense of U.S. interests. Avoiding reference to the U.S. military presence in Europe and to NATO, the article denounced Moscow for increasing its forces in Europe, improving its weapons, and launching frequent military exercises there. Underlining Peking's carefully differentiated approach to the two superpowers, the article repeatedly used the term "Soviet revisionism," while consistently referring to the "United States" without any pejorative epithet.

Similarly, a 13 July NCNA commentary hailed as a direct slap at Soviet ambitions Malta's recent demand for an agreement on reducing superpower presence in the Mediterranean Sea prior to the CSCE summit, but made only a passing reference to such an agreement's implications for the United States. And several recent NCNA reports stressed the growing Soviet threat in such diverse areas of Europe as the Danish coast, the North Sea, Portugal and Cyprus, while making several positive references to the United States as a necessary strategic bulwark for West European countries in resisting the USSR.

EARLIER PEKING COMMENT ON CSCE      When CSCE preparatory talks began in the fall of 1972, Chinese spokesmen had stressed that the conference represented a thinly disguised effort by both the United States and the USSR to settle European issues "behind the backs" of the European people. Peking had called for

Classified by 000073  
Automatically declassified  
on 09/26/1999

CONFIDENTIAL

- 14 -

dismantling NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of foreign forces as prerequisites for European security, and it firmly backed the interests of the small and medium-sized countries against both superpowers.\*

As the CSCE preparatory talks entered their second phase in mid-1973, Peking's line shifted in accord with the PRC's more positive view of U.S. forces in Europe and of NATO as keystones in Western efforts to check Soviet expansionism. From then until now the Chinese media have encouraged U.S. and West European determination on strategic issues against Soviet blandishments based on detente. Most recently, Peking applauded President Ford's statements at this May's NATO summit meeting that the United States would carefully scrutinize Soviet intentions at the CSCE and demand significant concessions from the USSR. Peking has dropped past calls for dismantling NATO and withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe, and it has muffled past support for small and medium-sized states' calls aimed at U.S. influence. The Chinese at the same time gleefully played up signs of East-West impasse during the two years of talks in the second phase of the conference, reflecting Chinese pleasure over Moscow's inability to strike a bargain with the United States that Peking saw as detrimental to its own international interests.\*\*

---

\* For a discussion of the Chinese line at the time of the preparatory CSCE talks see the TRENDS of 12 October 1972, pages 13-14.

\*\* Peking's coverage of President Ford's European trip is discussed in the TRENDS of 4 June 1975, pages 6-7. Peking's general line on the second phase of the CSCE is discussed in the TRENDS of 31 July 1974, page 13.

CONFIDENTIAL  
TRENDS  
16 JULY 1975

- 15 -

## VIETNAM

## STRATEGY OF COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE REFLECTED IN GIAP-DUNG ARTICLE

The analysis of the final communist offensive to seize power in South Vietnam, in the lengthy article jointly authored by DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung, provides some insights into the planning and direction of the campaign by Hanoi's military leaders.\* While the last half of the two-part article calls attention to the unprecedented strength of the Vietnamese communist armed forces, the article never comes to grips with questions about the future of this massive military force--whether it will be demobilized, or how its strength might be used to exert Vietnam's influence in Southeast Asia.

The straightforward account in the first half of the article of events leading up to the fall of South Vietnam leaves the impression that, while overall strategy for the final campaign had been formulated and prepared well in advance, the timetable of the communist offensive was predicated on the outcome of each successive major military action, rather than on any previously devised schedule. The redundancy of some of the material, presented first in the opening half of the article and reviewed again in theoretical terms in the last half, suggests the possibility that the two authors were separately responsible for each of the major parts, with Giap--as the leading Vietnamese communist military theoretician--drawing the general lessons set forth in the second half of the article.

Touting the capture of South Vietnam with characteristic extravagance as "the greatest and most glorious exploit in all the 4,000 years of our people's nation-building . . . and a fabulous achievements of the 20th century," the article gave prime credit for the military success to the leadership of the Vietnam Workers Party and only secondly cited the "compatriots and combatants throughout the country." Consistent with DRV propaganda since the fall of Saigon, the article virtually ignored whatever role in the campaign the NFLSV and PRG might have had as the ostensible leaders of the South Vietnamese revolution. Only passing reference was made to their part, in the introduction to the second half of the article.

---

\* The release and dissemination of the Giap-Dung article were discussed in the TRENDS of 9 July 1975, pages 9-10.

PLANNING, TIMING OF  
 COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE

In treating the opening of the communist offensive in the Central Highlands, the first part of the article was in basic accord with an earlier assessment by Hanoi's prominent but anonymous military commentator "Chien Thang" (Victor)\* that Ban Me Thuot, the target of the attack, constituted "a key strategic position" and that if it fell, the other highland provincial capitals of Pleiku and Kontum would be isolated. The Giap-Dung article introduced an element not discussed by Chien Thang, however, when it claimed that diversionary tactics were used by the communists to mislead the ARVN into thinking the attack would be at Pleiku and thereby causing them to neglect the defense of Ban Me Thuot. According to the Giap-Dung article, the GVN evacuation of the Central Highlands was foreseen by the communists as early as 13 March, the day after the capture of Ban Me Thuot, although by the article's own account ARVN troops did not begin their retreat from Pleiku and Kontum until the 16th.

The next major move in the offensive, as recounted in the Giap-Dung analysis, was begun "only a few days after" the conclusion of the Central Highlands campaign when "large attacks" were mounted in Military Region I. The preparations for these attacks had been completed by mid-March, and on the 19th, "before even the conclusion of the Central Highlands campaign," the decision was made to "annihilate" the Thua Thien-Hue defense system, the article averred. The decision to attack Danang came on 24 March, the article declared, when it was decided that the GVN's position there would be highly untenable after the communist capture of Hue to the North and Tam Ky to the South. The article said that the fall of Danang "pushed the enemy into a hopeless situation" caused by a decline in morale, organizational chaos, loss of equipment, and "bankruptcy of strategy and tactics."

Apparently about the same time the communists made up their minds to attack Danang, they were making the decision to launch an all-out attack on Saigon. This was supported by the article's assertion that "toward the end of mid-March, . . . we had already determined the ensuing direction of development, namely, toward Saigon-Gia Dinh." The ultimate decision, however, was not made until a few days later, specifically in the "middle of late March," when the fall of Hue was imminent and it was decided "officially," according to the article, to launch the Ho Chi Minh campaign for the capture of Saigon.

The article's description of the timing of the communist decision to press for a total military victory coincides closely with some rather abrupt changes discerned in Vietnamese communist propaganda

---

\* See the TRENDS of 7 May 1975, pages 3-5 for a discussion of the Chien Thang article.

Classified by 000073  
 Automatically declassified  
 six months from date of issue.

- 17 -

last spring. Toward the end of March and in early April, Hanoi and PRG media stopped promoting the possibility of a negotiated settlement with a government replacing Thieu, a proposition that had received strong backing until then.\* The Giap-Dung article underlined the communists' rejection of a compromise solution after this time when it criticized alleged U.S. and GVN efforts to "delay" the offensive, not only through military means but on the basis of undefined "cunning political and diplomatic tricks" that would "limit the complete victory" of the communist forces.

COMMENT ON U.S. ROLE, POSITION      Despite the earlier withdrawal of U.S. military forces from South Vietnam, the likelihood of renewed U.S. participation in the fighting was actively considered by the communist strategists and apparently rejected as not posing a decisive threat--judging by the article's attention to this subject. In the discussion in part one of the military situation following the collapse of military regions I and II, the author baldly contended that the United States was essentially "powerless" to do anything, "no matter how they might intervene." The argument made in the second half of the article also took the tack that renewed U.S. participation was unlikely--not because of U.S. impotence but because the United States recognized that the GVN could not be saved and that intervention would "only lead to even more ignominious defeat." Irrespective of the professed confidence that the U.S. would not reenter the war, the second part of the article acknowledged that preparations were made "to deal with such an eventuality," but failed to specify what they were.

Predictably, the article argued that the impact of the victory on the United States is farreaching. It claimed that this was the United State's "greatest military and political defeat," "a U.S. Waterloo" that will have "incalculable consequences for many years to come." The article said that the trust of U.S. allies had been "severely shaken" by the U.S. "defeat" and that this was causing "greater contradictions in the imperialist system" and accelerating its collapse.

---

\* The last known Hanoi media mention of the possibility of talks was contained in a 21 March NHAN DAN editorial; for the PRG, the last authoritative indication of a willingness to talk was presented by NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho in an AFP interview of 2 April that was transmitted by Front media on the 7th. The apparent change in the communist position on negotiations is discussed in the TRENDS of 16 April 1975, pages 8-9.

- 18 -

## COMMUNIST RELATIONS

## USSR SILENT ON PONOMAREV ROLE IN "DIRECTIVE" TO WESTERN CP'S

Moscow has predictably ignored French press reports claiming that alleged "Kremlin instructions" to West European communist parties on how to seize power were in fact based on a year-old article by CPSU Secretary Ponomarev, published in some editions of the June 1974 PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, the international communist journal. The "instructions," as reported last month in a "special edition" in Paris of the suspended Portuguese Socialist Party paper REPUBLICA, had prompted a flurry of Soviet reaction, including a 28 June TASS "refutation" calling the alleged instructions "nothing but a fabrication."\*

The June 1974 Ponomarev article, keyed to the fifth anniversary of the 1969 Moscow conference of communist parties, advocated on the basis of Chilean developments that Western CP's seeking to consolidate their revolutions should seize control of the news media and the army and form a new state apparatus. Ponomarev himself, speaking this month at a 4 July Kremlin meeting on the 40th anniversary of the Seventh Comintern Congress, touched only indirectly on the REPUBLICA affair in citing unspecified "worn-out fabrications and lies" as examples of the anticommunism and anti-Sovietism of "certain social democratic leaders, especially in connection with events in Portugal." He went on to declare that, while supporting the policy of alliance between communists and social democrats, the CPSU "strives resolutely to halt" such anti-Soviet actions by social democrats.

The French Communist Party (PCF) has demonstrated particular sensitivity to the REPUBLICA charge, which appeared as an insert in the 23 June newspaper LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS. PCF Secretary General Marchais, in a press conference reported in L'HUMANITE on 27 June, had denounced REPUBLICA's "Soviet directive" as a fake but went on to discuss the 1974 Ponomarev article, in which, he said, "a CPSU leader expressed a few personal reflections" following the Chilean coup. He insisted that "none" of the quotations used by REPUBLICA had actually appeared in Ponomarev's article. Indicating the implications of REPUBLICA's "forgery" for the PCF, he said that had the French party "not forcefully reacted against it, the publication of such a document could have led to complications in relations between our party and the French Socialist Party and helped to keep alive the attacks against our alliance."

---

\* See the TRENDS of 2 July 1975, page 27.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JULY 1975

- 19 -

Marchais also acknowledged that the French edition of PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM had not carried the 1974 Ponomarev article, remarking that it was viewed by the French party as "likely to obscure rather than illuminate" its struggle for power. Asked why the PCF did not publish Ponomarev's article at the time, Marchais responded that "it is generally known" that discussions are taking place within the international communist movement and that "some problems remain" which require further discussion. He added, however, that in order to demonstrate REPUBLICA's inaccuracies, the French CP had provided reprints of Ponomarev's article which would be available to newsmen as they left the press conference.

Classified by 000073  
Date 01-08-2001  
By 60322

CONFIDENTIAL

- 20 -

## NOTES

EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE PREPARATIONS: The Yugoslav media have provided the only communist-source confirmation thus far that a meeting was held in East Berlin 1-5 July by a working group charged with drafting a final document for the planned all-European conference of communist parties. Western reports claimed that the Yugoslav party delegation received support in its resistance to the Moscow-oriented draft document from delegations of the Romanian, Spanish, Italian and French communist parties. Belgrade's publicity for the meeting reflected a possible split in the LCY over the Yugoslav role in the planned conference. Thus TANJUG on the 13th reported an article in the weekly KOMUNIST denouncing a 9 July Belgrade TV program and the 10 July issues of POLITIKA, VJESNIK, and VECERNJE NOVOSTI for "impermissibly" altering the "official" TANJUG report of an LCY Presidium meeting on the 9th. The official report had said with regard to the LCY delegation's activity at the 1-5 July Berlin meeting that the Presidium "approved its work and confirmed its stands and views, especially" on the aims of the conference and the content of the final document. The alteration, which deleted the phrase "approved its work" in available reports in POLITIKA and VJESNIK, was said by KOMUNIST to reflect an irresponsible attitude by some papers' editors "that it is their right to edit and alter even official statements in their own way."

ROMANIAN BID FOR NONALIGNED STATUS: President Ceausescu publicly acknowledged on 13 July current Romanian efforts to obtain "observer" status at conferences of the nonaligned countries, such as the nonaligned foreign ministers' scheduled August meeting in Lima, Peru, and next year's summit conference in Colombo, Sri Lanka. Ceausescu's statement, carried by AGERPRES on the 14th, was in response to a question at a press conference during a visit by Austrian Chancellor Kreisky. Acknowledging that Bucharest "has indeed shown interest" in participating in nonaligned conferences, Ceausescu emphasized that Romania was asking only for observer status, rather than full membership, because of its position as a member of the Warsaw Pact. Although he indicated Romanian participation in nonaligned activities should take a limited form "until" the dissolution of the two military alliances, Ceausescu also seemed to leave open the option of seeking full membership in noting that "in the meantime the international situation will witness further changes and we shall judge accordingly how we should act in relation to these changes." Nonaligned charter member Yugoslavia has thus far withheld comment on the question of granting its neighbor observer status. On the other hand, Tito has publicly endorsed the March decision of the nonaligned countries' coordinating bureau to grant full membership to North Korea.

Classified by 000073  
Automatically declassified  
six months from date of issue.

CONFIDENTIAL



16 JULY 1975

- 21 -

DPRK ON NORTH-SOUTH CONTACTS: A 14 July KCNA report on the contents of a "telephone letter" to the South Korean vice chairman of the North-South Coordination Commission (NSCC) from the North's vice chairman, Cho Myong-il, appears to suggest that terms for resuming contacts between the NSCC vice chairmen are less demanding than the stiff preconditions for a formal dialog stated in a 3 July statement by the North's NSCC co-chairman, Kim Yong-chu. Cho said in his message that "we will meet with the Seoul side at an early date" if Seoul gave "assurances" that it would alter its "perfidious attitude," stop the "'anticommunist' and 'vanquish communism unification' rows and frantic war provocation maneuvers," renounce the "two-Korea's plot," and "honestly implement" the 4 July North-South joint statement. Cho omitted demands, made by Kim in his 3 July statement on the third anniversary of the 4 July 1972 North-South joint statement, that Seoul demand the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops and that it withdraw measures for "fascist repression" in the ROK as preconditions to reopening the North-South dialog. Contacts between the NSCC vice chairmen have been suspended since the North postponed the 11th meeting, originally scheduled for 30 May. The last plenary meeting of the NSCC, the third, was held in Seoul in June 1973.

CHINESE EDUCATION: Judging by recent provincial broadcasts reporting on local enrollment work to select students for higher education, the dictum that students should return to their original production units to engage in labor after graduation has been modified to permit fuller utilization of skills learned in the classroom. The new guidelines on job allocation for college graduates were reflected in a detailed 11 July Changsha radio report noting that all graduates of agricultural colleges in Hunan would return to their local communes after graduation, but that Hunan's colleges of medicine, education and forestry would practice "in part" the principle of "'coming from and going back to the communes.'" All other colleges in Hunan would just carry out experimental work in sending graduates back to their communes according to the "different needs of the rural areas." Anhwei radio on 12 July reported that local medical students would "partially practice the system of 'from communes, back to communes'" and it announced that liberal arts and science departments of the Hofei Industrial University would simply "test the system" at selected units. A more flexible system of job allocation for college graduates is in keeping with recent efforts to improve the quality of Chinese education, as it would tend to encourage qualified students to undertake training in technically demanding but heretofore unrewarding fields, thus speeding the training of vast numbers of "experts," particularly those in scientific fields, which China will need to realize its goal of joining the front ranks of the developed countries by the end of the century.

- S 1 -

## SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

### REORGANIZATION OF SOVIET AGRICULTURAL ADMINISTRATION UNDERWAY

With the recent dissolution of the Uzbek and Ukrainian ministries of state farms (sovkhozes) and signs that the Azerbaydzhani ministry will soon be abolished, the last of the five republic-level state farm ministries in the USSR will have been eliminated.\* This would appear to mark the end of the first stage of a reorganization and streamlining of the Soviet agricultural administrative system which CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev had called for in March 1974.

Under the general campaign to establish interfarm organizations since 1970, Brezhnev had encouraged a variety of approaches, allowing some areas to create separate interkolkhoz and sovkhoz organs and others to establish joint kolkhoz-sovkhoz organs. This extensive local experimentation from 1970 to 1973 greatly increased the number and diversity of administrative organs. However, in a speech in Alma-Ata on 15 March 1974, Brezhnev termed the prevailing structure of administration "too complicated" and called for a reorganization that would "insure a unified state line in all questions of agriculture" and coordination between agencies. He said further that the reorganization should "provide precise definition of jurisdiction and responsibility between various levels of leadership," help combine central planning leadership with local initiative, and eliminate superfluous administrative units.

Recently, Brezhnev's complaint about excessive complexity was clarified in a March 1975 QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS article by A. Yemelyanov, head of Moscow State University's department of agricultural economics and a frequent writer on agricultural policy. Yemelyanov urged a basically territorial system of administration--unified leadership of kolkhozes and sovkhozes in each rayon--and was highly critical of administrative separation of collective and state farms. Articles by other agricultural writers appearing shortly before Yemelyanov's article similarly attacked administrative separation of kolkhozes and sovkhozes. The thrust of these articles suggests that increased administrative integration of kolkhozes and sovkhozes is likely following the abolition of the republic sovkhoz ministries, but as yet there are no definitive statements from top leadership on future agricultural administration policy.

---

\* For background, see the Supplementary Article, "End of State Farm Ministries Accords With Brezhnev Policy," in the TRENDS of 26 March 1975.

- S 2 -

ADMINISTRATIVE  
EXPERIMENTS

During 1972 and 1973 Moldavia had been allowed to transfer administration of kolkhozes to elective councils of kolkhozes, the RSFSR had been permitted to establish a ministry for sovkhoses and a system of sovkhos trusts, the Ukraine transferred interkolkhoz organizations to the control of its councils of kolkhozes, while Belorussia, Tambov Oblast and some other oblasts were permitted to establish joint kolkhoz-sovkhoz associations. Characteristic of the atmosphere was a 5 June 1972 PRAVDA editorial praising a wide variety of new forms of agricultural administration (councils of kolkhozes, ministries of sovkhoses, specialized trusts, and many more) and encouraging experimentation.

In this experimentation, local authorities largely adhered to their traditional biases: the Ukrainians and Moldavians, long the backbone of the movement to create an elective system of "kolkhoz unions," established separate kolkhoz and sovkhos systems; the Belorussians and Estonians, longtime opponents of "kolkhoz unions," insisted upon joint kolkhoz-sovkhoz organizations. Two longtime kolkhoz union supporters, Agriculture Minister Polyanskiy and Brezhnev's agricultural assistant V.A. Golikov, have praised the Moldavian and Ukrainian systems, but Brezhnev himself did not firmly commit himself to either side, repeatedly praising both approaches in his public speeches.

SIGNS OF  
CHANGE

While Brezhnev did not care to choose sides, his Alma-Ata speech made clear his dissatisfaction with the administrative disarray, and Yemelyanov in his aforementioned QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS article interpreted Brezhnev's remarks as criticism of the existing system of separate administration of kolkhozes and sovkhoses and the subordination of sovkhoses and kolkhozes to different organs. In urging joint management of kolkhozes and sovkhoses in each rayon, Yemelyanov declared that "one of the important principles of the impending improvement of agricultural administration, in our view, should be creation of a unified organizational system of administration of kolkhozes and sovkhoses . . . ." Other signs of a shift in this direction had appeared shortly before, when articles by agricultural commentators I. Buzdalov and S. Semin in the December issues of QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS and ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE had also attacked administrative separation of kolkhozes and sovkhoses.

- S 3 -

The first actual move toward unified administration began in December 1974 with the abolition of the Georgian ministry of sovkhozes. This was followed by abolition of the RSFSR ministry in March 1975 and Uzbekistan's in April 1975. The Ukrainian ministry was not formally abolished but simply did not appear in the list of new government ministries announced on 6 July. The Azerbaydzhani ministry still exists, but is apparently slated for abolition when the republic selects its new government on 25 July: Minister S.G. Azizov was not among the deputies elected to the republic supreme soviet in mid-June.

The demise of the sovkhoz ministries represents a defeat for RSFSR Premier Solomentsev, who had bragged of the advantages of his republic's ministry; for the Ukrainian leaders, who had been first to establish such a ministry; for Gosplan First Deputy Chairman T.I. Sokolov, who had publicly lauded the creation of these ministries as a guide for the future; and probably for Polyanskiy, who appears to favor separate systems. It also coincides with a noticeable dip in Polyanskiy's fortunes. In March he was virtually ignored during the extensive celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the March 1965 CPSU Central Committee plenum on agriculture, and the book issued in honor of the anniversary, Along the Course of the March Plenum (Kursom Martovskogo Plenuma), carries articles by 42 officials, including two of Polyanskiy's deputies in the agriculture ministry--but none by Polyanskiy. The March anniversary clearly demonstrated that Central Committee Secretary Kulakov has replaced Polyanskiy as the spokesman for agriculture. Polyanskiy also fared worse than all other Politburo members during the April-May nominations of candidates for republic supreme soviet elections.\*

The present confused and contradictory patterns of agricultural administration can be seen in the systems existing in Moldavia, the Ukraine, the RSFSR, Tambov Oblast and Belorussia--the five most-discussed systems. A few other republics or oblasts have taken sides (Latvian and Georgian leaders supporting the Moldavian system) or introduced partial systems (Kazakhstan with special sovkhoz trusts or associations).

SEPARATE ADMINISTRATION      Moldavia has in effect established two separate sectors: 1) kolkhozes and inter-kolkhoz organizations (interkolkhoz construction associations, associations for mechanization and electrification of agricultural

---

\* See the FBIS Special Memorandum, "Variations in Republic Supreme Soviet Nominations," 12 June 1975.

- S 4 -

production, scientific production associations for production of livestock products, etc.) administered by rayon councils of kolkhozes and a republic council of kolkhozes; and 2) sovkhoses joined with agricultural processing plants in republic or union-republic agro-industrial associations or production associations for tobacco products, wine, vegetables and fruit, etc. Of Moldavia's 252 sovkhoses, 170 have been joined with processing plants, and 24 territorial agro-industrial associations (basically on a rayon scale) have been created, according to statements by republic first secretary Bodyul. The powerless councils of kolkhozes created in early 1970 were given executive powers over kolkhozes and interkolkhoz organizations in early 1973, leaving sovkhoses to the republic agriculture ministry. Since then various associations have been created to run most of these sovkhoses. According to Bodyul in a 31 May 1973 RADYANSKA UKRAINA interview, the agriculture ministry's rayon agricultural administrations have been reduced to small rayon agricultural departments.

Moldavia has come under fire from the Estonians and others for establishing mutually exclusive sectors, and recently Moldavia sought to remedy this political vulnerability by claiming that sovkhoses can join interkolkhoz organizations and that kolkhozes can join agro-industrial organizations. However, all Bodyul's statements indicate that this integration is still only in the talking stage. In an April 1975 KOMMUNIST article, Bodyul, while describing the agro-industrial system already established in the sovkhos sector, could only claim that "the conditions for agro-industrial integration now have begun to be created for the kolkhoz-cooperative sector also." A Kishinev conference reported in the September 1974 ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE indicated that there were serious legal problems preventing the kolkhozes, which are run by elected leaders, from joining agro-industrial associations made up of state-owned sovkhoses and processing plants.

The Ukraine established a ministry of sovkhoses in 1969 to administer its sovkhoses and placed interkolkhoz organizations under rayon and oblast councils of kolkhozes in June 1972, while leaving kolkhozes under the agriculture ministry. Thus, Ukrainian councils of kolkhozes do have some executive power (now administering 4,000 interkolkhoz organizations, according to Ukrainian Agriculture Minister Pogrebnyak in the 21 March 1974 RURAL LIFE), but not as much as the Moldavian councils. In the Ukraine, kolkhozes and sovkhoses thus are also essentially separated. Ukrainian Central Committee agriculture Secretary Borisenko indicated in the 28 April 1974 PRAVDA that the Ukraine's 214 agro-industrial associations included 231 sovkhoses and 225 plants--but only eight kolkhozes.

- 5 -

The few joint kolkhoz-sovkhoz agro-industrial associations have been organized mainly in one oblast (Krym), according to Ukrainian Central Committee agriculture section head V.I. Fedan, in a September issue of UNDER THE BANNER OF LENINISM. The Ukraine was criticized in a December 1974 QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS article by I. Buzdalov for this failure to integrate kolkhozes into agro-industrial associations. Thus, like Moldavia, the Ukraine is vulnerable on this point.

The RSFSR, after Solomentsev became premier in 1971, embarked on a course somewhat parallel to that of Moldavia and the Ukraine, but stressing new organs for managing the sovkhozes rather than new organs for the kolkhozes. The RSFSR established a large number of economically independent groups of sovkhozes (variously called production associations or trusts or firms), and after studying the work of the Ukrainian ministry of sovkhozes created an RSFSR ministry of sovkhozes in February 1972, as explained by RSFSR sovkhoz ministry official G. Kulik in the June 1973 ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE. This ministry administered the trusts of sovkhozes, while the republic agriculture ministry supervised the kolkhozes. Although Solomentsev and other RSFSR leaders had been lauding the results of their sovkhoz ministry system, they were apparently overruled recently and had to abolish their sovkhoz ministry in March 1975. Sovkhoz Minister I.P. Volovchenko was transferred to a newly created post of USSR deputy agriculture minister for organizing interfarm cooperation and the work of sovkhozes

**JOINT ADMINISTRATION** Tambov Oblast has followed a course contrary to that of its own RSFSR republic leaders. After establishing interkolkhoz associations in 1965, it changed to joint kolkhoz-sovkhoz associations in 1972. After Brezhnev praised the Tambov agricultural results at the December 1973 Central Committee plenum, Tambov's system received extensive attention in the press.\* However, the CPSU Central Committee censured the Tambov leaders in February 1975 for insufficient development of criticism and self-criticism, and since then Tambov achievements have not been given as much publicity.

Belorussia has also pursued the course of joint kolkhoz-sovkhoz associations. The clearest explanation of Belorussian policy was made by republic First Secretary Masherov in the aforementioned 1975 book issued in honor of the tenth anniversary of the March 1965 agricultural plenum. He stated that in 1972 Belorussia chose

---

\* See the FBIS TRENDS of 13 March 1974, pages 15-16.

the course of creating "kolkhoz-sovkhoz production associations" which now "function in each rayon." "During this short time," he wrote, "some of them have shown the undoubted advantages of this progressive form of management." These organs do not yet encompass all farms: as Masherov wrote in an April 1975 KOMMUNIST article, "practically all kolkhozes and a significant number of sovkhoses" belong to these associations at present. Belorussia, like other republics, elected councils of kolkhozes following the 1969 All-Union Congress of Kolkhozniks decision to create such councils, but statements by Belorussians indicate that these councils have been strictly limited to discussion, with all executive power retained by the agriculture ministry's organs.

Masherov initiated a new stage in Belorussian agricultural administration recently, borrowing some non-controversial aspects of the Moldavian system, while further pursuing a joint kolkhoz-sovkhoz system. After a two-day visit in Moldavia last October to study Moldavia's system, he warmly praised the Moldavians' work and on 9 January 1975 the Belorussian Central Committee and Council of Ministers adopted a decree approving some aspects of the Moldavian experiment. Furthermore, a 4 July 1975 Belorussian Central Committee plenum on agriculture heard republic agriculture secretary V.S. Shevelukha recommend a considerable reorganization of management of associations and livestock complexes. Borrowing on Moldavia's forms of agro-industrial associations, Belorussia will organize specialized republic associations for production and processing of vegetables, for administration of big livestock complexes, etc., according to the 8 July SOVIET BELORUSSIA version of Shevelukha's report. However, these will differ from Moldavia's in being mainly joint kolkhoz-sovkhoz associations and with most of them subordinate to the agriculture ministry. In fact, the agriculture ministry is to be strengthened rather than weakened under the new Belorussian system: special subdivisions are to be established in oblast and rayon agricultural administrations to manage interfarm associations, and the ministry's main administration in charge of interfarm associations is to be "significantly strengthened."

Estonia continues to administer both kolkhozes and sovkhoses through rayon agricultural administrations of the republic agriculture ministry, but republic First Secretary Kebin and other local agricultural spokesmen have been asking permission to establish a system of economically independent kolkhoz-sovkhoz rayon production associations. Estonian agricultural spokesmen have been openly critical of the Moldavian and other systems which separate kolkhozes from sovkhoses. Kebin has visited Moldavia twice (July-August 1973 and October 1974) and been given thorough tours of Moldavia's inter-kolkhoz system; but he continues to advocate the opposite approach.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JULY 1975

- S 7 -

PROSPECTS FOR  
INTEGRATION

The next move in agricultural reorganization has not yet been clearly indicated, but it will probably involve increased pressure to integrate kolkhozes into sovkhos-oriented agro-industrial associations. While Belorussian and Estonian leaders display increasing confidence in their integrated approach, Moldavia and the Ukraine, the champions of interkolkhoz organs, are coming under fire for failure to integrate, and recently they have appeared to be giving more attention to this problem. Despite this trend, Polyanskiy is continuing his support for their approach, using the occasion of the March 1975 meeting of the All-Union Council of Kolkhozes--which reelected him council chairman--to specifically praise the Ukraine for giving kolkhoz councils control over interkolkhoz organizations and Moldavia for giving councils control over kolkhozes.

Classified by 000073  
Automatically declassified  
on 09/26/1999



16 JULY 1975

- 1 -

## APPENDIX

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 7 - 13 JULY 1975

<u>Moscow (2733 items)</u>		<u>Peking (871 items)</u>	
Supreme Soviet Session	(--)	6%	Iraqi Vice President (5%) 7%*
Soyuz-Apollo Space Mission	(3%)	6%	Ma'ruf in PRC
China	(7%)	6%	PRC-DPRK Friendship (--) 4%
Mongolian Revolution	(--)	4%	Treaty 14th Anniversary
54th Anniversary			Romania (--) 4%
CEMA Council 29th Session	(3%)	4%	[Leaders' Message to (--) 3%]
Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister	(3%)	3%	Romanian Leaders on Floods
Williams in USSR			Japan (3%) 3%
			Guinea-Bissau Government (1%) 3%
			Delegation in PRC

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

---

\* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with Ma'ruf.