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Soviet Dissent and Its Repression Since the 1975 Helsinki Accords

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An Intelligence Assessment

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July 1985*

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An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
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**Soviet Dissent and Its Repression
Since the 1975 Helsinki Accords**

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Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 15 June 1985
was used in this report.*

Since signing the 1975 Helsinki Accords, Moscow has intensified its repression of Soviet citizens. The increase in repression occurred in large part in response to the upsurge in dissent that Moscow's signing of the Accords inspired. In addition, it probably was intended as a firm rebuff to what the Soviets perceived as US efforts to intervene directly in their internal affairs by making the easing of Soviet restrictions on human rights a condition for improved bilateral relations.

The Soviet regime was slow to crack down on the post-Helsinki spread of dissent. Shortly after the publication of the Accords in *Pravda* in August 1975, Moscow dissidents—ignoring KGB warnings to desist—began to organize a group to monitor Soviet adherence to them. By early 1977, dissidents in Lithuania, the Ukraine, and Georgia as well as in Moscow had established a network of Helsinki monitoring groups. The KGB allowed the members of this “human rights movement” to meet freely with Western supporters and even hold press conferences with foreign newsmen. Older, underground dissident groups, for the most part nationalist and religious in focus, also stepped up their activities in anticipation of receiving greater international attention and support. Dissident scientist Andrey Sakharov even appealed in writing to US President Jimmy Carter to champion the cause of Soviet human rights activists—and received a personal letter from the President promising to do so.

In early 1977, the Soviet authorities, increasingly aware of the extent of their dissident problem and Washington's willingness to press the human rights issue, cracked down hard on the Helsinki monitors, arresting such leading dissidents as Aleksandr Ginzburg, Mykola Rudenko, Yuriy Orlov, and Anatoliy Shcharanskiy. Aside from verbal attacks, however, the regime did not move against Sakharov, the most prominent Soviet dissident, and Jewish emigration was allowed to increase in 1978 and 1979. This mixed response may well have been designed to keep Western critics off balance and thereby allow for positive movement on bilateral issues of arms control and trade.

In 1980, in the wake of the Western condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent virtual suspension of superpower dialogue, Moscow dropped any pretense of concern with foreign criticism of its human rights record. Sakharov was exiled from Moscow and placed under house arrest, Jewish emigration was cut by half, and the Soviet security organs were allowed to move even more freely against dissident activists.

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Under its chairman, Yuriy Andropov, the KGB refined existing techniques of repression and developed new, more sophisticated measures to manage the dissident problem:

- Many of the most prominent dissidents were allowed or forced to emigrate.
- Others were arrested on criminal rather than political charges or confined in psychiatric hospitals.
- Induction of would-be Jewish emigrants into the military enabled the authorities to cite reasons of "state security" to deny permission to leave the USSR.
- The criminal code was revised to simplify the antidissident effort.
- Intimidation of Western journalists was stepped up in an effort to stop their reporting about the dissidents' lot.

By these and other measures, open human rights activity and nationalist dissent have been effectively repressed. Unofficial religious activity is currently the most vigorous form of dissent, but it, too, has been hard hit. Emigration has ceased to be a practical option for Jews and other minority peoples. Despite a recent small increase in the number of Jews permitted to leave the USSR, Soviet officials have indicated that they consider the era of large-scale emigration to be over.

To encourage dialogue with the West on longstanding issues of concern, General Secretary Gorbachev may make some minor concessions on human rights. His past and recent statements suggest, however, that no significant easing of restrictions on dissent is likely. Such actions could give his critics an issue on which to fault his performance and alienate even longtime supporters.

Although the "human rights" movement with its reliance on overt dissent has little prospect of recovery under current conditions, religious and nationalist dissidence, because it is so diffuse and difficult to control, is likely to reemerge. Religious believers have displayed an unusual willingness to take great risks in their efforts to worship according to their conscience. They also have developed an extensive clandestine network of activists and supporters from which to recruit replacements for arrested leaders. Nationalist dissidents have displayed similar tenacity, and regime actions on issues such as the regional allocation of resources and educational policy could spark nationalist tensions that, in turn, could stimulate nationalist dissent.

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**Soviet Dissent and Its Repression
Since the 1975 Helsinki Accords**

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The Ascent of the Human Rights Movement

The signing of the 1975 Helsinki Accords¹ by the Soviet Government gave new life to a moribund dissident movement.² Following the publication of the full text of the Accords in *Pravda*, discussion of relevant clauses on human rights, self-determination, and the free flow of people and information became widespread within intellectual circles, according to an emigre dissident (see inset for human rights provisions of the Accords). In May 1976, this ferment resulted in the formation of the Public Group for Monitoring Implementation of the Helsinki Accords in Moscow. Subsequently, branches were formed in Lithuania and the Ukraine (November 1976), Georgia (January 1977), and Armenia (April 1977).

[Redacted]

The upsurge in dissent was subsequently fueled by the international support that it aroused. In the United States, in particular, support for Soviet human rights activists came to enjoy a higher official priority than in the past. According to US Embassy reports, Washington's open advocacy of the dissidents' cause was viewed by some Soviet human rights activists as a potential shield against persecution.

[Redacted]

To judge from their public statements and actions, the Soviet activists monitoring the Helsinki Accords perceived themselves as apolitical defenders of the rights of citizens rather than as critics of the state. Citing the Accords and the other human rights declarations signed by the Soviet Government, they carried out their work in an open manner, signing names to documents, meeting freely with Western supporters, and even holding press conferences with foreign newsmen. Under the leadership of Yuriy Orlov, the Moscow Helsinki group brought together veterans of the

¹ The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), attended by 33 European nations plus the United States and Canada, was held in Helsinki in 1975 and addressed a wide range of security, economic, and humanitarian issues. Followup conferences were held in Belgrade in 1978-79 and Madrid in 1980-83.

[Redacted]

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² For the purposes of this paper, dissent and dissidence will mean deliberate activity by an individual or group that is designed to protest the policies of a given regime and bring about change in those policies. This definition does not encompass spontaneous mass activities such as riots or worker strikes.

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***Human Rights Provisions of the
August 1975 Helsinki Accords***

The participating states will:

Respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief for all....

Promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural, and other rights and freedoms....

Ensure that all peoples have the right to pursue their political, economic, social, and cultural development.

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Facilitate freer movement and contacts among persons and institutions....

Allow persons to enter or leave their territory temporarily to visit members of their families.

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Deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with applications of persons who wish to be reunited with their families....

Examine favorably requests from persons who have decided to marry a citizen from another participating state.

Facilitate freer and wider dissemination of information, encourage cooperation in the exchange of information with other countries, and improve the conditions under which journalists exercise their profession....

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Figure 1. Moscow human rights supporters, 1977

dissident community such as Aleksandr Ginzburg, Ludmilla Alekseyeva, Petr Grigorenko, and Yelena Bonner, who provided continuity for the group and valuable guidance to the younger, inexperienced activists. Anatoliy Shcharanskiy served as liaison between the Helsinki group and the Jewish emigration movement. Other group members included Aleksandr Podrabinek and Irina Grivnina, the founders of the Psychiatric Abuses Watch Group. Andrey Sakharov did not officially belong to the group but used his protected position and status as a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences to support its activities and publicize regime measures against its members.

The activism of the Helsinki movement encouraged established dissident groups and led to the formation of new ones. According to Soviet dissident contacts of our Embassy in Moscow, the dissident aid organization, the Solzhenitsyn Fund, was able to bolster its widespread network of activists to provide assistance to dissidents around the country. Also, an unofficial trade union, SMOT, was formed to defend workers in disputes with official bodies and to push for better worker representation by official trade unions.

In this environment of accelerated dissident activity, samizdat materials (protest literature written and disseminated illegally by individuals or groups) proliferated. Following the example of the most important samizdat journal, the *Chronicle of Current Events*, these publications reported the arrests and trials of

political prisoners and persecution of religious believers and ethnic minorities. Some groups concentrated their publishing efforts on subjects that Soviet dissidents had generally neglected in the past. The tiny Group for the Defense of the Rights of Invalids produced a large volume of samizdat that exposed Soviet discriminatory practices toward the handicapped. A small group of Leningrad women produced two feminist journals, *Zhenshchina i Rossiya* (Women and Russia) and *Maria*, that criticized the inability of the regime to correct the injustices from which Soviet women suffer.

The human rights movement enjoyed and indeed depended on a large foreign support network. Foreigners—newsmen, official visitors, and even tourists—channeled samizdat reports out of the country. This information was used to confront official Soviet representatives at international meetings. Western radio-broadcasts into the Soviet Union used this same material as part of their efforts to serve as a communications channel between dissident groups throughout the country and to provide an alternative to the official version of events for nondissident citizens,

Foreign supporters were also able to render vital material aid to dissidents who were often unemployed with families to support.

The Spillover Effect

The signing of the Helsinki Accords also gave new life to nationalist and religious dissent and the Jewish emigration movement. These sources of dissent long predated the rise of the human rights movement, but their leaders evidently believed that their groups could benefit from the increased international attention to the plight of Soviet dissidents that had been aroused by the activities of the Helsinki monitors. (See the appendixes for a more extensive discussion of nationalist and religious dissent and the Jewish emigration movement.)

The Moscow-based human rights activity had a significant impact on nationalist dissidents in the Ukraine and the Baltic republics. The Ukrainian and

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Lithuanian Helsinki groups were populated by veteran nationalist activists who used the Accords as a vehicle to promote local objectives. [redacted] the Lithuanian group also agreed to represent Estonian and Latvian interests at the request of leading activists of those republics. [redacted]

In the Baltic republics in 1977, nationalist dissidents not directly affiliated with the Helsinki groups formed an organization of their own—the Supreme Committee of the National Movement of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—that imitated the tactics of the human rights activists. [redacted]

[redacted] the Supreme Committee was formed to coordinate the activities of dissidents who intended to work within the system to obtain the rights promised to minority nationalities by the Soviet constitution. [redacted]

Religious dissidents also were able to capitalize on the publicity and foreign support generated by the human rights activists to gain international attention for their cause. [redacted] their efforts to attract such publicity also won them many Soviet supporters who were impressed by the boldness of the nonconformists in contrast to the subservience of officially regulated church groups. [redacted]

An early example of post-Helsinki activism by religious dissidents came in December 1976 when Russian Orthodox priest Gleb Yakunin and several associates formed the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights to report official persecution of believers. A similar group was formed in Lithuania in December 1978 by the Lithuanian priest Alfonsas Svarinskas. Later, some Ukrainian Uniate Catholics, led by activist priest Josef Terelya, formed the Initiative Group for the Defense of Believers' Rights to coordinate the activities of Uniates attempting to win legal status for their church. [redacted]

Pentecostals and other fundamentalist Protestant groups have also sought to take advantage of the international attention focused on Soviet dissent in the Helsinki era. In November 1980, according to dissident and Embassy sources, 30,000 Pentecostals staged a five-day hunger strike to bring their situation to the attention of participants at the Madrid CSCE meeting. [redacted]

The Jewish emigration movement had been perhaps the most active and well-organized branch of Soviet dissent in the few years before the signing of the Helsinki Accords. The new Helsinki-inspired human rights groups made a conscious effort to draw upon the expertise and enthusiasm of the Jewish movement, designating Anatoliy Shcharanskiy to serve as liaison with its leadership and recruiting Jewish refuseniks (Jews denied permission to emigrate) as Helsinki monitors. The well-established Jewish movement had less reason than weaker dissident groups to imitate the Helsinki monitors, but its members apparently believed that they could benefit from the increased international attention to Soviet dissidents that the activity of the Helsinki groups fueled. [redacted]

Soviet Reaction to Increased Dissent

The Soviet regime, which historically had reacted to incipient dissident activity with swift and harsh repression, was slow to crack down on the spread of dissent that its signing of the Helsinki Accords inspired (see inset). Moscow dissident Yuriy Orlov reported [redacted] that in the winter of 1975-76 the KGB was aware of his efforts to organize a Helsinki monitoring group and warned him not to do so. However, from May 1976, when Orlov's Moscow group was formally established, until early 1977, he and his associates were able to conduct their activities in an open fashion. By November similar groups had been openly established in Lithuania and the Ukraine, and by year's end religious dissidents—picking up on the tactics of the Helsinki monitors—were becoming more open in their dissent. [redacted]

There are several possible explanations for the initial tolerance of the spread of overt dissent. With the dissident movement all but dormant at the time the Accords were signed, the leadership may have felt there would be no significant reaction to them. The authorities may also have been playing a cat-and-mouse game, allowing the dissidents to organize to make it easier to pounce upon them all at once. The Soviets may also have deferred their crackdown out of concern for its potential impact on their relations with Washington during a presidential election year. In

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Early Dissident Actions and Soviet and Western Reactions

1975	August	CSCE Accords signed in Helsinki; published in Pravda.		Ethnic Germans demonstrate for emigration permission in Red Square.
	Fall and winter	Widespread discussion of Accords reportedly occurs among Soviet intellectuals; Yuriy Orlov and other Moscow-based dissidents begin organizing overt groups to monitor Soviet adherence.	April	Anatoliy Shcharanskiy arrested. Armenian Helsinki monitoring group founded.
1976	May	Yuriy Orlov and others found Moscow Helsinki monitoring group.	June	President Carter criticizes Soviet human rights abuses in report to Congress on CSCE implementation.
	November	Mykola Rudenko founds Ukrainian Helsinki monitoring group. Lithuanian Helsinki monitoring group founded. Both groups imitate the overt activities of the Moscow monitoring group.		US correspondent held in Lefortovo prison for three days for allegedly receiving secret information; allowed to depart USSR after release.
	December	Vladimir Bukovskiy exchanged for Chilean Communist Party leader Luis Corvalan. Orthodox priest Gleb Yakunin founds Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights.	July	Podrabinek's expose of Soviet psychiatric abuse, "Punitive Medicine," arrives in West.
1977	January	Aleksandr Podrabinek founds Psychiatric Abuse Watch Group. Andrey Sakharov sends letter to President Carter urging him to defend Soviet dissidents.	August	Supreme Committee of National Movement of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania founded.
		Georgian Helsinki monitoring group founded.	September	Sixth World Psychiatric Congress condemns Soviet abuse of psychiatry for political purposes.
	February	Aleksandr Ginzburg, head of Solzhenitsyn Fund, arrested. US correspondent ordered to leave the USSR (first expulsion since 1970). President Carter sends letter to Sakharov reaffirming support for human rights. Mykola Rudenko arrested. US State Department statement in defense of Ginzburg. Yuriy Orlov arrested.	October	KGB Chairman Andropov delivers speech asserting that the USSR has only a small number of dissidents, that they must be punished in accordance with Soviet laws, and that "efforts to interfere in Soviet internal affairs" conflict with detente and the Helsinki Accords. Belgrade CSCE Review conference opens.
			November	Baptist activist Petr Vins arrested.
			December	Vladimir Klebanov announces formation of Association of Free Trade Unions of Workers.
	March	President Carter receives Bukovskiy.		



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any event, throughout 1976, despite unprecedented overt dissent, the Soviet security organs limited their antidissident actions to low-level warnings and harassment. [redacted]

By early 1977, however, it was probably clear to the Soviet authorities that growing numbers of their citizens were perceiving Moscow's well-publicized signing of the Helsinki Accords as an indication that it would condone overt dissent. The regime's problem was exacerbated by the US decision to give public support to Soviet dissidents—a decision highlighted by President Carter's exchange of letters with Sakharov. In a series of actions clearly designed to signal that both dissent itself and foreign involvement in Soviet internal affairs had reached the limits of their tolerance, the authorities moved decisively against the human rights movement by arresting Ginzburg, Rudenko, Orlov, and Shcharanskiy. Other arrests were made as the year progressed, and a number of prominent dissidents were allowed or forced to emigrate. When these initial measures failed to bring dissident activity under control, the regime accelerated repression. A methodical pattern of arrests and trials, often accompanied by scurrilous propaganda, continued through 1978 and 1979. Moscow Helsinki group members, as well as prominent refuseniks and religious and nationalist leaders, were imprisoned. [redacted]

At the same time, the regime took no direct action against Sakharov, the Soviet Union's most prominent dissident, and Jewish emigration was allowed to increase. This mixed response may have been an attempt to keep Western critics off balance and allow for continued superpower dialogue on issues of Soviet interest while sending a clear repressive signal to the Soviet populace. [redacted]

After the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, Moscow dropped any pretense that it was concerned about foreign reaction. Probably perceiving that it had little to lose, the leadership allowed the security organs to move even more freely against activists and accelerate its rate of arrests. Most notably, in January 1980, Sakharov—who had condemned the Afghan invasion—was exiled to the city

of Gorkiy and placed under house arrest without being charged or tried for a specific crime.³ [redacted]

By late 1980, [redacted] morale in the human rights community was low, and activists were seriously questioning the wisdom of their open approach, which allowed the authorities to identify them so easily. By mid-1981, no new members were coming forward, and the few remaining dissidents were not asking for volunteers because it meant inevitable arrest for the new activists. By the end of 1981, the human rights movement had been effectively crushed:

- The four republic Helsinki groups were defunct, and the Moscow group had only three semiactive members.
- The Helsinki auxiliary groups—Psychiatric Abuses Watch Group and the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights—were inactive.
- Several dissident journals, including the *Chronicle of Current Events*, had been forced to cease publication. [redacted]

The other variants of dissent were severely affected by repression as well:

- In 1980 the Soviets cut Jewish emigration by over 50 percent, issuing only 20,340 visas. The downward spiral has continued, and last year's total of only 896 was the lowest since 1970.
- Dmitriy Dudko, a leading Russian Orthodox dissident, was forced to recant his views in a televised appearance in 1980 and subsequently withdrew from dissident activity.
- A fledgling cooperative group formed by activists from all three Baltic republics was crushed by arrests and forced emigration of members. [redacted]

There were several reasons for the human rights movement's inability to withstand the intensified crackdown. In addition to the strength of its adversary—the KGB—the movement also suffered from internal problems including the absence of a vigorous, [redacted]

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charismatic leader of international renown, lack of organization and dispersal of resources, and what proved to be an increasingly naive belief that foreign support would provide protection from regime repression. [redacted]

The Role of the KGB

The KGB has the primary responsibility for quelling domestic dissent. More than in earlier periods, however, the KGB has had to deal with leadership concerns over its international image. In response, under the leadership of its chairman, Yuriy Andropov, the KGB refined existing techniques and developed new, more sophisticated methods of repression, deemphasizing simple thuggery and making greater use of administrative and judicial means of containing dissent. The KGB's goal was both to get the dissidents off the streets and to keep them off the pages of the international press. [redacted]

Emigration and Exile. Many of the most prominent and effective dissident intellectuals and refuseniks were allowed or forced to emigrate. In our view, this tactic was designed to limit adverse Western reaction to the antidissident crackdown. Arresting such dissidents would have been the simplest means of stopping their activities. In prison, however, well-known dissidents might well have become rallying points for Western critics of Soviet human rights policy. Exile and emigration, moreover, were as effective as arrest in depriving the dissident community of its best known and most respected leaders. The KGB also used emigration as a carrot and stick—granting it as a reward for refuseniks (and sometimes non-Jewish dissidents) who kept quiet, while denying it to those who sought publicity for their cause. Examples include Lev Kopelev and Vasilii Aksenov, prominent intellectuals, who were allowed to go abroad in 1981 only to have their citizenship revoked later; Georgiy Vladimov, noted author and head of the Moscow chapter of Amnesty International; and peace activist Sergey Batovrin, who chose emigration over the threatened alternative of imprisonment. [redacted]

Arrest on Criminal Charges. Another technique employed by the KGB has been to arrest some dissidents on criminal charges rather than the more typical political charges, such as anti-Soviet behavior. This approach reinforces domestic propaganda that paints

dissidents as criminal renegades. Additionally, if the activist is unknown in the West, his plight may not come to the attention of concerned parties as it might if he were charged with a political crime. To support the criminal charge, the KGB recruits a victim and witnesses to the alleged crime, or plants false evidence during a search. In 1981, for example, refusenik Stanislav Zubko was sentenced to four years in labor camp for possession of a pistol and narcotics that [redacted] the KGB had planted in his unattended apartment. [redacted]

Rearrest [redacted] many of their colleagues, already in prison or internal exile, have been rearrested on trumped-up political or criminal charges and given another labor camp sentence before their initial term was completed. This approach keeps dissidents out of action and demoralizes their friends and associates. It befell numerous Helsinki monitors who otherwise would have been released almost simultaneously and who might have brought about a resurgence of human rights activity. Vladimir Skvirskiy, a SMOT activist, was arrested in 1978 for theft, rearrested in 1980 or 1981 on the same charge, and sentenced to one and a half years in labor camp. He was arrested a third time, for anti-Soviet slander, and sentenced in February 1983 to three years in labor camp. [redacted]

Confinement in Psychiatric Hospitals. The practice of sentencing dissidents to psychiatric hospitals has been a favorite KGB technique because the prisoner can be confined indefinitely without being charged. The late Aleksey Nikitin, for example, spent almost 11 years in psychiatric hospitals for defending workers' rights in the Ukraine. Although the technique had been common as early as the 1960s, it became more widespread in the years after the signing of the Helsinki Accords. International criticism of this practice led to the release of some victims (see inset), but in 1981 Amnesty International estimated that up to 1,000 persons were confined in psychiatric hospitals for political reasons. [redacted]

Inducting Dissidents. Drafting dissidents into the military is a technique that has been especially effective against Jews and Pentecostals wishing to

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A Successful Criticism of Soviet Human Rights Abuses

A rare example of human rights activity having an effect on Soviet behavior was the work of the Psychiatric Abuse Watch Group, established in 1977. Founding member Aleksandr Podrabinek, a medical technician, compiled a report documenting numerous cases of wrongful incarceration of political prisoners in psychiatric hospitals. Podrabinek's report was smuggled to the West and was instrumental in the World Psychiatric Association's (WPA) 1977 denunciation of Soviet practices and sparked anew the Western psychiatric community's debate over the possibility of forcing Soviet compliance with world standards in the field of psychiatry. The debate reached such a pitch that in early 1983 the Soviets withdrew from the WPA rather than be subjected to a minute examination of their methods and probable expulsion. Of the 22 victims of psychiatric abuse documented in Podrabinek's report, 14 were later released.

emigrate, because it delays emigration and enables the regime to cite reasons of "state security" to deny applicants permission to leave the USSR. Draftees who refuse to take the oath of loyalty are often court-martialed for pacifism or brutally assaulted by fellow conscripts to force them to denounce their religious beliefs. Young men who refuse to report for military service are arrested for draft evasion. In May 1980, four Baptist recruits were pressured by military authorities to take the oath of loyalty or face long prison sentences. One of the recruits had two brothers who had served prison terms for failure to take the oath. In August 1984, refusenik Aleksandr Yakir was sentenced to two years in labor camp for draft evasion, according to Embassy reporting.

Making the Crime Fit the Punishment. The practice of fine-tuning the criminal code to simplify the work of the KGB is not new in the Soviet Union. In 1966 Andrey Sinyavskiy and Yuliy Daniel were tried for violation of Article 70, which forbids "agitation or propaganda carried on for the purpose of subverting . . . the Soviet regime." The defendants asserted they had not intended to weaken the Soviet state by

sending their literary works abroad for publication. Seven months after the conviction of Sinyavskiy and Daniel, Article 190-1, which prohibits anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda but does not require proof of subversive intent, was added to the criminal code.

In the short period from September 1983 to January 1984, a number of additions and revisions were made to the Soviet legal code that broadened the criteria for determining a political crime and defining evidence in political cases. These changes gave authorities greater control over political prisoners. The change potentially most detrimental to dissidents was the addition of Article 188-3, which states that a prisoner who is accused of "malicious disobedience" of camp authorities and confined to "cell-type accommodations" ⁴ as a result may be sentenced to another three years in camp. This law simplifies the resentencing of prisoners by replacing a criminal procedure with an administrative one more easily controlled by camp officials. Under Article 188-3, the camp director need only interpret some action of a prisoner as "malicious disobedience," recruit a member of his staff as a witness, and proceed with the trial. Thus, political prisoners who attempt to continue their dissident activities while in labor camp by smuggling out reports of camp conditions and maltreatment of prisoners, staging hunger strikes, or circulating samizdat are automatically vulnerable to further prosecution.

The regime also revised Article 70 of the criminal code, which deals with anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, to prohibit "actions perpetrated with the use of financial means or other material valuables received from foreign organizations or individuals." This clause applies to a wide range of dissidents—refuseniks, religious believers, and members of dissident aid groups such as the Solzhenitsyn Fund—who receive vital financial and material aid from foreigners.

⁴ This refers to temporary detention in the prison, located in every labor camp, for even the smallest infraction of camp regulations.

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A revision of Article 77-1—on activities that disrupt the work of corrective labor institutions—added a clause that states that prisoners who “organize criminal group actions” or who “terrorize” fellow inmates will be punished by a sentence of three to eight years. This clause could be stretched to cover anything from a hunger strike by several political prisoners to a large-scale camp riot. Also at risk are religious believers who often evangelize fellow prisoners—activity that the regime has in the past labeled “terrorizing.”

[redacted]

A final change in the criminal code relevant to dissidents was the revision of Article 198-2—on willful abandonment of a residence by a person under administrative supervision to avoid supervision. Dissidents sometimes try to evade capture by going underground or traveling to another region. Now, any such attempt at evasion is punishable by one to three years of deprivation of freedom in addition to other political or criminal charges. [redacted]

Cutting Off Foreign Support. The Soviet authorities accompanied the crackdown on dissent with an effort to curtail dissidents’ contacts with their Western supporters. During the heyday of the human rights movement in 1976 and early 1977 many Western journalists in Moscow had close ties to the dissident community. The correspondents were well placed to report each act of official repression, with US journalists being the most aggressive. The regime responded with warnings in the press accusing some journalists of criminal activity and espionage, and one US journalist was expelled. When these warnings did not dampen the correspondents’ zeal, the authorities detained a US journalist in June 1977 for three days of interrogation in Lefortovo Prison in connection with the Shcharanskiy case. Although the Soviets gave the strong impression that he would stand trial, they apparently decided they had made their point and allowed the journalist to leave the country. [redacted]

Since 1977, the Kremlin has kept pressure on foreigners with occasional reminders that they can be held accountable for their actions while in the Soviet Union:

- In 1978, two US newsmen were summoned to appear in a Moscow courtroom on slander charges stemming from their coverage of nationalist disturbances in the Transcaucasus.

- In 1982, members of an official Canadian Jewish Congress delegation were beaten and robbed by unidentified assailants when they attempted to visit a Leningrad refusenik.
- In February through April 1984, at least 16 US and West European refusenik supporters, in the USSR on tourist visas, were expelled for “pro-Zionist activities.”
- In July 1984, two US Embassy officers were forcibly detained during a routine contact with a member of the Solzhenitsyn Fund. [redacted]

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Moscow also has suspended some communications services and disrupted others to hinder dissident links with foreigners, prevent Soviet citizens from being exposed to foreign influences, and keep information embarrassing to the regime from getting to foreign audiences. In 1980, the number of telephone lines to the West was drastically cut, and direct dial service was suspended because of “technical difficulties.” Soon thereafter, increased Soviet interference with the international mails disrupted postal deliveries in both directions. A few halfhearted attempts have been made to interrupt Finnish television reception in Estonia, but these have been unsuccessful. [redacted]

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Western Reaction to Soviet Human Rights Policies
The West European approach to Soviet human rights in the bilateral context is generally low key. The West Germans have been the most persistent in their efforts on behalf of ethnic Germans wishing to emigrate from the USSR, and West German leaders consistently raise the issue with the Soviets, even though they invariably receive a sharp rebuff. More representative of the type of “individualized” approach favored by West Europeans is the customary representation made on behalf of one or several specific cases. Many European heads of state have at one time or another indicated their support for Orlov, Shcharanskiy, and other selected individuals in official discussions with Soviet leaders. For example, the situation of Andrey Sakharov last summer prompted West German Chancellor Kohl, British Foreign Secretary Howe, and French President Mitterrand to make strong declarations in support of Sakharov during their 1984 visits

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Figure 2. Sakharov walking with doctor and psychiatrist at a Gorkiy hospital after his hunger strike, summer 1984

to Moscow. By confining their comments to specific cases, West European leaders seek to demonstrate their regard for human rights and support for the US position while minimizing damage to their ties to the USSR.

CSCE. The United States and Western Europe have also raised the issue of Soviet violations of human rights at the followup conferences to Helsinki, but such actions have not led the Soviets to comply with the human rights provisions. At the 1978 Belgrade CSCE Review, for example, Western governments insisted on a complete review of Moscow's lack of compliance with the 1975 Accords, but the Soviet side refused to allow any discussion of human rights. The result, in the words of the Belgrade concluding document, was that: "different views were expressed as to the degree of implementation of the Final Act . . . consensus was not reached on a number of proposals submitted to the meeting." The CSCE process, nonetheless, was preserved by scheduling the 1980 Madrid followup conference.

The troubled three-year Madrid conference eventually yielded positive, if symbolic, results on human rights, but only after considerable friction. Moscow

was on the defensive going into the meeting because of its military presence in Afghanistan. Its position deteriorated further after the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1980. Western recrimination on these two points resulted in a nine-month adjournment. After the session reconvened, the Western side cited numerous Soviet human rights violations and listed 65 individual dissidents who were victims of Soviet violations. The West called for inclusion in the final act of provisions for religious freedom, the right to form free trade unions, and improved working conditions for foreign journalists. The West also pressed for a followup meeting on human contacts (later scheduled for April 1986) and a meeting of human rights experts (held in May and June 1985).

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Moscow, in pursuit of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), apparently felt that a certain amount of Western tongue lashing could be tolerated if an agreement on CDE could be obtained. The Soviets did not take the criticism meekly, however, but charged the United States with trying to bring about the failure of the conference. Moscow ultimately accepted the human rights provisions and the two followup conferences on human contacts. But, in his speech at the concluding session, Foreign Minister Gromyko declared that interference in the internal affairs of socialist countries was "hopeless" and that the Final Act does not authorize anyone to act as "umpire" on human rights questions.

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The symbolic victory scored by the West at Madrid will probably have little practical significance. Moscow almost certainly will not comply with any of the provisions concerning religious freedom and trade unions. And, in the light of Soviet behavior at Belgrade and Madrid, the probability of meaningful dialogue occurring at the followup conference on human contacts is slight. To defuse Western comment immediately before the conference, the Soviets could make some cosmetic concessions such as releasing several prominent dissidents or resolving several long-standing family reunification cases. But at the meeting the Soviets are likely to adopt the same type of

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stubborn, uncompromising stance that they took at Belgrade and block any worthwhile discussion on human rights. [redacted]

Prospects for Future Dissent

There is little reason to believe that the current regime will be more responsive to human rights issues than past regimes. General Secretary Gorbachev, in his few public statements on the issue, has taken the standard Soviet line that human rights is an internal matter not subject to foreign meddling. During a visit to Canada in May 1983, for example, he maintained that existing Soviet legislation guaranteed equitable treatment of requests by Soviet Jews to emigrate. During his visit to Great Britain last December, Gorbachev's temper flared in response to a British official's question on human rights. Gorbachev's response was curt: "You govern your society and leave us to govern ours." [redacted]

While strengthening his grip on power, moreover, Gorbachev is not likely to ease restrictions in the sensitive area of human rights. Such actions might give his critics an issue on which to fault his performance and could alienate even longstanding supporters uncomfortable with any moves that might appear to justify Western criticism of the Soviet system. At the same time, with dissent at its lowest ebb in a decade, Gorbachev probably is under little pressure to adopt additional repressive measures. [redacted]

Gorbachev and his colleagues may make some concessions in the human rights area to give the impression of an openness to an expanded dialogue on issues such as arms control and trade—which have been linked in Western eyes to Soviet performance on human rights. Indeed, there is some evidence that, early this year, Moscow may have manipulated Jewish emigration for this purpose. Emigration increased slightly over the same period last year with most of the increase representing longtime Moscow refuseniks. This increase was widely publicized in the West, and, according to US Embassy officers, some members of the refusenik community also seem more optimistic now than at any time in recent years. Still, the repression of religious activists is continuing unabated, and labor camp conditions for imprisoned activists are worsening, [redacted]

Another move that Gorbachev might make to improve Moscow's image in the area of human rights would be the release of several high-visibility dissidents, possibly even Orlov or Shcharanskiy. Such a step, whether tightly negotiated or a unilateral gesture, would probably reap immense public relations gains with little real cost to Moscow. [redacted]

The regime is likely, however, to stonewall any explicit attempt to link human rights with arms control or trade as has been done in the past. Their experiences with the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments and the three acrimonious CSCE conferences have put the Soviets on guard against letting what they view as an internal national security matter become entangled in foreign policy issues and forums they may not be able to control. Moreover, the leadership may believe there is a good chance that US attempts to use substantive levers rather than public opinion to force Soviet compliance would not be supported by the NATO allies. The West Europeans are willing to condemn Moscow with rhetoric but shy away from economic sanctions, as was demonstrated when the United States tried to impose such sanctions against the USSR at the height of the Polish and Afghan crises. [redacted]

With no significant easing of repression in sight, the prospects for a revival of dissent in the near term are generally dim. Yet, because the strength of the different dissident groups and the impact of the regime's repressive measures on them have varied, some variants of dissent are more likely than others to re-emerge. [redacted]

The wholesale depletion of the ranks of open dissenters in the Helsinki groups almost certainly has persuaded dissidents of the necessity of underground operation, and precluded the reemergence of the "human rights" movement. Early on, members of the Ukrainian Helsinki group realized the cost of their overt activity and began to turn toward clandestine operation, according to Embassy reporting. The return to underground dissent probably will be accompanied by an increase in samizdat production. Though

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currently at a low level, samizdat is the logical vent for dissident views that cannot be openly expressed by other means during periods of harsh repression. [redacted]

The future seems particularly grim for Jewish emigration and dissent. Despite the recent small increase in the rate of emigration, Moscow's apparent decision to end large-scale emigration probably is not likely to be reversed. The regime has expended considerable effort over the last several years in getting the emigration-refusenik problem under control and appears unwilling to undo all its hard work for possibly fleeting bilateral gains. Moreover, the domestic consequences of allowing some minorities to leave the country while denying that right to others also works against a renewal of large-scale emigration. As the virtual cessation of emigration continues over time, the futility of seeking exit permission will discourage all but the most desperate Jews from even applying. Meanwhile, the unauthorized practice of Jewish cultural customs, such as teaching the Hebrew language, will continue to be prohibited. [redacted]

Religion and religious dissent, however, because they are so diffuse, will continue to be difficult for the regime to control. Believers in the past have shown that they are deeply committed and willing to take risks to be able to worship according to their conscience. Dissident religious leaders have been able to instill a significant degree of militancy and activism in their followers; attesting to this is the willingness of believers to endure daily official harassment and, increasingly, to risk arrest. This is especially true of Catholics and the Protestant sects that have engaged in wide-ranging dissident activity on a mass scale for many years. They have developed an extensive clandestine network of activists and supporters as well as some support among registered, nondissident believers, [redacted] It is this pool of nondissident believers that will provide replacements for those who are arrested. Russian Orthodox dissent, which is less well organized and has a less active base of support, probably will continue in samizdat channels as it has in the past. [redacted]

Religion's grassroots support is difficult for the regime to tackle. The failure of the previous antireligion efforts through propaganda, harassment, and the arrest of dissident leaders is reflected by the fact that

the regime has recently resorted to arresting local church leaders. At the same time, however, the light sentences meted out to local leaders reflect the regime's awareness that severe sentences are not always suitable for this particular problem. Although increased persecution will probably lead some unofficial congregations to register with the state and some individual believers may turn away from religious observance, in the past such tactics merely led to more underground religious activity. [redacted]

Nationalist dissent also enjoys an underlying strength that makes its recovery likely. Though subdued now, Ukrainian, Baltic, Georgian, and Armenian nationalism is never far below the surface. Economic constraints, unfavorable changes in nationality policies, or inept handling of local problems by Russian authorities could easily spark nationalist tensions among the populace. This tension might, in turn, stimulate dissident nationalism and even spark occasional outbursts of violence, as it has in the past. But, because republic security officials can be more relentless and severe than their Moscow counterparts, the likely method of operation for nationalists would be underground activity, including circulation of samizdat. [redacted]

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Appendix A

Soviet Nationalist and Religious Dissent in the Helsinki Era

Although less well publicized in the West than the activity of the Helsinki monitors, Soviet nationalist and religious dissent has deeper historical roots. It also touches upon issues with potentially broader appeal than those of concern to the intelligentsia-dominated Helsinki monitors in Moscow. As a result, it probably has been and still is viewed as more threatening by the Soviet authorities. [redacted]

Nationalist Dissent

Latent nationalism exists in virtually every republic in the USSR, but the formation of dissident groups and the publication of samizdat are not as widespread. During the period under review in this study, such activity was largely confined to the Baltic states and the Ukraine. Nationalist activity in Georgia and Armenia was channeled into the Helsinki forum, and in Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics Islam has been more important than national consciousness in shaping dissent. [redacted]

In the Baltic Republics. Estonia has a strong tradition of nationalism that affects all segments of society, and, in the Helsinki era, samizdat has been an important outlet for Estonian nationalist dissent. Samizdat journals have published numerous open letters to republic, national, and foreign leaders on topics ranging from reports of arrests to the detrimental effect of oil-shale exploration on the Estonian environment. Mart Niklus, perhaps Estonia's most prominent nationalist, was involved in many of these publishing activities as well as in efforts to coordinate dissident activities throughout the Baltic republics, until his arrest in January 1981. After Niklus's arrest, several samizdat journals were able to continue operation. [redacted] a major crackdown by the regime in 1983 and 1984 resulted in the arrest of several key dissident leaders and the curtailment of samizdat publishing. [redacted]

In Lithuania, nationalism has been as widespread as in Estonia and, at times, more violent. In October 1977, for example, armed force was required to disperse two nationalist demonstrations by Lithuanian

youths following Lithuanian-Russian sporting events. The Lithuanian national movement, however, apparently suffers from a lack of leadership and coordination. Over the last decade, [redacted]

[redacted] a number of groups have been formed with aims ranging from greater Lithuanian autonomy to total separation from the USSR; these groups, however, have quickly collapsed under KGB pressure and have been unable to give direction to popular hostility toward the Soviet regime. [redacted]

An unusually frank official acknowledgment of nationalist activity came in a 1982 speech by republic Second Secretary Nikolay Dybenko to the Lithuanian Komsomol Central Committee. Dybenko described a nationalist group formed in 1981 by a Komsomol member at a Telsiai high school that made public anonymous anti-Soviet letters before being discovered and disbanded in February 1982. According to Dybenko, similar groups had also been discovered in Kaunas, Vilnius, and several other towns. [redacted]

Even more so than in Estonia, samizdat has been an important force in Lithuanian nationalist dissent. The most important journal (other than the *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church*, discussed below) has been *Ausra* (The Dawn), established in 1975 to defend and preserve Lithuanian culture. Other relatively long-lived journals, such as *Perspektyvos* (Perspectives) and *Alma Mater*, like *Ausra*, have as their central theme the pursuit of an independent Lithuania. [redacted]

Latvia is the most Russified of the Baltic republics and the most tolerant of things Russian and Soviet. As a result, the vital grassroots sentiment that feeds national dissent in the other Baltics is lacking, and the Soviet authorities have been able to move against dissent with little need to worry about antagonizing the population. [redacted]

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Despite this lack of popular support, some Latvian nationalists have continued to struggle for independence. In June 1981, Juris Bumeisters and Dalnis Lismanis were tried on a charge of treason for their participation in the Social Democratic Party of Latvia, [redacted]. This underground party had contacts with supporters in Sweden and demanded Latvian independence from the USSR. Bumeisters was sentenced to 15 years in a labor camp plus 10 years of internal exile, and Lismanis was sentenced to 10 years in a labor camp. More recently, concurrent with the 1983-84 crackdown on Estonian dissent, the authorities carried out a similar campaign in Latvia that, [redacted] resulted in several convictions of members of the underground "Movement for the Independence of Latvia." [redacted]

An important development in Baltic national dissent has been the trend toward cooperative efforts by activists of all three nationalities. Because the modern histories of the three republics are similar, dissidents have seized upon the idea of combining forces to present a unified front to their common adversary. Early advocates of this approach were Lithuanian Viktoras Petkus, Estonian Mart Niklus, and Latvian Ints Calitis. Private discussions among such like-minded individuals led in 1977 to the founding of the Supreme Committee of the National Movement of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. [redacted]

[redacted] the committee was formed to coordinate the activities of Baltic nationalists who intended to work within the system to obtain the rights provided by the Soviet constitution to minority nationalities. The authorities, however, were quick to realize the inherent possibilities in such an alliance and moved immediately to crush the group. The three principles—Niklus, Calitis, and Petkus—are now serving long labor camp sentences. Similar cooperative activities—an earlier group and numerous samizdat efforts—have likewise met with quick reprisals. [redacted]

In the Ukraine. The Ukrainian nationalist movement has long been comprised of two distinct groups. In the western Ukraine, which did not fall under Soviet control until 1939, the main objective of the largely clandestine dissent is Ukrainian independence. The illegal but still functional Uniate Church, the repository of much Ukrainian nationalist feeling, has its

strongest following in this area. In the eastern part of the republic, which is more Russified, nationalist dissent is oriented toward cultural preservation and has attracted the support of well-known figures from the local intelligentsia. These dissidents stress the importance of defending the Ukrainian language, history, and culture from Russian encroachment. Although much of this activity is also clandestine, the public prominence of some participants and their greater access to the media have given them more publicity both at home and abroad than the West Ukrainian dissidents. [redacted]

The formation of the Ukrainian Helsinki group was an important step in the recovery of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, which had suffered from intensified repression after Ukrainian First Secretary Petr Shelest—a Politburo member—was ousted for nationalist offenses in 1972. The rapid destruction of the group, however, further aggravated the bleak situation of Ukrainian national dissent by removing yet another layer of activists. [redacted]

Ukrainian nationalist dissent has since been confined to scattered activity by individuals and an occasional short-lived group. In August 1981, for example, Nikolay Krainik was sentenced to seven years in labor camp and three years of internal exile for founding the "Ukrainian National Front," a group that allegedly had 40 members, had published several samizdat documents, and had advocated Ukrainian independence. [redacted]

Ukrainian nationalist samizdat production has been erratic, following the ups and downs of the movement as a whole. The *Ukrainskiy Vestnik* (Ukrainian Herald), a journal similar to the *Chronicle of Current Events*, catalogued the progress of Russification and chauvinistic behavior by state officials toward Ukrainians until three members of its staff were sentenced to labor camp in December 1980. Thereafter, the journal apparently ceased publication. At present, there is little Ukrainian nationalist samizdat. [redacted]

In Georgia and Armenia. National feeling in the Caucasus, particularly in Georgia and Armenia, runs

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high but has only rarely led to mainstream dissident activity. Several factors have accounted for this:

- Local authorities generally give their compatriots greater freedom of action than other national minorities are allowed and are more tolerant of “free enterprise” and corruption than in other republics.
- Georgians have taken to the streets in spontaneous mass demonstrations to wrest concessions from the republic leadership. Since 1978, there have been at least eight large-scale nationalist demonstrations in Georgia that the regime has responded to with conciliatory measures that hindered the spread of organized dissent.
- Armenians are traditionally more pro-Soviet than other national minorities because of their historic fear of Turkish aggression.
- Disillusioned Armenians, like the Jews, have had the option of emigrating from the Soviet Union, although that avenue has been severely constricted since 1980.

As a result of these constraining factors, the few dissident groups that have been formed have been small, ineffective, and nonthreatening to the regime.

[redacted]

In Azerbaijan and Central Asia. To judge from Soviet statistics on education, family size, and intermarriage among national groups, the native people of Azerbaijan and Central Asia remain culturally and socially resistant to assimilation with the European population of the USSR. For reasons ranging from the ethnic diversity of the local populace to their frequent lack of historical experience as independent nation states, nationalism in Central Asia and Azerbaijan has not been a problem for the Soviet authorities. Soviet media indicate, however, that, despite regime efforts, Islam continues to have a strong influence on the way of life in these areas, and, in the aftermath of the revolution in Iran and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the Soviet leadership apparently views the persistence of an Islamic consciousness as a source of potential problems. Numerous public statements by Soviet leaders demonstrate anxiety on this score. In

December 1980, for example, in an address to republic KGB officers, then Azerbaijan First Secretary Geydar Aliyev emphasized the need for tighter security measures on the Soviet-Iranian border, presumably to prevent Iranian Islamic fundamentalists from propagandizing in the USSR. Aliyev’s speech followed a tough statement by the republic KGB head warning that US intelligence services would attempt to use the situations in Iran and Afghanistan to influence Soviet Muslims. [redacted]

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The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, particularly in its early stages, appears to have aroused some resentment among Central Asians. According to Embassy reporting, riots took place at a Tashkent induction center, and spontaneous demonstrations against the intervention also occurred at the military commissariats in Issyk and Chilik, Kazakhstan. There also have been scattered reports that Soviet Central Asian reservists refused to fire on their Muslim brothers in Afghanistan and, on occasion, deserted to the other side.

[redacted]

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Despite the potentially disruptive influence of Islamic fundamentalism and the Afghan invasion, no widespread political or nationalist dissent among Central Asians is evident today. In contrast to the situation in the European USSR, there have been far fewer reports of dissident activity in Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Nonetheless, in 1980 a Soviet dissident told US Embassy officers he was in contact with “nationally motivated groups” in Kazakhstan, and a samizdat publication, *Sharqiy Turkistan Arazi* (The Voice of Eastern Turkistan), reportedly was circulating in Central Asia as of 1981. [redacted]

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In light of the inferior political and economic status of the Asiatic populace relative to the Slavic majority, Central Asia and Azerbaijan are potential trouble spots for the Soviet regime. A small native intelligentsia elite has emerged in each republic. These elites are seeking a greater participatory role in both republic and national-level policymaking, which their Soviet overlords may not be willing to relinquish. Issues such as demographic distribution, resource allocation,

How Many Believers?

Reliable statistics on religious participation in the Soviet Union are difficult to come by. Official Soviet estimates of the number of Russian Orthodox believers fall in the range of 30-50 million. Some Western observers believe, however, that the figure is much higher. The Catholic Church claims more than 2 million adherents in Lithuania, or two-thirds of the republic's population. There are also several million Catholics of the illegal Eastern Orthodox (Uniate) rite in the Ukraine. Of the Protestant sects, Baptists are the most numerous with at least 535,000 officially registered members. Exiled Baptist minister Georgiy Vins, however, maintains that almost half of all Baptist congregations are unregistered.

[redacted] there are about 33,000 officially registered Pentecostals, but Western estimates place the number in the range of 200,000 to 500,000. There are 45-50 million cultural Muslims in the Soviet Union, most of whom reside in Central Asia and Azerbaijan. There are about 2 million Soviet Jews.

[redacted]

and the "yellowing" of the Soviet military could cause friction between Moscow and the Central Asians. At this time, however, Moscow remains firmly in control.

[redacted]

Religious Dissent

Despite the best efforts of successive Soviet regimes, organized religion has not ceased to exist in the USSR. Over the years, antireligion campaigns and purges have taken a heavy toll with massive arrests of clergy, destruction of thousands of religious buildings, confiscation of property, and the enactment of laws restricting religious activity. Religion has survived, however, and in the Brezhnev era, when the regime slowed the pace of the antireligion campaign, religious activity and membership seem to have stabilized.

[redacted]

The Russian Orthodox Church. The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) occupies a unique position in both Soviet domestic and foreign policy. At home it has the largest number of adherents of any religious group and is part of the dominant Russian culture. As under

the czars, however, the church organization is closely controlled by the state and is used to serve regime interests. This subservience limits its influence. In the foreign policy sphere, ROC spokesmen are important hucksters for Soviet propaganda initiatives such as the peace program. In return, the regime occasionally makes concessions to the church, such as the June 1983 return of the ancient Danilovskiy monastery. Such accommodation, however, reduces ROC credibility and prestige, and some evidence indicates that believers and recent converts sometimes switch to another denomination because they are offended by ROC "collaboration" with the state.

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Most ROC dissent stems from protests against the church's willing acquiescence to regime control. Religious critics of the ROC in the 1970s built on the legacy of earlier Orthodox dissenters such as the prolific samizdat essayist Anatoliy Levitin-Krasnov. The most prominent critics were Fathers Gleb Yakunin and Dmitriy Dudko. Yakunin authored a series of reports detailing specific shortcomings of the ROC. One of these papers was an appeal to a World Council of Churches (WCC) assembly that provoked the first discussion of Soviet religious persecution by that organization. Dudko preached sermons openly condemning the spiritual emptiness of Soviet life and accusing the ROC hierarchy of passivity in the face of increasing government repression. According to dissidents, as word of Dudko's frank commentary spread, hundreds of believers and intellectuals flocked to his small church just outside Moscow. Dudko and his supporters wanted to free the ROC from state domination and bring about a religious revival in the Soviet Union.

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Predictably, the authorities moved to repress the two priests and their followers. Yakunin was arrested and in August 1980 sentenced to five years in labor camp and five years of internal exile. In a televised appearance in June 1980, Dudko recanted his views and confessed to anti-Soviet activity. Dudko's recantation was a severe blow to ROC nonconformists and to the dissident community in general. At a time when the morale of dissidents reportedly was already very low,

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the public humiliation of a respected activist seemed to point up the futility of any type of dissident activity. [redacted]

At present, Orthodox dissent is all but inactive. The Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights sent a message to the WCC's 1983 conference stating that it was not defunct but merely waiting for more favorable conditions to continue its activity. Last fall, an Orthodox priest, Aleksandr Pivovarov, was sentenced to three and a half years in labor camp, becoming the latest casualty in the dismantling of a dissident ring that had disseminated Bibles and other religious literature. [redacted]

Catholic Dissent. The election of a Polish cardinal to the papacy in 1979 was an inspirational event for Catholics in the Soviet Union as well as for those in Poland. Although activist Catholics in the USSR have sometimes taken exception to John Paul's decisions,⁵ according to US Embassy sources, Pope John Paul II is viewed by Soviet Catholics as a strong ally. This perception was almost certainly reinforced by the Pope's ability to negotiate successfully with the Kremlin on church affairs. For example, in 1982 Bishop Vincēntas Sladkevichus, who had been in exile since 1958, was appointed Apostolic Administrator of the diocese of Kaisiadorys in the Lithuanian SSR. [redacted]

The Lithuanian Catholic Church (LCC) is the strongest and most vigorous religious body in the Soviet Union, enjoys the support of all segments of the population, and has a dissident history that predates the Helsinki Accords. Although most Catholic dissent in Lithuania is nonviolent, on occasion spontaneous violent incidents do occur. In 1972, a series of religious-nationalist demonstrations occurred after the self-immolation of a student in Kaunas. [redacted]

[redacted] the incident sparked two days of rioting in Kaunas and several months of youth unrest, including 10 other immolations, throughout the republic. The same year also witnessed the appearance of the first issue of the

⁵ The 1983 appointment of an aged and ailing Latvian priest as the only Cardinal representing Catholics in the Soviet Union was viewed by the Lithuanian samizdat journal, *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church*, as a favorable gesture toward "the passive and capitulationist stance of the Catholic Church of Latvia" and an attempt to ignore "the sacrifices, stubborn struggle, and resolute stance" of Lithuanian Catholics. [redacted]



Figure 3. Catholic religious pilgrimage to Hill of Crosses near Siauliai, Lithuania, 1979 [redacted]

Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church, a journal that has sought to promote greater unity among priests and laymen and strengthen their willingness to stand up to the authorities. [redacted]

In the Helsinki era, another important force in Lithuanian Catholic dissent has been the Catholic Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights, founded in November 1978. The Catholic Committee, headed by Father Alfonsas Svarinskas, has used samizdat to criticize Soviet discriminatory laws and practices. Its first major statement, signed by Bishop Sladkevichus and over 500 Lithuanian priests, was a condemnation of the official "Regulations on Religious Association," which, among other things, require a committee of nonmembers to oversee the activities of every congregation. Until January 1983, the group was untouched by arrests, probably because most of its members were priests. In that year, however, Svarinskas was arrested—the first time since 1971 that a Lithuanian priest had encountered such treatment. After Svarinskas's confinement in a labor camp, another member priest was sentenced to labor camp and several other members were persuaded to resign from the committee. The current status of the Committee is unknown. [redacted]

In the Ukraine, the Uniate Church, outlawed in 1946, still claims several million adherents who are also zealously nationalistic. The majority of practicing Uniates, preferring the safety of a nonconfrontational

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stand, have accepted forcible integration into the Russian Orthodox Church. A smaller group of Uniates, however, has a semisecret independent church organization with about 350 priests, [redacted]

[redacted] This group of Uniates has long petitioned the Soviet authorities to legalize their church. Although failing to secure legalization, the Uniates still attempt to worship according to their conscience, usually in secret services that leave them vulnerable to prosecution. The Lithuanian *Chronicle* reports that, in October 1981, two Lvov priests were found guilty of conducting illegal church services and sentenced to five years in labor camp, three years of internal exile, and confiscation of property. [redacted]

Baptists and Pentecostals. To judge from reports that have been smuggled abroad, the unofficial (unregistered) Protestant sects—especially the Baptists and Pentecostals—have attracted large numbers of rural, factory, and white-collar workers throughout the country in the past 10 years. In their efforts to avoid state regulation and protest their treatment at the hands of the Soviet authorities, unregistered Baptists and Pentecostals have formed action groups and established several important samizdat publications and printing shops. [redacted]

Baptists have produced the lion's share of all religious samizdat. The Church Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists (CCECB) and its offshoot, the Council of Prisoners' Relatives (CPR), have continuously published three journals for almost 20 years.

Bratski Listok (Fraternal Leaflet) is the "official" journal of the CCECB and sets forth its policy toward the official Baptist Church and the state. In addition, unregistered Baptists produce *Vestnik Istiny* (Herald of Truth), which exposes official persecution against believers and publishes some inspirational-theological pieces. The CPR produces a bulletin that includes regularly updated lists of religious prisoners. These journals are published by the Khristianin publishing house (see inset). [redacted]

Aside from petitions and letters to international human rights and church groups, there has been little Pentecostal samizdat. Pentecostals have instead concentrated on securing emigration permission from the regime. Though basically unsuccessful—fewer than a

dozen Pentecostal families have been given exit permission—the Pentecostal emigration movement has been publicized in dramatic ways. In mid-1983, two Pentecostal families were allowed to emigrate after seven members lived in the US Embassy for five years. [redacted]

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The regime's response to such activities has been an increased attempt to control unregistered Protestant congregations through a renewed emphasis on registration with the official watchdog agency, the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA). In a Soviet press article last year, for example, former CRA Chairman Vladimir Kuroyedov outlined the benefits of registration while criticizing local officials for "restricting the rights of believers." Less benignly, the authorities have lately been singling out for repression the leaders of unregistered congregations who are otherwise exemplary citizens. Last August, Yevgeniy Goula, deacon of a small Pentecostal congregation near Moscow and a popular leader who counseled moderation in dealings with the government, advising against emigration, and described by acquaintances as a "model citizen," was arrested for conducting unauthorized religious services. Goula, the sole support of a family of 10, received a suspended sentence. If believers do not register with the state, however, the authorities probably will become tougher. [redacted]

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The removal of CRA Chairman Kuroyedov last November may foreshadow a further intensification of the regime's antireligion efforts. [redacted]

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[redacted] Kuroyedov's removal resulted from his inability to curb youth interest in religion. His replacement, Konstantin Kharchev, who has experience in youth affairs, is said to be a man with especially strong antireligious views. Since entering office, Kharchev reportedly has assumed personal responsibility for the ROC and has taken an extensive tour of ROC dioceses in preparation for personnel changes at the diocesan level. He has also made a similar tour of registered Baptist Churches. [redacted]

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Khristianin Publishing House

The Baptist publishing house, Khristianin, was established in the mid-1960s by Georgiy Vins and CCECB Chairman Gennadiy Kryuchkov. In June 1972, the CCECB sent an open letter to former Premier Kosygin informing him of the existence of Khristianin, explaining that for several years they had requested Bibles and other literature and that when their requests were denied they decided to produce the publications themselves. Khristianin printing shops, as widespread as Baptists themselves, are built and operated by networks of believers, usually in their own homes. Vins estimates that Khristianin has produced about 500,000 religious books, including samizdat journals, Bibles, hymnals, and theological works. [redacted] some registered Baptist churches help support the Khristianin effort. [redacted]

The printing shops have been the object of numerous raids by the security organs. In February 1982, for example, in Tokmak, Kirgizia, six operators were arrested and 600 newly printed Bibles were confiscated. In what may have been a coordinated action, massive searches were also carried out in Tashkent and Vostochno-Kazakhstan oblast. Although KGB pressure on Khristianin has been intense, Baptists have proven extremely determined and resilient in their efforts to continue their publishing work. [redacted]




Figure 4. Homemade Khristianin printing press built and operated by unregistered Baptist believers [redacted]

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Islam. It is clear from the official Soviet press that in many areas of Central Asia and Azerbaijan there has been a revival of interest in the religious aspects of Islam in the past few years. Underground seminaries are educating unofficial mullahs who teach Islam to children in unofficial mosques. Soviet authorities have repeatedly criticized these practices in the media, calling them the "antisocial activity of religious extremists," and have intensified the teaching of atheism in schools. This relatively mild reaction suggests that although the revival is widespread it is not a mass phenomenon. [redacted]

In addition, the Soviet press suggests that there has been a minor resurgence of membership in secret Sufi brotherhoods, particularly in the North Caucasus. Such clandestine brotherhoods, which combine religious fanaticism and nationalism, led the great Muslim revolts against the early Soviet regime. [redacted]

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[redacted] there is widespread but diffuse anti-Soviet sentiment among Muslims that occasionally erupts in violent but easily containable incidents. To date, however, well-organized dissident activity by Muslims has not surfaced. [redacted]

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Appendix B

Jewish Emigration and Dissent


The Jewish emigration movement was perhaps the most active and well-organized branch of Soviet dissent in the few years before the signing of the Helsinki Accords. As a result, the new Helsinki-inspired human rights groups made a conscious effort to draw upon the expertise and enthusiasm of the Jewish movement. Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, as previously noted, served as liaison between the two groups, and a number of Jewish refuseniks were Helsinki monitors. Predictably, these activists were among the earliest targets of the KGB's crackdown—Shcharanskiy, for example, was arrested in 1977. [redacted]

Emigration. While arresting prominent Jewish dissidents and cracking down on other forms of dissent in 1977 and 1978, the regime allowed the rate of Jewish emigration to rise dramatically. By 1979, the rate had reached an alltime high of 50,460 visas issued. The reasons for the increase during a period of repression are unclear. The Soviets may have been attempting to sway the US SALT II ratification process. Moscow was also pushing for increased trade with the United States, and easing emigration may have been intended to forestall problems with US policymakers who had earlier linked trade and emigration through the Jackson-Vanik amendment. Or, more simply, the regime may have been clearing out the backlog of applications before cutting emigration. [redacted]

In any event, in 1980 the Soviets reduced the emigration flow. Only 20,340 visas were issued in 1980, and since then emigration has practically stopped. The 1984 total was only 896, the lowest since 1970. Legitimate family reunification has essentially become the only reason accepted for exit permission, and most of those approvals are for Jews with relatives in Israel rather than the United States. [redacted]

There is considerable evidence to suggest that Moscow made a decision in late 1979 or 1980 to dispense with emigration, including that of Armenians and ethnic Germans, as well as that of Jews. The 1980 high of 6,109 Armenians receiving exit permission was reduced to 88 by 1984. German emigration fell from 6,947 visas issued in 1979 to only 910 in 1984 (see chart). [redacted]

Figure 5
USSR: Emigration, 1973-84



^a 1981 Armenian emigration rate is an estimate.

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Statements by Soviet emigration officials and political figures indicate that these cutbacks reflected formal policy decisions. In 1982, Soviet emigration officials began telling applicants that "Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union has come to an end." In 1983, apparently to publicize this decision, the authorities established the Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public. Soviet officials also began implying to foreign governments that emigration had ended, even as a "gesture." In April 1983, Soviet CSCE delegate Sergey Kondrashev said that an increase in Jewish emigration was unlikely because past Soviet experience with such gestures had been unsatisfactory. In his January 1983 visit to Bonn, Foreign Minister

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Gromyko reportedly told German officials that, because so many ethnic Germans had already emigrated, the downward trend in emigration was "natural." He repeated this line to Chancellor Kohl, who visited Moscow last February. [redacted]

The across-the-board cut has been achieved by a series of bureaucratic measures designed to complicate the already cumbersome emigration process. Although family reunification remains a valid reason for seeking to emigrate, the concept of "family" has been gradually narrowed to include only spouses, children, and "perhaps" parents. The authorities have refused to honor invitations to emigrate from relatives abroad from former Soviet Jews living in the United States. Their justification has been that such Jews had achieved emigration under false pretenses and "forfeited" the right to invite relatives to join them. [redacted]

The existence of a large number of refuseniks—possibly as many as several thousand—as well as thousands of Germans still awaiting exit permission refutes the claim that all who wish to emigrate have done so. Potential emigrants nonetheless probably have been discouraged from risking their economic security, peace of mind, and possibly their freedom for a highly problematical chance at emigration. An informal Embassy Moscow poll of Armenians and Jews bound for the United States in late 1983 revealed that only 8 percent had relatives who were also seeking exit permission, compared with 20 percent in a similar 1982 poll. Thus, the proclamation that emigration has ended may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. [redacted]

Refuseniks. In addition to moving against Jewish emigration, the Soviet regime has intensified its repression of Jewish refuseniks within the USSR. To judge from the accounts of Soviet Jews, however, this repression often had unintended consequences. Jews who actively maintain ties with foreign supporters and those who attempt to foster a sense of Jewish cultural pride and group identity are harshly repressed. These activities nurture a sense of Jewish uniqueness and pride and keep emigration hopes alive, thus precluding assimilation. [redacted]

In 1982, authorities began to warn refuseniks who had been able to maintain ties to Western supporters to cease all contact with foreigners. According to reliable US Embassy contacts, refuseniks who ignored the warning have been visited by the KGB, had their homes searched and belongings confiscated, and sometimes have been taken away to spend a day or two in jail. This routine may be repeated several times until the authorities are satisfied that the refusenik is sufficiently intimidated. Occasionally, the authorities try the opposite tactic and promise some refuseniks emigration permission if they voluntarily "keep quiet." Aleksandr Lerner, a leading figure of the Leningrad refusenik community, for example, withdrew from action for over a year after the KGB made such a promise to him. The KGB, however, reneged on its promise. [redacted]

The regime's attitude toward refuseniks who attempt to perpetuate feelings of ethnic consciousness and group identity has gradually hardened over the past three or four years. An early victim was Viktor Brailovskiy, who had hosted the Sunday Scientific Seminar, a forum—sometimes attended by foreign scientists—that enabled refusenik scientists who had been dismissed from their jobs to keep current with scientific advances. In November 1980, Brailovskiy was arrested and in June 1981 he was sentenced to five years of internal exile. More recently, Iosif Begun was given the maximum sentence of seven years in labor camp and five years of internal exile for giving Hebrew lessons and lectures on Jewish history and culture. Begun's severe sentence reflects the tougher stand that has evolved toward refuseniks. [redacted]

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