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Algeria-USSR: Bendjedid Changes Course



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An Intelligence Assessment

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July 1985

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An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
and
Office of Soviet Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations.

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESAs,

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**Algeria-USSR:
Bendjedid Changes Course**

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Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 14 June 1985
was used in this report.*

Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid is trying to loosen Algeria's close ties with the Soviet Union. Since coming to power in 1979, Bendjedid has:

- Improved relations with the West, including the United States.
- Reduced the number of Soviet military advisers from 2,500 to about 800.
- Sought Western and US military equipment and technology to supplement Algeria's predominantly Soviet-made arsenal.
- Replaced pro-Soviet senior Algerian officials with men who are mostly Western in their outlook, tastes, and style.

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An overall shift in Algeria's ideological perspective coupled with an interest in diversifying Algeria's sources of arms are the major factors that will continue to weaken ties between Algiers and Moscow. The growing inadequacy of Algeria's Soviet-style economic institutions to meet increasingly vocal consumer demands is pushing the government to adapt Western business practices and to rely on private enterprise. Moscow's support of Bendjedid's rival after President Boumediene's death also continues to affect relations.

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At the same time, Algiers will need continued access to sophisticated military equipment at a lower cost than obtainable from the West as well as resupply and maintenance assistance. Algiers also believes a working relationship with Moscow supports Algeria's commitment to nonalignment. An Algerian decision to sharply downgrade ties to the Soviet Union would occur only if the Algerians believed they had developed secure enough military ties to the West to ensure its military needs.

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The Soviets have tried to slow the deterioration in relations with high-level visits, offers of sophisticated military equipment, and rhetorical support but have not offered concessionary terms. Moscow values the hard currency it receives from its military and economic sales to Algeria.

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Moscow also wants access to Algerian bases for its own naval and air forces but has received permission for only limited use. Excluding Western influence is a more realistic Soviet goal, and Moscow is unlikely to threaten to cut off military supplies to avoid accelerating Algeria's turn toward the West.

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Moscow may use the threat of expanding cooperation with Morocco and Libya to discourage Algeria from further improving relations with the West, especially the United States. Relations between Moscow and Algiers would be severely strained if the Soviets:

- Established significant military ties with Morocco.
- Provided Libya with a substantial quantity of more sophisticated equipment than Algeria currently has in its inventory.
- Acquired permanent basing rights in Libya. 

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Bendjedid's decision to put some distance between his government and Moscow has uncovered possible areas of mutual interest with the United States. Algeria is interested in US military training and equipment, especially avionics and transport and fighter aircraft. Algiers also is looking to the United States for aid in improving Algeria's agricultural sector and increasing the availability of consumer goods. 

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Commercial ties, however, are not likely to translate into consistent Algerian support of US foreign policy initiatives. Indeed, Algeria's policies will often appear contradictory and erratic as Algiers tries to maintain its nonaligned credentials as well as its role as an important participant in the Middle East peace process. 

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
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Figure 1



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Algeria-USSR: Bendjedid Changes Course

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Algerian President Bendjedid has found that the pro-Soviet policies that Algeria has followed since independence in 1962 have not met Algeria's needs. The Bendjedid government is taking steps to reduce Algeria's dependence on the Soviet Union and has made clear that its version of nonalignment includes improved relations with Western Europe and the United States.

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Factors That Influence the Policy Switch

Dependence on Soviet Military Equipment

A major factor that has contributed to Algeria's reevaluation of its relationship with the Soviet Union is Algiers's concern over its dependence on Soviet military equipment. In the late 1970s the Algerians assessed the military relationship with Moscow and concluded that the quality and sophistication of Soviet military equipment no longer were sufficient for Algeria's needs, according to the US Embassy in Algiers. This was reinforced by dissatisfaction with the lack of adequate training. Nevertheless, Algeria's desire to move ahead with an ambitious military modernization program prompted a \$3.4 billion contract with Moscow in 1980. Embassy sources in Algiers reported that the Soviets were the only major arms supplier willing to provide expeditiously the equipment requested. This deal included such items as MIG-23 Floggers, several regiments of SA-6 anti-aircraft missiles, T-72 tanks, a large number of BMP personnel carriers, and probably two Romeo-class submarines and five new missile patrol boats. In addition, the Algerians have received an SCC-3 coastal defense missile system and one Koni-class frigate.

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The 1980 arms agreement allowed Algeria to solidify its predominance in the Maghreb. These arms deliveries, however, make Algeria dependent on Soviet spare parts and equipment for a long time. In the five years that have passed since the Algerians negotiated the Soviet arms deal, Algiers has been shopping around for new contracts, according to US Embassy sources

in Algiers. When the Bendjedid government decides to purchase new military equipment, we anticipate that Algiers will deviate from past practice by considering Western equipment as well as Soviet arms. For example, the Algerians signed last year a \$1.9 billion contract for air defense equipment from France.

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
Problems of a Socialist Economy

Another important factor in Bendjedid's decision to put distance between his government and Moscow has been the emergence of basic economic problems that many Algerian officials attribute to a rigidly socialist economy:

- The highly centralized industrial sector has run into trouble. Modern business techniques, such as inventory control, production scheduling, and distribution have been poorly managed. Heavy industry has been favored over production of consumer goods, much of which are imported under strict government control. Domestic availability of such goods as automobiles, televisions, and refrigerators is low compared to demand, and prices are high. Growth of disposable income far surpasses availability of goods, leading to a thriving black market. Guaranteed wages and government disdain for private initiative have hindered productivity gains. As a result, production costs for locally made goods are considerably higher than imported products, and the utilization rate of existing industrial capacity, according to local observers, is only about 50 percent.
- The level of technology needed to develop the hydrocarbon industry is often beyond the capability of the work force, and this has fostered a reliance on foreign technicians.
- Central planning proved ineffective in matching production with demand, and, as a result, the output of the country's industrial sector has not met growing consumer demand.


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Figure 2. Soviet-built MI-24 HIND on display during 1 November Revolution Day parade last year.



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Figure 3. Algerians parade Soviet-built SA-6 surface-to-air missiles on 1 November Revolution Day last year.




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Figure 4. Soviet-built SA-8 surface-to-air missiles on parade at 1 November Revolution Day celebration last year.




- To industrialize the economy quickly after independence in 1962, Algeria neglected to develop the country's social and economic infrastructure, particularly agriculture, education, and social services. Neglect of water resources has led to a serious national shortage. The quality and availability of housing also are an increasingly thorny issue for the government, sparking recent civil unrest in parts of Algiers.

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The growing disparity in living standards in Algeria compared to the West and mounting pressures to provide jobs and meet consumer wants have convinced the regime to move away from centralized planning, according to the US Embassy. Although Algeria remains committed to socialism, particularly in the heavy industries, the Bendjedid government is encouraging private-sector participation in the economy by loosening restrictions on foreign investment and decentralizing the mammoth bureaucracy that runs the state companies. Emphasis has shifted from heavy to light industry, and the current five-year investment plan focuses on starting new projects in housing, agriculture, and education. The transfer of some public land to private farmers has been met with great enthusiasm.

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Close ties with the Soviet Union have generated fairly strong anti-Soviet attitudes among many Algerian officials, according to the US Embassy in Algiers. These attitudes have several causes, including a religiously inspired anti-Communism and negative personal experiences in dealings with Soviet officials. Although most senior military officers who make up the ruling elite have received training in the Soviet Union, US Embassy officers report that many often

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25X1 make anti-Soviet statements. Algerian officials privately observed to US Embassy officials that sending their countrymen to the Soviet Union for training has "inoculated them against Communism." [redacted]

25X1 Support for the Policy Shift

[redacted]
[redacted] Statements made by Algerian officials suggest that Bendjedid's second-term Cabinet is made up of loyal, like-minded men whose moderate, anti-Marxist instincts will further limit Algeria's relationship with the USSR. In our view, most senior military officers are eager to diversify Algeria's sources of arms, and the technocrats are convinced that national development requires rapid access to Western technology and a liberalization of Algeria's economic policies. We cannot identify any senior Algerian officials who advocate a return to the strongly pro-Soviet stance that prevailed under President Boumediene. [redacted]

We believe that at lower levels of the party, bureaucracy, and military, however, there are people who remain pro-Soviet. They will be critical of seeking closer ties to the West at the expense of Algeria's ties to the Soviet Union. In our view, however, Bendjedid and his colleagues are in sufficient control and have enough popular support to pursue their policies. [redacted]

25X1 Keeping Moscow Happy

25X1 Bendjedid's efforts to curtail Algeria's close relationship with the Soviet Union should not mask the fact that Algiers will continue to work with Moscow in several areas. Bendjedid and his advisers are not free to discard all of the radical policies of the past. The underpinnings of the regime are in the revolution and its anticolonial ideology, and these are still the basis for the leadership's legitimacy. We believe that, even though Bendjedid has no serious political competition, neither he nor his colleagues believe in tampering with Algeria's revolutionary heritage. As it cultivates closer ties with the West, the Bendjedid regime is especially sensitive to preserving Algeria's commitment to nonalignment. [redacted]

To this end, Algiers is careful to maintain the appearance of good relations with Moscow and has denied in public and to US officials that there has been any cooling of relations. Asserting that Algeria intends to have good relations with both superpowers, Algiers allows both Soviet and Western access to its ports on a case-by-case basis but refuses Moscow's requests to establish permanent basing rights or hold joint military exercises. The Bendjedid government also remains committed to participating in such Soviet-sponsored activities as the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization and Moscow's annual International Youth Festival. A fairly steady stream of low-level Soviet delegations passes through Algiers to discuss bilateral issues and sign cooperation agreements. The US Embassy in Algiers reports that about 6,000 Soviet economic advisers and technicians are participating in Algeria's development programs. Their access to the local population, however, is restricted. [redacted]

Despite the close military relationship between Algiers and Moscow, the Soviet Union has never been one of Algeria's major trading partners. According to the US Embassy, Algiers would like to reduce its trade deficit with the Soviet Union but has little to export other than wine and hydrocarbons, the latter of which competes with Soviet production. [redacted]


Moscow and Algiers do not cooperate on natural gas sales. According to US Embassy sources, Algiers has pleaded with Moscow for a united front on marketing natural gas in Western Europe but has been rebuffed. Algeria, which views Western Europe as the most logical area for it to expand natural gas exports in the next decade, has been unable to reduce the USSR's large share of West European gas markets primarily because of its refusal to lower its price and Western Europe's perception that the Soviet Union is a more reliable supplier. If Algeria cuts its price—unlikely at this time—competition for West European gas markets could become a contentious issue. [redacted]

Algeria continues to send some students to the Soviet Union for higher education and professional training,

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Figure 5
Algeria: Merchandise Trade With the USSR,^a 1974-84



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[Redacted]

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although its high-level technocrats are predominantly French-educated. Language problems and the generally low opinion of education in Communist countries contribute to a lack of strong Algerian interest in pursuing higher education there, according to the US Embassy in Algiers. Most Algerian students believe that a Western education will open up greater opportunities for them in Algeria, where French is still considered the professional language. Some students have turned down scholarships to the Soviet Union in anticipation of a scholarship in the West. This trend is likely to continue and even accelerate as Algeria looks more to Western technology for its development programs. [Redacted]

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Algiers has generally remained silent when it disagrees with Soviet policies. The Bendjedid government, however, has departed dramatically from the previous regime by repeatedly abstaining on the UN resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan rather than voting with Moscow. According to Embassy reporting, Algiers periodically criticizes the invasion in private to both Soviet and US officials. We

believe this attitude typifies the approach the Bendjedid regime will take on Soviet policies it considers contrary to its interests. [Redacted]

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No Partnership in Regional Politics

Preventing the intervention of outside powers in Arab and North African affairs has been one of Bendjedid's major foreign policy objectives. The Algerians are suspicious of Libya's ties with the Soviet Union and were extremely troubled by Qadhafi's public threat in March 1984 to give Moscow access to Libya's military facilities. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Algiers wants to maintain military parity with Libya and would view efforts by the Soviets to sell more sophisticated weapons to Algeria's neighbors as threatening regional stability. [Redacted]

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The Bendjedid government has not displayed concern over Moscow's ties with Tunis and Rabat. Algiers

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probably welcomes the recent increase in Soviet contacts with Tunis as enhancing Tunisia's nonaligned credentials. We believe that a Soviet military relationship with Morocco, however, would be viewed by Algiers in the context of the Moroccan-Algerian rivalry for regional leadership and would further strain ties between Algiers and Moscow. [redacted]

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We believe the Algerians do not want direct Soviet military involvement in the Western Sahara conflict. Algiers, however, would like Moscow to extend stronger diplomatic support for Algeria's position on the Western Sahara issue. An Algerian decision to request direct Soviet support for the Polisario conflict cannot be ruled out, especially if Algiers believes that such support might bring Rabat to negotiate a solution to the conflict. [redacted]

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The Bendjedid government has been gradually reducing the Soviet presence in Algeria. The US Embassy in Algiers reports that the number of Soviet military advisers has been reduced over the past five years from 2,500 to about 800. The cost of employing Soviet technicians in Algeria's armed services probably is becoming a burden, and the government probably believes these jobs should go to Algerians anyway.

[redacted]

The View From Moscow

Moscow has been concerned by Algeria's efforts to readjust its relationship with the Soviet Union since the late 1970s, according to the US Embassy in Moscow. We believe Algeria's interest in the West as an alternative supplier of military equipment has disturbed Moscow most, as this strikes at the very heart of the Soviet-Algerian relationship. Moscow probably believes that this could eventually lead to a loss of other benefits. At a minimum, we believe that Moscow wants to preserve its naval access to Algerian ports and air transit privileges as well as access to emergency maintenance facilities. The Soviets also

value the hard currency they get from economic and military cooperation. Moscow probably believes its image in the Third World and among Arab states has been enhanced by its generally perceived closeness to Algeria. [redacted]

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Since 1979 the Soviets have been trying to prevent further erosion in their position. They have made it clear that they want military cooperation to continue and demonstrated this by giving Algeria's arms requests special consideration, providing what they believed was an adequate flow of spare parts for existing inventories and trying to improve their contacts with the Algerian military. A visit by the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Gorshkov, in 1979 soon after Bendjedid's election probably led to the 1980 military assistance deal. In late 1983, Moscow sent then Soviet Armed Forces Chief of Staff Ogarkov—the highest ranking Soviet official to visit Algeria in two years—to dissuade Bendjedid from acquiring Western military hardware. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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The Soviets have also been annoyed by Bendjedid's efforts to pursue a more evenhanded foreign policy. Especially irritating were Algeria's active role in the release of the US hostages from Iran; its abstention on UN votes calling for withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan; its more conspicuously nonaligned stance than the other foreign delegates at the 26th Soviet Communist Party Congress; and its moderation and diminishing role in the Arab Steadfastness Front. [redacted]

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The Soviets recently have stepped up their efforts to reverse Algeria's turn to the West. US defense attache reports from Moscow state that the Soviet Union is making extra efforts to improve the supply of spare parts and to fulfill contracts and is leaving open the possibility of the sale of the latest version of the T-72 tank and additional combat aircraft. Moscow probably believes that too much time has lapsed since Bendjedid's last visit to the Soviet Union in 1981, and

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Figure 6. Soviet President Brezhnev welcomes Bendjedid during his only visit to the Soviet Union in 1981



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it would like to schedule an official visit soon. Bendjedid's visit to Washington this year will certainly cause the Soviets to press even harder for a visit. [redacted]

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Soviet attempts to influence Algerian politics do not come during arms negotiations but when Algerians need spare parts or maintenance equipment, [redacted]

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[redacted] last year, Moscow successfully protested the Algerian Navy's intention to replace the engines in its Nanuchka and Osa-class patrol boats with West German MTU models. New Soviet engines will be used instead. [redacted]

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We believe Moscow values the hard currency it receives from technical and military assistance and the few large-scale development projects it has in Algeria. Its concern over growing Algerian arms purchases from the West has not yet prompted Moscow to relax hard currency repayment terms. Last November [redacted] a deal to balance bilateral trade by selling oil to the Soviet Union fell through most likely for that reason. The Soviets have also been unresponsive to rescheduling Algeria's arms debt. [redacted]

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Soviet media coverage of Algeria suggests Moscow recognizes that future ties may be less substantial

than in the past. Instead of asserting unequivocally, as was once the case, that Soviet-Algerian relations will continue to improve, several articles have appeared since November 1983, which state that there are just "good prospects" for expanded relations. Algeria, however, is still grouped with Syria, the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), Libya, Angola, and Ethiopia as "socialist-oriented, non-aligned countries with which the USSR has good relations." [redacted]

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Moscow's desire for good relations with Algiers has not prevented the Soviets from seeking to improve its position with Tunisia or Morocco and Libya—Algeria's regional rivals. In our view, the Soviets probably hope cordial ties with Morocco will reduce the chances that Rabat would move closer to the United States or provide the US Central Command with facilities that could be used to project power in the Mediterranean region. [redacted]

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Consequently, Moscow has avoided involvement in the protracted Algerian-Moroccan dispute over the status of the Western Sahara. Although the Soviets sympathize with the Polisario's efforts to gain independence and have acquiesced in Algeria's transfer of

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Soviet-made arms to the guerrillas, they have not officially recognized the Polisario's self-proclaimed republic. The Soviet Ambassador in Rabat told the US Ambassador that Soviets did not travel through Western Sahara because the Algerians are sensitive to any indication of Soviet support for Morocco's position.

Libyan moves to gain influence in the Maghreb, such as the union between Morocco and Libya, have heightened Algerian fears and have placed the Soviet Union in the difficult position of supporting two adversaries. Although the Soviets have avoided public comment on the union, the Soviet Charge in Tunis told the US Ambassador in mid-September that Moscow is worried the union will further strain the frosty relations between Tripoli and Algiers and increase regional tensions. Moscow may also believe that the union could lead to closer ties between Algiers and Washington.

The number of high-level visits between Moscow and Algiers has increased since the Moroccan-Libyan union. In our view, Moscow was aware of Algeria's anger over the union and probably hoped to dissuade Algiers from improving its relations with Morocco's Western friends—France and the United States—who were equally disturbed by the union. The US Embassy in Algiers reports that little substance appears to have come out of any of these meetings.

Outlook

A sharp deterioration in Algerian-Soviet relations is unlikely so long as the Algerian armed forces are heavily dependent on Soviet supplies—which they will be for some time. We believe that Algeria's armed forces would begin to feel the effects of a cutoff of Soviet spare parts and maintenance in less than a year, severely weakening Algeria's security. Personnel would have to be trained on new and technologically

unfamiliar equipment, and any attempt to diversify suddenly would be accompanied by logistic problems. Moreover, the high cost of Western equipment probably would restrict the quantity the Algerians could purchase quickly.

Nevertheless, the Bendjedid government is committed to reducing Algeria's dependence on Soviet arms and is unlikely to change this policy even if the Soviets threaten to cut off Soviet equipment. We believe Algiers will continue to reduce the number of Soviet military advisers and technicians and will move ahead with its plans—already in progress with France and the United States—to diversify its sources of military assistance, concentrating first on naval and air purchases. Algiers almost certainly would tolerate inconveniences such as delays in deliveries of spare parts and maintenance equipment, a tightening up of payment schedules, and insistence on receiving hard currency payments that are likely to result from Moscow's efforts to dissuade Bendjedid and his advisers from turning to the West. Bendjedid is unlikely to approve longstanding Soviet requests for military base rights or to sign a friendship treaty with Moscow, which would be viewed by the current regime as compromising Algeria's nonaligned position.

Algiers will be cautious not to alienate Moscow or jeopardize its Soviet arms relationship as it develops ties to the West, particularly the United States. The Bendjedid regime probably is confident that Moscow will not cut off arms deliveries so long as Algiers does not try to dramatically change the relationship. Algeria almost certainly will continue to grant the Soviets limited access to Algerian ports as well as overflight privileges. Algerians probably will also refrain from publicly criticizing Soviet policies that they believe are peripheral to Algeria's interests, such as Soviet support for Nicaragua. Algiers may increase the number of low-level delegations and ship visits as a way to reassure Moscow that relations have not changed.


The Algerians would radically change their ties to the Soviet Union—such as expelling Soviet advisers or canceling Soviet port visits—only if they believed they had developed secure enough military ties to the West

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Figure 7
Military Deliveries to Algeria, 1980-84



^a Primarily from the USSR.

^b Estimated.

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to ensure their military needs. Excessive Soviet meddling in internal Algerian politics—highly unlikely at this time—or an alignment between the Soviet Union and Morocco could also provoke Algiers to downgrade relations with Moscow. The Algerians probably have looked closely at Egypt's experience in 1972 when Cairo expelled most of the Soviets and would want to avoid similar difficulties.

will limit the current regime's willingness to readjust its ties to the Soviet Union. Bendjedid's efforts to develop a foreign policy that encompasses these conflicting goals will result in a policy that often appears inconsistent and erratic. We can expect Algeria to continue to reflect a sharper anti-US position in the United Nations and in the press than Algerian policymakers adopt in private.

We believe Moscow would respond to such measures by slowing spare parts deliveries but would cut them off only if Algiers stopped repayment on its debts. The Soviets could also threaten to sell arms to Morocco, provided the Moroccans were interested. In Moscow's view, however, that might accelerate a closer alignment between Algeria and the United States.

From Algeria's perspective, closer cooperation with the United States will depend in part on how Washington responds to Algerian requests for military and economic assistance. As the Bendjedid government feels more confident in its relationship with Washington, Algiers is likely to be more willing to acknowledge publicly its cooperation with Washington. To show their good faith in enhancing US-Algerian military cooperation, Algerian officials escorted US officials through several vessels and the port facilities at Mers el Kebir earlier this year. The Algerian press

Implications for the United States

Algiers probably has not yet determined the extent to which it is willing to develop contacts with Washington. Algeria's need for Soviet spare parts, its commitment to nonalignment, and its revolutionary legacy

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covered Bendjedid's visit to the United States in mid-April in surprising detail, partly as a signal that US-Algerian relations will proceed despite Moscow's concerns. Algiers, however, was careful not to overplay the prospects for military cooperation.

Prospects for increasing US cooperation at the expense of the Soviets are good in some areas:

- The Bendjedid government has told US officials that it is particularly interested in obtaining US air training and equipment such as avionics, large transport aircraft, and possibly fighter aircraft.
- Partly to ensure against an interruption in Soviet military supplies, the Algerians have requested US assistance in modernizing and maintaining Algerian MIG-21 aircraft.
- In the economic sphere, Algiers is looking into agricultural assistance and developing a more formal mechanism for economic cooperation under a Joint Economic Commission established this year.

Algeria is more concerned with economic development, regional affairs, and nonalignment than with East-West issues. Bendjedid is likely to prefer the role of "impartial" mediator in most issues to that of taking sides with one of the superpowers. We believe Bendjedid's efforts to step away from Soviet policies in the Middle East and elsewhere have helped to bring Algeria into the Arab mainstream and improve Algeria's role as an effective negotiator between the moderate and radical Arab states. As a result Washington has gained Algeria's tacit support for some US policies in the Middle East. Although adverse developments in the region could inhibit the current dialogue, Bendjedid's strategies for pursuing regional stability and a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict are not necessarily incompatible with those of the United States.

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Algeria-USSR: Indicators of Change in Relations

We expect the Bendjedid government to maintain cautious but correct relations with Moscow as it pursues closer ties to the West, including the United States. Nevertheless, we have identified several indicators that we believe would signal a change in Algeria's policy toward the Soviet Union, either toward building closer ties or rapidly curtailing relations. These indicators are ranked from most significant to least significant.

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Algeria Grows Closer to the Soviet Union.

- Signs major arms deal with Moscow to include MIG-29 and other Soviet equipment not yet available to Eastern Europe or Cuba.
- Increases number of Soviet advisers in Algeria.
- Grants Soviet basing rights and access to Algerian military facilities.
- Signs a friendship and cooperation treaty with Moscow.
- Sanctions direct Soviet military sales to the Polisario guerrillas and a Soviet presence, such as military advisers, doctors, or teachers, in Tindouf area where Polisario are given sanctuary.
- Encourages Tunisia to accept Soviet military advisers.
- Restores legal status of Communist Party in Algeria.

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Algeria Moves Rapidly To Curtail Ties to Moscow.

- Expels most Soviet military advisers and technicians.
- Denies Soviet access to repair facilities even on emergency basis and denies Soviet overflights.
- Agrees to cooperate with other Arab countries to support Afghan rebels.
- Bendjedid consistently refuses to meet high-level Soviet officials.
- Prevents Algerians from receiving Soviet training.
- Increases public rhetoric against Soviet policies, including condemning Soviet presence in Afghanistan.
- Criticizes Soviet relations with Libya and Morocco.

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