



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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# Grenada: A First Look at Mechanisms of Control and Foreign Involvement

Interagency Intelligence Assessment  
Memorandum to Holders  
of NIC M 83-10021

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**GRENADA: A FIRST LOOK AT  
MECHANISMS OF CONTROL  
AND FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT**

Information available as of 7 August 1984 was  
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.

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## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
FOREWORD.....	1
KEY JUDGMENTS.....	3
DISCUSSION.....	7
The New Jewel Movement.....	7
The Coard Coup.....	7
Interworkings With the People's Revolutionary Government ..	7
Political Indoctrination.....	7
Relations With the Church.....	8
Relations With Labor.....	9
The Grenadian Revolutionary Armed Forces.....	9
Organization.....	9
Armed Strength.....	9
Armament.....	10
Factory Markings.....	10
The Ministry of the Interior.....	11
Havana's Influence in Grenada.....	11
Cuban Military Advisers.....	11
Cuban Use of Grenada.....	12
The Point Salines Airport.....	12
Growing Soviet Influence.....	12
Soviet-Cuban Cooperation.....	13
Dealings With Other Nations.....	14
Vietnam.....	14
Narcotics.....	14
Annex A: Original Key Judgments.....	15
Annex B: Interworkings of the New Jewel Movement and the People's Revolutionary Government.....	17
Annex C: Assistance and Type of Aid.....	19

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## FOREWORD

On 19 December 1983, the Intelligence Community issued an Interagency Intelligence Assessment, *Grenada: A First Look at Mechanisms of Control and Foreign Involvement*, which reflected the results of the initial exploitation of the documents recovered from Grenada after the invasion of 25 October 1983. The judgments noted therein were based on an all-source assessment of some 3,500 documents that had been processed at that time. This Memorandum to Holders of the IIA draws on the analysis of an additional 8,000 documents to provide further insights into some of the subjects previously covered and information on several new subjects as well. [redacted]

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Over 11,000 documents have been exploited to date; a few more may be forthcoming, but we believe the vast majority already have been reviewed. With the exception of those documents that must be exempted by Freedom of Information Act guidelines—probably less than 50 in all—the entire collection will be released to the public in the near future. [redacted]

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As we pointed out in the original Assessment, the documents reveal Grenadian perspectives; they do not contain Soviet or Cuban objectives with respect to Grenada. The documents do provide an appreciation of the New Jewel Movement's (NJM) motivations, strategy, and objectives as they applied to the consolidation of the Bishop regime's rule, and they show how the NJM sought to make itself useful to Moscow and Havana. The documents also illustrate in considerable detail the ambitious plans that Grenada's Marxist-Leninists had for subverting, with the support of Cuba and the USSR, not only Grenada but the Eastern Caribbean region as well. [redacted]

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Note: This Memorandum to Holders of IIA: *Grenada: A First Look at Mechanisms of Control and Foreign Involvement* was requested by the President. It was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. The Memorandum was coordinated at the working level within the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State. Also participating were the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. [redacted]

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## KEY JUDGMENTS

The exploitation of over 11,000 documents captured in Grenada has reaffirmed the basic judgments of the original Assessment:

- The New Jewel Movement (NJM) was dedicated to building a Marxist-Leninist society in Grenada and consolidating its own power.
- Cuba and the Soviet Union provided extensive political, economic, and military support to the Bishop regime, and by October 1983 had made considerable progress in turning Grenada into a center for further subversion in the region (see annex A for the original Key Judgments).

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The additional documents provide considerable detail on how the NJM sought to continue its growth by indoctrinating the populace and controlling events in Grenada through a series of mass organizations that covered every segment of Grenadian society. The NJM was aided in the development of these institutions by the Communist Parties of Cuba and the Soviet Union, which provided specialized training and advice to the NJM cadre. Nevertheless, the documents indicate that after four years of continuous effort to build support for Marxism-Leninism in Grenada through a variety of means, the Movement had failed in its efforts and was forced to rely on the personal following of Maurice Bishop.


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The documents show that the NJM's abiding fear of counterrevolutionary activity reached fever pitch after the bombing attempt on Maurice Bishop's life in 1980. The NJM reorganized and greatly expanded the counterintelligence section of the Ministry of Interior's Special Branch in order to try to preempt counterrevolutionary activity. Cuban advisers trained some agents on Grenada; others were sent to the Soviet Union or Cuba for more detailed studies. Graduate agents were primarily employed in gathering information on other Grenadians—the church, labor unions, and youth—but also kept a close watch on foreign visitors including the medical school students, and operated with Cuban intelligence agents in support of the Bouterse regime in Suriname and Tim Hector's leftist party in Antigua.


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The leaders of the NJM were obsessed by their belief that the United States would lead a counterrevolution against them. The Bishop regime based its military requirements on threat analyses that anticipated US-sponsored counterrevolutionary activity ranging from domestic


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terrorism to an invasion of the island by Grenadian and Cuban exiles based in Venezuela. The NJM planned on expanding the Grenadian armed force, which in mid-1983 had an authorized strength of 4,400 soldiers—including reservists and militia—to as many as 20,000 Grenadians, about 20 percent of the population. 


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Grenada received nearly 11,000 weapons and various military support equipment from Cuba and several Soviet Bloc countries in a series of deliveries between April 1979 and August 1982. Military equipment deliveries were handled with tight security at the highest levels of the NJM—the documents indicate that Maurice Bishop personally coordinated offloading procedures with Colonel Tortolo, the senior Cuban military adviser in Grenada. The Cubans carefully monitored deliveries and brought the armored vehicles ashore themselves under cover of darkness. 


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We have received a single unconfirmed report that an unknown quantity of arms was shipped from Grenada to St. Lucia in 1979, but have found no trace of such a shipment in the thorough records kept by the Grenadian custodians. However, between February 1981 and January 1982, 900 British rifles were either combined with other weapons on the rolls or dropped from the listings. 

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Our analysis of the factory markings on weapons recovered from Grenada has revealed new information on Soviet weapons production. The captured Soviet Bloc electronics, trucks, and armored vehicles were manufactured after 1980. Some recovered Chinese antitank weapons probably were delivered to Vietnam in the mid-1960s; weapons from the same batch have turned up in El Salvador, Guatemala, Lebanon, and Guinea-Bissau. 

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We believe that by 1982 Havana and Moscow had accepted the NJM as a reliable ally and had begun to exploit their relationship with Grenada when the US-led invasion terminated their influence. The documents show that Havana's relationship with the NJM was the more developed: Castro used the good offices of the Bishop regime to try to develop friendly leftist regimes in the Caribbean Basin and to help coordinate a regional voting block of members of the Socialist International; Havana also encouraged a relationship between Nicaragua, the Salvadoran insurgents, and the NJM for the mutual benefit of all parties. 

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We believe that, following the establishment of a Soviet Embassy in Grenada in 1982, the Soviet influence on Grenadian affairs began to approach that of the Cubans. The NJM placed a high priority on further enhancing its own stature with Moscow, but was hindered by Soviet bureaucracy and disinterest. Nevertheless, the documents confirm that

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[Redacted]

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the NJM was determined to prove itself worthy of Soviet support, and offered to establish Grenada as a means by which Soviet influence might reach the Eastern Caribbean, and considered Suriname and Belize as special targets for penetration. As reported in the original Assessment, the Bishop regime offered both Moscow and Havana military use of the Point Salines Airport, although neither was willing to provide the financial support necessary to complete the project. [Redacted]

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The documents show that the Soviets and the Cubans had worked closely to develop and support the Bishop regime, and shared common goals with respect to Grenada:

- Soviet projects were often preceded by Cuban feasibility studies.
- Grenadian officials passed through Havana en route to Communist Bloc capitals.
- Soviet arms deliveries were made through Cuba, and Cuban personnel were used to offload major shipments in Grenada.
- Nonmilitary goods shipped from the USSR and its allies frequently passed through Cuban ports. [Redacted]

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We are unable to judge from the available evidence whether Moscow and Havana had become competitors for influence over events in Grenada, or, in the aftermath, were simply trying to avoid blame for the demise of the NJM. While the additional documents shed no new light on events leading directly to the death of Maurice Bishop, [Redacted]

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[Redacted] and that competition for leadership of the NJM was the primary cause of its dissolution. [Redacted]

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Nevertheless, blatant courting of Soviet favor by NJM officials may have led to some reduction in Cuban influence, although the continued pervasive presence of Cuban advisers in most People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) offices remained a concern of some senior Grenadians. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Notes written by NJM officials during the Bishop-Coard dispute show that Havana reacted with surprise, alarm, and dismay to the anti-Bishop actions, but there is no indication of any response from Moscow. We do not know whether this Soviet silence indicated foreknowledge of the events, adoption of a hands-off attitude, or reliance on Havana to control the situation. After the US-led invasion, Havana did not adopt the Soviet line that alleged US intelligence involvement in the Bishop-Coard dispute, and [Redacted] lamented that Moscow had failed to join in Havana's attempt to mediate between the NJM factions. [Redacted]

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
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We have examined recent statements by former PRG officials who contend that Bishop's downfall was the result of his intent to adopt democratic institutions at the suggestion of Fidel Castro and against the wishes of Moscow. We consider them to be self-serving attempts to trade on Bishop's continued popularity to restructure the remnants of the NJM into a legitimate political party. 

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All evidence gathered to date indicates that the leaders of the NJM were not associated with drug dealings. They linked narcotics use and trafficking with counterrevolutionary activity in Grenada, and expressed their opposition to any dealings in drugs by maintaining a close surveillance over the few known users and dealers on the island. 

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## DISCUSSION

**The New Jewel Movement****The Coard Coup**

1. We have found no documentary evidence that sheds new light on events leading directly to the death of Maurice Bishop. There are, however, convincing reports that Bernard Coard had set in motion a plot to overthrow Bishop when Coard resigned from the Central Committee and Politburo of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) in September 1982 to "devote himself to his work as Minister of Finance." Coard spent little time in the ministry offices; instead, he gave most of his time to the behind-the-scenes political maneuvering necessary to undermine Bishop's position. Coard's scheme was disturbed by Bishop's successful trips to the United States and Eastern Europe in the spring and summer of 1983. A report from the Grenadian Embassy in Moscow found among the documents indicates that even this most pro-Soviet sector of the NJM hailed Bishop's meeting with the US National Security Adviser and State Department representatives as a diplomatic triumph beyond all expectations. Fearing that Bishop's popularity within the Coard faction might spoil his plans, Coard had his associates who controlled the Central Committee reinstate him in the Movement and create a joint Bishop-Coard leadership on 15 September 1983, a development that led directly to the demise of the NJM. [redacted]

2. Since the original Assessment was published, we have received a number of reports that Bishop—on the advice of Fidel Castro—was about to hold free elections, encourage the development of private enterprise, and attempt closer relations with the United States. We consider these reports, which cite recent remarks made by former NJM officials now attempting to reconstruct the Movement as a legitimate political party in Grenada, to be self-serving attempts to trade on Bishop's continued popularity. The Grenadian documents show that the primary purpose for Bishop's visit to the United States was public relations—to put the Reagan administration on the defensive by appearing to be reasonable and making the United States appear to be a bully. Other documents indicate that the Bishop-Coard struggle focused on

Bishop's popularity with the masses, his failure to retain control of key party positions, and his lack of attention to day-to-day party affairs. [redacted]

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**Interworkings With the People's Revolutionary Government**

3. The NJM and the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) were inseparable as evidenced by a large number of recovered documents including the minutes of the 3 September 1982 NJM Central Committee meeting that identified over 90 percent of the PRG and Cabinet combined as full members of the party. Maurice Bishop often made reference to the "NJM/PRG" as a single entity in his handwritten notes. Annex B further demonstrates the interactions of the party and government by showing the overlap of NJM and PRG positions held by the top Grenadian officials between 1979 and 1983. [redacted]

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**Political Indoctrination**

4. The documents show that the NJM placed a high priority on indoctrinating its members and the citizenry in Marxist-Leninist thought. The Soviet and Cuban Communist Parties provided the NJM with their expertise in forming mass organizations, conducting political indoctrination, and recruiting new members. Grenadian students in Moscow and Havana studied ideology, politics, and economics in preparation for ". . . party work among youth, women, farmers, teachers, and workers." Maurice Bishop's special request to Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov led to a three-month political training course in Moscow for Grenadian Deputy Defense Minister Chris Stroude in preparation for ". . . conducting political work in the armed forces." A high-level NJM delegation to Havana in May 1982 sought ways to apply the Cuban model for party work among the masses to building internal ideological support for the party in Grenada. [redacted]

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5. The documents show that mass organizations were the NJM's most frequently used form of spreading influence. Grenada's leaders established Parish Coordinating Bodies, a National Women's Organization, and a National Youth Organization in their

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attempts to convert the masses to the state ideology. In structure, tactics, and mission, these three organizations appear to have been closely patterned on their counterpart mass organizations in Cuba. The Parish Coordinating Bodies, the highest regional political organizations, were comprised of a series of zonal committees, each charged with monitoring the political mood in its base area, implementing government programs at the local level, mobilizing the masses, and "... carrying out the decisions of the party." The Women's and Youth Organizations were responsible for accomplishing similar tasks in their respective portions of society, and with recruiting prospective party and militia members. [redacted]

6. The NJM Organizing Committee carefully monitored and coordinated the use of all forms of communications to carry the party's message to the people of Grenada; Radio Free Grenada broadcast news and propaganda provided by Soviet and Cuban wire services, the local newspapers were censored by the NJM, NJM tutors taught political classes to groups of party members and to mass organizations, and party labor representatives conducted on-site political discussions as a part of the normal workday. Educating the youth received special attention in order that the future of the revolution might be assured. Notes taken by members of the National Youth Organization who visited Moscow and Havana indicate that the NJM was interested in methods to indoctrinate the very young. [redacted]

7. Virtually every individual, organization, and business that associated with the NJM were required to submit "workplans" of the author's annual objectives and methods for approval by higher party authorities. Although these plans were intended to establish a system of personal accountability, they became progressively less specific, and stated goals were rarely met at any level of the party. [redacted]

8. The documents confirm that the vast majority of the members of the NJM were themselves newcomers to Marxist-Leninist thought and spent a great deal of time in educating each other, as well as the general public, in the intricacies of Communist dogma. Whenever a party endeavor failed to reach its goal, "ideological crash courses" were instituted in the belief that a proper interpretation of doctrine and raising the consciousness of those responsible would lead to eventual success. [redacted]

9. New Jewel indoctrination efforts culminated in a flurry of activity from July to October 1983 as the party attempted to reverse its declining popularity and

rectify its internal leadership schism. As recorded in the documents, the final crisis was in part the result of a growing awareness among party leaders that the Movement had not capitalized on the potential of the mass organizations it had created. Not only had the indoctrination programs failed to popularize the Movement and secure a broad base of support for its programs, but the downward drift of the NJM's fortunes was most visible in the population's increasingly apathetic approach to attendance at group meetings and indoctrination sessions. For example, even though the National Youth Organization maintained the best record of attendance among the mass organizations, 21 of its 86 youth groups did not meet in March or April 1982; a year later, only 25 percent of its membership attended those meetings that were held. [redacted]

#### Relations With the Church

10. Recovered minutes of NJM meetings indicate that the Movement's leaders believed the church to be its most formidable domestic foe. Over 75 percent of the population had been educated in church-operated private schools and remained active churchgoers. The church competed with the NJM's organizing and indoctrinating efforts, and preached against Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Church leaders were considered to be active counterrevolutionaries who used their pulpits to complain about NJM human rights violations, censorship of church newsletters, and recruitment of children into the militia. The NJM directed the "Special Branch" of the Ministry of the Interior to monitor all sermons, maintain surveillance over church leaders and those with whom they regularly dealt, and tap the telephones of the leading churches. Intelligence reports prepared by Major Keith Roberts, head of the Special Branch, during the March-July 1983 time frame indicate that the four principal churches in Grenada—the Roman Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, the Seventh Day Adventist Church, and the Methodist Church—were considered "... a threat to the revolution" and the "... main churches against whom our work is directed," but urged caution because "... churches thrive on persecution." [redacted]

11. In October 1982, a Cuban delegation headed by Aurelio Alonzo Tejada of the America Department of the Cuban Communist Party visited Grenada for the purpose of evaluating the conflict between the NJM and the church. In a recovered document written in Spanish, the delegation concluded that, although the NJM perceived church bodies as adopting aggressive

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positions, the situation had not reached the critical point of open confrontation. The delegation made several recommendations to the NJM that included:

- Appointing a comrade to be responsible for religious matters.
- Training the comrade in Cuba.
- Inviting Grenadian laity and clergymen to visit Cuba.
- Promoting contacts among Grenadians, Nicaraguans, and other Latin American laity and clergymen.
- Passing information among the NJM, the Cuban Communist Party, and the FSLN of Nicaragua.

We have no evidence that any of these Cuban recommendations were ever presented to the NJM or implemented in Grenada.

#### Relations With Labor

12. When the Bishop regime came to power in 1979, five of the eight trade unions in Grenada were already under the influence of the NJM. These were:

- The Bank and General Workers Union.
- The Commercial and Industrial Workers Union.
- The Technical and Allied Workers Union.
- The Agricultural and General Workers Union.
- The Grenada Union of Teachers.

The remaining unions—the Seamens and Waterfront Workers Union, the Public Workers Union, and the Taxi Owners and Drivers Association—were considered to be “bourgeois oriented,” and were targeted for penetration, supervision, and control in a directive from the NJM leadership to the Organizing Committee recovered from Grenada.

13. The NJM believed that the most effective and ideologically correct way to further the revolution was through complete unionization of the labor force under NJM leadership. To accomplish this, the NJM Organizing Committee established and carefully monitored a Workers Committee which was charged with propagating Marxist-Leninist thought among the workers, building party organizations at all work centers, and completing the process of unionization at the various enterprises and work centers. By June 1983, the Workers Committee had established 116

functioning worker education classes. Tutors reported that rarely did more than 75 percent of the workers at each site come to class, and that participation was uniformly low—. . . the workers still have a strong antirevolution side to them (sic).” The anti-NJM sentiment in the recalcitrant unions was never effectively controlled and seemed to grow stronger as disputes over wages and benefits were exacerbated by a gradually increasing number of complaints against worker education classes. Even the leaders of the unions loyal to the Movement became dissatisfied with NJM economic policies that failed to improve employment opportunities for their membership.

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#### The Grenadian Revolutionary Armed Forces

##### Organization

14. The Grenadian armed forces were organized into a headquarters and four geographic commands based on electoral parishes:

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- Region 1—St. George’s and St. David’s Parishes.
- Region 2—St. Andrew’s Parish.
- Region 3—St. John’s, St. Mark’s, and St. Patrick’s Parishes.
- Region 4—the Islands of Carriacou and Petite Martinique.

These organizations provided a skeleton regular army staff that was intended to provide leadership for reservists and militia upon national mobilization.

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##### Armed Strength


15. The documents show that, from the beginning, the leaders of the NJM were obsessed by the belief that the United States would organize a counterrevolutionary movement to overthrow their regime. Almost from the day he took power, Maurice Bishop began a series of appeals to several sources for the “means” to defend Grenada and continued to press for greater numbers of weapons to be delivered on steadily advancing schedules throughout the reign of the NJM. Early on Bishop’s concerns included appropriate storage space for the military equipment he had requested. On 22 December 1980, he sought Bulgarian aid for the construction of 12 warehouses “. . . to facilitate a fully armed and prepared Grenadian army and militia.” A report prepared by Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard and several members of the Ministry of Defense dated 16 April 1983 reiterated the NJM belief


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that the United States remained the primary threat to the regime, but posited that the most likely form of US intervention would be to facilitate domestic terrorism or to back Cuban and Grenadian exiles who might conduct an invasion from Venezuela. Similar threat analyses apparently were used to justify the steadily increasing planned strength of the Grenadian armed services. 

arranged the details of the transfer with Colonel Tortolo, the senior Cuban military adviser to Grenada. Bishop directed the harbor master at St. Georges to close the harbor to shipping for the entire period required for the transfer. Grenadian longshoremen brought 42 weapons containers ashore on the 25th, but, from midnight until 0500 on the 26th, only Cubans were allowed into the area while the armored vehicles and trucks were offloaded. Among the equipment given to Grenada in this shipment were 3,000 Czech M-52 rifles, 1,000 Soviet assault rifles, 300 Soviet pistols, 10 armored vehicles, and 5,850 sets of individual equipment. 

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16. In 1980, Deputy Minister of Defense Ewart Layne petitioned Maurice Bishop for equipment to outfit a force of 6,000 enlisted men and 300 officers, most of which was delivered in August 1982. The Ministry of Defense calculated its strength in mid-1983 at one permanent infantry battalion and five reserve battalions plus supporting elements—with an authorized strength of roughly 4,400—although the Grenadian armed forces could muster only 500 to 600 effectives to meet the invasion force on 25 October. Plans called for the formation of a far larger force by adding two regular and four reserve battalions by the end of 1983, one regular and two reserve battalions in 1984, and three reserve battalions in 1985, for a total of four regular and 14 reserve units. 

 has quoted him as planning to arm and train 20,000 Grenadians—about 20 percent of the population.  once told  that any excess weapons "... could be sent to other countries that were having revolutions," and that some weapons had been sent to St. Lucia in 1979. We have no information of such a movement, nor do Grenadian weapon logs show a decrease in holdings at that time.

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**Armament**

17. Grenadian military records show that Grenada received approximately 10,750 small arms from its Communist patrons: some 3,800 rifles—apparently including some 900 British .303 rifles and 350 US M-16s—came from Cuba in April 1979, another 2,600 from the Soviet Union in 1981, and about 4,300 rifles and pistols were part of a shipment received in August 1982. The Grenadians kept very thorough accounts of the weapons in their control, but the 900 British rifles were either combined with another category or dropped from the rolls between February 1981 and January 1982. 

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18. The best example of Soviet-Cuban delivery tactics occurred on 25-26 August 1982. Maurice Bishop's handwritten notes indicate that he personally

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**The Ministry of the Interior**

22. This PRG organization was responsible for developing and maintaining the internal security apparatus. During 1980 the Ministry underwent a major expansion that resulted in the establishment of five branches:

- The Bureau of Operations and Investigation (Special Branch) conducted intelligence and counterintelligence operations.
- The Personal Security Section (Guard Company) protected Grenadian leaders and visiting officials.
- The Police/Prisons Section provided normal police services and guarded the Richmond Hill Prison.
- The Coast Guard patrolled beaches and coastal waters.
- The Immigration Section regulated entry and exit from the island, and controlled foreign residents.

All sections were assigned a Cuban adviser who was charged with improving the general efficiency and effectiveness of his section. This was of particular importance in the Police/Prisons Section because the NJM believed the police to be politically unreliable. (c)

23. [redacted] the counterintelligence section of the Special Branch was reorganized under Major Keith Roberts, and further divided into functional and geographic areas [redacted]



[redacted] Agent training was upgraded by sending some students to the USSR and others to Cuba, [redacted]



general, two types of training—police and “nonpolice”—were received at all locations. The former concentrated on traditional criminal investigation methods, while the latter consisted of espionage, sabotage, wiretapping, assassination, and the like. [redacted]



24. The majority of the graduates of these courses were employed in searching out “counterrevolutionary” activity in Grenada, but there is some documentary evidence of off-island intelligence operations. Tim Hector, the leftist leader in Antigua, thanked his personal friend Maurice Bishop for courier services

provided him by Grenadian agents through St. Georges to Havana. The documents contain the report of a Grenadian intelligence operative who with Bouterse and “the C-2 man”—believed to be a Cuban agent—discussed training for Surinamers in Grenada in security, intelligence, and counterintelligence operations. We have found no indications that Grenadian agents worked for or with Soviet intelligence agencies.



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**Havana’s Influence in Grenada**

25. There is no documentary evidence that suggests that Havana orchestrated the day-to-day activities of the NJM and the PRG, although reports cited in the original Assessment indicate that Cuban Ambassador Torres Rizo had a particularly close relationship with Maurice Bishop, and that Bishop counted on his advice in many matters of state. Havana sent a number of advisers to Grenada for about two weeks at a time on a project-by-project basis, but only its diplomatic and military missions maintained a continuous presence on the island. Even so, several influential members of the NJM had become concerned that foreigners might get the impression that Cubans “. . . dominated the scene.” Visitors reported that their telephone calls to PRG offices were often answered by a Cuban who was sitting in for his indigenous counterpart. Richard Jacobs, Grenadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was especially concerned that the NJM take action to dispel the impression that “. . . the Cubans have taken over.” There is no evidence to indicate that the NJM took any steps to correct this situation, however. [redacted]

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**Cuban Military Advisers**

26. A 1981 agreement between Cuba and Grenada identified 40 Cuban military advisory positions in Grenada that were established to strengthen local defenses. Of the 40 positions, 27 were referred to as “permanent specialists” indicating that the incumbents would serve until the agreement expired on 31 December 1984. The remaining 13 “Temporary Specialists” were on two- to four-month rotational duty. Cuba paid the salaries of its advisers, and Grenada provided for their local living expenses. The agreement does not specify the positions, ranks, or Grenadian counterparts of the Cuban military advisers. [redacted]

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27. After the remnants of his military contingent returned to Cuba, Fidel Castro ordered a thorough investigation of their actions during the invasion. The results of the Board of Inquiry indicated that there had been a broad pattern of cowardice by the Cuban

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soldiers. All those who were not wounded have been demoted, reprimanded, or otherwise punished as an example to future "internationalists." Colonel Pedro Tortolo Comas, the Cuban commander in Grenada, and many of the others reportedly have been reduced in grade and sent to Angola as enlisted soldiers.

**Cuban Use of Grenada**

28. The documents indicate that Havana began to exploit its relationship with Grenada in 1982 when it sought to create wider support in the Socialist International for Soviet and Cuban viewpoints by organizing a regional voting block within the membership. At first, Cuba encouraged Grenada to express its support for "progressive struggles" in southern Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America; later, a secret regional caucus of leftist governments was organized by Cuba and hosted by Nicaragua to coordinate positions and votes on issues before the body. Grenada also lobbied within the Socialist International for the admission of other emerging Caribbean parties in order that regional influence might be further expanded.

29. Maurice Bishop's personal notes indicate that Cuban officials kept the NJM informed on events in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Other documents show that the NJM complied with a Cuban request that Comrade Ramon Cordona be permitted to establish an office in St. Georges in order to "... conduct work in the Caribbean on behalf of the FMLN-FDR." A letter from Major Keith Roberts to Leon Cornwall, Grenadian Ambassador to Cuba, indicates that Havana had granted permission for three high-level NJM officials to visit Nicaragua so that they might observe "... how the war was being directed and controlled."

30. Havana was interested in securing NJM assistance in gaining influence over and gathering intelligence on the political parties in the Eastern Caribbean—particularly in Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago. A high-level Grenadian delegation to Havana in 1982 agreed to provide the Cuban Communist Party with a list of needs for Grenada and "... a separate one for the Caribbean left political parties." The NJM hosted a "Party Building Seminar" for 15 Caribbean leftist organizations in August 1982, followed by a meeting of leftist youth groups sponsored by the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Continental Organization for Latin American Youth, and the International Union of Students—all Communist front groups—in September.

31. The Cubans frequently sought the opinion of Richart Hart, a Jamaican who served as the Grenadian Attorney General and whom they considered an expert on Caribbean politics, and requested his assistance in penetrating the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. Havana also cultivated the special relationship between Maurice Bishop and Tim Hector, a leftist leader in Antigua. Hector passed Antiguan classified documents to Grenadian agents probably for eventual transmittal to Cuba, arranged for security training in Grenada for some of the members of his party, and smuggled two of his people who were wanted by the Antiguan authorities through Grenada en route to asylum in Cuba.

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**The Point Salines Airport**

32. The Grenadian documents contain many references to the major construction project on the island, the Point Salines Airport. This project was the cornerstone of the Bishop regime's plans to greatly increase the island's tourist industry, and was initially proposed to and accepted by Havana shortly after the NJM came to power. The runway originally was planned to be 2,400 meters (about 7,800 feet) long—too short to routinely handle large jet aircraft. On 29 October 1980, a Grenadian delegation to Cuba suggested that the runway be lengthened to 2,750 meters (9,000 feet) to accommodate the standard air carriers; the Cubans agreed to the extension after conducting an additional feasibility study.

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33. Minutes of NJM meetings show that the airport was the source of many of the problems faced by the PRG. Senior Grenadian officials spent a great deal of their time attempting to secure aid to complete the project, but had little success. The NJM offered both Moscow and Havana military use of the airport, although neither was willing to provide financial aid for the project.

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As described in the Assessment, most of the monetary aid came from Middle Eastern nations whose support decreased as oil prices declined.

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**Growing Soviet Influence**

34. Moscow also grew more interested in Grenada following the opening of its Embassy in St. Georges in 1982. The documents show that Foreign Minister

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Unison Whiteman immediately began actively courting the Soviets in order to justify continued Soviet aid to Grenada. During the following year, members of the diplomatic community in Grenada noticed that the Soviets seemed to be gradually replacing the Cubans as the primary source of advice to the PRG, although the documents reflect a continuing closer relationship with Havana and Ambassador Torres Rizo. The NJM/PRG obviously believed in keeping both patrons satisfied to the extent that was possible, and offered political support for both in the international arena.

35. Many recovered documents indicate that the NJM was most interested in proving its worth to Moscow by creating a route for Soviet influence through Grenada to the Caribbean left, even though the Soviets seemed content to use their Cuban proxies for such access. During the summer of 1983, St. Georges was developing plans to host "... twice-a-year meetings with the progressive and revolutionary parties in the region," after which a member of the NJM Central Committee would report to Moscow in order that Grenada might become the "... point of access to the USSR for all of these groups." The NJM singled out Suriname and Belize as special targets through which they might enhance their importance to the Soviets. The US-led invasion prevented the NJM from pursuing these plans.

36. The NJM was hindered in its attempts to enhance its stature with Moscow by Soviet bureaucracy and disinterest. The documents contain the report of Bernard Bourne, Grenada's Minister-Counselor to the Soviet Union, that the Soviet's foreign relations staff was not organized to deal with a friendly English-speaking government in the Western Hemisphere, so Grenada was handled by Nicholai Mostevets, the head of a minor section lumped in with the United States and Canada. Bourne stated that the Soviets "... have no experience in dealing with parties of socialist orientation which are in power," and that Mostevets repeatedly told him that "... the Caribbean was very distant from the Soviet Union and not one of their priority areas." Richard Jacobs, the Grenadian Ambassador to Moscow, wrote to Maurice Bishop in July 1983 that as a result of these factors and Grenada's small size, "... we would figure in a very minute way in the USSR's global relationships. ... They are therefore very careful, and for us sometimes maddingly slow, in making up their minds about who to support (sic)."

**Soviet-Cuban Cooperation**

37. The Grenadian documents contain a great deal of evidence indicating that Soviet and Cuban support

for and development of the Bishop regime was closely coordinated. They indicate that:

- Soviet-sponsored economic assistance projects were often preceded by Cuban feasibility studies.
- Grenadian official visits to Moscow or other Communist Bloc capitals typically began and concluded with a coordinating stopover in Havana.
- Soviet arms deliveries came from or were transshipped through Cuba, and Cuban personnel were used to offload major shipments in Grenada.
- Nonmilitary goods shipped from the USSR and its allies frequently passed through Cuban ports.

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38. Nevertheless, some circumstantial evidence of rivalry between Grenada's two patrons may be inferred from NJM members' notes taken during the Bishop-Coard dispute. These notes show that Havana reacted with surprise, alarm, and dismay to the anti-Bishop actions, but there is no indication that Moscow made any comment on the situation although the USSR was officially informed of events in Grenada by the NJM Central Committee. We do not know whether this silence indicated Soviet foreknowledge of events, adoption of a hands-off attitude, or reliance on Havana to control the situation.

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39. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] The PRG appeared to the diplomatic community to have placed more reliance on Soviet rather than Cuban advice after a permanent Soviet diplomatic mission was established in 1982. Reports of Grenadian officials' courting of Soviet favor are consistent with the accounts and recommendations recorded in the recovered documents, but whether NJM actions resulted in a local Soviet-Cuban rivalry, or the enmity between the ambassadors was of a personal nature is unknown.

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40. [Redacted]

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oners. During a visit to Hanoi in 1981, a group headed by Hudson Austin was briefed on CIA intelligence and counterintelligence methods, as well as anti-aircraft operations. The group then visited Ham-Na "reeducation camp," where Vietnamese reeducation techniques of daily work regimens and routine political indoctrination were demonstrated. The Austin delegation reported that the Ham-Na camp was constructed in April 1975, and at the time of their visit housed about 350 former South Vietnamese officials and priests.

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43. In April 1982, Deputy Minister of Defense and Interior Ewart Layne led a delegation to Hanoi that sought Vietnamese assistance in military training and aid. Layne's meetings with his Vietnamese counterparts produced an agreement for training some 20 Grenadians in Vietnam, but there were insufficient funds available to transport the students to Hanoi. The NJM appealed to Moscow for help, but the documents contain no evidence that they were successful. The training never took place, nor did Vietnamese officials ever visit Grenada.

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**Dealings With Other Nations**

41. The PRG signed aid and trade agreements with a number of countries, most of which were in the Soviet Bloc. Annex C shows the full scope of the NJM's international activity as revealed in the documents.

**Vietnam**

42. Documents examined after the Assessment was published have provided additional insights into relations between Grenada and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Cuba facilitated meetings between the NJM and Vietnamese officials, and all preliminary communications between the two parties were conducted through the Grenadian Embassy in Cuba. The NJM wanted to exploit Vietnamese experience in conducting anti-American military actions and to use Vietnamese methods of monitoring and reeducating pris-

**Narcotics**

44. There is no documentary evidence of Grenadian involvement in international drug trafficking. To the contrary, many documents indicate that the Grenadian leadership was strongly opposed to drug use and trafficking for both ideological and pragmatic political reasons. The NJM came to identify drugs and drug usage with counterrevolutionary elements in Grenada. Because NJM members placed great importance on an ideologically pure model of socialism, with strong internal organization and loyalty to the party and government, narcotics trafficking was seen as a means to destabilize the population, diffuse the attention of the masses, and provide funds for anti-NJM activities. Grenadian counterintelligence maintained a close watch over individuals and groups associated with narcotics in an attempt to eliminate the use of drugs on the island.

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## ANNEX A

## ORIGINAL KEY JUDGMENTS

Following an all-source assessment of available intelligence on Grenada and an analysis of that part of the documents recovered from Grenada before 30 November 1983, we have come to the following conclusions:

- The primary focus of almost all actors on the Grenadian scene—both foreign and domestic—was on consolidating the power of the New Jewel Movement and strengthening its Marxist-Leninist orientation. To achieve this end, a web of relations among Grenada, Cuba, and the Soviet Union evolved, characterized by:
  - Discreet associations that became more overt as the New Jewel Movement increased its internal control.
  - Close party-to-party relations among all three countries.
  - Implementation of many Soviet-Grenadian agreements through Cuba. [redacted]
- The New Jewel Movement constituted a very small but highly influential part of the Grenadian populace, dedicated to building a Marxist-Leninist society but divided by personal ambitions and conflicting views on how quickly to proceed with this task. By October 1983, Grenada had:
  - A self-described Marxist-Leninist political party—complete with Central Committee, Political Bureau, and Secretariat—representing the revolutionary elite.
  - An army and militia that in size and armament far outstripped those of its neighbors or of previous Grenadian governments; both institutions helped move Grenada in the direction of a militarized society and provided important vehicles for indoctrinating youth.
  - An internal security apparatus that dealt harshly with overt regime opponents and was sufficiently pervasive to intimidate potential challenges to the New Jewel Movement.
- A highly developed propaganda machine that relied on the government-monopolized media and party-controlled entities throughout the government bureaucracy to disseminate the leadership's political message. [redacted]
- The captured documents underscore that the Bishop regime viewed Cuba as its principal foreign ally. Fidel Castro and Maurice Bishop had developed a close personal relationship. [redacted]
- While Castro almost certainly knew of the competition between Bishop and Bernard Coard, he probably was unaware of the degree to which Bishop had lost support within the leadership and of the Coard faction's growing drive for dominance. The killing of Bishop was clearly unforeseen in Havana. [redacted]
- The Cuban role in defending Grenada is still being examined. Thus far, we have not been able to confirm that armed Cubans defended other than their own positions or were involved in coordinating a defense with Grenadian forces. Most of the Cuban resistance came from the 40-odd military advisers and an unknown number of construction workers who were trained reservists in the Cuban military. It appears, however, that the majority of the construction workers had insufficient arms and ammunition and offered little resistance. [redacted]
- The Soviet Union valued the New Jewel regime in Grenada as a symbol of declining US power and expanding Marxist influence in Latin America. Moscow initially kept the Grenadians publicly at arm's length, effectively masking the growing military relationship. The captured documents show that direct Soviet influence was brought to bear on party organization, ideological training, and management of the failing Grenadian economy. [redacted]
- Both the documents and open sources show that Grenadian contacts with the USSR were handled primarily by Deputy Prime Minister Coard, who was the most ideologically committed and the most pro-Soviet member of the leadership. There is controversy within the Intelligence Community regarding the extent of Soviet control over

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events in Grenada. The documents give no indication that in July 1983 Coard discussed with Soviet officials the leadership conflicts in the New Jewel Movement. There is general agreement within the Intelligence Community that such discussions might have taken place; the Defense Intelligence Agency and some analysts in CIA believe that when Coard went to Moscow he informed the Soviets of his plans to challenge Bishop and petitioned the Soviets for advice and support. DIA further believes that Coard was instructed by Moscow to take action to assume leadership. However, no documentary evidence of any kind of collaboration as described above has been found as yet.

- Although the documents provide no evidence of a Soviet or Cuban request to use air and naval facilities on Grenada, we believe that the Cuban role in building the Point Salines Airport indicated an expectation of using it for Cuban purposes, and the USSR probably also planned use of some facilities. The documents indicate that Grenadian officials envisaged the possibility of such use
- The captured documents and other sources show that Grenadians had been:
  - Receiving training in Cuba and the USSR for both domestic and foreign intelligence work.
  - Conducting military training and political indoctrination of small groups of eastern Caribbean leftists.

- Broadcasting Cuban- and Soviet-furnished propaganda over Radio Free Grenada.
- Disseminating newsletters to Caribbean journalists and media workers.
- Although few references in the captured documents support the judgment, other evidence indicates that both Havana and Moscow viewed Grenada as a springboard for:
  - Penetrating other countries in the area.
  - Distribution of propaganda and money to leftists in the region.
  - Military training of subversive groups.
- Captured documents reveal that Grenada had secret military agreements with Cuba, the Soviet Union, North Korea, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. While the Grenadians may have believed these weapons were for their armed forces, we believe that the Soviets and their proxies probably intended to draw on the stores of weapons on Grenada to supply friendly countries in the region as opportunities or need might arise
- The overall picture presented by the evidence is that by October 1983 the USSR and Cuba had made real progress toward turning Grenada into a center for further subversion of the region.

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## Annex B

Interworkings of the New Jewel Movement  
and the People's Revolutionary Government


Name	People's Revolutionary Government Position *	New Jewel Movement Position								
		Party Member	Central Committee	Politburo	Organizing Committee	Workers Committee	Education Committee	Economic Bureau	Propaganda Committee	Other
Austin, Hudson	Minister of Defense, Interior, Communications, Construction; Commander of Grenada Revolutionary Armed Forces	X	X	X				X		
Bain, Fitzroy		X	X		X	X				
Bain, Norris	Minister of Housing	X								
Bartholomew, Tan		X	X		X		X			
Bishop, Maurice	Prime Minister; Minister of Defense, Interior; Commander in Chief of Grenada Revolutionary Armed Forces	X	X Chairman	X Chairman	X	X Chairman	X	X		Secretary General
Bourne, Bernard	Minister-Counselor, USSR	X								
Bullen, G. R. E.	Ambassador to European Countries	X								
Coard, Bernard	Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of Finance, Planning, Trade, Industry	X	X	X	X		X	X Chairman		Deputy Secretary General
Coard, Phyllis	Deputy Secretary for Information; Secretary for Woman's Affairs	X	X	X	X		X		X	National Women's Organization
Cornwall, Leon	Ambassador to Cuba; Secretary for Youth, Sports	X	X	X	X					
Creft, Jacqueline	Minister of Education, Youth, Social Affairs	X	X							
DeBriggs, Chris	Deputy Minister of Health	X	X							International Relations Committee
Gahagan, Major Basil	Chief of Staff of the People's Revolutionary Army	X								International Relations Committee
Jacobs, Richard	Ambassador to USSR	X	X	X						
James, LTC. Liam	Deputy Minister of Interior, Defense; Chief of Security	X	X	X			X	X		
Layne, LTC. Ewart	Deputy Minister of Defense	X	X	X						
Louison, Maj. Einstein	Deputy Minister of Defense; Chief of Staff of Grenada Revolutionary Armed Forces	X	X	X						
Louison, George	Minister of Agriculture, Education	X	X	X	X		X	X		National Youth Organization
McBarnette, Coleville	Deputy Secretary of Information	X	X		X		X			
Radix, Kenrick	Minister of Justice, Agro-Industries, Industrial Development	X	X	X						
Ramdhanny, Lyden	Minister of Tourism, Deputy Minister of Finance	X	X							
St. Bernard, Ian	Deputy Secretary of Interior, Committee of Economic Ministers	X	X		X		X			
Strachan, Selwyn	Minister for National Mobilization, Labor, Communications	X	X	X	X		X	X		
Taylor, Caldwell	Ambassador to the UN	X	X	X						
Whiteman, Unison	Minister of Foreign Affairs	X	X	X				X		
Williams, Dessima	Ambassador to the OAS	X								

\* Duplication of some positions was caused by personnel movements during the New Jewel Movement's four-year reign.

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**Annex C**

**Assistance and Type of Aid**

Country	Agri-cultural	Communi-cation	Construc-tion	Diplomatic	Economic	Education	Internal Security	Medical	Military	Political	Scientific & Technical	Trans- portation
Algeria			X		X				X			X
Bulgaria	X		X	X	X	X				X		
Cuba	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Czechoslovakia	X				X	X			X			X <sup>a</sup>
East Germany	X	X			X	X	X			X		X
Hungary		X <sup>a</sup>				X					X	
Iraq			X	X	X						X	
Libya	X	X	X	X	X				X			
North Korea	X		X		X				X <sup>a</sup>			
Poland		X <sup>a</sup>			X <sup>a</sup>	X <sup>a</sup>						X <sup>a</sup>
Sweden	X <sup>a</sup>					X <sup>a</sup>		X <sup>a</sup>				
Syria		X	X	X	X						X	
USSR	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
Venezuela					X <sup>a</sup>							
Vietnam		X <sup>a</sup>				X <sup>a</sup>	X <sup>a</sup>		X <sup>a</sup>	X <sup>a</sup>	X	
Yugoslavia				X <sup>a</sup>	X <sup>a</sup>					X <sup>a</sup>		

<sup>a</sup> Draft agreement or discussion; status of implementation unknown.



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