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INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

15 February 1983

Ghana: The Rawlings Regime One Year Later

Summary

The Rawlings coup in December 1981 set in motion what is likely to be a prolonged period of instability in Ghana. The regime--consisting of Rawlings, the Provisional National Defense Council, and other advisors--has no clearly defined plan for dealing with Ghana's 25-year political and economic decline. In recent months the government has lost direction and become increasingly preoccupied with its own survival. Nevertheless, the regime shows no inclination to back away from its radical course.

The country's economy is in a shambles and drifting toward ruin. A new economic plan, emphasizing even broader state control over or intervention in virtually all sectors of the economy, was recently announced but it is too vague to be a practical guide for economic recovery.

The next few months--the time frame of this paper--may well determine the regime's future. The greatest threats to its continued existence do not come from the numerous exile groups plotting its demise but from discontent within factions of the military. Public dissatisfaction with the regime is running high because of severe food shortages and increased unemployment and creates an atmosphere conducive to coup plotting. The country's scant resources will be strained further by the influx of perhaps as many as two million Ghanaians being expelled from Nigeria as illegal aliens.

Open opposition to the regime would force it to take repressive measures and exacerbate factional conflict within the regime itself. The response of one or two key military units in Accra to such a factional confrontation would probably determine the outcome.

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If the regime remains more or less intact, it still may lack a coherent policy. The regime will focus on its efforts to mobilize the population through a mix of exhortation and repression. Such a policy would be based on the belief that other revolutionary states would provide security assistance while the US and other Western aid donors would continue to provide enough food and economic assistance to allow the regime to survive.

The Libyans, and to a lesser extent, the Soviets and the Cubans have provided some support, but significant involvement during the past year was discouraged by the instability and apparent transient nature of the Rawlings regime. Recent increases in Libyan military assistance and Moscow's revived interest in economic and technical cooperation suggest a growing willingness to support Ghana's radical orientation, however. Without measurable economic relief, which seems unlikely, the regime will become increasingly repressive and U.S. and other Western offers of assistance conceivably could be overshadowed by Ghana's growing reliance on Moscow and its allies. In an effort to shift blame for its economic failures, the regime may become increasingly hostile to the West in general and the US in particular.

Introduction

The December 31, 1981 coup was Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings' second attempt to rescue Ghana from some 25 years of political and economic disarray under a variety of civilian and military governments. His stated aim is to take power away from the country's Western-oriented middle-class, which he blames for Ghana's troubles, and return the country to "the people." Beyond that aim, Rawlings has no clearly defined plan for dealing with Ghana's problems. His

vague notions for restructuring Ghanaian society have been and will continue to be distorted by many in the regime for their own purposes.

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The Rawlings regime faces a formidable array of problems. The downhill slide of Ghana's economy has been accelerating since 1978. Exports of cocoa and gold--its two traditional revenue earners--have been falling steadily because of depressed world prices and declining production. The country's external debt now stands at over \$1 billion. By the end of October 1982, Ghana had about \$171 million in foreign exchange. Inflation in 1981 was 116 percent. Severe shortages of food, consumer goods, and industrial raw materials have become commonplace because of corruption, a lack of imports, the imposition of price controls, and increased enforcement of anti-smuggling laws.

So far, Rawlings has displayed no more aptitude for solving Ghana's problems than he did during his 112-day tenure in 1979. His regime took five months to appoint an official responsible for finance and economic planning and a full year to announce an official economic reform program. Measures taken thus far to control public expenditures include a freeze on non-essential government spending, the closure of a third of Ghana's foreign

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missions, and postponement of all new public sector construction. Under the new economic program, the state will control imports and exports and state intervention in banking, increase joint ventures with foreign investors, and devalue the currency. The regime has yet to spell out how it intends to implement the new policies.

The regime hopes that the program will pave the way for a resumption of talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Negotiations with the IMF in September broke down over the rate of devaluation and increases in cocoa producer prices. Since mid-January the regime has been attempting to reopen negotiations with an eye toward attracting some \$400 million from the fund as well as funding from private financial markets. The regime appears willing to discuss a formula for devaluation, but prospects for an early resolution of Ghana's problems with the IMF do not appear good.

Decision-making and policy formulation within the regime are hampered by ideological, tribal and personality differences and a severe shortage of expertise. The five-member Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) chaired by Rawlings is nominally the supreme policy-making body; however, the council still has not developed an adequate system for discussing policy and reaching decisions. Moreover, two of its former members are under investigation for their possible role in an abortive coup attempt last December. Many major decisions are made by Rawlings' advisers and not even brought before the PNDC. In the absence of programs the regime has resorted to "revolutionary" rhetoric, fabrications of external threats, and periodically, open hostility toward the West, particularly the US, in order to mobilize popular support and to divert attention from its own failures and shortcomings.

The military, which has been a major political force since the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966, is a major problem for the regime. The government can exist only with the suffrance and loyalty of major factions within the armed forces, although the loyalty of many units is still uncertain. Military discipline, which had all but disappeared after the coup, is showing some signs of revival in the wake of Army Commander Quainoo's recently-implemented field training program. But this is only a start in the direction of instilling professionalism among the troops. Nevertheless, friction exists between officers and other ranks, and a number of soldiers take advantage of the breakdown of authority to prey on the population. Failure to curb excesses by the military damages the regime's public support but actions needed to tighten discipline could spark a mutiny or, worse, a counter-coup.

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The Struggle for Control of the Revolution

Initially, the Rawlings regime, although predominantly leftist, included a fairly broad spectrum of Ghanaian political opinion. In recent months,

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however, the identifiable "moderates" have left the PNDC, while almost all those who remain claim to be "revolutionaries," who take a generally Marxist approach to Ghana's problems, or at least, justify their programs in revolutionary terms. The "revolutionaries" subscribe to Lenin's view of imperialism and see Ghana as the victim of foreign exploiters aided and abetted by corrupt domestic elements. They believe society must be restructured and power taken away from the former ruling class and given to "the people," who are generally defined as farmers, workers, the urban poor, students, and lower-ranking soldiers and policemen. On the other hand, professionals, military officers, big businessmen and traders, leaders of the former political parties, and tribal chiefs are anathema to the regime and are suspected of being "anti-revolutionary" and "enemies of the people." This posture severely complicates the regime's efforts to govern.

Most of the revolutionaries--whether part of the regime or among its popular supporters--are young, in their 20s and 30s. Many belonged as children to Nkrumah's Young Pioneers. Before December 31 many were university students or lecturers, the purity of their socialist ideology unsullied by practical experience outside the academic world. Many belong to radical organizations such as the June 4 Movement, the People's Revolutionary League, the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards, and the New Democratic Movement. All these groups wax nostalgic over Nkrumah and the first Rawlings regime, and berate former military and civilian governments for straying from the Nkrumahist path and for corruption. The PNDC offers them an opportunity to exercise power which they could not have obtained through democratic politics.

Nonetheless, disagreements do exist among the "revolutionaries" stemming from policy and personality differences. Some believe Ghana's economic problems should be resolved through conventional socialist measures such as expanded state control over the economy and a decisive break with the Western economic system. Others, such as PNDC Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning Dr. Kwesi Botchwey, favor continued dealings with the West, not excluding a devaluation of the currency and an understanding with the IMF, to strengthen Ghana for the socialist transformation.

In foreign policy, there is a consensus within the regime that Ghana should be committed to non-alignment and Pan-Africanism. But differences of opinion exist on East-West issues, and on the need to maintain Ghana's revolutionary credentials while not overly offending traditional Western aid donors.

The regime has placed heavy emphasis on mobilizing the people by creating a network of People's Defense Committees in communities, workplaces, and military and police units throughout the country. The committees are supposed to fight corruption, discuss national issues, and expose enemies of the revolution; they resemble Cuban Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, Libyan People's Assemblies, and Ethiopian Kebeles.

The performance and leadership of these committees have been uneven, however. Efforts by some committee leaders to stifle opponents, take the law

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into their own hands, and seek personal gain have aroused popular resentment, and the committees have collaborated with some PNDC members to challenge PNDC actions and personalities. In November, PNDC Chairman Rawlings announced that the defense committees would continue to exist, but their activities would be regulated by law, apparently in order to establish PNDC authority over them.

The revolutionaries firmly control the government-owned media, and use it to advance the aims of the revolution and attack Western governments and multinationals. They have attacked US policies toward Libya, Central America, Namibia, and the Organization of African Unity. Allegations of Western-backed plots to invade Ghana have been featured periodically in the press.

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As for Rawlings himself, his indignation over Ghana's decline and its corruption and social injustice is deeply felt. He is non-ideological in defining solutions, but the radical friends he made during his period out of power often have the last word with him, while more moderate friends who were with him during his previous rule find access to him difficult. Although his popularity declined throughout 1982 due to the PDNC's poor performance, he still appears to have a larger public following than anyone else in the PNDC and to be the principal force capable of holding it together.

Key Interest Groups

The Military

Rawlings came to power with the support of the Air Force, in which he had served, the Reconnaissance Regiment, and certain other army units in Accra. However, there is widespread skepticism throughout the ranks toward the regime as a whole, and the loyalty of the military is questionable. There are splits along regional, ethnic, and ideological lines within both the regime and the military. Moreover, the degree of military support for the Rawlings

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Government at any given time is impossible to determine. Rawlings and Army Commander Quainoo are concerned about the lack of discipline and cohesiveness within the military.

Quainoo, through a series of military exercises begun in late September involving troops from throughout the country, is attempting to rebuild discipline and distract the soldiers from political and economic concerns. Nevertheless, military discontent with the regime stemming from economic hardship and tribalism continues to pose the most immediate threat to the regime's survival. [REDACTED]

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The Reconnaissance Regiment and the Military Defense Force organized after the coup appear to function apart from the rest of the military and are probably the key military units in the country. [REDACTED]

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Farmers

Farmers, as the most traditional and the most dispersed element of society, pose the least threat to the regime but also are likely to prove to be the most difficult to mobilize. Nevertheless, farmers are essential to the achievement of one of the regime's major goals--agricultural self-sufficiency. Tensions between farmers and successive regimes over the years have been strong, stemming from unfair or ill-conceived government pricing and marketing policies, absentee land-lordism, and rising operational costs. The Rawlings regime, like its predecessors, has not been able to come up with workable agricultural policies. Most apparent is its failure to strike a balance between a fair price for the farmer and the need to provide food for urban workers at reasonable prices, a problem virtually all African governments are struggling to solve.

Workers

Unlike the dispersed farm population, Ghana's workers are organized into trade unions, which traditionally have exhibited a large degree of independence. Most are located in the urban areas, as are the unemployed. They are the people most immediately affected by shortages of food and other consumer products, and by economic downturns.

The regime is extremely sensitive to the implications of dissatisfaction on the part of union members and the unemployed. The PNDC, determined to control the workers, created Workers Defense Committees at workplaces throughout the country to supervise the trade unions and perhaps eventually to replace them. The PNDC also removed the moderate leaders of the Trades Union Congress and replaced them with radicals, an action which has not won the support of the workers, and has sparked complaints by the International Labor Organization (ILO). On the other end of the spectrum, the Workers Defense

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Committees in the Accra area have allied themselves with ultra-leftists who believe the regime has not gone far enough. The Workers Defense Committees may become even more of a factionalizing force within Ghanaian society if, as expected, the unemployment rate continues its already alarming climb.

In addition, the regime will have great difficulty absorbing the estimated one million or more Ghanaians recently expelled from Nigeria as illegal aliens. The refugees will add to the burden on Ghana's inadequate food supply and economy. The regime hopes to disperse most returnees to tribal homelands, where they can make a living in subsistence agriculture. Returning middle class professional and skilled workers will expect jobs, however, and could become troublesome to the regime if their expectations are not met. The food, logistic and security problems created by the returning Ghanaians will make it more difficult for the regime to strengthen its shaky position and could encourage more active plotting by moderate elements.

Students

While many students support the regime, many others are the sons and daughters of the discredited former elite and thus are distrusted. Students also tend to be activist by nature and take to the streets--often unpredictably. Radicals in the regime would like to harness those energies and they back a number of student and youth groups. However, PNDC-backed radical candidates lost out to moderate student leaders in a bitterly contested election last June for the leadership of the National Union of Ghana Students. The new leadership slate is attempting to build a strong constituency on the basis of student issues rather than on the anti-imperialism espoused by the regime. The PNDC has threatened to close the universities in case of disruption, which is likely to deter students from taking a lead in challenging the regime.

Tribal Groups

Tribalism is also a potentially serious factor in Ghanaian politics, although perhaps not as acute a problem as in some other African states. Nevertheless, a high degree of tribal favoritism does exist in business, the civil service and, particularly, the military, where a tug of war has taken place over the years between the Ewe and the Akan among the senior officer ranks. The Rawlings regime is widely perceived as being dominated by the Ewe, who form 12 percent of the population but account for about 40 percent of the military. The Ewe come mostly from the Volta region of eastern Ghana. Rawlings is half Ewe and has surrounded himself with Ewes, including his security adviser, Kojo Tsikata, a number of military unit commanders who supported the coup and his immediate security entourage. The murders last June of three judges and a retired Army Major, all Akans--apparently by six Ewe non-commissioned officers--has exacerbated tribal tensions, as did the northern-led coup attempt in November.

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Traditional Moderates

There is a broad interest group in Ghana, particularly in the urban areas, which supports moderate positions on political and economic matters. This group includes many professionals, civil servants, businessmen and traders, and former political leaders. Often articulate and vocal, many support a return to civilian rule and desire more economic ties to, and assistance from, the West. While Rawlings has argued that some members of this group are "enemies of the people" because of their elitist positions in society, their concerted influence in the cities is significant and cannot be ignored.

The outcry of the Ghana Bar Association, the Association of Recognized Professional Bodies, and the Christian Churches after the June 30 murders of three prominent judges forced the PNDC to appoint an independent special board to investigate the murders. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The outcry may have deterred further political murders. The professionals also have links with the National Union of Ghana Students. The well-known views of the judiciary and the bar have forced the PNDC to provide much more due process for accused persons before the public tribunals than they received from the People's Courts in the previous Rawlings regime, to reduce some the tribunals' sentences and in effect to abandon prosecutions of the officers of the former political parties.

The regime has brought some traditional moderates into the revolutionary process by offering them positions in the regime while at the same time taking repressive measures against the most vocal elements of this group. Repression, however, could produce even greater chaos within the PNDC and foster disagreement throughout the regime. Moreover, a crackdown on traditional moderates would further tarnish the regime's image abroad.

Internal Stability and External Threats

The Rawlings coup set into motion what is likely to be a prolonged period of political and economic instability in Ghana. The unresolved ideological and personal tensions within the regime appear to be intensifying rather than abating. In the economic arena, the regime has adopted an economic plan with radical, nationalistic, statist and anti-Western features, which is likely to jeopardize its efforts to attract external capital and work against recovery efforts. Thus, tensions within the regime over economic policy are likely to increase in the months ahead, particularly as it attempts to implement its new economic programs.

With no meaningful reforms in sight, the serious economic malaise gripping Ghana could well topple the regime which is already in serious disarray. One of the greatest threats to its survival, other than a counter-coup, may be food shortages and the lack of resources with which to finance needed imports and maintain at least some industrial output.

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The 1982 harvest was disappointing, including an 80,000-100,000 metric ton shortfall in maize. Industry, now operating at only 5-10 percent of capacity, faces additional shutdowns which will swell the ranks of the urban unemployed, the group which suffers the most from food shortages and the accompanying run-up in prices. In the Accra area most workers are already organized in defense committees and have in the past demonstrated against moderates in the regime and against moderate actions taken by the PNDC. Their loyalties have been to ultra-left elements within the regime but it is difficult to predict whom they would blame for their plight, or how the regime or its members would respond collectively or individually. All sides would seek to enlist the support of the military and the police, probably sparking factional fighting within and between those forces. They would also seek the backing of various outside powers, taking help wherever they could find it. Rawlings could well be pushed aside. Any emergent government whether nominally revolutionary or moderate would be inherently unstable and open to subversion as long as it failed to show economic progress.

Despite PNDC fears, external threats to the regime by prominent Ghanaian exiles appear minimal. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the exiles are widely dispersed either in nearby African countries such as Togo and Nigeria or in London and appear to have scant resources or support at home or abroad for any moves against the regime. The longer they are in exile, the more their credibility diminishes. Many of them already have lost whatever sympathy they enjoyed from their host governments, particularly from Nigeria, because they have used their exile status for their own personal gain.

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Libyan, Soviet and Cuban Involvement

The Ghanaian revolution is in many ways influenced by the Libyan model. Rawlings and many of his radical advisers admire Libyan leader Qadhafi. Rawlings reportedly established contact with Tripoli after returning the country to civilian rule in September 1979, in part because of his disillusionment with the country's halting progress. Rawlings attended the 1980 national day celebrations in Tripoli and returned to Accra impressed with the social and economic development that he had observed.

During the latter days of the civilian government it was widely assumed in Accra that Rawlings was receiving Libyan money. [REDACTED]

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Nevertheless, Qadhafi responded quickly when Rawlings reassumed power. He immediately recognized the new regime, and diplomatic relations--severed by the civilian government in 1980--were soon restored. In the first months after the coup, Libya airlifted substantial quantities of small arms and

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ammunition, some food and medicines, and delivered 500,000 barrels of crude oil.

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Since Qadhafi's initial rush to assist Rawlings, Tripoli has not lived up to the regime's economic expectations. An arrangement under which Ghana received 360,000 metric tons of crude oil on credit terms of one year was basically a commercial deal rather than a gift, which Ghana would have preferred, although the credit was needed then and unobtainable elsewhere. The Libyans also turned down a Ghanaian request last spring for a \$500 million loan, probably because of Tripoli's cash flow problems at that time associated with the soft international oil market.

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Nevertheless, Qadhafi apparently attaches considerable importance to cultivating relations with Ghana.

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Once the regime begins to feel more secure it may send more officers and enlisted men to Libya for training, particularly on equipment already provided by Tripoli, and instructor pilot training. All training reportedly will be on a grant aid basis.

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Despite Ghanaian disappointment with Libyan economic assistance, the basic ideological identification with Libya is strong and is not likely to lessen, if for no other reason than that the regime needs relations with Libya to enhance its non-aligned credentials and to offset being drawn too closely into the Western orbit.

Moscow moved slowly in dealing with the Rawlings regime, even though early Soviet media commentary on the coup was highly favorable. The Soviets apparently were unsure of the PNDC's orientation and its survivability and may also have been experiencing a sense of deja vu, remembering the close association with Nkrumah in the 1960s which ended in 1966 with Nkrumah's ouster. Moscow's relations with subsequent regimes never approached the degree of closeness enjoyed under Nkrumah.

A Ghanaian delegation, led by a radical member of the PNDC, visited Moscow last March seeking economic aid. In mid-December, Ghana and the Soviet Union signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement, providing a \$10 million credit facility to meet the cost of technical assistance and equipment required for a number of Soviet-financed projects which were abandoned when Nkrumah was overthrown. The agreement may indicate Moscow's concern that Rawlings will not survive without external help. A cultural exchange agreement also was signed. In addition the regime's acceptance of a Soviet

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military attache last August may have fulfilled a precondition for future military assistance.

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The Soviets also are seeking opportunities by discreetly making contacts with avowed socialist advisers around Rawlings and with student and labor leaders, reactivating various friendship and cultural societies and providing propaganda materials to Ghana's radical-dominated official media.

The same Ghanaian delegation that visited Moscow also sought aid from East European countries and from Cuba, but only Havana responded favorably. Agreements providing for trade, technical assistance and air and navigation rights have been initialled and a Cuban cultural group has toured Ghana. Some Cubans and Libyans may be involved in training a military protective force for PNDC headquarters at Gondar Barracks

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Thus far, the regime has been able to respond to challenges, such as a poorly-planned coup attempt in late November, with its own troops. The regime is becoming increasingly fearful over its prospects for survival, however, and is turning to Libya and may turn to Cuba for increased military assistance or even possible future intervention on its behalf should it face a serious threat to its authority.

On balance, under Rawlings, closer ties with Tripoli, Moscow and Havana are likely. Progress probably will be slow, however, even taking into account the radicals' ideological rapport with those governments. Ghanaian foreign contacts often are carried out on the whim of individual members of the regime and do not reflect any official government policy decision.

Because of Libya's involvement in other areas, Qadhafi may try to live off the goodwill he already has built up in Accra with his military aid rather than make a major investment in the shaky Rawlings regime. Moscow appears hesitant to make a major commitment in Ghana until the regime has consolidated its power. Even the Cubans appear reluctant to support Rawlings extensively, perhaps out of concern with entanglement in a highly unstable situation. If, within the next few months, however, open opposition to the regime becomes widespread the radicals may look to Moscow or its allies to provide security, technical, organizational and propaganda assistance.

Relations with African States

Ghana's neighbors are concerned about the country's radical drift under Rawlings and are especially uneasy about the danger of Ghana becoming a base for Libyan subversion in West Africa. To date, we have not seen any evidence that the Rawlings regime is engaged in subversive operations against its neighbors or that it intends to allow Ghana to be used as a base of subversion.

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Nevertheless, Ghana's relations with its African neighbors have been strained since the coup. Nigeria, which has been accused by the Rawlings regime of working with the US and Britain to invade Ghana, strongly distrusts the regime but does not want to take any actions which would drive it closer to Libya or the Soviet Union. Lagos temporarily suspended crude oil sales to Ghana following the Rawlings coup because of payment arrears of over \$120 million. Ghana agreed to repay its debt over an 18-month period in exchange for future oil shipments with 90-day credit terms. However, more recently, Nigeria once again suspended Ghanaian sales because of Ghana's failure to meet the revised payment schedule. Ghana's relations with Lagos have been strained further by Nigeria's recent expulsion of undocumented aliens which could result in the influx of as many as 2 million unwanted Ghanaian refugees.

Relations with Ghana's immediate neighbors--Togo, Upper Volta, and Ivory Coast--have been strained since Ghana closed its land borders last September. Ghanaian troops sent to guard the border killed or injured a number of Togolese citizens, leading to threats of retaliation by the Togolese government. In mid-October Togo, Upper Volta, and Ivory Coast sent a joint demarche to Rawlings threatening to close their own borders if Ghana did not reopen its borders in accordance with the freedom of movement rules of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In November Ghanaian Foreign Minister Asamoah visited Upper Volta and Ivory Coast to announce a limited reopening of the border. The border with Togo was temporarily reopened earlier this year to refugees from Nigeria.

Implications for the US

The Rawlings regime's relations with the West are based on a dichotomy. On the one hand is a growing awareness that virtually all of Ghana's economic assistance comes from the West and that Ghana cannot do without that assistance for the foreseeable future. On the other hand the Rawlings regime believes that Ghana's problems are caused by Western imperialism.

That dichotomy will provide the context for Ghana's relations with the US in the months ahead. The regime will continue to press for US assistance, but will hope to get it without conditions such as devaluation or politically unacceptable austerity programs. On the political level, the US will continue to be the target of criticism whenever the regime feels threatened or needs an external scapegoat. At the same time, because of ideological affinities, Ghana will side with other radical states on international issues in which the US has a stake.

Some Ghanaian economic advisers have expressed the belief that economic desperation sooner or later will force the regime to renew closer cooperation with the West in order to obtain support for new economic stabilization measures. Given the quickening pace of Ghana's economic deterioration, however, stabilization measures would fail to halt the economic decline even

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if massive Western aid were available immediately. Moreover, as long as politics drives economic policy, which has been the case throughout the life of the regime so far, Ghana is likely to forego economic reforms required by Western-backed financial institutions. Such a policy would be based on the belief that the US and other Western donors would continue to supply enough bilateral assistance--mainly food--to allow the regime to survive.*

The aimless drift of the Rawlings regime over the past year has resulted in a cautious Soviet and Soviet-allied policy toward Ghana. Nevertheless, recent increases in Libyan military assistance and Moscow's revived interest in economic and technical cooperation suggest a growing willingness to support Ghana's radical orientation. Should the regime begin to consolidate its position, Moscow and its allies most likely would be encouraged to respond with additional military and technical assistance.

Moreover, without measurable economic relief--which the new economic plan is not likely to provide--the regime will be forced to become increasingly repressive and Western, particularly US, offers of assistance conceivably could be overshadowed by Ghana's growing reliance on Moscow, Tripoli and Havana. In an effort to shift blame for its economic failures, the regime may become increasingly hostile toward the West in general and the US in particular, possibly endangering US citizens and interests.

*The US supplied Ghana with \$23 million worth of assistance in 1981, 80 percent of which was food. In 1982, more than 3,000 metric tons of food were delivered to Ghana under the PL 480 program.

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ANNEX

Jerry John RAWLINGS

Former Air Force Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings is serving as head of state for the second time. He came to power by leading military coups in both instances. In June 1979 he and a group of junior military officers ousted the Supreme Military Council headed by Frederick Akuffo. Rawlings subsequently ruled as Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council until September 1979, when he allowed the country to proceed with already scheduled presidential and legislative elections. Ghana returned to civilian rule under President Hilla Limann, whom Rawlings deposed in December 1981. When questioned about the possibility of a return to civilian rule, Rawlings has firmly stated that he has no intention of handing over power as he did in 1979.

Rawlings entered the Ghana Military Service as a cadet in 1967, after having attended primary and secondary schools in Accra. He went to flight training school in 1968 and was commissioned as a pilot officer in 1969. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1970 and to flight lieutenant in 1978. He retired from the Air Force in November 1979.

Rawlings, 34, is the son of a Scottish father and an Ewe mother. An excellent polo player, he also enjoys other sports. Rawlings speaks fluent English and several tribal languages, including Ewe, Twi, and Ga. He is Catholic. Married, he has two children.

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