



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

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# **Trends in the Horn of Africa**

**Special National Intelligence Estimate  
Memorandum to Holders**

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*SNIE 76-81  
27 September 1983*

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## MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS

SNIE 76-81

### TRENDS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

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## SCOPE NOTE

The purpose of this Memorandum to Holders is to assess developments in the Horn of Africa since the publication of SNIE 76-81, *Conflicts in the Horn of Africa*, in June 1981, and to estimate the trends likely to affect the interests of the United States in that area over the next two years.

SNIE 76-81 dealt primarily with the conflicts in the Horn: Somali efforts to wrest the Ogaden from Ethiopia; Somali irredentist claims on territory in Kenya and Djibouti; and separatist insurgencies in northern Ethiopia. That Estimate also assessed in some detail the roles of the USSR and Cuba in support of Marxist Ethiopia and the relationship between Soviet activities and objectives in Ethiopia and broader Soviet strategic policies and goals.

At the time of the 1981 Estimate, the involvement of the United States in the area was modest and was largely keyed to the new military access agreements with Somalia and Kenya and to the preservation of other pro-Western governments in the states bordering on Ethiopia. Sudan and Kenya were judged at that time to be relatively stable. The most dramatic changes since the publication of SNIE 76-81 have been the political and economic deterioration of the pro-Western countries of the area, and the much greater—and still growing—US involvement in support of these regimes that in turn support US goals in the region. US military and economic aid to Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya has almost tripled since 1981. The United States is also improving port and airfield facilities in Kenya and Somalia, largely to facilitate CENTCOM planning for contingency operations in the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf areas. Joint military exercises are held with Sudanese, Kenyan, and Somali personnel.

Soviet support of Ethiopia remains substantial and a sizable Cuban military force is still in Ethiopia. The Soviet military advisory presence has grown since the last Estimate, and Soviet efforts to promote the political and ideological indoctrination of Ethiopians have increased. The Soviets continue to use Ethiopian facilities to support their Indian Ocean naval squadron, and apparently are asking for more. The Libyan role in the Horn has also increased in the past two years, in part because of the Tripartite Pact (Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen). In addition to focusing on the growing and more complex role of the United States,

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this Memorandum updates the assessment of the activities of the Soviets, Libyans, and Cubans in the Horn area, and the probable impact of their presence on US interests there. It also addresses Soviet objectives in the Horn area and the likelihood of further Soviet successes.

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## KEY JUDGMENTS

The principal developments in the Horn of Africa of concern to the United States since the publication in 1981 of SNIE 76-81, *Conflicts in the Horn of Africa*, are:

- Increasing signs of instability in pro-Western states (Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya) where the United States has pre-positioning and military access arrangements.
- A much greater US involvement in attempting to shore up the economies and the military establishments of the pro-Western states that support our regional objectives.
- The continuing strong Soviet and Cuban presence and influence in Ethiopia.

All of Ethiopia's neighbors—Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti—are looking to the West, especially to the United States but also to moderate Arabs, for military and economic support. They are nervous about the strong Soviet and Cuban presence in the Horn; they seek help in meeting massive foreign debts; and they need considerable military aid to defend their borders and—in Sudan and Somalia—counter internal discontent.

The national rulers preside over troubled tribal and clan societies, and rely upon relatively weak and poorly armed military establishments. Discontent is rising in Sudan, particularly in the south; traditional clan and subclan warfare in Somalia is intensifying; tribal tensions and discontent with President Moi have become more pronounced in Kenya; and the reduced French budgetary support to Djibouti is adding to the frictions among the tribal elements of that fragile society.

All of these states provide military access or pre-positioning facilities to the United States with little or no formal quid pro quo. The United States, however, has had to take a leading role in the debt rescheduling program for Sudan and in the economic support of Kenya and Somalia. The United States has also become a principal military supplier to Kenya and Somalia and is a major source of arms to Sudan. US economic and military aid to Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya has risen from \$230 million in FY 1981 to a projected \$644 million in FY 1984.

The pro-Western leaders in the region will ask for larger amounts of military aid to curb internal dissidents and, in the case of Sudan and



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Somalia, to satisfy their restless military establishments as well as to defend their borders against Ethiopian or Libyan threats. They will also require much more financial help for their sagging economies and may tend to link this aid to the continued US use of the facilities. They are likely to do less to resolve their own problems, and to rely more on the United States.

In sum, the costs to the United States of maintaining the facilities and access rights in the pro-Western Horn countries are certain to rise—whether or not the present governments remain in power. Some of these leaders are already forming an exaggerated perception of the value of their countries to the United States and of the willingness of the United States to bail them out. Over the short term, the United States will be pressed to provide increasing amounts of economic and military assistance and to be more aggressive in encouraging international institutions and private concerns to provide aid and investment. Over the longer term, perhaps even within the next several years, the pro-Western states in the Horn may attempt to extract rental payments for use of their facilities.

The dangers of large-scale invasions by Ethiopia or Libya to the pro-Western countries are considerably less than the threats to the existing regimes from internal discontent and disorders, stimulated in some cases by Ethiopians and/or Libyans. Given the rising instability in these countries, the positions of the current leaders are likely to become more tenuous in the next two years. In most cases the likely successors to the current leaders would be inclined to pursue a pro-Western policy. There is little likelihood of a pro-Soviet government coming to power in any of these countries, but a successor regime might seek a more nonaligned posture, and thus create new problems for US military planners.

The perennial conflicts in the Horn of Africa are no nearer to resolution than they were two years ago, and continue to tie the Ethiopians closely to the Soviets. Chairman Mengistu needs a continuing flow of Soviet arms for his repeated, unsuccessful assaults on Eritrean and Tigrean guerrillas and for maintaining control over the reconquered Ogaden. The combined forces of the Ethiopian Army and Somali dissidents continue to enjoy superiority over Somali forces along the disputed Ethiopian-Somali border. But, despite the discouraging military situation and US counsels of restraint, hope of regaining the Ogaden is still a key factor in Somali national policy. Mengistu will maintain pressure along the border and order limited cross-border

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strikes, but is not likely to undertake a large-scale invasion in the next year or two.

The Eritrean and Tigrean insurgents in northern Ethiopia are well organized and strongly motivated. They can probably hold their mountainous strongholds and inflict casualties on the Ethiopian Army for the next several years. Mengistu, by refusing to negotiate in good faith with the rebels, leaves himself with no choice but to continue a costly conflict.

Mengistu is in firm control over the Ethiopian Government, but depends upon Soviet arms and advisers, a force of some 9,000 Cubans, and several thousand Soviet, Cuban, and East European military, political, and economic advisers in his efforts to consolidate power and transform Haile Selassie's feudal empire into a centralized Marxist-Leninist state. Mengistu has chosen the Soviet model, rather than had it imposed upon him. He has set a timetable for the establishment of an Ethiopian Communist Party (September 1984) and intends to dominate it through a clique of trusted aides, mostly military officers.

Mengistu seeks drought and refugee relief and specific aid projects from the West, but is willing to make only minor concessions in return. Ethiopia's pressing need for much greater economic assistance (which it is not getting from the Soviets) suggests that there might be an opportunity for the United States to affect the pace—but not the direction—of leftward trends in Ethiopia over the next two years. Yet even substantial US or Western economic aid would have little influence upon Mengistu so long as the northern insurgencies drag on, tensions remain high along the Somali border, and the United States continues to back Somalia militarily.

There appears to be no significant threat to Mengistu's position. His sudden demise, however, would bring prolonged confusion and a power struggle within the armed forces, probably along ideological lines. The successor regime would probably be equally dependent on the Soviets and Cubans, but not necessarily their choice.

Libyan involvement in affairs in the Horn has increased since the 1981 signing of the Tripartite Pact (Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen). The Pact has afforded Qadhafi enhanced opportunities for pursuing his goals of overthrowing the Sudanese and Somali Governments and for thwarting US regional objectives. The Pact was never fully implemented, but it has brought to Ethiopia some \$320 million in financial aid from Libya. The current problems between Mengistu and Qadhafi, stemming from the recent contentious meeting of the Organization of

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African Unity (OAU), the Libyan invasion of Chad, and the currently strained relations between Libya and South Yemen illustrate the differences in the respective national and personal goals of Pact members, and the great difficulty for even a radical regime to sustain any kind of close relationship with Qadhafi. Ethiopia and Libya are still likely to collaborate on limited programs where there is a convergence of interest. Mengistu and Qadhafi have long been in agreement on using Somali dissidents to promote the downfall of Siad, but Qadhafi is far more intent than is Mengistu about subverting Sudan.

Some 9,000 Cuban troops and advisers remain in Ethiopia, mostly in the Ogaden. At the present time, the Cuban presence constitutes a strategic reserve against the possibility of a new Somali invasion, but there is little military need for it. While the Cubans have not been engaged in combat for five years, they retain their original operational capabilities. It is unlikely that all of them will return to Cuba within the next two years, primarily because of the Mengistu regime's concern for the overall security situation in Ethiopia. There is also the possibility they could be used in Angola and perhaps even Mozambique.

Soviet activity in the Horn, which began when the Soviets seized on Somalia's need for arms some 20 years ago, suggests the following policy objectives:

- Exploitation of Ethiopian military needs to establish a firmer patron-client relationship and to consolidate Soviet influence in the Ethiopian Government.
- Use of Ethiopian territory to facilitate the projection of Soviet naval and naval air power into the Arabian Sea-Indian Ocean region and the oil-rich Persian Gulf area.
- Use of military and political influence in the Horn to undermine perceived US strategic policies.
- Expansion of Soviet influence by encouraging leftist change and weakening pro-Western governments in black Africa and in the Red Sea area.

The seriousness of Soviet interest and involvement in the Horn is underscored by the large Soviet, East European, and Cuban advisory presence in Ethiopia and by Moscow's provision of some \$4 billion in military assistance to be delivered by 1985. While Moscow's current position hinges on Ethiopia's military needs and Mengistu's ideological preferences, the Soviets are also trying to institutionalize their relationship and influence to prevent a future setback similar to those suffered in Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia in the 1970s. A key Soviet goal has been

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the establishment of a Communist party in Ethiopia through which Moscow could cultivate a reliable cadre of civilian supporters.

Soviet and East European economic advisers are increasing in numbers and influence in the Ethiopian Government and some 5,600 Ethiopian students are being trained in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Soviet ideologues are indoctrinating potential Ethiopian Communist party members, and the Soviet military advisory presence has expanded in the past two years from some 1,400 to roughly 1,700. Despite these Soviet inroads, Mengistu has proved to be a less-than-pliant client, whose version of a Marxist-Leninist state will probably fall short of Soviet expectations. He has thwarted the Soviets on issues of interest to Moscow, and the Ethiopians complain about deficiencies in Soviet economic assistance, spare parts problems, and Moscow's refusal to grant various types of military and technical training.

These frictions may be exacerbated over the next few years, as Ethiopia is scheduled to begin in 1984 major military debt repayments to the USSR of \$200 million a year—an amount it almost certainly cannot meet. There will be some hard bargaining, squabbling, and increased tensions, including some venting of Ethiopian nationalistic and xenophobic feelings. Nonetheless, we believe the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship will remain solid, because each side needs the other. Ethiopia is the USSR's key client in the important Horn of Africa and Moscow is the only source for Ethiopia's continuing military requirements. Hence, while the Soviets may be only partially successful in further consolidating their influence in Addis Ababa, they will retain a strong position with little likelihood of any real setback in the next few years.

The USSR has made mixed progress on its second objective, the improvement of access to Ethiopian facilities to enhance the projection of Soviet power into the Arabian Sea-Red Sea-Indian Ocean areas. Facilities now available appear to be adequate for current Soviet needs. But, according to a source with good access, the Soviets now seem intent on expanding their access. Since the visit of Admiral Gorshkov to Ethiopia and South Yemen in March 1983, the Soviets have apparently requested of both governments permission to expand or develop new facilities. Mengistu has rejected or postponed several Soviet proposals, but has agreed to the addition of some 70 Soviet technicians to the several hundred already at Dahlak Island.

It seems likely that the Soviet efforts to enhance their naval support facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen apparently are designed to advance the overall strategic aims of projecting military power into

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distant areas and to counter CENTCOM activities in the Horn area—the third major objective of Soviet policy. The Soviets probably believe that the United States has extensive plans for future access and deployment in the Horn area and that a key US objective is to neutralize the Soviet military presence in the Horn of Africa. Mengistu almost certainly sees US policies in the Horn as an effort to encircle and eventually threaten his emerging Marxist state in Ethiopia. The Soviets will keep a close eye on any port and airfield improvements in Somalia and Kenya carried out by US contractors, and will keep the pressure on Mengistu for permission to expand present facilities and perhaps to develop new ones.

On the Soviets' fourth objective—the expansion of Soviet influence in black Africa and the Red Sea area—they are not likely to make much headway in the next two years. They will expect Mengistu to use his position as Chairman of the OAU to advance Soviet causes and denounce the United States. Mengistu is likely to please them on occasion, but may find it convenient for his own purposes to appear evenhanded at other times.

The Soviets probably realize that their best chance to expand influence in the Horn is to exploit the instability of the pro-Western countries there. The previous experience of Sudan and Somalia with the USSR has left unpleasant memories, and Soviet military backing of Ethiopia and Libya virtually rules out a closer connection with the USSR. Other moderate black African states have severe security and economic problems, and are aware of the inability of the USSR to deliver on promises of economic aid. These governments are shaky and some may not survive the next couple of years, but the successor regimes in the currently pro-US Horn countries are not likely to be pro-Soviet or pro-Libyan.

Mengistu's dependence on Soviet military assistance, the debt owed to Moscow, and his concern over US intentions are likely to lead him to yield to Moscow's desires for continued and perhaps more extensive use of military facilities in Ethiopia. On balance, however, the Soviets are unlikely to achieve all of the above objectives over the next two years.

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## DISCUSSION

## US Interests and Involvement in the Horn of Africa

1. The countries of the Horn of Africa have very little intrinsic value to the United States. They have few natural resources and are too poor to constitute a significant market for US exports. Nonetheless, they are of major and increasing importance to US strategic planners for three reasons:

- The Horn of Africa is a key choke point on a major East-West naval and trade passage (the Suez-Red Sea-Indian Ocean route) and is adjacent to the oil-rich and potentially turbulent states of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf.
- Ethiopia's pro-Western neighbors have agreed to provide the United States with access to certain ports and airfields, and in the case of Sudan, to allow the United States to pre-position military equipment for contingency planning. The United States is spending over \$100 million on military construction to improve facilities in Kenya and Somalia. Access rights in the Horn of Africa are an essential part of the larger CENTCOM responsibility for rapid deployment in response to security threats to Saudi Arabia and the moderate Arab oil-producing states in the Gulf.
- The USSR is exploiting both its considerable arms aid to Ethiopia and the Ethiopian regime's affinity for Marxism-Leninism in order to consolidate the preeminent Soviet influence in that country, and to maintain and improve its naval support facilities in the area.

2. Because of these broader concerns, the United States is supplying modest but increasing amounts of military aid and is acting both unilaterally and with international consortia to shore up the faltering economies of the friendly states. US military and economic aid to Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya has soared from \$230 million in FY 1981 to \$644 million projected for FY 1984. (See table 1.) The United States is also trying to bolster the self-confidence of the military and

**Table 1** *Million US\$*  
**US Economic and Military Assistance,**  
**FY 1981-84**

	1981 <sup>a</sup>	1982 <sup>a</sup>	1983 <sup>a</sup>	1984 <sup>b</sup>
<b>Somalia</b>				
<b>Total</b>	<b>40.3</b>	<b>84.4</b>	<b>109.1</b>	<b>156.0</b>
<b>Economic</b>	<b>20.0</b>	<b>39.0</b>	<b>60.0</b>	<b>80.0</b>
<b>Military</b>	<b>20.3</b>	<b>25.4</b>	<b>28.1</b>	<b>41.0</b>
Military Assistance Program	0	15.0	15.0	40.0
Foreign Military Sales (credit)	20.0	10.0	12.5	0
International Military Education and Training	0.3	0.4	0.6	1.0
Economic Support Funds	0	20.0	21.0	35.0
<b>Kenya</b>				
<b>Total</b>	<b>32.0</b>	<b>87.7</b>	<b>109.9</b>	<b>158.7</b>
<b>Economic</b>	<b>20.0</b>	<b>39.0</b>	<b>60.0</b>	<b>80.0</b>
<b>Military</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>38.0</b>	<b>19.9</b>	<b>36.7</b>
Military Assistance Program	0	15.0	8.5	23.0
Foreign Military Sales (credit)	6.0	22.0	10.0	12.0
International Military Education and Training	0.5	1.0	1.4	1.7
Economic Support Funds	5.5	10.7	30.0	42.0
<b>Sudan</b>				
<b>Total</b>	<b>157.3</b>	<b>276.2</b>	<b>261.5</b>	<b>329.5</b>
<b>Economic</b>	<b>75.0</b>	<b>125.0</b>	<b>135.0</b>	<b>148.0</b>
<b>Military</b>	<b>32.3</b>	<b>51.2</b>	<b>44.3</b>	<b>61.5</b>
Military Assistance Program	1.7	0	43.0	60.0
Foreign Military Sales (credit)	30.0	50.0	0	0
International Military Education and Training	0.6	1.2	1.3	1.5
Economic Support Funds	50.0	100.0	82.2	120.0

<sup>a</sup> Actual disbursements.

<sup>b</sup> Proposed commitments.


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Figure 1  
The Horn of Africa



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civilian elites of these countries and sustain their pro-Western attitudes through a variety of tangible and intangible gestures of US support.

3. As the domestic political, security, and financial problems of the friendly governments have worsened in the past year or two, these governments have come to depend on the United States as their primary source of support. The risks of misunderstanding are rising, and our friends may assume a far greater willingness and ability on the part of the US Government to come to their aid in extreme circumstances than might prove warranted given the current constraints on US military and economic assistance.

#### Pro-Western States of the Horn

4. All of the states bordering on Ethiopia—Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, and Somalia—have cast their lot with the West. The United States has military access agreements with Kenya and Somalia, a pre-positioning accord with Sudan, and an informal understanding with Djibouti on military use of the port and airfield. In return for use of these facilities, the United States has undertaken some specific obligations, for example, port and airfield improvements at Berbera and Mom-basa. Also, in order to preserve political stability and the pro-Western alignment of these states, the United States in the past two years has agreed to provide larger amounts of military, economic, and financial aid. In less tangible aid, the United States is giving political support to these friendly governments, and private reassurances to beleaguered rulers.

5. All of the pro-Western states are in serious financial trouble. Most of them are obliged by agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or foreign creditors to undertake domestic reforms and austerity programs which are difficult to carry out, highly unpopular, and politically risky. Ethnic-based discontent, never far beneath the surface in any of the Horn countries, has been rising in Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan, and could threaten the tenure of the current national leaders. Changes of government in countries now friendly to the United States or the eruption of new civil conflicts could threaten US interests in this area more profoundly than was the case two years ago. Pro-Western states in the Horn area do not trust each other, and frictions are especially pronounced between Kenya and Somalia and between Somalia and Djibouti. There is also a potential for serious friction between

these countries and the United States, because of their greater dependency on the United States, their heightened expectations of receiving US largesse, and growing internal pressures on national leaders.

#### Somalia

6. President Siad has held power in Somalia for 14 years, despite an attempted coup, a major defeat of his forces in the Ogaden in 1978 and subsequent military reverses, serious internal tribal fighting, and continuing economic difficulties. He has survived by applying his shrewd political instincts, manipulating the tribal balance in his favor, and crushing any sign of internal political opposition.

7. In the past few years Siad has distributed arms to favored tribes and clans for political support. These arms are often used by the tribesmen to contest grazing lands and water rights, or to settle old scores. With automatic weapons, the traditional feuds have bloodier results than they used to have, and tend to get out of control. Consequently, Siad has recently had to divert regular units of the Somali Army to intervene in tribal conflicts.

8. As a result of Siad's political reliance on individuals and tribes he regards as personally loyal, political favorites fill most key government, military, and economic positions. Corruption and inefficiency adversely affect the economy, but sweeping reforms are unlikely for political reasons. The economy is sustained by loans and grants from Italy, West Germany, moderate Arab states, and the United States.

9. Although we estimate the chances of full-scale Ethiopian invasion of Somalia as low, such an event would have serious consequences for the US position in the Horn region, and would reduce the overall US capability to respond to CENTCOM contingencies. Even if the United States were to increase greatly its military aid to Somalia, it would be years before Somali capabilities would be sufficient for reasonable defense of the country. At the present time Somalia has expressed dissatisfaction with the level of US aid. An increase in US assistance, however, could be counterproductive, given the longstanding Somali desire to regain control of the Ogaden. Should the Somali Army actively pursue its irredentist aims with US arms, the United States would be perceived as backing a territorial aggressor, a label pinned on the Somalis over the years.

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10. Probably a more serious threat to the US position in Somalia than an Ethiopian invasion would be a collapse of public security in the northern area where US contractors are starting to improve the airfield and expand the port at Berbera. The major northern clan, which has long been at odds with the Siad regime, is increasingly restive. The Ethiopian-backed Somali National Movement (SNM) insurgents have fostered the dissidence, and an oppressive military commander in the north has further antagonized the populace. Siad visited the region in early 1983 and managed to restore temporarily some confidence in his government by conciliatory gestures. Since then tribal fighting has continued, partly because Siad has failed to fulfill his commitments. In addition, tribal conflict has intensified along the central border area in the last year.

11. If Siad does not survive the next two years in office, the most likely cause of his downfall would be a coup by members of the armed forces, perhaps including some in his inner circle. They would consider removing Siad if the internal tribal conflicts get out of hand, if successful Ethiopian and dissident raids along the border continue, or if the military conclude that Siad is not likely to get the amounts of military aid from the United States that they deem as vital.

12. Any replacement of Siad would be either an Army officer or a civilian with strong Army backing. The successor would, of necessity, seek to maintain the flow of external aid, which would mean at least at the outset maintaining good relations with the United States, Western Europe, and the moderate Arabs. Most senior and middle-grade military officers have unpleasant memories of the earlier Soviet presence and would be reluctant to take that route. Less is known about the political orientation of more junior officers. We believe, however, that the replacement of Siad would not necessarily endanger the US position or US interests in Somalia, at least over the near term, but would lead to increased pressure for sophisticated arms.

#### Sudan

13. President Nimeiri has governed for as long as Siad, and has survived challenges from political foes and rivals in the Army and Libyan efforts to remove him. Like Siad, Nimeiri relies on his political instincts,

the loyalties of a circle of trusted advisers, and the support of the Army. In fact, the armed forces present the primary threat to Nimeiri.

14. Since the last estimate, the Sudanese economy has continued to decline. The enormous foreign debt (about \$8 billion), the worldwide recession, and persistent drought have stymied efforts to revive the economy. The debt service ratio is well over 100 percent. Sudan's economic woes stem from years of government mismanagement and are not likely to improve over the next two to three years. Oil, discovered by Chevron exploratory teams in southern Sudan, will not help the economy until the pipeline to the Red Sea is completed in the late 1980s. The IMF is providing assistance in debt rescheduling, but the currency devaluations and austerity measures that the IMF requires may generate additional discontent. In the past, Sudanese have taken to the streets to demonstrate displeasure with governmental performance, and they may do so again without forewarning. Such demonstrations, if persistent, could bring about the downfall of Nimeiri if the Army concluded that the President had lost his political touch.

15. Nimeiri has long contended with an array of domestic political foes, ranging from the conservative Ansars and the Muslim Brotherhood to the secular National Unionist Party and the Sudan Communist Party. The Communists are rebounding from losses caused by government repression in the 1970s, and are gaining members among students and trade unionists. They are not a significant threat to Nimeiri and party leaders do not now advocate his overthrow. Nimeiri tolerates a certain level of political opposition, so long as the factions do not unite, but is quick to repress groups that appear to constitute a threat to his regime.

16. The recent invasion of Chad by Libya and Libyan-sponsored Chadian rebels is threatening to Nimeiri. He is particularly concerned that the Abeche area of eastern Chad, near the Sudanese border, might come under Libyan influence. On the Sudan side of the border the tribal groups of Darfur Province have long been neglected by Khartoum. Nimeiri fears that the accumulated grievances of the Darfur populace could be exploited by Qadhafi's agents, and that the Darfur inhabitants might form dissident bands to oppose the Sudanese Government. Bands of Sudanese dissidents, trained and armed in Libya, form part of the rebel force in Chad. Some of these dissidents may

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be Darfur tribesmen. Nimeiri's armed forces and police are thinly scattered around Sudan, and would be hard pressed to cope with discontent in western Sudan at the same time that internal security problems are increasing in the south. In the event of an overt Libyan attack or a Libyan-directed insurgency in Darfur, Egypt would almost certainly come to the aid of Sudan, in accordance with the Sudan-Egypt military pact and traditional Egyptian concern over keeping Sudan out of unfriendly hands.

17. Although Nimeiri ended the prolonged north-south Sudanese civil war 10 years ago, the less advantaged southerners feel discriminated against by the Muslim north. Nimeiri has vacillated over policy towards the southerners for years, but in the spring of 1983 he took a tougher approach, implementing a plan to divide the south into three regions and deciding to rotate southern military units to the north. Some of the southern tribes view these as hostile acts and a betrayal by Nimeiri. Dissidence is clearly rising in the south. This has been sparked by a series of mutinies by southern Army units against orders transferring them to the north; while these mutinies were not a reaction to political issues, they have added to the ranks of the dissidents. Both Libya and Ethiopia support the training of small bands of Sudanese dissidents in Ethiopia. Some of these groups may be involved in the anti-northern activities in southern Sudan.

18. The unrest in the south is unfocused and confused and may not reach the dimensions of civil war. Nonetheless, the deterioration of central government authority in southern Sudan, if unchecked, would cause severe strains in the Sudanese military. Northern officers and troops do not relish the idea of becoming an army of occupation in the south. If such a policy were implemented, some would question the wisdom of Nimeiri's policies. Indeed, such a move could unite southern dissidents and would worsen the security situation. The chances of a coup against Nimeiri by factions within the Army would grow considerably if the southern situation got out of control, requiring many more northern troops in the south, or if the economic decline in the country worsened noticeably. Nimeiri recognizes that the Army is the arbiter of power and he has kept the military well paid and well housed, but this may not guarantee their loyalty under more adverse circumstances.

19. If Nimeiri were displaced by an Army coup, his successor would almost certainly be either a military officer or a ranking member of the present Cabinet. The Vice President is the constitutional successor but he is not popular with the Army. Most senior officers share Nimeiri's pro-Western and pro-American views. They might, however, seek to redefine the relationship with the United States in order to gain more benefits in return for the pre-positioning rights.

20. If discontented junior officers were to overthrow Nimeiri, there is less assurance that the successor regime would be as friendly to the United States. The attitudes of junior officers are not clear, and US military observers believe they are vulnerable to recruitment by opposition groups. Those junior officers with Ansar or Brotherhood links might seek to distance Sudan from both Egypt and the United States, and would take a more nonaligned posture with closer ties to Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states. Some junior officers who adhere to fundamentalist Muslim beliefs might even seek closer relations with Libya and other radical Islamic states. There is little likelihood of a pro-Soviet government coming to power in Sudan in the next couple of years, but a successor government with strong nonaligned views would seek a more balanced role between the United States and the USSR, and this would create major problems for US strategic planners.

#### Djibouti

21. Djibouti, independent only since 1977, is still in many respects a French dependency. The French own and operate most of the economy, manage the government ministries, and exert a strong cultural influence. France provides budget subsidies, including nearly half of the Djiboutian military budget, and trains and supplies the tiny Djiboutian Army. France also maintains its own forces—some 3,700 Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel—which are committed to the defense of Djiboutian territory.

22. Djibouti has a strategic value to France as the main base of the French Indian Ocean fleet and as a sea and air link between metropolitan France and the French islands and interests in the Indian Ocean. Hence, despite budgetary stringencies, the French are likely to maintain their military and political presence in Djibouti for the next several years, and perhaps longer. The French hope that their presence in Djibouti

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bouti will keep the area from becoming part of the worldwide confrontation between the superpowers. France, however, is already trimming the annual budget subventions to Djibouti (by 10 percent in 1983).

23. The French and Djiboutians welcome US naval port calls and fueling stops and permit the United States to use Djibouti's military airfield for reconnaissance and surveillance missions. These arrangements are ad hoc and informal and no payment is involved. The Djiboutians, however, are now looking for increased aid from the United States to offset the reductions in French subsidies. If they do not receive what they think is a proper level of US aid, they are likely to charge for the use of their facilities. Although the French realize they cannot provide all the aid the Djiboutians desire, they will be wary of opening the door to an increase in US influence. Paris would prefer some arrangement in which the United States provides assistance while still recognizing that France has the predominant interest in Djibouti.

24. The Djiboutian population is mainly Issas (ethnic Somalis) and Afars (a nomadic tribe living mostly in Ethiopia). There is no indication yet that the Afar-Issa political balance, now weighted in favor of the Issas, is in danger. But there is likely to be considerably more tribal squabbling as the government comes to grips with financial reality. Djiboutian officials are often irritated and embarrassed by the dominant French presence, but they know that they cannot get along without it. They are not likely to turn to the Soviets or to Libya for aid because of their own political conservatism and because the French and moderate Arab states would oppose it.

#### Kenya

25. Since the last estimate, Kenya's political and economic stability has eroded considerably. The abortive coup of August 1982, in which junior-ranking personnel of the Kenyan Air Force attempted to overthrow President Moi, has left political scars. Moi lacks the self-confidence and political skills of his predecessor, Jomo Kenyatta, and since the attempted coup has focused unduly on imagined plots and conspiracies. He is attempting to fashion a new ruling elite based on a coalition of leaders of some of the previously underrepresented tribes (Kamba, Luhya, and Kalenjin). By systematically excluding key politicians of the larger tribes (Kikuyu and Luo) from the

centers of power, he risks alienating the best educated and most politically sophisticated segments of the population. The Kikuyu have dominated Kenyan politics since independence and are not likely to accept the role of outsiders without mounting some kind of challenge. Thus, the outlook is for an increasingly troubled political and security scene in Nairobi.

26. The growing political malaise is fed by the deterioration of the Kenyan economy. In the past few years the combination of depressed world prices for coffee and tea, higher imported fuel costs, mismanagement of parastatal corporations, mounting current account deficits, and increasing foreign debts have plunged Kenya's once-promising economy into a state of continuing crisis. IMF programs and emergency funding from Western donors have helped stave off a collapse, but related austerity measures have aggravated Moi's political problems.

27. Even if the temporary financial crises are weathered, the long-range outlook is bleak. The modern sector of the economy is declining, and restrictions on imports are severely affecting industrial production. Moreover, the rate of population increase in Kenya is among the world's highest (about 4.1 percent a year), and arable land is already in short supply. Population pressures are intensifying the political and economic unrest and are manifested in the rising urban unemployment and crime rates.

28. Keeping the Kenyan economy afloat will become an increasingly costly burden for the Western donors, mainly the United Kingdom and the United States. The main benefit to the United States will be the continued Kenyan support for US regional security objectives, particularly the use of Mombasa port and airfield facilities by the US military. The Kenyans will also expect a continuation of the modest military grant program now in effect, and will almost certainly ask for a great deal more. The Kenyans are slowly rebuilding their air defense system and will look primarily to the United States as the supplier to help rebuild the Air Force, which was placed under Army control after the attempted coup in 1982.

29. Kenya is not seriously threatened by any external power but feels isolated in East Africa. Moi's relations with President Obote of Uganda and President Nyerere of Tanzania have been troubled in the past, but the three leaders are now seeking better

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rapport. The Somalis are in no position to renew their old claims on Kenya's Northeast Province. Moi and other Kenyans are uneasy about US military aid to Somalia, despite recent US-sponsored movements toward a rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia. Kenyans are also uneasy about the long-term threat posed by Ethiopian military power and the Ethiopian-Soviet alliance.

30. Moi will continue to follow a generally pro-Western foreign policy, but he is erratic and insecure. Hence, US relations with Kenya are likely to be subject to occasional misunderstandings and Moi will need periodic reassurance and gestures of US support. He is likely to face continued domestic political turbulence and some hard economic decisions. If the military were to believe that he was not ruling effectively, or that popular discontent arising from tribal strife or economic deterioration were getting out of hand, it would consider seizing power. If Kenya were governed by senior military figures or by some factional leader supported by the military, the basic pro-Western orientation would be unchanged.

#### Current Status of the Conflicts in the Horn of Africa

##### Ogaden

31. The combined forces of the Ethiopian Army and Somali dissidents continue to demonstrate superiority over Somali forces along the disputed Ethiopian-Somali border. In the summer of 1982 the Ethiopians and Somali dissidents conducted a successful limited offensive and seized two border towns which they still hold. Mengistu believed at that time that the Siad regime would collapse if dealt a military defeat. Ethiopian operations in the area are also aimed at discouraging forays by Somali regular forces and ethnic Somali guerrillas into Ethiopian territory. Ethiopian forces continue to be deployed throughout the Ogaden, remain sufficiently strong to deter a major Somali offensive, and can attack Somalia at will.

32. Siad is embarrassed by the inability of his forces to retaliate effectively. Despite his public pronouncements in early 1983 when he appeared to disclaim any territorial designs upon his neighbors, Siad still holds the view shared by most Somalis that a prime national goal of the Somali Republic is eventually to bring together under one flag all Somalis and all Somali-

inhabited territory. This Greater Somalia concept implies the absorption of the Ogaden, as well as the Northeast Province of Kenya and most of Djibouti. In practice, however, Somali objectives are now restricted to the Ogaden. Even if Siad wanted to abandon the historical claim to Ethiopian territory, political considerations would dictate otherwise. Siad and his ruling circle are unwilling to drop the issue because they depend too heavily upon the political support of the Somali clans that inhabit or spill over into the Ogaden. Thus, despite the discouraging military situation and US counsels of restraint, the hope of regaining the Ogaden is still a key factor in Somali policy.

33. The Ogaden dispute is complicated by the activities of Somali insurgents sponsored by both Ethiopia and Somalia. The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), suffering from factionalism and reduced support from Mogadishu, has declined in effectiveness and morale in the past two years, but still sporadically harasses Ethiopian convoys and patrols inside the Ogaden. If the Somali Government continues its present efforts to bolster the effectiveness of the WSLF, the Ethiopians are likely to be provoked into retaliation.

34. On the other side, two guerrilla groups are attacking targets in Somalia. The Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF), composed mostly of Majertain clansmen, who are political enemies of Siad, played a major role in the Ethiopian offensive of 1982. The SDSF is strongly anti-American as well as anti-Siad, is trained and funded by Ethiopia and Libya, but is regarded by most other Somalis as a self-serving tribal interest group. It is likely to cause further localized disruption by its raids into Somalia, but does not have the military power or the popular support to topple the Siad regime by its own efforts.

35. A newer, and perhaps greater, threat to Siad is the Somali National Movement (SNM), drawn from major clans in northern Somalia. The SNM is smaller than the SDSF and has resisted the urgings of Libya and Ethiopia to merge with its rival. Operating inside northern Somalia with Ethiopian arms, funds, and logistic support, the SNM successfully exploits traditional northern distrust of Siad and his mainly southern ruling circle.

36. Mengistu probably expects Siad's internal troubles to mount and either bring about his downfall or at

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the least keep him from any further adventures in the Ogaden. Mengistu realizes that an Ethiopian invasion would rally the Somali clans to Siad. Also, he is aware of the resupply operation by the United States and its allies to Somalia last summer, and may believe that the United States would take even stronger measures in the event of a major Ethiopian offensive. Neither Mengistu nor the Soviets would want to precipitate an extensive major conflict, possibly involving the United States directly, particularly when the counterinsurgency campaigns in northern Ethiopia are not going well. Moreover, in his new role as Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Mengistu sees an opportunity to gain acceptance as a senior African leader. A blatant invasion of a neighboring state would tarnish his new image and violate one of the guiding principles of the OAU charter (inviolability of borders). None of these considerations will deter Mengistu from launching limited border strikes by the Ethiopian Army or dispatching bands of dissident Somalis into Somalia to stir up dissension and embarrass the Siad regime, but we estimate that Ethiopia will not undertake an overt invasion in the next year or two.

#### The Eritrean and Tigrean Insurgencies

37. Over the past two years, the Ethiopians have made virtually no headway against the northern insurgencies. A lengthy campaign in 1982, involving some 120,000 Ethiopian troops and scores of high-level Soviet advisers, failed to dislodge a far smaller Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) force from its mountain stronghold. A renewal of major offensive operations in 1983 was delayed because of the need for Ethiopian forces to contain guerrillas of the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in neighboring Tigray Province. Ethiopian tactics against both insurgent groups have been based on extensive sweep operations and massed attacks on rebel strong points. The insurgents have responded by falling back into rough terrain and ambushing the pursuers. Reports of Ethiopian use of lethal chemical warfare agents have not been substantiated.

38. Both insurgent groups are well led, well organized, and well motivated. They support each other in the field to some extent, but their motives and aims differ. Both insurgent groups style themselves Marxist-Leninist, but they get no help from any external Communist source, primarily because they are bat-

ting a Marxist-Leninist government in Addis Ababa that has the blessing of Moscow. The EPLF is not only the largest of three competing Eritrean liberation groups, but is the only effective force. Sporadic efforts by Sudan and Saudi Arabia to coordinate the activities of the Eritrean groups have failed. After 20 years of struggle, the Eritrean rebels of all groups are not likely to settle for anything less than independence for Eritrea. The most that Mengistu would offer would be some sort of semiautonomy in an Ethiopia still dominated by Amharas. There is, therefore, virtually no chance for a negotiated settlement.

39. The motives and organization of the TPLF are somewhat murkier. Tigreans have historically considered themselves the core grouping of the multiethnic Ethiopian Empire and entitled to at least coequal status with the Amhara. The TPLF, unlike the EPLF, might settle for some sort of autonomy in a federated Ethiopia. But Mengistu has already ruled out federation and refuses to compromise.

40. Mengistu is frustrated by the failure of his campaigns in the north. He is dissatisfied with some aspects of Soviet assistance, but finds it more convenient to blame neighboring Sudan for its aid to the insurgents. Sudan has actually provided only limited cross-border help to the rebels, not wanting to antagonize the militarily stronger Ethiopians and fearing that Ethiopia might promote further dissident activity by Sudanese now training in camps in Ethiopia.

41. The Tigreans and Eritreans probably can hold their positions in rugged terrain and defy the regime for the next several years. Meanwhile they are exacting a heavy toll on Ethiopian forces. The high casualty rates and frequent logistic breakdowns are affecting Army morale, as shown by the rising desertion rate (especially from the militia) and the unpopularity of the new national conscription. By refusing to negotiate in good faith with the rebels, Mengistu leaves himself with no choice but to continue the costly conflict.

#### Internal Ethiopian Developments

42. Internal developments in Ethiopia are central to nearly all of the issues and conflicts in the Horn. Ethiopia, despite its poverty and backwardness, is by far the most important country in the area in terms of population, military power, and ability to destabilize its neighbors. It is at the same time the most stable

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politically. Chairman Mengistu has consolidated decisionmaking power in his own hands, having outmaneuvered, intimidated, or eliminated all significant internal rivals. While the remnants of former political opposition groups—which are primarily Marxist—no doubt continue to harbor great animosity toward Mengistu and the military regime, they appear to have been effectively suppressed by the regime's security apparatus. Mengistu is feared and hated, but is unopposed in Addis Ababa.

43. Mengistu dominates a patchwork collection of commissars, councils, committees, and Cabinet that make up the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia. In the spring of 1983 he reshuffled the Cabinet and announced a series of steps designed to establish by September 1984 a People's Democratic Republic to be ruled by a Communist Party of Ethiopia. Mengistu has also decreed a national conscription to mobilize the population for military service, and established an Institute of Nationalities, charged with drafting a constitution that would accommodate the disparate tribal groupings, some of which are now in armed revolt.

44. The Soviets play an important advisory role in the Mengistu regime, but the recent pronouncements are in full accord with Mengistu's known aspirations. He has chosen the Soviet model, rather than had it imposed upon him. There is a considerable confluence of his aims and the Soviets' for the structure of the Ethiopian state.

45. Soviet and East European civilian advisers are assuming a larger role in the economic planning process and in the ideological indoctrination of prospective Ethiopian party officials. As a measure of the importance Moscow places on this aspect of the bilateral relationship, the Chairman of the State Planning Committee (GOSPLAN) and a Central Committee member each spent several weeks in Ethiopia earlier in 1983. Soviet suggestions, which often tend to be more advantageous to Soviet interests than those of Ethiopia, are not always accepted, but Ethiopia is so short of management skills, economic expertise, and experience in planning that the Communist advisers fill a void. Foreign Communists are also providing academic, technical, and political training to thousands of Ethiopian students in Ethiopia, the USSR, and Eastern Europe. Not all of these youth will be ideologically committed to the Soviet world view when they

fill the ranks of the Ethiopian bureaucracy, but they will be more familiar with Soviet procedures and presumably more amenable to building a collective society in the Soviet model.

46. The Ethiopian economy is in disarray, the result of political purges, on-going insurgencies, heavy military expenditures, and attempts to institute a collective system in agriculture. Hard currency reserves would be even more depleted by now were it not for Libyan funding. Mengistu recognizes the economic plight of the country, as well as the inefficiencies and corruption of the bureaucracy that add to the turmoil. His response is to exhort the bureaucracy to reform itself, to turn to his foreign Communist advisers, and to seek non-Communist foreign assistance. The Soviet Chairman of GOSPLAN, on his recent visit, counseled Mengistu to steer clear of Western loans or aid offers. Mengistu seeks drought and refugee relief and specific aid projects from the West, but is willing to make only minor concessions in return.

47. Since the last estimate the Soviet military presence in Ethiopia has risen from some 1,400 to about 1,700 personnel. Soviet advisers perform training, ideological indoctrination, logistical and maintenance functions, administer the still substantial military aid program, and accompany some Army units in field operations in the north. Roughly 9,000 Cuban troops and advisers remain in Ethiopia, mostly in the northern part of the Ogaden, where they constitute a strategic reserve against the remote possibility of a renewed Somali attack.<sup>1</sup> A Cuban unit near Addis Ababa could come to Mengistu's aid in case of an internal revolt. About a thousand Cuban civilians are assigned to diverse agricultural, medical, and small industrial projects. The Cuban military presence in its garrison status provides a measure of political support to the regime, but there is little military need for it. The Cubans have not been engaged in combat for five years but retain their operational capabilities. They are unlikely to return to Cuba any time soon, however, because of the Mengistu regime's fear of another Somali invasion and the possibility that they may be needed against the insurgencies in Angola, and perhaps even in Mozambique.

48. Mengistu's prime concerns for the next couple of years will be gaining control over the insurgent-

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controlled areas in the north and maintaining his hold on the Somali-inhabited Ogaden. Secondly, Mengistu wants to impose his own version of a centralized Marxist regime throughout an Ethiopia in which he is the dominant figure. Hence, we see virtually no chance in the next couple of years of reversing the leftward course of Ethiopia.

49. Despite Mengistu's military dependence upon the Soviets and his personal commitment to the creation of a Soviet-style state, Ethiopia's pressing need for economic assistance suggests that there might be an opportunity for the United States to affect the pace—but not the direction—of leftward trends in Ethiopia over the next two years. Yet even substantial US economic aid, which many technocrats in Addis Ababa desire, would have little political influence upon Mengistu so long as the northern insurgencies drag on, tensions remain high along the Somali border, and the United States continues to back Somalia militarily.

50. Mengistu generally moves swiftly and sometimes ruthlessly to suppress incipient discontent within the armed forces. The chances of a coup from within the military establishment are not very great. Nevertheless, continued failure of the counterinsurgency campaigns might lead one or more military figures to conclude that Mengistu should be replaced, although we have not detected any signs of plotting. The sudden demise of Mengistu, by accident or assassination, would bring considerable, and perhaps prolonged, confusion. There is no apparent successor nor any influential personality with a substantial power base. A power struggle within the armed forces would almost certainly result, probably along ideological lines. The eventual successor regime would probably be equally dependent on the Soviets and Cubans, but not necessarily their choice.

#### West European and Moderate Arab Interests in the Horn

51. Both West European and moderate Arab states have a stake in developments in the Horn of Africa. They would like to rid the area of Soviet, Cuban, and Libyan influence, but they have other interests—some at variance with those of the United States—and their tactical approaches are not always in harmony with US policies.

52. The Italians, former colonial rulers in the Horn, still have substantial investment and trade connections in the area and normally take the lead in EC economic aid negotiations with Ethiopia and Somalia. West Germany, grateful to Somalia for help in resolving a Lufthansa hijacking a few years ago, provides unilateral aid to Mogadishu, and also maintains a technical aid program in Ethiopia. The United Kingdom leads multilateral financial rescue efforts on behalf of Kenya and provides limited economic and military aid to Nairobi. In addition to the international consortium that handles Sudan's massive debt problem, a number of European states maintain bilateral aid programs in Sudan. Aid from France and the French presence are essential to Djibouti. In most respects, these activities complement the efforts of the United States to maintain a firm Western presence and commitment to the area.

53. West European policies toward Ethiopia, however, are based on premises that are at odds with US policies. Europeans believe that they can wean Mengistu away from his heavy reliance on the USSR by offering increased aid in return for some political gestures of nonalignment. In 1982 Mengistu seemed interested in establishing a dialogue with the West, and even met with the US Charge earlier this year, but remains highly suspicious of US intentions in the area. Anti-Western themes are featured in the propaganda from Addis Ababa, and there is no reason to expect that any Western overtures will accomplish much in the next couple of years.

54. Like the Europeans, the moderate Arabs want to reduce the Soviet, Cuban, and Libyan influences in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia and Egypt are uneasy about the Soviet military presence in Ethiopia, but are unwilling and unable to do much about it. The Saudis and the Gulf Cooperation Council states are usually willing to provide oil on advantageous terms to Sudan and Somalia, as they do to many other impoverished Islamic states. The Saudis and Kuwaitis also fund the purchase of some military items from Egypt on behalf of Sudan and Somalia. Egypt takes a historical and strategic interest in Sudan and would probably come to its aid if it were seriously threatened by Libyan forces or other elements hostile to Egyptian interests. But Arab aid to Somalia is often given grudgingly, especially since the decline in Arab oil revenues.

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55. Under these circumstances, the United States cannot expect more vigorous support by the Arabs for US policies in the Horn of Africa. Egypt and Oman, for reasons of their own, are supportive of CENTCOM goals. But they would not want to get directly involved in the conflicts of the Horn in support of US policy initiatives, particularly if this exposed them to retaliation by their adversaries.

### Libya <sup>2</sup>

56. Libyan involvement in affairs in the Horn has increased since the 1981 signing of the Tripartite (or Aden) Pact among Ethiopia, Libya, and South Yemen. The Pact has provided Libya with opportunities to act against Western (especially US) interests and against pro-Western governments, although the relationships among the three countries have been anything but smooth and currently the agreement is all but moribund.

57. Some of the more grandiose features of the Pact, such as the formation of a large military reserve force to be funded by Libya and available to fend off imperialist attacks on any member state, were never implemented. Nor has Libya provided all of the promised funds to Ethiopia and South Yemen. Nonetheless, each member state has gained something from the Pact. The Libyans gained the support and cooperation of Ethiopia in their efforts to topple Siad and, to a lesser extent, Nimeiri. Ethiopia received over \$320 million in financial aid from Libya, and South Yemen got some \$30 million from Libya for housing projects.

58. The Pact has become less tripartite in nature, and more a series of bilateral relationships. South Yemen's contacts with Ethiopia are close and mutually beneficial. Aden loaned Ethiopia a landing craft for operations against Eritreans, and sent prospective pilots to Ethiopia in an aborted training program. South Yemen also takes in a small number of Somali dissidents for training at the behest of Ethiopia. But Aden's relations with Libya are strained, and it is seeking external aid from the Gulf Cooperation Council states rather than from Libya. Qadhafi's rebuff at the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa, which he blames in part on

Mengistu, could further weaken the Tripartite Pact. Ethiopians are concerned that Libya might cease its financial aid to them and are trying to avoid any further damage to the relationship. Current problems between Qadhafi and Mengistu illustrate the differences in the respective national and personal goals of the leaders and the great difficulty for even a radical regime to sustain any kind of close relationship with Qadhafi.

59. Ethiopia and Libya are still likely to collaborate on limited programs where there is a convergence of interest. Mengistu and Qadhafi have long been in agreement on using Somali dissidents to promote the downfall of Siad. But Qadhafi is far more intent than is Mengistu about subverting Sudan. The fact that Sudan could, if it chose, provide much more aid to the EPLF and the TPLF has had a partial restraining influence on Mengistu. Qadhafi has no such constraints, and harbors an intense hatred of Nimeiri because of the latter's support of Egypt, the Camp David accords, and the Lebanese-Israeli agreement. Also, even though both Mengistu and Qadhafi would like to eliminate the US presence and influence in Africa, Mengistu is more wary of taking actions that would draw an unwelcome US response.

60. Although Qadhafi left the OAU Summit in a huff and tried to retrieve his credibility by plunging into Middle Eastern Arab affairs, he is not likely to ignore any new opportunities in Africa to advance his revolutionary goals. His intervention in Chad testifies to his continuing ambition to upset regimes not to his liking. Many of his ventures fail because of erratic direction from Tripoli, inept performances by his operatives, lack of followthrough, and misreading of local situations. However inept and erratic some of his activities may appear, Qadhafi is not deterred by his own failings and will continue to meddle in the Horn countries, with or without Ethiopian collaboration.

61. Qadhafi has no particular quarrel with Kenya or Djibouti, but the expanded US military use of facilities there will increasingly attract his attention. Libya currently has little access to Kenya because there are few Libyan sympathizers in the country and Kenyan security forces pay close attention to Libyan activities. The Libyans could renew earlier attempts to influence the Djiboutian Government, but the Djiboutian President is wary of Qadhafi and French and local services are vigilant about attempted Libyan

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**Figure 2**  
**Aden Pact and US-Allied Countries**



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subversion there. Hence, the chances of Libyan or Libyan-inspired incidents against the Americans in Kenya or Djibouti are not great.

**Soviet Activities and Prospects in the Horn of Africa**

62. The Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa began 20 years ago as an opportunistic response to

Somalia's need for military aid. When the USSR supported Ethiopia during the Ogaden war in 1977, Somalia ousted the Soviets, who by that time had developed a close relationship with the Mengistu regime. For Moscow, Ethiopia is of particular importance because it is the dominant state in the Horn and because of its proximity to the oil-rich Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. Analysis of Soviet activities in

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the Horn area suggests the following Soviet policy objectives:

- Exploitation of Ethiopian military needs to establish a firmer patron-client relationship and to consolidate Soviet influence in the Ethiopian Government.
- Use of Ethiopian territory to facilitate the projection of Soviet naval and naval air power into the Arabian Sea-Indian Ocean region, and the oil-rich Persian Gulf area.
- Use of military and political influence in the Horn to undermine perceived US strategic policies.
- Expansion of Soviet influence by encouraging leftist change and weakening pro-Western governments in black Africa and in the Red Sea area.

63. On the first of these points, the Soviets are successfully employing their preferred instruments for exerting influence—military assistance and ideological indoctrination. The USSR has already delivered about \$2.6 billion of the \$4 billion in military aid that it has agreed to provide. Annual arms shipments in the 1981-85 period are expected to be about a third lower than the average of 1976-80. This is mainly because the Ethiopian armed forces, which grew from some 45,000 to over 240,000 during the earlier period, have now leveled off at around 200,000, and the replacement of US arms by Soviet weaponry in the Ethiopian military inventory has been largely completed. In the renewed campaigns against the northern insurgents during 1982 and 1983, General Petrov, chief of Soviet Ground Forces, helped plan Ethiopian operations for a two-month period at the beginning of each offensive. Ethiopia will still need Soviet arms for some years to come because of its inability to crush the insurgencies in the northern provinces, because it views Somalia and—to a lesser degree—Sudan as continued threats to its security, and because it believes that the United States will help to arm all of its neighbors.

64. The Soviets would like to see Ethiopia as a secure and consolidated state, fully committed to developing along Marxist-Leninist lines. While Moscow's current position hinges on Ethiopia's military needs and Mengistu's ideological preferences, the Soviets are also trying to institutionalize their relationship

and influence to prevent a future setback similar to those suffered in Egypt and Somalia in the 1970s. Toward this end, a key Soviet goal has been the establishment of a Communist party in Ethiopia, through which Moscow could cultivate a reliable cadre of supporters.

65. Recent developments reflect other Soviet efforts to strengthen their position. Soviet and East European advisers will be attached to the proposed regional economic centers. The Soviets have also been pressing Mengistu to replace Western-educated government officials with more ideologically compatible or Eastern-trained individuals. Mengistu typically has hedged on his response, selecting officials more on a basis of personal loyalty and competence than on ideological purity. Nonetheless, the large numbers of Ethiopians undergoing academic, technical, and political training in the USSR (3,680) and in Eastern Europe (1,905) will provide a reservoir of future officials, some of whom may be more ideologically attuned to Soviet aims. Many other Ethiopian youths are being trained in Ethiopia by Soviets, Cubans, and East Europeans.

66. Despite these apparent inroads, the Soviets probably are still wary of the crafty Mengistu. He has proved to be a less-than-pliant client whose version of a Marxist-Leninist state will probably fall short of Soviet expectations. Mengistu, for example, has forestalled Moscow on the party issue for over five years and could do so again; even when it is established, the party will probably be dominated by the same military clique that Mengistu has perpetuated over the years. His most recent Cabinet shakeup brought some pro-Soviet officials into key positions, but several newly promoted, US-educated ministers could propose financial and foreign policy programs that would make Moscow uneasy. Moreover, he continues to check the Soviets on other issues, refusing to establish a joint military academy in Ethiopia or to grant greater established access to Ethiopian facilities.

67. Frictions stem from cultural misunderstandings, the clash of Ethiopian nationalism and xenophobia with Soviet ideological preconceptions, and Ethiopian resentment of Soviet arrogance. Ethiopians also complain about the lack of Soviet economic assistance, the poor quality of some Soviet equipment, the lack of spare parts, Moscow's reluctance to grant various types of military training, and its refusal to help Ethiopians develop maintenance and repair capabilities.

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68. These perennial frictions may be exacerbated over the next few years, as Ethiopia is scheduled to begin major military debt repayments to the USSR in 1984 of some \$200 million a year—an amount it almost certainly cannot meet. During this time, there will probably be some squabbling, hard bargaining, and increased tensions. Nonetheless, we believe the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship will remain solid, primarily because each side needs the other. Ethiopia remains the USSR's key client in the important Horn area and Moscow is the only superpower prepared to meet Addis's continued military needs. Hence, while the Soviets might be only partially successful in fulfilling their first objective—expanding and consolidating their influence in Ethiopia—they will nevertheless retain a strong position, with little likelihood of any real setback in the next few years.

69. On the second objective—the improvement of Soviet access to bases in Ethiopia to project the Soviet presence into the Arabian Sea–Red Sea–Indian Ocean areas—progress is mixed. Soviet patrol and ASW aircraft continue to operate from Asmara airfield to monitor US naval activity in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. Dahlak Island, though a small support facility, is useful to the Soviets for repairs of ships and submarines of their Indian Ocean Squadron. Furthermore, its location on an island some 20 miles from the Ethiopian mainland provides some protection from Ethiopian interference and possible Eritrean attack. These facilities, considered in conjunction with Soviet use of port and air facilities in nearby South Yemen, contribute to the Soviets' ability to keep naval forces on station in the Indian Ocean, far from the borders of the Soviet Union.

70. The Soviets are apparently not satisfied with these arrangements, [redacted] and are seeking to expand their access to facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen. Mengistu, after ignoring or denying several Soviet requests for expanded naval access, recently has given permission to the Soviets to add about 70 technicians to the several hundred at the Dahlak Island repair facility. The Soviets claim that the additional personnel are needed because of planned delivery of new equipment and some expansion of the facility. The Soviets have chosen to keep the investment at Dahlak at a low level, partly because it is not a felicitous site for a larger Soviet community. Also, Soviet naval activities and

presence in the Indian Ocean area have diminished in the past two years. Yet, increased use of Dahlak in the first half of 1983 and the revival of earlier Soviet requests for increased military access suggest that Moscow may be planning to expand its shore-based facilities in order to support a somewhat higher level of activity in the area in the next few years.

71. The renewed Soviet interest in expanding its naval capabilities in the Horn area is also suggested by the efforts of Admiral Gorshkov to obtain new air and naval facilities in South Yemen. During his visit to Aden in March, Gorshkov apparently asked for such facilities and was turned down by the South Yemenis. The USSR may have again evinced interest in a proposed reconstruction of naval facilities near Assab to Soviet military specifications. The Ethiopians have previously turned down projects submitted by foreigners to reconstruct the facilities near Assab. Mengistu appears cold to the idea of a permanent foreign naval presence or substantial access in mainland Ethiopian ports. But the USSR will probably raise the issue again, either in conjunction with the visit of the Chief of the Soviet Navy next year, or perhaps in connection with the repayment of the arms debt.

72. It seems likely that the apparent Soviet efforts to enhance their naval support facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen are designed to advance the overall strategic aims of projecting military power into distant areas and to counter CENTCOM activities—the third major objective of Soviet policy in the Horn. The Soviets will keep a close eye on the port and airfield improvements in Somalia and Kenya carried out by US contractors, and will keep the pressure on Mengistu for permission to expand present facilities and perhaps to develop new ones. They probably believe that the United States has extensive plans for future access and deployment in the Horn area and that the US aim is to neutralize the Soviet military presence in the Horn of Africa. Mengistu almost certainly sees US policies in the Horn as an effort to encircle and eventually threaten his emerging Marxist state in Ethiopia. It is likely, therefore, that Mengistu and the Soviets are reinforcing each other's worst-case views of the American presence in the Horn of Africa, and the Soviets probably exaggerate American intentions in order to play upon Mengistu's fears.

73. As for the fourth objective—the expansion of Soviet influence in black Africa and the Red Sea

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area—the Soviets are not likely to make much headway in the next two years. Mengistu as Chairman of the OAU will need little encouragement to strike a heavy note of anti-American, pro-Soviet propaganda. Mengistu sees nothing incongruous about decrying the presence of US “bases” in Africa while ignoring the use of Ethiopian military facilities by Soviet ships and naval aircraft. Nonetheless, Mengistu may feel that the position of Chairman of the OAU requires at least some gestures of evenhandedness. The joint communique issued at the conclusion of Romanian President Ceausescu’s recent visit to Addis Ababa contained no anti-American material. The Soviets may gain only marginal propaganda advantages from Mengistu’s tenure as OAU Chief. Moderate black African states in the area show no inclination to turn to the Soviets, despite their security and economic deficiencies. The inability of the USSR to provide meaningful economic aid is widely recognized in the countries of the Horn. Soviet propaganda appeals to Africans to turn against the “neocolonialist West” fall on deaf ears, because most Africans know that their only hope for economic survival lies in access to Western aid and markets. Similarly, the Soviets are unlikely to be able to exploit security weaknesses of Ethiopia’s neighbors. In Sudan and Somalia, anti-Soviet attitudes are strong because of unpleasant memories of earlier close association with the USSR and because of current Soviet support of their main adversaries—Libya and Ethiopia.

74. The Soviets probably realize that their best chance to expand influence in the Horn is to exploit the instability of the pro-Western countries there. Nonetheless, there is little evidence that the Soviets are directly sponsoring dissident elements in the pro-Western states of the Horn. Indeed, the Ethiopians allow the Soviets only limited access to the various Sudanese and Somali dissident camps in Ethiopia. Presumably, the Soviets are encouraging Libyan and Ethiopian funding and training of Sudanese and Somali factions which have the capability of stirring up trouble in their homelands. Despite such efforts, the Soviets have at times urged Mengistu to reduce tensions on the Somali border, reflecting Moscow’s desire to minimize the possibility of a major new Ethiopian-Somali conflict. All pro-Western governments in the Horn of Africa are so beset with severe internal problems that the additional trouble caused by cross-border insurgents may not be the determining factor in their possible downfall. Furthermore, as assessed in other sections of this Estimate, the successor regimes are not likely to be pro-Soviet or pro-Libyan, though they might opt for a more nonaligned policy, less supportive of US interests.

75. Mengistu’s dependence on Soviet military assistance, the debt owed to Moscow, and his concern over US intentions are likely to lead him to yield to Moscow’s requests for continued and perhaps more extensive use of military facilities in Ethiopia. On balance, however, the Soviets are unlikely to achieve all of their objectives over the next two years.

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## ANNEX

**Table A-1**  
**Military Balance in the Horn of Africa**  
**(Estimated Personnel Strengths and Major Equipment)**

	Ethiopia	Somalia <sup>a</sup>	Kenya	Djibouti <sup>b</sup>	Sudan <sup>c</sup>
<b>Army</b>					
Personnel	180,000+	39,500	13,000	2,500	51,000
Tanks	907 <sup>a</sup>	290	60+	33	285
Armored personnel carriers	715 <sup>a</sup>	490 to 525	4	—	209
Armored cars/vehicles	240 <sup>a</sup>	41	107	11	100
Field artillery	1,020 <sup>a</sup>	440	70	15	100
Air defense artillery	920 <sup>a</sup>	450	—	8	200 to 340
Surface-to-air missile battalions	8	10	—	—	3
<b>Navy</b>					
Personnel	3,500	2,000	650	120	1,500
Corvette	1	—	—	—	—
Missile attack boats	4	2	—	—	—
Patrol boats	18	13	7	1	12
Medium landing ships	7	5	—	—	2
<b>Air Force</b>					
Personnel	4,000	2,500	1,850	850	3,000
Jet fighters	152	47	25	10	45 to 50
Helicopters	49	4	10	8	22
Transports	19	9	11	3	11

<sup>a</sup> Figures include approximately 200 tanks, about 135 field artillery pieces, nearly 200 armored vehicles, and some 40 air defense guns purchased by Ethiopia and assigned to Cuban forces.

<sup>b</sup> All forces shown in Djibouti are French. The embryonic Djiboutian Army has about 2,700 men and is equipped with 40 armored vehicles and 10 APCs.

<sup>c</sup> The equipment in both Somalia's and Sudan's inventories generally have low operational rates.

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
**Table A-2**  
**Estimated Insurgent Personnel Strengths**  
**in Eritrea and Tigre**

Ethiopian armed forces	100,000
Guerrilla forces	27,000 to 33,000
Eritrean Liberation Front	5,000
Eritrean People's Liberation Front	15,000 to 20,000
Tigrean People's Liberation Front	7,000 to 8,000



**Table A-4**  
**Soviet Naval Visits**  
**to Dahlak Island**

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Total ships serviced	40	50	93	101	87	Averaging 15 per month



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**Table A-3**  
**Estimated Ethiopian and Somali Personnel**  
**in and Near the Ogaden**

<b>Ethiopia</b>	
Government forces	60,000
Somali Democratic Salvation Front guerrillas	2,500
Somali National Movement combat force	500 to 1,000
<b>Somalia</b>	
Government forces	39,500
Western Somali Liberation Front guerrillas	3,000 to 5,000



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