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Remarks:

For information only.

Attached are suggested replies by Bureau of the Budget to the questions raised by the Jackson Subcommittee Report No. 1026 which is also attached. Ralph Reid had sent this over as a matter of courtesy although it is still draft at this point.

SIGNED

John S. Warner
Legislative Counsel

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Legislative Counsel - 221 East	7 Apr 60

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

Filed by DB/I
11 APR 1960

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

April 1, 1960

Dear Mr. Warner:

As promised, I am enclosing a draft copy of comments prepared within the Bureau on Senate Report No. 1026. The enclosure is still unofficial and will undoubtedly be modified from time to time to take new situations into account but may be helpful as generally indicative of the nature of our thinking.

Sincerely,

Ralph W. E. Reid
Assistant Director

Mr. John S. Warner
Legislative Council
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Enclosure

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
Washington 25, D. C.

March 25, 1960

D R A F T

Subject: Organization for National Security

SUGGESTED REPLIES TO QUESTIONS RAISED BY SENATE REPORT 1026

II. POLICY-MAKING AT THE SUMMIT

Question: Some hold that the NSC tries to deal with too many, and too wide a variety of policy problems. The argument goes that it would be of greater usefulness if it concentrated its energies on a relatively small number of policy questions of overriding importance.

Answer: The President has determined that he will not assign an area of national security policy formulation permanently as the responsibility of an agency, department, or individual outside the NSC mechanism. However, every endeavor is made to limit the specific policy problems discussed by the NSC to those having interdepartmental interest appropriate for decision by the President.

Question: Another point of view is that the Council is not well equipped to resolve such problems of great urgency and that it functions best when treating very routine matters.

Answer: Since its members are kept currently abreast of a wide variety of emerging situations, the NSC is well equipped to discuss urgent problems as well as routine ones. The President has in fact determined that he will make decisions on national security policy -- except in special cases of urgency -- only within the framework of the Council.

Question: Others maintain that, despite the efforts of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to the contrary, the papers emerging from the process are still so compromised and general as not to furnish clearcut guidance for action.

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Answer:

It is a governing concept of the NSC that its activities will not be limited merely to areas of agency agreement and that the Council, on its own initiative, will cock out areas of agency conflict or omission to act, so as to permit presentation of alternative or new courses of action for Presidential decision. Under the present Administration the NSC process has been explicitly designed to assure that divergent views are presented to the President and that resultant guidance is relevant and forthright. The NSC Planning Board, for example, is explicitly directed to identify possible alternatives in the formulation of policy recommendations and to avoid undesirable compromises which conceal or gloss over real differences. Such differences, if they cannot be resolved, are reported to the Council and are neither suppressed nor compromised. More than half the policy statements which are sent to the Council from the Planning Board contain split views, largely on important issues on which one or more of the NSC agencies has indicated a strong divergence of opinion. For example, a recent paper dealing with a fundamental policy contained 19 splits when it was sent to the Council from the Planning Board and required five successive Council meetings before final approval.

Question:

Others urge that the NSC process be more closely geared to the budgetary process. It is held that the two now go forward essentially independently of each other, and that budgetary decisions taken outside the Council framework often negate or change the intent of NSC policy papers.

Answer:

Budgetary decisions are designed to reflect Presidential decisions, whether taken in the NSC or elsewhere. It is, of course, within the prerogative of a President to make a decision which supersedes one made earlier by him; what is imperative is that when a decision is made he have available to him all information relevant to the problem. It should be noted that the present Administration has adopted a policy of requiring that all NSC papers have appendices which clearly spell out the financial implications of the proposed policies.

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Question: Some urge giving more formal recognition in ESC deliberations to the primary role of the Secretary of State in national security policy formulation.

Answer: The Council is a corporate body, composed of individuals advising the President in their own right rather than representatives of their respective departments and agencies. Their function should be to seek, with their background of experience, the most statesmanlike solution to the problems of national security, rather than to reach solutions which represent merely a compromise of departmental positions. In actuality, of course, initial drafts of most policy papers reviewed by the NSC are prepared by the Department of State. All policy papers reviewed by the NSC reflect the written views of the Department of State, either through acquiescence in the paper or through explicit suggestions for alternative language. The President, however, must have complete freedom to select those courses of action he believes most appropriate and should not be denied -- as the proposal suggests -- full opportunity to consider the views of his other Council members. As President Eisenhower pointed out in a recent press conference (February 17, 1960), it is his desire that every member of the ESC be "just as free to express his opinion as a man can be," and that "nobody is barred from bringing up any fear or any matter, any preoccupation on his mind, any anxiety or conviction."

Question: Some propose encouraging debate on more sharply defined issues by giving departments or ad hoc task forces more opportunity to present policy drafts directly to the NSC.

Answer: The NSC now follows a practice of asking departments or ad hoc task forces to prepare materials for direct presentation to the Council. "Debate on more sharply defined issues" is not in itself encouraged, however, merely by giving departments or task forces more opportunity to present policy drafts directly to the NSC. Sharply defined issues are best debated if alternative courses of action are presented for discussion, as is the case in papers developed through the Planning Board mechanism, which permits each member department or agency to place before the President precisely the language it wishes against whatever background of common agreement has been reached. To the extent that special reports are called

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for from various departments and agencies, the present process normally permits them to be reviewed by the Planning Board, which makes it possible for divergent points of view to be sought, debated, and presented to the Council simultaneously with the basic report. The process also assures ample opportunity for study of the issues, in advance, by those who are to attend the Council meeting.

Question: Still others suggest changing the composition of the NSC and the Planning Board toward the end of giving greater weight to the views of the State and Defense Departments.

Answer: If the President is to have the benefit of all relevant points of view in making a decision affecting the national security, it is necessary that all responsible agencies have an opportunity to present their recommendations to him. The weight which the President assigns to the views of the Departments of State and Defense when they are at variance with other agencies is necessarily a matter to be kept to the discretion of the President rather than to be determined by an arbitrary formula. In any event, the ultimate decision is that of the President.

Question: Others propose making greater use of "discussion papers" to encourage wide-ranging and penetrating exploration of critical policy issues.

Answer: During the past year the NSC has made considerably greater use of "discussion papers" designed to outline alternative courses of action. The NSC staff is under explicit instructions to make a continuing examination of the totality of national security policies with a view to determining whether gaps exist which should be filled and whether important current issues and the policy implications of anticipated developments are being adequately explored. It is normally imperative, however, that the "discussion papers" be later followed by "policy papers" designed to outline with precision agreed objectives and courses of action.

Question: Some suggest substantially or modestly increasing the size of the NSC staff, with particular reference to broadening the base of scientific and military competence.

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Answer: It is agreed that the NSC staff should be comprised of individuals of high competence with a substantial background in matters related to U.S. security interests. However, it is believed responsible agencies should provide technical competence and guidance and that it should not be necessary to layer over agency responsibilities in such fields. Provided continued care is exercised in selecting NSC staff members, it is not now believed expansion of the staff is necessary.

Question: Others propose improving the monitoring function of the OCB, by concentrating its activities on a narrower front of key problems.

Answer: Under present arrangements implementation of all NSC papers is monitored either by the OCB or by appropriate agencies, the assignment depending on the scope of the decision involved. If we begin with the premise that it is desirable to arrange such follow-up action, then either the OCB must be responsible for all follow-up not readily assignable to an agency or agencies, or a new organization comparable to the OCB would need to be created to cover certain activities no longer the responsibility of the OCB. This would not appear appropriate nor is it apparent OCB operations would be improved by concentration on a narrower range of problems. In actuality, the usefulness of the OCB is enhanced by present instructions which permit the OCB, by agreement among the participating agencies, to advise and assist in the coordination of inter-agency operating matters separate and apart from specific policies assigned to it by the President for coordination. The recent designation, as Chairman of the OCB, of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (who is also Chairman of the NSC Planning Board) should be very helpful in assuring the consistency of OCB actions with those of the NSC.

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Question: What are the merits and shortcomings of moves to shift the "center of gravity" in planning toward the Presidential level?

Answer: Merits of this proposal include assurance that no single department will take precipitous action and that all relevant points of view are considered in the process of policy development. On the other hand, there would be organizational layering and perhaps overstaffing, as well as a potential danger of failure to assess operating realities unless appropriate departments were given full opportunity to participate in the making of policies which they would later be expected to carry out.

Question: What observations are appropriate concerning the problem of organizational arrangements for staff assistance in the national security area?

Answer: As pointed out in the Committee Report, each President needs great freedom to adapt his office and procedures to his own nature and experience. He should, therefore, have maximum possible discretion in organizing national security policy-making machinery and in organizing and

staffing the Executive Office. Under current circumstances the present organizational arrangements for staff assistance in the national security area are considered eminently satisfactory.

III. THE KEY DEPARTMENTS: STATE AND DEFENSE

Question: Are the responsibilities of the State and Defense Departments in national security policy-making now correctly defined and divided? If not, what changes are needed?

Answer: In general, the responsibilities of the Departments of State and Defense in national security policy-making now appear to be correctly defined and divided.

Question: Should the Secretary of State be formally charged with more responsibility in connection with our defense posture and the defense budget?


Answer: Our defense posture and our defense budget reflect national security policies in whose development the Secretary of State has participated fully. No additional responsibility would appear warranted.

Question: Should the Secretary of State be asked to testify in the Congress concerning foreign policy implications of the defense budget?

Answer: The President has the Constitutional responsibility of advising the Congress from time to time as to the State of the Union. The annual State of the Union Message, the Budget Message, the Economic Report, and other special messages provide frequent opportunities for the President to apprise Congress as to the nation's posture in defense and other matters. The Congress is undoubtedly entitled to ask appropriate witnesses to testify on bills which come before it; whether the Secretary of State would be in position to provide information additional to that made available in the State of the Union Message or by other messages or witnesses appears questionable, particularly when it is recalled that the Secretary of State -- through the NSC process -- will have joined in recommending the defense budget to the President.

Question: Would it be desirable to create a "super-Secretary of State" who would be responsible for the over-all direction of foreign affairs, and who might have under him additional Secretaries of Cabinet rank for such areas as diplomacy, information and foreign economic matters?

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Question: Would it be desirable to create a Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cabinet rank, responsible to the Secretary of State, who could represent the United States at Foreign Ministers' meetings?

Answer: This would not appear practicable. The proposed position would be comparable to that of an Ambassador-at-Large -- not that of a Foreign Minister.

Question: Would any other arrangements help, such as appointments of Ambassadors-at-Large?

Answer: Depending on circumstances, the occasional appointment of Ambassadors-at-Large could be helpful.

Question: What is the proper relationship between State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and/or the Joint Staff of the JCS)? Should a representative of the Secretary of State participate in discussions of the JCS when appropriate?

Answer: The Joint Chiefs of Staff are military advisers to the Secretary of Defense. The proper relationships are between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and are basically the responsibility of the parties concerned. There would, however, appear to be no greater justification for a representative of the Department of State sitting with the JCS than there would be a representative of the Bureau of the Budget.

Question: Should a representative of the JCS sit with the Policy Planning Staff of State (and/or other State Department groups)?

Answer: There would appear to be no particular reason why a representative of the JCS should sit with the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State and/or other internal State Department groups. The advice of the JCS is readily available to State through established channels.

Question: Is the responsibility of ISA now properly conceived? If not, what should it be?

Answer: The current responsibility of the ISA appears to be properly conceived.

Question: Should officials with more diverse backgrounds and experience be brought into the policy planning process in State and Defense?

Answer: From the point of view of the Bureau of the Budget, it would be extremely helpful if officials with financial backgrounds and experience were brought into the policy planning process in State and Defense.

Question: Is there need for a joint State-DOD-JCS Planning Staff?

Answer: For the planning and broad execution of national security policy it is deemed necessary to assure participation of all agencies represented in the National Security Council and the OCB. There are, however, undoubtedly instances related to policy execution which would be facilitated by consultation among fewer agencies. Such consultation is undoubtedly carried out at present.

Question: Can greater use be made of ad hoc interdepartmental task forces on special issues of national security policy?

Answer: It is believed maximum feasible use is now made of such committees. It is necessary, however, that all appropriate agencies be given an opportunity to review the resultant reports before final recommendations are made to the President.

Question: Is the proposed joint career service practical and worthwhile?

If so, how can it be administered so as to assure the selection of outstanding individuals and their assignment to areas where their skills can best be utilized?

What special problems might arise in integrating military officers into such a staff and how might they be solved?

Answer: No off-the-cuff answers to these questions are possible. A further study of the pros and cons is recommended.

IV. RESOURCES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Question: Should State and Defense (and perhaps other agencies concerned with national security) participate fully in the initial establishment of "budgetary guidelines" for national security programs?

Answer: Overall budgetary guidelines must necessarily consider the totality of the nation's requirements, a process for which the Cabinet offers a more appropriate initial forum than the National Security Council. All principal agencies of the Government are thus afforded an opportunity to participate in the development of guidelines, although the final decision, of course, must be that of the President.

Question: Does the present length of the budgetary cycle discourage timely initiation of important new programs and encourage the continuation of old programs after they have outlived their usefulness? If so, what might be done to shorten the cycle?

Answer: The totality of funds included in the major national security budgets and the degree of administrative flexibility provided by law permit adequate opportunity to initiate new programs or discontinue old ones. Continuing care must be taken, however, to assure that programs are not frozen at the technical service level whether or not time or technology has overtaken the program.

Question: Should the budget be prepared in another form? Some maintain that, in its present form, the budget conceals policy alternatives of crucial importance rather than illuminating them. Such reforms as a functional budget for the armed services are proposed. Would this or similar changes be in order?

Answer: The President's budget is a program which results from a choice between policy alternatives and necessarily reflects decision rather than indecision. The Budget Message, however,

Does provide an opportunity for discussion as to why a particular alternative was selected; in the FY 61 Budget Message, for example, an explicit explanation is given as to why particular decisions were made in regard to the B-70 program and a conventional aircraft carrier.

Further consideration of a functional budget for the Department of Defense is warranted, particularly as to the specific functional breakdown to be used. However, all appropriations would probably need to be made to the Secretary of Defense; the acquiescence of congressional committees in the revised arrangements would be desirable.

Question: Should there be advance preparation of alternative budgets for all major national security programs? Some wish to see one proposed budget at X dollars; another at perhaps 10 per cent below this level; and still another at perhaps 10 per cent above. Such a procedure, they hold, would permit policy-makers to see more clearly, and sooner, what is sacrificed and what is gained at various expenditure levels. Can and should this be done?

Answer: The proposal is worthwhile.

Question: Should the NSC process be more closely related to the budgetary process?

Answer: As noted earlier, the budget is designed to reflect Presidential decisions, whether made through the NSC or any other process. Under present arrangements, the NSC annually reviews the budgets for major national security programs to assure constancy with major national security policy. This procedure appears satisfactory.

Question: Some now feel the need for a fourth annual report from the President -- a Requirements and Resources Report. In broad outline, the report would have five main elements:

One: It would contain a statement of our over-all long-term strategy for national security.

Two: It would present, as a "package", our over-all long-term requirements for foreign policy, defense, and domestic programs affecting our world position, including a statement of program priorities.

Three: It would present, also as a "package", long-term projections of the resources needed to meet these requirements.

Four: It would relate both requirements and needed resources to the nation's present and future economic capacities.

Five: It would contain recommendations for corrective action wherever future resources appear inadequate to meet our needs.

Would the presentation of such a report to the Congress be desirable?

Answer: To the extent the proposed elements are feasible, there is nothing to preclude the incorporation of unclassified materials in any of the three major Presidential messages or in any subsequent special messages. A major problem in regard to long range projections in a democratic society lies in the multitude of uncertainties involved; in effect, for a long range projection to be accurate would require economic and other controls to assure that the long range situation conformed to the projection. Even present procedures, which involve 24 to 30 month projections in connection with the annual budget cycle, are subject to a substantial margin of error.

V. SCIENCE AND THE POLICY PROCESS

Question: It is obviously vital that radical technological developments having major effect upon the world balance of scientific and military power be (1) speedily identified while still in the conceptual stage, and (2) rapidly pushed to the top-level decision-makers.

Many hold that past and present organizational processes are not adequate to accomplish this end.

One suggestion for reducing institutional "lag time" in these matters calls for setting up special watchdog groups -- exclusively charged with "flagging" crucial technical programs at the earliest possible date and then speeding them to the highest decision-making levels.

Would this or alternative steps be desirable?

Answer: It is agreed that science should be adequately represented in those areas where policy impinges on science, so that scientific considerations may be incorporated in policy making. This relationship between science and the policy process has been recognized in recent years by the appointment of a Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (who is invited to attend all NSC and Cabinet meetings), by the creation of an active Science Advisory Committee to the President as a successor to the ~~old~~ Science Advisory Committee, by the creation of the Federal Council on Science and Technology, by the appointment of a science adviser to the Secretary of State, by extension of invitations to the Chairman of the AEC to attend NSC and Cabinet meetings, and, as is noted, by the general upgrading of the research and development function within the three services and the Department of Defense. Representatives of the National Science Foundation and National Aeronautics and Space Administration are also invited to participate in the NSC and Cabinet processes when appropriate. It is believed the above innovations afford ample opportunity for "flagging" crucial technical programs and speeding them to the highest decision-making levels.

Question: How, without straitjacketing technological development, can State and Defense furnish those concerned with development more useful guidance concerning the paths of technological exploration which might best enable us to further our overall political and military objectives?

Answer: There is nothing to preclude this fight now.

Question: What institutional changes within the Department of State might help give political policy-makers a better understanding of the impact of research and development projects on the future of foreign policy?

Answer: The recent establishment of the position of Science Adviser to the Secretary was designed to prove of major assistance in this regard.

Question: What institutional changes within the Department of Defense might help give senior civilian officials and military officers a fuller awareness of the relationship between scientific developments and defense planning?

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Answer: The recent establishment of the Office of Director of Defense Research and Engineering, with responsibility for the Defense Science Board and the Weapons System Evaluation Group, was designed to prove of major assistance in this regard. Further, each of the three service departments has either an Assistant Secretary or a Director for Research and Development.

Question: Would it be desirable, toward the end of closer joint scientific-political analysis and planning, to assign more scientists to positions in political areas, i.e., the Policy Planning Staff in State, or the Office of International Security Affairs in Defense?

Answer: Insofar as science and technology are concerned in the national security process, the mere addition of a scientist to a unit concerned with formulating or executing policy in which science plays only an indirect part would not of itself provide the sort of relationship contemplated. Even an active scientist cannot be versed in all fields of science, particularly with the highly specialized nature of scientific activities today. Scientific and technical advice must continue to come from the men working in the various scientific fields. It would appear most desirable, as has been done, to assure the participation of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology in NSC and Cabinet discussions.

Question: Would joint scientific-political planning at early stages in the decision-making process also be promoted by assigning more political and military planners to posts in technical areas?

Answer: See answer immediately above.

Question: Is there a need for raising the prestige and status of scientific advice within the Department of State?

Answer: More time is necessary adequately to assess the role of the Science Adviser to the Secretary and of the scientific attache program.

Question: What is the best relationship between science and technology in State and Defense, on the one hand, and scientific advice at the Presidential level, on the other?

Answer: The present system appears to work satisfactorily.

VI. "THINK GROUPS": WHAT IS THEIR CONTRIBUTION?

Specific suggestions made so far include the following:

Question: A "White House RAND" making studies for the President's national security staff and/or the National Security Council.

Answer: The report notes that policy research must not be confused with policy making. If it is accepted that the actions of the Executive Branch will normally be determined within that Branch and not by external agencies, it will be reasonably obvious why it is both desirable and time-saving to assure that executive agencies participate from their initiation in major national security studies and that the studies not be made by groups unable to root their conclusions in operating realities.

The experience of the past several years has indicated substantial "in house" competence for such studies in the Government; from this point of view there would appear to be no necessity for a special "White House RAND" to make studies on behalf of the NSC. Actually, as is the case at present, consultants of the highest stature can and are brought in to assist in the development of studies or to review existing policies.

Question: A "think group" for the State Department.

Answer: It is recognized that the Department of State, along with other departments of the Government, should be in position to seek outside advice on any of the policy areas for which it has responsibility. How such advice is used is, of course, a matter for the judgment of Department officials.

Question: An organization jointly sponsored by State and Defense.

Answer: As has been noted earlier, interdepartmental problems -- by and large -- are best solved in forums including all major departments. Other than for purely operational matters, it is doubtful that a joint State-Defense research organization would have a broad enough base to command substantially more attention than one responsive to a single department.

Question: A group working for all the Executive Branch departments and agencies concerned with national security.

Answer: As noted above, it is doubtful that any group responsible to a congeries of departments would see adopted proposals to which major departments took exception. The more desirable course would be to place in the agencies from the beginning whatever policy problems were deemed to require study. In this connection there has been as yet no determination of compelling need for a new organization to initiate or to carry out policy research projects. A wide range of research is being carried out by government departments and agencies, by institutions under contract to the Government, by many of the universities, and by private organizations. If the product of these efforts is not adequate to the needs of the Government, it is not because the facilities and organization do not exist. There would undoubtedly be merit, however, in making the end products of such studies more broadly available to other government agencies than appears to be the case at the present time.

Question: A similar group responsible to the Congress.

Answer: The merits of the proposal are not clear. Neither is it clear that the judgments of such a group would necessarily have any significant effect on Executive action.

Question: To the extent that the development of semi-autonomous policy research organizations is desirable, which departments or agencies could best profit from their services? The State Department? The National Security Council? State-Defense under a joint sponsorship arrangement?

Answer: Other than in unusual circumstances, it is not believed that available evidence confirms the necessity of such organizations except as they might directly serve individual departments.

Question: Are there any special difficulties in using such organizations at the White House level?

Answer: As indicated earlier, there are difficulties in using such organizations at any level above that of individual departments and agencies.

Question: Should we try to build on the resources of existing organizations such as the Institute for Defense Analyses, and expand their charters?

Answer: This would be a matter for decision by interested agencies.

Question: Insofar as there is a problem of unequal standards in pay and prestige between such organizations and policy research within the government, how can this best be handled?

Answer: It is doubtful that individuals responsible for the development of national security policy could or should be categorized in such fashion as to permit them to be treated differently from other Government employees in the matter of salaries. The problem, therefore, will need to be treated in the context of the totality of Government personnel proposals. In this connection the President has proposed to the Congress a review of all compensation systems in the three branches of the Federal Government, directed toward adoption of an equitable employee compensation policy.

Question: Are there better methods for stimulating and making use of policy research in important problem areas at universities and individual study centers?

Answer: None are known.

Question: What steps would encourage more productive policy research within the government, with particular reference to the State Department and the defense establishment?

Answer: Since such research is the responsibility of agency heads, the several departments and agencies would be better fitted to discuss this problem. However, it is not clear that present research is inadequate.

VII. BETTER POLICY MAKERS

Question: Almost all authorities agree that inadequate compensation is a primary cause of our inability to secure and retain better key officials. Few propose that governmental salaries be brought to industrial levels, but almost all recommend a narrowing of the gap. They note in passing that the gradual but steady rise in university salaries holds forth the prospect that the salaries of key government officials may soon compare unfavorably with top positions in the academic community.

What recommendations are appropriate to meet this problem?

Answer: It is doubtful that individuals responsible for the development of national security policy could or should be categorized in such fashion as to permit them to be treated differently from other Government employees in the matter of salaries. The problem, therefore, will need to be treated in the context of the totality of Government personnel proposals. In this connection the President has proposed to the Congress a review of all compensation systems in the three branches of the Federal Government, directed toward adoption of an equitable employee compensation policy.

Question: As a general rule, how long should a person serve in a top policy-making position in order to learn the job and begin to make significant contributions?

Answer: Much depends on whether the individual is brought into the position from outside the Government or is promoted from within. The illustration given regarding the offices of Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense is, for example, somewhat misleading, since, as in the case of Secretary Gates, one individual may have filled both positions. Very roughly, however, an individual brought into a position regarding which he has had no previous experience would probably require six months familiarization; an individual promoted from the position of Deputy would require far less.

Question: Should a nominee be asked by the appropriate Senate Committee to give assurance that he intends to serve at least such a minimum period?

Answer: It would be perfectly appropriate for a congressional committee to question a nominee as to his intentions with respect to his service in the Government, but since a nominee is appointed to serve the President, the assurances should be between the President and the nominee. By and large, what is satisfactory to the President should be acceptable to congressional committees.

Question: Could a contribution be made by a "sense of the Senate" resolution expressing concern with this problem?

Answer: The President has an obvious concern and interest in the problem, as well as responsibility for its solution. It is not clear how he would be helped by a Senate resolution.

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Question: Would substantial salary increases be helpful: If so, what level must be attained in order to make such action effective?

Answer: It is doubtful that individuals responsible for the development of national security policy could or should be categorized in such fashion as to permit them to be treated differently from other Government employees in the matter of salaries. The problem, therefore, will need to be treated in the context of the totality of Government personnel proposals. In this connection the President has proposed to the Congress a review of all compensation systems in the three branches of the Federal Government, directed toward adoption of an equitable employee compensation policy.

Question: How can a better climate be created in the business community for their executives doing a "tour or duty" in government?

Answer: The answer should probably be sought from the business community.

Question: Do the conflict of interest regulations prevent many outstanding executives from serving in government positions? If so, how can they be amended so that the individual is not unduly penalized, while the government is being protected?

Answer: Amendment of the regulations to require disclosure -- rather than divestment -- of holdings would appear helpful.

Question: Would permanent undersecretaries be desirable in the national security field?

Answer: No. It is imperative that key policy makers be responsive to the authority of the President; the proposal for permanent undersecretaries would undercut this authority. When administrations change, however, it is desirable -- as was true in 1953 -- that selected officials of the previous administration remain for a few months to provide continuity in key positions in the national security area. Basically, continuity is provided by permanent career staffs.

Question: If so, in what particular departments or agencies?

Answer: Not applicable.

Question: Should a major effort be made to improve formal training at various levels for selected Foreign Service and other civilian employees, including additional opportunities to attend university graduate schools?

Answer: Recent changes in legislation gave agencies substantially more flexibility in this regard than has been true in the past. This new experience should be evaluated before any further changes are made.

Question: If so, how might the Executive Branch and Congress best concert their efforts to this end?

Answer: Not applicable.

Question: Should opportunities be increased for cross-fertilization of ideas and experience in joint political-military-scientific training programs, including greater civilian participation in the various war colleges?

Answer: No objection.

Question: Would it be desirable to establish some new study institution, perhaps sponsored jointly by State and Defense and related agencies, offering training beyond the National War College level for a limited number of senior officials?

Answer: This seems doubtful. The educational curriculum at the National War College can be set at any desired level.

Question: Many have raised questions concerning the present length of tours of duty of military officers and civilian officials. They cite the progressively longer period required to master job requirements in many fields, particularly where technical or specialist problems are involved. They note approvingly the gradual trend toward longer tours of duty, but believe that further action in this direction is required.

What corrective action is in order?

Answer: It is believed there are still too many military and civilian tours of duty, particularly overseas, of less than two years in duration. These should be lengthened, recognizing, of course, the necessity for changes in top-level positions at the time of changes of administrations.

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86TH CONGRESS }
2d Session }

SENATE

{REPORT
{No. 1026

ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE MADE BY ITS SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL POLICY MACHINERY (Pursuant to S. Res. 115, 86th Cong.)



JANUARY 18, 1960.—Ordered to be printed

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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

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FOREWORD

The Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery was established in the summer of 1959 for the purpose of making the first comprehensive review of our national security policy process undertaken since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.

Its objective is to review the effectiveness of present policy machinery and methods against the background of the changed perspectives and problems created by the cold war and to make recommendations for constructive reform where appropriate.

The subcommittee has devoted the first phase of its study to a thorough and meticulous survey and analysis of the key issues involved in organizing for national security. Toward this end, the subcommittee has conferred with present and former Government officials and students of the national security policy process. It has engaged in correspondence with key authorities on particular subjects being studied by the subcommittee. The staff has prepared several background studies in cooperation with the executive branch and the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress.

This interim report represents a distillation of the main issues and proposals before the subcommittee. During the present session of Congress, the subcommittee plans to hold comprehensive hearings which will focus on the problem areas covered in this report.

HENRY M. JACKSON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery.

JANUARY 12, 1960.

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REPORT
No. 1026

ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

JANUARY 18, 1960.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. JACKSON, from the Committee on Government Operations, submitted the following

REPORT

I. THE PROBLEM

THE STRATEGY OF FREEDOM

In the 14 years since the end of World War II the traditional distinction between peace and war has been obliterated by a contest which knows no boundaries and no limits except those imposed on world communism by expediency. The competition is total—it is military, economic, scientific, political, diplomatic, cultural, and moral.

Conflict, whether it be hot or cold, is a great simplifier, reducing issues to their fundamentals. And the essence of the present contest is the age-old struggle between freedom and tyranny. Free men are once again called to unite their strength to outperform tyranny.

The need on this, as on all other occasions when free men have been challenged, is for a unifying purpose and a plan of action, for the vision to see the threat as an opportunity and for the will to persevere. Free men must defend the boundaries of freedom, and at the same time work for an enduring world community of peace with justice.

Good leadership in this cause is indispensable. But standing by itself, it is not enough. The cold war confronts us also with a critically important and enormously difficult problem of Government organization. The policy road between Washington and an Embassy officer in Laos, a military field commander in Germany, an information officer in Panama, a technical assistance worker in India, or a scientist in a top secret weapons laboratory is tortuous and long. Elaborate and complicated mechanisms and processes are inevitably needed to translate the national will into coherent and effective plans and programs.

The National Security Act of 1947, which created the Department of Defense and the National Security Council, and which called for "the establishment of integrated policies and procedures * * * relat-

ing to national security," represents the last major revision of our national security policymaking machinery. In essence, it codified the experience and lessons of World War II.

Almost 13 momentous years, however, have elapsed since the passage of this act. These years have seen the cold war become the dominant fact of international life. They have seen the obliteration of time-honored distinctions between foreign and domestic policy. They have witnessed a multiplication of the resources required for national security. They have created as many new demands on our intellectual resources as upon our material wealth. They have seen science and technology move to the very center of the policymaking stage.

The Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery was established for the purpose of making the first comprehensive review of our national security policy process undertaken since the discussion and debate preceding the National Security Act of 1947. The subcommittee's goal is to review the effectiveness of existing policymaking organizations and methods against the background of the changed perspectives and problems of the last 12 years, and to make such recommendations for improvement of the policy process as are appropriate.

Senate Resolution 115, authorizing this review, calls upon the subcommittee to make studies concerning:

- (1) The effectiveness of the present organizational structures and operational methods of agencies and instrumentalities of the Federal Government at all levels in the formulation, coordination, and execution of an integrated national policy for the solution of the problems of survival with which the free world is confronted in the contest with world communism;

- (2) The capacity of such structures and methods to utilize with maximum effectiveness the skills, talents, and resources of the Nation in the solution of those problems; and

- (3) Development of whatever legislative and other proposals or means may be required whereby such structures and methods can be reorganized or otherwise improved to be more effective in formulating, coordinating, and executing an integrated national policy, and to make more effective use of the sustained, creative thinking of our ablest citizens for the solution of the full range of problems facing the free world in the contest with world communism.

This study is not concerned with questions of substantive policy as such. It will not pass judgment, that is, on particular policy decisions made in the cold war. Rather, it is concerned with whether existing governmental machinery gives us the greatest possible likelihood of devising and successfully carrying out integrated and effective national security programs.

The subcommittee assumes that we face a national problem, far transcending either political party or any particular administration. The President has assured the cooperation of his staff with the subcommittee's work, and the study is being conducted throughout on a scholarly, objective, and nonpartisan basis.

A PHILOSOPHY OF APPROACH

A wise and courageous President, top executive branch officials effectively discharging their responsibilities, a Civil Service correctly interpreting and properly executing our policies, a Congress affirmatively and constructively playing its crucial role in the national security policy process, a citizenry alert to the great challenges of the time and willing to make the sacrifices needed to meet them—these are the preconditions of a strategy equal to the challenge.

Lacking these things, the organizational forms of policymaking will be ineffective—no matter how closely they may conform to the principles of sound management practice.

But to say this is not the same as subscribing to the mistaken notion that “Leadership is all that matters” or “All we need is 10 more bright people in Washington.” This study is based on the assumption that good national security policy requires both good policymakers and good policy machinery. One cannot be divorced from the other.

The agencies and departments of the Government involved in the national security process deal with a total annual budget of almost \$50 billion. They call upon the assistance, directly or indirectly, of millions of people. They work through literally thousands of interdepartmental and interagency committees. Daily, they must make and coordinate hundreds of different decisions having an important bearing on national security. Obviously, good organization helps the policy process, and poor organization hinders it.

Certain points seem fundamental in seeking ways and means of improving the national security policy process.

First, paper changes in organization do not necessarily bring corresponding changes in policy. It is easy, on paper, to draw organizational charts which have the virtue of symmetry and which conform to management textbooks. It is much more difficult to propose changes which will help policymakers in fact.

Second, one should not impose rigid or doctrinaire organizational patterns upon the policy process. The principles of sound organization are constant, but they can be applied in many ways and with equal effectiveness. Policy machinery should be adaptable to the style and work habits of our individual planners and decision makers.

Third, proposals for change should build upon existing organizational patterns and existing institutions, wherever possible. The potential benefit of possible reforms must be measured against the potential harm of disrupting established practices.

SUBCOMMITTEE ACTIVITIES

To date, the study has concentrated on identifying problem areas requiring possible remedial action and on defining and developing lines of constructive and practical reform.

The subcommittee has held more than 200 interviews with present and former Government officials and students of national policymaking. These interviews have ranged from discussions with Cabinet officers of this and previous administrations to talks with “Indians” in the middle and lower echelons of the Government. In addition, the views of a considerably larger group of authorities have been solicited in writing.

In October, the subcommittee staff prepared a background memorandum identifying certain broad problem areas as meriting systematic study. A large number of qualified officials and observers were invited to comment upon the problems outlined.

Thereafter, a series of more detailed questionnaires, each dealing with a particular phase of the subcommittee's inquiry, was prepared. These specific memorandums have been sent to carefully selected authorities possessing special competence and experience in the fields involved.

The interviews held and correspondence received to date have resulted in a large number of stimulating and useful suggestions.

The subcommittee has also profited greatly from two conferences of unusual interest. In September, in connection with the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, the subcommittee had the privilege of sponsoring a seminar on its study which was attended by some of our Nation's most distinguished students of the national security policy process. In November, the Council on Foreign Relations was generous enough to make the subcommittee's project the subject of one of its study seminars. Numerous fruitful ideas emerged from both meetings.

Some dozen ranking authorities in various phases of the study have been invited to become subcommittee consultants. This roster of consultants will be enlarged as the inquiry proceeds.

The Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress has completed a bibliography of selected materials on the subject of national security policy machinery. Certain background studies are also being prepared by the Library of Congress and the executive branch.

II. POLICYMAKING AT THE SUMMIT

THE NEW PRESIDENCY

By law and practice the President has the pivotal role in matters of national security. He is responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs; he is Commander in Chief; he makes the great decisions on the budget. Increasingly his choices involve complex scientific and technological questions. The range of matters on which he must not only be informed but also provide leadership extends from agriculture to the zodiac.

The integration of national policy—domestic, foreign, and military—must take place, first of all, in the President's mind. The consensus needed to support national policy depends largely upon his powers of leadership and persuasion. The organization of the executive branch for making and carrying out national policy should therefore be designed above all to help the President with the heavy tasks that world leadership has thrust upon him. The new demands and dimensions of the office make it a new Presidency, significantly different from what it was in more quiet times.

Each President will have his own style of doing business—the product of his nature and experience. Each therefore needs great freedom to adapt his office and procedures to suit the peculiarities of his style.

THE NEED FOR POLICY INTEGRATION

Almost every leading civilian and military officer who served in World War II concluded that the existing machinery was inadequate for the formulation of overall national security policy. The National Security Council, created by act of Congress in 1947, was one of the answers to the complaints and frustrations of World War II policy-makers.

The Council is charged with advising the President—

with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

Although the National Security Council was created by statute, and although there are certain statutory members on the Council, it is an adaptable institution, which different Presidents have used in different ways.

Under the present administration, the National Security Council meets more often and more regularly than before. The present administration created the NSC Planning Board, chaired by a Presidential Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and consisting of representatives of Assistant Secretary rank from the departments represented on the Council. It also created by Executive order the Operations Coordinating Board—

in order to assist in the effective coordination among certain agencies of certain functions relating to the national security and to provide for the integrated implementation of national security policies by said agencies.

In addition, both a larger number and a wider variety of policy questions now go on the NSC agenda than previously. Indeed, the President has determined that—

he will * * * (1) not assign an area of national security policy formulation permanently as the responsibility of a department, agency, or individual outside the NSC mechanism; (2) make decisions on national security policy—except in special cases of urgency—within the framework of the Council.

The style of operation has also changed. The burden of drafting and redrafting policy papers now falls more on the Planning Board and less on the departments and agencies. The format of the papers has been regularized, and meetings appear to be conducted on the basis of more precise agenda than formerly.

It is clear from the record that, while the NSC is a formal institution of government, it remains an institution for the President's use, and its mode of operation must therefore reflect the President's predilections.

VIEWS ON THE NSC

A wide variety of opinion exists concerning the role actually played by the NSC in the policy process.

There is a general agreement that it serves certain useful functions:

It has been said, and not completely in jest, that "if there were no NSC, we would have to invent one." Few quarrel with the principle behind the establishment of the Council and the necessity for some type of formal mechanism for coordinating and integrating departmental views at the highest level of the Government.

The NSC also serves as a useful forum for discussion at top governmental levels. It gives the President an opportunity to meet, at one time and in one room, with the heads of the major national security departments and agencies. A two-way educational process between the President and his chief aides results.

The "debriefings" furnished by the participants after NSC meetings are reportedly very useful tools of communication between the President and the departments.

Many attach real importance to the existence of a written body of policy papers and a written record of decisions.

There is also general agreement that the NSC has certain limitations in its policy advisory role to the President:

The NSC confronts the same problems facing any inter-departmental committee, with its built-in bias toward compromise.

It can never substitute for vigorous thinking and planning in the departments, especially the Department of State.

QUESTIONS IN DISPUTE

Many suggestions have been made for improving the NSC process:

One: Some hold that the Council tries to deal with too many, and too wide a variety of policy problems. The argument goes that it would be of greater usefulness if it concentrated its energies on a relatively small number of policy questions of overriding importance.

Two: Another point of view is that the Council is not well equipped to resolve such problems of great urgency and that it functions best when treating more routine matters.

Three: Others maintain that, despite the efforts of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to the contrary, the papers emerging from the process are still so compromised and general as not to furnish clear-cut guidance for action.

Four: Others urge that the NSC process be more closely geared to the budgetary process. It is held that the two now go forward essentially independently of each other, and that budgetary decisions taken outside the Council framework often negate or change the intent of NSC policy papers.

Five: Still others propose various institutional reforms for improving the policy process. Among the suggestions made are these:

Giving more formal recognition in NSC deliberations to the primary role of the Secretary of State in national security policy formulation.

Encouraging debate on more sharply defined issues by giving departments or ad hoc task forces more opportunity to present policy drafts directly to the NSC.

Changing the composition of the NSC and the Planning Board toward the end of giving greater weight to the views of the State and Defense Departments.

Making greater use of "discussion papers" to encourage wide-ranging and penetrating exploration of critical policy issues.

Substantially or modestly increasing the size of the NSC staff, with particular reference to broadening the base of scientific and military competence.

Improving the monitoring function of the OCB, by concentrating its activities on a narrower front of key problems.

Which criticisms, if any, are justified, and what form might remedial action take?

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYMAKING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND EXECUTIVE OFFICE

Some observers favor shifting the "center of gravity" in national security policymaking away from the departmental and toward the White House level. In essence, they would have the White House or Executive Office staff play a much larger part in the detailed formulation of policy. They argue that such a step is needed to overcome the parochial views of the departments and agencies.

One leading expression of this viewpoint takes the form of proposing a sizable national security planning staff at the Presidential level. Critics of this suggestion argue that such a staff would be too far removed from operating realities to produce realistic policies. They also warn of the danger of downgrading the prestige of the operating departments, and reducing the vitality of intradepartmental planning.

However, even if moves toward centralizing national security planning at the Presidential level are rejected, Presidents, of course, still look to their staffs for help in national security matters. The increasing complexity and broadened scope of Presidential responsibilities in this field lead many to think that more staff assistance will be needed, not less.

Some favor loose and informal arrangements in this area. Others think it would be well to knit advisers together through formal organization arrangements in the Executive Office.

The following questions seem in order:

One: What are the merits and shortcomings of moves to shift the "center of gravity" in planning toward the Presidential level?

Two: What observations are appropriate concerning the problem of organizational arrangements for staff assistance in the national security area?

III. THE KEY DEPARTMENTS: STATE AND DEFENSE

ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS

The Secretaries of State and Defense are the President's principal civilian advisers in the field of national security policy. In addition, they are responsible for running the two Departments of the Government which play the dominant roles in formulating and executing this policy. Any attempt to improve the policy process must therefore devote major attention to the roles and relationships of these two Departments.

MORE RESPONSIBILITY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE?

The Secretary of State is the President's principal adviser on foreign policy; he is also the first officer of the Cabinet.

Just as we have a new Presidency, so also have circumstances conspired to create a new role and new responsibilities for the office of Secretary of State. Today's occupant of that office needs to be far more than a skillful practitioner of the arts of diplomacy. He needs a wide-ranging knowledge of the relations between military and foreign policies, of the uses and limitations of economic and military aid, of information, propaganda, and related programs, of the strengths and weaknesses of our adversaries, of the dangers and opportunities in countries around the world, and of the working of international institutions and of regional organizations.

Some, however, would now have the Secretary of State assume still additional responsibilities in the formulation of national security policy. They reason as follows: Outside of the President, the Secretary of State is the official mainly responsible for formulating our national security goals. It is less and less possible, however, to divorce means and ends in security planning. The relationship between our political objectives and the military, economic, and other capabilities needed to achieve them is increasingly intertwined. Therefore, many seek ways and means of giving the Secretary of State a more dominant role in overall national security planning.

Among the questions raised are these:

One: Are the responsibilities of the State and Defense Departments in national security policymaking now correctly defined and divided? If not, what changes are needed?

Two: Should the Secretary of State be formally charged with more responsibility in connection with our defense posture and the defense budget?

Three: Should the Secretary of State be asked to testify in the Congress concerning foreign policy implications of the defense budget?

Four: Would it be desirable to create a "super Secretary of State" who would be responsible for the overall direction of foreign affairs, and who might have under him additional Secretaries of Cabinet rank for such areas as diplomacy, information, and foreign economic matters?

LIGHTENING THE NEGOTIATING BURDENS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

However the responsibilities of the Secretary of State may be defined, the problem of finding time to discharge them is formidable. A generation ago, when the other burdens of this office were far less onerous than today, a trip by a Secretary to an international conference occasioned headline news. But today, he is away from his desk for long periods of time, making it extremely difficult for him to shoulder his main responsibilities of advising the President and directing the work of his Department.

Questions frequently raised are:

One: Would it be desirable to create a Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cabinet rank, responsible to the Secretary of State, who could represent the United States at foreign ministers' meetings?

Two: Would any other arrangements help, such as appointments of Ambassadors at Large?

STATE-DEFENSE-JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF RELATIONS

The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff must form a well-coordinated and smoothly working team in both the planning and execution of national security policy.

Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of International Security Affairs performs a major function in this complex process of coordination. It has been described as "the Pentagon's State Department."

Among its responsibilities it is charged with—

developing and coordinating defense positions, policies, plans, and procedures in the fields of international politico-military and foreign economic affairs, including disarmament, of interest to the Department of Defense and with respect to negotiating and monitoring of agreements with foreign governments and international organizations on military facilities, operating rights, status of forces, and other international politico-military matters.

Communications between the services and State go through ISA.

Differences of viewpoint exist over the proper place of ISA in the policy process. Some argue that it duplicates functions of the Department of State and unnecessarily layers relations between State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Those of this view would encourage more direct relationships between State and the Joint Chiefs. On the other hand, it is held important that the Secretary of Defense have access to counsel in these problem areas from some source other than the armed services themselves.

Among the questions which occur are:

One: What is the proper relationship between State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and/or the Joint Staff of the JCS)? Should a representative of the Secretary of State participate in discussions of the JCS when appropriate?

Two: Should a representative of the JCS sit with the Policy Planning Staff of State (and/or other State Department groups)?

Three: Is the responsibility of ISA now properly conceived? If not, what should it be?

WAYS TO BETTER PLANNING IN STATE AND DEFENSE

Even those who favor shifting the "center of gravity" in national security planning closer to the President would agree that the planning function of the departments and agencies is still vital. Many would go further and argue that the main burden of planning should and must fall upon the departments. They say there can be no substitute for the fullness of resources and the richness of operating experience formed only at the departmental level.

One point seems beyond argument. Today, effective national security planning depends on intimate day-to-day contact between the diplomat, the soldier and his civilian colleagues, the scientist, the economist, and others.

Many believe that the planning process in State and Defense would be improved by enlisting the talents of officials experienced in a wider variety of fields than is now the case. They also seek ways of encouraging planning cross-fertilization through greater use of planning teams whose members represent diverse viewpoints and backgrounds.

These questions follow:

One: Should officials with more diverse backgrounds and experience be brought into the policy planning process in State and Defense?

Two: Is there need for a joint State-DOD-JCS Planning Staff?

Three: Can greater use be made of ad hoc interdepartmental task forces on special issues of national security policy?

A JOINT CAREER STAFF?

Many, while stressing the importance of an integrated national security policy, see as limited the role of coordinating mechanisms in achieving this end. They approach the problem through people, and seek ways of developing policymakers with nonparochial viewpoints and wide breadth of experience.

One proposal advanced calls for a joint career service embracing a small and carefully selected number of military officers, and senior career officials from the State and Defense Departments and related national security agencies.

Proposals for such a service, although varying in detail, have certain features in common. They see candidates for such a service being selected at roughly the level of colonel or its civilian equivalent. Those entering the service would serve tours of duty in a number of different departments or agencies. They would be required to address themselves to a wide variety of policy problems. They would be given special opportunities for advanced training.

These questions follow:

One: Is the proposed joint career service practical and worthwhile?

Two: If so, how can it be administered so as to assure the selection of outstanding individuals and their assignment to areas where their skills can best be utilized?

Three: What special problems might arise in integrating military officers into such a staff and how might they be solved?

IV. RESOURCES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

A CENTRAL PROBLEM

The generation past has seen a quantum jump in the demands which national security makes upon our national substance. The list of legitimate claimants for these resources grows ever longer.

The problem is twofold: to allocate existing resources wisely and to generate additional resources where necessary.

THE BUDGETARY PROCESS

The budgetary process—the decisive resource-allocating instrument—lies at the very heart of national security planning and programming. Plans and policies, without dollar signs attached, are mere

aspirations. It is the budgetary process which translates them into actual programs.

There exists an enormous literature of comment on the budgetary process as it relates to national security. Recommendations for improvements of the process are as numerous and varied as criticisms of past and existing practices.

Major questions raised include the following:

One: Should State and Defense (and perhaps other agencies concerned with national security) participate fully in the initial establishment of "budgetary guidelines" for national security programs?

Two: Does the present length of the budgetary cycle discourage timely initiation of important new programs and encourage the continuation of old programs after they have outlived their usefulness? If so, what might be done to shorten the cycle?

Three: Should the budget be prepared in another form? Some maintain that, in its present form, the budget conceals policy alternatives of crucial importance rather than illuminating them. Such reforms as a functional budget for the armed services are proposed. Would this or similar changes be in order?

Four: Should there be advance preparation of alternative budgets for all major national security programs? Some wish to see one proposed budget at X dollars; another at perhaps 10 percent below this level; and still another at perhaps 10 percent above. Such a procedure, they hold, would permit policymakers to see more clearly, and sooner, what is sacrificed and what is gained at various expenditure levels. Can and should this be done?

Five: Should the NSC process be more closely related to the budgetary process?

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The larger our gross national product, the greater is our ability to meet the various private and public demands on the economy.

Many now argue for a closer relation between national security planning and economic growth.

Some say that our past and present long-term planning now fails to reflect fully enough our capacity for continuing a "normal" rate of economic growth. As a result, they contend, we sometimes deny ourselves the opportunity to undertake important programs which could be carried out without increasing the proportion of our gross national product devoted to national security.

Others go further. They say that national security planning, based merely on a projection of existing growth rates into the future, does not take full advantage of our potential ability to meet national security needs. They hold that long-term planning should be based upon our ability to accelerate the rate of economic growth through affirmative policies designed toward this end. Such forward planning, they believe, will enable us to fill such additional national security requirements as may arise without endangering important domestic programs or imposing undue burdens on the private sector of the economy.

A REQUIREMENTS AND RESOURCES REPORT?

Each year, in the opening weeks of the Congress, the President submits to the legislative branch three reports of great importance for national security. They are the state of the Union message, the budget message, and the economic report.

Some now feel the need for a fourth annual report from the President—a Requirements and Resources Report. In broad outline, the report would have five main elements:

One: It would contain a statement of our overall long-term *strategy* for national security.

Two: It would present, as a "package," our overall long-term *requirements* for foreign policy, defense, and domestic programs affecting our world position, including a statement of program priorities.

Three: It would present, also as a "package," long-term projections of the *resources needed* to meet these requirements.

Four: It would relate both requirements and needed resources to the *Nation's present and future economic capacities*.

Five: It would contain *recommendations for corrective action* wherever future resources appear inadequate to meet our needs.

Advocates of such a report make these points: It would fill an existing gap between the more general state of the Union message and the more detailed shortrun budget message. The very process of preparing such a report in the executive branch would make for better integration of national policy and might well bring new policy problems to light. Its "wholeness" would give the Congress valuable perspective and yardsticks for measuring the desirability of individual national security programs. Its appearance would stimulate more intelligent public understanding, discussion and debate of national security problems.

Would the presentation of such a report to the Congress be desirable?

V. SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE POLICY PROCESS

PERSPECTIVE

A short generation ago, the concern of a President or a Secretary of State or Defense with problems of science and technology was slight and intermittent. Today, those in these same posts of responsibility know scarcely a day in which they do not confront some technological problem of overriding importance to the future of foreign and defense policy.

The impact of science and technology upon our organizations and processes for making national security policy has become as profound as its impact upon the tools of war themselves. Forecasts of technological developments heavily color all the plans of the soldier and his civilian superiors. They likewise strongly contribute to defining the realm of the possible in diplomacy—sputnik was a political as well as a technological fact. Those concerned with the budgetary process must reckon with research programs which can grow in a year or two from a tiny laboratory project involving a few scientists to a billion-dollar engineering and production program.

THE PACE OF TECHNOLOGY

Lying at the very heart of the problem is the ever-accelerating rate of technological change.

The statesman of a century ago was given more than a generation to adjust national policies to the change from coal to oil in the world's navies. But today such adjustments must occur, in historical terms, overnight. An example: National security planners had scarcely begun to adapt policy to the fact of fission weapons in the world's arsenals, when the vastly more destructive fusion weapon entered upon the scene.

While the pace of technological change has quickened, the cost of failure to make appropriate policy adaptations has risen—exponentially. Again, an example: Germany's failure to press the development of radar before and during World War II.

As technological leadtime grows longer, the chances for second-guessing grow fewer. Ten years may be needed to bring a sophisticated weapons system from the birth of the concept to the delivery of hardware. Crucial decisions, committing us to great expenditures and to largely irrevocable policy courses, must be made at the very beginning of the planning stage.

Every prediction, moreover, suggests a quickening of the pace of change. Seen in the perspective of 1970, the problems faced by policy-makers in 1960 may appear almost easy.

The years since World War II have seen repeated attempts to define organizational patterns and policy processes which better integrate science and technology with national security planning. The most recent answers to the problem have consisted of a limited increase in scientific staff support in State, a general upgrading of the prestige and authority of the research and development function within the three services and the Department of Defense, and bringing high-level scientific advice directly into the White House.

BALANCE OF POWER PROJECTS

It is obviously vital that radical technological developments having major effect upon the world balance of scientific and military power be (1) speedily identified while still in the conceptual stage and (2) rapidly pushed to the top-level decision makers.

Many hold that past and present organizational processes are not adequate to accomplish this end.

One suggestion for reducing institutional "lag time" in these matters calls for setting up special watchdog groups—exclusively charged with "flagging" crucial technical programs at the earliest possible date and then speeding them to the highest decision-making levels.

Would this or alternative steps be desirable?

THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF POLITICAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND MILITARY PLANNING

There is growing awareness that scientific, military, and political planning must go forward together. Some argue that our defense planners, particularly at top civilian levels, have as a group not appreciated fully enough the future military implications of crucial technical programs in the developmental state. It is also held that

our research and development effort too often suffers from lack of adequate guidance concerning weapons systems of maximum utility.

Some also hold that our foreign policy planners, as a group, have not concerned themselves enough either with the future political consequences of weapons systems in the laboratory state or with non-military technical developments holding promise of great impact upon foreign policy. Similarly, it is argued that our research and development programs would benefit from clearer guidelines concerning projects which might best help further our foreign policy goals.

Certain questions appear important:

One: How, without straitjacketing technological development, can State and Defense furnish those concerned with development more useful guidance concerning the paths of technological exploration which might best enable us to further our overall political and military objectives?

Two: What institutional changes within the Department of State might help give political policymakers a better understanding of the impact of research and development projects on the future of foreign policy?

Three: What institutional changes within the Department of Defense might help give senior civilian officials and military officers a fuller awareness of the relationship between scientific developments and defense planning?

Four: Would it be desirable, toward the end of closer joint scientific-political analysis and planning, to assign more scientists to positions in *political* areas, i.e., the Policy Planning Staff in State, or the Office of International Security Affairs in Defense?

Five: Would joint scientific-political planning at early stages in the decision-making process also be promoted by assigning more political and military planners to posts in *technical* areas?

Six: Is there a need for raising the prestige and status of scientific advice within the Department of State?

Seven: What is the best relationship between science and technology in State and Defense, on the one hand, and scientific advice at the Presidential level, on the other?

VI. "THINK GROUPS": WHAT IS THEIR CONTRIBUTION?

THE NEED FOR POLICY RESEARCH

The case for additional systematic policy research in the area of national security policy is strong. In an earlier day—when foreign affairs could be clearly distinguished from domestic affairs, when science and technology were largely divorced from national security planning, when diplomacy was a matter of personal dealings between monarchs or their envoys, and when the problem of resource allocation did not have today's pivotal importance—it might have been argued that security planning required no more than the wit and wisdom of a few policymakers. But that day is gone—forever.

Today, the range of plausible policy alternatives confronting our security planners is enormous. The problem of arriving at an optimum balance of forces within the Military Establishment is vexing enough in itself. But it is relatively simple when compared to the difficulty of blending political, military, economic, and scientific instrumental-

ities into a coherent national strategy best forwarding our national purpose.

The matter is altogether too complex to be solved by intuition, or improvised "seat of the pants" policymaking. There is now wide and growing recognition that the techniques of policy research—the orderly formation, development, and analysis of policy alternatives—can give the decision maker invaluable assistance.

The human and institutional resources in our country potentially available for policy research are vast. They are to be found in industry, universities, laboratories, and research centers. When compared with this potential reservoir of nationwide talent, the governmental resources now available for policy research are limited. Unless one is to advocate a huge expansion of these in-house research activities, ways must be found to tap and bring to bear upon policymaking the full range and diversity of intellectual resources now existing outside the Government.

OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND DEFENSE PROBLEMS

The post-World War II period has seen growing use of semi-autonomous policy research and operations analysis organizations by the armed services. The Department of Defense receives comparable assistance from the Institute for Defense Analyses.

For the most part existing research organizations have concentrated on rather specific systems analysis or "hardware" problems. Is a slow-firing aerial cannon of large caliber more effective than a rapid-firing machinegun of smaller caliber? At what point does the price of building greater accuracy into a missile begin to cost more than is gained?

THE BROADER PROBLEM

Many now favor employing the techniques of systematic research on a much broader range of national security problems. They would draw far more heavily upon the resources of the social sciences, and combine them with the physical sciences to analyze a wide spectrum of national security problems with complex political-military-economic-psychological interrelationships.

Those who advocate increased policy research also stress its limitations. They warn against confusing policy research with policymaking. The former can play only an advisory role. Actual decisions must be the responsibility of elected and appointed Government officials.

Also, it should be apparent that policy research, by itself, cannot furnish answers to many of the truly crucial problems of national security—problems such as the right size of the national security budget or the right balance of our military forces. Research can never take the place of final judgment.

PROPOSALS ADVANCED

Suggestions have been made for increased policy research in three different areas—in the Government itself, in universities or study centers engaged in projects under Government contract, and in semi-autonomous organizations following the general model of the Rand Corporation.

The strengthening of existing, or the establishment of new, semi-autonomous organizations has been a matter of particular interest. The argument is made that many highly talented people who do not wish to work directly for the Government might be attracted by careers in such organizations. It is also held that the semidetachment of such groups encourages fresh looks at policy alternatives, promotes the development of novel ideas, and helps prevent departmental or agency party-line thinking, while at the same time allowing close liaison between policy researchers and policy makers.

Those of this persuasion do not, of course, propose that the Government delegate "thinking" to some outside group. They see internal and external policy research reinforcing and stimulating each other.

In this connection, however, some stress the danger of a double standard in pay and prestige between such organizations and policy research within the Government itself.

Specific suggestions made so far include the following:

A "White House Rand" making studies for the President's national security staff and/or the National Security Council;

A "think group" for the State Department;

An organization jointly sponsored by State and Defense;

A group working for all the executive branch departments and agencies concerned with national security;

A similar group responsible to the Congress.

Some wish to broaden the mandate and increase the resources of existing organizations, such as the Institute for Defense Analyses. Others wish to create completely new groups. One school thinks in terms of a relatively large research group; another argues for the desirability of numerous smaller study centers in competition with each other.

These questions appear relevant:

One: To the extent that the development of semiautonomous policy research organizations is desirable, which departments or agencies could best profit from their services? The State Department? The National Security Council? State-Defense under a joint sponsorship arrangement?

Two: Are there any special difficulties in using such organizations at the White House level?

Three: Should we try to build on the resources of existing organizations such as the Institute for Defense Analyses, and expand their charters?

Four: Insofar as there is a problem of unequal standards in pay and prestige between such organizations and policy research within the Government, how can this best be handled?

Five: Are there better methods for stimulating and making use of policy research in important problem areas at universities and individual study centers?

Six: What steps would encourage more productive policy research within the Government, with particular reference to the State Department and the Defense Establishment?

VII. BETTER POLICYMAKERS

IMPORTANCE OF PEOPLE

In the making of national security policy, human talent is our most precious resource. Good people can often triumph over poor organization, but poor people will defeat the best organization.

Every person engaged in planning and executing national security policy has an indispensable contribution to make. The heaviest responsibility, however, falls upon three groups of people: (1) the *political executive*, (2) the *senior career official*, and (3) the *younger official of exceptional ability and dedication*.

The political executive—who may be a Secretary, an Under Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, or an official of comparable responsibility—represents the policy of the administration in office. The senior career official—who works at or near the top—provides the necessary continuity in policymaking, and places at the service of the administration in office his long experience in his particular field. The younger official of unique talents brings freshness of view to the policy process while preparing himself for future leadership.

The problem is this: how to attract better officials, how to train them better, and how to retain them in Government service.

THE PROBLEM OF PAY

Almost all authorities agree that inadequate compensation is a primary cause of our inability to secure and retain better key officials. Few propose that governmental salaries be brought to industrial levels, but almost all recommend a narrowing of the gap. They note in passing that the gradual but steady rise in university salaries holds forth the prospect that the salaries of key Government officials may soon compare unfavorably with top positions in the academic community.

What recommendations are appropriate to meet this problem?

TURNOVER AT THE SENATE CONFIRMATION LEVEL

It has often been argued that no corporation could prosper if its top officers were changed as rapidly as those of the national security departments and agencies. An example: Since the position of Secretary of Defense was established in 1947 it has been filled by six different men—each serving an average of 2 years. Eight men, each remaining in office an average of a little more than 16 months, have served as Deputy Secretary of Defense since that post was authorized in 1949.

Those concerned with this problem point out that the period of education needed to familiarize top national security officials with their jobs is at least as long as that required to discharge correspondingly heavy responsibilities in industry. They also stress that this period of familiarization will grow steadily longer as the problems faced by governmental policymakers increase in complexity.

The major questions raised are:

One: As a general rule, how long should a person serve in a top policymaking position in order to learn the job and begin to make significant contributions?

Two: Should a nominee be asked by the appropriate Senate committee to give assurance that he intends to serve at least such a minimum period?

Three: Could a contribution be made by a "sense of the Senate" resolution expressing concern with this problem?

Four: Would substantial salary increases be helpful? If so, what level must be attained in order to make such action effective?

Five: How can a better climate be created in the business community for their executives doing a "tour of duty" in Government?

Six: Do the conflict of interest regulations prevent many outstanding executives from serving in Government positions? If so, how can they be amended so that the individual is not unduly penalized, while the Government is being protected?

PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARIES

The argument is made that political executives, as a general rule, simply cannot be expected to serve long tours of duty in the Government. This fact, combined with the increased premium on continuity of service as national security issues grow more complicated, leads many to recommend a move toward the British system of permanent under secretaries.

However, the counterargument is made that such a step would have the drawback of making the governmental process less responsive to the national will as expressed through elected officials and their top aides. The further point is made that governments employing permanent under secretaries have not fared better than our own in devising wise national security policies.

One: Would permanent under secretaries be desirable in the national security field?

Two: If so, in what particular departments or agencies?

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TRAINING

It is increasingly held that the intricate problems of national security planning require greater emphasis on formal training for military officers and civilian officials throughout their careers. Existing programs toward this end show wide variations.

Military officers fare best. Many with the rank of colonel or its equivalent spend roughly one-third of their service careers in schools. They receive numerous opportunities for postgraduate study at universities. They rise through the elaborate system of service training schools which culminate in the National War College and the counterpart institutions of the three services. Participation in this formal training program is a virtual prerequisite of promotion to higher rank.

Foreign Service and State Department officers fare next best. They have limited opportunities for postgraduate training at universities. A small number of them attend the National War College and other service schools. The Foreign Service runs three training pro-

grams on its own—the junior officers' orientation program, the middle career course, and the senior officers' course. But the resources devoted to these programs are very modest when compared with expenditures for training military officers.

The remainder of the civilians in the other national security departments and agencies fare poorest. Their opportunities for extensive and systematic training are limited in the extreme.

The following questions arise:

One: Should a major effort be made to improve formal training at various levels for selected Foreign Service and other civilian employees, including additional opportunities to attend university graduate schools?

Two: If so, how might the executive branch and Congress best concert their efforts to this end?

Three: Should opportunities be increased for cross-fertilization of ideas and experience in joint political-military-scientific training programs, including greater civilian participation in the various war colleges?

Four: Would it be desirable to establish some new study institution, perhaps sponsored jointly by State and Defense and related agencies, offering training beyond the National War College level for a limited number of senior officials?

TOURS OF DUTY

Many have raised questions concerning the present length of tours of duty of military officers and civilian officials. They cite the progressively longer period required to master job requirements in many fields, particularly where technical or specialist problems are involved. They note approvingly the gradual trend toward longer tours of duty but believe that further action in this direction is required.

What corrective action is in order?

VIII. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

In the American system of government the contribution of the legislative branch to national security policy is indispensable. It sets the broad framework for that policy; it votes the moneys needed to carry it out; it provides the most important forum for debate of national security issues.

Just as the executive branch has in the past adapted its organization to new policy challenges, so also have congressional mechanisms evolved to meet changing circumstances. This will no doubt be true of the future also.

PROBLEMS OF CONGRESSIONAL ORGANIZATION

An immense body of recommendations exists concerning possible improvements in the organization of Congress as it relates to national security.

Most commonly, concern is felt over the fragmentation of Congress in its methods for dealing with national security matters. It is stated that Congress lacks mechanisms for dealing with national

security issues "in the round." Because of this, it is argued, Congress misses an opportunity not only to clarify its own thoughts on the relationships between political, military, and economic factors, but also to help guide its constituency on the interrelationship of these problems.

Numerous suggestions for improvement have been made. They range from proposals for more frequent joint meetings of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, to establishing permanent National Security Committees in each House, or else creating a Joint Congressional Committee on National Security.

A variant proposal calls for a Joint Committee on the State of the Union, which would meet for only a few weeks at the beginning of each session to consider the President's major first-of-the-year reports to the Congress.

Many of those who favor some additional national security report to the Congress, such as a Report on Requirements and Resources, draw an analogy from the Joint Economic Committee and favor establishing a nonlegislative joint committee to receive, study, and debate the new national security report.

Some say that Congress should now take the initiative in reforming its existing procedures and structure for dealing with national security problems.

Others point out, however, that past changes in congressional structure and practice have often tended to parallel corresponding changes in the executive branch. They cite the instances of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and the Joint Economic Committee. They note also that the establishment of the Department of Defense was followed by the creation of the Armed Services Committees in the Senate and the House.

IX. PUBLIC SUPPORT

In a democracy, it is the public which sets the limit of the possible in national security policymaking. Effective policy requires more than smooth-working machinery and excellent Government officials; it demands public understanding and support as well.

A cold war, which may persist for generations, makes peculiar demands upon the public. It lacks the unifying stimulus of a hot war. It calls for an undramatic, drawn-out effort with no predictable terminal date. It poses issues in which agreement on ends is often clouded by debate over means.

Proposals for reform of the policy process must therefore be judged by the additional yardstick of their contribution to fuller public appreciation of national security problems.

