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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION

Production and Materials

IMAC 69-1

September 21, 1961

## INTERDEPARTMENTAL MATERIALS ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Meeting No. 68  
September 19, 1961

Present

**Presiding:** Frank B. Ellis, Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization  
Charles S. Brewton, Assistant Director for Resources and Production,  
OCDM  
Russell H. Hughes, Deputy Assistant Director for Production and  
Materials, OCDM

Members:Department of State

Sydney L. W. Mellen

Department of Defense

Carl Rolle

Department of the Interior

W. E. S. Flory

Department of Agriculture

Bruce M. Easton (Alternate)

Department of Commerce

William C. Truppner (Representative)

General Services Administration

Maurice J. Connell

International Cooperation Adm.

Theodore L. Sweet

Observers:Bureau of the Budget

Lewis V. Hall (Representative)  
(Item 1 and introduction to Item 2)

Atomic Energy Commission

James T. Bray

Small Business Administration

George S. Hartman

Others:

Frederick G. Dutton, Special Assistant to the President  
Robert C. Turner, Bureau of the Budget  
Louis Marengo, Central Intelligence Agency  
Glenn V. Gibson, Defense (ASIL)  
John G. Harlan, Jr., GSA (DMS)  
G. Lyle Belsley, OCDM (R and P)  
Charles H. Kendall, OCDM Gen. Counsel  
James P. Durkin, OCDM (Gen. Counsel's Staff)  
Ralph E. Spear, OCDM (Program and Policy)  
W. E. Elliott, OCDM (Security)  
W. N. Lawrence, OCDM (P and M)  
W. G. Fritz, OCDM (P and M)  
M. N. Niewenhaus, OCDM (P and M)  
W. G. Smith, OCDM (P and M)  
Ernest Crooks, OCDM (P and M)

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1. IMAC 68-1, SUMMARY MINUTES, 67th Meeting, May 2, 1961

(Secretary's Note: The review of the summary minutes was not completed at the meeting. However, the minutes were approved by telephone, with the following amendments:

Item 4, paragraph b, after the second sentence, insert: "Commerce, in general, supported these statements." (Suggested by Commerce alternate)

Item 5, under "Recommendation 6," second paragraph, add: "and other pertinent factors." Under "Recommendation 8," at end of last sentence, last paragraph, change the period to a comma and add: "but it is expected that the group will be concerned only with materials that can be made available to foreign aid programs under existing legislation, which requires reimbursement for any materials used." (Suggested by State alternate))

2. Declassification of Stockpile Data

The Director of OCDM, Mr. Frank B. Ellis, reviewed for the Committee the developments that led to the calling of this meeting, and asked for its advice and recommendations, in view of these developments, toward a determination with respect to declassification of stockpile data. The Director said that he had as yet expressed no position on the matter in order that he might have the benefit of free discussion both within and without OCDM.

Mr. Charles S. Brewton, Assistant Director of OCDM for Resources and Production, told the Committee of the results of a study of the matter by the OCDM Resources and Production staff (summarized in Attachment A to these summary minutes).

Mr. Brewton informed the Committee that the only categories on which the Committee's advice was requested at this meeting with respect to declassification, were stockpile objectives and inventories. He observed that disclosure of information on stockpile materials would undoubtedly facilitate efforts of Congressional committees to rectify what they might believe to be wrong or ill-advised procedures. He stated also that it is the policy of this Administration to make as nearly as possible full disclosure of all information on actions and policies of the Government. However, if these benefits are outweighed by security considerations, the national security should not be compromised.

Following Mr. Brewton's presentation, the Director requested the comments of the Committee. These comments are summarized, in the order of discussion, in Attachment B to these summary minutes.

The Director, on his own behalf and that of Mr. Dutton of the President's staff, expressed appreciation of the frank and sincere discussion at this meeting and stated that these views should be helpful in resolving the serious question of whether stockpile data should be declassified. He suggested that although a recommendation would be developed promptly, he would appreciate receiving any additional information that might be of assistance.

E. Taylor  
Executive Secretary

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Attachment A  
to IMAC 69-1, Summary Minutes  
of 68th IMAC Meeting on  
September 19, 1961

Views of the CCDM Resources and Production Staff on

Declassification of Data on Strategic Stockpile Objectives and Inventories

Declassification of Stockpile Objectives and Inventories

Public announcement of our stockpile objectives and inventories would be of considerable advantage to a potential enemy as it would reveal information regarding our defense planning, mobilization readiness, and weaknesses in certain areas. While in some cases declassification of information concerning objectives and inventories may not have any adverse effects, in many cases publication of our objectives and inventories would reveal technological changes and technical planning which would aid a potential enemy in evaluating our security position. A separate treatment of the various materials in the stockpile is not feasible. In this matter, there are no practicable means of treating different stockpiled items in different ways.

It is especially important to note that our objectives for individual items change from time to time in line with changing plans for meeting various emergency needs. Any release of information about such changes would lead to informed speculation as to the reasons behind our actions, with resulting conclusions which may show the Nation's hand in its mobilization planning. In fact, the release of information about changes in individual objectives might reveal the intentions of, or the basis of planning by, the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Since the last half of 1955, the semiannual nonclassified stockpile report has included information indicating whether the stockpile objectives for each item in the stockpile have been attained. This is done without any indication whatever about the inventories or quantities involved. In 1958, the reduction of the general stockpile planning period from 5 years to 3 years was announced. A future change in this planning period, or in the basis of stockpile planning, is possible. The declassification of stockpile objectives and/or inventories, together with the known planning period and the known fact about whether individual objectives have been attained, could reveal substantial information about our mobilization position.

Information concerning the potential enemy's stockpiles of materials would be very valuable to this country in measuring the enemy's materials position and plans. Your attention is called to a statement by the Central Intelligence Agency that:

- "(1) we would very much like to have this kind of stockpile information pertaining to the USSR, and
- "(2) the classified information pertaining to U. S. stockpile would be of at least some limited intelligence value to the USSR."

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Declassification of stockpile objectives and inventories would also reveal to friendly and unfriendly countries our appraisal of their value to us in an emergency. In this connection attention is called to the statement submitted by the Department of State on August 2, 1951:

"If information on inventories and objectives in the National Stockpile were made freely available, unfriendly governments would be assisted in their efforts to wage the cold war. Political and economic measures aimed at making more difficult our fulfillment of objectives, or disposal of sizeable surpluses could be rather effectively carried out.

"It seems possible that, in possession of details of inventories and objectives, friendly foreign governments might be able to deduce something of the political-economic evaluation placed on them by the United States in the determination of the stockpile objectives. To the extent that this could be done, it could be contrary to our international interests."

Declassification of stockpile objectives and inventories would automatically disclose the quantities of materials excess to our estimated mobilization requirements. This in turn would create uncertainty as to Government intentions to dispose of surpluses and thus tend to have disrupting and unstabilizing effects on markets, both domestic and foreign. Over a period of time it could enhance opportunities for speculators to start rumors of Government intentions and thus produce short run effects on markets which they could take advantage of.

While some people in the trade and in foreign governments may know roughly what surpluses exist, this is quite another matter from publishing exact official figures and keeping them up to date.

#### General.

Declassification of stockpile information has been thoroughly considered by interested Government agencies represented on the Interdepartmental Materials Advisory Committee. The subject was also reviewed by the President and his Cabinet in 1958. Following this review, and in accordance with the decisions reached on that occasion, DMO V-7 was published in the Federal Register on June 14, 1958. The Order contained the following policy on declassification:

"Declassification of Stockpile Data. The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization shall declassify stockpile data to the maximum extent feasible when it determines with the concurrence of agencies concerned that the national security would not thereby be jeopardized."

When this Order was revised in many respects on December 10, 1959, it reaffirmed, after Presidential review, the classification policies set forth in the 1958 Order.

When the stockpile classification was reviewed at the 51st meeting of the Interdepartmental Materials Advisory Committee on October 1, 1958, interested agencies recommended the declassification of strategic stockpile inventory data for non-specification grade materials, materials with no current or probable stockpile

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objectives, and quantities of materials authorized for disposal. This recommendation was based on the favorable stockpile inventory conditions at that time. When the stockpile program was initiated, many materials, specification and non-specification grade, were accepted by surplus transfers from other Government agencies because most objectives were far from attained. Almost anything was better than nothing. However, during the years following such acquisitions the inventories of specification grade materials improved to such an extent that many of the low grade materials could be declared surplus to the needs of the stockpile program.

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Attachment B  
to IMAC 69-1, Summary Minutes  
of 68th IMAC Meeting on  
September 19, 1961

Views of the Interdepartmental Materials Advisory Committee and Others on  
Declassification of Data on Strategic Stockpile Objectives and Inventories

Central Intelligence Agency

The Central Intelligence Agency representative reaffirmed the substance of that Agency's letters of July 28 and September 9, 1961, to the OCDM Director regarding declassification of stockpile information, and reiterated these two points: (1) CIA would like to have this type of information from the Soviet Union, and (2) the U. S. information would be of at least some intelligence value to the Soviet Union. He said that it does not follow, however, that CIA opposes declassification. CIA does not believe that release of stockpile data would be so deleterious as to outweigh good and sufficient reasons, from the standpoint of policy, for revealing this information. However, if there is no particular reason for making this information public, why give the Soviet Union free information about the stockpile.

Atomic Energy Commission

The AEC observer stated that although generally declassification of data on stockpile objectives, inventories and quantities on order would not be objected to by that Agency, the matter requires caution. He pointed out that as in all generalities one must consider certain situations that may arise. Only a few of the materials presently being stockpiled are now highly sensitive to AEC. However, in the future, because of some breakthrough in research and technological advances, other materials may suddenly become important to AEC. For these reasons, it may be necessary for AEC to submit new requirements, which in turn may cause an increase in certain stockpile objectives or even establishment of new objectives, and possibly amendment of the stockpile procurement directives if additional acquisition is necessary. If AEC were known to be the major claimant for these materials, the mobilization requirements (classified restricted data) could easily be compromised.

The AEC representative believed that, in the event of declassification, OCDM could find a way to protect AEC data. However, AEC would like the opportunity of examining the figures on certain materials before they are published in order to satisfy both AEC and OCDM that there would be no compromise of security.

Although the classification of basic data sheets was not an item for discussion at this meeting, AEC noted that the classification of these data is a sensitive one.

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### Department of Commerce

The Commerce representative supported AEC's statements concerning the problems of protecting AEC data if stockpile data are declassified.

Commerce did not believe that disclosure of stockpile data would have any serious effect upon the domestic market. The industries most importantly concerned with production of stockpile materials can rather closely estimate stockpile quantities of some materials. With respect to whether this would be true of other nations either friendly or unfriendly Commerce would defer to the judgment of CIA and State.

### Department of the Interior

The Interior member stated that his Department is interested in seeing as much of the data as possible on stockpile inventories and objectives declassified, and it finds no basis from the information available to that Department on which to argue against declassification from a national security standpoint. He noted, however, that other agencies have indicated that declassification of some of these data could compromise the security of data or programs for which they are responsible. He referred particularly to (a) State's observation that the disclosure of stockpile objectives would show the political-economic evaluation placed on certain countries with respect to wartime supply, particularly for materials that come from single-source countries (this evaluation is a part of the classified system for factoring supply), and (b) Defense's statement that if the objectives are revised according to present military planning there is a chance of compromise.

The Interior member pointed out that for several years a listing of the basic and maximum objectives achieved (without any indication of quantities) has been published in the semiannual Stockpile Report to the Congress. This, he believed, had proved to be a rather tight security control in that it did not seem to compromise data still classified. However, if information on strategic stockpile quantities were published along with the statements regarding achievement of objectives, it would be possible to determine the magnitude of at least those objectives that are not met. Therefore, it seems imperative that both the objectives and inventories be treated alike; i.e., either declassify both or classify both.

### Department of State

The State member reaffirmed statements made in that Department's letter of August 2, 1961, to the OICM Director (which were read at this meeting (see Attachment A). He said, however, that these factors alone would not be serious enough to cause the Department to object to declassification. The major considerations, he believed, were: (a) the views of Atomic Energy Commission, Department of Defense, National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Central Intelligence Agency, (b) the security implications of allowing the potential enemy to keep informed of changes in the stockpile objectives.

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### Department of Defense

The Defense representative said that his Department does not object to declassification of information on stockpile inventories and information contained in stockpile procurement directives. Nor does Defense object to the disclosure of the present stockpile objectives inasmuch as the military information implicit therein is about 3 years old. The Defense representative did state, however, that if it is the intention to update these stockpile objectives on the basis of present planning, the disclosure of the updated objectives for some materials could reveal specific military planning. This would be particularly true for new materials to be stockpiled. He said that the Department would want to give a little more thought to releasing information on stockpile objectives, but would still have no objection to release of inventory information (except as noted below).

Defense could see no benefit to the public in revealing stockpile storage locations and quantities of stockpile materials at each location unless there are compelling reasons for doing so. This would merely complicate the problem of protecting these inventories from sabotage and other unauthorized access.

Defense stated that information contained on basic data sheets and information relative to the systems for factoring supply of and requirements for strategic materials should remain classified.

### Department of Agriculture

The Agriculture alternate said that his Department is not in a position either to appraise the security implications of declassifying stockpile data or to object to declassification. It therefore defers to other agencies having a more expert knowledge of these implications.

### General Services Administration

The GSA member stated that his organization is not in a position to determine whether changing the security classification of stockpile data would adversely affect the national security and, therefore, is not in a position to object to declassification. GSA deferred to OCDM and other agencies directly concerned with such considerations.

### International Cooperation Administration

The ICA member said that his agency is not in a position to evaluate the implications of releasing stockpile data. It was his personal view, however, that the statements presented by Mr. Brewton at this meeting pointed up the necessity for retaining the security classification for some of the categories.

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Small Business Administration

The Small Business Administration observer likened his agency's position to that of the Central Intelligence Agency, and restated SBA's belief (expressed in a letter of August 1, 1961, to the Director of ODCM) that effective steps should be taken to complicate the acquisition by unfriendly powers of data detrimental to the security of the United States. SBA also restated its position that if there is any doubt as to whether a document should be classified, downgraded or declassified, the doubt should be resolved in favor of classification.

Bureau of the Budget

(Secretary's Note: The representative of the Bureau of the Budget left the meeting early because of an emergency call. He subsequently informed the Committee Secretary that his comments would have been along the lines of the Budget Director's letter of September 9, 1961, to the Director of ODCM; i.e., that the Bureau would defer in this matter to the agencies directly responsible for the development and maintenance of stockpile information.)

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