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25 February 1960 -

Edna McEnroe, NSC Secretariat, checked on the attached this date and reported that nothing had ever been done. At present it was a closed case. If it were reopened on PB it would probably come out in a new memo.

Betty S.

4.6: 103 - misc. memos

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OCI - 2164 - 57

5 APR 1957



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MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant, CPP

THROUGH : Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT : Comment on 25 March Memorandum for the NSC Planning Board: "Possible Withdrawal of Forces from Central Europe"

1. OCI concurs in this memorandum's evaluation of the USSR's readiness to withdraw its forces from East Germany and Eastern Europe, as well as in the analysis of Soviet policy on European security and German reunification.

2. OCI believes that the statement on West German rearmament plans (Para. 22) does not adequately reflect more recent information on the new German schedule. While the last part of Para. 22 indicates a slow-down, the second sentence is misleading in implying that the Germans are still trying to adhere to their original commitment of a 3-4 year build-up of 500,000 men and 12 divisions. (References:)

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This paragraph might better read, after the existing first sentence:

"While the Adenauer government agreed originally to provide forces of half a million men and 12 divisions in a 3-4 year build-up program dating from 1 January 1956, it has since concentrated on building up seven small divisions to combat-readiness during 1958, and has been reluctant to inform its NATO allies of its long-term aims beyond the announced goal for the end of 1957 (135,000 men in uniform). Nevertheless, leaders of German opinion, both Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, have indicated the need, especially since the Hungarian revolt, for Germany to regain some posture of military defense. Despite the present wait-and-see transitional period of the German build-up, fundamental West German policy is still based on the stationing of Western troops in Germany and on loyal adherence to NATO as a military and political ally."

2. It may be relevant to point out that the discussion of the merits and demerits of German neutralization (Paras. 27-36) leaves a gap in the intelligence picture by omitting any consideration of the probable policies of a united, neutral Germany, and the effect of such policies on US interests.

Although speculative, a brief paragraph (inserted between Paras. 32 and 33) might state:

"On the other hand, there is reason to believe that a united, neutral Germany would exhibit more nationalist feeling than the Federal Republic has shown thusfar, particularly because the unification of East and West Germany would bring the status of the areas east of the Oder-Neisse line to the forefront of political consideration. This situation would obviously produce new tensions and dangers."

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/ HUNTINGTON D. SHELDON
Assistant Director,
Current Intelligence

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Amory

DATE: 4 April 1957

FROM : W. O. Webb

SUBJECT:

I have not attempted to integrate the attached comments or to add my own. I think both Willard and John have some provocative thoughts worth your while to read, although I doubt that they will get many backers for going as far as they recommend toward withdrawing US troops. I emphatically agree that the State draft is too long and diffuse and that it is futile at this stage to get into the business of specific drafting comments.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SA/DDI

DATE: 4 April 1957

FROM : O/NE - WE

SUBJECT: Planning Board Paper of March 25, 1957, "Possible Withdrawal of Forces from Central Europe"

1. In general, I associate myself with EE's comments.

2. Throughout the paper, there is repeated reference to the capacity of NATO military strength in Western Europe to deter or counter a Soviet attack. Similarly, the point is repeatedly raised that the Western Europeans would fear a US withdrawal as an indication that the US was relying upon "push-button warfare" and that Western Europe would be left indefensible and vulnerable to Soviet invasion. These assumptions are not supportable; if we had a more accurate picture clearly in mind the discussion of this problem might be more fruitful than that made in the draft.

3. It should be recalled that the USSR has not invaded Western Europe or otherwise used its preponderant land power in Europe since 1945, even though it could easily have done so, especially up to 1950. In part the reasons were political and economic, but the principal military reason was the US nuclear capability. That capability has been greatly increased, and is much more formidable now than it ever was. Western Europe since 1945 has had and does not now possess the capability to deter or counter Soviet attack; the capability to do that rests in the US nuclear capability and essentially in the US Strategic Air Command. The value of NATO forces in Europe is essentially symbolic; it is a visible demonstration that the US is including the NATO area under its nuclear umbrella; it reassures the Western Europeans on this score.

4. Two additional points need to be made: (a) the West Europeans could lose their faith in deterrence or in US protection as a consequence of certain US actions even if US forces remain, and (b) they could be brought to retain their faith in US protection and the effectiveness of the deterrent even if US forces leave. The two are not necessarily identical. It is the content of US policy and the atmosphere in which US defense policy, US foreign policy, and intra-NATO relations operate which is the persuasive point; it is a failure to understand the actual strategic situation and a lack of confidence in the permanence and depth of the US commitment which persuades the Western Europeans to desire the visible signs of it. But any sign that the US has lost faith in the deterrent effect of its nuclear power, or any convincing demonstration

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that the US was coming to rely upon nuclear power to deal with any minor conflict would lead the West Europeans into defeatism and neutralism with their attendant dangers even in the face of a continued US military presence. On the other hand, if the US withdrew from the continent, the Western Europeans' confidence would be retained and could even be augmented if we said and did other things to convince them that such action was not in any way a "Fortress America" strategy. (Such things as maintaining effective and highly mobile conventional forces, keeping naval forces in the European area, maintaining air bases on the European periphery, assisting in the development of their own military forces, maintaining and extending close and intimate relations in intelligence and planning, and greater political and economic cooperation in NATO.)

5. If the above is true (as I believe to be the case), then we have greater maneuverability than the draft suggests. We could make offers to withdraw from the continent which would be costly for the USSR to accept or to refuse.

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WILLARD MATTHIAS

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2 April 1957

TO : SA/DDI

FROM : O/NE - EE

SUBJECT: Comment on Planning Board Draft Paper, "Possible Withdrawal of Forces from Central Europe," March 25, 1957

1. General - This is not a very impressive draft. Its internal consistency, especially as between Sections II B and II C, leaves much to be desired. After going a long way around it comes out at Para. 40, not with a statement of "policies and actions which might bring about" Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, but with the statement of a pious hope that forces at work independent of Western policy will ultimately achieve this result for us. It would have been easy to reach this somewhat negative conclusion in a much shorter paper. I believe, however, that there are more positive lines of action open to US policy.

2. The base point from which to begin a discussion of this subject is the argument developed in Paras. 5-10 which concludes that "the Government of the USSR has no real present intention of withdrawing forces from Central Europe." This argument could be made even more strongly, as it was in NIE 12-57. The USSR cannot withdraw without endangering interests which it evidently considers vital. There probably is no formula of counter-concession which the West could devise which would induce Soviet withdrawal. Moreover, this is not a short-term tactical situation, as Para. 11 implies by way of providing a logical pretext for discussing possible terms of withdrawal in Section II C. On ideological and military grounds control of Eastern Europe is likely to remain a fixed and non-negotiable element of Soviet policy. This will remain true even though Soviet diplomacy and propaganda from time to time, for purely tactical reasons, appear to give a contrary impression.

3. If this position is clearly understood, most of the argument under II C. becomes irrelevant and does not need to be so laboriously spun out. At the same time, because the Soviet position is in fact rigid, there is an opportunity for a more flexible US policy than the discussion under II C. indicates. Since US proposals for mutual withdrawal are unlikely to be taken up, they can be put forward, always assuming that they are acceptable to US allies, to achieve other desirable results than negotiated understandings with the USSR. If the US showed itself actively interested in concessions to effect Soviet withdrawal, two important results would follow from a Soviet refusal to entertain such proposals: a) The USSR's principal argument for maintaining its control (euphemistically put as maintaining the unity of the Socialist camp against the imperialist threat or strengthening the Warsaw pact against Nato war plans) would be undermined.

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An active US diplomacy and propaganda for a negotiated withdrawal of both sides would be a convincing demonstration that the US has no aggressive plans. This would exacerbate the Soviet problem of maintaining control since this control rests heavily on the myth of US aggressive intentions. Thanks to the Yugoslavs, the ideological argument has already been made that the classic Marxist conception of capitalist aggression is outdated. It would be in our interest to document this "heresy" since it has a great divisive potential within the Soviet dominated "socialist camp." In particular, it would stimulate and strengthen the nationalist elements within the Satellites which, as Para. 40 points out, are the principal hope over the long run for a gradual relaxing of the Soviet grip. b) A demonstration of US willingness to withdraw from Europe in agreement with our allies would, if rejected by the Soviets, improve the political-psychological atmosphere surrounding our military presence in Western Europe.

4. Even if there were some prospect that US proposals would be entertained seriously by the USSR, the US could afford to go further than the discussion under II C. seems to imply. The paper in Para. 16, last sentence, refrains from assessing the military consequences of US withdrawal from the continent. This cannot very well be left out of the calculation and its omission is a serious gap in the argument. If it were included, the net answer might well be that, in view of the growth of German military power and current weapons developments, the US military presence on the continent is no longer essential. (The underlying military thinking in this paper seems to rest too much still on the massive Soviet ground threat to Western Europe, a conception which is outdated by the more recent development of Western and Soviet military capabilities.) But US withdrawal would have to rest on two conditions: a) It would have to be undertaken with our European allies' consent. b) It would have to buy a Soviet withdrawal significant enough to have political consequences in Eastern Europe.

5. The discussion of the German problem (Para. 18 ff.) seems unrealistic. Strauss' statement that the West "could not prevent" Germany from opting for neutrality need not give rise to the alarm reflected in the draft; he expressed a simple fact which our policy should always have taken into account. Our position in Germany would be stronger and there would be less danger of German neutralism if we had taken the clear position that Germany's choice of alignment or non-alignment after unification would be completely free.

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6. In actual fact, however, a great state like Germany could not simply withdraw from the power context on which its existence would depend. Clearly, the Soviets are under no illusions on this point. They could have obtained a neutralized Germany almost at will in recent years. But they do not trust formal declarations of neutrality. They know that Germany would align herself where her interests required, and they fear that Germany's choice would not lie with the USSR. The key question here is where the interests of a free Germany would lie. The West could contemplate a free German choice with equanimity since Germany's interests in the foreseeable future would almost certainly not lead her to take an anti-Western position.

7. The paper is correct in calling attention to the Polish problem in connection with German unification (Para. 34), but does not make the right point. The present situation in Poland gives the USSR added reason for not making a German settlement, since Soviet military power in Germany and the unsettled border issue are a powerful check on Polish independence. From the Western point of view, a settlement of the Polish-German frontier issue must be made simultaneously with German reunification. If this were done, Poland would not need to lean on the USSR as a military guarantor and the opportunity for a Polish policy of independence would be greatly enhanced. Thus reunification of Germany, even a "neutralized" Germany, could open up new political perspectives within the Soviet orbit even if a general Soviet withdrawal from the Satellites was not achieved. Thus contrary to the draft, it would not be essential to hinge a German settlement on the USSR's complete withdrawal from the Satellites. It would be excellent to achieve this, but even without it we would have greatly advanced our objectives: with Germany reunified and Poland free to pursue a more independent line, the vulnerability of the whole Soviet position in the Satellites would be greatly increased.

ONE

27 March 1957

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Note to  and Matthias

This looks like a fairly important piece of business, but as the paper stands now nothing much will come of it.

The paper sets out to examine ways in which the US might "encourage" the withdrawal of Soviet forces from EE and in para. 10 it appears to promise some proposals that would at least seriously embarrass the Soviet position in EE. By para. 40, however, it has rejected all initiatives as disadvantages to the US and ends with a tired re-affirmation of faith in the policy of depending on nationalist pressures within EE to bring about a gradual attenuation of the Soviet position.

Perhaps there is no other course for the US, but I feel that some of the arguments against other initiatives as stated in this paper are of dubious validity.

Taking another approach, since the paper recognizes in para. 5 that the USSR would not be willing to withdraw at the present and in para. 12 that the USSR would require a large quid for its quo why bother to go on with the exercise. If we are not prepared to pay the required quid, why not concentrate on proposals which would be unacceptable to the USSR, but embarrassing to their position in Europe.

May I have your individual comments by noon on 3 April.

James C. Graham

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

COPY NO. 10

March 25, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC PLANNING BOARD

SUBJECT: Possible Withdrawal of Forces from
Central Europe

REFERENCES: A. NSC 5616/2, para. 23
B. NSC 5705/1, para. 17-b

The enclosed draft report on the subject, prepared by Department of State, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the Planning Board at an early meeting.

The enclosure was submitted by the State Member as a proposed response to paragraph 23 of NSC 5616/2 and paragraph 17-b of NSC 5705/1, and also as a Staff Study in support of the Discussion Paper on Political Issues which is in preparation in the Department of State in connection with the Review of Basic National Security Policy.

MARION W. BOGGS
Director
NSC Secretariat

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POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM
CENTRAL EUROPE: A FURTHER STUDY
OF THE BALANCE OF POWER

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D R A F TPOSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM CENTRAL EUROPE;
A FURTHER STUDY OF THE BALANCE OF POWERI. THE PROBLEMA. NSC Directive

1. NSC 5616/2 of November 19, 1956 stated that it would be in the U. S. interest to encourage developments which may lead to the reduction and withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, and instructed the Planning Board urgently to undertake a study of the policies and actions which might bring about this result. A later NSC paper, 5705 of February 8, 1957, reaffirmed this directive.

B. Soviet Note of November 17, 1956

2. By an interesting historical coincidence, the Soviet Government turned almost simultaneously to the question of withdrawal of forces in Central Europe. On November 17, 1956, in a letter from the Soviet Prime Minister to the President of the United States, which was likewise tabled with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Soviet Government advocated in addition to proposals in the general disarmament field:

a. The reduction during 1957 by one-third of the armed forces of the USA, USSR, France, and the UK stationed on German territory.

b. The significant reduction of the armed forces of the U. S., UK and France stationed in NATO countries and Soviet forces in Warsaw Treaty countries.

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c. Liquidation in the course of two years of foreign army, naval, and air bases on the territories of other states.

There was likewise a proviso for serial photographic inspection of armed forces of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries to a depth of 800 kms. on either side of the present Western Communist boundary.

3. The U. S. returned an interim answer to the Soviet note of November 17, 1956, when on December 31, 1956 the President replied to the Soviet Prime Minister indicating that U. S. proposals on disarmament would be made in the UN and specifically in the Disarmament Subcommittee. However, there seemed evidence to suggest that both the Soviet and the United States Governments might be willing to separate the purely disarmament aspects of the Soviet note from the more political suggestions relevant to withdrawal of forces.

II. DISCUSSION

A. A Study of the Balance of Power

4. In accepting the postulate established by the NSC as to the advantages of Soviet withdrawal, the essential question is what inducement can be offered which can bring about such withdrawal. Undoubtedly the USSR would at least demand a probable equivalent reduction and withdrawal by the U. S. and other NATO allied forces from Western Europe, with the ultimate objective of securing the complete removal of

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American forces from the area covered by the North Atlantic Alliance on the European continent. The question to be evaluated, therefore, is in essence one of the balance of power.

B. Evaluation of Soviet Readiness to Withdraw

5. Intelligence appraisals and other information reaching the Department suggests that at the present time the USSR would not be willing to remove its forces from Eastern Germany and satellite Europe.

6. There appears to be no basic change from the Soviet position on European security and German reunification existing at the time of the Summit Conference. Withdrawal of U. S. military forces from Europe continues to be a primary Soviet objective. Nevertheless, it is by no means clear that the Soviet leaders would be willing to pay the price of withdrawing their troops from Germany and Eastern Europe merely for U. S. withdrawal from Western Europe. Modifications in the Soviet disarmament statements seemed designed to give the impression that the Soviet Government's thinking in this field is not static, that in fact some kind of deal is possible; this is an important political warfare tactic, particularly for dealing in the long range with German aspirations for reunification.

7. Soviet reasons for rejecting withdrawal of their troops from Germany and Eastern Europe at this time seem to fall into four categories:

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a. Effect in Eastern Europe

(1) The Soviet leaders realize that their control of Eastern Europe has been threatened by the national and basically anti-Soviet revolutions in Hungary and Poland and by continuing Yugoslav attempts to expand their influence. At least until the present situation in Eastern Europe is stabilized and the dimensions of "national communism" established, they would reject any action, such as Soviet troop withdrawal, which would be interpreted, both inside Eastern Europe and out, as an indication of Soviet willingness to weaken their grip on the area. The Soviet leaders indicated in their important statement of October 30, 1956 that they would upon request withdraw their troops from any Eastern European country, but only if other members of the Warsaw Pact consented. However, subsequent communiques reporting meetings with Rumanism, Polish, East German, and of course of Hungarian Communist leaders have indicated that Soviet troops will remain "temporarily" in those countries. This no doubt reflects the fact that Soviet troops and the demonstrated Soviet willingness to use force to keep Eastern Europe "socialist" and within the Warsaw Pact are at this time the ultimate guarantees that local Communist leaders will remain in power.

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(2) The Soviet leaders appear to realize that they must go further toward allowing the appearances of internal autonomy and toward bettering economic conditions in Eastern Europe. However, these recent challenges to the Soviet position have been so dramatic that the Soviet Union requires time to consolidate its present position. An actual pledge of withdrawal of Soviet troops in the near future might make consolidation along present lines most difficult and would stimulate national variations from the Moscow pattern, when what the Soviet leaders want now is conformance to that pattern and emphasis upon loyalty to the Communist Bloc.

b. Military. In this present period, the Soviet military leaders apparently continue to feel that they need the territory of Eastern Europe for maneuver in the event of hostility, for radar sites, for air bases, and for short-range missile launching locations.

c. Internal Effects in the Soviet Union. New "socialist" economic and political patterns devised by the Poles, Hungarians, and Yugoslavs have been important stimulants to the questioning of Soviet practice (and even of the Soviet system in some cases) by the Soviet intelligentsia during the heady post-Khrushchev speech days. Radical changes in Eastern Europe might stimulate thought and discussion within the Soviet Union even

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more, a situation about which the Soviet leaders appear to be particularly concerned.

d. Western European Pressures. The Soviet leaders have probably felt that there is a chance that time, changing weapons systems, and economic and political pressure for U. S. withdrawal may create circumstances which will bring about this result eventually without their having to withdraw their own troops from Germany and Eastern Europe.

8. Soviet military capability remains undiminished and indeed is increasing. They retain a vast military machine, which is being equipped with most modern weapons. The force cuts announced by the Soviets cannot be verified, but would not affect this conclusion in any event. Soviet forces could control any uprising in the satellites without affecting their capability to mount a major offensive.

9. Although the foregoing reasoning may be conclusive, events of the past few months in Eastern Europe have left a profound mark not only within the Soviet Union itself but likewise within the satellite periphery. It is pertinent to quote the following appraisal, concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee, in the Estimate of the World Situation submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence as NIE 11-3-57 of January 29, 1957:

"In the aggregate, we believe the Communist Bloc has been weakened both physically and psychologically. The military, political, and economic position of the USSR in the Satellite area has deteriorated and relations with Yugoslavia strained. The ideological and

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psychological leadership of the USSR has been impaired and the strength of Communism as an international movement has been diminished by organizational and philosophical turmoil."

10. In consequence, it may be assumed with some certainty that (a) the Government of the USSR has no real present intention of withdrawing forces from Central Europe and (b) it is presently vulnerable to a diplomatic counterattack from the West. The Soviet Union has publicly announced to the world its readiness to withdraw forces, and yet it realizes that any withdrawal of its forces from satellite Europe would be fraught with unfavorable if not fatal consequences. If its bluff were called the USSR would be placed in a difficult position.

C. Policies and Actions which might induce Soviet Withdrawal

11. The foregoing might be deemed a tactical appraisal of the Soviet position on withdrawal of forces from Central Europe. The long-range strategic objective of the USSR is to secure the removal of American military power from continental Europe and the United Kingdom, and ultimately to achieve the removal of US overseas bases which could be used for an atomic strike against the Soviet Union. Another benefit in this overall strategic aim would be the dissolution of NATO.

(a) Total U. S. Withdrawal from Europe and Liquidation of Bases.

12. Coming back to the essential inquiry requested by the NSC, namely, to study the policies and actions which might bring about the withdrawal of Soviet forces from

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Eastern Europe, it seems clear that the USSR would not be willing to withdraw its forces unless the quid for its quo was spelled in very large capital letters. The most simple formulation of the Soviet readiness to deal on a mutual withdrawal of forces was set out by Khrushchev in an interview with Joseph Alsop on February 19, 1957 when he was reported to have said: (Washington Post, February 20, 1957)

"Soviet troops would be withdrawn to the national territory of the Soviet Union from all countries in Europe where they are now stationed in accordance with existing treaties and agreements. Meanwhile, Western European countries would also withdraw their troops stationed in the territories of other Western European countries. The United States would also withdraw its troops to American territory from Europe and Asia, and along with that would go the liquidation of all foreign military bases."

13. A more limited proposal on withdrawal was the Bulganin note of November 17, 1956 whose basic propositions were outlined in paragraph 2 above.

14. Even though accepting the evaluation that at the present time the Soviet Union has no intention of withdrawing from Eastern Europe, and that it would find itself in difficulties if any such withdrawal were undertaken, it is nevertheless possible that certain inducements in the form of compensatory Western withdrawal of forces would bring the Soviet Government to a readiness to order such a reduction in its troop strength in satellite Europe as might be acceptable not only to the Western powers but particularly to Germany and the satellite states. However, the Soviet Union

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would not be prepared to withdraw from Eastern Germany and satellite Europe without insuring the basis of at least an equal, and at most a greater, measure of security against what it considers to be the potential threat of the U. S. than now exists under the present balance of military power.

15. Khrushchev has already said that if the U. S. would pack up and go home and liquidate its overseas bases, the Soviet Union would withdraw its forces to the national territory of the USSR. This simple, even-Stevanovich, proposition would obviously redound to the strategic benefit of Russia as it would leave the continent of Europe exposed to the rapid redeployment of Soviet land power with no adequate indigenous strength which could oppose such power. Such a withdrawal of Soviet forces would, therefore, be achieved at a price too stiff to contemplate.

(b) U. S. Withdrawal from Continental Europe

16. The Soviet Union after negotiation might, however, be willing to withdraw its forces in Europe to its own frontiers in return for a U. S. and possibly UK withdrawal of forces from continental NATO Europe. This would be a somewhat equivalent proposition, provided European forces remained unchanged, since, although the threat of ready deployment of Soviet forces Westward from its own frontiers would still exist, the NATO lines would have deterrent strength in the posting of U. S. forces in non-NATO areas contiguous to NATO Europe, such as Spain, Morocco, Libya,

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and the Sixth Fleet. It might also be possible to negotiate an arrangement whereby U. S. forces and air bases would continue as at present to be stationed in the UK and Iceland. In other words, the deal, if made, would be for U. S. forces to withdraw from continental NATO Europe only. The equilibrium of such a changed military balance of power is a matter for military assessment.

17. On the political side, it would seem that given the present temper of our continental NATO allies such a massive withdrawal of American military power from continental Europe would cause them to feel that the U. S. was relying upon a strategy of "push-button warfare," and that the removal of American land forces would leave continental Europe open to a Soviet invasion. The Europeans have amply indicated that they have no stomach for being "liberated" after the devastation of an atomic war. In consequence, on political grounds it would appear that the U. S. could not contemplate the engineering of a Soviet withdrawal of forces from Eastern Europe if that is to be bought at the cost of a compensatory withdrawal of U. S. forces from NATO continental Europe, even with the retention of bases and forces in Spain, the Mediterranean periphery and the North Atlantic islands.

(c) The Central Problem of Germany

18. A third possibility for the negotiated withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe centers upon a solution of the German question.

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(1) German Reunification

19. Paragraph 15 of NSC 160/1 sets forth as a basic objective of United States foreign policy "the restoration by peaceful means of Germany as a united state, with freedom of action in internal and external affairs, firmly attached to the principles of the United Nations, capable of resisting both Communism and Neo-Nazism, and from which Soviet troops have been withdrawn." The United States has repeatedly pledged its unremitting support to the reunification of Germany as a basic objective of its policy. Under Article 2 of the Bonn Conventions, German reunification is a treaty responsibility of the United States (as well as of Britain and France).

20. There can be no prospect of lasting security in Europe unless conditions of stability are established on the European continent. The reunification of Germany is a prerequisite to the stabilization of Europe.

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21. All German parties proclaim the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom as the first objective of German foreign policy. In recent months German political leaders in both government and opposition parties have speculated upon European security arrangements in connection with reunification but all parties would reject any proposals regarding European security such as the withdrawal or thinning out of foreign troops in East and West Germany unless German reunification is likewise provided for.^{1/}

1/ In recent months Germans both in the Government and opposition have shown interest in the possibility of the withdrawal or thinning out of foreign troops in Germany in connection with German reunification. The German note to the Soviet Union of September 7, 1956, regarding German reunification mentioned the possibility of developing "appropriate arrangements" along the Eastern borders of a reunited Germany and referred explicitly to Prime Minister Eden's proposal of the creation of a demilitarized zone between East and West. This reference to the Eden proposal was retained despite a suggestion by the United States Government that it be omitted. In recent press conferences Chancellor Adenauer has also referred in vague terms to the withdrawal or thinning out of troops as an element in the reduction of international tensions. On January 31 Foreign Minister Brentano told the German Parliament that the proposals made at Geneva still form the basis of the government's policy in this field. The opposition parties in Germany have also discussed this subject. The Free Democratic Party has renewed its emphasis on the withdrawal of foreign troops at least to the Rhine and the Oder as part of a German reunification settlement. Leading Socialist politicians have advocated that a test case for a functioning system of armaments limitations and controls be made on the basis of a militarily thinned-out zone in the heart of Europe which at the same time would bring about German reunification and release the satellites.

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(2) German Policy in Support of NATO

22. The policy of the Federal Republic of Germany has been alliance in NATO, the support of allied forces permanently based on German soil, and the gradual buildup of a German military contribution to NATO strength. The Adenauer Government has agreed to provide land forces of half a million men organized in 12 divisions in three years from January 1, 1956, together with an air force of 1200 planes over a period of four years from the same date. Leaders of German opinion, both of the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, have indicated the need for Germany to regain some posture of military self-defense. However, a degree of zeal among the German people and in the government itself toward moving rapidly to a posture of moderate rearmament has been notably lacking. Nevertheless, fundamental West German policy is thus far based on the stationing of Western troops in Germany and loyal adherence to NATO as a military and political ally.

(3) A Possible Shift in German Policy Toward Neutralization

23. As indicated in the footnote to paragraph 21, there have nevertheless been indications that the Germans are beginning to wonder if other means can not be found to achieve their immediate primary objective of reunification with East Germany on conditions which would assure the elimination of the Communist taint from a united nation and the maintenance of the sovereign independence of the Fourth Reich.

24. Three days after Chancellor Adenauer had publically reaffirmed his past policy and in a press conference indicated

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that Germany could not contemplate any other policy, the German Minister of Defense, Herr Franz-Josef Strauss, published a so-called "theoretical article" in the weekly review Politisch-Soziale Korrespondenz which is said to be closely associated with the governing parties in Bonn. Herr Strauss wrote:^{2/}

25. "Nobody in the governing coalition holds the view that a Germany reunited in peace and freedom must automatically be a member of the North Atlantic alliance. A reunited Germany will be able to decide freely for itself within the framework of its political possibilities.

"The contractual assurance of this possibility exists not only on paper and not only in theory. Therefore, it may be that, although there exists a preference and also a security wish for a reunited Germany to belong to a military alliance of the West, the hard political requirements of the German people might cause them to make a decision according to the Austrian pattern of neutralization as between East and West⁷.

"The West would not want to and could not prevent^{3/} Germany from making such a decision. Such a decision would have to rest on very sober political and military considerations. The road to such freedom of decision, which will be open only when the entire

^{2/}New York Times, February 20, 1957.
^{3/}Italics added.

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German people participates, does not lead over the battlefield but over the field of negotiations."

26. The Russians are able to read the Politisch-Soziale Korrespondenz as well as the Americans. It is not impossible that in pursuit of its basic aim of reducing NATO strength the Soviet Government may commence secret feelers with the West German Government on the basis for a new settlement in Central Europe.

(4) Russian Withdrawal in Return for German Neutralization

27. Returning to the question of "policies and actions which might bring about the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe" the possibility suggests itself that in return for the neutralization of a reunified Germany the Russians might be prepared to concede withdrawal of their forces, most certainly from Eastern Germany, and possibly from satellite Europe as well. If such a negotiation were undertaken the Russians would contemplate a number of improvements in their security situation which could be achieved by the neutralization of Germany, but against these gains they would have to weigh the consequences of the loss of Eastern Germany and of military control in the satellite states.

28. In evaluating the possibilities of such a negotiation the question of Austria is illustrative. No progress was made over innumerable sterile meetings on the settlement of the Austrian question and the withdrawal of allied and Soviet forces from that country until Germany entered the NATO alliance. The Soviets then moved to checkmate the allied military position by

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agreeing to the neutralization of Austria. Neutral Switzerland already lay to the south of Germany and once Austria was neutralized an East-West zone extending more than 500 miles was established, effectively sealing off the land line of communication between the newest NATO ally, Germany, in the north and Italy in the south. With the contiguous extension of Yugoslavia to the east and south along the Adriatic Sea, the Soviet high command could rest easier in the knowledge that land NATO forces were buffered by the arc from the western frontier of Switzerland to the Strait of Otranto.

29. It is not impossible that a similar evaluation of the main chance may again motivate the leaders in the Kremlin. If Germany were made a neutral state the Soviet Union would insure the withdrawal of American forces from that country and thus force back the main deterrent power which is now poised on the western side of Central Europe. The political consequences of such a withdrawal might well start a reaction within NATO which would lead to its further weakening. General Norstad has said in speaking of the will to use NATO forces should the need arise:

30. "The will exists today. It is, however, the most perishable of our assets. It cannot be produced and stockpiled like a weapon. Rather, like a plant or any other living thing, it needs continual refreshment. Nothing could be more enfeebling to the spirit that so far has animated NATO than a suspicion, however faint, that some of its partners were withdrawing behind their

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own frontiers, counting upon their long-range weapons to preserve the balance." ^{4/}

31. However, as against these advantages in the Soviet eyes of the neutralization of Germany, the Kremlin must likewise evaluate the political consequences of the loss of Eastern Germany as a Communist satellite and an uncertain military ally. Probably, from a purely military point of view, the Soviet General Staff could concede the withdrawal of its forces from Eastern Germany and the relinquishment of such advanced bases as the Red Army and air force have in that area without conceding a major loss in military striking power. However, on the political side it would be demonstrated to the world that the advantages of Communism are not sufficient to withstand the more positive benefits of a free enterprise system within a dynamic nationalism, and the Soviets in return for the neutralization of a united Germany would have to concede that their communist dominance in East Germany had been an ephemeral thing. However, after the events in Poland and Hungary few realistic leaders in the Soviet Government would be inclined to argue that Communist regimes in Eastern Europe are deep-seated in the popular affection.

32. What would be the NATO reaction to a German or Soviet proposal for the reunification of a neutralized Germany with

^{4/} Department of State Bulletin, Vol XXXVI, No. 921, February 13, 1957, p. 253.

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concomitant withdrawal of all foreign forces from its soil? It is possible that the French would be pleased with such a prospect on the more immediate and parochial ground that German armed might would not be in a position again to attack French territory and also on the wider ground that a neutral buffer zone in Central Europe would lessen the chances of war between East and West. The Italians, who are already sealed off from access to Germany through the Brenner Pass by the neutralization of Austria, would probably not oppose and might share a French judgment that the chances of war would be diminished by the establishment of a neutralized zone. The Swedes, Swiss and Yugoslavs, who are already professional neutrals in varying degrees, would undoubtedly welcome the new arrangement. Here it might be said parenthetically that in a system for European security based on the neutralization of Germany, guarantees might be expected from **these** powerful neutrals whose armed forces are in fact more militarily significant than those of most of our NATO allies on the continent.

33. The NATO governments, and above all the U. S. and the government in Bonn, thus may face a hard choice in adding up the advantages and disadvantages of a reunification of Germany, won at the price of neutralization and withdrawal not only of Soviet forces but of American and other allied troops from German territory. By such an arrangement the U. S. would have achieved one of its asserted basic policies, the

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reunification of Germany by peaceful means, but without Germany as an ally; and the Soviet Union in return for an increase in security by the establishment of a buffer neutral zone would have to accept a severe political loss in the relinquishment of a Communist Eastern Germany. It could, however, be argued that NATO existed as an effective going concern while Germany was still demilitarized and that NATO could continue as an effective deterrent force without the use of German soil and manpower.

34. If a negotiation of such basic importance were undertaken a further opportunity might be afforded of insisting that Soviet forces withdraw not only from Eastern Germany but Eastern Europe generally. Here, however, the paradox of Polish reaction would undoubtedly come into play. Facing a reunited Germany the Poles would probably turn to the Soviet Union as the only military guarantor of the Oder-Neisse frontier. Depending upon circumstances at the time a Polish government might not want the withdrawal of Soviet troops. However, elsewhere in the satellite states the withdrawal of Soviet forces would be welcome. In the formulation of a basic system of European security founded on the concept of neutralized areas it would be in the interest of Germany itself, as well as Western Europe generally, to insist that Soviet forces be withdrawn to Soviet national territory.

35. Despite present U. S. and Federal German policies, one dominant political hypothesis must always be kept in mind:

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if the German people decide that the main impediment to peaceful reunification is the fact of their alliance in NATO, they may decide that they want reunification more than continuance in NATO, provided an equivalent security can be found in neutralization.

36. Another assessment may strike the German mind: under the present brittle balance of power it does not require even a Teutonic imagination to conclude that if the balance were militarily disrupted the battlefield would be Germany itself. Former members of the German General Staff would likewise have no difficulty in concluding that a major strategic target of Soviet atomic bombing would be the German industrial complex. In their future assessment of what is best for Germany, they might conclude that a position as a powerful neutral state in the center of Europe is safer than that of a divided Germany on the frontier between NATO and the Soviet bloc.

(d) Other Possibilities of Withdrawal: The Bulganin Note of November 17, 1956

37. Of the other possible policies and actions which might result in a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, the Bulganin proposals of November 17, 1956 can probably be dismissed as not being acceptable to the West. On the suggestion for a one-third withdrawal of U. S., UK and French forces from Germany to be met by an equivalent withdrawal of Russian forces from Eastern Germany, the Kremlin has no doubt taken note of the publicly expressed intention of the British Government to reduce its forces in Federal Germany

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by more than one-third; nor will the Russians have failed to note the fact that French NATO forces in Germany are of a token character since most of the effective units are in service in North Africa. The West, therefore, has in large measure already accomplished a one-third withdrawal of forces in Western Germany, nor has it received any compensatory reduction in Soviet forces in return.

38. Evidence from various Western European capitals suggests that a "significant reduction" of U. S., UK, and French forces elsewhere in NATO territory as against a similar reduction of Soviet forces in Warsaw Pact Europe might start that process of "snow-balling" which would reduce NATO military effectiveness below the point where it could serve either as a deterrent or a shield. (It should be kept in mind, however, that the Soviets would have perhaps an even more formidable problem of "snow-balling" behind the Iron Curtain.) As for the liquidation of foreign bases on the territory of third states within two years, it is clear that under present strategic concepts such a course of action would vitiate the effective striking power of the U. S. against the USSR and China.

D. Summary

39. To sum up this appraisal of the various policies and actions which might bring about a withdrawal of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe the following conclusions emerge:

a. The main Soviet aim of reducing NATO power to impotence and of forcing the withdrawal of American forces from Europe has not altered.

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b. As of the present time, the Soviet Union would find it disadvantageous to withdraw its forces from Eastern Europe.

c. The most sweeping Soviet proposal -- complete American withdrawal from Europe and liquidation of overseas bases in return for Soviet withdrawal of forces to national territory -- would be one-sidedly to the advantage of the Soviet Union and could not be accepted by the U. S.

d. A compromise solution, providing for the withdrawing of Soviet forces to national territory and of U. S. forces from continental NATO Europe but retaining lodgment in Spain, North Africa and the Atlantic islands, would probably cause the continental NATO allies to lose heart and would result in such a diminution of NATO strength as to be unacceptable to the U. S.

e. A proposal for the reunification and neutralization of Germany would imply the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Germany and possibly also from satellite Europe. It would impose a severe political loss on the USSR through the disappearance of Communist Eastern Germany, but it would have significant strategic advantages for the Soviet Union in causing the withdrawal of American and other NATO forces from Western Germany and in completing the neutralization of central Europe from Sweden to Yugoslavia. The neutralization of Germany on these terms might have an overwhelming appeal for the German people if they reached the conclusion that this was

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the only means to obtain reunification under acceptable conditions. German neutralization might likewise have a definite appeal to France and would be attractive to the more powerful European neutrals such as Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia.

f. The proposals for Allied and Soviet withdrawals outlined in the Bulganin note of November 17, 1956 are on the whole unacceptable to the U. S.

E. Possible Courses of Action

40. If the foregoing analysis is valid, possibly the most effective long-range course of action would be for the U. S. and its Western allies to exploit the forces of nationalism and resistance in Eastern Europe which caused last year's revolutions in Hungary and Poland. While the immediate effects of these developments will probably be a tightening of Soviet control, as has happened in Hungary and East Germany, as well as an attempt to circumscribe Polish freedom of action, nevertheless these forces may represent an irreversible trend to which the Kremlin may seek to accommodate itself rather than to hold mutinous populations in subjugation, with all attendant risks. The Western powers may find it possible thus to weaken the Soviet system through the development of relations with particular satellite states interested in enhancing their independence. An increasing recognition by the Soviets of nationalism and independence may have a favorable effect on

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German reunification but it is of course likely that under these circumstances the Soviets will try to premise German reunification upon German neutrality.

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