

TOP BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	[redacted] SA/DDI		
2	344 Admin		STAT
3			
4			
5			50X1
6			

ACTION

DIRECT REPLY

PREPARE REPLY

APPROVAL

DISPATCH

RECOMMENDATION

COMMENT

FILE

RETURN

CONCURRENCE

INFORMATION

SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Liaison Committee meeting
 [redacted] *in March*
 17 feb 60
 50X1
 Attached for DDI review and comment.



CI DDP
1024 J Bldg

*ONE
OCI*

1400-19 Feb 60

*ONE comments given
to CI, DD/P -
19 Feb 60*

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

STAT TRANSMITTAL SLIP

18 Feb

(Date)

TO:



BUILDING

0

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

*oal has no
comments*

STAT

FROM:



BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

~~SECRET~~

SA/DDI

19 February 1960

ONE/NE/


STAT

Comments on Assessment of the Thrust of Communist Subversion
in the CENTO Area

1. We believe the attached account to be a generally valid analysis of the threat of subversion in the CENTO area. The following comments on specific points, however, would seem to be in order:

a. In the paragraph at the bottom on page three, the point is made that Communism endorses Arab unity under certain conditions. Actually, Communist endorsement of Arab unity is, at present, purely tactical -- aimed at undermining anti-Communist and pro-Western governments, or at preserving what remains of the Communist appeal. The Communists do not actually favor Arab unity under any circumstances which are not under ultimate Communist control.

b. In the following paragraph on page four, many of the issues enumerated are less pertinent than others which could have been chosen, e.g. the UAR-Iraq conflict, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Nasser's troubles in Syria, etc.



50X1

~~SECRET~~