

INTRODUCTION TO INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

W70000-1L

OBJECTIVE:

1. Know the objectives, general subject matter, procedures, and points of major emphasis in the course.

OVERVIEW:

The underlying objectives of this course are four. First, we want to develop a sense of what the National Foreign Intelligence Community is and how the U.S. intelligence system works. In so doing we will look at U.S. intelligence from an institutional perspective, examining the organizations and agencies which comprise the Community and the means by which they interrelate.

Our second objective is to gain a deeper understanding of the nature of the intelligence product. Strategic planning, crisis management, and direction of military operations each dictate differing forms of intelligence products. Similarly, institutional and substantive considerations influence the processes used for the production and presentation of different products. Thus, understanding the intelligence product is an important prerequisite to understanding its use.

Third, since the intelligence product can have real value and utility only insofar as it supports the national security decisionmaking process, we will explore the peculiar relationship between the intelligence producer and the intelligence user, or consumer. Our goal here is to develop some insights into the role of intelligence in the formulation and execution of national policy and into the considerations associated with evaluating the quality and effectiveness of the intelligence product.

Finally, we want to give some thought to the functions of intelligence and the structure of the Intelligence Community in the future. How can intelligence help us cope with threats to our national security while not itself becoming a threat to our democratic society?

The organization of the course may suggest an intent to deal with each of these objectives separately. This is not so. The objectives are inter-related and pursuit of them will be both continuous and simultaneous. Our premise is that no single objective in the study of intelligence can be pursued in isolation from the others.

Although intelligence is not a new discipline, it has traditionally been shrouded in secrecy. In recent years, however, much of the secrecy surrounding the U.S. Intelligence Community has been dissipated. In the Optional Reading for this block, Professor Harry Howe Ransom a scholar who has studied the role of intelligence in America for many years, analyzes the growing body of literature on intelligence organizations and operations. Many of the books he discusses are on reserve in the AU Library. The required readings for the course are drawn from several sources. Several readings on the Intelligence Community come from the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (the "Church Committee"). Although published five years ago, this report still provides the best available compilation of information on the history, organizations, and operations of U.S. intelligence. They will supplement, and sometimes disagree, with the lectures presented by representatives of the intelligence organizations and agencies. We will also use some contemporary intelligence products published by CIA, DIA, and Air Force intelligence to further our understanding of the intelligence product. These classified documents will be provided later. Finally, we will look at the general problem of intelligence and policy and the complex producer-consumer relationship through the writings of academics and intelligence professionals. Both intelligence producers and intelligence users have been invited to speak on these topics. In addition, we will employ the case study method to focus on the role of intelligence in various military and political events and crises.

READINGS:

Assigned: None.

Optional:

"Being Intelligent about Secret Intelligence Agencies"

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

W70001-1½L/1D

OBJECTIVES:

1. Know the terminology used in intelligence activities.
2. Comprehend the intelligence process and the steps in the intelligence cycle.
 - 2.1 Explain how intelligence requirements are formulated and expressed.
 - 2.2 Summarize the methods by which intelligence information is collected.
 - 2.3 Explain how intelligence information is processed into a form suitable for the production of finished intelligence.
 - 2.4 Summarize the process by which information is converted into finished intelligence.
 - 2.5 Explain the means by which finished intelligence is disseminated to consumers.

OVERVIEW:

The intelligence process can be likened to an industrial one. Raw material--fragments of information of various types and degrees of detail and validity--is collected and fed into a factory--an analytic or production organization. The factory processes its raw input into a variety of products, finished intelligence, designed for the use of a variety of consumers. Intelligence managers seek to determine the needs of their consumers, to translate these into requirements for collection, to direct collection in response to these requirements, and to shape the finished intelligence product so as best to meet consumer needs. Since the universe of information is infinite and consumers are insatiable, while resources and budgets are finite, intelligence managers must also establish priorities for what is to be collected and what finished intelligence is to be produced. These priorities then drive budgetary decisions, either to reallocate resources among existing organizations and systems, to create new programs and capabilities, or to eliminate unproductive ones.

The theoretical concept utilized to describe this process is called the "intelligence cycle." The reading on "The Intelligence Cycle" summarizes the phases or steps in the process--planning and direction, collection, processing, production, and dissemination. Articles by Herbert Scoville, Jr. (former Deputy Director for Science & Technology at CIA) and Major General Schlomo Gazit (former Israeli Director of Military Intelligence) treat specific intelligence collection and analysis issues.

READINGS:

Assigned:

"The Intelligence Cycle"

Optional:

~~"Is Espionage Necessary for Our Security?"~~

"Estimates and Fortune-Telling in Intelligence Work"

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: OVERVIEW

W70002-1L

OBJECTIVES:

1. Know the history, organization, and role of the intelligence Community in national security policymaking.
 - 1.1 Describe the major trends and changes in the National Foreign Intelligence Community since 1945.
 - 1.2 Outline the current organizational structure for National security policymaking.
 - 1.3 List the current members of the National Foreign Intelligence Community.
 - 1.4 Describe the role of the Intelligence Community in National security policymaking.

OVERVIEW:

The concept of an "Intelligence Community" can be both perplexing and confusing to professional military officers. The idea is confusing because professional military officers naturally identify with their parent service, not with a loosely organized as mixture of civilian and military organizations and agencies. The "Intelligence Community" concept is perplexing to military officers because the nominal leader of the Intelligence Community is responsible directly to the President and is clearly not in the military chain of command. Where did this peculiar system originate? How did it evolve? How does it function? Does it really work? This block of instruction addresses these questions as a means of introducing us to the Intelligence Community.

READINGS:

Assigned:

- "The Foreign and Military Intelligence Operations of the United States: An Overview"
- "The Role of the Intelligence Community"

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: THE PRESIDENT AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

W70003-1L

OBJECTIVES:

1. Know the past and present use of intelligence by the President and the means by which the President provides guidance and direction to the Intelligence Community.

- 1.1 Describe the intelligence needs of the President and his role in the national Intelligence Community.
- 1.2 Outline the primary instruments with which the President controls, directs, and supervises the intelligence activities of the U.S. Government.

OVERVIEW:

In its Final Report, published in 1976, the Senate intelligence investigating committee (the "Church Committee") described the central role of the President in U.S. intelligence:

Intelligence has been the province of the President. It has informed his decisions and furthered his purposes. Intelligence information has been seen largely belonging to the President, as being his to classify or declassify, his to withhold or share. The instruments of U.S. intelligence have been the President's to use and sometimes to abuse.

The U.S. Intelligence Community has always enjoyed a unique relationship with the White House, as this observation suggests. The President now has three mechanisms to control, direct, and supervise the U.S. Intelligence Community: the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Intelligence Oversight Board. Do these instrumentalities insure that the President's intelligence needs are met and that intelligence activities remain under Presidential control?

READINGS:

Assigned:

~~"The President's Office"~~

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

W70005-1L/1D

OBJECTIVES:

1. Know the history, organization, and functions of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its role in the Intelligence Community.
 - 1.1 Identify the sources of CIA authority.
 - 1.2 Trace the growth and development of the CIA since 1947.
 - 1.3 Outline the general organization of the CIA and describe the functions of its major elements.
 - 1.4 Describe the relationship between the CIA and the other elements of the Intelligence Community.

OVERVIEW:

The work of a service like the CIA can be broken down into three general categories: intelligence-gathering and analysis, the protection of its own integrity (or counterintelligence), and political intervention. Although all three are undertaken by a single institution, under the authority of one man, each of those functions has its own purposes and rationale. Criticism of the Agency...has touched in scattershot fashion on all three aspects. CIA people are willing enough to concede the blunders and excesses of the past, but insist that the basic business of the Agency, if ugly in some of its particulars, is necessary too, one of the fatal facts of modern life. Like taxes, prisons, and armies. An outsider naturally resents this argument--

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but two thousand years of history, in which failures of intelligence were often as destructive as failures of arms, make it hard to dismiss. The trouble with the argument is that it lumps the CIA's work all together, and suggests that the rest of us must take it or leave it. This we do not have to do.

Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets

The Intelligence Community in general and the CIA in particular have been the subjects of considerable discussion in recent years. No other society has looked so deeply and publicly into its own intelligence activities and thus no other society can claim more knowledge of its own intelligence agencies than can ours. The reading and lecture will present interesting and contrasting views of the CIA. ~~The reading is part of the Church Committee's Final Report on its 1975-76 investigation of U.S. Intelligence activities. The lecture will be presented by the CIA Advisor to the AU Commander.~~ How do these viewpoints compare? How should we deal with the assumptions cited by Thomas Powers?

READINGS:

Assigned:

~~"History of the Central Intelligence Agency"~~

~~Optional:~~

~~"CIA Production of Finished Intelligence"~~

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: . NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

W70006-1L/1D

OBJECTIVES:

1. Know the importance of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and the role and functions of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS).

1.1 Trace the history of cryptology in the U.S.

1.2 Describe the general role and functions of NSA.

OVERVIEW:

SIGINT has played a prominent role in U.S. intelligence activities throughout this century. In this block an instructor from NSA's National Cryptologic School will discuss the history of cryptology, the key contributions of SIGINT to the U.S. intelligence product, and the role and functions of NSA.

READING:

Assigned: None

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

W70007 -1D/1JD

OBJECTIVES:

1. Know the organization, mission, functions, and relationships among Defense intelligence staffs and organizations.

- 1.1 Trace the evolution of intelligence organizations in the Department of Defense (DoD).
- 1.2 Describe the process by which intelligence policy is formulated and implemented in DoD.
- 1.3 Describe the organization, mission, and functions of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the role of the Military Intelligence Board.

OVERVIEW:

One of the major trends in the Intelligence Community since its establishment in 1947 has been increasing centralization of the intelligence activities within DoD. This trend toward centralization is a manifestation of a broader trend toward unified and specified commands and enhanced authority for the Secretary of Defense over the military services. Some centralization actions--the establishment of DIA in 1961 and the creation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) in 1971--occurred as a result of DoD efforts to control intelligence activities previously performed by the Services. More recent changes, such as the establishment of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Policy Review) in 1977, have resulted from the desire of the Secretary of Defense to protect Defense intelligence resources and missions from assimilation by the Director of Central Intelligence. The military services are authorized to engage in those intelligence activities necessary for their operational missions (tactical and "departmental" intelligence), but national and DoD departmental intelligence--setting collection priorities, producing finished intelligence, and preparing the Defense intelligence budget--is the responsibility of the Director of DIA. The line between national and tactical intelligence has been relatively easy to define but very difficult to discern in reality. Not only does considerable overlap exist, but DoD has also expended considerable time and effort to achieve an effective and efficient interface between the two. Unravelling the complex Defense intelligence roles, responsibilities, and relationships will be our challenge in this block.

VULNERABILITY ENGINEERS

DIA offers challenging career opportunities for individuals with a BS/MS degree in civil/structural engineering. Experience in the analysis of nuclear and/or conventional weapons effects and the analysis of physical vulnerability of targets is desirable for higher grade levels.

You will prepare physical vulnerability studies, mathematical analysis and computations to determine the effect of applying various conventional and nuclear weapons against specific targets. You will also plan the scope and methodology of weapon projects and programs as well as develop methods and procedures for the physical vulnerability analysis of targets to various weapons effects.

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Civilian Personnel Division
Recruitment Branch (Dept. PVE)
Washington, DC 20301

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DIA

READINGS:

Assigned:

~~"The Department of Defense"~~

"Military Intelligence: Eyes and Ears of Defense"

Optional:

~~"The Intelligence Mythology of Washington"~~

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE

W70008-1D/1JD

OBJECTIVES:

1. Know the organization, mission, and functions of Air Force intelligence organizations.

1.1 Describe the mission and responsibilities of Air Force intelligence.

1.2 Describe the organization, mission, and functions of Air Force intelligence organizations and activities, including the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, the Air Force Intelligence Service, the Foreign Technology Division of Air Force Systems Command, and the intelligence organizations of the Strategic Air Command.

OVERVIEW:

The Air Force has traditionally been a key element in the nation's intelligence system because it operates in the medium best suited for reconnaissance and surveillance of actual or potential adversaries. Air Force intelligence activities span the full range of intelligence collection disciplines and production responsibilities. In this block, a senior Air Force intelligence officer will describe these activities and the organizations which conduct them.

READING:

Assigned: None

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

W70009-1S

OBJECTIVES:

1. Comprehend the organization and operations of the U.S. intelligence system in collecting and producing foreign intelligence.

- 1.1 Summarize the means by which U.S. intelligence collection requirements are established.
- 1.2 Explain the process for tasking national intelligence collection systems.
- 1.3 Summarize the methods and means by which the Intelligence Community prepares foreign intelligence products.
- 1.4 Summarize the means by which finished intelligence products are conveyed to consumers.

OVERVIEW:

The quantum jumps in science and technology in the 1960's and 70's revolutionized the U.S. intelligence system. Highly sophisticated electronic and photographic collection systems, operating in a new medium, have given the Intelligence Community access to foreign military information once unobtainable by any means. Computers have allowed analysts to process, evaluate, and store huge amounts of data.

Sherman Kent, in the 1965 Preface to his classic work, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (1949), foresaw the turn toward technology which U.S. intelligence would take. "Whatever the complexities of the puzzle we strive to solve and whatever the sophisticated techniques we may use to collect the pieces and store them," Kent warned, "there can never be a time when the thoughtful man can be supplanted as the intelligence device supreme."

How has the technological revolution in intelligence affected the organization and operations of the U.S. Intelligence Community? Do we really collect more intelligence than we can analyze? Are there institutional or technological barriers to making the U.S. intelligence system more efficient and productive? Does the current system provide an environment where the human intellect can function fully and successfully? *wede* ?

These are some of the questions we will discuss as we sum up the U.S. Intelligence Community and prepare to examine in detail the relationship between intelligence producers and intelligence consumers.

READING:

Assigned: None

INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY

W70010-1L/1D

OBJECTIVES:

1. Comprehend the role of intelligence in the policymaking process.
 - 1.1 Summarize the basic barriers to analytic accuracy cited by Richard K. Betts.
 - 1.2 Explain the "traditionalist" and "activist" views of the appropriate relationship between the intelligence officer and the policymaker or consumer.
 - 1.3 Summarize the key issues in the Intelligence-Policy-making relationship.

OVERVIEW:

Sherman Kent begins his discussion of the intelligence producer-consumer relationship with the observation that: "Intelligence must be close enough to policy, plans, and operations to have the greatest amount of guidance, and must not be so close that it loses its objectivity and integrity of judgment." How can intelligence organizations achieve this balance in relationships with their consumers? What factors govern the maintenance of such a balance? What happens when producer-consumer relationships sour? In this block we will investigate the nature of the intelligence organization's relationships with its consumers, looking at the natural tensions that exist between intelligence and policy.

READINGS:

Assigned:

"Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable"

"The Problems of the Intelligence Consumer"

Optional:

~~"Producers and Consumers of Intelligence"~~

"Intelligence for Policymaking"

INDICATIONS & WARNING (I&W) INTELLIGENCE

W7001-1L/1D

OBJECTIVES:

1. Know the background of the U.S. warning system and how the Worldwide DoD I&W System operates.
 - 1.1 Outline the evolution of the U.S. warning system.
 - 1.2 Describe the mission, organization, and operations of the Worldwide DoD I&W System.
2. Comprehend the nature of the warning process.
 - 2.1 Summarize the characteristics of the warning process and the problems inherent in identifying, evaluating, and analyzing indicators.
 - 2.2 Explain the concept of intentions and the interactions between opposing decisionmakers.

OVERVIEW:

The primary objective of any national intelligence system is to acquire information which contributes to warning of threats to the security of the state. Failures to provide such warning have in recent times had a profound effect on world events. The Pearl Harbor attack, Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War in the Middle East represent instances in which intelligence indicators generated by one state were not correctly perceived and analyzed by another state. The political leaders of the second state thus were not sufficiently warned to make decisions and direct actions which might have reduced or precluded threats of its security.

In her seminal study on attack warning, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, Roberta Wohlstetter examined the details of why intelligence concerning the possibility of a Japanese attack did not result in proper tactical warning for U.S. forces in Hawaii. Wohlstetter developed the thesis that the true "signals" of Japanese intent became imbedded in background "noise" which supported other plausible explanations of events. In the article from Foreign Affairs she summarizes much of her book and suggests that a similar analytical approach is useful to understanding the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Thomas Belden continues to explore the relationship between warning and decisionmaking and suggests some innovations designed to mitigate organizational obstacles in warning and crisis operations.

READINGS:

Assigned:

"Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight"

"Indications, Warning & Crisis Operations"

Optional:

"Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks"

I&W INTELLIGENCE: 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR CASE STUDY

W7001~~1~~-1S

OBJECTIVES:

1. Comprehend the warning problems involved in the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and the Arab states.

- 1.1 Explain the Israelis' explicit and implicit assumptions concerning the conditions under which the Arabs would attack.
- 1.2 Give examples of the "signals" which the Arabs sent concerning their intentions.
- 1.3 Summarize the character of the "noise" in which the Arabs' signals were imbedded.

OVERVIEW:

The total balance of forces is in our favor, and outweighs all other Arab considerations and motives, and puts a brake on the immediate renewal of hostilities.... Our military superiority is the double result of Arab weakness and our own strength. Their weakness derives from factors which, I believe, will not change quickly.

Israeli Defense Minister
Moshe Dayan in a speech to the
Graduates of the Military
Staff and Command College,
10 August 1973

Richard K. Betts, in an earlier reading, suggested that: "Intelligence failures are not only inevitable, they are natural." The October 1973 Yom Kippur War represented an intelligence failure of unparalleled significance, not only for Israel, but also for the intelligence services of the Western democracies. The consequences of failing to foresee the Arab attack on Israel remain with us today. In studying the Yom Kippur War, we can see quite vividly how perceptual biases and filters make it so difficult to pick up the "signals" out of the "noise." What lessons does the Yom Kippur War hold for U.S. intelligence producers and consumers?

READINGS:

Assigned:

"Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the
Yom Kippur War"

Optional:

"The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise"

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OF SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES

W70013-2L/1D

OBJECTIVES:

1. Comprehend the major issues involved in the production of intelligence estimates on Soviet strategic forces and objectives.
 - 1.1 Summarize the historical record of U.S. Intelligence estimates on Soviet strategic forces.
 - 1.2 Explain the analytical methodologies employed in estimating the present and future capabilities of Soviet strategic forces.
 - 1.3 Give examples of the major problems encountered in producing estimates on Soviet forces and objectives.

OVERVIEW:

Estimative intelligence on Soviet strategic forces and objectives constitutes one of the principal production functions of the U.S. Intelligence Community. As we develop and deploy our own strategic forces, it is important that military planners and defense policymakers understand present and future Soviet strategic capabilities and comprehend likely Soviet responses to our policies and actions. The arms control negotiations of the past decade have given impetus to the efforts of the Intelligence Community to improve the quality of its estimates.

Planners and policymakers must, however, bear in mind the limitations of estimative intelligence, as Klaus Knorr points out in one of the later readings:

Although the future, within some framework of particulars, can be estimated, it cannot, of course, be known. To estimate is to guess in order to reduce uncertainty dictated by lack of knowledge. The assumptions and preconceptions about reality that structure the guesswork can be more or less rigorously deduced from past behavior. But--as the historical record discloses...--even the most sophisticated assumptions can lead threat perception astray. To depend wholly on any one preconception or set of assumptions is to court surprise. This risk is magnified by the tendency that the selection of an assumption about the real world becomes an act of cognitive closure that easily leads the perceiver to be close-minded and to ignore or explain away

discrepant information. It must therefore be accepted that although good estimates can reduce uncertainty about the future, even the best cannot be depended on to prove it.

Knorr also identifies several kinds of predispositions that intervene to affect the selection of assumptions and receptivity to incoming information and which are apt to distort estimates. Among these are emotions, strong ideological commitments, bureaucratic behavior, and wishful thinking.

Bear these considerations in mind while you review the controversy over U.S. intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic forces in the readings. We will have an opportunity to explore them more deeply during the lecture on weapon system analysis as applied to Soviet strategic estimates. Two of the historically controversial subject areas of these estimates--Soviet strategic bombers and ICBM's--will be highlighted to illustrate the techniques of weapon system analysis.

READINGS:

Assigned:

"Debate Over U.S. Strategic Forecasts: A Mixed Record"

"The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode
Concerning Soviet Strategic Capability and Objectives"

Optional:

"Soviet Strategic Forces" (Handout)

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

W70016-1L/1D

OBJECTIVES:

1. Know the means by which the Executive and Legislative branches exercise oversight of U.S. intelligence activities.

1.1 Describe the role and responsibilities of the Intelligence Oversight Board.

1.2 Describe the role and responsibilities of the Inspector General for Defense Intelligence and the intelligence responsibilities of the OSD General Counsel.

1.3 Describe the role and responsibilities of the Congressional intelligence oversight committees.

OVERVIEW:

From World War II to 1976 the term "oversight" as applied to the Intelligence Community meant "something overlooked." The organizations comprising the Community remained free to conduct business virtually as they saw fit. The Rockefeller Commission and Congressional investigating committees findings on improprieties in intelligence operations forced the Executive and Legislative branches to change their definition of "oversight" to something approximating "watchful care." Executive Branch oversight is now exercised at the Presidential level by the Intelligence Oversight Board. It receives reports from the Inspectors-General and General Counsels of the various intelligence agencies and may conduct investigations of improprieties when it deems warranted. Congressional oversight of CIA and Defense intelligence activities was traditionally exercised by the Armed Services Committees. In 1976, however, the Senate created a Select Committee on Intelligence with jurisdiction over all the agencies and entities of the Intelligence Community. The House established a similar committee the following year. Our purpose in this block is to examine how oversight of intelligence activities works and to determine what effect the oversight system has on the conduct of intelligence operations.

READINGS:

Assigned:

"U.S. Intelligence and the Congress"

THE FUTURE OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE

W70016-11/1D

OBJECTIVES:

1. Analyze the major institutional and substantive issues facing the U.S. Intelligence Community in the 1980's.
 - 1.1 Outline some of the proposed changes in the structure of the Intelligence Community.
 - 1.2 Identify some of the management challenges facing intelligence organizations.
 - 1.3 Identify some of the major problems in foreign intelligence collection and production which the U.S. will encounter in the 1980's.

OVERVIEW:

During the past ~~six~~^{eight} years the U.S. Intelligence Community has been probed, measured, and studied as never before. Not surprisingly, these examinations of U.S. intelligence organizations have yielded numerous recommendations for changes in the structure of the Intelligence Community. Often these recommendations for change derived solely from analysis of past performance. Intelligence, however, is a dynamic field governed by constant change and uncertainty. Intelligence problems of the future may differ markedly from the problems with which intelligence organizations grappled in the past. Basing a new national intelligence structure on old needs may not be the most productive course of action.

The international environment of the 1980's will affect not only how we structure the Intelligence Community, but also how we collect and produce intelligence. Rapid advancements in technology will provide new opportunities for gathering and manipulating strategic foreign military information. These developments may significantly enhance our ability to verify arms control agreements, thereby making arms control more attractive to national policymakers. Such a course would place heavy strategic monitoring responsibilities on the Intelligence Community and require a continuing heavy investment in technological systems. On the other hand, we may see a marked increase in low intensity conflict in the future which will necessitate an entirely different intelligence response. Increasing violence and instability in a Third World about which we know relatively little but on whom we and our allies depend more and more for scarce resources is likely to generate new intelligence requirements. So, too, is the growing threat of international, transnational, and urban terrorism. Can intelligence technology be adapted

to these problems? What kind of expertise should the Community be nurturing today to cope with the intelligence issues of the 1980's? Are there extraordinary analytical techniques that we should be investigating for application in the future?

In this final session, we will discuss the outlook for U.S. intelligence in the 1980's by exploring the challenges facing the Intelligence Community and examining ideas for structural change and methodological innovation.

READINGS:

Assigned:

"Strategic Intelligence: Problems and Remedies"

~~"Rescue Mission Report: Centralized and integrated intelligence support external to the JTF"~~