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THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

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STRATEGIC STUDY

STRATEGIC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

by

R. B. WADE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH

REQUIREMENT

Research Supervisor: Mr. John F. Gilhooly

THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

March 1984

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
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REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

TO: Mr. John N. McMahon  
Deputy Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

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THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE  
STRATEGIC STUDIES REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Strategic Counterintelligence and National Security

AUTHOR: R. B. Wade, Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: March, 1984

The Counterintelligence Community is seen to be too operationally oriented and fragmented to be fully effective. A critique of current recommendations to correct these problems concentrating on the multidisciplinary approach. The suggestion of a matrix management system as an alternative means to enhance the Community's effectiveness by improving interagency coordination and providing better strategic intelligence. In the absence of organizational reform, the paper recommends that a commission be formed to analyze the current situation and institute changes to improve the quality of strategic counterintelligence.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Robert B. Wade (B.A. History/Philosophy, Western Washington University; M.A. Political Science, University of Washington), Supervisory Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation is a counterintelligence specialist. He is a graduate of The National War College, Class of 1984.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Counterintelligence can be defined several ways, depending on the perspective. No matter the definition, positive intelligence, which can be of strategic use to policy makers, can always be generated. However, this type of intelligence has not been furnished to top policy makers by the Counterintelligence Community. The reasons for this are threefold. First, the Community is organizationally and mission fragmented. Second, counterintelligence is not the major mission of any specific organization and consequently, it has not received the resources or attention it deserves. Third, counterintelligence has been too operationally oriented.

To correct this situation, it has been recommended that the Community be centrally reorganized and a multidisciplinary counterintelligence approach initiated. This paper contends that such reorganization is not practicable and would make little impact. A matrix management system, however, controlled through the National Security Council, would enhance the Community's effectiveness by improving interagency coordination while providing better strategic intelligence.

In the absence of organizational reform, the paper recommends that a blue-ribbon commission be formed to analyze the current situation and institute a dialogue to improve the quality of strategic counterintelligence. The paper concludes, that counterintelligence elements must balance their short-term operational focus with strategic vision. In turn, it is incumbent on policy makers to demand this from the Counterintelligence Community.

INTRODUCTION

There exists a vast amount of counterintelligence literature. These accounts, however, normally emphasize specific, colorful "spy" stories and ignore other, more significant, contributions which counterintelligence can make to national security. In order to better understand counterintelligence and the sophisticated contributions it can make, this paper examines the Counterintelligence Community and makes recommendations to enhance its vital role in the national security process. The conclusions arrived at, I hope, will provide a better understanding of the role counterintelligence can play while raising issues worthy of further discussion and analysis.

CHAPTER I

THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT

The current source of authorization for United States intelligence activities, Executive Order 12333, defines counterintelligence as:

"... information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs."<sup>1</sup>

At its most basic level, counterintelligence is the identification and neutralization of the hostile intelligence threat. However, although it appears to be a simple concept, there are many subtleties within it which have caused one commentator to call it the "least understood" and "most mysterious" component of intelligence<sup>2</sup>. This complexity is apparent in the numerous definitions provided by various authors.

Harry Howe Ransom, for example, has defined counterintelligence as:

...intelligence activity devoted to countering the effectiveness of hostile foreign intelligence operations. Essentially, it is a police function. More specifically, its purpose is to protect information against espionage, to guard one's intelligence operations from infiltration by the adversary and to secure installations or material against sabotage. Counterintelligence is, in a sense, a negative, defensive function."<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, others have seen a broader, more aggressive role for counterintelligence. Newton S. Miler, a former member of CIA's Counterintelligence Staff, has stated that "counterintelligence involves investigation and surveillance activities to detect and neutralize the foreign intelligence services and the initiation of operations to penetrate, disrupt, deceive and manipulate these services...to our benefit."<sup>4</sup>

Most commentators view counterintelligence from one side or the other of this offensive-defensive split. The majority of professionals in the Counterintelligence Community, however, define counterintelligence as offensive, (counter) human intelligence. Their task, as they see it, is to target and neutralize the hostile intelligence activity of foreign intelligence officers and their agents.<sup>5</sup> The greatest success, from this perspective, is the

recruitment of a hostile intelligence officer while he remains "in place." The value of information gained in such an operation, it is believed, is greater than that received through any other method.

However, there is a third perspective which generally receives less attention particularly by counterintelligence professionals. This is the fact that counterintelligence operations can produce positive intelligence. Generally, since most counterintelligence organizations are offensively (case) oriented, the intelligence emphasized, such as a hostile services modus operandi, has immediate operational value. Although, at the same time, intelligence pertaining to the hostile government's capabilities, intentions, or gaps in information, is also received.<sup>6</sup> A hostile intelligence officer, for example, might show interest in developing information about certain grain diseases. Since this information is not operationally important (e.g. personality assessment of the officer), its strategic value, a possible low grain harvest in the foreign country because of disease, may be missed. Consequently, it might not be provided top policy makers for assistance in their deliberations.\*

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\*Strategic intelligence is defined as foreign, positive intelligence pertinent to national security.<sup>7</sup> Positive intelligence being "all the things you should know in advance of initiating a course of action."<sup>8</sup>

Increased interest in one area might also signal the imminence of military action. The British double agent, Dusko Popov, for example, purportedly brought the FBI a questionnaire for Pearl Harbor, given him by the Germans, prior to the Japanese attack. No action was apparently taken on this information since the FBI apparently believed it to be German deception.<sup>9</sup> The point is that operational considerations, if Popov's account is correct, overrode the strategic possibilities of furnishing this information to policy makers for early-warning or possible use in our own deception operation.

Further, faced with an increasing hostile presence, counterintelligence managers must direct their limited resources to investigations of the activities of hostile intelligence officers where the immediate threat is and where tangible payoffs are necessary. Although each component of the Community produces individual reports and studies, they reflect their organization orientation and center on "case" studies or "after-action" reports. Consequently, there is little emphasis on the production of strategic intelligence.

The Community as a whole could also produce strategic reports of great value to policy makers. Studies could be made of the potential threat posed by emerging nations, rising immigration or even new technology. However, under the current system, these types of problems are seen piecemeal, if at all.



Top policy makers, in turn, do not demand this type of information. Although it is only speculation, this attitude may result from identifying the FBI's counterintelligence role with that of law enforcement. The result is a passive, negative view of counterintelligence and a lack of understanding about the type of positive information counterintelligence can provide.<sup>10</sup> These differing views result in a situation where there is no impetus, from within or without the Community, to change the current system.

The situation is complicated by the fact that the Counterintelligence Community is composed of a number of executive departments and agencies. Of these, the FBI, CIA and each of the military services have operational counterintelligence responsibilities. Each of these, as well as the nonoperational elements, have differing missions and, therefore, different perspectives of counterintelligence. Each organization, therefore, has only a fragmented view which limits its operational and strategic effectiveness.

The FBI, for example, has primary counterintelligence responsibility within the United States. Its investigations are geared to detecting and countering the human intelligence threat posed by hostile intelligence services. CIA has a corresponding

responsibility abroad albeit with emphasis on protecting its collection efforts from the activities of the hostile service. Concurrently, each of the military services conducts similar activities, domestically and overseas, to protect our military interests.

This structural fragmentation is an outgrowth of our domestic political culture and its distrust of government power which might inject its influence into the private lives of citizens. Counterintelligence has overtones of "secret police" and the Community reflects this desire for a division of power. Watergate just confirmed this natural suspicion and allowed further erosion of the investigative powers of the Community.<sup>11</sup>

Functionally, this pluralism can and does lead to overlaps in jurisdiction, bureaucratic "turf" battles and failures to pass pertinent information throughout the Community. Although there are established and generally effective procedures to facilitate interagency cooperation, they tend to be informal and to lack clear lines of authority and responsibility. The basic fact remains, however, that each agency maintains a separate data base under its control.

There is then no formal or systematic means to provide policy makers with a Community-wide strategic intelligence product. The Community is aware of the need to enhance its capability in this

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area and has, through the years, created various committees in an attempt to coordinate the nation's counterintelligence effort. Most recently, for example, a Counterintelligence Staff was established. Representatives from throughout the Community are assigned to the Staff which provides staff assistance to the Director of Central Intelligence. The staff also develops policy for the Community and coordinates nonoperational matters throughout the group. It also provides staff support to the National Security Council particularly an annual threat analysis. However, although the Staff levies individual requirements on elements of the Community, it has no authority. Consequently, it does not overcome the Community's pluralism (it only coordinates nonoperational matters) or significantly raise the quality and quantity of strategic intelligence.

Given the political culture's tendency to distrust intelligence organizations, it is interesting to note that counterintelligence is not the primary mission for any of the Community agencies. The FBI, as I have implied, is first a law enforcement organization while CIA is primarily concerned with the collection and production of positive intelligence. Consequently, in these and other Community organizations, counterintelligence is somewhat of an abused stepchild which does not get the attention, resources and nurture it deserves. This reinforces the focus on operational matters noted above.

in the final analysis, counterintelligence and positive intelligence are different sides of the same coin. Counterintelligence is not just a reactive, law enforcement function. It can produce strategic intelligence. Further, the Community, as it is organized today, in a loose confederation of independent, case oriented agencies, does not play the strategic role in national security that it is capable of. How to improve this situation will be discussed in the next chapter.

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2. Roy Godson, "Counterintelligence: An Introduction," National Strategy Information Center, Roy Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Counterintelligence (Washington, D.C., 1980), p 1.
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CHAPTER II

STRATEGIC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The Counterintelligence Community, in structure and function, is fragmented. These circumstances have led some knowledgeable commentators to advocate reorganization and centralization of the Community in an effort to provide better direction. The concern is that there is nobody in charge of the national counterintelligence effort and these recommendations are designed to give someone the appropriate authority and responsibility. Typical recommendations are:

The creation of a Director of National Intelligence who would be separate from the Intelligence Community's operational elements and have no institutional ties to the Community. One of his responsibilities would be to provide guidance and tasking to all Government counterintelligence elements.<sup>1</sup>

The establishment of a new, independent intelligence service which would conduct both counterintelligence and positive intelligence operations.<sup>2</sup>

Designation of a National Intelligence Officer for Counterintelligence who would report to the National Security Council.<sup>3</sup>

Interwoven with these arguments for reorganization is a concern that the U.S. does not have the capability to judge the foreign intelligence threat in its entirety. In response, some critics have proposed a new concept which has become known as multidisciplinary counterintelligence (MDCI) or all source counterintelligence. Proponents of this position, like Kenneth E. DeGraffenreid, formerly a staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), argue that the intelligence threat today is not just espionage (HUMINT) but technical systems, signals intelligence (SIGINT) and photointelligence (PHOTINT), as well. Their position is that these systems cross the Community's jurisdictional lines and, in light of of the Community's fragmentation, limit our ability to identify and counter them. The Community also does not possess the technical knowledge to fully assess the threat thereby weakening our security further. Since we are faced with a multidisciplinary threat, we need to respond in kind.<sup>4</sup>

Supporters of MDCI believe that the means to rectify this situation is by forming an autonomous organization which would have access to all intelligence source reporting, human and technical. This agency would be totally separate from the Community's operational components and would only conduct total threat (strategic) analysis. Implicit in this system would be a

centralized file system incorporating all Government counterintelligence files. The organization would analyze the information received and provide the product, a national foreign intelligence threat assessment paper, to policy makers for action. In addition, some commentators assume that the organization, in performing its analytical functions, will need the authority to provide guidance and tasking to all counterintelligence elements on how to investigate certain cases and what information to collect.<sup>5</sup>

This system, it is argued, would give the U.S. a better picture of the foreign threat while providing a greater flexibility of response. A human source in-place, for example, might give information contradicted by a technical source. Knowing this, policy makers could direct that action be taken to verify the correct source. If a hostile deception effort was uncovered, direction could be given that a countermeasure be instituted to negate the deception. Under the current system, commentators argue, there is little likelihood that such deception would be found out.

A staff member of the SSCI sees MDCI as playing a broad devils advocate role. In his view, all positive intelligence should be looked at from the MDCI perspective. As a defensive measure, MDCI should look at each aspect of our operations from the hostile side. We might know, for example, that the hostile government might have the ability to penetrate our communications.



The MDCI organization would then task one of the counterintelligence operational groups to test the theory and see if the communications were being penetrated. Offensively, according to this individual, MDCI would critique our own collection efforts to determine if we are the target of an organized deception effort.<sup>6</sup>

DeGraffenreid believes in an even broader MDCI program. He would incorporate into MDCI, personnel, document, installation and communications security which are not even defined in the current Executive Order as counterintelligence. He not only believes MDCI would defeat the foreign intelligence and deception threats, it would also neutralize foreign attempts to obtain U.S. technology and effect the American economy. Finally, he argues that an MDCI organization could also assist other elements in the Intelligence Community in responding to terrorism, anti-American propaganda and other types of operations directed against our security.<sup>7</sup>

These arguments, I think, reflect a number of influences on the Intelligence Community which have occurred during the past decade. First, there is an increased awareness that the Soviet Union is obtaining important technology, legally and illegally.

Christopher Boyce, for example, voluntarily provided the Soviets information on covert satellites used by the CIA which he obtained from his employment at TRW. William Kampiles was another volunteer who also provided the Soviets with information about another classified surveillance satellite. These cases led to concern that the Soviets would use the information learned from these systems to deceive other U.S. technical collection systems.

Additionally, the post-Watergate Congressional Hearings on the conduct of U.S. intelligence activities badly bruised those who favored human intelligence activities. The Intelligence Community still chafes under the legal and policy restrictions which resulted. Emphasis was given to technical collection methods and the human intelligence side was downgraded. This orientation inevitably affected counterintelligence activities and a broader scope for the discipline was envisaged.\*

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\* For an example, see William R. Harris, "Counterintelligence Jurisdiction and the Double Cross System by National Technical Means" in National Strategy Information Center, Roy Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Counterintelligence (Washington, D. C., 1980).

Further, the Congressional Hearings brought the intelligence system into the public spotlight. Academics, as well as others, then began to make a study of the intelligence process. MDCI expands this beach head since it would also bring more people into the counterintelligence process particularly non-professionals.

Finally, there is deep concern over unauthorized "leaks" of classified information. By centralizing the intelligence process, the reasoning is that these could be stoppered or the breach in security found easily.

Much of the support for the multidisciplinary approach originates in Congress especially in the SSCI. Most recently, the SSCI attempted to gain support for a separate group of analysts, from throughout the Intelligence Community, to perform MDCI. The proposal met with strong objections from all members of the Community and was deferred. Separate committees, composed of leading members of the counterintelligence community, were established, under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence, to look into the issue. To date, no further action has occurred. However, one professional staff member of the SSCI has stated that, whether the Intelligence Community likes it or not, "interdisciplinary counterintelligence is here to stay."<sup>8</sup>

Discussions over MDCI have served to highlight the issues raised in the beginning of this report notably the need for strategic intelligence production and better coordination among its elements. Even more importantly, perhaps, is the debate initiated about the type of counterintelligence system needed to meet the challenge of the future. However, I would argue that inherent in the MDCI and centralization concepts, there are serious faults which negate their possible implementation.

Foremost is the fact that MDCI, with its emphasis on technical intelligence and concern about deception, is not counterintelligence. Counterintelligence is concerned with neutralizing human intelligence efforts. It is not oriented or equipped to deal with technical questions or to interpret the technical product and vice versa. Additionally, MDCI focuses on protecting information which is a security function and not part of the definition of counterintelligence in Executive Order 12333. In short, combining two different orientations, approaches and techniques, would be like mixing water and oil. It would, I believe, have an extremely adverse affect on our ability to deal with the foreign intelligence threat.

Whenever there appears to be a lack of direction in an organization, the initial impulse is to consolidate its functions and create a distinct chain of command with a definite focus of authority and responsibility. In considering such centralization for the Counterintelligence Community, however, a number of problems exist.

First, I do not believe our domestic political culture, with its distrust of Government power, would allow a centralized intelligence system. Democracy depends on public policy being developed through a checks and balances process. Its foundation is the separation of powers. A unified intelligence system would violate all of these precepts.

Second, the creation of another bureaucracy, with its own institutional goals, on top of the first, would further complicate the original problems. It would be another competitor for scarce resources and "turf." Who would control the new organization? Practically, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the individual agencies to give up or allow limitations, whether perceived or not, on their power and influence. The situation would violate every principle of organizational behavior. Reorganization, without having "everyone on board," would not only lead to "turf" battles but would seriously limit the efficiency and effectiveness of the new organization.

Third, how would information be shared? The centralization of files and data would violate the basic principles of security such as compartmentation and "need to know." Some individuals would presumably have knowledge of all the secrets of U.S. intelligence. Who would want to pay the price for leaks from this organization or for hostile possession of the information? The FBI, for example, takes great pride in protecting its sources and believes this is the fundamental reason people cooperate with it. It is extremely doubtful that it would abandon this responsibility to a centralized system.

Fourth, how would investigations and the dissemination of information be handled to accord with the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts, which strictly limit what can be done?

Fifth, would an analytic product, free of competition, provide better information to policy makers? Many would argue that it would not.

In discussing reorganization we must also determine if it will make any real impact in the output of the Counterintelligence Community. Richard Betts, in a study of intelligence failures, addresses this issue. Betts argues that reorganizations of the intelligence system make little difference unless they are in response to the specific needs of decision makers.<sup>8</sup>

Reorganization can never compensate for the decision makers

predispositions or for the ambiguity within the decision making process. Betts further states that reorganization to address one wrong will only create a new glitch in the system. Accordingly, Betts concludes that any changes in the system should be specific and minor. Besides, he notes, the intelligence system overall has done well in the past and may not need any more modification.<sup>9</sup>

Clearly, the fragmentation and analytic capability of the Counterintelligence Community need to be improved. Although most professionals in the Community believe the current system of interagency cooperation works well enough, one is left with the belief that the U.S. Government would be better served if this informal system of cooperation was formalized. The current Executive Order recognizes this problem when it exhorts the Community to "...seek to ensure full and free exchange of information in order to derive maximum effort from the United States intelligence effort."<sup>10</sup>

Betts' assertion that limited, modest structural adjustments are better than full scale reorganization make sense to me. Given the validity of these comments, what can be done to improve the structure and analytic capability of the Counterintelligence Community?

First, someone needs to be in charge. Someone needs to provide oversight of Community activities with the necessary authority and responsibility to influence the production of strategic intelligence.

Sherman Kent, in his classic work Strategic Intelligence For American World Policy, argued for a highly centralized (positive) intelligence system. His ideas eventually became the organizational nucleus of the CIA. Although the prime mission of the Counterintelligence Community must remain the neutralization of the human foreign intelligence threat, some of his ideas have direct bearing on the concerns I have expressed.

Kent believed that a centralized intelligence system should perform a coordinating function. It should establish clear jurisdictional boundaries for the Community and ensure that these were maintained. The organization should also see that the Community's individual reporting was of high standard and manage all interagency projects. This organization would also channel resources to agencies that were in need. Kent stressed in his plan that the organization should not participate in operations and become embroiled in bureaucratic wars. Finally, it should be kept inordinately small so that it did not bureaucratically proliferate.<sup>11</sup>



These functions, although somewhat too broad, are similar to those that I believe need to be implemented to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of counterintelligence in the national security process. There are a number of ways, aside from MDCI, in which this can be done. One way would be to give the necessary authority to one of the existing agencies in the Community. The most logical choice, of course, would be the FBI which is the coordinator for counterintelligence within the U.S. However, this would open the door to charges of partiality as well as to organizational politics. For these reasons, it would not be practical or desirable.

Another possibility would be to increase the authority of an already established group such as the Counterintelligence Staff. However, since it currently involves people detailed from their agencies, institutional ties would be strong and politics would probably play a continuing role. These factors would severely limit the desirability of such a move.

A third alternative, which deserves some serious consideration, would be the modified use of a system business has termed "matrix management" This concept grew out of "high-tech" industries, such as aircraft manufacturers, where several research and development efforts were proceeding simultaneously. It was very difficult to coordinate all these efforts in a formally structured environment so the matrix model was created. This involves the

creation of ad hoc groups, each led by a team leader, who manages a specific project. The team leader reports to a project manager, who coordinates that particular area of research, and to a functional manager, who is responsible for the total effort. The team, for example, might be concerned with wing stress. The leader would report to the manager responsible for wing design and to the manager responsible for the entire plane. The system theoretically, therefore, balances the needs of specialization with the needs of coordination.<sup>12</sup>

Transfer of a method like this to the counterintelligence system might allow specialized questions to be answered or monitored via task forces or ad hoc committees while maintaining the integrity of the individual agencies. In fact, the Counterintelligence Staff's threat assessment is somewhat similar although not so formalized. The establishment of this system, coupled with a small coordinating group like that envisaged by Kent, would provide the needed unification of policy while allowing the agencies of the Community to continue their basic missions as they have in the past.

Structurally, the one major change in the current system that would be necessary is the creation of a "counterintelligence coordinator" with the authority and responsibility to perform the functions outlined by Kent. Preferably, this person should be a

civilian or possess no institutional ties to a specific agency. He should receive assistance from a small staff of specialists, who might come from within the Community but would not be allowed to return to avoid bureaucratic pressures or organizational bias. Finally, the group should be responsible to the National Security Council to further prevent bias. This latter suggestion might allow the Counterintelligence Staff to be the foundation of the new organization since the basic framework is already in place.

The success of this organization, which I will term the "National Counterintelligence Center," will ultimately depend on strategic leadership and thinking within the Community and on the part of top policy makers. Indeed, this is true for the current national counterintelligence effort. Counterintelligence managers must make a greater effort to explain to policy makers what it is they do, what resources they need and what they can contribute to the decision making process. They must determine too what policy makers need from the Community and do their best to provide it. In turn, policy makers must bring counterintelligence into the policy process. They must require that the Community produce quality strategic intelligence and be willing to provide the necessary resources to do so.

The Reagan administration has, from its inception, expressed an interest in upgrading counterintelligence. To date, significant

changes have not occurred primarily because of bureaucratic politics. In order to get the reform process moving again, I would recommend that a Presidential "blue-ribbon" Commission be established which would study the counterintelligence system and the arguments for and against reorganization. The counterintelligence system has changed little since World War II and it is time for rethinking its purpose. The Commission would also kindle the needed dialogue between the Counterintelligence Community and national security policy makers. These actions can only benefit the Community, policy makers and, most importantly, the nation.

NOTES II  
CHAPTER II (Pages 11-25)

1. Roy Godson, "Intelligence Reform in the United States: The Proposed Charter," World Affairs, Summer, 1980, pp. 15-16.
2. Donovan Pratt, "Counterintelligence Organization and Operational Security in the 1980's," Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Counterintelligence, p. 228.
3. Interview with a professional staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (non-attribution).
4. Kenneth E. DeGraffenreid, "Building for a New Counterintelligence Capability: Recruitment and Training," Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Counterintelligence, pp. 263-276.
5. Roy Godson, "Intelligence Reform in the United States: The Proposed Charter," World Affairs, Summer, 1980, p. 17.
6. Interview with a professional staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (non-attribution).
7. DeGraffenreid, p. 263.
8. Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable," World Politics 31, No. 1 (October, 1978) p. 72.
9. Ibid., pp. 84-85.
10. "Executive Order 12333," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, p. 1337.
11. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949, pps. 91-94.
12. For a complete discussion of this topic see David R. Hampton, et al., Organizational Behavior and the Practice of Management (Glenview, Ill: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1982) pp. 507-509.

### CHAPTER III

#### CONCLUSIONS

The United States Intelligence Community is composed of several departments and agencies. Each of these organizations has some counterintelligence responsibility. Each, according to their missions, sees this responsibility differently and defines their objectives and goals accordingly. It is these different, albeit complimentary, views which have led to the current situation where the counterintelligence target is not getting the recognition, focus and resources it deserves and is not fully performing to the best of its ability.

The reasons for this are threefold. First, the Community is organizationally and mission fragmented. There is not a strong, central authority to speak for counterintelligence like the Director of CIA speaks for intelligence collection requirements. No one has specific authority or responsibility for counterintelligence and, consequently, it does not receive the attention it deserves in the security and decision making contexts. Second, counterintelligence, in each organization, is always a secondary if not tertiary mission. As a result, it must compete for a voice internally as well as externally. Third, counterintelligence, as a discipline, has been too operationally oriented. Resources have been directed to this area at the expense of analysis. As a result,

counterintelligence has developed a narrow, short-range, immediate, and introspective view of itself.

As a result, the Counterintelligence Community has not provided policy makers with the strategic information it should. Counterintelligence though must learn to see itself as part of the "Intelligence Community" and, as such, be able to provide policy makers with positive information equivalent to that provided by United States collection efforts. In turn, policy makers must be educated about the types of strategic information the Community can provide, and then must demand that type of information from it.

The answer, I believe, lies in minor reorganization of the Community. It can not remain the informal confederation it is today. It must speak with one voice so that a coherent, consistent, and strategic counterintelligence program can be formulated and put into practice. Given the political realities, the establishment of a counterintelligence coordinator and staff in the National Security Council appears to be the most logical answer.

To avoid bias and bureaucratic politics, this individual should be a civilian with the authority and responsibility to implement a national counterintelligence program. A matrix management system might be the means to bring strategic counterintelligence to the attention of policy makers while conveying their concerns to the Counterintelligence Community.

In order to initiate the reform process and foster dialogue between policy makers and the Community, it is recommended that a Presidential Commission be created to study the counterintelligence system and arguments for reorganization.

In today's complex environment, with its concern over Soviet expansionism, state sponsored terrorism, technology transfer and other threats, decision makers need the best intelligence they can have. Counterintelligence represents a seldom tapped reservoir. It can and should play a large role in national security policy formulation and execution.

In short, the Counterintelligence Community needs strategic leadership. This is not to downgrade the operations function of counterintelligence. It is an effort to provide a balance to the Community which will best serve the nation's security.



CHAPTER IV

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