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SUBJECT:  
  
Speech for the Air War College, Class of 1984

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T-107



25 AUG 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : [redacted] Deputy Director, Public Affairs Office

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SUBJECT : Speech for the Air War College, Class of 1984

1. Attached are backgrounds to topics you may wish to address at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, when you speak to the Class of 1984 on "Intelligence and the Policy Process" at 10:00 a.m. in the auditorium on Monday, 12 September. General Hodges, Commandant of the College, and CIA representative [redacted] will meet your plane.

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2. Approximately 250 students and faculty members with the rank of colonel and lieutenant colonel will be in the audience. It will be a closed session and all attendees will have Top Secret clearances. Foreign officers attending the course are not included in this session.

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3. You have been asked to speak for 45 minutes, then a break, followed by 45 minutes of Questions and Answers. General Hodges will introduce you. A throat mike will be available, and he will hook it around your neck before returning to his seat in the audience. The mike has an adequate amount of cord so that you are free to move around the platform. Unless you prefer a monitor, the question and answer period will be handled by you. Your speech will be taped for our records.

4. An informal luncheon hosted by General Hodges will follow your address. Approximately 16 people will be at your table including the General, [redacted], some students and faculty members. A business suit is the dress of the day.

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5. In Annex II for further information are:

- Biography of General Hodges
- Scope Sheet
- History of the Air War College
- Resident Program

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Charles E. Wilson

Unclassified when separated from attachments

TS-83-0715  
Copy #3 of 6

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Background Topics For DDCI

REMARKS TO THE AIR WAR COLLEGE

12 September 1983

TOPICS

- I. Local Anecdotes for Introduction
- II. Intelligence and the Policy Process
- III.
- IV. Soviet Active Measures
- V. The Soviet and Cuban Threat to Central America
- IV. Terrorism

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ANNEX I. Technical Developments in Intelligence

II. Additional Materials on the Air War College

I. Local Anecdotes

There are two rather amusing topics at Maxwell Air Force Base. One is the local newspaper called The Montgomery Advertiser:

°One of the more startling facts I discovered as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is that about 50% of the key judgments and conclusions reached in our finished intelligence publications are based on open source material, especially the press. I therefore have become more aware of the content of the media, both local and national. I understand that Montgomery, Alabama, has a newspaper called The Advertiser. After looking it over, I am inclined to ask my friends at the US Information Agency to put you all on their subscription list because you probably come close to qualifying as a denied area without benefit of an iron curtain.

A second is that trustees from the local penitentiary are housed on the base:

°I also learned that there is a federal prison located on Maxwell Air Force Base. This surely guarantees that you are never short of qualified faculty or knowledgeable guest speakers. I am certain that former Attorney General John Mitchell, while he was in residence, could have given a fine talk on the perils of being a Washington decisionmaker.

(These suggestions were provided by )

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Finally, students always like to poke fun at their school:

°I'm honored to be at the Air War College, founded by the great aviation pioneer General Orval Anderson back in 1946. He talked the Air Force out of naming it the Joint Air Command and Staff School. He didn't like the acronym: J-A-C-A-S-S .

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## II. Intelligence and the Policy Process

°Lesson of Pearl Harbor learned. President needs total, evaluated, coordinated national intelligence. He's getting it--and using it.

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°State, Defense, CIA big three of intelligence community. All use same data base, but compete in analysis. Differing views encouraged. No one has monopoly on wisdom.

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°In earlier period, quantity of information insufficient. No longer a problem. In technical field, problem is how to process enormous quantity. Focus also on improving quality of analysis.

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°Many problems today require interdisciplinary approach. Example: understanding Iran requires socio-cultural approach, as well as political and economic

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°Many issues today are transnational: nuclear proliferation, political instability and insurgency, terrorism, technology transfer.

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°With growth of technical collection, traditional relationship of tactical and national intelligence has changed. Every field commander cannot have own private satellite. But, a satellite can simultaneously satisfy requirements of both a commandlike SAC and the policy planners of the NSC. Current DCI strong supporter of making national collection systems available to meet tactical needs.

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°Relationship with Congress has changed. Congress far more involved in foreign affairs, including intelligence. Division of oversight committees along party lines (cf. Central America) particularly unfortunate. Partisan oversight is no oversight at all. American people deserve better than that. Now that it has started, especially in the House, don't know if can be turned around.

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IV. Soviet Active Measures

°In 1979, in Japan, a young Soviet officer named Stanislav Levchenko came over to our side. He was first Soviet "active measures" officer to defect to West. He had a lot of specific information to give us, but also described for us Soviet strategic concept of "active measures" in all its fullness.

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°Active measures is Soviet term for all operations aimed at influencing the policies of other nations, as distinguished from intelligence. Includes what we would call covert action but much broader. Active measures refers to an orchestration, at highest level, of all Soviet instrumentalities, overt and covert, in pursuit of worldwide Soviet objectives.

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°Soviet active measures include: diplomacy, propaganda, agitation, disinformation, forgeries, clandestine radio, press

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placement, and political influence operations. Primary target is US. Common aim of influence operations is to insinuate Soviet views, in a non-attributable fashion, in foreign governmental, journalistic, academic, and artistic circles.

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°Strategic objectives are to denigrate US, to isolate it from friends, influence public opinion against US military programs and against CIA, and undermine political resolve of the West to oppose Soviet encroachments.

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°Soviet active measures in Western Europe have been well documented. In summer of 1977, Soviets initiated an intensive worldwide campaign against US production of neutron bomb. Campaign in Eastern Europe faithfully mirrored Soviet effort.

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°World Peace Council, a Soviet front, went into action; staged incidents in Istanbul, Accra, Stuttgart, Frankfurt,

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Lima, Tripoli, and Tanzania. There followed media pickup in Western Europe. First came "hack comment" from fronts and CPs. Second type of comment, and the far more important, was that of the non-Communists situated politically in center or on left. The adverse editorial treatment given neutron bomb by this non-Communist journalistic sector was Soviets' real propaganda success.

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°The Soviets initiated the neutron bomb campaign; but more often they exploit something already there. Desire for peace is strong among all nations. When it becomes a "movement", the Soviets try to manipulate it, even to finance it. When movement revolves around a controversial issue, particularly one with military implications like modernization of theater nuclear forces in Western Europe, Soviets move in a massive arsenal of "active measures" to push issue.

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SECRET V. The Soviet and Cuban Threat to Central America

°The Soviets do not want war--just fruits of war. To accomplish their goals, Soviets have designed a low-risk, low-profile strategy

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°This strategy makes maximum use of surrogates to front for Soviets allowing Kremlin to remain half-hidden in the shadows. We now see them using surrogates such as Cuba. Cubans in turn use Nicaragua. Finally, Nicaraguans use Salvadoran guerrillas. In El Salvador, we face surrogates of surrogates of surrogates.

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°Strategy at work today in our own back yard in Central America. It is a clever strategy that is particularly difficult for an open nation like ours to counter. Any direct response by West can be conveniently condemned as imperialistic.

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°Strategic stakes high in Central America. Soviet theorists have not overlooked fact that strategically Caribbean Sea and Central America form this nation's fourth border. [REDACTED]

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°Half of all our foreign trade passes through either Panama Canal or other Caribbean sea lanes. Soviet control of sea lanes could destroy our capacity to resupply Western Europe in an emergency. [REDACTED]

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°Soviet military deliveries to Cuba have increased dramatically. [REDACTED]

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°Strengthened military forces have enabled Cuba to assume more influential role in hemisphere than size or resources would indicate. Soviet assistance to Cuba now totals more than 8 million dollars a day. [REDACTED]

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°Cuba's immediate goals are to consolidate control of Sandinista Government in Nicaragua. Then, with Nicaraguan assistance, overthrow governments of El Salvador and Guatemala. Later would come Honduras and Costa Rica.

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°About 8000 Cubans are in Nicaragua today, including some 2000 military advisers. Soviets have 50 military and 100 economic advisers. Soviet personnel are assisting Sandinistan security services, and even Nicaraguan general staff. East Germans, Libyans, Vietnamese, and PLO personnel also active in Managua.

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°Sandinistas have been engaged in huge military buildup. Somoza's National Guard numbered 9000 before 1979 and about 15,000 at height of fighting. Sandinistas now have 25,000 regular troops and 50,000 in active reserve and militia forces.

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°Arms shipments from Nicaragua to El Salvador are well-orchestrated. Arms come in by air, sea, and land.

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°On 15 March 1982, Costa Rican Judicial Police discovered house in San Jose that had cache of half a million dollars worth of weapons, explosives, uniforms, and forged visas. These were to be transported through Costa Rica to El Salvador by Nicaraguans in vehicles with hidden compartments.

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°But one example of arms smuggling taking place all the time. Guerrillas in El Salvador using these arms to go after economic targets, to try to force government into static defense posture. Without Nicaraguan aid, insurgents in El Salvador would have to give up.

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°Struggle will continue. Soviets, Cubans, and Nicaraguans believe US Government and American people are unable to maintain a consistent policy of opposition.

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VI. Terrorism

°In April 1983, a tremendous explosion ripped apart US Embassy in Beirut; 57 killed, 17 of them Americans. This is but latest example of how terrorist groups threaten US lives and property abroad.

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°Our task is to track and infiltrate, if possible, these groups. Infiltration is not easy. Groups use strict compartmentation and other sophisticated security procedures.

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°A handful of countries provide arms, money, and training to terrorist cells: USSR, Libya, Cuba, Syria, East Germany, Iran, and South Yemen. For some of these countries, terrorism has become an accepted instrument of state policy.

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°US citizens are primary targets of radical groups. Some 200 Americans killed since 1968. About half were victims of indiscriminate attacks.

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°More and more, terrorists are specifically singling out Americans for assassination. US diplomats are most frequent victims; American businessmen are next likeliest target. US firms have paid an estimated 125 million dollars in ransom over past 10 years.

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
°Greatest number of terrorist attacks occur in Lebanon, France, Spain, and West Germany. Most common type of attack is bombing. We have recorded nearly 4,500 bombings worldwide since keeping records 15 years ago.


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°Terrorism is mindless, irrational, and dangerous.

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You will probably receive questions on intelligence reconnaissance systems. ANNEX I has been coordinated with Ev Hineman and  and is at the appropriate classification level for this group. It may provide you some thoughts for your answers.

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ANNEX II

Additional Materials on the Air War College



# Biography

## United States Air Force

Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C. 20330

MAJOR GENERAL PAUL H. HODGES

Major General Paul H. Hodges is commandant of the Air War College, and vice commander of Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.

General Hodges was born Jan. 21, 1930, in Washington, D. C. He graduated from Lowell High School in San Francisco and then attended Oberlin (Ohio) College until the outbreak of the Korean War. He enrolled in the aviation cadet program and received his commission as a second lieutenant in December 1952. General Hodges resumed his academic studies while on active duty and received a bachelor of arts degree in history from the University of Omaha in 1966. He graduated from the Air War College in 1971.



His first assignment was to Otis Air Force Base, Mass., as a radar observer in F-94s. After completing pilot training and advanced gunnery school, General Hodges flew RF-84F's with the 303rd Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron at Sembach Air Base, Germany, from 1956 to 1958. He transferred to the 18th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron at Laon Air Base, France, where for the next two years he flew RF-101s. While serving with the 18th, General Hodges competed in Royal Flush V, a biennial aerial reconnaissance competition among North Atlantic Treaty Organization units.

In 1960 General Hodges was assigned as an instructor pilot at Shaw Air Force Base, S. C., flying RF-101s and F-101B's with the 4414th Combat Crew Training Squadron and in 1962 represented the Tactical Air Command in the reconnaissance phase of the William Tell competition. In March 1963 he moved to Tactical Air Command headquarters at Langley Air Force Base, Va., and served as an air operations officer in the Special Activities Section of the Directorate of Operations until he entered the University of Omaha in June 1965.

After earning his degree in January 1966, General Hodges reported to Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, for duty as operations officer for the 10th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, and later that year became chief of the Standardization and Evaluation Branch for the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing. In December 1966 the general was assigned to the 16th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Republic of Vietnam, where he flew 209 combat missions as an RF-4C aircraft commander.

Following his Southeast Asia tour of duty, General Hodges spent three years at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, serving first as operations officer, then commander of the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron.

General Hodges entered the Air War College in 1970 and after graduation was assigned to Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., as chief, Reconnaissance Division, Directorate

(Current as of September 1982)

O V E R



of Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development.

From August 1973 to February 1974, General Hodges served as vice commander of the 26th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Zweibrucken Air Base, Germany. He then transferred to Royal Air Force Station Alconbury, England, as commander of the 10th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing. While there he flew RF-4C's and F-5E's. In March 1977 he took command of the United States Air Forces in Europe's largest wing, the 601st Tactical Control Wing at Sembach Air Base, Germany. The wing operates a mobile tactical air control system providing surveillance and command and control of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization aircraft in defensive and offensive air operations.

He returned to the United States in 1979 and was assigned as deputy director for operations, National Military Command Center, Washington, D.C. In May 1980 General Hodges was named deputy director for operations (reconnaissance, electronic warfare and command, control and communications countermeasures), Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-3. He assumed his present duties in July 1982.

The general is a command pilot and has accumulated 5,000 flying hours. His military decorations and awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, Distinguished Flying Cross with one oak leaf cluster, Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal with 14 oak leaf clusters, Air Force Commendation Medal and Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with palm.

He was promoted to major general Jan. 1, 1982, with date of rank Aug. 1, 1978.

General Hodges is married to the former Joan M. Cerwonka of Medford, Mass. They have two daughters: Joanne and Leigh. His hometown is Galway, N.Y.

(1L-1D)

INSTRUCTION PERIOD NO. 2125

TITLE: INTELLIGENCE AND THE POLICY PROCESS

INTRODUCTION: The role of intelligence is to provide information and analysis to those who formulate and execute national security policy. The finished intelligence product does not come from a single organization, but rather it usually represents a coordinated composite. Intelligence supports the policy process; it is the prelude to decisions and a guide to action. The decision maker's first requirement usually is for the most accurate possible picture of the international environment in which he must pursue national objectives. The test of intelligence is how well it provides this picture.

OBJECTIVE: To comprehend the role and influence of intelligence information and organizations on the policymaking process.

DESIRED LEARNING OUTCOMES (Students should be able to):

1. Discuss roles of the "intelligence community" in the policy process.
2. Explain the impact of national estimates on policymaking and discuss the methods by which interagency disagreements are resolved.
3. Identify current intelligence issues (e.g., executive direction, protection of sources, covert action, oversight by Congress, controlling damage to US capabilities, "failures" to estimate major events, efforts to rebuild clandestine capabilities, etc) and their influence on the policy process.

ASSIGNED READINGS:

1. U.S., Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "The Role of Intelligence in the Foreign Policy Process, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs," 96th Congress, 2nd Sess., 1980 pp. 20-27.

ADDITIONAL READINGS:

- \*1. "Controversy Over Legislative Limitations on Covert US Intelligence Operations: Pro and Con," The Congressional Digest, Vol 59, No 5 (May 1980): pp.131-160.
- \*2. Thomas K. Latimer, "US Intelligence and the Congress," Strategic Review (Summer 1979): pp. 47-56.

\*3. Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable," World Politics (October 1978): pp. 61-89.

\* Not included in Instruction Circular.

# History

World War II experiences of Army Air Corps leaders demonstrated the importance of the old Air Corps Tactical School. At the end of the war, these leaders undertook the task of planning a comprehensive professional educational system for the greatly expanded Army Air Corps. The Air War College is the apex of this system.

On 12 March 1946, War Department letter AG 352 redesignated the Army Air Force School to Air University and concurrently established the Air War College to prepare selected officers for the employment of large Air Force units and to insure the most effective development of the Army Air Forces. Throughout the years, this mission has kept pace with changing concepts of air power, continuous international tensions and the increased pace of technology.

Austin Hall, headquarters for the old Air Corps Tactical School, was the first home of the Air War College which opened on 3 September 1946 with 40 faculty and staff personnel and 55 students including 45 Air Force, 5 Army, 2 Marine Corps, 2 Royal Air Force, and 1 Royal Canadian Air Force. Except for a decline during the Korean conflict and Vietnam, the student body increased steadily to a high of 315 in the class of 1974.

The current class of 1983 has 258 students, an optimum number for the college, and includes students from all US military services, civilian governmental agencies, and many allied forces. Over 6500 students have graduated from the Air War College Resident Course.

Anderson Hall, Building 1401, is now the home of the Air War College. This building was dedicated 28 January 1966 in memory of Major General Orvil A. Anderson, early military aviator, pioneer balloonist and aerospace explorer, and Air War College's first commandant.


Since relatively few senior Air Force officers have an opportunity to attend the Air War College resident course, the Directorate of Associate Programs of the College administers two nonresident courses. The Correspondence Program, begun in 1947, offers the advantages of guided self-study, and the Seminar Program, instituted in 1961, gives senior officers an opportunity to improve their professional education through study and discussion of selected Air War College materials in seminars at their home stations. Study materials include audio and video tapes of resident course guest speaker lectures and faculty presentations prepared especially for the Associate Programs.



Austin Hall



General Anderson



Commemorative Plaque

# Resident Program

**Curriculum:** The Air War College curriculum stresses the application of aerospace power. A major portion of the academic year is devoted to a thorough and critical analysis of current strategy with a view toward the development of optimum alternative future strategies. The course provides for an in-depth evaluation of US and allied capabilities as they may be applied across the broad spectrum of conflict. It also includes instruction in the use of modern analytical techniques used by DOD to evaluate competing strategies and weapon systems. The curriculum allows for a wide range of individual differences in experience among students and provides ample opportunity for student-faculty research on current problems facing the Air Force.

## AIR WAR COLLEGE CURRICULUM FLOW PLAN (AY 82-83)

AUGUST		SEPTEMBER		OCTOBER		NOVEMBER		DECEMBER		
MILITARY EMPLOYMENT										
ORIENTATION	MILITARY STRATEGY (1)			SOVIET MILITARY STUDIES (2)		GENERAL PURPOSE FORCE EMPLOYMENT (3)				
	NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS									
	NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT (1)		NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY STUDIES (2)		REGIONAL STUDIES (3)					
	ELECTIVE TERM I (FALL)						ELECTIVE			
JANUARY		FEBRUARY		MARCH		APRIL		MAY		
MILITARY EMPLOYMENT										
JOINT AND COMBINED WARFARE (4)					STRATEGIC FORCE EMPLOYMENT/SPACE STUDIES (5)					
LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT										
LEADERSHIP AND PROFESSIONALISM (1)		PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (2)		RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND DEFENSE DECISION MAKING (3)			NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY			
TERM II (WINTER)				ELECTIVE TERM III (SPRING)						

*JM*

Executive Registry  
83-3663/2

9 August 1983

NOTE FOR: [Redacted]

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FROM: EA/DDCI

SUBJECT: DDCI Speeches

1. In response to your suggestions for trying to be helpful in providing support to the DDCI for upcoming speeches, I offer the following, which will be disappointing for you. The DDCI simply does not feel comfortable with prepared speeches. He finds it difficult, moreover, to really focus on preparing for these speeches much more than about a week ahead of time. Within those limitations, I think the best we can try for is for you to offer up candidate topics and eventually an outline in bullet form of ideas about those topics and possible backup reading material. He will then weave his remarks from that material. If you can try to provide this about two weeks ahead of time, we can try to get some reaction and provide any more guidance sometime during the following week.

2. With that in mind, on the Air War College Address scheduled for 12 September:

-- You might provide some bullets on the intelligence process.

-- He would be willing to talk about [Redacted]

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-- Because of security/compartimentation concerns, he would not be willing to discuss [Redacted]

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-- My guess is he would feel comfortable replaying themes he has tended to use in the past, including the Soviet threat, technology transfer, the rebuilding of the Intelligence Community, etc.

3. If you will work on this and get us something a couple of weeks ahead of time, that would be helpful. If you could also advise me what the World Affairs Council scheduled for 30 September is interested in, we could also get started on that one. Under the circumstances, I think this is the best we can do.

4. As I have mentioned before, one area in which you could always be helpful would be providing any anecdotes or local color items.

*thank,*

[Redacted]

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Distribution:  
ORIG & 1 to Addressee  
1 to EA/DDCI

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

26 July 1983

NOTE TO:

[Redacted]

SA/DDCI

SUBJECT: Air War College Address

After talking with our contact at the Air War College, we've learned that Mr. McMahon's audience will have Top Secret clearances. They have also requested that he address the following topics if possible:

[Redacted]


[Redacted]

We are going to go ahead and see what information we can gather on these issues. I think this will add the necessary depth to an introductory discussion on the intelligence process as given to you in the Army War College speech.

[Redacted]

PAO


*add intell support to mil commanders -  
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

26 July 1983

NOTE TO:

[Redacted]

SA/DDCI

STAT

SUBJECT: Air War College Address

After talking with our contact at the Air War College, we've learned that Mr. McMahon's audience will have Top Secret clearances. They have also requested that he address the following topics if possible:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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We are going to go ahead and see what information we can gather on these issues. I think this will add the necessary depth to an introductory discussion on the intelligence process as given to you in the Army War College speech.

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**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**

**Routing Slip**

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8	DDS&T				
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10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
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
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Executive Secretary  
7/20/83  
Date



T 107  
XF P307



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
AIR WAR COLLEGE (ATC)  
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, AL 36112



1 4 JUL 1983

Mr. John N. McMahon  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington DC 20505

Dear *John* Mr. McMahon

I am very pleased to invite you to the Air War College to address the Class of 1984 on "Intelligence and the Policy Process" at 1000 on Monday, 12 September 1983. We have scheduled 45 minutes for your presentation and an additional 45 minutes for a question/answer period. Following your presentation, we would appreciate your attendance at a luncheon with a group of our students. Attachments 1 and 2 reflect the desired scope of the presentation and provide an overview of the Air War College program.

As you know, most of our students are colonels and lieutenant colonels or their naval equivalents from the US Armed Forces, primarily the Air Force. We also have civilians from U.S. Government agencies and international officers representing some 25 countries. Since we expect your remarks to be classified to provide the most meaning to our US students, we have made other arrangements for the international officers and they will not be present during your briefing.

Our Protocol Office will contact you to assist with travel arrangements. Colonel Cecil Robins will provide additional information and assistance. His telephone number is (205) 293-2130 or 2386.

We appreciate your interest in the Air War College and look forward to your visit.

Sincerely

*Paul Hodges*  
PAUL H. HODGES  
Major General, USAF  
Commandant

*Delighted you can  
come!*

- 2 Atch  
1. Scope Sheet  
2. Air War College Bulletin

(1L-1D)

INSTRUCTION PERIOD NO. 2125

TITLE: INTELLIGENCE AND THE POLICY PROCESS

INTRODUCTION: The role of intelligence is to provide information and analysis to those who formulate and execute national security policy. The finished intelligence product does not come from a single organization, but rather it usually represents a coordinated composite. Intelligence supports the policy process; it is the prelude to decisions and a guide to action. The decision maker's first requirement usually is for the most accurate possible picture of the international environment in which he must pursue national objectives. The test of intelligence is how well it provides this picture.

OBJECTIVE: To comprehend the role and influence of intelligence information and organizations on the policymaking process.

DESIRED LEARNING OUTCOMES (Students should be able to):

1. Discuss roles of the "intelligence community" in the policy process.
2. Explain the impact of national estimates on policymaking and discuss the methods by which interagency disagreements are resolved.
3. Identify current intelligence issues (e.g., executive direction, protection of sources, covert action, oversight by Congress, controlling damage to US capabilities, "failures" to estimate major events, efforts to rebuild clandestine capabilities, etc) and their influence on the policy process.

ASSIGNED READINGS:

1. U.S., Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "The Role of Intelligence in the Foreign Policy Process, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs," 96th Congress, 2nd Sess., 1980 pp. 20-27.


ADDITIONAL READINGS:

- \*1. "Controversy Over Legislative Limitations on Covert US Intelligence Operations: Pro and Con," The Congressional Digest, Vol 59, No 5 (May 1980): pp.131-160.
- \*2. Thomas K. Latimer, "US Intelligence and the Congress," Strategic Review (Summer 1979): pp. 47-56.

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\*3. Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable," World Politics (October 1978): pp. 61-89.


\* Not included in Instruction Circular.



# AIR WAR COLLEGE

## BULLETIN

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