

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

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	22	SUSPENSE			

boes
STAT

Date *[Signature]*

Remarks
 Please pass recommendation to Ms. STAT
 PAO says DCI will not go - someone from SOVA being asked to go.

FOR 29 Nov 84
Date



Face-To-Face

A program to improve understanding of international issues through direct communication between Government officials and private citizens sponsored jointly by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the American Foreign Service Association.

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CABLE: INTERPEACE
TELEX: 248329 CEIP

November 26, 1984

Executive Registry

84 - 9816

Dear Colleague:


I would like to invite you to a Face-to-Face dinner discussion on Tuesday, December 11, 1984, to hear an address by Dimitri Simes, Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Simes, a noted commentator on US-Soviet relations, will speak on The Chernenko Politburo: How Serious a Threat, How Credible a Partner. During his address, Mr. Simes will discuss the structure of the present Soviet leadership and what decisions he believes that it can make in the field of US-Soviet relations.

In addition to his position at the Carnegie Endowment, Mr. Simes is Professorial Lecturer at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies. He is the author of several books and numerous articles, a regular columnist with The Christian Science Monitor, and frequently appears on US and foreign television programs focusing on East-West topics. Mr. Simes graduated from the Moscow State University with a M.A. in modern foreign history in 1969 and received the Soviet equivalent of a Ph.D. from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1972. He came to the United States in 1973 and was naturalized in 1980.

We will meet in the Carnegie Conference Center, 11 Dupont Circle, 8th Floor (entrance on New Hampshire Avenue, across from the Dupont Plaza Hotel entrance). Parking is usually available in the Brookings lot on P Street between 17th and 18th. You are invited for cocktails at 6:30 pm. Mr. Simes will speak at 7:00, followed by discussion until dinner at 8:00. Discussion will continue after dinner until 10:00 pm. Mr. Simes' address will be on-the-record, and the the questions and answers will be off-the-record.

We look forward to seeing you on the 11th. Please respond whether or not you plan to attend by calling Betty Katzner (797-6414) no later than Thursday, December 6th.

Very truly yours,.


Ronald A. Dwight
Director
Face-to-Face Program



P 306

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1984

Take Small Steps Toward Moscow

By Dmitri K. Simes

WASHINGTON — Now that the Presidential election is over, Americans can at last return to business and politics as usual. Among the pressing issues at hand, few things are more important than relations with the Soviet Union. What's more, for the first time since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, there are tentative signs of improvement in the American-Soviet relationship.

Washington and Moscow, each for reasons of its own, seem to be interested in a limited accommodation. Momentous obstacles remain, however, and an eagerness to do too much too fast could backfire.

Campaign considerations alone cannot explain the new American emphasis on dialogue with Moscow. White House insiders insist that Mr. Reagan believes that his large-scale military program, a renewed American geopolitical assertiveness and the new mood of self-confidence have created an advantageous environment for seeking arrangements with the Kremlin.

His Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, and national security adviser, Robert C. McFarlane, are known to feel the same way. The meetings between Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, and President Reagan and Mr. Shultz went as well as could be expected in today's climate of superpower hostility.

Achieving even this modest success required a number of bureaucratic and policy decisions. For example, the report of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, which listed possible (and impossible) Soviet violations, was at first withheld and then downplayed. The Administration, both publicly and privately, made clear to the Soviet Union that some mutual restraints on testing of antisatellite weapons would be considered if Moscow agreed to resume talks on strategic and intermediate-range offensive systems.

Recent Soviet public pronouncements and private comments strongly suggest that the Kremlin continues to distrust Mr. Reagan and that no relatively minor changes in American rhetoric, or even action, will change this attitude quickly. Yet, Moscow has signaled that it is relatively open to American overtures.

There appear to be four reasons be-

hind the cautious Soviet willingness to explore a diplomatic relationship with the United States. First, the Russians tried a posture of uncompromising belligerence for months and it backfired — deployments of American missiles in Europe go on without much opposition.


Beyond that, the septuagenarians dominating the Politburo are uncomfortable with a highly volatile situation of unrestricted rivalry. Soviet leaders would prefer to block a renewed arms race that could cost the Soviet Union dearly and tilt the military balance in America's favor.

The Soviet leadership situation — while still uncertain — contributes to greater superpower interaction. Konstantin U. Chernenko is now firmly enough in charge to speak for the collective leadership, and the Soviet decision-making process seems to be functioning more smoothly. The Chernenko Politburo is hardly in a position to undertake a much needed fundamental reassessment of Soviet foreign policy. But it seems capable of conducting routine business, including superpower diplomacy.

Finally, and most importantly, the Russians increasingly fear that (to use their terminology) the international correlation of forces is shifting against them. Their instinct is to hang tough but to give priority to protecting their own position rather than expanding geopolitically.

Nevertheless, neither side is ready for a second détente. During a period of domestic difficulties, the Soviet elite needs Mr. Reagan's America as an external enemy. In addition, the anticipation of yet another political succession in the Kremlin discourages ambitious politicians from experimenting with the bold approaches needed to reach a major agreement with the United States. In Washington, the naysayers maintain great influence inside the Administration. They will use Mr. Reagan's landslide victory as evidence of a popular mandate for an uncompromising stand against the "evil empire."

The Russians, by their rhetoric and deeds, traditionally help American



Bellefleur

Momentous obstacles remain

critics of rapprochement. Even if Moscow is willing to bargain earnestly on arms control and other issues, it will probably persist in actions Americans find abhorrent. While Mr. Shultz may prefer to avoid linking Soviet actions with negotiations, will the Administration be able to escape it amid public outrage over Kremlin misbehavior?



Thus, too ambitious a pursuit of a comprehensive settlement with the

Soviet Union may be counterproductive. Fundamental differences cannot be resolved while the Soviet Union remains a totalitarian, global military empire. And even a more modest compromise may be beyond reach after so much hostility has been accumulated on both sides.

We should instead focus on small but realistic measures that would make sense in their own right — not as stepping stones to a grander compact — and that would be supported by the American public and would contribute to stability. Ratification of treaties on nuclear threshold testing and peaceful nuclear explosions, urged by Mr. Chernenko, are in both sides' interest and are not terribly controversial in either country. So is Mr. Reagan's suggestion (at Soviet urging) to pursue constraints on antisatellite weapons and his idea of holding regular,

Cabinet- and sub-Cabinet-level meetings between American and Soviet representatives.

Those inside, and particularly outside, the Administration who want more are hoping that these small steps would contribute to larger-scale undertakings. Much would depend on Soviet willingness and ability to respond. But even if the Russians continued to dig in their heels, marginal but genuine diplomatic arrangements would help de-escalate tensions in the superpower rivalry. To neglect such opportunities to build a new rapprochement would risk ending up with nothing. In cooperating with the Russians, it is wise to aim lower in order to hit higher.



Dennis Perino

Dmitri K. Simes is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.