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THE DIRECTOR OF
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National Intelligence Council

19 April 1984

NOTE FOR: DCI
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ADDI

FROM: John Horton
NIO/LA

SUBJECT: Interagency Intelligence Assessment
GRENADA: POLITICAL AND SECURITY
PROSPECTS

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Attached is the Interagency Intelligence Assessment: GRENADA: POLITICAL AND SECURITY PROSPECTS as requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Principal Drafter was [redacted] of DDI/ALA and was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. It was coordinated on 18 April 1984 and distributed today.

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John Horton

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INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

19 April 1984

**GRENADA:
POLITICAL AND SECURITY PROSPECTS**

This Interagency Intelligence Assessment was requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. The Assessment was coordinated at the working level within the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State. Also participating were the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps. Information available as of 18 April 1984 was used in the preparation of this Assessment.

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19 April 1984

Interagency Intelligence Assessment**GRENADA: POLITICAL AND SECURITY PROSPECTS****KEY JUDGMENTS**

Despite much internal political disarray in Grenada in recent months, we believe that a coalition of democratic, centrist parties--such as the one recently formed--most likely will win the election now tentatively scheduled for later this year. The New Jewel Movement (NJM)--which ruled Grenada under Maurice Bishop--appears too disorganized and discredited to participate effectively, and it probably will require several years to rejuvenate itself as a political party.

Former Prime Minister Eric Gairy has had only limited success in revitalizing his old party, and is likely to pose a major problem only if the new democratic alliance fails to coalesce into a united front. A return to power by Gairy would discredit the multinational intervention and undermine US interests in Grenada and in the region as a whole. [REDACTED]

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Although most available information discusses NJM plans to participate in the democratic process, we have received reports that the NJM leaders may be assembling a paramilitary force for the party. However, the probability of successfully organizing such a force appears to be low as long as US and Caribbean forces remain in Grenada. The possibility of isolated terrorist acts by disaffected, unemployed youths, or former members of the People's Revolutionary Army or Militia, cannot be dismissed. [REDACTED]

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Public emotions are running high against former government and army members being held in connection with the death of Bishop and others last October. The potential for violent public reactions against the detainees is substantial, particularly if the conduct and outcome of the upcoming trials displease the population. Moreover, radical supporters of the detainees might try to disrupt the proceedings. [REDACTED]

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Prospects are poor for developing an indigenous police force by the end of this year capable of coping effectively with this limited security threat. The reconstitution of the police force and training of its members are progressing slowly. A foreign police presence probably will be needed at least until mid-1985 to maintain law and order, to provide security for the upcoming trials and the election, and to deter potential dissident and subversive activity. [REDACTED]

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The Caribbean Peacekeeping Force--which numbers less than 450--has developed into an effective security organ largely as a result of US security assistance and training. Although leaders of the participating countries have publicly agreed to keep their contingents in Grenada through the election period, the financial strains caused by their involvement could lead many to reduce or terminate their commitment if sufficient funding is not forthcoming soon from Washington. [redacted]

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Any significant reduction in the US and the Caribbean peacekeeping forces could well have serious destabilizing political repercussions. Although credible evidence of a serious threat to stability has yet to materialize, many Grenadians are deeply concerned that the potential for disruptive violence will climb sharply if the peacekeeping forces--and especially the US military contingent--depart. [redacted]

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**INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
GRENADA: POLITICAL AND SECURITY PROSPECTS**

1. Although daily life has returned to normal in Grenada, the country is still recovering from the fall of the leftist regime of Maurice Bishop and the collapse of its political and economic systems. Reconstruction is progressing as well as can be expected, given the limited resources and expertise available. [REDACTED]

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2. The sense of safety and well-being provided by the US military and the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force has created a stable environment which has enabled the Grenadians to focus on getting the country back on its feet. The road to self-sufficiency, however, will be slow and faltering, as inexperienced officials try to pick up the pieces and tackle enormous political, economic, legal, and security tasks. [REDACTED]

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3. Grenada faces several major national events in the coming months -- voter enumeration and an election probably later this year, trials of those detained in connection with the murders of 19 October 1983, and a commission of inquiry into the abuses of the Bishop regime as well as that of former Prime Minister Eric Gairy. The outcomes of these events and their impact on the security situation are difficult to predict, and each undoubtedly will influence the other. [REDACTED]

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POLITICAL ACTIVITY

4. The liberation of Grenada from one-party rule in October 1983 and the prospect of the first election since 1976 have led to a proliferation of political contenders. Since January political activity in Grenada has increased and a variety of political hopefuls -- some old hands and some newcomers -- are preparing for the election. The current political landscape consists of four parties grouped around the political center with the leftist New Jewel Movement (NJM) of the late Prime Minister Bishop on the outer fringe. No single dynamic, forceful and appealing political leader has emerged thus far. Politicking has remained at a low level as the contenders organize their parties, devise campaign strategies, formulate platforms, select candidates, and jockey for position. [REDACTED]

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5. Popular involvement and interest in the election has been slow to develop in part because the population is still recovering from the emotional trauma of the October 1983 events. Following the demise of the Bishop regime, most Grenadians felt an aversion toward politics. This feeling translated into apathy and apprehension over the prospect of elections. Moreover, people seemed to lack confidence in their ability to choose competent and trustworthy leaders. [REDACTED]

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6. Although the fluidity of the current political situation has added to their confusion, most Grenadians share a revulsion for the leftist, pro-Cuban New Jewel Movement (NJM). Many also view Gairy, who returned to Grenada in January, as eccentric and as a threat to political stability. [REDACTED]

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7. The New Jewel Movement: Discredited and disorganized following the demise of the People's Revolutionary Government, Bishop's death, and the multinational intervention, the New Jewel Movement has no significant popular support. Former members of the leftist government and its diplomats overseas have tried to rejuvenate the party by perpetuating the memory of the popular Bishop and establishing the Maurice Bishop and October 19 Martyr's Foundation. Their efforts so far, however, have been less than successful. The leaders have received promises of some Cuban material assistance.

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8. The party probably still enjoys some residual support among disaffected youths, but it does not appear to represent a serious political force. The NJM recognizes that the current political atmosphere is not conducive to a major effort to revive the party. Time is needed to heal the wounds from last October and for the party (under the guise of the Maurice Bishop Memorial Foundation) to develop sufficient support to compete successfully in elections. According to several sources, party leaders have indicated that it will be several years before they will be ready to effectively participate in elections. Over the longer term, however, the party could become a threat to internal security and stability if the moderates cannot provide effective leadership. [REDACTED]

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9. Gairy's Party: Since his return to Grenada, Gairy has been trying to muster support for the revitalization of his old party, the Grenada United Labor Party. His efforts so far have been unsuccessful and he apparently is frustrated and disappointed by the poor reception he has received. Gairy has announced that he will not run in the election, but will work behind-the-scenes in the campaign. Most Grenadians believe that his ultimate goal is to return to power and that the Grenada United Labor Party is his vehicle.

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10. Gairy traditionally could count on the support of some 20 to 30 percent of the population, particularly among the older generation and in rural areas. However, he is viewed with deep-seated animosity by most of the younger generation, which make up the majority of the population. Moreover, former supporters have been reluctant to associate with him, and he reportedly is having difficulty recruiting candidates. [REDACTED]

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11. Gairy's party is likely to pose a major problem only if the new, democratic alliance fails to coalesce into a united front. Fear of an eventual resurgence of the NJM could aid Gairy's cause by driving anti-NJM voters into his camp. Conversely, many observers fear that if a viable alternative to Gairy's party is lacking, voter turnout will be low, particularly among youth, leading to a Gairy victory. [REDACTED]

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12. Because of the deep-seated dislike of Gairy and the likelihood of his instituting repressive measures, his victory could provoke social unrest and possibly even political violence. Moreover, a return to power by Gairy would discredit the multinational intervention and undermine US interests in Grenada and in the region as a whole. [REDACTED]

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13. The Democratic Center: Three political parties make up the democratic center. The Grenada National Party, led by 66-year-old Herbert Blaize, has been involved in domestic politics since the 1950s. Traditionally backed by businessmen and an older constituency, the National Party has a narrow support base. As the head of government in the 1960s before Grenadian independence, Blaize is an experienced politician who has a reputation for honesty. However, he lacks charisma and his frail health could be a detriment. [REDACTED]

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14. The National Democratic Party was formed in January by 35-year-old George Brizan, an educator and administrator in the civil service. Brizan has support in the civil service, the business sector, and among many youths whom he has taught. Although Brizan is well-liked and respected, he is inexperienced politically, and some Grenadian political observers have described him as weak. Brizan hopes to capitalize on his popularity among the youth in the St. Georges area, by combining with the support base of the National Party. [REDACTED]

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15. The Grenada Democratic Movement is a former exile organization which was based in Trinidad and the United States during the Bishop regime. It is headed by Francis Alexis, a professor and lawyer. The Democratic Movement and its young, well-educated leaders are largely unknown in Grenada and have not made much of an impact on the political scene. The party suffers from a credibility problem because many Grenadians resent what they perceive as the organization's opportunistic return to the island for elections, and the fact that its members did not suffer under the Bishop government as others did. While Alexis's participation in a political coalition apparently is desired by leaders of other centrist parties, some other members of the Democratic Movement are considered too controversial. [REDACTED]

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16. Former political detainee Winston Whyte is planning to form another political party but does not appear to have significant support beyond his stronghold in the town of Sauters. Moreover, Whyte is suspect among some moderate Grenadians because he was a Minister in the Gairy government and by more conservative elements because of his ties with the New Jewel Movement before falling out of favor in 1979. [REDACTED]

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Coalition Politics

17. After months of stalemated discussions, the three democratic parties agreed in early April to form an alliance for the forthcoming election. The new coalition, called the "Team for National Togetherness," reportedly will allow each party to retain its identity and structure, but will campaign on a platform of national unity. The alliance will be led by Herbert Blaize and

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will be open to any political contender with a demonstrated commitment to democracy and human rights. The formation of the new body apparently was the result of mutual accommodation and an underlying conviction held by the party leaders that some type of alliance was needed to defeat Gairy's party in the elections. [REDACTED]

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18. A workable alliance would allow the parties to broaden their support bases and pool their political and organizational skills. In addition, a well-organized and effective campaign presenting a united democratic front would have a good chance of winning the election. However, many details still have to be worked out and a straightforward and comprehensive educational campaign will have to be launched in the coming months to ensure success. The basis for the formation of the alliance and the agreements reached on power-sharing could have significant implications for the strength of the democratic coalition and, if it is successful, for the new government. [REDACTED]

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THREATS TO INTERNAL SECURITY

19. A major concern among the Grenadian population is that hard-core elements of the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) and the People's Revolutionary Militia (PRM) will resort to terrorism when the US military forces depart. The estimated 2,000 former members of the PRA and PRM are currently disorganized and demoralized, but could become a source of mischief and instability if they are not soon integrated into society through gainful employment. Some PRA arms probably remain on the island and could fall into the hands of trained soldiers from the previous leftist regime. The possibility of isolated terrorist acts by disaffected, unemployed youths, cannot be dismissed. [REDACTED]

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20. The New Jewel Movement: Although most available information discusses NJM plans to participate in the democratic process, we have received reports [REDACTED] which indicate that the NJM leaders are assembling [REDACTED] a military force for the party. The force reportedly will consist of 100 armed soldiers mostly drawn from the PRA and Grenadian students who received military training in Cuba. [REDACTED] Cuba has agreed to provide training and equipment for the force, which has been characterized as a security/bodyguard unit with some guerrilla warfare capabilities. One party leader reportedly said that the force may be necessary to counter plans that Eric Gairy may have to seek revenge against the NJM and its supporters. The force also is intended to serve as a combat wing of the party to be used in an eventual uprising led by the NJM. [REDACTED]

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21. Although it is possible that the NJM leaders are considering the formation of a paramilitary wing, other reporting on the party's strategy and activities indicates that over the near term the party leaders do not want to jeopardize their right to eventually participate in Grenadian politics by engaging in such activities. Moreover, the probability of successfully organizing such a military force appears to be low as long as US and Caribbean forces remain. Other major obstacles include the strong popular opposition to the PRA and the current disillusionment among former rank and file members of the NJM and the PRA. [REDACTED]

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22. The likelihood of NJM-sponsored subversion could increase if Gairy were to return to power. Many young Grenadians and former NJM supporters vehemently oppose Gairy primarily because they fear that if he regains control in the government that he will try to eliminate any dissidents. The possibility of political violence and widespread unrest would increase. On the other hand, a Gairy return to power would be advantageous to the leftist NJM because they could then play on people's fears and try to portray themselves as saviours as they did in the late 1970s. [REDACTED]

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23. If a responsive moderate democratic government is elected, however, the prospects for subversive activity by the NJM are less likely. Any efforts to destabilize a strong popular government would be counterproductive and would be met with open opposition. In this case, party leaders probably will bide their time and seek opportunities to foment unrest or cultivate legitimate opposition to the new government. [REDACTED]

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24. Internal security could also be threatened by the presence of detainees at Richmond Hill prison now being held in connection with the death of Bishop and others on 19 October 1983. Popular sentiment against the detainees is high. The general population vehemently opposes the radicals, holding them responsible for plunging Grenada into a political and military crisis. Grenadians want the detainees convicted through due process, and the investigations, case preparation, and physical security required for the trials are likely to absorb most of Grenada's legal and security resources for the rest of the year. [REDACTED]

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25. We believe the defense will try to prolong the process by raising legal technicalities and will seek to gain maximum propaganda value by discrediting the Advisory Council. With public emotions running high, the potential for violent public reactions against the detainees is substantial, particularly if the conduct or outcome of the trials displease the population. Moreover, radical supporters of the detainees might try to disrupt the proceedings. While the formation of a group of political supporters to defend the radicals' interests appears unlikely, the possibility of residual support for the radicals among some Marxist-indoctrinated youths and the reported ability of the detainees to maintain ties with the outside through visitors, raise important security concerns. [REDACTED]

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26. Regardless of the outcome, the trials will have a significant effect on the election and on Grenada's long-term security situation. A competent security force will be viewed by many as essential to maintain public order, prevent any disruptive incidents, and guarantee just proceedings during the trials. [REDACTED]

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27. We judge the potential for subversive activity by Gairy and his supporters, should they fail to win the election, as minimal. Most political observers agree that while Gairy may continue to use his skills and connections to manipulate and discredit his political opponents, he probably would not resort to violence as the way back to power. [REDACTED]

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28. Although the views and intentions of some 150 to 200 Grenadian students remaining in Cuba, USSR, and East Germany are not yet known, their eventual return to Grenada could have implications for security. There is no evidence of destabilizing activities by the approximately 40 students who have so far returned, but these youths represent a potential base of support for the NJM. [REDACTED]

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SECURITY FORCE CAPABILITIES

29. Grenada currently lacks a viable, indigenous police force and is totally dependent on the US and Caribbean Peacekeeping Forces (CPF) for its security needs. The 350-man Grenadian police force lacks the discipline or the training to maintain law and order, much less to control a possible resurgence of radical elements. There is also a lack of competent senior and mid-level management as well as potential candidates for the top leadership positions in the new Grenadian police force. Moreover, many of the members who served the Bishop and Gairy governments are highly politicized and corrupt. The process of removing these disruptive elements will further delay the formation of an effective law enforcement apparatus. [REDACTED]

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30. Reorganization and training of the police are progressing slowly. The Barbadian Commissioner of Police and a British adviser are involved in training 30 police recruits in Barbados. Plans also are underway to accelerate training for the rest of the force and for additional recruits. Foreign police and security advisers in Grenada do not believe they will be able to assess Grenada's security requirements accurately until several groups of these trainees are integrated into the police force and assume their duties later this year. [REDACTED]

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31. Once trained, the police force will need to develop confidence through on-the-job experience and to establish credibility with the populace. A sense of loyalty and pride in the force is necessary for the morale of its members and to protect it from political influence. The US Embassy and other foreign security advisers in Grenada believe that a fully trained indigenous police force will not be ready to assume complete responsibility for internal security until mid-1985. In the meantime, a foreign police presence is needed to maintain law and order, provide security during the uncoming trials and the election, and to deter dissident activity. [REDACTED]

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The Caribbean Peacekeeping Forces

32. The CPF has become an effective security organ whose performance and capabilities have improved significantly since last November largely as a result of US security assistance and training. The force now numbers less than 450, including two companies--or about 300 members--from Jamaica and another 150 personnel from Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and St. Kitts. The contingent from the Jamaican Defense Force is competent and professional and generally better regarded than contingents from

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the other Caribbean islands. The CPF plays the prominent security role on the island, while US military personnel--numbering some 250--maintain a lower profile. Most Grenadians, however, still look to the US military as the main guarantor of stability. [REDACTED]

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33. Jamaica will probably maintain its peacekeeping contingent in Grenada at current levels, at least for the near term. The political benefits derived by Jamaican Prime Minister Seaga as a result of his contribution to the CPF so far have outweighed the economic costs involved in supporting this force in Grenada. However, Jamaica may decide to withdraw some or all of its CPF contingent if large-scale public disorders arise at home. The Jamaican Defense Force, even at full strength, would be hard-pressed to contain massive demonstrations or riots and widespread criminal activity if the opposition party decides to use political violence to push the government into calling early elections. Although the opposition has refrained from using this tactic so far, they may be planning to do so in the next few months. [REDACTED]

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34. Although all the participants have a vested interest in ensuring the continuation of democratic rule after the election, domestic financial and security needs are likely to bring growing pressure on a number of countries to pull out. The leaders of the CPF countries have publicly agreed to keep their contingents in Grenada, along with US military forces, through the election period. The financial strains caused by their involvement, however, could lead them to reduce or terminate their commitment if sufficient funding from Washington is not forthcoming. [REDACTED]

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