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26 November 1984

Mr. William Casey
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Headquarters, CIA
Washington, DC 20505

5 DEC 1984

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Dear Director Casey:

Enclosed please find a copy of the published report: "Soviet/Cuban Strategy in the Third World after Grenada" [Toward Prevention of Future Grenadas] based upon a conference held at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, August 15-18, 1984. The report includes proceedings and findings, as well as policymaking recommendations.

The conference report is a product of the Naval Postgraduate School (Soviet and Eastern European Studies, Department of National Security Affairs), and the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars). The report is co-authored by Dr. Jiri Valenta and Dr. Herbert J. Ellison, with assistance from Lieutenant Frederick F. Shaheen (USN), (a student of Soviet Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School), and Mr. Bradford P. Johnson (of the Kennan Institute). Any comments or opinions of the report would be greatly appreciated.

If a follow-on conference can be arranged for 1985, it is hoped that you may be able to participate and furnish input to stimulate discussion and a consensus of recommendations of benefit to U.S. national security interests.

Best regards,

Jiri Valenta

JIRI VALENTA
Associate Professor & Coordinator
Soviet & East European Studies
Dept. of National Security Affairs


1 Encl: Report

P.S. I enjoyed our meeting & you & hope that I can be of some assistance to you if needed.

DCI EXEC REG

SOVIET/CUBAN STRATEGY IN THE THIRD WORLD AFTER GRENADA

TOWARD PREVENTION OF FUTURE GRENADAS



A CONFERENCE REPORT

**SOVIET/CUBAN STRATEGY
IN THE THIRD WORLD
AFTER GRENADA**

TOWARD PREVENTION OF FUTURE GRENADAS

A CONFERENCE REPORT

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AUGUST 15-18, 1984

KENNAN INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RUSSIAN STUDIES
WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
WASHINGTON, D.C.

and

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES PROGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

A multidisciplinary conference was held August 15-18, 1984 at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. The purposes of the conference were:

—To generate scholarly examination of documents captured during the U.S., East Caribbean forces' intervention in Grenada in October 1983, with a view to determining causes of the bloody coup in Grenada, the impact of the intervention upon Soviet/Cuban strategy and tactics in the Caribbean Basin and other areas of the Third World.

—To examine in bipartisan fashion U.S. options for countering Soviet/Cuban strategy and tactics in the Third World.

GENERAL

Though highly uneven, the documents captured during the Grenada invasion nevertheless provide an unprecedented glimpse into the inner workings of an aspiring Third World Leninist regime. They clearly illuminate Bernard Coard and his faction's drive toward Leninist transformation of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) Party which erupted in violent factional struggle, leading to the death of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and precipitating the U.S./East Caribbean security forces' intervention.

The Grenada Documents also provide new insights into Soviet and Cuban policies *vis-à-vis* radical Third World regimes, particularly if compared with views expressed by Soviet literature on the subject. A key Soviet/Cuban strategic objective in the Third World is to aid in the selective building of "socialist-oriented", revolutionary, anti-U.S. regimes. The most advanced socialist regimes are those with evolving vanguard Leninist parties structured on the principle of democratic centralism (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola, South Yemen, and eventually, the Soviets hope, Nicaragua) and cadres trained in the U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries, or at least well-connected with Soviet bureaucracies. The Soviet objective in Grenada — a country not very high on the Soviet list of priorities, yet with a potentially important strategic location — was to help create an advanced type of socialist-oriented country which could eventually serve as a bridge between the Soviets and Cubans and other revolutionary forces in the region. A foothold in Grenada and Nicaragua, and among revolutionaries in El Salvador, could also be of benefit to the Soviet Union by preoccupying the United States in its own strategic hinterland. Therefore the Soviets accorded special status to the New

Jewel Movement in an ideological agreement with the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), concluded several top-secret arms transfer agreements, and provided for military training and growing advisory assistance. The NJM leaders aspired both to become a revolutionary bridge to other nations in the region, and to emulate Cuba's example of a long process of institutionalizing a Leninist system — the two essential preconditions to continued and improved Soviet support. This the Coard faction hoped could eventually lead to Soviet recognition of the NJM as a proper Communist Party.

The Grenada Documents also highlight the increasing sophistication of Soviet methods in furthering Third World strategic objectives, such as their utilization of the auxiliary capacities of junior allies like Cuba, North Korea, Libya, and some Warsaw Treaty Organization nations. By acting through junior allies like Cuba, the Soviets are able to favor Soviet global interests while deflecting costs and risks in other areas of their international relations. On the other hand, when Cuba acts as a broker between the Soviets and radical regimes, serious tactical disagreements can arise and precipitate crises such as occurred in Grenada.

The absence of Soviet military support during the Grenada intervention had an adverse impact — though uneven — on the Soviet alliance system and on some of the developing radical regimes, particularly in the Caribbean Basin. It helped to put Nicaragua on the defensive, increasing pressure for a negotiated solution in El Salvador, and its effects were also seen in Surinam and possibly in Angola and Ethiopia. Above all, the Grenada experience demonstrates that the U.S.S.R. avoids contracting military alliances with more vulnerable Communist and Third World radical nations, particularly those adjacent to the U.S. periphery, where Washington is willing to protect its interests with military force. Grenada created much concern in Cuba and raised the perceived costs and risks of Soviet and Cuban support for radical Third World regimes (especially in the Caribbean Basin). In its net effect, however, Grenada was only a temporary setback for Soviet and Cuban policies, and the long-term impact of the intervention should not be exaggerated, especially if there is no domestic consensus upon long-term U.S. strategy aimed at curbing Soviet/Cuban military activism in the Third World.

RECOMMENDATIONS

While there was no conclusive evidence of an immediate threat to U.S. security interests in Grenada, circumstances in Grenada prior to the intervention (such as the murder of the Prime Minister, the threat to U.S. citizens, and the violent and unpredictable nature of the situation) made the U.S. and East Caribbean security forces' intervention an extraordinary yet necessary measure. In the long run, the probable negative consequences of U.S. inaction far outweighed the immediate costs of intervention. In spite of the reservations held by some conferees, there was a strong consensus on this issue. The following recommendations were offered by one or more conference partici-

pants, and no effort was made to arrive at a formal consensus on each point:

—Top priority should be given to long-term strategic planning toward prevention of superpower confrontation and escalation of conflict in the Third World.

—U.S. policymakers need to anticipate long-term challenges in the Caribbean Basin, Central and South America, and other parts of the Third World. The Caribbean Basin is especially important to the United States; therefore, the U.S. should heed Soviet/Cuban “security linkages” with nations in this region. Studies are needed of Soviet/Cuban perceptions and policies regarding the Third World and ties with radical forces.

—In Grenada, priority effort should be to influence political and economic stability, and to prevent a return to left or right dictatorships by encouraging a coalition of democratic forces.

—Bipartisan support should be given to long-term economic assistance programs to Third World nations, particularly in the Caribbean region, and on a higher level than presently contemplated.

—The National Endowment for Democracy should be encouraged to initiate programs of education and research in the area of Soviet/Cuban Third World strategy.

—As an immediate measure, the U.S. should continue to exert a high degree of pressure to eliminate “death squad” tactics, and to support democratic processes and institutions in El Salvador and elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere.

—The U.S. should be alert to possibilities for negotiation with Cuba and Nicaragua. More caution should be exercised in the classification of Third World radical regimes.

—The U.S. should increase political and economic aid to each Caribbean Basin nation as its capacity permits, should strengthen existing ties with these states and cultivate ties with both ruling and opposition parties through diplomatic exchange programs, and should post credible, dynamic, and linguistically qualified U.S. diplomatic representatives.

—In the Caribbean Basin, much more emphasis should be given to development of technical infrastructures (roads, ports, communications), advice on planning and budgeting, and education of economists and financial experts. Funding should come from both the private and public sectors.

—The U.S. should be prepared to offer all forms of security assistance in accordance with needs of the developing nations in the Caribbean Basin, taking into account each nation’s stand on human rights.

—Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which prohibits police training, should be critically reviewed and amended for countries where there is respect for human rights.

—U.S. policy should distinguish between Soviet/Cuban sponsored strife and indigenous revolutionary situations. Where appropriate, and warranted by the circumstances, we should even consider aid to democratic forces combating oppressive governments.

—A counterstrategy should be developed to intensify constraints on Soviet/Cuban acquisition and use of surrogates. U.S. policy should capitalize on differences in Soviet/junior partner alliances and policies.

—U.S. negotiations with Cuba and Nicaragua should be based on reciproc-

ity, verifiable agreements, and monitoring. Soviet and Cuban military ties with Nicaragua or other radical regimes in the Basin should be non-negotiable.

—The U.S. must continue to be prepared to combine diplomacy and force (direct or indirect) to further foreign policy objectives and to insure security of the United States in the Caribbean Basin.

—The U.S. should encourage allied cooperation to increase constraints on Soviet, Cuban and other Soviet client states' military activities in Third World areas.

—The specific elements of bipartisan policy in the Caribbean (Kissinger report) should be institutionalized by legislation and be promptly implemented.

—An American bipartisan consensus regarding U.S. policies in the Third World is essential. A more extensive program should be adopted to increase public awareness of Soviet/Cuban policies in the Third World through new research centers, more extensive cooperation between the U.S. Government and academic institutions, and better use of the public media.

PREFACE

The United States and East Caribbean security forces' invasion of Grenada on October 26, 1983, focused attention on the problems of radical regimes in the Third World in general and in the Caribbean Basin in particular. The intervention also brought into focus Soviet and Cuban strategy and tactics in the Third World. Notwithstanding Grenada's political and economic significance, the intervention marked the first reversal in a decade of ostensibly Soviet-backed Cuban military activism, which first became obvious in Africa in 1975-78 (the Soviet/Cuban interventions in Angola in 1976-77, and in Ethiopia in 1977-78). This activism subsequently extended to new revolutionary clients in close proximity to the United States such as Nicaragua, El Salvador and Grenada.

The discovery of voluminous secret files during and following the intervention in Grenada has provided a unique opportunity to examine not only the inner workings of a radical Third World regime, but also the rudiments of Soviet/Cuban strategy in the Third World both before and after the U.S. intervention.

The idea of a conference on Grenada was conceived during 1983-84 by the conference chairs in Washington, D.C. at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. A sense of urgency was felt about undertaking an interdisciplinary examination of the serious political and economic issues facing the Third World, particularly in the Caribbean Basin. It was clear that Soviet and Cuban policies *vis-à-vis* radical Third World forces and the genesis of revolution was having a substantial impact on Third World development. It was resolved to address these issues effectively by promoting bipartisan interaction among specialists on the Third World and the Soviet Union and Cuba, both those inside and outside of government.

In the fall of 1983, scholars at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars began dialogue among specialists on the U.S.S.R., Latin America, and other Third World nations. This exchange was stimulated in part by the work of the nation's Bipartisan Commission on Central America which had invited several Wilson Fellows to testify at its hearings. The ongoing need to generate a multidisciplinary inquiry culminated in a conference organized by the Soviet and East European Studies Program of the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, and cosponsored by the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the National Strategy Information Center, Inc.

The conference group included about 50 prominent specialists with varying political tendencies and perspectives, and represented the United States Government, the media, as well as American universities and research institutions. Several of the participants served as leading consultants or witnesses for the Bipartisan Commission on Central America. As a product of the interaction of this diverse mix of specialists, analysts, and policymakers, this report neglects neither the East-West nor the North-South dimensions of the problems of revolution in the Third World, specifically in Latin America.

There were three specific objectives to be met by convening this confer-

ence. The first was to generate interest in a scholarly examination of the documents captured in Grenada which had until the time of the conference been mostly ignored by the academic community. The second was to utilize these documents in analyzing the New Jewel Movement (NJM) revolution and its ties with the U.S.S.R., Cuba, and other Communist and radical Third World regimes, and in evaluating the impact of the Grenada intervention on Soviet/Cuban strategy in the Third World. The third main objective was to examine the U.S. options in terms of new opportunities and obstacles in the Caribbean Basin, Cuba, and Africa after the invasion of Grenada.

The participants who were asked to write papers addressed a set of questions posed by the co-chair of the conference, Dr. Jiri Valenta. The conferees were not held to a rigid frame of reference, nor did they represent a single point of view. As a result, many differing interpretations were provided, both by authors of papers and by discussants. The only common starting point was an invitation to study the available Grenada documents, and to consider a number of questions regarding the Grenada revolution and Soviet/Cuban strategy that had been raised in an article by Jiri and Virginia Valenta recently published in *Problems of Communism* (July-August 1984).

The findings and recommendations of the conference are written herein by Dr. Jiri Valenta. These findings do not reflect unanimity of opinion on the part of the conference participants or the organizations they represent. However, they are based almost exclusively on the exchange of ideas that took place during the conference. The full proceedings of the conference, which will include all papers and commentaries, will be published several months from now in a monograph to be co-edited by Valenta and Ellison.

The conference required a great deal of organizational effort. A remarkable group of officers of all services of the U.S. Military contributed time and talent to the conference while pursuing studies in Soviet and East European Studies Program, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. In many ways, this conference was their conference. Special thanks go to the conference coordinator, LT Fred Shaheen (USN); Student Committee Chairman LCDR Steve Harris (USN), LT Jay Wilkins (USN), LT Will Dossell (USN), LCDR Rickard Johnson (USN), CPT Rosalyn Bellis (USAF), LCDR Kim Viner (USN), MAJ Joe Lahnstein (USA), and CPT Karen Decker (USAF).

We are also grateful to Mr. Bradford Johnson (Kennan Institute) and LT Fred Shaheen (USN) for their work as conference rapporteurs, and to Evan Raynes, Larry McLellan, Gladys Clearwaters and Phyllis McClellan for their editorial and technical support for the conference report.

For their assistance and encouragement of this project, we are particularly grateful to Virginia Valenta, Mr. Nestor Sanchez, Mr. Hugh McGowan, Mr. Walter Raymond, Dr. Constantine Menges, Dr. Charles Fairbanks, Ambassador Sally Shelton, Ms. Kay Stephenson, Mr. Anthony Gray, and COL George Thompson (USAF); COMO Robert H. Schumaker, Provost David Schrady, Dean Kneale Marshall, and Chairman of the Department of National Security Affairs, Dr. Sherman Blandin at the Naval Postgraduate School; and Dr. James Billington and the entire staff of the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

October 15, 1984

Sherman W. Blandin/Herbert J. Ellison
Monterey, CA/Washington, D.C.

AFTERMATH OF GRENADA: THE IMPACT OF THE U.S. ACTION ON REVOLUTIONARY PROSPECTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Summary of paper by Howard Wiarda

Grenada has provided us with a treasure trove of documents that are crucial to understanding both the internal and external dynamics of revolutionary situations. The Grenada documents provide us with the first clear glimpse of a revolution in progress.

While Soviet capabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean have increased, and Soviet tactics and strategy have become more sophisticated, there are also severe restraints operating on Soviet initiatives in the Western hemisphere. The Soviets and Cubans have increased their military and intelligence capabilities in the area, and Soviet strategy has shown a new emphasis on long-term rather than short-term gains; but Soviet economic problems (and perhaps succession problems) and the risks of provoking a conflict with the United States serve as limits to actual Soviet policy in Latin America and the Caribbean. It therefore seems unlikely that we shall see a much larger and direct Soviet presence in Latin America in the near future. Rather, the Soviet Union will probably continue to take advantage of already existing anti-American revolutionary movements to gain advantage for itself and to frustrate and embarrass the United States.

Our knowledge of the Soviet Union indicates that there is no Soviet timetable, master plan, or blueprint for expansion in Latin America. It would be more appropriate to say that the Soviet Union operates according to a set of goals and tactics designed to further its interests. The goals include expanding Soviet influence and prestige at the expense of the United States, and strengthening the Soviet military apparatus. The tactics are to take advantage of opportunities as they present themselves, and even to hurry them along if possible. This means that Soviet foreign policy in the Third World is driven more by specific conditions in developing nations than by a master plan. The Grenada documents seem to confirm this.

During the Khrushchev era, the Soviet Union significantly expanded its relations with the Third World left, but early tactics were not altogether successful. Military agreements did not greatly affect long-term relationships; few staunch allies were gained; and setbacks such as the loss of Sadat's Egypt produced growing disillusionment with the Third World. During the late 1960's and early 1970's, there was a retreat from some commitments to developing nations. But the Soviets have recently reassessed their policies. When Nicaragua (rather like Cuba in the early 1960's) unexpectedly gravitated to the Soviet camp, it became obvious that important gains could be made with relatively few commitments. Soviet strategy began to focus on long-term revolutionary possibilities, and this meant that assistance would be given to

broad-based popular-front and anti-imperialist foces, not just national liberation movements. At the same time, certain "quality controls" were built into this newly flexible Soviet strategy which did not exist during the 1950's and 1960's. These included greater selectivity in determining the reliability of the client; greater involvement in the internal affairs of client states; and increased involvement by Soviet allies (especially the Cubans and East Germans) to help consolidate and otherwise aid client regimes.

The Grenada documents, however, show that the Soviets appeared to keep a certain distance from the Grenadian revolution and the New Jewel Movement (NJM). The NJM was considered a "fraternal party," but it was not treated on the same level as other communist parties. The Soviets were of course supportive of the Grenadian revolution, but apparently there was no "micro-managing" of Grenadian affairs as in Afghanistan. The Grenada documents also show that the Soviets wanted the Grenadians to serve as intermediaries to other English-speaking groups in the Caribbean and to bring another country into the communist fold, either Suriname or Belize. The documents further show that Soviet strategists thought of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada as firmly ensconced in the Soviet camp, with El Salvador to be the next battleground. But the Soviets did not press too hard; the Grenadian documents seem to indicate a certain Soviet skepticism as to just how stable and trustworthy their client was.

Soviet ties to Grenada were largely through Cuba, but the Grenada documents do not indicate to what degree there was central control from Moscow as opposed to Cuban freedom of action. It appears that ultimate authority was lodged in Moscow, but that Cuba had considerable leeway. The Cubans were involved in all aspects of the Grenadian revolution. They served as intermediaries between Grenada, the Soviet Union, and Nicaragua, and Cuban officials sometimes sat in on the meetings of the Grenadian Central Committee and Politburo. One gets the impression from the Grenada documents that the Grenadians did practically nothing without first consulting the Cubans.

The Grenada documents show that the revolution was much more planned, sophisticated, serious, and Marxist-Leninist than was generally thought. Equally impressive was the degree of coordination between Grenada and its communist allies. The division of labor among the communist nations aiding Grenada was as follows: the Soviet Union (and Cuba) provided overall guidance and direction; the East Germans were involved in security and police training; and Cuba also provided training, construction crews, and technicians. The documents also reveal the degree to which Grenada and its allies made strenuous efforts to manipulate the Socialist International—to turn it into an anti-American organ, and to use it to gain support and legitimacy for the revolution. Likewise, efforts were made to influence domestic opinion in the United States and Canada.

The impact of the U.S. intervention in Grenada was felt most clearly in Suriname. Only hours after the invasion, the Cuban ambassador and most of his staff were asked to leave the country. In fact, the decision to reduce the Cuban presence in Suriname was made before the U.S. intervention. Suriname had become increasingly resentful of what was considered Cuban interference in its internal affairs, and efforts were being made to improve relations with the United States. The Grenadian intervention was not solely responsible for the

reduction of Cuban influence in Suriname, but it certainly speeded the process.

The impact of the Grenada intervention was also felt by the guerrillas in El Salvador. In general, the U.S. action was seen as a blow to revolutionary hopes and aspirations throughout the hemisphere. For the Salvadoran guerrillas it meant that the United States was willing to use force to prevent their coming to power. According to U.S. intelligence officials, the guerrillas concluded that either pressures should be increased for a negotiated settlement, or a fall Tet-like offensive should be launched to affect U.S. election results. The Cuban (and hence Soviet) role in the formulation of these plans is unmistakable. High Cuban officials have publicly set forth the logic for both of these strategies.

The most noticeable effects of the Grenada intervention were felt in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas were convinced that they were next to be invaded, and Reagan administration officials were deliberately vague when asked about the possibility of an invasion. The Soviets and Cubans added to Sandinista fears by making clear that Nicaragua could not count on military assistance in the event of an invasion. Nicaragua's fears of impending disaster eventually gave way to more reasoned assessments and increased military preparations, but the threat still remained and this has given the United States an immense amount of leverage in its relations with Managua.

It is not likely that the Grenada intervention was the watershed that some analysts have claimed. Nevertheless, the intervention has had significant long-term implications for guerrilla and revolutionary forces in Central America and the Caribbean Basin. Cuba has been forced to take stock of its activities in the region. Although there is much rhetorical flourish to the contrary, some reports indicate that Castro has realized socialism will not triumph anywhere else in Central America in the immediate future and that he has already begun to reduce his Central American and Caribbean commitments. If this is so, Castro may begin to look elsewhere to further the cause of "proletarian internationalism." There are also signs that the Soviet Union is reassessing its role in the region, and will look for opportunities elsewhere so as not to provoke the United States. The Grenada intervention may have been a victory for U.S. policy in the Caribbean and at least a temporary defeat for the Soviets, but it has not in any significant way reduced the overall reach of the Soviet Union, or its capacity to look for advantages in areas where the United States is less heavily committed.

GRENADA AND THE CARIBBEAN BASIN: MUTUAL LINKAGES AND INFLUENCES

Summary of paper by Anthony P. Maingot del Barco

The Grenada revolution and its demise create insights into the role of Marxism in the Caribbean Basin and, in turn, the political culture of the area. The term "role" implies that ideology can be used by both "true believers" as well as by those who merely use it instrumentally, thus it is important to differentiate between ideological "true believers" and "instrumentalists" in the Caribbean Basin.

In 1976 the Carter administration launched a diplomatic campaign, the intensity of which had not been seen since Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress." U.S. policy toward Latin America emphasized a lower military profile, negotiations for a Panama Canal treaty, numerous visits by U.S. emissaries, and a more conciliatory attitude towards Cuba. The broad context of Carter's foreign policy clearly indicated a shift in perspective about vital U.S. interests. Although the United States did not abandon concern for military security in the region (especially in light of Soviet naval activities), U.S. policy clearly became more political. The shift from military to political thinking in Washington began before the Carter administration took office and could be seen in the early 1970s, when the United States downplayed the significance of the radical threat to the region and emphasized the "opportunistic" nature of non-Marxist leftists in Latin America.

For example, in 1972 the Defense Intelligence Agency attached little significance to the Conference of Caribbean Revolutionary Groups held in Guyana. Similarly, although Guyana had declared itself to be a Marxist-Leninist state, in 1976 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs told a Congressional subcommittee that "an independent Guyana seeking its own path to social progress is no threat to this country." Administration officials began to develop an awareness of the selective radicalism of the non-Marxist left, but perhaps more importantly there was an increased understanding of the varieties of socialist posturing. According to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, the admiration for Cuba in the black English-speaking Caribbean stemmed from Cuba's participation in the anti-colonial and anti-white struggle in Southern Africa. In general, Cuba and the Soviet Union were not perceived as posing a major threat in the region.

The opportunistic aspects of certain self-proclaimed socialist states seemed to be widespread during the Carter Administration. Events in the Caribbean during the 1970s tended to indicate that constraints on further gains of Marxist-Leninist influence stemmed from problems of development. Washington trimmed its Caribbean policy accordingly, and Cuba's shift in focus from Latin America to Africa also contributed to the obvious lack of panic or hysteria in Washington's responses to radical developments in the hemisphere.

Throughout the Carter years, there were of course those who argued it

would be a mistake to underrate the political and ideological significance of Cuban activities in the region. For example, understanding the crucial importance of race in the Caribbean, the Cubans have taken full advantage of their policies in Southern Africa to increase their local popularity. Similarly, Cuba is represented almost exclusively by black diplomats in the Caribbean. The United States has also played the racial diplomatic game, but the Cubans have the advantage of being able to emphasize race and class at the same time. Issues of race and class are closely intertwined in the Caribbean, and such a strategy allows a fundamentally pragmatic approach to the political problems of the region.

Two major events in Central America in 1979 brought the foreign policy of the Carter administration into question. The first was the Grenada revolution of March 13, and the second was the fall of the Somoza dynasty four months later after a long and bloody armed uprising. In addition, in February 1980 a group of army sergeants brought parliamentary politics to an end in Suriname and began to make radical left statements. On March 13, 1980 Grenada celebrated the first anniversary of its revolution by hosting a meeting of Caribbean radicals, and during the summer Cuban fighter planes sank the Bahamian cutter *Flamingo*. In January 1981 the Reagan administration replaced Carter's policies with a much harder line toward Latin America; spheres of influence, geostrategic triangles and dominos became the operative concepts of U.S. foreign policy in the Caribbean.

It is fundamental for those who wish to understand contemporary relations between the United States and the English-speaking Caribbean to note the origins of ideological pluralism in the area. With the exception of Guyana, the political cultures of the British Caribbean colonies had already crystallized by the 1960s, when Marxism began to make its appearance and significant contacts were developed with the United States. These political cultures reflect advanced consumer societies with a long history of electoral politics which are more disposed to state-directed populism than people-oriented socialism. This has made Marxist objectives in the Caribbean far more difficult to achieve than those of the United States.

Guyanese politics moved steadily to the left during the 1960s, and in the early 1970s Guyana took the lead in initiating radical reforms in the Caribbean. Its 1971 nationalization of DEMBA (an important Bauxite company) contributed to legitimizing the idea of state ownership in the Caribbean. In 1975 the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties of Latin America and the Caribbean declared itself to be in favor of the so-called theory of "non-capitalist development," and by 1977 Guyana's economy was 80% state-controlled. An April 1977 meeting of one of Guyana's "vanguard" parties and other Marxist-Leninist groups in the region—which was heralded by Guyana as a "turning point in the struggle in the region"—seemed to interpret events in Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, and Guinea-Bissau as having changed the "correlation of forces" in the world. They were now in the transition from capitalism to socialism. Again, Guyana was the rallying point for the Marxists of the region. Even the Carter administration's view of radicalism in the area seemed to benefit Guyana.

Such a situation was well suited to the needs of the leaders of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) in Grenada. Guyana was utilized for the links it pro-

vided to the Caricom states, the non-aligned movement, the communist bloc, and Cuba.

Yet radical politics were on the wane elsewhere in the region. In Trinidad, for example, politics had already become a racial matter in which ideology played a minimal role. Marxist-Leninists had little electoral significance by 1966, but calls for socialist reform found their expression in an uprising of black youth in 1970—the so-called “Black Power” revolt. The term, however, is a misnomer. Undoubtedly, there were strong American-style Black Power influences, but in reality the movement reflected discontent in Trinidad’s Indian sugar-growing areas and seething anger among young unemployed urban blacks. This frustrated uprising was followed by an attempt by university students to create a Cuban-style guerrilla “foco,” which was defeated by 1973. By 1974 Trinidad was back to conservative politics as usual. Although Prime Minister Williams frequently used socialist rhetoric to his advantage, he read the conservative mood of his electorate well. He knew how to play the “radical” game, as indicated by his close relations with Venezuela and Cuba, but his domestic and foreign policies were consistently pragmatic and far from radical, as his response to the 1970 uprising makes clear. Perhaps the presence of a booming private sector and an active role for foreign capital is what sets Trinidad apart from the more radical regimes in Jamaica and Guyana.

Although Jamaica’s Michael Manley began his political career by leading the “moderate” trade union movement during the early 1950s, his policies and rhetoric have been anything but predictable. Under pressure from radical elements who showed increased electoral strength in the 1976 election, Manley began to radicalize his rhetoric, but continued to express more moderate sentiments as well. By 1978 Jamaican leaders had not defined the nature of the socialist system they were striving for, and it became increasingly clear that the majority of the electorate was in no mood for radical left experiments in “scientific socialism.” Jamaicans do not vote race as in Guyana, and hence widely different results are possible from one election to the next. This was the case in 1980 as the electorate turned away from radical politics and back to politics as usual. That Jamaican parliamentary politics survived the hectic period from 1976-77 is an accomplishment not to be minimized.

Neither the Cubans nor the Grenadians seemed to be put off by the often conflicting foreign policy statements of the leaders of Trinidad and Jamaica who sought to play their “radical cards” whenever it best suited their interests. This stems from Cuba’s policy of supporting friendly regimes no matter how they might be opposed by radical Marxist forces. Jamaica is no different from Spain, Peru or Mexico in this regard. In exchange for its support of these nations, Cuba benefits from their international prestige. The Cubans have learned that it pays to support friendly non-communist regimes rather than placing all their bets on small communist parties with little chance of coming to power.

It should be clear that Caribbean Marxism did not have its origins in the Grenada revolution. There is a long history of Marxist political organization in the Caribbean and the politicians of the region have long been adept at manipulating their rhetoric to obtain their objectives. Many of these leaders are either ex-Marxists or people well acquainted with Leninist tactics. Just as

some of these politicians play their radical cards to safeguard their position within pluralist parliamentary systems, the Grenadians did the opposite. They played their social democratic card in an attempt to consolidate their Leninist state. In this respect, the Socialist International was of fundamental importance to the NJM. Furthermore, while Grenada was clearly under pressure to act as an agent of socialist internationalism in the area, there can be little doubt of Grenada's eagerness to play that role. Everything indicated that the Soviets and Cubans encouraged the Grenadian leadership in that direction. From the start, Grenada's foreign policy was oriented towards "non-alignment," "anti-imperialism" (i.e., anti-Americanism), and "peaceful co-existence."

By 1979 the islands of the Eastern Caribbean had clearly joined the ideological fray. The 1979 "Memorandum on Economic Cooperation between Trinidad and Barbados" was obviously meant to counter the activities of the radicals in the area. In response, the July 1979 Declaration of St. Georges (Grenada) signed by the prime ministers of Grenada, Dominica and St. Lucia was supposed to signal a dramatic shift to the left in the Caribbean. In addition, St. Vincent was fully expected to join the radical alliance when it became independent; but St. Vincent's first election showed it was not yet ready for socialism. Moreover, the post-election uprising of Rastafarians and the quick dispatch of Barbadian police contingents indicated that there might not be many more Grenada-like surprises in the Eastern Caribbean. Dominica also began to moderate its rhetoric at about this time. The Grenada documents repeatedly mention a hardening of attitudes among the "reactionary" governments of the area.

In August 1981 Bishop told the Central Committee of NJM that "We have lost the propaganda fight on the regional front." He blamed this on U.S. efforts to isolate Grenada. Contacts with the area's radicals continued, and Grenada became a meeting place for radical groups that had little if any popular support at home. It is conceivable that the failure to make significant inroads in the Caribbean led the NJM to explore further contacts with the United States. Bishop himself toured the United States in 1982, but the more radical elements of the NJM viewed this as deviationism and passed a resolution calling for stringent Leninist measures in the leadership. By mid-1983 Bishop was doomed by the increasing radicalization of the NJM. In any case, the Marxist-Leninist experiment in Grenada had not advanced the cause of radicalism elsewhere in the Caribbean. As Bishop himself reminded his colleagues, "It was the Party and the Party alone that took power."

Radical movements in the Caribbean have been led by intellectuals with no mass base of support, and electoral results and polling data indicate that communism is not at all popular in the region. The initiatives of the radical left during the 1970s, including the Grenada experiment, have not been any more successful than the efforts of previous decades. Which then, is the correct U.S. foreign policy approach toward the Caribbean? The flexibility of the Carter administration or the hard line of the Reagan administration? It would appear that the English-speaking Caribbean has consolidated its political culture with a preference for parliamentary pluralism. This, and not any U.S. hard line, has been and is the best guarantor of democracy in the region. On the other hand, Grenada shows it is wise to take Leninists at face value. This

is especially important because parliamentary democracies are especially vulnerable to conspiratorial groups. It is also why the Reagan hard line can be useful at times.

GRENADA: LINKAGES AND IMPACT ON THE THIRD WORLD

Summary of paper by Colin Legum

Third World reactions to the military interventions in the Falkland Islands and Grenada were strikingly different, and offer us interesting insights as to Third World perceptions. The reaction to British intervention in the Falklands was overwhelmingly supportive. The notable dissenting voices were those who are normally expected to follow Moscow's lead, and those Latin American nations which identified with Argentina's case. The two most often cited reasons for this support were the Falkland Islanders' right to self-determination, and opposition to the use of armed force as a means of settling territorial disputes. The non-aligned movement apparently felt that Britain acted justly in defense of these principles.

In the case of Grenada, however, the reaction was almost exactly the opposite. The invasion of Grenada was overwhelmingly condemned, and the only nations to support the action were those which normally support U.S. policies, and the six East Caribbean nations that requested the American intervention. The reasons given for this opposition were quite varied. One of the most important was the very idea of a superpower using military force to "occupy" a small Third World nation. Many non-aligned leaders drew a parallel between their opposition to U.S. intervention in Grenada and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Another reason cited for Third World opposition to the invasion was that military intervention should not be used to deal with the domestic political crises of any nation. Those espousing this view voiced their support of regional rather than unilateral actions to deal with such crises. This approach carried the endorsement of all the nations of the Eastern Caribbean, except those which requested the invasion.

Other Third World nations made known their fears that supposed threats to U.S. security interests could be used as a pretext for American intervention elsewhere in the region. For example, President Forbes Burnham of Guyana, like many other non-aligned leaders, saw the Grenada intervention as falling into the pattern of past American interventions in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Chile. Similarly, there is a widespread belief in the Third World that, irrespective of the particular administration, Washington is obsessed about the real or imagined role of Cuba and the Soviet Union in supporting opposition

movements or governments in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin. The Third World reaction to Grenada shows that this perception almost automatically guarantees non-aligned support for Cuba in any situation where the declared goal of the United States is to counter Cuban-Soviet actions. Thus, Washington's claim (though well-substantiated) that the invasion of Grenada was undertaken in response to a legitimate request for help, was widely treated as simply a pretext for military intervention.

The leaders of the Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS) undoubtedly felt themselves to be severely threatened by events in Grenada, but their testimony has been heavily overshadowed by the popular Third World perception that the United States planned to use military force in Grenada regardless of whether it received a request for intervention or not. None of the evidence contained in the Grenada documents is likely to change either this view or any other Third World opinion regarding the Grenada intervention.

There are also more particular reasons why some Third World nations opposed the invasion of Grenada. Non-aligned nations are constantly wary of how the actions of the superpowers in one part of the world might affect developments in their own region. For example, the Grenadian intervention has increased fears among the African front-line states (Angola, Namibia and Mozambique, for example) that South Africa might use the Grenadian precedent to justify its invasion of their territories. This possibility seemed to be of particular concern to recently independent Zimbabwe.

Beyond the immediate debate over the rights and wrongs of the U.S. invasion of Grenada, the larger perennial question remains how to provide for the security of small and weak nations. The non-communist nations of Southeast Asia, for example, have joined in a regional security organization, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). But such organizations have so far met with little success due to a lack of political homogeneity in most regions. Therefore, for practical reasons, many small nations find it expedient to receive protection from a strong world or regional power. Undoubtedly, the best solution would be to encourage and support the establishment of balanced Regional Defense Forces, as is currently envisaged in the Eastern Caribbean. At the Commonwealth meeting in New Delhi in November 1983, sharp divisions of opinion over the Grenadian intervention were bridged by an agreement that the Commonwealth should assist the OECS in setting up its own regional security system. But when small nations cannot cope with crises that threaten their survival, it is preferable that they should (for reasons of military utility) be reinforced by a single power, perhaps with some form of window dressing by regional contingents. After all, Grenada "worked."

THE GRENADA OPERATION AND SUPERPOWER RELATIONS: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE PENTAGON

Summary of paper by Dov Zakheim

Analysts of the Soviet Union who attempt to evaluate present Soviet motivations have little to go on in the way of hard documentation. Soviet society is probably more closed today than during the 1930s, and recent changes in the Soviet leadership have served to make middle-level bureaucrats extremely cautious in voicing their views. Nevertheless, one cannot proceed with the analysis of superpower relations without speculating as to Soviet motivations and perceptions. Otherwise, one is left with only the official statements, and the imbalance that arises between a West that speaks with many voices and a Soviet Union that speaks with one.

To examine the impact of the American invasion of Grenada on superpower relations is to presume that Grenada was important to the Soviet Union. Grenada's value to the Soviet Union was a function of geopolitical considerations, actions taken by the Grenadian leadership to move Grenada into the Soviet bloc, and Moscow's support of Grenada in the brief period from 1980-1983 when Moscow responded to the New Jewel Movement's enthusiastic embrace of Leninism.

There are at least three different views of the motivations that propel Soviet international behavior. One view holds that the Soviet Union is prompted by an expansionist ideology that aims at world conquest. The main variant of this view holds that Soviet foreign policy seeks to seize on opportunities as they present themselves, but is still bent on global domination. A second view asserts that while communist ideology sets the USSR apart from other nations, the Soviet Union can be expected to act like all other nations—i.e., it will act in its own best interests. Finally, it has been argued that ideology might not be the prime motivating factor in Soviet foreign policy, but it fits neatly into historic expansionist impulses that can be traced to the Russian Empire.

To those who view the Soviet Union as just another state with a different form of government, the Grenada operation was as much a sideshow of U.S.-Soviet relations as it was of Soviet involvement in the first place. It was "opportune" for the Soviets to have a government in the Caribbean that considered itself a fraternal socialist state. It would have been just as opportune if that government had been located elsewhere. According to this view, the invasion of Grenada made little difference in the long run. But if one assumes a more aggressive and expansionist thrust to Soviet foreign policy, Grenada's importance to the Soviets becomes evident. Grenada was a promising development for the ideologues in the Kremlin, and there is no evidence that this trend has died out over the years. Grenada became a showpiece example of the worldwide expansion of Marxism-Leninism. Moreover, whatever the motivations of the leaders of the New Jewel Movement (NJM), there can be no denying the degree to which they absorbed the political lexicon, culture and structural norms of Marxism-Leninism. Their behavior reflected an almost

slavish mimicry of the Soviet Union.

Grenada was not only a boon to the ideologues; it was also important to those who practiced realpolitik because of its geostrategic dimensions. Grenada was one of the factors in what Brezhnev constantly referred to as the "correlation of forces" in the world—that great balance sheet that assesses the relative standing of the two superpowers. More importantly, Grenada represented another successful effort to find holes in the Monroe Doctrine, an objective articulated by Khrushchev in his memoirs. The Grenada experience also represented a break with British parliamentary traditions in the Caribbean. It embodied a clear reversion from democratic institutions to Marxist-Leninist ones. In addition, Grenada was of potential military utility to the Soviet Union. It complicated the efforts of American military planners, who had to allow for the possibility that the island could become a base for Soviet long-range bombers or reconnaissance aircraft, etc. It mattered little whether the airport at Point Salines would be used primarily as a tourist facility, as the NJM claimed. It was the potential that the airport offered to the Soviets that worried American analysts.

Grenada was thus a useful asset to the Soviet Union, and consequently its loss must have been viewed by Soviet policymakers as a blow to efforts aimed at the expansion of its foothold in the Western hemisphere. The invasion also resulted in several blows to the "progressive forces" of the region. Most noticeable in this regard were the expulsion of Cuban advisors from Suriname, and Castro's admission of his inability to come to the aid of revolutionary regimes in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is also arguable that the Grenada operation signaled an even greater blow to the Soviet Union in terms of its long-term relationship with the United States.

The Grenada operation was exceedingly popular in the United States, and as such, it may have signaled a major movement towards recovery from the Vietnam syndrome. Steps had already been taken in this direction as evidenced by the strengthening of America's military establishment, the downing of two Libyan aircraft on August 19, 1981, and the willingness to deploy U.S. forces in support of foreign nations such as Lebanon and the Sudan. The Grenada operation went further, however. It was not only a rescue mission, but a decisive use of U.S. military capabilities in support of U.S. interests. Furthermore, the operation had important military implications. Though undemanding compared to the types of opposition that might be expected in conflicts in Southwest Asia or Europe, the invasion of Grenada nevertheless imposed a variety of demands on U.S. forces that were carried out with considerable efficiency. Moreover, the cumulative impact of the Grenada operation on America's self-image should not be underestimated. It represented a clearcut military success that increased national self-confidence, and restored the United States to its role as a vigorous leader of the Free World. More than any other action since 1980, the invasion lent substance to the assertion that the United States would refuse to countenance acts of aggression, whether large or small, against American interests.

The 1970s witnessed a remarkable expansion of both the capabilities and uses of Soviet military power. The Soviet Union completed a major modernization of its forces (both nuclear and conventional) that enabled it to undertake new missions in the Third World, such as the airlift of Cuban forces to

Angola in 1975, and a larger airlift during the 1977-78 Ethiopia-Somalia war. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 displayed an even greater capability to project Soviet power. But the Soviet Union has scored no new gains since 1980. In the final analysis, this turn of events must be due as much to the changing nature of American diplomacy as to leadership changes in the Kremlin. The relations of the superpowers form a seamless web. Both watch each other's moves closely to assess the impact of the other's actions on superpower relations and the international balance of power. Considering the problems the Soviet Union faces at home and among its allies, the resurgence of the United States can only prompt an agonizing reappraisal of its own foreign policy. This reappraisal will certainly be influenced by an increasingly powerful Soviet military that is reputed to be a force for conservatism.

The United States did not escape criticism for its invasion of Grenada, but this criticism was far less harsh than some would like to believe. Yet the gains that democracy made in Grenada will not be preserved without a struggle. The liberation of Grenada was political, not economic. Unemployment is rampant, and as long as it remains high, agitators will find ready listeners. Grenada will continue to need economic assistance which is both specific to its particular needs and within the more general context of the Caribbean Basin Initiative. The military campaign of October 1983 was the initial blow in favor of democracy in Grenada. An economic campaign is the only way to preserve the gains that have thus far been made.

THE GRENADA OPERATION AND SUPERPOWER RELATIONS: A VIEW FROM THE IVORY TOWER

Summary of paper by George Liska

This paper starts from the assumption that all major powers have forcefully intervened at one time or another in their own sphere of influence to prevent damage to their national interests. All disclaimers to the contrary, intervention is almost as much an inalienable right as a practice in international relations. The debates surrounding the U.S. invasion of Grenada and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan raise the issue of whether the mode and scope of these interventions were commensurate with the provocations that sparked them. To apply the principle of proportionality to one's perception of these interventions, one must balance the intervening power's right of intervention with its duty to exercise restraint.

It is commonly accepted that a regional power's right of intervention is

most justified if an outside power fosters or exploits a local disturbance in the sphere of influence of the regional power. It is also self-evident that such outside interference is not justified if the regional power has refrained from intervention in the external power's sphere of influence. Finally, when interference is reciprocal, one power's right to intervene in its sphere of influence is certainly not nullified. Strategy is not governed by abstract symmetries. However, it might be said that the outside power has a certain "right" to get involved in the regional power's sphere as part of a bargaining process over the rules of reciprocal intervention and non-intervention. In other words, to what extent do past and present U.S. interference in the Soviet sphere of influence "justify" Soviet-Cuban interference in the Western hemisphere? The following discussion of land-based powers (read, the Soviet Union) and maritime-mercantile powers (read, the United States) will hopefully illuminate this question.

Historically, prominent land-based powers will invariably seek access to warm water ports in pursuit of military and economic security. Conversely, the dominant power in the international system, which is usually a maritime-mercantile power, will invariably oppose this push in the interest of preserving its superiority. The two kinds of powers have always found it difficult to agree on a balance of power that would afford each an equal measure of military and economic security. Often, ideological factors are injected into this competition for influence which is carried out in third nations (read, the Third World). Unfortunately, these ideological variables impede prudent "realpolitik" considerations to the detriment of each power. In the final analysis, the level of the threat imposed by each power on its rival is dependent on the degree of effectiveness and autonomy of lesser regional powers (such as Cuba) that serve as great power surrogates.

When these principles are applied to events in Grenada, it is still possible to find that the U.S. was entitled to resist Soviet/Cuban involvement in the Caribbean by invading Grenada. But this entitlement is qualified by prior and simultaneous U.S. interference in Soviet spheres of influence, such as in Central Europe and Southwest Asia. This interference creates an incentive, and perhaps a "right", for the Soviets to look for opportunities in areas of U.S. concern that might be used as levers to constrain such interference. U.S. involvement on the Eurasian continent has stimulated the Soviet urge to seek overseas influence as part of a strategy to equalize the status and security of the United States and the Soviet Union. Ideological categories aside, this "urge" can be explained with reference to the Soviet Union as the preeminent land-based military power, and the United States as the preeminent industrial-trading power.

Far-reaching social upheavals can sometimes cause Third World nations to assert latent "statist" values (such as independence) over "societal" factors (e.g., cultural patterns). This can result in the realignment of some Third World nations away from the dominant regional power toward the extra-regional power. Often the external regional power is involved in fomenting the social upheaval that leads to such changes. Such is clearly the case concerning Soviet actions in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin. Major realignments are rather rare, however, as indicated by the time that has elapsed from the Cuban revolution to the recent events in Nicaragua and Grenada.

The above analysis defers to authoritative assurances that Central America and the Caribbean Basin are areas that are strategically sensitive to the United States and potentially vulnerable to Soviet strategic designs. It follows that unqualified U.S. control over these areas is essential for safeguarding vital American interests. The current alarm over Soviet penetration into America's back yard through Cuban-inspired revolution is reminiscent of earlier American anxieties concerning foreign intervention into the Western hemisphere. One of the main reasons for the present administration's overemphasis on the Soviet threat to the Western hemisphere is the apparent willingness of the U.S. to play the role of a regional policeman in the region. In the wake of the previous administration's retreat from global commitments, the United States has reasserted its interests in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin at the expense of the Soviet Union, and its regional surrogate, Cuba.

U.S. policy toward Grenada, Nicaragua, and El Salvador is conditioned on whether one views regional issues in a "globalist" East-West perspective, or in terms of local social and economic issues. The global objectives of the Soviet Union are defined by Soviet bids for both tactical and strategic power. Tactical considerations are important because even limited regional gains significantly enhance Soviet power and prestige. Such tactical expansions of power are facilitated by the co-option of client-states into shared revolutionary enterprises. Strategic considerations, on the other hand, are concerned primarily with the achievement of global parity.

Given Soviet global objectives, and efforts by the U.S. to oppose the global Soviet push, the only way for the superpowers to reduce bilateral tensions is to exercise mutual restraint in each other's primary sphere of influence. It should be emphasized, however, that efforts to combine mutual self-restraint with "sharing arrangements" for access to all regions necessitates a bargaining process to determine various "vital" and "non-vital" geopolitical interests. For example, the Soviet Union will not exercise self-restraint in exchange for Western-supplied material or technological benefits. A different type of bargaining is necessary. Each superpower must ease its attempts to outflank the other and to create major bases of influence in the other's primary sphere of influence. Such was the Soviet attempt to use Grenada in order to extend Soviet influence in the Caribbean, and such is the U.S. attempt to contain Soviet power in the Far East by creating close links to the People's Republic of China. For the superpowers to reduce bilateral tensions and the level of interference in each other's primary sphere of influence, adjustments will be necessary in U.S. policy toward Poland and Afghanistan, and Soviet policy toward Latin American and the Caribbean.

In the final analysis, it is a matter of speculation as to whether concessions to Soviet interests or opposition to Soviet ambitions will facilitate the moderation of Soviet foreign policy objectives. Nevertheless, there may be room for an intermediate approach. This would entail extending the strategy of "differentiation" to the entire Third World, including the Western hemisphere. As the United States differentiates its policies toward Eastern Europe according to their behavior, so we might extend this strategy to Third World regimes everywhere. Such an approach might serve to exploit the differences between the Soviet Union and its local proxies.

BISHOP'S CUBA, CASTRO'S GRENADA: NOTES TOWARD AN INNER HISTORY

Summary of paper by Marc Falcoff

The Grenada documents are one of the most important scholarly resources since World War II for both Soviet and Cuban specialists. They are invaluable to an understanding of Cuba's role in the Caribbean Basin and Grenada. It is important that we fully understand this role, for the Grenada experience represents a watershed in Cuban foreign policy which is bound to affect the political and strategic environment in the region for some years to come.

Since 1959 Cuban foreign policy in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin has shifted several times. At first, the Castro regime sought to export its own model of revolution, the centerpiece of which was protracted guerrilla warfare indiscriminantly directed against almost all Latin American governments, whether dictatorships or democracies. This effort, however, did not include the English-speaking Caribbean. After several failures, including a particularly grievous setback in Bolivia, Cuba redirected its energies to other continents, and sought normal state-to-state relations with the governments it had previously sought to overthrow. Cuban foreign policy became more flexible in the 1970s as Havana directed its revolutionary efforts at various targets of opportunity, whether in Africa, the Near East, or the Caribbean itself. By the end of the decade, Castro was willing to lend support to any political force which could be described as anti-American and capable of seizing and holding power.

Without these changes in Cuban foreign policy, it is unlikely that the relationship between Cuba and Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement (NJM) would have been so close. Far from following the proven Cuban formula, the NJM seized power through the time-honored method of the Latin American right—the coup d'état, the first in West Indian history. Moreover, although the NJM self-consciously attempted to turn Grenada into a Cuban-style socialist society, it was far less successful in this regard than might be imagined. Indeed, the Grenada documents strongly suggest that the Grenadian revolution was largely political rather than social, and was confined to the comings and goings of a few party officials and the ethereal world of international relations.

The centrality of Cuba to the Grenadian revolution is now a matter of abundant record. In Grenada, as in Guyana, Suriname, and Jamaica under Michael Manley, the Cuban presence was most immediately visible in the economic sphere. Cuban economic aid took the form of outright donations of equipment and construction materials, and skilled construction workers and some technical assistance was also provided. Cuban aid programs were directed at agriculture, education and health projects, and the largest focus was at the Port Salines airport complex. The ostensible purpose of this facility was to increase tourism, but the high priority that the Cubans assigned to its completion suggests something more.

Cuba's economic ties with Grenada were essentially similar to the links Castro maintained with other Caribbean governments that by no means could be considered Marxist-Leninist. But the similarities end there. The Cubans were active in encouraging and assisting the NJM to achieve the subordination of all elements of society to the purposes of the state. The NJM seriously studied the possibility of a version of Cuba's Labor Army for their system of National Service. In the military sphere, the Cubans agreed to maintain military advisors in Grenada, and they granted scholarships to Grenadian soldiers and officers, and assisted the Bishop government in its efforts to counteract the opposition of the Grenadian church.

Cuba's economic and political assistance to Grenada was significant, but Castro's most important contribution to the NJM was in the international sphere. Cuban officials acted as "guides" to the labyrinth of world politics, instructing Grenadian diplomats at every turn about their relations with other socialist nations, the Socialist International, and even the United States. Cuba also served as an international conduit through which the Soviet Union and its East European allies could funnel both economic and military aid. This was largely due to the fact that Havana's port and storage facilities were far superior to anything in Grenada itself, but in all probability, the Soviet Union relied on Cuba's infrastructure because it wished to maintain a low profile in the region. According to the Grenadian ambassador in Moscow, the Caribbean is a region where the Soviet Union is interested in reducing areas of conflict with the United States.

The Cubans also became the most important source of guidance for the NJM in its relations with the Soviet Union. This was true of matters both large and small. For example when Bishop decided to send a delegation to Moscow to request additional military assistance, he first sent the delegation leader (and the Cuban military attaché) to Havana. Most importantly, however, the Cubans acted as the NJM's advocate in Moscow. According to the Grenadian ambassador in Moscow, although the Soviets were cautious in making commitments to the NJM, they had only responded as far as they had "because Cuba had strongly championed our case." It would appear that the Soviets regarded Grenada as Cuba's "project," to which they would lend assistance pending additional evidence of the NJM's stability, its immunity from U.S. intervention, and the durability of its professed pro-Soviet orientation. In other words, Grenada's relationship with Cuba was roughly similar to Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union. This suggests a kind of subcontracting of Soviet influence in certain areas where Moscow lacks experience and geographical proximity, but possesses a reliable surrogate. This allows the Soviets to explore the possibilities for expanded influence without risking embarrassing setbacks such as the ones that occurred in Egypt, Somalia, Ghana, and Peru.

As a result of the invasion of Grenada, it seems unlikely that Cuba will again support a revolutionary regime so unreservedly merely on the basis of a personal friendship with its leader. Furthermore, the invasion has forced Cuba to revise its views on the political feasibility of U.S. military intervention in the region. This will have serious implications for Cuban foreign policy, and may well presage a long period of neglect for the Eastern Caribbean as Havana rededicates its efforts toward El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Sanda-

nista regime in Nicaragua. Most importantly, Castro's capacity to gain Soviet aid for Cuba's allies may have been seriously damaged. In the wake of Grenada, Soviet decisionmakers may well be inclined to rethink the reliability of Cuban intelligence capabilities and the perspicacity of the Cuban leadership.

FRATERNAL ASSISTANCE: EASTERN EUROPE IN GRENADA

Summary of paper by Charles Gati

The Grenada documents captured by U.S. forces during the October 1983 intervention provide us with important insights into Soviet-East European relations and the scope of East European involvement in the attempted Sovietization of Grenada.

Aside from from insignificant trade activities, East European involvement in the Third World began with the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms agreement of 1955. Clearly, the deal marked the beginning of East European support for the Soviet Union's strategic objectives in the Third World. Since those meager beginnings in 1955, Czechoslovak and Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) involvement in the southern hemisphere has grown significantly. No longer merely focusing on Egypt, Iran, Iraq, India and Indonesia (the Third World nations considered to be of primary importance to the Soviet Union during the 1950s), Moscow and its allies have established diplomatic ties, expanded commercial links, offered military assistance, and maintained a presence in dozens of Asian, African, and Latin America nations. Leaving aside the special case of Romania, Moscow's allies have helped in the implementation of Soviet objectives in the Third World while concurrently seeking economic gain for themselves. Generally short of raw materials and eager to reduce their dependence on Soviet energy, the East Europeans found certain Third World nations to be ideal trading partners.

Yet the evolving pattern of East European-Third World trade clearly reflects political preferences as well as a measure of coordination within the Warsaw Pact. The sudden expansion of East European activity with Mozambique, Angola and Nicaragua in the 1970s was certainly not accidental. That it occurred at Moscow's request or insistence is beyond doubt. Nevertheless, it would be an oversimplification to argue that the East Europeans have no room for maneuvering or that Soviet decisionmakers always demanded unconditional collaboration from their allies. An "unwritten law" presumably contains the understanding that East Europeans have freedom of action to pursue their own interests in the Third World to the extent that such freedom serves, or at any rate does not interfere with, Soviet national interests.

Accordingly, the communist nations of Eastern Europe have been guided by several often conflicting considerations in their involvements with the Third World. They have sought to satisfy Soviet foreign policy interests, assure economic advantage for themselves, and act in such a way as to signal a measure of independence from Moscow in order to keep their economic connections to the West intact. At the same time, the East Europeans have sought to keep their commitments modest because of pressing economic problems and public opposition to most Third World assistance programs. The result of these conflicting considerations is that East European involvement in the Third World is very differentiated, ranging from Czechoslovakia's and East Germany's overt activism to the largely symbolic activities of Hungary and Poland. Except for Romania, each nation has assisted or trained radical forces in the Third World, and each (including Hungary and Poland) has sold military equipment to developing nations. But the scope and range of this involvement has been greatly varied. East Germany has long specialized in the establishment of little "Red Gestapos", i.e., political police and intelligence forces, and Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria have long been major arms suppliers to the Third World and various terrorist organizations. Hungary and Poland have also trained PLO forces and perhaps other terrorist organizations, but their Third World assistance programs have stressed mostly trade and technical aid.

The Grenada documents show that East European assistance to the New Jewel Movement (NJM) reflected past patterns. The documents indicate that members of the WTO—most notably Czechoslovakia and East Germany—concluded a variety of formal agreements with the NJM. There is evidence of a military accord with Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, and Czechoslovak arms shipments through Cuba. Czechoslovakia also assisted in the formulation of plans for Grenada's economic development. Furthermore, the documents show considerable involvement by the DDR as well. The East Germans were active in party, trade union and youth organizations, and provided equipment and training for the Grenadian internal security forces. All three of these nations were involved in some form of exchange program with the Grenadians. No evidence is found in the Grenada documents of Hungarian or Polish ties to the NJM. Both nations limited their support of Grenada to expressions of solidarity with the "struggling masses" of Grenada.

It seems that Grenada was primarily a Soviet-Cuban operation to which Czechoslovakia and East Germany made a contribution. The Grenada documents leave no doubt as to Soviet and Cuban desires to exploit the opportunities offered by the Grenadian revolution and to turn this tiny island nation into a Leninist state. Indeed, much of the aid the Soviets supplied to Grenada was aimed at supporting the emerging ruling class. To this end, the Soviets supplied weapons, propaganda machinery, an airplane, and even cars for the use of the NJM leadership.

There is more to be learned about Soviet-East European relations from what the Grenada documents do not contain, rather than what they reveal. Most notably, in none of the Grenada documents is there any indication of Soviet coordination with Eastern Europe. The strategic role of Cuba as a Soviet surrogate and a conduit for arms transfers is clear. But if Moscow agreed on any sort of division of labor with its East European allies, it is neither stipulated

nor implied in the Grenada documents. The absence of more East European support for Grenada should not be surprising. The fact of the matter is that regardless of the particular views they held regarding Grenada, most East European states still regard themselves as minor players in the East-West conflict outside the European theater. As most are weak politically, economically, or both, their primary motivations are with their own political survival. Unlike the Soviet Union, they have never had global ambitions, and hence their foreign policy priorities have been different from Moscow's. Some have even flirted with attempts to revive European détente, implying that the tense state of U.S.-Soviet relations does not (or should not) necessarily apply to "East" and "West" in general. Interestingly, the Hungarians published an authoritative statement earlier this year upholding the right of Warsaw Treaty Organization nations to pursue their own national interests, at times even at the expense of their international obligations.

The manner in which each East European state interprets the relationship between its national interests and international obligations is the key to understanding its foreign policy. Thus it appears that Czechoslovakia, living in self-imposed isolation from the West, has the most to gain from supporting distant Soviet causes in the hope of gaining favor with the Soviet Union. The DDR, whose population is most exposed to Western information and values, seems to have drawn back from its role in the 1970s as one of Moscow's main surrogates in the Third World. Bulgaria, which is one of the strongest supporters of "international fraternal assistance," lacks the resources to be of much use to the Soviet Union. Poland and especially Hungary, for their part, have done as little as possible without inviting Soviet criticism. Romania, it seems, stands in a category by itself. None of this is meant to imply, however, that the Soviets have "lost" Eastern Europe. It is rather meant to show that Eastern Europe has far more maneuvering room in its relations with Moscow than is commonly believed.

In the final analysis, the Grenada documents offer fresh evidence confirming the reluctance of most East European states (except Czechoslovakia) to support distant Soviet foreign policy objectives. These regimes are dependent on the Soviet Union, but their dependency does not translate into the obligation to support the USSR on all issues. Moreover, the reluctance of the Soviet Union to disturb the status quo in Eastern Europe provides Moscow's allies with significant freedom of action. The more that the Soviet Union is preoccupied with succession struggles, the more room Eastern Europe will have for maneuver. Likewise, the less important the issue, the more likely it is that the East Europeans will become significantly involved.

As early as 1949, U.S. policy has sought to encourage "national communism" in the Soviet bloc. Unable to free Eastern Europe from Soviet domination, the United States has sought to weaken the ties that bind the members of the Warsaw Pact. Without saying so explicitly, U.S. policy has attempted to drive a wedge between Moscow and its junior allies. The technique by which this objective has been pursued is called "differentiation." In essence, this is a policy of rewarding some communist states and punishing other according to their degree of domestic liberalization and the distance they maintain from the Soviet Union on foreign policy matters. To the extent that the Grenada documents confirm differences within the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the United

States should exploit such differences and compete for influence in Moscow's front yard.

LENINISM IN GRENADA

Summary of paper by Jiri and Virginia Valenta

The invasion of Grenada on October 26, 1983 focused attention on the problems of the Caribbean Basin. Some observers have argued that Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement (NJM) was a typical Third World radical regime; others emphasized the regime's Marxist-Leninist character. But by now it is difficult to deny either the NJM's attempts to create a Leninist state, or its extensive political, ideological, and above all military ties with the Soviet Union and Cuba. Regardless of one's opinion about the invasion, the documents captured on Grenada are a windfall for scholars in providing an unprecedented glimpse into the inner workings of an aspiring Third World Leninist regime and its relations with other communist nations.

Because of its miniscule size, Grenada could easily be taken over by a small but well-organized and disciplined force—which is precisely what happened on March 13, 1979, when the government of Prime Minister Eric Gairy was overthrown. Gairy became prime minister in 1967 when his United Labor Party came to power after Grenada was granted the right of internal self-government by the British. Once in power, however, Gairy resorted to political violence and intimidation. Some important socio-economic changes occurred under his regime, but eventually his oppressive rule antagonized most of his following. Worsening economic conditions set the stage for the popularly supported NJM takeover in 1979. The leftist New Jewel Movement had come into being in 1973, when two radical groups merged under the leadership of Maurice Bishop and adopted a socialist manifesto.

After Grenada was granted full independence in February 1975, the NJM concluded a tactical electoral coalition with two conservative groups. Dissatisfied with Gairy's presumed manipulation of the 1976 elections, the NJM organized trade unions, and some leaders began to push for the radicalization of the movement. Gairy's secret police forcibly suppressed strikes organized by the NJM, but a solid enough core of the party remained in 1979 to mount the successful takeover of the capital. The seizure of power was expertly planned and executed. Bishop was already a friend of Fidel Castro, and it is possible that the NJM revolutionaries were assisted or trained either by Cubans or Cuban-trained comrades from Guyana. Although the NJM had a radical economic program from the start, several factors contributed to the regime's further radicalization. One factor may have been a lack of tact on the part of some U.S. diplomats in dealing with the new Bishop government. Most im-

portantly, the pace and extent of socialist transformation was influenced by the radical wing of the NJM, led by Bernard Coard, which wished to turn the NJM into a Leninist vanguard party.

Grenada kept a mixed economy, but the state sector gradually became dominant as the government's central planning role increased in all sectors of the economy. The private sector was tolerated as long as it served the revolution. NJM efforts to improve living standards resulted in a substantially expanded public sector, which reduced unemployment from 40% under Gairy to 33% by 1982. There was also some drop in illiteracy. Rallies and marches were organized to increase labor productivity and awaken social consciousness, but these means of mass mobilization became unpopular as the revolution moved into its fifth year and economic conditions stagnated or worsened.

During the course of the revolution, the NJM was gradually transformed into a Leninist party that functioned through a Politburo and Central Committee. The impetus for this radicalization came from Coard and his followers, and ultimately resulted in a coup against Bishop in October 1983. Shortly after seizing power, Bishop replaced Grenada's constitution with a series of People's Laws, and in 1982 the NJM appointed a constitutional commission to create a "people's democracy constitution." To advance Grenada's political transformation, the NJM sought to build mass organizations (e.g., the National Youth Organization) modeled on those found in communist states. In this as in other matters, the NJM actively sought the help of foreign instructors in building itself into a vanguard party. As in other Leninist states, party members held the most important positions in both government and mass organizations. The obedience of the army was also ensured by party supervision. In addition, the NJM took control of the media, and its security forces, while preparing to fight external counterrevolutionaries, also engaged in harassing internal opponents. During Bishop's rule, an estimated 1,000 persons were detained at one time or another, most for political reasons.

The Bishop regime's interest in cultivating close ties with foreign communist states was fully reciprocated by the Soviet Union and Cuba. The Grenada documents show a gradual increase in both Soviet and Cuban involvement in Grenada's affairs. The Soviet Union's most important objective in the Caribbean Basin is political—namely to encourage and support anti-imperialist and anti-American forces. Moscow gives its fraternal support only to fully developed Leninist regimes like Cuba, or nations such as Nicaragua and Grenada that are progressing toward socialism. As early as 1981, the Soviet press spoke of Grenada's "progressive social transformation," but exercising their usual caution, Soviet leaders would not classify the NJM as a Leninist vanguard party. The NJM was informally considered a "fraternal" party, but was not treated on the same level as the Nicaraguan junta.

Formal relations between the NJM and the Soviet Union began when Coard travelled to the USSR in 1980 as the result of lobbying efforts by Cuba and Jamaica. The Soviets finally decided to make a formal commitment to Grenada in July 1982, when a secret agreement was consummated stating that the NJM and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) would cooperate in ways similar to those pursued by the Soviets in dealing with other socialist-oriented Third World nations. Ties among the Soviet Union, its allies and Grenada increased rapidly at this point, especially on a party-to-party basis. In

1983, the NJM concluded various new agreements with the Communist Party of Cuba, which provided for far closer and more regular ties than the NJM maintained with the CPSU.

The next most important Soviet objective in the Caribbean Basin is military. Moscow has sought to develop military ties with revolutionary regimes in the region to increase its military reach. Although the Soviets have proceeded very cautiously so as not to provoke the United States, they probably desire to secure access to additional facilities of the sort they now have in Cuba. The Grenada documents demonstrate that military aid actually preceded other ties with Grenada, and that this aid was gradually upgraded during the course of the revolution. The Soviets concluded three significant arms deals with Grenada "free of charge of delivery," which included the transfer of such weapons as armored personnel carriers, anti-tank guns, and rocket launchers. In accordance with these agreements, several Grenadian officers were sent to the Soviet Union for training. Military agreements were also concluded with Cuba and other communist nations, including Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Vietnam, and North Korea. Small numbers of military and other advisors were stationed in Grenada, with the Cuban contingent by far the largest by 1983. Arms transfers were scheduled through 1986, but when the United States arrived in October 1983, the weapons recovered were already sufficient to equip a force of about ten thousand.

By comparison, economic objectives play a relatively minor role in Soviet strategy in the Caribbean Basin. Soviet-Grenadian economic cooperation progressed between 1979 and 1983, but not nearly as rapidly as political or military cooperation. Grenadian officials frequently consulted with Soviet economic planners, and the Grenadians actively sought long-term markets in Soviet bloc nations. Interestingly, there is no evidence that the Soviets provided funding for the controversial Point Salines airport complex. Most of the funds for this project came from Libya, Cuba, Canada, Iraq, Syria, OPEC, and the European Economic Community. The Soviets provided some equipment free-of-charge, but none of this assistance was sufficient to have an effect on the troubled Grenadian economy.

It was against this backdrop of political uncertainty and economic hardship that high-level tensions surfaced in Grenada in September 1983. The Grenada documents suggest that in addition to Coard's personal ambitions, one of the reasons behind the leadership struggle was the generally shared feeling in the NJM Politburo that the revolution was failing due to an increasing lack of results, both at the mass and party level. On one level the Bishop-Coard struggle was a personality conflict, and on another, it was ideological. Coard and his radical followers were impatient with the pace of socialist transformation, whereas the Bishop minority was in favor of a more gradual approach. Coard accused Bishop of "right opportunism" and the inability to tighten Grenadian relations with the world socialist movement. The radical wing of the NJM passed a resolution that insisted, "based on the fundamental Leninist principles of democratic centralism" (i.e., subordination to the decisions of the party majority), the decisions of the Central Committee have the force of law. A plan to reorganize the party put forth by the Coard faction was designed to erode Bishop's power and clear the way for his eventual removal. When Bishop refused to go along with this plan, his opponents called for "cold-

bloodedness" and "Bolshevik staunchness," or what some called the "Afghan line." Bishop made a crucial tactical mistake by leaving the country (to visit Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Cuba, among others) in late September and early October when the party debate was at its height. On October 15 Bishop was expelled from the party and confined to house arrest.

The majority of the Central Committee had turned against Bishop, but the masses had not. On October 19—"Bloody Wednesday"—a mob of at least 10,000 people (about one-tenth of the entire population) liberated Bishop and made their way to Fort Rupert, where they would have access to radio equipment and arms. If the socialist transformation of 1979-1983 was a revolution from above, this appeared to be a revolution from below. Coard was faced with the prospect of a popular armed uprising, and in response he ordered the army to attack the fort with its Soviet-supplied armored personnel carriers. Bishop and his followers could have tried to defend themselves, but it appears that they lacked the heart for an all-out civil war. Many demonstrators were killed in the unresisted attack, and Bishop and some of his supporters were executed.

There is no clear evidence as to the extent of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the NJM power struggle. But it is likely that Soviet officials knew about the Bishop-Coard rivalry, and probably favored the anti-Bishop Leninist faction. The Soviets certainly made no effort to support him, and were probably suspicious of Bishop's attempts at rapprochement with the United States in June 1983. This was probably the turning point in Bishop's relations with Moscow. Bishop was extremely secretive about these meetings in the United States, and given traditional Soviet paranoia about the loyalty and orthodoxy of its allies, it is not surprising that the Soviet leadership lost confidence in Bishop. Furthermore, the Soviets usually prefer to deal with various cliques in a collective leadership, rather than with charismatic leaders. Whether or not the Soviets were actively involved in the anti-Bishop coup is a matter of speculation. Suffice it to say that unlike the Cubans, the Soviets did not eulogize Bishop after his downfall. By contrast, Castro tried to boost Bishop's prestige and morale shortly before the coup that deposed him. There was no sustained Cuban effort on Bishop's behalf, but as Bishop and Castro were friends there was at least a symbolic effort.

Castro's mistrust of Grenada's new leaders may have been one reason why Cuban military assistance was reduced after the coup. But another more compelling reason was the Cuban and Soviet awareness that a U.S. naval task force originally destined for Lebanon was moving toward Grenada. Castro sent 150 to 200 seasoned Cuban soldiers to command the symbolic resistance of the Cubans stationed in Grenada, but while it appears he fully expected an American invasion, he did not anticipate its exact timing. The Soviet response to the invasion was limited to displays of anti-American sentiment during the October Revolution anniversary parade in Moscow.

THE IMPACT OF THE GRENADA EVENTS ON THE SOVIET ALLIANCE SYSTEM

Summary of paper by Vernon Aspaturian

It is important to consider the impact of the Grenada events on the Soviet alliance system, here defined as the extended network of often uneven obligations that the Soviet Union has assumed or has contracted toward its allies, clients and friends. These obligations are not only military in nature; they are political, ideological, economic and diplomatic as well. Any forceful assertion or action by the United States that affects Soviet interests is bound to have an impact on the Soviet alliance system. It can be argued that the invasion of Grenada sent reverberations through the Soviet alliance system. Its impact was of course uneven, depending on the character and intensity of Soviet obligations towards its allies. Some were weakened; others were strengthened; and some were probably unaffected.

The intensity and juridical character of Soviet commitments to its allies varies considerably. Some Soviet obligations are taken contractually in the form of an official treaty. The best example of this type of obligation is the multilateral Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), but the WTO is supplemented by a series of bilateral alliances between the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe and other smaller communist states. Other Soviet commitments are essentially unilateral in character. Under the Brezhnev Doctrine, for example, the Soviet Union unilaterally reserves the right to come to the aid of communist nations which are threatened either internally or externally. A weaker form of unilateral commitment was announced in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan, whereby the Soviet Union reserves the right to come to the aid of any friendly Third World nation that requests assistance. However, it is more accurate to say this is an "option" for Soviet policymakers rather than a "commitment." The nature, intensity, and credibility of Soviet commitments vary in accordance with the status and character of the dependancy, its importance to Soviet interests, and the risks and benefits of fulfilling contractual obligations. The impact of the Grenada events should neither be under- or over- estimated, and should be viewed in the above context.

Grenada was not recognized by Moscow as a "socialist state" in the technical Soviet meaning of that phrase. It was not considered part of the Soviet community or alliance system. Thus the political, economic, ideological and military obligations that the Soviet Union has assumed toward its East European allies did not apply to Grenada. Furthermore, as the Grenadians repeatedly lamented, the Soviets were prepared to make commitments only to the extent of their capacity to fulfill and defend those commitments, and Grenada is only a small and distant country to the Soviet Union—an observation that applies to an entire class of Soviet dependents around the world. In light of this realization and the invasion of Grenada, several Soviet dependents are probably reassessing their relationship with the Soviet Union, especially those located in the Western hemisphere.

Grenada was not high on the list of Soviet priorities because of its rather in-

significant size, remote location, and vulnerability to "imperialism," i.e., to American power. But Grenada may have rated higher on the Soviet list of priorities than the Grenadians imagined because of its potentially strategic location. As the Grenadians realized that global and regional considerations are paramount in Soviet calculations, they were extremely eager to make themselves an important revolutionary force in the Caribbean to enhance their position in the Soviet scale of priorities. Grenada's ambitions became greater as the revolution progressed. One of the Grenada documents asserts that Grenada should become the mouthpiece for the entire universe of socialist-oriented nations in order to establish a higher priority for itself in the Soviet alliance system.

Soviet policy toward Grenada illuminates the relationships between the Soviet Union and an entire class of Soviet dependencies. Interestingly, the Grenada documents show that the Soviet Union rarely gives explicit instructions to its smaller Third World allies. The Soviets do not assign these nations explicit missions, but somehow they use their own ingenuity to discover what the Soviet Union has in mind for them. This was a practice that was first employed by Stalin in his dealings with his subordinates. Much of the time they were forced to interpret vague orders from above and assume the risks associated with failure while Stalin could always claim the credit for success. A similar relationship exists between the Soviet Union and its dependencies. To a certain extent, this also explains the activities of various East European nations in the Third World.

Aside from strategic considerations, the ideological character of the Grenadian regime had relevance for Soviet expectations and anticipated commitments to other socialist-oriented regimes, especially Nicaragua. By July 1983, according to Grenada's ambassador to Moscow, the Soviets already considered Grenada to be what will be called in this discussion a Type I "socialist-oriented" nation on the verge of becoming a Type II nation, i.e., one with a Leninist vanguard party. To become a Type II nation would have brought Grenada closer to becoming part of the "world socialist system" and presumably increase the Soviet commitment to Grenada, although Grenada would still likely rate relatively low in the hierarchy of socialist nations because of its size.

It should be noted that Soviet preoccupation with the ideological character of the NJM played an important role in triggering the factional conflict that led to the anti-Bishop coup that preceded the U.S. intervention of October 1983. In their zeal to meet the Soviet criteria of a "vanguard party," a majority of the NJM leadership voted to accelerate the revolutionary process, purge the party, and restructure it in accordance with Leninist principles. The relationship between the Soviet Union and Grenada on this score was an accurate reflection of Moscow's relations with other socialist-oriented nations deemed to be in a similar stage of development. This also highlights the fact that ideology is an important controlling mechanism used by the Soviet Union in its relations with Third World nations. By having custody of categories and reserving the right of authoritative analysis, the Soviet Union is in a position to shape the behavior of Third World radical parties that believe their development should follow Soviet patterns.

Cuba and Nicaragua have noted, both by word and by deed, that the Grenada precedent is too close for comfort for their tranquility. Although Cuba is considered to be part of the world socialist system, the Soviet Union has no

formal treaty to come to the defense of Cuba. Soviet commitments to Cuba and Nicaragua are unilaterally assumed, but whereas Cuba is presumably covered by the Brezhnev Doctrine, Nicaragua is at best covered only by the loose obligation to provide military assistance if requested. In any event, Moscow alone decides whether such obligations will be observed. In light of the Grenada events, neither Nicaragua nor Cuba can reasonably expect the Soviet Union to risk war with the United States in their defense. Moscow has carefully limited its explicit promises of military support only to those nations with which it has formal treaties. Everything else is assumed, implied, and inferred.

Apparently neither the Soviet Union, Cuba, nor Grenada believed until the last minute that the United States would invade Grenada. The Grenadians were encouraged in this view by repeated Soviet claims that the "correlation of forces" had shifted in favor of socialism. Undoubtedly, this view was partially the result of American non-intervention in the Nicaraguan and Iranian revolutions of 1979. In any case, the invasion of Grenada not only signaled an erosion of Soviet credibility in Latin America and the Caribbean; it also called into question the accuracy of Soviet assessments regarding the world military balance and the willingness of the United States to define its interests with force.

For Soviet decisionmakers, the invasion of Grenada has meant that the risks involved in the further expansion of the Soviet bloc have increased. Correspondingly, the intensity of an already weak Soviet commitment to socialist-oriented nations has diminished, and the attraction of such commitments for Third World leaders has also been reduced. The Grenada documents demonstrate that Moscow is very wary of making commitments to socialist-oriented nations which cannot be classified as Type II nations. This tendency will likely continue, for the Soviets have been "burnt" in Grenada (as they were in Egypt and Somalia), and they are apt to be even more careful in committing themselves in similar situations in the future. In this connection, it should be noted that reversibility of the historical process for socialist nations is not ruled out according to Soviet theory. This amounts to a form of ideological self-defense, since the Soviet Union wishes to preserve the precedent that no socialist state has ever been overthrown. Once the Soviet Union recognizes a Type II nation as authentically socialist, Moscow becomes committed to its survival. This is one of the major reasons why the Soviets are reluctant to grant Type II status to socialist-oriented nations.

In terms of specific Soviet commitments, one must assume that the Grenada events have served to weaken Soviet commitments to North Korea, Vietnam, and especially Cuba. As a rule, the Soviet Union is reluctant to provide ironclad military obligations to vulnerable, divided, and territorially distant states because it does not wish to be drawn into conflicts as the result of the adventurism of its allies. Most importantly, the invasion of Grenada arrested whatever movement there had been for increased Soviet commitments to the above nations. The ambiguity of the Soviet commitment to Cuba and its proximity to the United States will probably impel Castro to act more gingerly and prudently in his foreign relations. In general, nations that are part of the Soviet alliance system are at greater risk the greater their proximity to the United States. Thus, for both the Sandanistas and the rebels in El Salvador, the fun-

damental lesson of Grenada is that the most important restraint on the exercise of American power is not the Soviet Union, but rather the domestic politics of the United States.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND OPTIONS FOR COPING WITH SOVIET/CUBAN STRATEGY IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN

Summary of paper by Margaret Daly Hayes

The Grenada experience should be sobering to analysts of revolutionary situations such as those in Suriname, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Each of these nations has demonstrated fundamental political and economic weaknesses that facilitated takeovers by revolutionary elements. It is clearly in the interest of the United States to avoid future Grenadas in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin. Towards this end, the United States should actively support "stable, friendly, prosperous states that permit the free movement of goods and services throughout the region, that respect the political integrity of their neighbors, and that offer no support to the global political rivals of the United States." If the United States is to achieve these goals, it will have to become profoundly involved in the region, both economically and politically.

American interests in the Caribbean derive from the fact that U.S. security concerns are closely linked to regional stability. In addition, since the British departure from the region, the United States has been the nearest power with which the Caribbean states share some democratic and cultural traditions. The question is therefore not a matter of whether the United States should be involved in the Caribbean, but how it should be involved.

The problems of the Caribbean islands have to do with the scale of their economies and the political and social strength of their institutions. In economic terms, the region is plagued by the outmigration of some of its most qualified and productive workers and entrepreneurs. Problems of rising import costs (especially of oil) and declining prices for major exports have been exacerbated by economic mismanagement and corruption. Such problems were profound in certain nations, such as Jamaica during the 1970s. The lack of sufficient political will to find solutions to these problems has made them all the more difficult to solve, but there is still a great deal of unrealized economic potential in the region.

U.S. policymakers should realize that the political spectrum in Latin America and the Caribbean is quite varied. In Central America, most governments are weak and have no tradition of stability, organization or institutionalization. The tradition of parliamentarism is strong in the Commonwealth Caribbean,

yet political parties have not had a great deal of success in implementing far-reaching policies. Because of the ineffectualness of these governments, they have become increasingly vulnerable, and communist penetration of their institutions has increased over time.

One of the key frustrations of the present political situation in the Caribbean is the attractiveness that Marxism holds for young political leaders. For the long term, the only way to avoid future Grenadas is for the United States and its allies to work aggressively to accomplish the political, economic, and social development of the Caribbean so the Marxist model no longer holds significant appeal. It is more important that the people of the Caribbean do not become so dissatisfied with their governments that they are willing to accept the idea of armed revolution. Such goals can only be accomplished through long-term commitments of human and financial resources, but more importantly, they will not be accomplished unless the political leadership of the Caribbean becomes heavily involved in the process. Finally, it will be extremely difficult to implement such policies unless a sufficient degree of domestic support can be developed in favor of U.S. foreign policy objectives. Unfortunately, such support is not likely to be forthcoming until there is agreement on the nature of the Soviet threat facing the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin.

There is a tendency in the United States either to exaggerate or downplay Soviet intentions and activities in the Third World, especially in Latin America. In reality, the Soviet Union is not likely to establish itself in the Western hemisphere in any significantly threatening fashion in the foreseeable future. This would only provoke conflict with the United States, and furthermore, the Soviet Union does not need to "colonize" Latin American and the Caribbean to pose a global challenge to U.S. interests. The Soviets accomplish their foreign policy goals simply by supporting revolutionary movements or regimes which weaken U.S. influence. The real threat to the United States and the citizens of the Caribbean is the generalized destabilization that would result from upsetting the ideological status quo in the region.

It is wishful thinking to believe that the Soviet Union and its allies will forego any opportunities to influence events in Latin America and the Caribbean that are unfavorable to the United States. The Grenada documents suggest that the Soviets create and cultivate opportunities as much as they take advantage of opportunities offered by spontaneously occurring events. The instrument of this opportunism is Soviet ideology, and to counter this ideological threat, the United States must maintain better intelligence data on Latin America and the Caribbean, and indeed the entire world. This realization stems from the fact that the reduction of U.S. intelligence capabilities during the 1970s contributed to a series of diplomatic and political failures, most notably the successful challenge to the Somoza regime that began in 1978. American policymakers must also resolve to increase economic aid, and expand the diplomatic presence of the United States throughout the Caribbean.

The current economic situation in the Caribbean is characterized by severe balance of payments problems, heavy government debt problems, little real growth of GNP, decapitalization of human and financial resources, and a lack of investment. The United States must work to solve these problems both bilaterally and multilaterally, and efforts to stimulate economic development in the Caribbean should combine the energies of both government and private in-

stitutions. The American effort in this enterprise will of course have to be the greatest, for only the United States has any direct and immediate security interest in the region. Furthermore, only a significant U.S. presence in the Caribbean, both economic and political, is likely to encourage other donors and institutions to become involved in the region. In this regard, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) shows great promise for helping to alleviate the region's problems. It will be several years before we see significant results, but the investment incentive mechanisms and market opportunities created by the CBI will undoubtedly have a positive effect over the long term. As Edward Sagarin has noted, one simply cannot live next to the richest market in the world and remain poor.

Finally, the United States must realize that one of the most important keys to economic recovery in the Caribbean can be found in accelerated regional integration. Unfortunately, political differences, which have developed over the last several years as a result of the Nicaraguan and Grenadian revolutions, have nearly destroyed the once notable political integration of the English-speaking Caribbean. On a practical level, the United States should promote domestic security capabilities in the Caribbean, but equally important, it should assume the role of sponsor for promoting regional integration. Toward this end, the United States should use its newly asserted presence in the region to encourage an intra-regional dialogue on the economic and political problems of the region. The Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS), the Caribbean Common Market (Caricom), the World Bank's Caribbean Group, and the Contadora group all offer forums for such a dialogue. The commitment to this and other efforts designed to help the Caribbean must be long-term if they are to be successful.

NOTES ON GRENADA, SOVIET PROXIES AND U.S. POLICY

Summary of paper by Charles Fairbanks

When we ask ourselves how to improve relations with the Soviet Union, we tend to look for answers of a bilateral nature, with special emphasis on arms control talks. A more sophisticated view, however, sees formal negotiation as only a part of a continuum of diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union, many of which might not be readily observable. Moreover, the U.S.-Soviet relationship is not merely a matter of how the United States deals with the Soviet Union. Soviet behavior is also the result of the opportunities and limits faced by the Soviet Union throughout the world. Part of these opportunities and limits derive from American policy, but many other factors are involved as well. Just as American policy toward the Soviet Union is substantially

shaped by the objective situation the United States faces in Europe, the Near East and Central America, etc., so Soviet policy towards the United States arises in large measure from the same forces. In other words, Soviet conduct takes its character largely from U.S. foreign policy toward third parties. It is possible that U.S. policy toward third parties is in fact more important than bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations in determining Soviet behavior. Soviet officials emphasize, much more than their American counterparts, that objective conditions of this type, which they call the "correlation of forces" in the world, are an essential determinant of their policy.

In 1945 an enduring bipolar system emerged for the first time in world history. This shift from multipolarity to bipolarity fundamentally changed the conditions of postwar diplomacy. Major shifts in the relations of the great powers are much less likely than before 1945, and hence the U.S.-Soviet competition has largely become a matter of superpower maneuverings for influence in the Third World. This is precisely why tiny Grenada has significance for East-West relations. The developing nations are vitally important for structuring the foreign policies of the superpowers, but they are also the source of greatest danger in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Neither the right nor the left of the current foreign policy debate in the United States takes this into sufficient consideration. Conflict is most likely to arise where opportunities are great, risks are perceived to be small, and commitments are unclear. To a certain extent, détente stabilized the "central" (i.e., European) aspects of the U.S.-Soviet competition, but in other respects it cleared the way for continued conflict in the Third World.

Several characteristics of Third World politics facilitate the expansion of Soviet influence in the southern hemisphere. The first is the relative instability of most Third World nations. Internal instability generates opportunities for the Soviet Union to expand its influence, and the hallmark of Soviet foreign policy is its vigorous exploitation of opportunities. For example in Grenada, the emergence of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) and its eagerness to adopt Leninist ideals, was purely an indigenous development that owed very little to Cuban or Soviet encouragement. But once the NJM came to power in 1979, first Cuba and then the Soviet Union and its other allies moved in to exploit whatever opportunities they could. The Soviets also adeptly exploited the opportunities presented by the Ethiopian revolution during the late 1970s. The United States, on the other hand, did little to shape events in Grenada and the Horn of Africa during this period.

Second, the relatively small size of many developing nations creates opportunities for the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the Third World. It also makes it easier for nations like Cuba and South Yemen to influence events in the smaller states in their respective regions. Grenada again provides a striking example. With a population of about 100,000, it was fairly easy for a small group of revolutionary intellectuals to take control of Grenada, and then closely cooperate with the Cubans and Soviets, who seized on this opportunity to increase their influence in the Caribbean Basin.

Third, the expansion of Soviet influence is facilitated by the leftist or radical ideological bent of many Third World nations or groups. This was one of the real surprises of the Grenada experience. Most people who knew anything at all about Grenada or the NJM had regarded it, prior to the intervention, as a

leftist pro-Soviet regime, but not an avowedly communist one. But the Grenada documents reveal that the leaders of the NJM thought of themselves as serious communists, and the faction that took control just before the intervention considered itself to be truly Leninist in insisting on the further radicalization of the NJM.

Leninist ideology is a valuable and pragmatic instrument of Soviet foreign policy in the sense that it enables the Soviet Union to accomplish certain goals more easily than it could without the use of ideological tools. Communist ideology remains a powerful force for radical change in the Third World, despite its decreasing appeal in Europe. It is a powerful motivating force for those who are discontent with the status quo, and it offers important legitimizing and organizing principles for those rebelling against established authority. Once a ruling elite or revolutionary group adopts Leninist principles, an element of continuity and stability is achieved (through the use of totalitarian controls) that enables the Soviet Union to maintain and consolidate whatever gains have been made towards the achievement of Soviet goals. What the Soviets have gained through instability, they can also lose by instability, and Leninist political structures help to act as insurance against this possibility. Leninist ideology is not always successful in achieving this end, as shown by events in China, Albania, Yugoslavia and Somalia. But it is more useful than any substitute yet discovered for maintaining more or less direct control of distant nations.

Finally, Soviet expansion into the Third World is made easier by the extensive use of allies or proxies to achieve Soviet objectives where the Soviet Union does not wish to become directly involved. The term "proxy" is a useful one because it implies that the states in question are not necessarily controlled or guided by the Soviet Union. Rather the proxy's relationship is generally defined by nationalist motives which are also conducive to Soviet objectives. From their own point of view, Vietnam, South Yemen, and Ethiopia are not proxies. To the contrary, they are merely furthering their own objective with the assistance of the Soviet Union. Cuba is a slightly different case, however, because of the high degree of coordination between Cuba and the Soviet Union in most foreign policy matters.

U.S. policymakers are seriously concerned about the Soviet Union, but there is a tendency to regard the Soviets themselves as the greatest danger, while downplaying the dangers posed by Soviet proxies. This tendency is a serious mistake. Soviet proxies pose a threat to U.S. interests that we are only just beginning to understand. The reinforcing nature of the Soviet alliance system enables Moscow to maintain multiple channels of influence over certain nations. For example, the Grenada documents show that while Maurice Bishop and the NJM were particularly close to Cuba, the Coard faction had gained favor with the Soviet Union. Thus, whoever won the internal power struggle, the outcome would have been more or less acceptable to the Soviet Union. This would not have been the case if Cuba had been rigidly guided by the Soviet Union in its policy toward Grenada. A similar situation exists in Ethiopia, where the Cubans supply troops, and the Soviets supply arms and have insisted on the formation of a Communist Party of Ethiopia. If any of these channels of influence fail, others will remain and Soviet gains in Ethiopia will not be totally lost.

Though many of the activities of Soviet proxies are independent of direct Soviet control, efforts by the Soviet Union and its proxies reinforce one another. In essence, this constitutes a proxy system of many dimensions. One of the major advantages of this system is that most Soviet proxies are not understood to be clients of the Soviet Union by most members of the international community. Consequently, Soviet proxies can carry out actions against U.S. interests that the Soviet Union would never contemplate. Cuban troop deployments in Angola and Ethiopia and various terrorist activities are the most notable examples of this phenomenon. Proxies therefore increase the reach of the Soviet Union while they reduce the risks incurred by the USSR at the same time. The danger of course is that Soviet proxies might inadvertently draw the Soviet Union into direct conflict with the United States. This was avoided in Grenada by the reluctance of the Soviets to enter into formal obligations to the NJM. Accordingly, we can expect the Soviet Union to display similar caution toward its allies throughout the world, especially in Central America.

The proxy problem is above all a problem of how the United States handles Cuba and Libya, the two Soviet proxies that have assumed a global role for themselves. The previous administration did not regard these nations, and the proxy problem in general, with enough seriousness. But the Reagan administration has clearly demonstrated its willingness to take action against Soviet proxies, with special emphasis on those that pose the greatest threat to U.S. national interests—Cuba and Libya. The invasion of Grenada is the most notable example of this strategy, and the record suggests that a continuing and vigorous policy directed against Soviet proxies could have a substantial effect in limiting their activities.



Herbert J. Ellison, Constantine Menges, Sherman Blandin, and Richard Pipes



Alexander George, Virginia Valenta, Condi Rice, and Vernon Aspaturian



Winston Lord



Nestor Sanchez




Dov Zakheim, Jiri Valenta, George Liska, and W. Bruce Weinrod



George Thompson, Edward Rowny, and David Schrady



Richard Pipes




Gilbert A. Robinson



Vernon Walters



Jerry Hough, Robert Steele, and Edward Desmond



Charles H. Fairbanks, Alexander George, Jiri Valenta, Sally Shelton, and Margaret Daly Hayes



Howard Wiarda, Robert Wesson, Susan Purcell



Constantine Menges



Fred Shaheen



Herbert J. Ellison



Nestor Sanchez and Robert Steele



Jay Wilkins, Michael Massing, Bradford Johnson, and Jorge Dominguez



Howard Wiarda, Charles Maynes, Robin Kent, and Margaret Daly Hayes



Jiri Valenta



Tom J. Farer



Alberta Ellison, Mark Falcoff, and Georges Fauriol

SUMMARIES OF REMARKS BY KEYNOTE SPEAKERS

At various points during the conference, distinguished participants offered especially salient comments on Soviet and Cuban strategy in the Third World after the invasion of Grenada. Summaries of several of these remarks are presented here in order to illustrate the diversity of views among the conferees.

Vernon Walters

Ambassador Walters emphasized several myths concerning Central America in his remarks on U.S. policy in the region. First, he asserted that Central America is not the back yard of the United States, but rather its front yard. What happens in Central America is of vital interest to the United States because the area between the Panama Canal and the Rio Grande contains over 100 million people. Another myth is that the United States regards all insurrections against injustice and oppression as communist inspired. Many revolutionaries—such as Umberto Ortega or Fidel Castro—identify themselves as communist, and the United States should take such professions seriously. Walters stated that it is also a myth that the United States has pushed the Nicaraguans into the arms of the Soviets and Cubans. To this day, the United States remains the largest donor of aid to Nicaragua. It is therefore not that the United States turned its back on the Sandanistas, but that the Sandanistas chose to support the Soviet Union and the Marxist ideal. Finally, it is a myth that U.S. military aid to Central America indicates a preference for military solutions. About 70% of all U.S. aid to Central America has been economic, but such assistance is inadequate by itself; it must be augmented by an adequate security shield.

The ambassador suggested that perhaps the United States should have a doctrine that guarantees the achievements of democracy just as the Brezhnev Doctrine holds that when a socialist regime is threatened, the Red Army reserves the right to intervene to protect the achievements of socialism. This would have benefits not just for the people of Central and South America, but for the entire world, for the history of the last century shows that democracies almost never engage in aggressive wars. Dictatorships, on the other hand, whether of the right or the left, are driven to external adventure by their very nature. This is one the reasons why the United States should support democracy in Central America. However, it is even more important that the enemies of democracy do not obtain control over Central America. According to Mr. Walters, the Soviet Union adheres to Lenin's dictum, "Probe with bayonets. If you run into steel, try somewhere else." It is therefore important that the Soviets do not find the absence of steel in Central America. Certain target nations have been chosen in Central America, and in Mr. Walter's opinion, the ultimate target of the Soviet Union in the region is Mexico.

The United States should give the peoples of Central America a chance to develop democratic institutions, but democracy is under external attack in the region. As evidence of this, Mr. Walters invited us merely to turn on the radio

and hear the storm that beats down upon Central America from outside forces. In discussing the issue of whether or not the United States should negotiate with the guerrillas in El Salvador, Mr. Walters asserted that the United States must convince its Soviet and guerrilla adversaries that the route of force does not pay. The United States must also convince its friends that it has the means to meet the use of force by its enemies. Above all, the United States must not lock itself into an inflexible position by informing its adversaries of what it will or will not do in the future. Uncertainty, Walters stated, can be a very powerful weapon.

If Central America falls to the communists, the United States will be deluged with millions of refugees, according to Mr. Walters. But he optimistically stated that all is not lost in the region by any means. Costa Rica and Honduras have recently had democratic elections, and there have been four democratic elections and four democratic changes of government in the Dominican Republic since 1965, when the United States intervened in that nation's affairs over great protest. Mr. Walters was optimistic that if democracy can take root in Central America, it will become the normal accepted process for change, just as coups have been the normal accepted process until now.

In conclusion, Ambassador Walters asserted that the United States must make a stand in Central America and defend friendly regimes that are admittedly not perfect. The solution is not to allow flawed regimes to be replaced by totalitarian Marxist dictatorships. We must act soon, he said, for no one knows what the consequences will be if we delay.

Winston Lord

Throughout his remarks, Mr. Lord emphasized his support for the findings of the Bipartisan (Kissinger) Commission on Central America.

According to Mr. Lord and the Kissinger Commission, the turmoil in Central America does not have a single cause, but is the result of both indigenous factors and external intervention. On the one hand, liberals see revolution as the result of only poverty and injustice; they ignore the East-West security dimensions of the problem, the role of Marxist/Leninist ideology, and the actions of the Soviet bloc. On the other hand, conservatives point to the evil machinations of the Kremlin and its proxies to explain the causes of revolution; they ignore the economic, social and political roots of discontent. In reality, however, the causes of revolution are both internal and external.

Likewise, Lord stated, one cannot specify which aspect of the conflict in Central America deserves the most urgent attention from the United States—The economic or the security dimension. Both aspects of the problem form a seamless web, and accordingly, the Commission set forth three key aims of U.S. policy in Central America: democratic self-determination; social and economic freedom; and cooperation in meeting the security threats to the region. Without progress on the first two, there can be no security, and without an adequate security shield, there can be no social progress. Mr. Lord emphasized that if U.S. policy is going to succeed in Central America, the problem must be attacked at all levels and treated as a whole. Likewise, the commis-

sion's report must be treated as a whole, and Mr. Lord found it unfortunate that both liberals and conservatives have emphasized those aspects of the report they agree with while attacking the other side of the "seamless web." The selective approach—to emphasize either economic or security issues—guarantees failure, said Mr. Lord.

Military aid to El Salvador should be conditioned on progress towards human rights as a matter of necessity, according to Mr. Lord. Most of the Commission answered in the same manner, but three members (including the chair) qualified their support of the human rights condition in their footnotes to the report. They generally endorsed the approach, but said such a strategy should not be pursued if it means a Marxist takeover would ensue. Mr. Lord, however, disagreed and emphasized that the only way the United States can give people like Duarte leverage to make progress on human rights is to use the ultimate threat of ceasing aid, "applied sensitively and in terms of progress, not instant solutions." He admitted that this strategy is risky, but nonetheless is a policy that the United States must pursue. The wisdom of this approach has already been shown, according to Mr. Lord, by the progress Duarte has made and the increased international support he has consequently received, especially in Western Europe.

Mr. Lord concurred with the Commission's preference for elections in El Salvador as opposed to power-sharing arrangements as the best way to ultimately end the conflict there. The guerrillas propose to scrap the present government and military in El Salvador, and instead install a mixed provisional government by fiat—a classic Marxist-Leninist approach, according to Mr. Lord. He warned that precedents strongly suggest this would only be a prelude to the elimination of the moderate elements of the coalition. On the other hand, he recognized that the left cannot be asked to take part in elections without security guarantees. But Mr. Lord was hopeful that security can eventually be provided once Duarte's position is more consolidated. First, Duarte must forge an alliance with the "sane right" and the center before he can make any overtures to the left. Perhaps he can even split off some elements of the left if he can keep the pressure on militarily and further solidify his political position.

As regards Nicaragua, Mr. Lord felt that the United States should not rely exclusively on a strategy of either applying military pressures or opting for negotiations in its relations with the Sandinistas. We must reject the fatuous notion that force and diplomacy can be neatly compartmentalized—that if the United States would only relax its pressures on Nicaragua, the Sandinistas would be ready to negotiate. Just as in El Salvador, the left is more likely to reach for a political solution if it cannot count on a military victory. Mr. Lord noted that Sandinista rhetoric in fact became more conciliatory after U.S. naval deployments in Central America, military exercises in Honduras, and the Grenada rescue mission. Mr. Lord endorsed U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan contras, and felt that such aid should be used as a bargaining chip in future negotiations.

Finally, Mr. Lord stated that the United States should not simply settle for the "containment" of Nicaragua, but press for internal reforms as well. He noted that this is also the clear preference of Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, and the Contadora nations. It would be a blatant double standard to insist on

progress toward democracy in El Salvador, but not in Nicaragua, he emphasized. On balance, Mr. Lord argued that if the basic thrust of the Commission report is followed, the United States can succeed in Central America in the long-term. There is no guarantee of success, he warned, but there is the guarantee of failure without the package approach outlined by the Bipartisan Commission on Central America.

Constantine Menges

Dr. Menges began his remarks on U.S. and Soviet foreign policy toward Grenada by recalling that the U.S. action on that island was justified by the request of several Caribbean nations for U.S. intervention to restore order and democracy on Grenada. The other immediate reason for the action was to rescue the citizens of all countries who seemed to be in danger as a result of the "shoot-to-kill" curfew. Dr. Menges emphasized that there were many corollary benefits as well.

The first was that the invasion ended a significant subversive threat to Grenada's neighbors, Belize and Suriname, and other nations in the region, were threatened by violent groups that were receiving support, training and weapons through individuals from Soviet bloc nations (such as Cuba, Libya, North Korea, and Bulgaria) who were living and working on Grenada.

Secondly, the invasion prevented a further military buildup in Grenada. This buildup was small by any absolute measure, but large for such a tiny nation whose neighbors have very small armed forces numbering in the tens and hundreds. Obviously, if the buildup had continued, the military situation in the Caribbean would have required defensive preparations by the other nations in the area, diverting scarce resources away from economic development and increasing the risk of conflict.

Another benefit of the invasion of Grenada was that it prevented the Soviets and Cubans from using the airfield and harbor complex which was being rushed to completion. Dr. Menges reminded us that in the spring of 1982, the United States was preparing to deploy medium range missiles in Western Europe and the Soviets were publicly threatening analogous deployments against the United States. Thus he postulated that Grenada might have offered the Soviets a convenient opportunity to create a very tough bargaining position with respect to American missile deployments. This is a theory other analysts will disagree about, said Mr. Menges, but he argued that it is a possibility worth considering.

Finally, Dr. Menges felt that the most important corollary benefit of the invasion was a psychological one. The decision to respond quickly to a request for intervention from friendly nations prevented the demoralization of our allies throughout the region.

American policy toward Grenada has been consistent in the aftermath of the intervention, and Dr. Menges identified the three main elements of this policy as: cooperation with the Caribbean democracies to maintain a small peacekeeping force on the island to prevent threats to order; an effort to help the interim government with its deinstitutionalization of the previous regime; and support of the interim government's restoration of democratic institutions.

In discussing Soviet policy toward the Caribbean and the Third World in general, Dr. Menges described a multilayered approach which is both aggressive and well-organized. The United States has adequately dealt with the threats of nuclear and conventional warfare, but should become more conversant with the threat posed by indirect aggression from the Soviet Union and its partners—an alliance Dr. Menges called the "destabilization coalition." The character of this threat changes from situation to situation, but open military force is employed only rarely, as was the case of Cuban intervention in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia.

Dr. Menges argued that the destabilization coalition operates on three separate fronts simultaneously. The first area is Western public opinion and various international organizations. The goal in this area is to alter the views of these groups to delegitimize and isolate certain target governments. This can be seen from the documents captured on Grenada describing efforts to manipulate the views of the democratic socialist in the socialist international. This tactic is carried out by the Soviet bloc propaganda apparatus, communist parties in Western nations, various Soviet front groups, and a wide range of covert measures. The second area outlined by Menges concerns the domestic politics of the Western nation supporting the target government. Here the goal is to alter the views of the supporting government so it cuts off aid to the target nation. In the case of Grenada, for example, there was an elaborate effort to manipulate the American press and certain segments of Congress. The third area is the target government itself, where the goal is to bring about communism through a coup or some type of power-sharing arrangement that will ultimately lead to the dominance of a communist party. Many conflicts since World War II have had a similar character, but Grenada is unique for the evidence it has provided on the operations and strategy of indirect aggression. Grenada clearly illustrates the multilayered nature of this strategy, as does the presence of 905 Soviet bloc personnel on the destabilization coalition.

Dr. Menges asserted that the West can successfully cope with the threat of indirect aggression, and in this respect Grenada was important in showing that the United States has the will to help its friends defend themselves against the destabilization coalition. In conclusion, he suggested a counterstrategy to deal with the threat of indirect aggression. Menges said that the United States must affirm its democratic values, and that there should be a concerted effort to improve social and economic conditions in the Third World and an active strategy to help our friends defeat attempts at indirect aggression.

Tom J. Farer

According to Tom Farer, in terms of the geopolitical balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, most of the Third World counts for very little. Indeed, Dr. Farer stated that a U.S. policy for the Third World that is designed primarily to contain the expansion of Soviet influence has considerable potential to actually degrade American national interests.

First, Dr. Farer emphasized that a strategy of total containment guarantees a high level of tension in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, for it denies the Soviet

Union equal status with the United States as a great power with global interests. The United States has not seriously challenged Soviet dominance over Eastern Europe since the end of World War II, but on the other hand, America seems to regard the rest of the world as exclusively its own, said Dr. Farer. If the Soviets feel they have the right to seek influence throughout the globe, and if the United States feels that all expansions of Soviet influence must be challenged, then conflict will remain endemic. Thus a policy of total containment can be justified only if it can be shown to be clearly necessary for the protection of U.S. national interests. Not only did Dr. Farer feel such a policy unjustified, but it would also harm our relations with our West European and Japanese allies. Furthermore, the maximalist approach to containment would have a negative effect on the U.S. economy by requiring vastly increased expenditures on conventional weapons. Finally, Dr. Farer feared that over the long term, such a policy would also lead to increased domestic security measures, thereby threatening the institutional balances essential to the maintenance of democracy and civil liberties.

The Third World counts for little in the global balance of power, because it suffers staggering economic and political problems, both internally and externally. Dr. Farer made the case that even if the Soviet Union occupied several Third World nations, Soviet power would not be greatly enhanced unless it occupied the oil producing states of the Persian Gulf. (Such an endeavor would in fact overextend the Soviet Union by dissipating scarce resources.)

As an alternative to a strategy of maximalist containment, Dr. Farer suggested that the United States should stop worrying about ideology and seek to influence the foreign policies of important Third World nations. Admittedly, many revolutionaries turn to the Soviet Union after achieving power. But Dr. Farer suggested that even regimes proclaiming themselves Marxist should be "co-opted" by the offer of American assistance in exchange for Western access to local markets and a commitment not to allow Soviet bases. Dr. Farer insisted that this does not mean he did not take revolutionaries and their ideological commitments seriously, but the U.S. should not accept all revolutionary rhetoric at face value. For example Said Barre of Somalia proclaimed himself a "scientific socialist" upon his assumption of power in 1969 at least in part to obtain Soviet military assistance. He is now considered to be firmly in the Western bloc. Several other Marxist or nominally Marxist states (most notably China and Yugoslavia) have shifted their alliances over the last 30 years despite the fact that little effort was made to co-opt them. Even if one does not accept the assumption that the Third World is strategically unimportant, Dr. Farer still urged that the United States adopt a less ideologically rigid policy that would allow room for maneuvering the alignments of certain Third World regimes to the benefit of U.S. national interests.

In conclusion, Dr. Farer suggested that it is in the American national interest to engage the Soviet Union in some sort of broad negotiation concerning the "rules-of-the-road" for competition in the Third World. If we fail to do so, then we are engaged in a collision course, said Dr. Farer.

Jack Matlock

The fundamental importance of the Grenada documents, according to Dr. Matlock, is that they illuminate the role of ideology in Soviet motivations and behavior, and help us to answer the question of whether the Soviet Union is a revolutionary or traditional imperialist power. Ideology is not something that can be ignored in our analyses of the Soviet Union, said Dr. Matlock. It was apparently very important to the Soviets in their relations with the New Jewel Movement (NJM), and this suggests that the Soviet Union is something more than merely a traditional expansionist power.

At the same time, Dr. Matlock warned, we should not exhaust our perception of Soviet foreign policy by saying that it is purely Leninist, Marxist-Leninist, communist, or totalitarian. Indeed over the past 60 years, it appears there has been a fusion of many of the characteristics of imperial Russian foreign policy with Leninist ideology. This amalgam was evident in the Grenada experience. The Grenada documents reflect the more ideological aspects of Soviet foreign policy, but even from a "traditional Russian" point of view, there would seem to be some value—ideology entirely aside—in having a potential strategic base in the Eastern Caribbean.

Dr. Matlock suggested that perhaps Soviet officials and citizens do not really "believe" in communist ideology anymore, but the Soviet regime is unwilling to give up on ideology because it provides the sole form of legitimacy for the exercise of Soviet power. At a time when the Soviet Union is experiencing serious economic problems, the presumed and claimed victories of Soviet ideology throughout the world serve to legitimize the goals of the regime and decrease domestic discontent. In addition, although ideology may no longer be a dynamic motivating force for the Soviet Union, it does have the function of providing a framework for analyzing world events.

Aside from its legitimizing role, ideology also serves to order the Soviet alliance system into groups of socialist-oriented regimes and parties, and Leninist vanguard (i.e., communist) regimes and parties. The Soviets always push for the creation of vanguard parties, and they afford more trust to the leaders of such movements than the charismatic leaders of socialist-oriented groups. This is largely the result of Soviet apprehensions regarding setbacks in nations such as Egypt and Somalia. Moreover, highly bureaucratized vanguard parties are far less likely to turn against the Soviet Union than parties that are merely socialist-oriented or vaguely pro-Soviet. Soviet pressures on its allies to rapidly nationalize and socialize their economies have lessened since the 1960s. This is because many Soviet economic experiments in the Third World have run aground or tended to be extremely expensive. But while the Soviets might not be pushing for radical economic measures at the present, Dr. Matlock suggested they they will certainly do so as a matter of course, as much for pragmatic reasons as ideological ones. Through economic socialization, communist-style parties eliminate many competing sources of power (e.g., the middle class), which could later pose a threat to their dominance.

Soviet ideology, Dr. Matlock explained, has far more to do with Leninism than it does with Marxism. Many people commonly interchange the terms "Marxism" and "Leninism", and indeed, Leninism was an outgrowth of Marxism. But in fact it was Lenin and not Marx who formulated the concepts

of the vanguard party, "democratic centralism", and proletarian internationalism, which have been such fundamental elements of Soviet ideology since the 1920s.

Finally, Dr. Matlock emphasized how Soviet ideology can be particularly useful to revolutionary leaders who are having difficulty maintaining or consolidating their power. This is the real appeal of Leninism to radical Third World elites, Dr. Matlock asserted. Through its totalitarian controls and party supervision of the government, the economy, and especially the military, the Leninist vanguard party can rapidly consolidate its position and remove opposition elements, including from the party itself, with ample ideological justification. In the final analysis, then, Soviet ideology is not a formula for economic development, or for correcting social inequality. Ideology does not solve these problems, Dr. Matlock insisted. It exacerbates them, and is merely a formula for staying in power.

Richard Pipes

In his discussion of the Soviet Union and Grenada, Dr. Pipes noted how strikingly easy it was to superimpose communist ideology on Grenada. However, just as gigantic industrial projects imposed on underdeveloped nations tend to collapse, so do many Marxist experiments in the Third World.

According to Dr. Pipes, it has become clear in the last several years that the Soviet economy cannot sustain an imperial drive of the dimensions of the 1970s. Soviet resources simply will not stretch that far, he said. In some open-source publications, Soviet specialists on the Third World are advising their comrades abroad not to rush the nationalization of industries or the development of socialism in general, and to maintain good relations with the United States. This is the advice that has been given to Nicaragua, for example. The patterns of Soviet expansion during the last several years suggest an effort to concentrate on smaller, relatively inexpensive nations that will not impose a great strain on the Soviet economy, but which are of potentially great strategic value. Dr. Pipes asserted that the Soviets are shying away from long-term policies that seek to transform Third World societies from feudal states into socialist democracies. Such efforts have been extremely expensive in the past, and they have often led to tremendous disappointments for the Soviet Union. Instead of trying to transform the world in its own image, the Soviets are now concentrating on gaining cheap access to naval and air bases in the Third World.

From this point of view, Grenada was an ideal target for the Soviet Union. As Grenada sits athwart important shipping lanes, its significance to the Soviet Union was primarily military, not political or even ideological. Despite the rhetoric of its leaders, Grenada was hardly a fully-structured communist society. Rather the Soviets considered Grenada a socialist-oriented nation, which according to Soviet theorists, is a nation making the transition from feudalism to socialism without going through capitalism. Accordingly, said Dr. Pipes, the American liberation of Grenada was not a setback that the Soviets would find intolerable. Grenada, one can argue, was merely another example of a socialist-oriented nation going wrong—of which there are many

examples. However, the major difference between Grenada and other Soviet setbacks was that the 1983 setback was by the force of American military power. This is something new in the Soviet experience, and it must have had a profound effect on Soviet foreign policy considerations.

Over the last 20 years, the Soviet Union has learned that charismatic leaders are useful for creating socialist-oriented regimes in the Third World. But they are also very unreliable once they come to power because of their nationalist character. Thus the Soviets often replace popular charismatic leaders with "internationalists" who owe their allegiance entirely to Moscow. Dr. Pipes noted that this was apparently the case in South Yemen and Afghanistan, and most recently in Grenada.

Dr. Pipes noted that in the aftermath of Grenada, Third World leaders dependent on the Soviet Union cannot be assured of continuing Soviet support. But he also asserted that the Grenada experience was not necessary to come to this realization. Soviet officials have repeatedly said that nations far from the periphery of the USSR would have to defend themselves in the event of an American invasion. The lack of formal treaty commitments to Cuba corroborates this assertion.

Finally, in summarizing his views on the Soviet role in the Grenadian revolution, Dr. Pipes maintained that the problem in Grenada was not poverty, but the activities of a few radicals supported by the Soviet Union (and Cuba). Admittedly, poverty and other social problems are widespread in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin, yet according to Dr. Pipes, these problems only become international problems and a threat to U.S. security when the Soviet Union moves in. As Dr. Pipes put it, "I do not deny that poverty is a problem in 90 percent of the world, but the real problem is the Soviet Union."

Sally Shelton

Ms. Shelton's remarks on the origins of revolutionary change in the Caribbean Basin focused on the differences between liberal and conservative viewpoints explaining that change. Liberals have traditionally explained revolution in the Third World as the result of economic deterioration resulting from the colonial legacy, increasing oil prices, and the recession of the 1970s. Conservatives, on the other hand, tend to focus on the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies. Certainly, elements of both of these views are determinants of revolutionary change in the Caribbean, but Ms. Shelton identified another operative factor that she defined as "institutional corruption", or the inability of existing economic, political and security systems to manage the challenges they are confronted with. Most of the problems faced by the smaller nations of the Caribbean have not been the result of economic deterioration or the Soviet/Cuban threat, Ms. Shelton asserted, but rather of various "non-traditional" armed elements.

The general consensus among most Caribbean analysts is that democratic processes and free enterprise are deeply rooted in the region as the result of its British colonial past. But aside from the U.S. government's interest in seeing that the Caribbean remains democratic and stable, the United States also has important economic and military interests in the region. There is a significant

degree of American investment in the Caribbean, and there are certain strategic minerals in the region (such as bauxite) to which the United States must maintain access. Moreover, Ms. Shelton emphasized that the sea lanes through the Caribbean must remain secure because in the event of a conflict in Europe, most of the equipment that would be needed to resupply NATO forces would be sent from ports in the Gulf coast area.

In addition to economic deterioration, Soviet/Cuban involvement, and institutional corruption, Ms. Shelton identified several additional causes of instability in the region. First, there is lack of commitment to the kinds of economic and political policies that are necessary to insure growth and stability. Indeed, some islands are literally surviving on international aid from the United States, Canada, and multilateral lending institutions. On the political side, a number of Caribbean governments are attempting to subvert legal or constitutional procedures to assure their survivability. In essence, the basic ineffectualness of most Caribbean governments has increased their vulnerability to external threats. To deal with these problems, Ms. Shelton suggested the strengthening of existing institutions, and several specific policy recommendations.

For example, Ms. Shelton cited the need for better intelligence gathering capabilities in the Caribbean. This was clearly the case in Grenada, where U.S. information on the New Jewel Movement (NJM) was sketchy because the NJM was not taken very seriously until late 1983. We ignore political developments in the Caribbean, whether of the left or the right, at our own risk, said Ms. Shelton. She also suggested that the United States upgrade and expand the quality of its diplomatic representation in the Caribbean. In addition, the United States should maintain contacts with opposition groups (as Ms. Shelton did when she was ambassador to Barbados), and like the British, the United States should maintain a U.S. embassy or consulate on every island in the region — perhaps on the non-independent ones as well. The United States should also work to develop the technical infrastructure of the region. A certain degree of continuity in long-term U.S. policy must also be developed, and the United States should revive its multilateral contacts in the Caribbean Basin because regional cooperation movements seem to be breaking down. The economic and security needs of the Caribbean can best be met through effective regional cooperation, according to Ms. Shelton. Hence the United States should couple its bilateral and regional approaches, while being willing to make substantial financial commitments to the region over the long term, for the Caribbean will probably remain economically dependent on the United States and Canada for the foreseeable future.

Alexander George

Dr. George's remarks stressed the importance of understanding what role the use of force—or the threat of the use of force—should play in efforts to prevent further Grenadas, Nicaraguas, and Cubas. It is certainly important to advocate preventative measures that attempt to consolidate existing pluralist regimes, but the question according to Dr. George is what to do when confronted with the failure of such efforts. Like the Kennedy administration,

we can act out of the desire to allow "no more Cubas in the Caribbean"—which was clearly the case in the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic. But it is useless to propose an optimizing strategy that runs aground on domestic political restraints, according to Dr. George.

Dr. George stated that there seemed to have been a consensus that the United States must not separate force from diplomacy. Unfortunately, he said, they must bear some relationship to each other. Above all, the United States must face up more realistically to the domestic constraints on any administration to develop a policy that is relevant and can be implemented over the long term. Whether we like it or not, the United States must strive to identify optimal strategies and policies for protecting American interests.

Dr. George also touched upon the idea that U.S. foreign policy in the Caribbean should be concerned about the fact that what happens in the region is of fundamental concern to America's allies. He stressed that the United States has failed to recognize the important security interests of Western Europe in the Caribbean, at least partially due to the perception that its allies have been "soft" on the Soviet Union. This is unfortunate, for the Caribbean is important to America's allies because it lies along critical sea lanes from the Gulf of Mexico to Western Europe—the route by which most American supplies would be sent to Europe in the event of war. Dr. George noted that America's West European allies might have the following interest in the Caribbean: closer coordination with the United States, especially in terms of security arrangements; joint economic assistance; and perhaps open diplomatic relations with Cuba, which could serve to widen the differences between Cuba and the Soviet Union, thus facilitating West European and American interests in the area.

Herbert Ellison

Dr. Ellison commented on some of the ways in which the study of the Grenada documents suggested continuities in the historical relationship of the Soviets with foreign communist movements. This was very clear in the Soviet support for Coard's "Leninization" of the New Jewel Movement, the process that led to the purge of Bishop and to his death. The epithet "right-wing opportunist" that was applied to Bishop recalls a long succession of such intra-party struggles from the 1920s to the present in which the Soviets have been direct or indirect participants, whether through the agency of the Comintern, the Cominform, or the contemporary International Department. Indeed the process recalled Soviet pressures on Castro himself during the 1960s to accept a Soviet-style party, even as they pressed him to abandon "left-wing opportunism" in his pursuit of revolution in Latin America.

Another element of historical continuity is provided by the Soviet role as senior partner in the revolutionary enterprise. Several conference participants noted that the Cubans were given broad leeway in the Caribbean and Central America, both in locating revolutionary opportunities and developing them. Yet the Soviets, through regional party conferences and other mechanisms, continued to provide broad ideological leadership and to mobilize the community of socialist states. And it was clearly the Soviets calling the tune when

Coard moved against Bishop, an action which not only precipitated an internal crisis but provided the pretext for the external intervention that shattered the whole revolutionary enterprise. As in previous situations, the Soviet preoccupation with Leninist ideological/organizational orthodoxy—and aversion to charismatic leaders—precipitated a fatal crisis.

Another historical theme that Grenada suggests is the steady expansion of the instruments and range of Soviet action in support of foreign revolution. During the interwar years the Soviets were confined to their own limited group of diplomatic and commercial missions abroad, to a handful of foreign communist parties, and to a few publications and front movements. The expansion of the community of communist states and parties in the postwar era—in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America—and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower, have had tremendous consequences. Of the five secret military agreements the Grenadians had signed, one was with Cuba and one with North Korea. And the nearly 900 personnel from “friendly” states resident in Grenada at the time of the intervention included Cubans, Soviets, North Koreans, Libyans, East Germans and Bulgarians. Not the least important consequence of this change was the ability of the Soviets to mask their own role, and thus minimize U.S. opportunities for diplomatic confrontation.

Dr. Ellison stated that the latter point suggests still another continuity of Soviet policy in the postwar years: the concern to thwart American intervention in Soviet revolutionary projects abroad. The availability of surrogates, or proxies, was a newly important advantage. Yet the American military capacity for intervention remained, and it was clearly the reckoning of both Soviets and Cubans that the power would not be used, a reckoning based on U.S. hesitancy in such matters since the Vietnam War and the impact of a massive effort in the U.S. to discredit such initiatives, an effort that included propaganda, disinformation, and special pressures on the U.S. Congress. The Grenada documents show much about the effort to influence American perceptions of the Grenadian revolution; perhaps these materials can help us to understand better the system and instruments through which that influence is applied.

Dr. Ellison noted that one of the conference speakers had argued that the Third World was really unimportant in the broader U.S.-Soviet confrontation. He argued that the Third World—as it is called today—has been regarded by the Soviets since the 1920s as the central arena of their confrontation with the capitalist world. They have come to accept a long-term stability of the advanced capitalist states, and have repeatedly affirmed that their best opportunities lie in the “weakest link” of the “world imperialist system”—the colonial (now decolonized) peoples and states. Since the restructuring of the International Department in the 1950s, the central focus of activity of that key foreign policy instrument of the Central Committee and Politburo has been upon the Third World. It would be wise to look more closely at the Soviet literature on this subject, and to examine more carefully the pattern of revolutionary support actions, before diminishing its importance.

A final element of continuity is the historical pattern of excessive (or too exclusive) concentration of the West upon the military elements of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. What one deals with in Grenada is, in the first analysis, an ex-

ercise in ideological/political action—one that has military-strategic implications, but one that suggests a future need for more effective political, as well as military, responses to the communist challenge.

Nestor Sanchez

Mr. Sanchez stated that both he and the U.S. Department of Defense strongly support conferences such as the present one on Grenada. The value of these conferences is that policymakers and members of the academic community can engage in meaningful give-and-take discussions and analyze possible policy alternatives.

According to Mr. Sanchez, although the United States has historically ignored Central America, the present administration was quick to recognize the importance of the region to American security interests. Neither Havana nor Moscow is responsible for the root problems of Central America, but they are taking advantage of the region's problems, and this requires an American response. It is important that this administration should develop a consistent, long-term policy with respect to Central America that has enough built-in flexibility to insure national and bipartisan support. If we fail to do this, Mr. Sanchez warned, the United States might find itself in the position of having to react to an emergency that requires outright intervention.

Mr. Sanchez argued that the United States has several options in Central America. It can walk away from the problem, or resort to the use of combat troops. But as neither of these are realistic alternatives, Mr. Sanchez advocated the further development of current U.S. policy toward the region. The aims of this policy are to support four goals: democratic institutions and human rights in the region; economic reform, including land reform; negotiations; and security assistance to our friends in order to give the first three objectives a chance to succeed. He noted that dispute over U.S. policy in Central America is not so much a matter of goals, but rather the specific mix of economic and security assistance. Generally, the mix has been about 5-to-1 in favor of economic aid, according to Mr. Sanchez, and if the recommendations of the Bipartisan Commission on Central America are accepted, the ratio could increase to 7-to-1. But he cautioned that the United States should not try to shape Central America in its own image; the frustrations would be endless if this were the aim of U.S. policy.

Mr. Sanchez outlined evidence that progress has recently been made in Central and South America. El Salvador has had three elections under the pressure of a guerrilla war; Guatemala has elected a legislative assembly and is planning a presidential election; Argentina and Brazil are in the process of making their way towards democratic change; and Chile has promised elections in 1989. Unfortunately, U.S. policy toward Central America usually generates more emotion than clear thought, but nonetheless Mr. Sanchez was confident that if we seek consensus and bipartisan agreement, a sound, long-term policy is within reach.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

by Jiri Valenta

The following findings and recommendations are based on Valenta's own work as well as on the discussion among conference participants. No effort was made to arrive at a formal consensus on each point.

THE GRENADA DOCUMENTS

The Grenada documents provide an unprecedented glimpse into the inner workings of an aspiring Third World Leninist regime and its relations with more established Leninist regimes elsewhere. It is true that the documents are not comprehensive and are highly uneven, and perhaps the most sensational were destroyed by defenders of the island. Moreover, they are primarily Grenadian, as few documents from Soviet sources were discovered. Despite these shortcomings, however, this unique set of documents possesses an extraordinary historical value that is comparable to the Soviet documents Professor Merle Fainsod had at his disposal when writing the seminal *How Russia Is Ruled*.¹ Another such windfall were the internal documents of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party dealing with the crisis of 1968 which have been analyzed by Gordon Skilling, Galia Golan, and Jiri Valenta.

Unfortunately, some of the Grenada documents are incomplete, and others are illegible. Furthermore, not all of the documents had become available to the public by the time of the conference "Soviet/ Cuban Strategy in the Third World after Grenada" (August 1984). The volume of documents is enormous, and many still have not been properly catalogued and sorted. However, as a senior U.S. Government official attending the conference noted, none of the Grenada Documents have been classified and the vast majority² will be made available to the public as soon as they are processed. According to the same official, it has been agreed among U.S. and Grenadian officials that upon completion of the processing all documents will be returned to Grenada.

Notwithstanding their limitations, the study of the Grenada documents can be very useful in analyzing strategies and tactics employed by the Soviet Union and Cuba. The documents allow cross-reference and comparison between the Grenadian New Jewel Movement (NJM) Party perceptions and assessments and those drawn from open sources of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other Communist and radical developing countries. Such comparisons were

used extensively by most of the scholars who were asked to write papers for the conference, and by the discussants who attended. Their contributions represent a significant step in the ongoing effort to understand better Soviet and Cuban strategies and tactics in the Third World.

LENINISM IN GRENADA

It is important to consider how the Grenada documents shed light on the NJM Party and its ties with the U.S.S.R., Cuba, and the latter's allies. The prevailing view among the conferees was that the revolution in Grenada was much more Leninist-oriented than originally anticipated. Admittedly there remains the conceptual problem of how to characterize accurately the ideological and political orientation of the NJM and similar radical Third World movements. Analysts refer to them alternately as Marxist, Marxist-Leninist, or even Stalinist. However, perhaps the most appropriate label for a party in a Third World country that is building a vanguard party and pursuing a pro-Soviet foreign policy is Leninist. Despite the obvious shortcomings of this classification, it would appear more appropriate than the term provided by the Soviet vocabulary: Marxist-Leninist. This is because it was Lenin, not Marx, who developed the concept of a vanguard party dictatorship of the proletariat that, combined with proletarian internationalism, forms the core of the political system adhered to and propagated by the Soviet Union.

Current Soviet ideology has very little to do with Marxism, and almost everything to do with Leninism, as illustrated in the Grenada situation. Although reasonable analysts can and do differ over the degree to which Leninism had been established in Grenada, and how successful it was, no one can deny the violent drive of Bernard Coard's faction toward an absolute Leninist transformation of the NJM party and Grenada. This process was richly documented in the voluminous, sometimes secret, files discovered on the island. Ultimately it was the Coard faction's emphasis on ideological mobilization, economic control, democratic centralism and "Bolshevik staunchness" that produced the factional bloodshed in Grenada during October 1983. The ongoing development of Grenada along Leninist lines was a significant phenomenon for the Soviets. After a period of cautious appraisal, Soviet officials began to describe Grenada publicly as socialist-oriented, while privately they classified the NJM as a "fraternal party". This level of relations was reflected in a CPSU and NJM party-to-party agreement on ideological cooperation. To be sure, the elevation of Grenada to a "higher" political category (that included Angola, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Nicaragua) depended in part on ideological considerations.

Obviously, Grenada was not officially recognized by the Soviet Union as a Communist state and, as shown by the Grenada documents, it was not very high on the Soviet list of priorities. This was for a variety of reasons, though mainly because of its minuscule size and geographical remoteness. Nevertheless, Soviet officials hoped that in due time, given its strategic importance and a projected change in the correlation of forces, Grenada would become a valu-

able ally. The documents provide no conclusive evidence that Grenada had become a depot of Soviet arms for future use in the region, nor were there any Soviet or Cuban military bases or facilities at the time of the U.S. invasion, aside from the controversial airport, which also had clear-cut civilian purposes. (The military nature of the airport is suggested by circumstantial evidence: Grenadians reportedly were prohibited from approaching certain areas of the construction project, and the full storage tanks were considerably larger than similar airport facilities in the region.)

It is likely that the Soviets and their allies made a significant and guarded commitment to Grenada, by according it a special revolutionary status. They also concluded several top-secret arms transfer agreements, and sent a considerable number of weapons, and dozens of advisors, in a military assistance package that far exceeded the reasonable defense requirements of a small island. It is possible that Grenada might have become a component in Soviet military planning as well as a bridge to revolutionary forces elsewhere in the region (Surinam and Belize), thereby following the Cuban example of the last quarter-century. The documents clearly suggest that this possible role for Grenada was attractive to some NJM officials who considered it essential to obtain continued and improved Soviet support.

The study of the Grenada case, together with the analyses of leading Soviet Third World experts (e.g., Karen Brutents)³, suggests that in the Soviet mind there exist at least two types of socialist-oriented countries in the Third World. First is the type-A country having no vanguard party, and only a vaguely defined Leninist ideology. These countries are typically led by a charismatic leader (e.g., Mali, Ghana, Indonesia, Egypt, and Somalia, of the 1960's and 1970's).

The second is the type-B country having an incipient Leninist vanguard party, together with other structures built around Lenin's principle of democratic centralism. Because of previous experiences with Yugoslavia, China, and other Third World regimes, the Soviets tend to distrust charismatic leaders of Communist and radical regimes, although they may be prone to be cooperative in paving the way toward proper Leninist societies.

This is demonstrated by the case of Cuba, where the Soviets worked with Fidel Castro to build a more advanced, type-B socialist-oriented government from a type-A structure. The final stage in this long and arduous evolution was the Soviet recognition of Cuba as a proper Communist state in the 1970's. During this process, Cuban leaders had to establish their Communist credentials by building a vanguard party and holding regular party congresses, among other things.

The events in the Grenadian situation illustrate that in the 1980's the Soviets have preferred to deal with a structured Leninist party that has Soviet-trained cadres or is well-connected with Soviet bureaucracies. The Soviets also tend to deal more readily with Leninist-*apparatchik* types (like Coard) than with charismatic and unpredictable leaders (like Maurice Bishop). The evidence does not conclusively support Soviet backing of Coard in the October coup in Grenada, but there is evidence to suggest possible Soviet displeasure with Bishop. Bishop and U.S. officials had agreed prior to the coup to avoid antagonistic rhetoric as a "confidence building" measure in U.S.-Grenadian relations. For several months, Bishop kept his promise, hoping for

substantial talks with the U.S. while apparently displeasing the Soviets for failure to brief Moscow.

According to the Soviets, the stability and reliability of any socialist-oriented country in the Third World should not depend so much on a leader's popularity as on the leading role of a bureaucratic vanguard party. At the moment, the most advanced existing socialist-oriented countries appear to be Afghanistan and Ethiopia. In September 1984, with Soviet ideological backing, Ethiopia established a Communist Party under the name of Worker's Party of Ethiopia. Grenada was about to become a part of that select grouping, and very likely would have had Coard's coalition prevailed. It is no wonder that Coard and his supporters studied Karen Brutents so intensively.⁴

NJM AND SOVIET/CUBAN STRATEGY

The Grenada Documents reveal a certain degree of tentativeness and ambiguity in Soviet policies *vis-à-vis* Third World nations. First, it shows that the U.S.S.R. does not necessarily seek to create Communist regimes at any cost. Secondly, the Soviet Union seems in many instances to prefer that its allies (Cuba in Africa and Latin America, and Vietnam in Southeast Asia) micromanage—and play a primary role in—the initial development of new relationships with aspiring Leninist forces. As used here, a Soviet ally is not necessarily a state controlled by the U.S.S.R., nor a Leninist state, although some Soviet allies do conform to these qualifications. They might more appropriately be called junior Soviet partners, like Cuba, who (using Soviet military and economic aid) pursue policies that benefit Soviet strategic objectives. For instance, Cuba's shrewd move in sending black diplomats and military advisors to both Africa and the Caribbean helped the Soviets to make friends in radical circles.

Finally, the Soviet Union rarely gives explicit instructions or assigns tactical missions to socialist-oriented states in the Third World. (Afghanistan is an exception because of its special conditions, geographical location on the Soviet border, and direct engagement by Soviet armed forces.) Instead, aspiring Leninist leaders in the Third World are usually at liberty to use their own imagination (with Cuba often acting as a broker) to cultivate ties with the Soviets and explore basic Soviet strategic objectives and limits of tolerance. Thus, in the first years after the revolutionary coup of 1979, the primary task of Grenadian leaders was to demonstrate their usefulness to the Soviet leadership.

As the leaders of revolutionary regimes consolidate internal power, the Soviets gradually become interested in strengthening ties with them. Ultimately, the Soviet Union aims to reduce or eliminate Cuba's brokerage role and develop direct relations with socialist-oriented regimes. This strategy became apparent in Angola in 1977-78 and may have been a factor in the internal leadership conflict in Grenada in October 1983. A similar trend may evolve in Nicaragua.

The Grenada documents suggest that although Soviet leaders are initially

cautious about assigning tactical missions, they do have implicit long-term strategic objectives in the Third World. This is indicated by the 1983 remarks of former Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov, regarding the growing struggle of anti-American progressive forces in the Western Hemisphere: "Over two decades ago there was only Cuba in Latin America; today there are Nicaragua and Grenada, and a serious battle is going on in El Salvador."⁵

Over the last few decades there has been a remarkable continuity in Soviet strategy and tactics concerning Communist parties and radical forces in developing nations. At the same time, there has been a noticeable increase in sophistication of methods used by the Soviets. As seen in Grenada (also in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Mozambique, and Nicaragua), the Soviets have expanded the scope of their policy instruments, particularly the auxiliary capacity provided by foreign communist parties and radical Third World movements.

In the last ten years, the Soviets have made expert use of military security aid via allies who often act as proxies. To be sure, the Soviet ally phenomenon is complex, and the use of the term does not necessarily imply that the U.S.S.R. is directing the foreign policy of allied or semi-allied countries; in some instances, the contrary might be more true. Thus, the Soviet Union might be perceived at times as a proxy of quasi-independent Cuba in Africa (Angola and Ethiopia), and in the Caribbean Basin (Nicaragua, Grenada, and El Salvador). As an actor having a great interest in and knowledge of the Caribbean Basin region, it was Cuba that discovered the revolutionary opportunities in both Nicaragua and Grenada. It could be argued that Cuba drew the Soviet Union into the region, much as Vietnam helped to deepen Soviet involvement in Southeast Asia. In the final analysis, however, the Soviet Union exercises leverage, if not control, over key decisionmaking by their allies. Moreover, the Soviets also benefit from the Cuban and Vietnamese ventures in strategic areas of the Third World, and one might add the activities of Libya and North Korea. East European involvement, both in Africa and in the Caribbean Basin, has been much more limited than that of Cuba and Libya.

As illustrated by the Grenadian experience, the intensity and scope of Soviet allied involvement in the Third World varies from state to state, even among Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) nations. This depends upon the general nature of each nation's alliance with the U.S.S.R., internal conditions and interests, and particularly the need to reinforce the regime's legitimacy. (Among the most involved countries have been East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria; generally less involved have been Poland and Hungary; Romania generally has pursued autonomous policies.)

The strategic objectives of some junior Soviet allies like Cuba are formulated independently, but must win the approval of the Soviets, who provide substantial military and economic assistance. In spite of frequent tactical disagreements such as those witnessed in Grenada in October 1983, the division of labor among Soviet allies ultimately favors Soviet global interests. By employing Cuban personnel, the Soviets avoid damage to their reputation in the international community, do not directly provoke the U.S., and are even able to blame others for errors.

IMPACT OF GRENADA

The impact on the Soviets and their allies in radical Third World regimes caused by the U.S./East Caribbean intervention in Grenada should neither be exaggerated nor underestimated. The intervention was a watershed in the history of the Caribbean Basin. (The last watershed appeared to have been in the 1950's when Western labor movements won over the pro-Soviet labor movement.) The failure of Leninism in Grenada can be interpreted as a general failure of Leninist temptation in an environment such as the East Caribbean where the prevailing political culture is democratic and parliamentarian.

The decline of Leninism in Grenada sent reverberations throughout the Soviet alliance system. The intervention in Grenada came as a surprise in the Soviet Union, where it was taken as an important signal that America may be recovering from the Vietnam syndrome, and may once again be prepared (as in the 1950's and 1960's) to use military force to defend its interests. In the months following the Grenadian intervention, the Soviets appeared to be reassessing their costs and benefits of support for revolutionary forces in the Caribbean Basin. Although the intervention added a dimension to the policy-making process in Moscow, it did not trigger a wholesale reappraisal of Soviet foreign policy. The operation was too small, too simple to be compared with what Vietnam demanded, or what Nicaragua may require. Among other things, the long-term impact will depend on the results of the 1984 U.S. Presidential elections, and on the policies of the future administration concerning aspiring Leninist forces in the Third World in general, and in the Caribbean Basin in particular.

Grenada also had an impact on the perceptions of other Communist and radical Third World leaders. The intervention indicated that Soviet allies outside the immediate Soviet sphere of influence were not automatically assured of Moscow's protection, even when faced with a mortal challenge from imperialism. These are troubling implications for Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, and even Cuba. The Soviet failure to protect Grenada explains to Communists and their socialist-oriented allies why the U.S.S.R. has avoided contracting military alliances (with implicit military commitments) with the more vulnerable Communist states of Albania, North Korea, and Vietnam (before 1978).

Fidel Castro may now be even more greatly concerned about the ambiguous Soviet commitment to Cuba in the case of direct conflict with the United States. Unlike their behavior in their own periphery (or even in remote regions of Africa), Soviet Union leaders are less able or willing to support pro-Soviet regimes in the American backyard, particularly when Washington is willing to protect its interests with military force. After Grenada, the Caribbean may be a lower priority on Castro's agenda, while he may rededicate his efforts to expand Cuban influence in Central America.

Initially, the intervention in Grenada had a considerable impact in Nicaragua, where the Sandinistas had earlier anticipated a "Grenada-style" intervention in their own country. (Junta leader Daniel Ortega was said to have sent his family out of Nicaragua immediately after the invasion of Grenada.) U.S. pressure in the form of military exercises in the Caribbean and Central America, U.S. sponsorship of revolutionary activities in the region, and the Grenada intervention created a bunker mentality in Nicaragua, and proved to

the Sandinistas that there was a limit to U.S. patience. Despite this sobering effect on Managua, the impact of Grenada on Nicaragua should not be overestimated. The intervention contributed to a noticeable weakening of Nicaraguan support for guerrillas in El Salvador, and increased the pressures towards negotiations with the Duarte government. However, it sharpened Managua's obstinance, and played into the hands of the hard-liners such as Minister of the Interior, Tomas Borge. For him, the intervention served as proof of a forthcoming U.S. intervention in Nicaragua.

Some residual effects of the intervention were evident elsewhere in the Caribbean Basin, particularly in Surinam. Under pressure from Brazil, but also because of events in Grenada and just hours after the U.S. intervention on October 26th, Surinam expelled Cuban advisors and diplomatic ties with Cuba were reduced to a minimum. The Cubans were held responsible for the bloody October 19th coup. The expulsion decision appeared to have been made after the anti-Bishop coup, but the U.S. intervention may have accelerated the disengagement. Recent developments such as improved relations between Nicaragua and Surinam suggest that the impact of the intervention has dissipated somewhat.

It is not surprising that in Asia and Africa (particularly in Angola and Ethiopia) the effects of the U.S. intervention in Grenada were not as profound as they were in the Caribbean Basin. However, even leaders in Ethiopia and Angola probably were surprised by Soviet and Cuban inability to support Grenada. The action in Grenada conveyed a message about U.S. resolve which may support the U.S. "constructive engagement" strategy in Southern Africa. The intervention was viewed as a positive sign by the Angolan anti-Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) guerrilla forces such as the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) which in fall of 1984 increased the scope of its activities to include the capital Luanda. It also sounded a positive note among Afghan freedom fighters.

While the Grenada intervention raised the costs of Soviet and Cuban support for revolutionary activities in geographically remote regions, its effect upon Third World revolutionary regimes is still unclear. If followed by long-term U.S. strategy to curb Soviet/Cuban influence in Third World regions, and a successful stabilization in Grenada and the Caribbean Basin as a whole, the impact of the intervention may be more lasting than some observers have anticipated.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS

Most conferees agreed that the U.S./East Caribbean intervention in Grenada was an extraordinary yet necessary measure. Although the detrimental consequences of the intervention to U.S. relations with Western Europe and some Third World countries were acknowledged, most conferees agreed that in the long run, U.S. inaction in Grenada was fraught with grave consequences for the security of the United States and East Caribbean nations. For example, U.S. inaction could have led to demoralization of friendly nations in the Car-

ibbean region, and elsewhere. The extraordinary circumstances preceding the U.S. decision to intervene, such as the killing of a popular Prime Minister and several Cabinet members, the uncertain status of American students, and the urgent request for help by East Caribbean nations, made intervention an enticing option for U.S. policymakers.

There is no conclusive evidence of an immediate, direct threat to U.S. security interests due to conditions in Grenada. Had a military buildup taken place in the future, a threat to U.S. security interests could have become a reality, and it would have been more difficult to effect a reversal. However, the prevailing consensus among members of the Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS) in 1983 was that Grenada's military build-up had threatening implications for the region. There is no doubt that Mr. Reagan's decision prevented the consolidation of a more brutal Leninist, and more pro-Soviet, regime.

It is imperative that U.S. policymakers pursue a vigorous and sustained program of political and economic stabilization in Grenada. Regardless of its size, Grenada is a challenging test of American resolve and commitment to democratic values. Therefore, by democratic means, the United States must do its utmost to prevent the return to rule of Eric Gairy or another NJM dictatorship that would be a serious blow to U.S. credibility and sincerity.

The successful military intervention in Grenada must be followed by long-term economic assistance. By political and economic means, the U.S. must seek truly to restore the democratic process in Grenada. In this effort, the National Endowment for Democracy should develop educational and research institutions for study of causes and conditions of years of oppression under Gairy and the NJM, and contribute to the democratic education of future generations of Grenada and other Caribbean countries. The lure of oppressive rule to the power-hungry of both right and left is a lesson that should not be forgotten, as it is applicable to the region as a whole.

A point eloquently made at the conference was that the Third World arena matters little in terms of geopolitical struggle between East and West. Most participants either explicitly or implicitly challenged this assumption. Since the late 1950's, superpower competition in the Third World, and the potential ignition of global conflict, has been a central issue for U.S. policymakers. As always, prevention of superpower confrontation and escalation of conflict in the Third World should be given highest priority in U.S. strategic planning.

An understanding and appreciation of the Third World's historical, political, economic, and social diversity is essential for a successful and sensitive U.S. policy toward the Caribbean Basin region. It is simplistic to attribute the source of conflict solely to Soviet and Cuban policies; equally naive is the notion that poverty is the cause of the problem. What is undeniable is that the U.S.S.R., its allies, and proxies often take effective advantage of political instability or crisis in developing nations. This has been particularly true over the last decade as the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and, along with Cuba and other proxies, became active in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. Meanwhile, the Soviets and Cubans provided substantial security aid (weapons and advisors) to revolutionary forces in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Grenada.

Given the centrality of the Soviet-American competition in Third World

areas, U.S. policymakers must abandon short-term strategies that address short-term crises; instead, we must develop consistent long-term strategies designed to avoid conflict and control future crises effectively.

The Caribbean Basin is especially important to the United States because of its geographic proximity. The Basin constitutes a vital passageway for petroleum and other important raw materials, and would assume critical strategic importance if the United States were to be involved in an overseas conventional war. In that event, a growing Soviet/Cuban military presence in the Basin could endanger U.S. logistical support for NATO forces in Europe, as well as the delivery of strategic materials to the United States. The United States also has compelling economic interests in the Caribbean Basin by virtue of the large private business investments there. The safeguarding of U.S. interests in the region and domestic stability require preventing abrupt economic dislocation, massive immigration, and hostile radicalization of Caribbean political life.

The Reagan administration has recognized the importance of Central America and the Caribbean Basin to the United States, and has directed attention to this long-neglected region. Formation of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (chaired by Dr. Henry Kissinger) was an important step toward devising long-term viable policies. U.S. officials should be more visible in their support and implementation of legislation that is based on the recommendations of the Kissinger Commission report.

Beyond the scope of the work of the Bipartisan Commission, there is an urgent need to anticipate long-term challenges to the United States, not only in Central America (the only region dealt with by the Bipartisan Commission), but also in the Caribbean Basin, South America, and other parts of the Third World. An analysis of NJM strategy in Grenada suggests linkages among the revolutionary forces of Central America, the Caribbean, and South America. These perceived linkages are very much part of Soviet and Cuban strategic thinking, and must not be neglected or overlooked by U.S. policymakers.

There is an equally urgent need to study the dynamics of political and economic challenges in Peru, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, and the changes that are anticipated in Chile in 1989. Of no less importance are the economic problems and possible political destabilization in Mexico. It is also necessary to study the strategies and tactics of communist and radical Third World regimes that affect these Central and South American countries, and to examine the latter's ties with the U.S.S.R. and Cuba. Given the experience in Grenada and elsewhere in the Third World, Soviet and Cuban perceptions and policies deserve special attention by U.S. policymakers.

We should be better prepared to anticipate and prevent crises in the Third World whenever possible, and to control those which are unavoidable. Policymakers need to substitute ideological rigidity with a resilient frame of mind to understand radical Third World regimes. They should avoid indiscriminant labeling of all radical forces as Marxist or Marxist-Leninist, since these tend to confuse the political and ideological orientation of these groups. It is ludicrous to call Surinam's LTC Dese Bouterse a Marxist. Careless usage of the Marxist-Leninist label (even in documents such as the distinguished report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America) belies a misreading of the complexity and differences existing among Communist and

radical Third World parties. National Communist parties such as those of China and Yugoslavia fear Soviet imperialist ambitions, while others such as Italy's Eurocommunist Party and Yugoslavia's party are of pluralist or semi-pluralist orientation and refuse the Leninist label. Some radical regimes in the Third World are not Leninist-oriented. As suggested by the Grenada documents, radically nationalistic forces coexist with Leninist factions within radical Third World regimes; the distinction between Leninist and non-Leninist forces should not be blurred. Because "Leninist-oriented" clearly means having both a vanguard party and a pro-Soviet foreign policy, U.S. policymakers and their advisors should avoid stereotyping and classifying Third World radical parties.

Politically, U.S. policymakers must support democratic processes in Third World countries, particularly in Central America and the Caribbean Basin, that resist oppression, be it of the left or right. We must exercise greater pressure on the El Salvador government than we did before the 1984 election to curb and eliminate right wing death squads. However, experience indicates that the extreme left cannot be defeated by wiping out the political center; nor can we endorse the guerrillas' violent approach. Moreover, we must avoid creating a double standard by insisting on progress toward democracy in El Salvador, but not in Nicaragua, where the Sandinistas are establishing a regime similar to that which existed in Grenada.

Political and economic aid should be extended to friendly Third World regimes in an amount that each nation can utilize effectively and that is dependent on the observance of basic human rights. The most prudent way to prevent a future Grenada is to strengthen existing ties and encourage more capable democratic institutions in developing nations. In the Caribbean Basin in particular, we must help democratic forces resist attempts by the parties in power to subvert legal and constitutional procedures, as in Grenada under Gairy, or Guyana under Forbes Burnham. The projected work of the National Endowment for Democracy is an important step toward these goals. However, we need to go beyond this framework to develop new and imaginative ways to accomplish the establishment of capable and responsible democratic institutions in developing nations.

In terms of politics, the U.S. should promote friendly political ties with Third World radical regimes, excluding only those aligned with the U.S.S.R. and its allies. Meanwhile, through diplomatic exchange programs, we should attempt to cultivate political ties with opposition parties of various persuasions, while becoming better acquainted with and more knowledgeable about their leaderships. The Carter administration erred by failing to do this in 1979 in Grenada. It is imperative that we understand various elites and counter-elites in radical Third World nations. We must upgrade and expand our diplomatic personnel through permanent representation in each of the developing nations, no matter how minuscule their size, heeding the British example. The paucity of U.S. intelligence about the political development in Grenada points out that intelligence gathering and evaluating activities in the area must be improved.

According to East Caribbean sources, in 1980-81 there were no experts on Grenada whatsoever in the U.S. intelligence community. Within the U.S. governmental structures, we must strengthen and disseminate appropriate in-

telligence evaluations. Moreover, we must train and prepare credible and dynamic diplomatic cadres with adequate linguistic abilities to cope with new challenges in radical areas of the Third World.

The economic situation throughout Central America is appalling. We need to allocate greater resources to encourage economic development in emerging nations, particularly in those geographically near to the United States. The Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the Central American Project are new programs urgently needed to formulate economic assistance packages and improve the floor of credit and investment in Central America and the Caribbean Islands. Immediate economic aid, from both the private and public sectors, is imperative—even before political solutions are found.⁶

Immediate emergency aid should be followed by the long-term five-year economic assistance programs recommended by the Bipartisan Commission. The success of this approach will require not only American resources, but also bipartisan public support, and above all, patience, as there will be no quick fix. However, financial aid alone is not the answer to all the problems of the Caribbean Basin. In fact, economic assistance to some Caribbean islands is relatively high at present, and may be at the upper limit of what these nations can absorb for the time being. Other more urgent needs include concentrated assistance in developing a technical infrastructure (roads, ports, communications, etc.), advice on planning and budgeting programs, and education of economic and financial experts. We should employ both private and public sector approaches to provide this assistance.

The U.S. Government and its citizens must not entertain unrealistic expectations for Central America and the Caribbean Basin. We must recognize that despite the best efforts, at least some of the Caribbean nations may never achieve self-sustained economic growth and therefore will continue to depend on economic aid from the United States, Canada, and other industrialized nations.

U.S. security assistance must be an integral part of U.S. strategy *vis-à-vis* Third World nations. Whereas security threats in many remote parts of Asia and Africa tend not to affect vital U.S. interests, threats in the Caribbean Basin do. In the Caribbean Basin, threats to a given nation's stability may not always be caused by deteriorating socio-economic conditions, or by the U.S.S.R. and Cuba, but by coup attempts organized by North American gangsters (Dominica), or by bands of modern-day buccaneers (Barbados).

Therefore, in the Caribbean Basin we must not separate diplomacy and force. Although, one cannot give exact recommendations as to how, or under what circumstances, force should be used, it should be remembered that direct use of American force should only be carried out under extraordinary circumstances such as those in Grenada in October 1983. However, in some extreme circumstances the careful use of direct U.S. military force may again become necessary.

The indirect application of force (military exercises, for example) is the preferred approach. The expanding U.S. naval deployment in the Caribbean, and the military exercises in Honduras, in conjunction with the Grenada intervention, have had a sobering effect upon Havana and Managua. Whenever prudent, the U.S. should continue to use indirect military force in peacetime to further its foreign policy objectives, particularly by regular and irregular bi-

lateral and multilateral exercises in the Caribbean Basin and Central America. To be effective, joint military exercises and other forms of military activities in the Caribbean Basin, as elsewhere, require an extraordinary sensitive touch on the part of the U.S. military in recognizing our allies' national pride and self-respect.

Responsible arms transfers and other forms of security aid to friendly Third World nations, taking into account the reasonable security needs of each country and each country's record on and human rights, criteria, are also an option. In this respect, Congress should repeal Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act which prohibits the use of U.S. foreign assistance funds for training national police in developing nations. Surely such training should be permitted in countries having Westminster parliamentary political cultures such as those found in the Caribbean. We should also help strengthen the coast guard, internal security, and intelligence capabilities of friendly developing nations in the Caribbean, and in the democratic nations of Central America such as Costa Rica.

The experience of Grenada suggests that one of the most complex difficulties facing the United States is to counter the activities of Soviet junior partners such as Cuba, Libya, Vietnam, North Korea, and some of the East European countries. It is one of the most serious security problems to face the United States in the last decade. An important lesson coming out of the Grenada experience is the recognition of the need for the United States to develop an effective counter-strategy which would multiply and intensify the constraints on the Soviets and their allies in strategic regions of the Third World.

Inducements and pressures need to be exercised upon the U.S.S.R., Cuba, Libya, the WTO nations, and other countries whose Third World policies purposely serve Soviet security and political interests. The indebtedness and otherwise serious economic problems facing nations such as Cuba and Nicaragua provide the United States with some opportunities to employ negative incentives to curb their activities. The U.S. Government should do its utmost to coordinate Western credit policies toward Cuba, Nicaragua, and other Soviet junior partners.

In addition to various forms of pressure, and indirect use of force, the United States should not discourage allies like former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat from actively pursuing policies aimed at hampering the activities of Soviet allies. While exerting pressure upon Soviet allies, we should not discount proposals for negotiation when offered by regimes such as those in Nicaragua and Cuba. However, we should guard against naïveté: given Cuba's and Nicaragua's expressed commitment to revolution, any negotiated solution must be based on reciprocity, verifiable agreements, and careful monitoring. Soviet and Cuban military ties with Nicaragua should be unacceptable, and therefore nonnegotiable.

The Grenada documents reveal some tactical differences between the Soviet Union and Cuba, as well as between various competing factions in radical, socialist-oriented regimes. Using new and imaginative tactics, the United States can play upon those existing and future tactical differences, thereby undermining Soviet partnership policies. In some cases, we might consider the option of furnishing aid to insurgents fighting against recognized oppressive governments. Other means can be devised to co-opt non-Leninist insur-

gents who might otherwise develop close ties with the U.S.S.R. via Leninist elements such as Coard's group in Grenada, or that of First Secretary Shafik Handal of the Communist Party in El Salvador. Such a strategy might have been quite effective in both Nicaragua and Grenada prior to 1979.

The experience of Grenada should have dispelled any preexisting misperceptions regarding Third World revolutions. We should neither exaggerate nor underestimate the ties of some of these revolutionaries with the Soviet Union and its allies. Each revolution must be judged independently, and we should distinguish between Soviet/Cuban-fomented strife in the Third World, and revolutionary situations indigenous to developing countries.

No American foreign policy can be successful without the bipartisan support of the American people. Implementing policy over a period of time is difficult in the American political system. Long-term U.S. policies recommended by the Bipartisan National Commission on Central America require strong domestic support and an enduring commitment, as does any effective U.S. counter-strategy to Soviet/Cuban policies in the Third World.

Obviously, the U.S. presidential election season does not provide the most propitious time for bipartisan support on any issue. Yet it is very encouraging that so far the issue of Soviet/Cuban activities in the Caribbean Basin in general, and of the Grenadian intervention in particular, has not become a subject of controversy between the presidential candidates. In fact, the intervention in Grenada was subsequently supported by candidate Walter Mondale, who declared that if he had been President, he too would have used military force "to go there and protect U.S. lives".⁷ However, regardless of who assumes office on November 6, 1984, every effort should be made to develop long-term American policies to cope with revolutionary regimes faced with the Soviet/Cuban threat, and the threat to the United States via these countries. The Soviets and their allies place great importance on reaching, and even influencing, public opinion in the United States. Indeed, one of the captured documents in Grenada was a telephone book listing sympathetic media and other useful contacts in the United States.

Much as been written about the need to educate the American public concerning Soviet-American arms control and strategic balances, but little has been done to generate public interest in revolutionary problems in the Third World, and in Soviet/Cuban attempts to exploit them. It is up to U.S. Government agencies and private organizations to foster more research and to increase public awareness about Third World revolutions as they relate to Soviet, Cuban, and allied proxy strategies and tactics.

There is likewise a great need to educate the American people about Soviet efforts to reduce the U.S. capacity to respond to and challenge Soviet strategy. This reduced capacity has been achieved not only by the impressive Soviet military buildup of the last decade, but also by indirect political maneuvering and propagandizing. These latter efforts are aimed at distorting the nature of local Third World conflicts, presenting each as a new Vietnam and a menacing prelude to general war. More funding should be made available for East-West and Third World specialists to study these problems, because experts from both groups often have differing perspectives. A divided foreign policy establishment and divided community of foreign policy specialists in the United States seriously inhibits the formulation of and support for U.S.

foreign policy. We do ourselves a great disservice in speaking of liberal versus conservative positions regarding Soviet power and the Third World. We should put all such ideological stereotypes behind us, and work toward a national consensus in support of realistic and effective long-term policies. These efforts should not be sponsored only by a few elitist institutions, but should also tap the talent of a broad cross-section of educational and research institutions.

Funding should be provided to produce a first-rate series of television documentaries for sustained and expanded coverage of activities of radical Third World regimes and aspects of Soviet and Cuban policy toward the Third World. National Public Radio should broadcast aspects of Soviet and Cuban activities in the Third World. There should be more extensive interaction on these subjects among U.S. Government agencies and academic and research institutions. New research centers dealing with Soviet involvement in the Third World should be funded, and the U.S. Government should take a more active role in bringing about the interaction of Soviet and Third World experts in a number of short- and long-term projects.

An extensive effort must be made to bridge existing divisions on these issues through education of the American public. This will promote significantly the consensus building needed to implement and sustain long-term foreign policies intended to counter deleterious Soviet/Cuban strategy in the Third World.

NOTES

1. Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963.
2. A handful of documents, perhaps ten, appear to affect the privacy of U.S. Citizens. These will not be available for public scrutiny.
3. Karen Brutents, *The Newly Free Countries in the Seventies*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1979, p. 106.
4. J. Valenta and V. Valenta, "Leninism in Grenada", *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1984, p. 18.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
6. For a more substantial discussion, see William H. Bolin "Central America's Real Economic Help Is Wanted Now," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1984, pp. 1096-1108.
7. *The Washington Post*, September 19, 1984.

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