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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



Executive Registry  
84 - 763

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6 February 1984

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Mr. William J. Casey  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20305

Dear Mr. Casey:

[Redacted]

The following items of intelligence are provided for your use this week:

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1. The Angolan Air Force is about to receive its first squadron of MIG-23/FLOGGERS from the Soviet Union.

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FLOGGERS are probably air interceptors intended to improve Luanda's capability to respond to South African air operations over southern Angola. Even if the FLOGGERS are quickly assembled and assimilated into the Air Force, their deployment to Southern Angola is unlikely to deter continued South African Air Force reconnaissance activity or bombing runs against presumed South West Africa People's Organization guerrilla bases. In fact, in the past, Angola's FISHBED pilots have been reluctant or refused to engage South African aircraft because in at least two encounters Luanda has lost two FISHBEDS without damaging Pretoria's aircraft. Thus, unless the proficiency of Angolan or Cuban pilots improves dramatically in coming months, the acquisition of FLOGGERS will be only a potential rather than an actual improvement in Angola's air power.

2.

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Although The Ghandi government stresses its present leadership in the Nonaligned Movement it has been notably restrained on the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. At the same time, the Kremlin is seeking to steadily improve its special relationship with India. In this vein, Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov's scheduled February visit to India (recently cancelled) was seen as an effort to further strengthen Indian dependence on Soviet military equipment by validating the various service deals negotiated in 1983.

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
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3. Iraq's daylight missions over 20 Iranian cities and seaports on 26 January were the first in more than a year. Sirens sounded in Iran cities and broadcasts were interrupted with warnings to seek shelter. Iraq's news media added to the pressure by announcing the receipt of SS-12/SCALEBOARD surface-to-surface missiles. These actions are another facet of the broad Iraqi campaign to pressure Iran into a negotiated resolution while preparing for escalation if peace efforts fail. Baghdad has also increased threats against Iran by citing its ability to destroy the latter's key oil export facility at Kharg Island by using its new Super Etendard aircraft. Iran knows well the effect of Iraqi surface to surface missiles, having suffered numerous FROG and SCUD attacks on its border cities throughout the war. Nevertheless, we have yet to receive confirmation on the receipt of SS-12s and it is highly unlikely Iraq's claim is true. In addition, an Iraqi strike on Kharg Island is probably not imminent because Arab acquiescence, a necessary ingredient, is still lacking.



JAMES A. WILLIAMS  
Lieutenant General, US Army  
Director

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