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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



15 March 1984

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[Redacted]

Mr. William J. Casey  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20305

Dear Mr. Casey:

[Redacted]

The following items of intelligence are provided for your use  
this week:

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1. There is increasing evidence that insurgents of the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) support their operations in Guatemala (GT) by operating logistic cells in the central and northern districts of Belize. This network of cells funnels money, food, medicine and arms to the guerrillas in GT, with some supplies going direct and others following a more circuitous route through Mexico. High Belizean Government officials are said to be aware of the FAR network, and a few have been implicated in aiding and abetting the guerrilla support operations or, at a minimum, acquiescing to it. Knowledge of FAR's cross-border activities might prompt Guatemala to take a harder negotiating attitude vis-a-vis Belize or, in the extreme, to mount armed incursions against its neighbor. Although the Government of Belize is not threatened at this time, the potential for trouble is considerable. Belize's failure thus far to shut down the FAR network could be a result of official complicity or the government's poor economic situation. It may also reflect the fact that the government does not want to do anything to anger its potential supporters in the approaching election. Whatever the implication, the long-suspected existence of a FAR network in Belize appears to be a fact.

2. Initial analysis of the Bulgarian arms transfer at El Bluff-Rama indicates the probable delivery of at least 20 PT-76 light amphibious tanks and 22 T-54/55 tanks. In addition, six BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles may also have been delivered recently to El Tempesque, a frequent storage point for new equipment and the home of a tank battalion. This is the first indication of the PT-76 in Nicaragua.

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The arms delivery at El Bluff-Rama, as well as the possible helicopter transfer at Corinto, is consistent with previous procedures. The PT-76s will quite likely be used to form reconnaissance elements in the Sandinistas armored and motorized infantry brigades. Both activities add to the evidence of continuing Warsaw Pact support for the government.

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
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3. Initial deliveries of the MI-9 airborne command post helicopter have apparently been made to East German and Czechoslovak air force units.



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Thus far in Soviet units one or two MI-9s have usually been assigned to a divisional helicopter squadron or transport helicopter regiment. This practice indicates some of the Basepohl helicopters will be transferred or deployed to other East German units.

JAMES A. WILLIAMS  
Lieutenant General, US Army  
Director

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