



SECRET

DDI-04768/84

17 AUG  
1984

NOTE FOR : Director of Central Intelligence  
 FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence  
 SUBJECT : Breakfast Meeting with Senator Wallop and  
 Angelo Codevilla  
 REFERENCE: Your query about paragraph four of the memo  
 describing the 31 July breakfast meeting with  
 Senator Wallop and Angelo Codevilla (Attachment 2)

1. I don't believe there are any misunderstandings about the importance of Soviet active measures and propaganda deceptions, or their role in our deception conference.

25X1 2. [redacted] did want the Senator to appreciate, however, that the focus of the conference is intended to be more comprehensive than that which would be afforded by examining only  
 25X1 [redacted], and that the conference is especially concerned with Soviet deceptions specifically targeted against the intelligence community.

3. Active measures will be covered at our HUMINT session on Thursday morning, and the concept was explicitly included in the working definition of deception sent to all conference participants (Attachment 1). This definition, incidentally, was developed as a more succinct version of that being used in NIE 11-11.



Robert M. Gates

Attachments:

- 1 - Working definition of deception sent to conference participants
- 2 - Your note of 10 August concerning the breakfast meeting with Senator Wallop

THIS MEMORANDUM IS CLASSIFIED  
 SECRET IN ITS ENTIRETY

SECRET

CL BY SIGNER  
 DECL OADR

SECRET

SUBJECT: Breakfast Meeting with Senator Wallop and  
Angelo Codevilla

Distribution:

Original - Addressee (w/atts)

- 1 - DDI (w/atts)
- 1 - EXEC REGISTRY
- 1 - NIO/SP (w/atts)
- 1 - C/DDAC (w/atts)
- 1 - CRES Chrono (wo/atts)
- 1 - FICG Chrono (w/atts)
- 1 - FICG Subject (w/atts)

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DI/CRES/FICG/  (17 August 1984)

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### WORKING DEFINITION

Deception refers to a Soviet action, or set of actions, intended to create or perpetuate false perceptions with the aim of influencing US policies, plans, or actions to the advantage of the USSR. We are primarily interested in Soviet activities which are directed at US human and technical collection systems, and which are intended to lead US intelligence to erroneous conclusions. We are also concerned with activities which appear purposefully ambiguous, go beyond simple denial measures, and may be intended to compound the uncertainties in our assessments; and with active measures operations which have the effect of eroding policymakers' confidence in our intelligence judgments.

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


**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X (w/o att)		
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI	X (w/att)			
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	ES		X (w/o att)		
20					
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22					
		SUSPENSE	17 August	Date	

Remarks

  
 Executive Secretary  
 10 August 1984  
 Date

3637 (10-81)

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ER 84-6031

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Executive Registry
84- 6031

H. DDI 84-04466


10 August 1984

NOTE FOR: DDI

FROM: DCI

Bob:

What do you make of this? I certainly don't think that, as paragraph four seems to indicate was done, the active measures and propaganda deception can be ruled out of our area of concern.

  
William J. Casey

Attachment:  
Memo for the Record,  
dtd 2 August 84,  
Subject: Breakfast  
Meeting with Senator  
Wallop and Angelo  
Codevilla

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**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Breakfast Meeting with Senator Wallop and Angelo Codevilla

FROM: C/FICG/CRES/DI  
3E47 Hqs.

EXTENSION

NO. DDI-04466/84

DATE 2 August 1984

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

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1. ~~DCI~~  
~~4060~~ *Hqs*

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SECRET / [redacted] DDI 04466/84  
[redacted]

2 August 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

25X1

FROM : Larry Gershwin, NIO/SP  
: [redacted] C/DDAC  
: [redacted] C/FICG/CRES

25X1

SUBJECT: Breakfast Meeting with Senator Wallop and  
Angelo Codevilla [redacted]

1. On 31 July, the subject meeting was held in the DCI's dining room to discuss several issues related to Soviet intelligence denial and deception. The discussion that ensued for 1-1/4 hours involved a constructive exchange of views and information, and on the whole appeared to satisfy our objective of communicating the many steps the Community has taken during the past two years to improve, expand, and institutionalize its analysis in this area.

2. We explained several matters, including the following:

-the establishment of the DDAC, and its mission to coordinate the work of the several new groups in the Community, including those at NSA, DIA, AF/INOA, and FICG; an extended description of activities underway at and level of expertise employed by NSA and DIA; and, the relationship among the IPC, NIC, and DDAC.

-the establishment of FICG, including its size, missions, and functions; its role within the DI with regard to the cross-cutting research issue; its involvement in studies like the Integrated Damage Assessment and NIE 11-11; and, a few examples of the types of papers on FICG's production agenda (e.g., Soviet Intelligence Analysis and the Soviet Satellite Warning Program).

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[redacted]



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DDI-04466/84

-the fact that the new Community groups are directly represented in the NIE 11-11 process.

3. Senator Wallop and SSCI staffer Codevilla raised several issues, including:

-the Brass Commission recommendation for 10 positions to be added to the NIO/FDIA. We responded that the NIC was designed to be lean; that being in an evolutionary phase it is too early to determine whether the NIO needs additional positions; and, that if new positions are needed for denial and deception (D&D) analysis they should be assigned to the production offices of the Community's analytical organizations.

-Soviet active measures, including disinformation, as a major problem that confronts the United States. They cited the campaign by Velikov against the US strategic defense initiative and on the ASAT talks as an example of how well organized the Soviet effort is, and asked how the Community was organized to deal with the subject. We described the mission of the State-chaired Active Measures Working Group, suggested that they hear more detail from members of that group, and while admitting that DI analysis in the area was limited, cited the draft IIM being prepared under the aegis of [redacted]. Several times Senator Wallop expressed the US policy need for a quick-reaction capability, one that could respond rapidly to statements like those by Velikov. Necessary to this response, the Senator believes, is the sharing of the essence of the Community's information with the general public as a key to countering the Soviets.

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-the need to educate policymakers. The Senator is concerned that now that the Community is organized to produce D & D papers, the findings will not reach those who need to be educated, e.g., Congressman Long and the drafters of the Democratic platform.

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5. As we stood up, Codevilla, in an aside, noted he viewed FICG's organizational position under the DDI as a conflict of interest. He implied that FICG would not question or challenge DI products owing to potential risks to career development. We did not respond directly to this point, but noted we felt constructive criticism would be received within the family. And, we offered that in our view the production (positive intelligence) side of the house was the right place for deception analysis rather than within counterintelligence; and, that by being in the production directorate and organizationally separated from collection programs, FICG is better able to assess deception issues.

6. There was no specific discussion of the SSCI's proposal to establish a counterintelligence analysis center in DIA--although we provided a thorough explanation of DIA's current D&D effort overseen by DB-I--or of our counterproposal to augment FICG by including analysts from other agencies. Our intention was to emphasize the many Community efforts already underway and to stress the role in this regard of positive intelligence versus counterintelligence. It is also noteworthy that there was very little discussion about NIE 11-11. In sum, we probably made a positive contribution, but are unsure if we led them to turn the corner insofar as the markup is concerned.

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SECRET [redacted]

DDI-04466/84

SUBJECT: Breakfast Meeting with Senator Wallop and Angelo Codevilla [redacted]

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Distribution:

- 1 - DCI
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - DDI
- 1 - ADDI
- 1 - D/OLL
- 1 - NIO/FDIA
- 1 - C/DDAC
- 1 - ICS [redacted]
- 1 - NIO/SP
- 1 - IPC Staff [redacted]
- 1 - C/ACIS
- 1 - NIO/At Large (Hutchinson)
- 1 - CRES Chrono
- 1 - FICG Chrono
- 1 - FICG Subject
- 1 - C/CI Staff/DO

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DI/CRES/FICG [redacted] (2 August 1984)

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- 4 -  
SECRET [redacted]

### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**SUBJECT:** (Optional)

Breakfast Meeting with Senator Wallop and Angelo Codevilla

<b>FROM:</b> C/FICG/CRES/DI 3E47 Hqs.	<b>EXTENSION</b>  	<b>NO.</b> DDI-04466/84
		<b>DATE</b> 2 August 1984

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE	DATE	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDI 2E44 Hqs.			8	
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SECRET, [redacted] DDI-04466/84  
[redacted]

2 August 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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FROM : Larry Gershwin, NIO/SP  
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: [redacted] C/FICG/CRES

25X1

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DDI-04466/84

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DDI-04466/84

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SECRET [redacted] DDI-04466/84  
[redacted]

SUBJECT: Breakfast Meeting with Senator Wallop and  
Angelo Codevilla [redacted]

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- 1 - FICG Subject
- 1 - C/CI Staff/DO

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DI/CRES/FICG/[redacted] (2 August 1984)

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