MEMORANDUM FOR: RECORD

Comments at paper clips (which were provided by C/ACIS [redacted]) phoned to Barbara Frelek ES/ACDA 1220 hrs. 4/30/84.

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20451

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84- 1911

April 27, 1984

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robert M. Kimmitt,
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Charles Hill,
Executive Secretary, Department of State

Colonel John H. Stanford,
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense

[redacted] STAT
Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: ADPA Speech

A draft copy of the Director's speech to be given on May 2, 1984, before the ADPA in Seattle, Washington, is attached. Any comments you may have should be phoned to me (632-8478) not later than 3:00 p.m., Monday, April 30.

Barbara Toelek for
William B. Staples
Executive Secretary

Attachment
As stated

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EXEC
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L-266

TECHNOLOGY: FRIEND OR FOE OF ARMS CONTROL?

Ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure to be here with you this evening. I want to thank the American Defense Preparedness Association for inviting me to talk about arms control, technology and our national security.

In reflecting on this subject, a story I once heard about Winston Churchill's 1946 visit to the United States came to mind. You will recall that that visit was the occasion for his famous and prophetic "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri. During that same visit, it has been reported that Churchill received a briefing on the future of some new technologies--including the future ability to alter man's thinking and behavior. When asked what he thought about those horizons, he reportedly responded that his only consolation was the knowledge that he would not be around.

This should remind us of the dual-edged nature of technological development. It offers both promise and problems. We can ignore either only at great risk or great loss.

I want today to discuss briefly how technology and arms control go hand-in-hand--as a friend, not a foe--in our efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Surely we all agree that reducing that risk is among the most critical--if not the most critical--issue of our time. President Reagan has, I can assure you, no higher priority.

I am also sure that we all agree that arms control agreements by themselves cannot prevent nuclear war. To keep the peace, we must first be militarily and economically strong. As a great and free nation, we have great responsibilities for taking the lead in maintaining peace, while simultaneously preserving democracy, freedom and other cherished values.

For forty years we have deterred major Soviet aggression. We have done this by the threat of a nuclear response to large-scale conventional attacks on NATO and by guaranteed nuclear retaliation in response to a Soviet nuclear strike against the United States or any nation vital to US interests.

Our policy of assured retaliation--even though its object is deterrence--raises for some the specter of nuclear holocaust. There are those, including some leading religious leaders, who react to this policy--sometimes called mutual assured destruction--with moral outrage.

I can assure you that the President, and those of us who serve under him, are no less aware, no less concerned about the potential horror of nuclear devastation. Moreover, we are keenly aware that no nation can win a nuclear war. A major nuclear war would leave only losers with long-term global effects that would know no boundaries between attacker and those attacked, or between combatants and innocent peoples.

So far our long-standing policy of deterrence has worked. We have experienced no nuclear war. We have succeeded in deterring conventional aggression where our greatest economic and security interests lie. The absence of a major conflict in Europe since World War II represents a period of peace unmatched on the Continent in the preceding two centuries.

As we look down the road, technological advancement will remain central to effective deterrence and to effective arms control in several ways.

First, one of the great ironies of security policy is that to preserve peace--and to establish a realistic basis for arms control--we must continually improve our deterrent posture. Technology can provide the modernization we need to keep the peace.

Second, history has shown us that arms control agreements thare are not effectively verifiable become a source of tension and mistrust, rather than reinforcing the prospects for peace. Technology can provide the assurances and capabilities we need to construct effective, enduring agreements.

Finally, emerging technologies are permitting us to now begin to contemplate replacing some nuclear weapons with conventional weapons which can perform the same tasks. By reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, technology could provide new incentives for nuclear arms reductions at the negotiating table and raise the nuclear threshhold. Let me briefly touch on each of these areas, before welcoming your questions.

Technology and Modernization

For Americans the most fundamental principle of our security policy is that our purpose is to prevent war, and especially nuclear war, from occurring. To prevent war, we must maintain forces which make clear to any potential aggressor that the cost to him of starting a war would be far greater than anything he could hope to gain. This has been the core of our deterrent policy since World War II.

To be sure, we must also continuously try to negotiate controls on these weapons, and particularly those that most threaten peace and stability; this includes the large land-based ICBM systems that represent the greater threat of a first strike. We must also continuously seek other measures that reduce tension and uncertainties in East-West relations.

But we cannot--indeed dare not--ignore the need to respond in a measured way to the challenges posed by the expanding Soviet nuclear arsenal with improvements in our own strategic forces. Arms control is not an alternative to modernizing our armed forces. Rather maintaining effective armed forces--including survivable nuclear forces--is essential for arms control to have a chance. Achieving sound arms control agreements and force modernization are mutually dependent and mutually reinforcing policies.

The Soviets are not different in this respect from any other tough negotiator. If they can realize their goals without giving up anything in return, they will surely prefer that deal. Who wouldn't? If we hand them strategic superiority by neglecting our force modernization, we cannot hope to attain strategic parity by pursuing arms control. On the other hand, if we pursue programs to redress the imbalances that have developed through the unparalled Soviet military buildup over the past decade, the

Soviets will have strong incentives to negotiate genuine arms reductions. And negotiate, I believe, they will.

Arms control will simply not survive in conditions of US-Soviet military inequality, real or perceived. The relentless buildup of Soviet nuclear forces over the past decade and the growing vulnerabilities of elements of the US strategic forces has forced us to design new weapons systems to counter the resulting imbalances and instability. Once again we are relying on technology to give us new weapons that are less vulnerable to enemy attack, will maintain our deterrent capability, improve stability and, thus, reduce the risk of war.

For example, the President announced last year that we would follow the recommendation of the Scowcroft Commission and develop a new small missile--called Midgetman--that could be based in a number of ways, such as mobile launchers, that would be better able to survive a Soviet attack and thus increase crisis stability. The conclusion of that program will represent a major technological advance and contribute significantly to deterrence.

Efforts are also underway to modernize our submarine launched missiles and our bombers. And we are continuing to implement NATO's 1979 decision to modernize the Alliance's intermediate-range nuclear forces to balance Moscow's massive, unprovoked--and profoundly destabilizing--buildup of new triple-warheaded SS-20s. In the long term, we also are trying to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons in the strategic area by seeking viable new technolog~~y~~ies of missile defense.

As we improve our conventional, theater and strategic nuclear forces in an effort to maintain the balance, we are also intensively seeking arms control solutions to our security problems. We have been negotiating with the Soviet Union, in Geneva, to substantially reduce the strategic arsenals of both sides. Particularly, we have concentrated on reducing the two most destabilizing elements of those forces, MIRVed missile warheads and total missile throw-weight. In INF we have been seeking to eliminate the entire class of longer-range INF missiles which include the Soviet SS-20 missiles and our ongoing and planned deployments of Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles.

But, as you know, the START and INF negotiations have been put on hold by the Soviet Union for an indefinite period. This Soviet action was totally unjustified. For our part we remain prepared to return to the negotiating table without preconditions at the earliest possible time.

Technology and Verification

A second area where technology has a major role to play in arms control is in verifying compliance with agreements and in providing monitoring capabilities for new limitations.

The President's recent findings of Soviet violations or probable violations of a number of arms control obligations underline the importance of effective verification. You cannot have sound arms control without compliance; and you cannot have compliance unless you have knowledge. Technology ~~can~~ has helped us greatly here and can do more.

Yet verification becomes more difficult and complicated as nuclear weapons grow more complex. With the eventual introduction of mobile ICBMs like Midgetman here and in the Soviet Union, for example we will be presented with new arms control challenges--how to monitor the number of mobile weapons deployed throughout the vast Soviet land mass? The problems will be even tougher as we focus on qualitative aspects of the arms competition. Acceptable solutions to verification problems will require innovative thinking, a partnership between our engineers and our diplomats, and--but not least--a good deal of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

However difficult this problem, we have no reason to despair. We have faced such problems in the past; we can do so again, under vastly more complicated conditions. Indeed, it is probably fair to say that the SALT I treaty limiting US and Soviet strategic forces was made possible back in the last 1960s by the development of a number of technological marvels--the advent of surveillance satellites euphemistically called national technical means [redacted]

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There is some debate about how effective our national technical means have been in monitoring compliance with arms control treaties. But you are all aware that it was this American technology that has enabled us to uncover Soviet violations of existing arms control treaties. This is a clear demonstration of how technology and diplomacy work hand-in-hand, and it offers hope for crafting workable arms control treaties in the future. One thing is certain, if verifiable arms control treaties are to be a reality, our ability to monitor compliance will have to keep pace with changing weapons technologies.

Future Horizons

Looking back, we have done reasonably well in both the modernization and verification areas in maintaining our security. Our technical and industrial capabilities have improved and we continue to build on and learn from past arms control experience. Solutions to our near-term security problems, while not completed, seem close at hand. It is less clear, though, just what our nuclear strategy and policy will be around the turn of the century.

This brings me to the third area where technology can play a major role in arms control--the development of emerging weapons technology which, while enhancing deterrence, will reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons.

The nuclear genie will not be put back in the bottle in the foreseeable future, if ever. We must, therefore, look to the horizon and beyond for new policies and strategies that can serve us and our Allies in the future. Here, again, we might look for answers along the dual-track of technology and diplomacy--new weapons systems, new arms control measures.

Developments in conventional weapons systems offer us future opportunities to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons and to significantly raise the threshold for using nuclear weapons in Europe and elsewhere. The distinct possibility exists that improved conventional weapons can replace some nuclear weapons in accomplishing many military missions.

For example, with more accurate targeting and more effective conventional munitions, we could expect that conventional weapons could be used to destroy targets deep behind enemy lines which previously could be effectively attacked only with nuclear weapons. Progress in missile guidance means that our new surface-to-air missile defense systems could rely on conventional, rather than nuclear warheads. Conventional weapons might also be preferable for anti-submarine warfare. And there are numerous other areas where emerging conventional technologies provide potential replacements for nuclear weapons.

But I hasten to introduce a cautionary note. For as far as we can see into the future, nuclear weapons will continue to undergird the West's deterrent strategy.

In the President's speech of March 23, 1983 he called upon the scientific and technical community to determine how we might use future technologies, technologies that have yet to emerge from the laboratory to defend our nation and our Allies against ballistic missile attacks. We may discover that defense systems even if not totally effective, will change the strategic reltionship between the superpowers in ways that will be beneficial to both. We will need to pursue research that will lead us down this road.

There are no assurances that these approaches will work even if they are technically and economically feasible. What is clear, though, is that, if either of these ideas--or some combination of the two--is to succeed, a necessary condition will be verifiable arms control agreements--agreements that limit the dimensions of the US-Soviet military competition. Without such limitations, we are likely to endlessly skitter from one kind of arms competition to another. We will have failed.

I am confident that our technical and scientific community, along with the political and diplomatic communities, will continue to work together to solve these difficult problems.

J. Robert Oppenheimer said, at the explosion of the first atomic bomb: "In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no overstatement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin; and this is a knowledge which they cannot lose". Perhaps some future Oppenheimer will say that technology equally opened the path to redemption. There is a chance, of course, that we may not succeed. But is certain that if we do not try, we will fail.

Thank you.

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20451

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OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

April 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR:

✓Robert M. Kimmitt,
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Charles Hill,
Executive Secretary, Department of State

Colonel John H. Stanford,
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense

[redacted] STAT
Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: World Affairs Council of Orange County Speech

A draft copy of the Director's speech to be given on May 4, 1984, before the World Affairs Council of Orange County, California is attached. Any comments you may have on this speech should be phoned to me (632-8478) not later than 3:00 p.m., Monday, April 30, 1984.

William B. Staples
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

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L-266

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It's a pleasure for me to be here to address the World Affairs Council of Orange County.

As some of you may know, before I was appointed to my present job as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, I served a two-year stint at the United Nations as the United States Deputy Representative. As you might imagine, it was not without some skepticism about the efficacy of multilateral diplomacy, and more specifically of the United Nations, that I agreed to serve. But the opportunity to work with Jeane Kirkpatrick was too good to turn down, and the UN experience proved invaluable.

Months later, I got a call from Judge Clark asking me to come to Washington to take over the Arms Control Agency, It came at a time when I was becoming increasingly frustrated by the amount of puerile rhetoric that goes on in New York. But I had also seen some faint glimmerings that a multilateral approach to arms control issues could be useful. Of course, the most important factor in my decision to accept was the challenge of the idea of coming to grips with some of the most intellectually demanding and emotionally charged issues of our times: how to reduce the risk of war while preserving our cherished values, our freedoms.

When I joined ACDA, we were actively and energetically engaged in bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear arms and on intermediate or long-range nuclear arms reductions in Europe, as well as the multilateral talks in Vienna, in Geneva, and a conference about ready to convene in Stockholm. I want to talk about those multilateral efforts tonight. They are where the action is these days in arms control because the Soviets have put the bilateral nuclear arms talks on ice for an indefinite period.

Multilateral negotiations have had an important, and often overlooked, impact. Negotiations at the Geneva Disarmament Committee (the predecessor of the present CD) produced the 1963 treaty that bans the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in space, and underwater. That was, in effect, the first international nuclear arms control treaty, and it continues to exercise an important influence today.

Another major product of the Geneva talks was the 1968 treaty banning the further spread of nuclear weapons to other countries and establishing a system for safeguarding peaceful nuclear activities so they cannot be used for military or any nuclear explosive purposes. That treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, is today adhered to by more than 120 nations--more countries than have adhered to any other arms control agreement. That treaty has been recognized by every U.S. Administration since President Johnson as a critical cornerstone of our interest in preventing nuclear weapons spread.

Just two weeks ago, Vice President Bush presented the United States draft treaty for a total global ban on chemical weapons to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. It signifies both the continuing importance of multilateral arms control issues and the intensity of the Reagan Administration's efforts to embrace security through arms control.

Of the three multilateral fora in which the East and West are involved in discussions on various arms control issues, the Geneva Conference is the oldest. It evolved over the years from an 18-Nation Disarmament Committee, which began meeting in 1962 and just this year has been renamed for the fourth or fifth time. It is now the Conference on Disarmament, a forty member group, representing the East, West, and the non-aligned. The next oldest multilateral area is the negotiations in Vienna on mutual and balanced conventional force reductions in Europe. These have been going on for 11 years, but have yet to achieve any significant agreement. The youngest, the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, began meeting this January in Stockholm.

Let's begin with the Conference on Disarmament and our draft treaty to ban chemical weapons totally.

President Reagan announced early last month that he would slend the Vice President to Geneva to present a draft treaty that would ban the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, transfer and use of chemical weapons. On April 18 the Vice President tabled the text and called upon the Soviet Ambassador seated two seats to his right--to work with us and the other 38 members of the CD to achieve agreement promptly.

The Soviet news agency Tass, responded almost immediately and predictably to this announcement by referring to the treaty as a propaganda trick deliberately rigged with unacceptable

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conditions. The conditions to which Tass referred are proposed provisions for on-site challenge inspections on very short notice. What the United States has proposed is indeed unusual. It is far-reaching, it is intrusive. In arms control it is unique. We have suggested an "open invitation" to inspect any military or government-owned or controlled facility, on twenty-four hours notice, in order to resolve compliance questions. This provision is in the draft because the United States wants to achieve an effective ban on chemical weapons, the world's oldest means of mass destruction of human beings. In 1915, clouds of chlorine gas called mustard gas rolled across the battlefields at Ypres, Belgium. That was the beginning of World War I. Over 1 million casualties and 90,000 deaths came from chemical weapons. In the 1930's they were used in Ethiopia by the Italians. Then, for 30 years, no nation used them.

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In the late 60's, however, there was evidence of their reappearance on an obscure battlefield in Yemen, almost certainly supplied by the Soviets. In the mid-1970's, the Hmong people in Laos became the next victims of chemical warfare. In 1979 we received reliable reports of chemical weapons being used by Soviet forces in Afghanistan, a practice that has apparently continued into the 80's. And Vietnamese and Lao troops, Soviet surrogate forces, continued at least until very recently to use chemical weapons against the Hmong resistance. Then, in 1983 the world has witnessed Iraq using chemical weapons in its war against Iran.

All this despite the two international agreements that restrict use the use of chemical weapons.

The first is the Geneva Protocal, which prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases. That treaty was completed in 1925 with the grim lessons of World War I fresh in mind. The Soviets joined it in 1928, Iran in 1929, and Iraq in 1931. It has been a major bulwark against chemical weapons use, more than 100 countries are parties, but it is now in danger of crumbling by two parties' disregard for their own obligations.

The second treaty is the 1972 Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons. It prohibits development, production, transfer and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons. Toxins are chemical weapons, which can be produced by biological processes or chemically synthesized. The Soviets have been parties to the Convention since 1975 and Laos since 1973. Both have violated it.

Two years ago, in his speech to the United Nations' Second Special Session on Disarmament, President Reagan said that, "The use of chemical and biological weapons has long been viewed with revulsion by civilized nations. No peacemaking institution can ignore the use of these dread weapons and still live up to its mission."

Nine months later, in February 1983, Vice President Bush announced at the CD that the United States would support negotiations for a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. The same month the United States provided to the

Conference a detailed paper outline of what would need to be included in an effective, comprehensive chemical weapons ban. Our draft treaty takes a futher step in that directon.

The next question, of course, is predictable: why are we asking Congress for money to build binary chemical weapons when we are ready to negotiate to ban these weapons?

The United States unilaterally decided to stop producing chemical weapons in 1969, while retaining a limited deterrent capability. Unfortunately, the Soviets did not stop. They have a variety of chemical agents and delivery vehicles, a substantial production capacity, large numbers of chemical warfare troops, and extensive chemical protective equipment and training.

The United States is absolutely committed to negotiation of a verifiable ban on chemical weapons. At the same time, the United States must have have a credible way of deterring the Soviet Union from using its capability. Binary weapons can provide that deterrent, and in our view, promote successful negotiations as well. The modernization program would not mean that our stockpile would grow--it would only become more dependable and modern. For every binary round produced, an aging, less safe chemical munition would be destroyed. Of course, when agreement is reached on a chemical weapons ban, all chemical weapons, binaries included, would be destroyed.

The total elimination of chemical weapons is our goal and we need to try to move the Soviets in that direction. We believe our willingness to go ahead with a modernization program, unless they agree to a ban, is an important incentive.

Now let's turn to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks, or MBFR. This eleven-year negotiation, important as it is, generally receives much less public attention. And, as noted, it has yet to produce any concrete agreement after eleven years. MBFR involves 19 countries of the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances. It seeks ways to reduce the massive concentration of troops on both sides of the dividing line in Central Europe. It deals exclusively with conventional forces.

You need no long memory to recall that this is the area that kindled two world wars. It is also the potential cockpit of future conflict between the superpowers.

Neither side is oblivious to the danger, and they have been meeting since 1973 to try to reduce and balance these troop levels. Unfortunately, so far success has eluded our best efforts.

Now, I am sure that some of you are wondering if a negotiation that goes on for 11 years without a tangible result is worth the candle. You are not alone. Some of MBFR's more cynical critics, impatient with the lack of progress, have observed that keeping track of the talks is like watching a car rust. Others are critical of the whole nature of the effort. They contend that the "M. B. F. R." really stands for "Much Better For The Russians."

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Before I tell you why MBFR--Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions--are worth pursuing, let me say that if there is anything I have learned while working on arms control, it is that impatience has no place whatsoever. Impatience can give rise to unnecessary and perhaps damaging concessions and less than well-founded positions. In MBFR, as in other arms control talks, the issues are highly complex and involve very important questions of national security. That kind of negotiation requires extraordinary patience. History shows us nothing worthwhile comes easily or quickly.

The devastating potential for nuclear destruction creates a sense of urgency in the public mind. This could be dangerous. Of course the matter is urgent, and we deeply regret that the Soviets have broken off negotiations. But at the same time it would be a mistake to let a sense of urgency blur our vision, or to put all our arms control eggs in the nuclear basket. In formulating arms control policies, we have to consider the entire spectrum of modern warfighting capability, both nuclear and conventional forces.

In fact, since a nuclear conflict would very likely be preceded by conventional hositilies, it is essential that arms control policy complement the nuclear weapons talks with strong efforts to reduce the chances of conventional war. That's why the MBFR negotiations have formed an important part of this U.S. arms control agenda.

Another significant benefit of MBFR, that is often overlooked by its critics, is the involvement of most of our NATO partners in the negotiations. The experience gained by negotiating together for common goals, promotes a cohesiveness among Alliance members that can only strengthen NATO as a political force.

Finally, the talks are the only bloc-to-bloc negotiation in existence today. This direct channel of communication between NATO and the Warsaw Pact has, if nothing else, increased understanding between the two opposing alliances. That, in itself is a confidence-building measure.

While it it true, as noted, that success has eluded us in MBFR, some progress has been made.

Last year the Eastern side offered a new proposal that moved a considerable distance toward the Western position on the critical issue of verification. Specifically, the East agreed in principle to the long-standing Western insistence on the establishment of observers and troop entry-exit points through which all forces entering or leaving an area would pass; to an exchange of information on forces remaining in the area; and to on-site inspection. These moves stopped well short of what we actually need in the way of verification, but they are a step in the right direction.

To elicit further Eastern movement, the West has prepared a new proposal designed to get around what has been the major stumbling block for years: the inability of the two sides to agree on the size of the present Eastern force. In short, the Eastern numbers simply do not jibe at all with Western estimates. This has been commonly called the "data" issue.

Our new approach would offer flexibility on the data issue in return for flexibility from the East in meeting our verification concerns. The approach offers the Eastern countries an opportunity, if they want it, to show that they are seriously interested in MBFR progress. The next round of talks begins later this month. We do not know if we can succeed, but we do know that we have very sound proposals if the Soviets and the other Warsaw Pact members are willing.

The third multilateral arms control forum just got underway in Stockholm. It is the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe--usually referred to as the CDE. You'll recall particular attention was focussed on the opening last January, as it represented a key multilateral arms control from beginning after Soviet walkouts from START, INF, and MBFR. Most of the 35 states participating sent their foreign ministers--we were represented by Secretary Shultz, and the Soviets by Mr. Gromyko. Its first session concluded in March, and on May 8, the second of four meetings scheduled for this year will begin.

This form stems from, and is an integral part of, a larger overall effort. It is an outgrowth of another conference--the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe--or CSCE. The CSCE began in Helsinki in 1975, and has subsequently met in Belgrade and Madrid. It meets next in 1986 in Vienna--and this is when the CDE must report its progress on security issues to the larger body of CSCE. CSCE is concerned with a broad spectrum of fundamental human values--such as human rights, economics, cultural cooperation--and security. Now that we have covered this somewhat complex relationship, let's look at CDE a bit closer. The Stockholm conference is focussed on confidence and security building measures. These are measures designed to increase openness in the military sphere and thus reduce the chances of surprise attacks or miscalculation. Prior notification of military exercises and subsequent verification of their nonthreatening nature, for example, enable all parties to have a better understanding of what their European neighbors are doing militarily.

We are working together with our NATO allies in this Conference to accomplish measures that are militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable, and applicable to the whole of Europe. We have, early in the process, introduced a Western package, which meets these standards. Our proposals would enhance trust and security by requiring each State to:

o Provide information on the structure of its military units.

o Submit an annual review of all important military activities it has planned in Europe during a coming year.

o Give advanced notice of important military activities at least 45 days in advance.

o Invite other parties to send observers to all important military activities.

The Soviet Union has not introduced any specific proposals at Stockholm; but rather has concentrated on promoting general declarations for non-use-of-force and no-first-use of nuclear weapons, reduction of military budgets, a chemical-weapon-free-zone in Europe, and nuclear-free zones in Europe. These either merely reiterate existing commitments, or seek to undermine NATO strategy, or advance unverifiable limitations that would do little but harm to our basic objective of increasing stability. Obviously the Soviet Union is not yet serious about negotiating in Stockholm. For our part, we will keep working.

Conclusion:

These multilateral negotiations are frequently overlooked, for the very simple reason that by their nature they move slowly, and public attention is rivetted on nuclear weapons and the need to reduce them as fast as possible. That is only natural. So is the public concern about the Soviet walk-out from the intermediate-range nuclear force talks and the Soviet's indefinitely suspending the strategic arms talks.

When the Soviets took those steps late last year, evey my father asked if I was in need of a job to keep busy. He was quite surprised to learn of all the behind-the-scenes work in which we at the Arms Control Agency--and in the Reagan Administration--are heavily engaged, even when the bilateral Geneva talks are on ice.

In the first place, we are actively reviewing issues in the nuclear negotiations with a view to being ready and flexible when the Soviets return to those talks. We cannot forecast when they will come back, but it is clear that nuclear arms control is in their interests as well. It is fair to assume, therefore, that these talks will resume later, if not sooner.

In the second place, as I have outlined, we are actively participating in a number of multialteral arms control negotiations. The seemingly endless negotiating rounds and the weary rhetoric we hear in the UN fora, and in the Geneva, Vienna, and Stockholm talks can be frustrating. But we must not be overly critical. That is, regrettably, part of multilateral diplomacy.

For despite this irritating aspect, our active participation is essential if we are to advance our arms control interests and Alliance unity. The issues themselves--quite apart from the rhetoric--are thorny and contentious. But they all involve important goals for our security and foreign policy.

We have not reached our goals but we are staying the course and steadily working to achieve them. One of the important achievements of President Reagan's search for greater international stability is that this quest has gathered more momentum under his leadership than, I venture to say, under any Administration in recent history. He is leaving no stone unturned and activating all fronts.

Thank You.

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20451

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April 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robert M. Kimmitt,
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Charles Hill,
Executive Secretary, Department of State

Colonel John H. Stanford,
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense

[redacted] STAT
Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Mid-America Committee Speech

A draft copy of the Director's speech to be given on May 2, 1984, before the Mid-America Committee in Chicago is attached. Any comments you may have on this speech should be phoned to me (632-8478) not later than 3:00 p.m., Monday, April 30, 1984.

Barbara [illegible] for
William B. Staples
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

DCI
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REG

L-266

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ARRESTING THE NUCLEAR GENIE

It is a pleasure to be with the Mid-America Committee to discuss one of the most critical arms control issues before us: stopping the spread of nuclear weapons or, if you will, arresting the nuclear genie.

I would ask you to pause for just a moment and ponder the following:

- What if Iran or Iraq had the nuclear bomb?
- What if a leader like Qaddafi got a hold of that capability?
- What if the PLO or another terrorist group acquired nuclear weapons?

Frightening thoughts, I am sure we all agree. But live issues still. Constant vigilance and active policies will be necessary to avoid having these thoughts become realities.

Even today, talk about the spread of nuclear weapons to Iran is in the news. A British defense journal recently alleged that Ayatolah Khomeini's Iran is only two years away from acquiring the bomb. Our own assessment is that it would take many more years for either Iran or Iraq to develop nuclear weapons if they decided to do so.

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But even the possibility -- howsoever slim -- clearly is frightening. For well over three years now, these two countries have been engaged in a bloody war of attrition. Neither has honored even the limited conventions for conflict that have grown up over the years. Iran has used young boys as shock troops; Iraq has used deadly chemical weapons.

If either of these two warring nations possessed a nuclear weapon, does anyone doubt that it probably would have been used? Does anyone doubt that such use would have greatly increased the already terrible destruction and loss of life? Does anyone doubt that the use of nuclear weapons, or even only its prospect, would have risked drawing in still other nations, raising the danger of wider conflict?

Look at another hypothetical example. Past Argentine governments have stressed that Argentina does not intend to acquire nuclear weapons. The new civilian government has reiterated that pledge and taken steps to ensure more civilian control over Argentina's advanced nuclear program.

But as you recall, a few years ago Argentina and Britain went to war over some small barren islands in the South Atlantic -- the Falklands or, as Argentina calls them, the Malvinas. What if the military government at the time had nuclear weapons? The stakes and dangers of that conflict could have gone up dramatically.

Look even further at the dangers of nuclear terrorism. Imagine the devastating impact upon the Western economies if one of the key Middle East oil production or distribution facilities were struck by a terrorist attack using a nuclear weapon. Or, a terrorist group might seek to smuggle a nuclear weapon into a Western European capital or into the United States. The group's objective might be to demand political concessions, to extort financial compensation, even simply to inflict terror and devastation. The chances or opportunites for a terrorist group to acquire a nuclear weapon increase if the number of nuclear powers increase. Imagine, if you will, a Qaddafi with the bomb. And, I might add, he has stated his ambition to try to get one.

There are more examples, but the point is clear: efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons are absolutely critical to our attempts to create a more stable and peaceful world, to strengthen the already frayed fabric of world order.

The bomb's spread around the globe would threaten not only its new owners' neighbors but also its new owners. It would threaten the security and well-being of the United States and our close friends and Allies. Indeed, the possible spread of nuclear weapons to any of the many regions of the world characterized by continuing crises and periodic military conflict poses the greatest danger of nuclear weapons actually being used.

How can we meet this challenge, or control this threat? We wrestle with that question daily.

As a start, we need a defense in depth:` that is, a broad range of measures and institutions that will reduce the chances that these terrifying weapons will spread still further around the globe. Or, if you will pardon the metaphor with the baseball season getting underway, this is a field in which we can hit singles and perhaps a few doubles but very rarely a home run.

A first part of that defense are a range of security relationships, guarantees and other policies that are often overlooked in discussions of proliferation problems because they have nothing directly to do with nuclear weapons spread. By contributing to regional political stability, however, they reduce any incentives countries might otherwise have to "go nuclear." Thus, these tools of our broad security and foreign policies are also indispensable to our efforts to prevent nuclear spread.

Another essential element in this defense are measures to slow and impede the technical progress of any country that sets out on the road to the bomb. The United States, has, with some other countries' support, pursued such measures to rather good effect.

Over the past several years, we have led an international effort to upgrade and strengthen controls for nuclear exports applied by the major nuclear suppliers. Just last January, all these suppliers agreed on steps to tighten controls on technology for enriching uranium. "Enriching" sounds innocent, but that process is one of the two paths by which a country could acquire "bomb-grade" material. We cannot rest as technology marches on. Today, work is underway to deal with the threat posed by other sensitive technologies.

Your government is, I can assure you, not asleep on these issues. We have a system for "nuclear export alerts" that plays an important part in trying to impede countries' pursuit of a nuclear explosives capability. Intelligence, for example, often alerts us to attempted or pending purchases of items or technology that can help a country on a road to nuclear explosives. With early warning of such sensitive transactions, the United States can take action itself, or urge other governments to prevent their going through. In 1983, we had we had more than 100 of these alerts. Many had good results.

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Nonetheless, nearly four decades have passed since the first nuclear explosion at Alamogordo, New Mexico in July 1945. That is another way of saying that nuclear weapons are, in some respects, an old technology -- much like television. The leaders of every country that might be contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons knows the most important technical fact about them: they work.

Thus, important as our efforts are to reinforce the technical barricades against nuclear weapons spread, they can only buy time. In some cases, of course, we can buy a great deal of time. In others, the time may be short. But, whatever time we buy can be valuable in itself. A later political change may bring to power leaders not committed to developing nuclear explosives.

One of our most important problems is how to use wisely the time that has been bought. How do we take advantage of whatever breathing space we gain? The defense in depth can fall apart if that time is not put to good and sometimes hard use.

One way to use that time productively is to work on reducing the motivations, either real or imagined, that can lead countries to seek nuclear weapons in the first place. This leads me back to the strong and credible alliances and security ties around the world that I mentioned earlier. They are vital for our non-proliferation goals. This is one reason why the Reagan Administration has sought to buttress our alliances and other ties in northeast Asia and to establish a new security relationship with Pakistan.

Fielding a defense in depth also requires that whatever time is available be used to strengthen the international insitutions that help prevent the bomb's spread. While we justifiably question the net value of some international agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, or the IAEA as the jargon would have it, is one that is very much in our interest. Created in 1957, largely as a result of of the Eisenhower Administration's initiative, this Agency today administers a system of safeguards on civilian nuclear facilities -- including on-site inspection, checking of records and actual physical measurements and checks. Countries accepting safeguards on all their nuclear activities demonstrate their peaceful intentions and reduce suspicions on the part of their neighbors. An effective safeguards system can detect possible misuse of peaceful nuclear technology, thereby ringing the alarm bell. That risk can serve as an important deterrent.

That leaves a question, of course, of how the countries of the world will respond, if the alarm bell rings? President Reagan has made clear that any violation of IAEA safeguards or of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or a nuclear explosion by a non-nuclear power, would be of grave concern for the United States. Specific sanctions also are provided by U.S. legislation and international agreements in the nuclear field.

But, to be honest, we need to strengthen the prospect of strong sanctions. Those warnings are necessary for an effective preventive system. We need to remind potential proliferators that the response of the United States and others will come down hard if the alarm sounds. That warning can help tip the balance against a country's seeking the bomb.

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons also demands that we use the time available to enhance the growing international norm against acquiring these weapons. Past experience here is quite illuminating.

In 1960, France detonated its first nuclear weapon in an Algerian desert. French President de Gaulle immediately sent a congratulatory telegram to his scientists at the site, lauding their great feat and stressing that France, too, now had the access due it as a great power with the most advanced weaponry. Little more than a decade later, in 1974 India detonated a nuclear explosive in the Rajasthan desert. Rather than stressing India's acquisition of advanced weaponry, Indian Prime Minister Gandhi called that blast a "peaceful nuclear explosion" -- needed to build harbors and dig canals. That is a distinction that we all know has no practical difference. India sought, so to speak, to sneak into the "nuclear club" through a back door.

What these two stories reflect, to my mind, are the changed international mood and expected standard of behavior. Put simply, it is no longer thought legitimate to acquire nuclear explosives.

This changed international norm is best evidenced by the readiness of more than 120 countries to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and thereby renounce any acquisition of nuclear weapons. We continually seek to strengthen this barrier by encouraging the relatively few hold-outs to join the treaty. In this Administration 10 new parties have been added. Regrettably, several countries of most proliferation concern continue to hold out -- for a variety of reasons.

We will experience next year a large international conference to review the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We will work long and hard to ensure its success but -- as in so many other areas -- success may be measured to a considerable degree by the avoidance of failure or disaster. The world at large can ill afford to allow this stalwart to be eroded.

Many of you may not be aware of the fact that we have another key part of our defense in depth in a treaty promoted and culminated by our neighbors in Latin America that creates a nuclear weapons-free-zone there. All but a few Latin American countries have joined but regrettably not all. Early in this Administration, President Reagan sought and obtained Senate ratification of an important non-proliferation protocol to this treaty, thereby removing one obstacle to its complete success. That success will depend principally on the hold-outs in the region itself. The new Alfonsin government in Argentina, for example, could contribute greatly to this goal and to stability in the region by acceding to this nuclear-weapon-free-zone.

Those countries outside these systems and not accepting these norms are, to be sure, a major concern. We need to use the time we buy to bring them closer if not completely into accord with the international non-proliferation norms and responsible behavior of most nations. We need to use "sticks" and "carrots."

In this regard, you have no doubt read recently about the new agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with China. A lot of the "news" announced by President Reagan in Beijing has focused on the prospects of nuclear sales to China. An extremely important result of this recent opening to China has been frequently overlooked.

Within the past months, China has moved to accept international non-proliferation practices and norms. It has joined the International Atomic Energy Agency. It has stated that it will require international safeguards on its nuclear exports. It has stressed that it will not assist or encourage other countries to acquire the bomb.

These are most welcome steps. United States discussions on nuclear cooperation with China over the past year -- as well as those of other countries -- contributed to this beneficial result. That affect may be difficult to calculate, but should not be ignored.

Finally, our defense in depth against nuclear proliferation requires the cooperation of other countries. In the non-proliferation area, like so many others, we simply cannot do it alone -- or go it alone.

Cooperation with our allies and other nuclear suppliers is essential if we are to continue to press the technical barriers against proliferation. The cooperation of many neutral and non-aligned countries as well is necessary if we are to ensure that the international norm against proliferation remains strong.

Cooperation with the Soviet Union is also important. Indeed, in the past few years this cooperation has been expanded and established on a more regular basis. Our two countries have continued to work together in this area for a rather simple reason: The Soviets do not want to see other countries join the nuclear weapons club any more than we do. They know that it will threaten their security.

I would be remiss this afternoon if I left you without the reminder that cooperation at home is also necessary. Of course, we in the Executive Branch do not always agree with the Congress on particular proposals to deal with the threat of nuclear weapons spread. And, of course, Members of Congress do not always share our approach. Despite differences of view, the two branches need to work effectively together to achieve our country's abiding non-proliferation goals.

What about the future? -- Should we be optimistic or pessimistic about the prospects for avoiding the further spread of these devastating nuclear weapons around the world. It strikes me in thinking about those questions that, throughout the past decades, the very gloomy forecasts of a world of more and more nuclear weapons states have not held true.

For example, in 1958 a special committee of the National Planning Association predicted in a monograph 1970 Without Arms Control that "by 1970, most nations with appreciable military strength will have in their arsenals nuclear weapons -- strategic, tactical or both." Similarly, in a 1962 press conference, President Kennedy warned of a world in which by 1970 or 1975 nuclear weapons would be "in the hands of a good many nations."

Five countries are, as you know, nuclear-weapon states. Also - India has demonstrated a nuclear capabililty. Still the pessimistic predictions have not come to pass.

Instead, the United States and many other countries have put those past decades to good use. Through those efforts we have many building blocks against nuclear weapons' spread.

Now most countries around the world have come to recognize that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is very much in their interest and that if they are not part of the solution, then they are part of the problem.

But we cannot -- dare not -- rest on past efforts and established building blocks. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons "into the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world," to quote another gloomy prophecy by President Kennedy, is a continuing challenge. With patient effort, and high-level attention and public support, I believe that we can meet that challenge successfully. The nuclear genie is out of the bottle but we can -- and must -- arrest its travels.

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20451

Executive Registry
84- 1910

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

April 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robert M. Kimmitt,
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Charles Hill,
Executive Secretary, Department of State

Colonel John H. Stanford,
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense

[redacted] STAT
Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Bilderberg Speech

A draft copy of the Director's speech before the Bilderberg meeting at Saltsjobaden, Sweden is attached. Any comments you may have on this speech should be phoned to me (632-8478) not later than noon, Tuesday, May 1, 1984.

Barbara Godlak for
William B. Staples
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

DCI
EXEC
REG

L-266

NEW TRACKS TOWARD EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL

A standard saying in Washington runs something like this: "Negotiating with the Soviets is not really all that bad compared to the ordeal of negotiating, and a sometimes battling, within the United States Government to get a position in the first place."

It is uttered only half in jest and reminds one of Winston Churchill's now famous characterization of democracy as "the worst system ever invented -- except for all the rest". In truth, the disagreements that take place over the bargaining table in Geneva can pale compared to some of the debates over arms control purposes and policies that take place in Washington. The Executive Branch, the Congress, the press, the bureaucracy and the public all partake to varying degrees, depending on the issue.

Having a general understanding of how systems work in the West, the Soviets frequently assume that if they sit back and hang tough, they can count on the West to negotiate with itself and come up with new proposals to try to move them. It is an age-old strategy. Unfortunately, experience has shown the Soviets that it is not an unwise strategy for them to pursue.

This underlines the need for some constancy and consensus, or at least sufficient support, if our arms control efforts are to be successful. The Reagan Administration has put great effort into building bipartisan support at home and greater commonality and consultation with our Allies. This also underlines the need to try to look ahead, farther down the road, to see how we can strengthen our basic arms control objectives and the public confidence in them.

I am assuming -- and, I trust, fairly -- that all of us here have a good grasp of exactly where the different arms control negotiations stand today:

- o The Soviets have walked out of the INF talks. It is uncertain whether and when they will come back to separate negotiations on these weapon systems.
- o The Soviets have indefinitely suspended the START talks but are likely to return, if not later this year then next.
- o The US is actively reviewing issues in these areas to insure that when the Soviets do come back, we will be ready and flexible.
- o Multilateral arms control negotiations will be where much of the action is this year.
- o The Conference on Disarmament will have a lot to focus on in working toward a total global ban on chemical weapons as recently proposed by the US.
- o The MBFR negotiations are again underway. The West looks forward to showing some flexibility on the data question if the East is ready to be flexible on verification issues.
- o In the CDE in Stockholm, we look forward to trying to get down to serious negotiations, but Soviet willingness remains a question mark.

Rather than rehash in greater detail specific issues in these negotiations, I would like to focus today on two longer-term approaches -- somewhat "new tracks", if you will -- toward achieving our arms control objectives. The first is the need to seek ways by which we can, over time, reduce the role and perceived importance of nuclear weapons in our defense posture. The second is the desirability of giving further consideration to how we might advance arms control objectives through less formal and probably less comprehensive arrangements. Both of these tracks have potential promise if we are willing and able to pursue them.

De-Emphasizing Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear deterrence will, for as far as we can see into the future, be a central element in US security policy. The US commitment of that deterrent for the protection of US Allies is at the heart of NATO. Whatever else we do, we must not cast doubt on the viability of that deterrent strategy, as doubt only increases instabilty and the chances of miscalculation.

But a number of factors argue for beginning to examine some possible steps toward reducing the extent to which we rely on nuclear weapons in US and Western security strategy. For one, the US no longer has the clear nuclear superiority that it enjoyed up until the late 1960's. For another, the prospect that nuclear war could have drastic, long-term, global effects is being driven home by new research. The idea of a "nuclear winter" knows no boundaries between attacker and the attacked, or between combatants and innocent peoples.

Finally, there is great concern among Western publics over nuclear weapons. This is understandable. Public confidence in our deterrent strategy will be undermined if we are perceived as relying too heavily on the threat of nuclear annihilation.

It is both reasonable and possible to provide decision-makers with capabilities that will present options other than the Hobson choice of early initiation of nuclear weapons use or inaction. New conventional weapons technologies offer one way to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons. Nuclear arms control can also help.

Significant opportunities are opening up in conventional weapons systems that could provide ways of de-emphasizing nuclear weapons on both the strategic and theater levels. Conventional weapons that could effectively assume military roles that up until now have been achievable only by nuclear weapons are on the horizon. These systems are based on technologies for improved ways of finding and distinguishing targets on the battlefield and in the rear; on more sophisticated command, control and communications systems; and on more effective conventional munitions -- the so-called smart weapons.

Our arms control efforts are designed to affect significant reductions in forces. START and INF would directly reduce nuclear weapons. All our proposals in these talks are consistent with our nuclear deterrence strategy. Nevertheless, they reflect a willingness to reduce the emphasis that has been placed to date on nuclear weapons.

In addition, the West has taken several unilateral steps to reduce nuclear weapons. The US nuclear stockpile today is a third below its 1967 peak, yet still more effective. Alliance decisions over the last four years will result in a net decrease of 2,400 weapons in the nuclear stockpile in Europe.

These arms control efforts, combined with improvements in our conventional capabilities can set the stage for a security policy that places less emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons. Some of these conventional opportunities and programs are, admittedly, still in the early stages of development. But we need to look at them now in terms of how they can enhance our deterrent posture and public confidence in it.

A look at the late 1950's and, particularly, the 1960's shows us that efforts to significantly strengthen conventional capabilities have run up against two major concerns. The first relates to the effect generally on the US nuclear commitment to NATO; the second relates to cost.

Past efforts by the US to strengthen conventional capabilities -- and thereby to de-emphasize nuclear weapons -- run the risk of seeming to Europeans as a weakening of the basic American commitment to its Allies. It seems to me, however, that strengthened conventional capabilities would actually enhance that commitment by supplementing, not replacing, the nuclear component.

Conventional forces are, generally speaking, more expensive than nuclear defense. On the other hand, the real cost of significantly strengthened conventional defense is not clear. More effective ways of managing the collective defense resources of the Alliance offer the possibility of deploying more capable conventional forces without having to make great increases in our defense expenditures. Finally, cost issues also have to be weighed against the prospect of not having a military response when it is really wanted or needed.

This does not argue for a change in NATO's strategy of deterrence and flexible response. That doctrine, carefully crafted in the 1960's, has served the Alliance well and remains valid today.

But the concept of flexible response was intended to be based on, and should be based on, a balanced mix of conventional and nuclear forces. What I am suggesting is that we need to give greater attention to steps to strengthen the conventional leg of that mix.

A conventional build-up should, of course, not be entertained as a way to make possible a policy of "no first-use" of nuclear weapons. Even if such a major build-up were attainable, which is highly questionable, that policy would be both unwise and dangerous. To qualify the US commitment to its own defense or to the defense of Europe with a "no first-use" posture would lower the Soviet calculation of the risks and potential costs of aggression against NATO. That would not serve our fundamental policy objective of deterrence.

Escalation to nuclear weapons would be a grave step, one which the Alliance would want to take only after deliberate and careful consideration. It is not a decision that we would want to be rushed into by the press of events if we did not need to be rushed.

Flexible response -- supplemented by a integrated policy for conventional force development that would offer a choice of "no early first-use" -- would preserve an effective deterrent and go a long way to reassuring our publics. And, as Professor Michael Howard has noted, "reassurance" of Western publics and political structures has been as important in maintaining our freedom and security as has "deterrence" in its narrower sense.

De Facto And De Jure Arms Control

Generally speaking, in arms control efforts to date we have sought formal agreements as the means of imposing limits. These, of course, establish mutual and specific legal obligations binding on the parties. We should, where possible, continue to seek such legally binding arrangements to reduce and otherwise limit arms.

At the same time, we should be alert to possibilities for engaging in arms control by mutual restraint. This could be comprised, for example, of statements of national policy -- unilateral undertakings by the sides -- which could be negotiated and confirmed in exchanges of declarations or letters. The outcome would be *de facto* arrangement which, in some instances, could be both easier to achieve and simpler to carry out.

These kind of arrangements would not, obviously, apply to all situations. In weighing the relative merits of a *de jure* or *de facto* arrangement in any given case, certain considerations come to mind.

Comprehensiveness is one of them. This is both a virtue and a problem. It is a virtue in the sense that it is best to limit all critical categories of arms and forces. Otherwise, systems that are not limited have a tendency to be built up and exploited. This can, effect, undercut the constraints on systems limited. It is a lot like a balloon that is squeezed in one area only to bulge out in areas that are not so constrained.

The first strategic arms limitation agreement, for example, froze the number of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile launchers, but placed no limitations on the number of warheads and only indirect limits on throwweight -- important measures of the overall destructive capability of missiles. We have witnessed, during the 1970's, significant increases in the number of warheads on these missiles and, particularly, a tremendous increase in the destructive capability of the Soviet missile forces.

While a more comprehensive agreement is more likely to limit real military capability, they are by definition more complex and difficult to negotiate. They are also, in many respects, much more difficult to verify. In fact, achieving comprehensive agreements in some areas are today, just as they have been throughout the history of arms control, virtually impossible because of the verification difficulties. Hence, we establish priorities and seek to be as comprehensive as possible.

De facto arrangements would have a tendency to be less comprehensive, and to focus on areas or systems where verification presents fewer rather than more problems. They would, in theory, be easier to negotiate and possibly quicker. By being less formal, de facto arrangements would also be more easily modified if circumstances changed than would legally-binding treaties or agreements. That, as well, can cut both ways depending on the circumstances.

In going down a more limited path in any given area, however, we would need to consider the impact or effect on our broader objectives.

In the United States, not to mention other countries, law requires that any obligation undertaken with regard to arms control or disarmament must be approved by the Senate as a treaty or authorized by special enabling legislation passed by both Houses of Congress. The SALT I Interim Agreement was approved in the latter manner. Alternatively, restraint as a national policy -- such as our policy on not undercutting SALT I or SALT II as long as the Soviets exercise similar restraint -- would not necessarily require that kind of approval. Nevertheless, working closely with Congress will always be necessary to avoid any appearance of trying to "end-run the system".

I am not suggesting that we should turn our attention away from the long and arduous negotiations on arms control agreements to more simple approaches outside of agreements. That would not serve Western interests or likely be successful.

But I am suggesting that, as we look down the road at arms control, it may be possible to advance our objectives in certain areas by establishing mutual restraint through de facto, reciprocal undertakings. Given the obvious problems of negotiating and then achieving approval for full-fledged arms control accords, we should not ignore those possibilities.

Nor am I suggesting that this restraint should be unilateral. Unilateral examples can be important. We should, I think we will all agree, try to lead the way toward more stabilizing and survivable systems. That is critical to reducing the risks of war.

But unilateral action does not usually get us very far and is not sufficient. While the West exercised restraint in developing strategic capabilities in the 1970's, we witnessed a massive and unsurpassed Soviet buildup. So, I am focusing on reciprocal, not unilateral, undertakings.

Barbara Tuchman once observed that "a problem that strikes one in the study of history, regardless of period, is why man makes a poorer performance of government than of almost any other human activity". That, too, is reminiscent of Winston Churchill.

But, in the advanced nuclear age, we cannot afford poor performance in our security and arms control strategies. Nor can we afford not to try to look down the road to possible new, or at least different, horizons. I have tried to outline a couple of those today. More obviously exist and will warrant our attention.