

**SECRET**  
**THE DIRECTOR OF**  
**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

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National Intelligence Council

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NOTE FOR: DCI  
DDCI

FROM: [redacted]  
NIO/LA

25X1

One of our speakers at the NIC Conference [redacted] on 22 March was Richard Armitage, OSD/ISA, who said, in the course of his remarks on the CIA product, that he had been most influenced in his opinion of El Salvador by one such publication. I have identified it, unfortunately. I had hoped it might have been something produced by us in the NIC, but it turns out to be a paper produced by [redacted] Population, Resources, and Politics in the Third World: The Long View. The paragraphs that Armitage must have been referring to are attached.

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[redacted]

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Attachment:  
as stated

[redacted]

25X1

cc: DDI  
D/OGI

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assure the return of a large majority of the workers to Mexico after their working life is over, and reduce political pressures on the Mexican Government. Even with such a program in effect—but especially in the absence of such a program—the US Government might see itself obliged to take very expensive measures both to bolster the Mexican economy and to attempt to seal the US southern border. [redacted]

#### El Salvador

El Salvador, with 220 persons per square kilometer, is the most densely populated noninsular nation in the Western Hemisphere; it shares a long border with Honduras, which, with 38 people per square kilometer, is the least densely populated country in Central America. Population pressures that led some 300,000 Salvadorans to emigrate to Honduras between World War II and the late 1960s also contributed to the 1969 "Soccer War" between the two countries. Despite the current convergence of interest between the two conservative, anti-Communist governments, illegal migration continues and a number of border disputes remain unresolved. [redacted]

The situation can only get worse in the future. By the end of the century, El Salvador's population, currently 4.7 million, will have grown to 7.4 million, and the population density will be a suffocating 346 persons per square kilometer. Honduras, although growing more rapidly, will still have a density of only 62 persons per square kilometer. Birth control measures, even in the unlikely case that they were adopted on a wide scale, would do little to alleviate the problem between now and the end of the century. Land reform is also at best a partial answer; with 42 percent of its small land area unsuitable for either cultivation or pasturage, there is no way that El Salvador can employ its expanding population in agriculture. Its once-promising industrial sector, largely destroyed by leftist violence that drove out foreign investment, is unlikely to revive soon, even if peace can be achieved. Indeed, the only circumstances that we foresee that could significantly alter the outlook for population increase would be the continuation of El Salvador's internal war at much higher levels of violence. [redacted]

Thus, we believe it is near certain that, by the year 2000, relations between El Salvador and Honduras will have degenerated into a state of chronic hostility. Massive illegal migration punctuated by one or more border wars is the most likely scenario. This population-forced hostility will probably be extreme enough to undermine any Salvadoran-Honduran cooperation against revolutionary elements from outside. (25X1) (In addition to the illegal migration to Honduras, many more Salvadorans will be migrating to the United States. In 1978, before the guerrilla war had begun in earnest, 25,000 Salvadoran illegals successfully entered the United States. [redacted] 25X1)

#### Egypt

Egypt, with a population of 45.9 million squeezed into a largely arid country where less than 3 percent of the land is suitable for agriculture, has no place to go but out.<sup>2</sup> Unlike Mexico and El Salvador, however, Egypt has not relied upon illegal migration or war but upon the legal export of labor. Egyptian office workers, teachers, doctors, and laborers can be found throughout the Middle East and in Western Europe, (25X1) North America as well. In 1982 an estimated 1.7 million Egyptians—roughly 13 percent of the labor force—worked abroad. The importance of these workers to the economic viability of Egypt is even greater than their number would suggest; the remittances that these workers send home through official channels—estimated at \$2.3 billion in 1982—are a major source of foreign exchange. [redacted] 25X1

By the year 2000, Egypt's population will number between 70 and 80 million, and the labor force will have nearly doubled to about 22 million. The demand for Egyptian labor abroad, however, will probably have stagnated and may well have declined. The rapid economic growth of the oil-producing countries of the Middle East will have long since moderated and with it the need for Egyptian labor. Competition for those jobs that remain will be heavy. Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Lebanon, Jordan, Sudan, the Yemens, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand have all shown themselves capable of competing with Egypt for the petroleum dollar. We expect that, over (25X1)

<sup>2</sup> Although Egypt is one of the most industrialized of Arab states, industry employs only a small portion of the labor force. (25X1)