

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

8 May

14 MAY 1984

Unclassified briefing materials on El Salvador being distributed to various agencies' spokesmen by Ambassador Reich's office.



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MEMORANDUM FOR: DISTRIBUTION LIST

FROM: S/LPD - Otto J. Reich *jm fr*

SUBJECT: Sandinista Support to Salvador Guerrillas

Attached are various briefing materials for USG spokespersons who are asked about Sandinista support to guerrillas in El Salvador. The entire package is unclassified. These include:

- President Reagan's Radio Address of April 14, 1984
- Joint Statement of April 10, 1984
- Deputy Secretary Dam's Remarks to HFAC on April 11, 1984
- Ambassador Kirkpatrick's Op-Ed in Washington Post, April 15, 1984
- Ambassador Reich's article in USA Today, April 11, 1984
- Assistant Secretary Motley's address before Foreign Policy Association on January 19, 1984
- Evidence of Cuban/Sandinista Support to Salvadoran Guerrillas:
 - A. Summation of Nicaraguan "In-House" Facilities to Support the Salvadoran Insurgency
 - B. Summary of some Declassified Reports of Nicaraguan/Cuban Support to the Salvadoran Guerrillas
 - C. Cuban/Sandinista Assistance to the Salvadoran Guerrillas (evidence from open sources 1983-present)
 - D. Nicaraguan/Cuban Support to the Salvadoran Guerrillas
 - Questions and Answers
 - E. Appendix
- Background Paper: Central America (May 27, 1983)
- History of U.S. Policy on Talking to the Sandinistas

We would appreciate your bringing to our attention additional material that would be useful. Please contact Tim Stater of my office on 202/632-6751, Rm 6253.

For Immediate Release

April 14, 1984

RADIO ADDRESS
OF THE PRESIDENT
TO THE NATION

The Oval Office

12:06 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: My fellow Americans, much has been made of late regarding our proper role in Central America and, in particular, toward Nicaragua. Unfortunately, much of the debate has ignored the most relevant facts. Central America has become the stage for a bold attempt by the Soviet Union, Cuba and Nicaragua to install communism, by force, throughout this hemisphere.

The struggling democracies of Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador are being threatened by a Soviet bloc and Cuban-supported Sandinista army and security force in Nicaragua that has grown from about 10,000 under the previous government, to more than 100,000 in less than five years.

Last year alone the Soviet bloc delivered over \$100 million in military hardware. The Sandinistas have established a powerful force of artillery, multiple rocket-launchers and tanks in an arsenal that exceeds that of all the other countries in the region put together.

More than 40 new military bases and support facilities have been constructed in Nicaragua -- all with Soviet bloc and Cuban support -- and an investment of over \$300 million. In addition to money and guns, there are now more than 2,500 Cuban and Soviet military personnel in Nicaragua, another 5,000 so-called "civilian advisors," as well as PLO, East-bloc*and Libyan assistance to the Sandinistas.

And that's not all. Our friends in the region must also face the export of subversion across their borders that undermines democratic development, polarizes institutions and wrecks their economies. This terrorist violence has been felt by all of Nicaragua's neighbors, not just El Salvador. There have been bombings in peaceful Costa Rica, and numerous attempts to penetrate Honduras -- most recently last summer, when the Sandinistas infiltrated an entire guerrilla column*which had been trained and equipped in Cuba and Nicaragua.

El Salvador, struggling to hold democratic elections and improve the conditions of its people, has been the main target of Nicaragua's covert aggression. Despite promises to stop, the Sandinistas still train and direct terrorists in El Salvador and provide weapons and ammunitions they use against the Salvadoran people. If it weren't for Nicaragua, El Salvador's problems would be manageable, and we could concentrate on economic and social improvements.

Much of the Sandinista terror has been aimed at the Nicaragua people themselves. The Sandinistas who govern Nicaragua have savagely

murdered, imprisoned and driven from their homeland tens of thousands of Miskito, Rama and Suma Indians. Religious persecution against Christians has increased and the Jewish community has fled the country. The press is censored and activities of labor and business are restricted.

The Sandinistas have announced elections for November, but don't hold your breath. Will new parties be permitted? Will they have full access to the press, TV and radio? Will there be unbiased observers? Will every adult Nicaraguan be allowed to vote? Given their record of repression, we should not wonder that the opposition, denied other means of expression, has taken up arms.

We've maintained a consistent policy toward the Sandinista regime, hoping they can be brought back from the brink peacefully through negotiations. We're working through the Contadora process for a verifiable multilateral agreement, one that insures the Sandinistas terminate their export of subversion, reduce the size of their military forces, implement their democratic commitments to the Organization of American States and remove Soviet bloc and Cuban military personnel.

But the Sandinistas, uncomfortable with the scrutiny and concern of their neighbors, have gone shopping for a more sympathetic hearing. They took their case to the United Nations and now to the International Court of Justice. This does little to advance a negotiated solution. But it makes sense if you're trying to evade the spotlight of responsibility.

What I've said today is not pleasant to hear. But it's important that you know Central America is vital to our interests and to our security. It not only contains the Panama Canal, it sits astride some of the most important sea lanes in the world. Sea lanes in which a Soviet-Cuban naval force held combat maneuvers just this week.

The region also contains millions of people who want and deserve to be free. We cannot turn our backs on this crisis at our doorstep. Nearly 23 years ago, President Kennedy warned against the threat of communist penetration in our hemisphere. He said, "I want it clearly understood that this government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of our nation." We can do no less today.

I have, therefore, after consultation with the Congress decided to use one of my legal authorities to provide money to help the government of El Salvador defend itself.

Until next week, thanks for listening. God bless you.

END

12:11 P.M. EST

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

April 10, 1984

JOINT STATEMENT

In recent days, a shrill and often confusing debate has developed over our goals, plans, and activities in Central America. Because this debate, much of it uninformed, unattributable, and increasingly partisan, is obscuring the real situation, we believe it in the public interest to set the record straight on our objectives, our policy, and our actions--on the record.

First, allegations have been made that we are planning for U.S. combat troops to conduct an invasion in Central America. We state emphatically that we have not considered, nor have we developed plans to use U.S. military forces to invade Nicaragua or any other Central American country. Secretary Weinberger made this point in his television appearance on Sunday. Some have chosen to disbelieve him--consciously or unconsciously confusing what they call "invasion" plans with our longstanding obligations under the 1947 Rio Treaty, our treaty obligations to defend the Panama Canal, or military contingency plans for disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, or emergency evacuations. For over a generation, as prudence would dictate, we have maintained and updated plans for these contingencies. We have not, however, planned to use our forces to invade any country in the region.

Second, some have indicated that we are planning to conduct a post-election military enterprise in Central America. This quite simply is not the case. As stated before, we are not planning for such action now nor are we planning for it after our election. What the Soviets, Cubans, and Sandinistas are planning may well be something else again.

Third, it has been alleged by critics of the Administration that certain activities in the Central American region have not been adequately briefed to appropriate committees of the Congress. To the contrary, all U.S. activities in the Central America region have been fully briefed in detail to the committees of the Congress which exercise jurisdiction in full compliance with the law. Further, last week (April 4) the President sent a letter to the Majority Leader of the Senate, Howard Baker, assuring him that our objectives and goals in the region had not changed--specifically, "the United States does not seek to destabilize or overthrow the Government of Nicaragua."

Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, the current debate has tended to confuse the improvements that we have helped make in El Salvador with what is really going on in Nicaragua:

- Our policy toward Nicaragua has been consistent in that we have supported the multi-lateral dialogue in what is known as the Contadora process. We have endorsed the 21 Contadora objectives which would require that Nicaragua terminate the export of subversion, reduce the size of its military apparatus, implement its democratic commitments to the OAS, and remove Soviet Bloc and Cuban military personnel.

MORE

Nicaragua's response throughout has been fraudulent and cynical. They have tried to avoid a comprehensive solution for the region by seeking to reduce all diplomacy to bilateral questions. They have tried to bypass regional and hemispheric efforts by making propaganda at the United Nations. Now they have cynically attempted to side-track negotiations by going to the International Court of Justice. A government fanatically dedicated to intervention beyond its borders thus seeks to use an honorable international institution to protect it from its own citizens who are rising up against it. This Administration will not be deceived nor will it play that game. Following the example of other nations, the U.S. has checked this maneuver by a temporary and limited modification of our acceptance of the court's jurisdiction.

Nicaragua continues to be the source of regional subversion and insurgency. In May 1983, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, itself, concluded that "the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua is helping train insurgents and is transferring arms and financial support from and through Nicaragua to the insurgents. They are also providing the insurgents bases of operations in Nicaragua. Cuban involvement--especially in providing arms--is also evident."

In El Salvador, on the other hand, we have witnessed an inspiring display of courage and commitment to the democratic process by the people of El Salvador. At the end of last month, these courageous people again braved guerrillas violence and sabotage to vote for their next president.

The courage and confidence in democracy that the Salvadoran people are demonstrating deserve our admiration and full support. Now more than ever, our backing for the democratic process must go beyond mere words. Recent uninformed comment on these matters has diverted attention from the central issue. The Administration has proposed a long term program based on the recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. We have also presented our case for urgent military assistance to El Salvador. That case is sound and the ongoing Salvadoran election process about to enter a run-off requires our support so that El Salvador can ensure its safe conduct.

It is critical that the American people understand what is at stake in the Central American region. Central America is strategically important to the United States. It not only contains the Panama Canal but sits astride some of the most important sea lanes in the world. Most importantly, it contains millions of people who want to be free and who crave democracy. The recent elections in El Salvador prove that. The real issues are whether we in the United States want to stand by and let a communist government in Nicaragua export violence and terrorism in this hemisphere and whether we will allow the power of the ballot box to be overcome by the power of the gun. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union and Cuba want to see communism spread further in Central America. The question is: Will the United States support those countries that want democracy and are willing to fight for their own freedom?

George P. Shultz
Secretary of State

Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense

William P. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security
Affairs

OUTLINE OF OPENING REMARKS
BY THE
HONORABLE KENNETH W. DAM
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
April 11, 1984

[The Basic Message]

- By moving in timely fashion, the United States has preempted a new Nicaraguan campaign to avoid serious negotiations.
- The many political, developmental and strategic issues raised by the Central American situation, and in particular by Nicaragua's actions, cannot be resolved in a piecemeal fashion.
- They must be addressed comprehensively, as is happening in the Contadora process, of which Nicaragua is a full participant, and which the United States firmly supports.

[Nicaragua's Record]

- Regrettably the record proves beyond a doubt that Nicaragua has repeatedly sought to avoid serious, comprehensive dialogue with its neighbors:
 - Until mid-1983, Nicaragua insisted on dealing with key Central American issues only bilaterally and then only with certain countries (e.g., Honduras) and not others (e.g., El Salvador).
 - In the fall of 1982 Nicaragua even refused to meet with the Costa Rican Foreign Minister, who had been designated by the 8-nation San Jose group to discuss the San Jose principles with the Nicaraguans.
 - This past fall, after accepting Contadora, Nicaragua suddenly attempted to shift the venue to the U.N. General Assembly.
 - Nicaragua repeated this diversionary maneuver once again earlier this month, at the U.N. Security Council.
- In short, Nicaragua is forum-shopping. This is a familiar tactic, but hardly one conducive to serious negotiations.

[The U.S. Action]

- Learning that Nicaragua was again attempting to undermine Contadora -- this time by filing a complaint against the United States before the International Court of Justice -- we modified our accession to the Court's compulsory jurisdiction to defer any litigation of issues involving Central America.
- The Secretary of State on April 6 so notified the Secretary General of the United Nations.
- We believe the Court is a capable and viable instrument for resolving disputes that are susceptible to judicial resolution.
- But, in the specific circumstances of Central America today, the Court is not the right venue.
- Had we not acted as we did, Nicaragua's suit would inevitably have split off certain issues from the broader complex of interrelated issues at the Contadora negotiating table.
- Our action, then, was taken to keep the search for peace where it belongs, in the agreed Contadora process, which addresses the legitimate concerns of all concerned.

[Legal Implications]

- Our notice of modification
 - took effect upon delivery last Friday;
 - defers any litigation for two years, long enough for the Contadora process to have a reasonable opportunity to conclude successfully;
 - applies only to matters involving Central America.
- Similar actions have been taken by other countries in the past, among them Australia, India and the United Kingdom.
- In addition, a large number of countries have not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ at all -- among them France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and Spain.
- Neither the Soviet Union nor any Eastern Bloc country, including Cuba, has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.
- The modification we have made is limited and temporary. It does not alter our long-standing support for the Court.

[What We Ask of Nicaragua]

- The United States and Nicaragua's Central American neighbors want Nicaragua to
 - sever military and security ties to Cuba and the Soviet bloc;
 - end support for guerrilla groups in neighboring countries;
 - fulfill the Sandinistas' commitments to the OAS to support democracy; and
 - reduce Nicaragua's military strength to levels that would restore military equilibrium in the area.

[The Contadora Process]

- Contadora is the venue that offers the best prospects for a political resolution of these issues.
 - as a regional process, Contadora engages all of the countries in the area;
- The 21 Contadora objectives meet our own pragmatic tests for what is necessary to bring about a peace that protects the Central American democracies and is consistent with our own interests:
 - the substance of the 21 objectives is practically identical with the policy the President set forth just a year ago to the Joint Session of Congress.
 - if the Contadora objectives were to be implemented on a verifiable and enforceable basis, our objectives with regard to Nicaragua would also be met.

[Two Final Comments]

- Let me make two final comments.
 - First, Nicaragua's record of intransigence, repression, and aggression has demonstrated its leaders will not keep their promises unless they conclude they must.
 - Steady pressure is necessary to interdict the aggressive and repressive will of Nicaragua's leaders.
- Second, there is a critical difference between Nicaragua's tactics and the approach we have adopted.

- We are not shopping for a forum that excludes what we don't want to talk about.
- The Contadora objectives are genuinely comprehensive: they take into account Nicaraguan complaints against the U.S. and Honduras as well as Salvadoran, Costa Rican and other complaints against Nicaragua.
- While the Sandinistas have cynically attempted to narrow the subjects fit for discussion, we have just as consistently sought to ensure that all the issues were dealt with.
- That has been and remains our goal: a workable and lasting peace built on a foundation of democracy, development and security for all concerned.

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A Matter of Self-Defense

Washington Post 4/15/84

The core of the United Nations Charter is Article 24, which enjoins all member states to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." This prohibition on the use of force was never intended to stand on its own, but was to be seen in the context of the entire Charter. In particular, as stated in Article 51, it was not intended to "impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."

... The structure of the U.N. Charter was accepted by its member states on the expectation of the effective functioning of collective peacekeeping measures. However, this vision was never realized. Instead of a world order operating according to the principles and procedures of the U.N. Charter, there emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War two contending orders. The first was an order dominated by the Soviet Union, committed to and engaged in a process of continuing expansion through the use of violence. The second was a Western, democratic order, comprised of the Western, democratic states and committed to the defense and the promotion of democratic values....

The dilemma created by the clash of these two orders, these two ways of conceiving and acting in relationship to law, has occupied a very great deal of intellectual and political attention ever since. The dilemma was incisively stated by George Kennan in an early essay entitled, "Diplomacy in the Modern World," in which he wrote: "The American concept of world law ignores those means of international offense, those means of the projection of power and coercion over other peoples which bypass institutional forms entirely or even exploit them against themselves. Such things as ideological attacks, intimidation, penetration and disguised seizure of the institutional paraphernalia of national sovereignty. It

ignores, in other words," Kennan continued, "the device of the puppet state and the set of techniques by which states can be converted into puppets with no formal violation of, or challenge to, the outward attributes of their sovereignty and their independence." ... It is in this context that we must view the case of Nicaragua and its own insistence today in the world on protection under Article 24. At the same time that it is engaged in the continuing, determined, armed attack against its neighbors, the government of Nicaragua has openly proclaimed its commitment to what is called "revolutionary internationalism."

"This revolution goes beyond our borders," declared Interior Minister Thomas Borge in a speech delivered on the second anniversary of the revolution. "Our revolution was always internationalist." ... By late 1979, at a time when the Carter administration was providing Nicaragua with large amounts of economic assistance, the Sandinistas had already initiated the build-up of a military machine vastly superior to that of any other country in the region....

In June 1980, the Sandinistas invited the Salvadoran guerrillas to set up command and control headquarters in the Managua area, and Nicaragua and Cuba began at that time their full-scale support of El Salvador's FMLN, including the training and provision of arms and supplies....

In 1980 and 1981, Nicaragua and Cuba engaged in massive airlifts of arms and supplies to El Salvador's guerrillas from Papatona Airfield in Nicaragua, with the objective of preparing the guerrillas for a large-scale January 1981 offensive....

In early 1981, the Sandinistas began aggressively to violate Costa Rica's treaty rights to use the San Juan River. In 1982, the Nicaraguan government initiated activities designed to destabilize and intimidate the Costa Rican government. On July 4, 1982, for example, Nicaraguan agents were directly involved in the bombing of the offices of a Costa Rican airline in San Jose. In June 1983, the Sandinistas infiltrated into Honduras a 100-man guerrilla force trained in Cuba and Nicaragua as a first step toward destabilizing the Honduran government....

In December 1983, a group of some 2,000 Miskito Indians fled their concentration camps—and it is not too much to call them that—at Francisco Cerpe, Nicaragua, and took refuge in Honduras at the Morocón refugee camp. The Nicaraguan government strafed the refugees from airplanes....

As of this time, there is not a scintilla of evidence to suggest that any of the Nicaraguan activities in support of armed attack against its neighbors, especially El Salvador, have ceased. The supplies from Nicaragua for the Salvadoran insurgency arrive by air, by sea and by land. They arrive by small planes, such as Cessnas, which land on dirt roads and fields and off-load their arms. Small boats and dugout canoes are used to ferry arms from Punta Cosinquina in Nicaragua across the Gulf of Fonseca to El Salvador and further up the coast. Larger quantities of weapons and supplies load and leave from Nicaragua's now famous west coast ports on ocean-going vessels....

Last May 13, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued a report, which concluded: "the Sandinistas have stepped up their support for insurgency in Honduras, and the Cuban-Nicaraguan aid for insur-

gence constitutes a clear 'picture' of active promotion for revolution' without frontiers throughout Central America by Cuba and Nicaragua." ... The House committee said, "The intelligence supporting these judgments provided to the committee is convincing."

Just last week, a Democratic member of the Senate Intelligence Committee stated that it was the committee's judgment that "Nicaragua's involvement in the affairs of El Salvador, and to a lesser degree its other neighbors, continues."

... In response to a declaration by the arm opposition that they were prepared to lay down arms if they could participate in a peaceful political competition for power and help settle Nicaragua's political question through the ballot box, the government of Nicaragua announced that such opponents would not be permitted to participate under any circumstances and would instead be tried in absentia as criminals. The government of El Salvador took exactly the opposite position and actually invited the armed opposition to participate in the election on condition only that they lay down their arms and agree to peaceful political competition.

It seems perfectly clear, therefore, that we portray Nicaragua as a victim in the current situation is a complete Orwellian inversion of what is actually happening in Central America. There can be no question by reasonable persons that Nicaragua is engaged in a continuing determined, armed attack against its neighbors and that under the charter of the United Nations, if not according to the laws of the struggle, those neighbors have the right of individual or collective self-defense....

As we confront the clear and present danger in the contemporary world, we must recognize that the belief that the U.N. Charter's principle of individual and collective self-defense requires less than reciprocity is simply not tenable.

The writer is U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. The article is adapted from an address before the American Society of International Law.

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A. SUMMATION OF NICARAGUAN "IN-HOUSE" FACILITIES
TO SUPPORT THE SALVADORAN INSURGENCY

Nicaraguan support to the Salvadoran insurgency, which could be classified "in-house," i.e., within Nicaragua, falls into three essential areas. These are training, logistical support, and the use of Nicaraguan territory for command and control of the guerrilla forces fighting in El Salvador. The following are examples:

- The FSLN has made available secret training sites where combat training is given to Salvadoran guerrillas. The training is known to include small unit tactics, weapons firing and demolition. These training sites, which are staffed by Cuban and Nicaraguan military personnel, have been identified and located. There are at least four that have operated since 1981 in Nicaragua.
- Cuba transports large volumes of weapons and munitions to Nicaragua by air and sea for break down and eventual transfer into El Salvador. At least one warehouse has been identified as being used as a storage area pending onward shipment of the materiel to El Salvador.
- The Nicaraguans have also established workshops for the modification of vehicles that are used in smuggling materiel (weapons, ammunition, and other supplies) from Nicaragua into El Salvador. These workshops are located near Managua.
- Several separate Salvadoran guerrilla command centers and their respective radio transmission facilities have been identified in Nicaragua. These broadcast facilities send orders to the guerrilla units operating in the Salvadoran countryside.

As is known--and evidenced by the recent deaths of two senior Salvadoran guerrilla leaders--the leaders of the Salvadoran insurgency live in Managua. When there are important decisions to be made, unit commanders are brought out of El Salvador for meetings in Managua or Havana. Based on intelligence and information supplied by guerrilla defectors, Cubans and Nicaraguans play an important role in whatever decision is reached.

B. SUMMARY OF SOME DECLASSIFIED REPORTS OF
NICARAGUAN/CUBAN SUPPORT TO THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS

- On May 13, 1983, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives issued a report which concluded that "the Sandinistas have stepped up their support for insurgents in Honduras" and that Cuban and Nicaraguan aid for insurgents constitutes "a clear picture of active promotion" for 'revolution without frontiers' throughout Central America by Cuba and Nicaragua." The committee also reiterated its earlier finding that the guerrillas in El Salvador "are well trained, well equipped with modern weapons and supplies, and rely on the use of sites in Nicaragua for command and control and for logistical support. The Intelligence supporting these judgments provided to the committee is convincing."
- On May 27, 1983, the State and Defense Departments issued a report entitled "Background Paper: Central America", which provided further support for the conclusions of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
- Our Monitoring of the Central American situation continues to support the conclusion that Nicaragua has become a focal point for the use of politically motivated violence to exploit the demands for more democracy, social justice, and economic development in Central America in order to bring extreme leftist groups to power.
- In early October 1982, it is reported that Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto told a confidant that the routes for supplying the Salvadoran insurgents by sea have been compromised and that other supply routes must be found. This same source reported that in most cases Nicaragua is the focal point for all contacts between Honduran leftists and the Cubans. He specifically stated that the "Cinchoneros" maintain their Cuban contacts in Nicaragua.
- A report was received in mid-March 1983 from a Salvadoran guerrilla source that arms, ammunition, and other supplies destined for the Salvadoran insurgents continue to arrive from Nicaragua, primarily by overland routes from Honduras.
- On 26 March 1983, an 11 man squad of armed FMLN insurgents was surprised by the Honduran National Police some 20 kilometers from the Honduran/El Salvadoran border. Two guerrillas were killed and the remainder escaped; however, the police captured a quantity of communications equipment and a notebook describing an arms trafficking route from Nicaragua through Honduras to El Salvador. In addition to the codebook, weapons and other materials, the guerrillas were carrying Sandinista propaganda material and a Sandinista flag.

- -- On 24 April 1983 a combined force of Salvadoran Navy commandos and Salvadoran sailors made contact with guerrilla troops at the Hacienda Las Pampas. The engagement resulted in the death of four guerrillas and the capture of guerrilla equipment. These weapons, as well as the majority of weapons (M-16s) captured or turned over by guerrillas, have been traced to Vietnam.

- In early April 1983, there had been reports that members of the Salvadoran Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) had made arrangements with the Libyans for weapons and ammunition for the FMLN. These supplies were to be delivered by air and sea by the Libyans to Nicaragua for transfer to El Salvador. This information was proven correct when the Brazilians impounded four Libyan planes later that month.

- The suspicious murder/suicide of the two top leaders of the largest guerrilla force within the Salvadoran insurgency movement in Managua in April 1983 provides additional evidence of Cuban and Nicaraguan control over that insurgency movement. Beyond the legitimate questions of Cuban/Nicaraguan complicity in the deaths of Cayetano Carpio and Melida Anaya, the fact remains that these acts took place in Managua. Moreover, guerrilla commanders were recalled from the battlefield in El Salvador to Managua to discuss the impact of the two deaths and to select a new leadership. Previously classified information indicated that the guerrilla commanders were flown to Cuba to continue the discussions. Manuel Pineiro, head of the Americas Department of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, traveled to Managua to meet with the Salvadoran guerrillas and later accompanied the guerrillas to Cuba.

NOTE: Only a few of the literally thousands of intelligence reports about Nicaraguan/Cuban support to the Salvadoran guerrillas have been declassified. Thus, the activities described above constitute only a small part of the evidence reflected in intelligence reports of a broad sustained pattern of Nicaraguan and Cuban promotion of violent revolution in Central America.

C. CUBAN/SANDINISTA ASSISTANCE TO THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS
(EVIDENCE FROM OPEN SOURCES 1983-PRESENT)

- Nicaraguan support to the Salvadoran insurgents within Nicaragua falls into three essential categories: training, logistical support, and the presence of the Salvadoran guerrilla command and control headquarters. (Numbers at the end of the items below correspond to articles and reports in Appendix E.)
- Following an intensive study, that included both classified and unclassified sources, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives concluded on May 13, 1983 that "the Sandinistas have stepped up their support for insurgents in Honduras" and that Cuban and Nicaraguan aid for insurgents "constitutes a clear picture of active promotion 'for revolution without frontiers' throughout Central America by Cuba and Nicaragua." The committee also reiterated its earlier finding that the guerrillas in El Salvador, "are well trained, well equipped with modern weapons and supplies, and rely on the use of sites in Nicaragua for command and control and for logistical support. The intelligence supporting these judgments provided to the Committee is convincing."
- A member of the committee, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, reiterated these findings as recently as March 29, 1984. He stated that about 80 percent of the ammunition and the greater portion of Salvadoran guerrilla weapons still arrive via Nicaragua.¹
- Other public information concerning Sandinista support to the Salvadoran guerrillas has come by way of defectors from the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran guerrillas.
- Miguel Bolanos Hunter, a Sandinista for five years and a member of the Sandinista intelligence service, stated in October 1983 to the Washington Times that, "I wouldn't place them (the Sandinistas) as an agent of the Soviet Union," although they are "exporting revolution every place that they can."²
- In an August 28 interview with the New York Times, guerrilla commander Alejandro Montenegro, who defected because of high Cuban and Nicaraguan influence in the Salvadoran guerrilla movement, stated that Cuba has "directed the activities" of the insurgency since 1980 and that the guerrilla leadership is now operating from bases in Nicaragua. He added that he had made his dissatisfaction known "that the process was being transformed and manipulated by other interests, the Cubans and Nicaraguans."³

D. NICARAGUAN/CUBAN SUPPORT TO THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

QUESTION: What is the extent of Soviet and Cuban influence over and support for the Sandinistas?

ANSWER: The Soviet Union and Cuba have both played a vital role in the Sandinista military buildup, in assisting its political consolidation, and in supporting it economically.

Most of the military weaponry for the Sandinista Army has come from Soviet Bloc and Cuban inventories, although Moscow has tried to hide its involvement through the use of such intermediaries as Algeria and Libya. Furthermore, some 3,500 to 4,000 Cuban military and security advisors are in Nicaragua assisting in everything from barracks and airfield construction to tank training and maintenance. Total military aid commitments have amounted to several hundred million.

In the economic field, there are another 4,500 to 6,500 Cuban teachers, health workers, construction personnel, and technicians in Nicaragua. While much of their work is humanitarian, the ultimate goal is to assist the Sandinista regime in building up a solid economic infrastructure and aiding political consolidation. The Soviets and other Bloc countries are also heavily involved in economic assistance, and they have provided some \$400 million worth of aid commitments since 1979. Furthermore, at least 300 Soviet and other Bloc personnel are in Nicaragua providing political and economic assistance.

Libyan involvement in Sandinista affairs has become more and more evident. During 1983, numerous shipments of military materiel have been delivered to the Sandinistas by a Libyan-owned airline. A number of costly items of military hardware, including four Sia-Marchetti aircraft, have been used in close air support. Four major cargo flights involving three IL-76s and one C-130 were slated to arrive in Managua on April 14, 1983. These aircraft were detained in Brazil en route to Managua, when it was determined that they were carrying military equipment, instead of the medical supplies that the cargo manifests listed.

QUESTION: Is it not true that the Soviet Union and Cuba have denied providing arms to the Salvadoran insurgents, and that no Soviet weapons have been captured in El Salvador?

ANSWER: The Soviets and Cubans can make such denials because they are not sending Communist weapons to the guerrillas. Rather, they are transporting U.S. weapons captured in Vietnam to Nicaragua for eventual covert infiltration into El Salvador. These weapons include M-16 rifles, M-79 grenade launchers, and M-72 anti-tank rockets. Arms captured from insurgents in El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Guatemala have serial numbers traceable back to weapons the U.S. provided to Vietnam. There have been Soviet grenades captured from Salvadoran guerrillas.

Another indication of Nicaraguan support to the Salvadoran insurgents was revealed in a document captured on March 26, 1983 from a Salvadoran guerrilla by the Honduran Public Security Forces. The document lists a total of 125 locations in Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador along a 10 to 15 kilometer-wide infiltration corridor between Nicaragua and El Salvador.

QUESTION: Have the Cubans and Nicaraguans assisted the Salvadoran insurgents in special sabotage operations?

ANSWER: The Cubans and Nicaraguans have trained and equipped Salvadoran insurgents to conduct special operations. For example, according to the captured insurgent leader responsible for the raid on the Ilopango Airbase outside San Salvador in early 1982, the sabotage team was specially trained in Cuba. The leader visited Managua in late 1981 to meet with the Cubans and to review his instructions to conduct the operation.

The destruction of the large Puente de Oro bridge in October 1981 was another such operation. Cuba and Nicaragua have provided almost all the explosives for the large-scale sabotage campaign against the Salvadoran economy. There is a special military base in Nicaragua where Salvadoran insurgents are trained for special sabotage operations.

Current
Policy No. 539

Is Peace Possible in Central America?

January 19, 1984



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Langhorne A. Motley, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, before the Foreign Policy Association, New York, January 19, 1984.

The Events of 1983

There's nothing easy about the situation in Central America. The issues are so complex and the situation changing so rapidly that everyone keeps looking for "signals" of what is happening—and what will happen next.

The signals today, as usual, are mixed. I want to talk very specifically today about one kind of signal coming up from Central America: the signals which tell us on the one hand that peace is possible there and the ones that say the opposite. But before I even begin, remember that nations, like people, are capable of sending false signals—of making paper commitments that have no meaning.

With that in mind, let's look at some interesting signals.

- In January 1983, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela met on the island of Contadora to consider ways to prevent a widening conflict. After a slow beginning for what is now known as the Contadora process, all five Central American nations agreed in September to a document of objectives—21 in all—to serve as a basis for a comprehensive regional peace treaty. Just 10 days ago—on January 8—these governments agreed on specific procedures to

guide negotiations to implement these objectives.

- In El Salvador, meanwhile, the fighting continued. But last year a large-scale amnesty was approved by the Constituent Assembly and effectively and humanely implemented. More than 1,000 guerrillas and camp followers came in from the cold. Two meetings took place between the Peace Commission and the guerrilla representatives. That dialogue was interrupted when the guerrillas refused even to discuss participating in the direct popular elections for president now set for March 25. But the Salvadoran Government has carefully left the door open to renewed contacts.

- In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas gradually softened the tone of their statements. They agreed formally to the 21 objectives of the Contadora process—objectives that include democratization, arms control, an end to support for subversion, and gradual withdrawal of foreign military and security advisers. In November, the Sandinistas signaled they were reducing their ties to Cuba and to the Salvadoran guerrillas. They also initiated a dialogue with some of their internal opposition—although they have not yet responded to a call from all major anti-Sandinista forces to implement their 1979 commitments to the Organization of American States (OAS) and allow all political elements to compete for power in free and genuinely fair elections.

What does all this mean? Is there finally some reason to hope that Central America is on a course toward peace? Or

are all these signals examples of the dashed hopes and propaganda that plague Central America? What is the evidence?

Where Does Nicaragua Really Stand?

Let me start by reviewing the record with regard to Nicaragua. When in 1979 the Sandinistas formally pledged to the OAS to establish a democratic, pluralistic, and nonaligned regime, the United States took a leading role in the international effort to assist Nicaragua. In the first 21 months after the fall of Somoza, we authorized \$117.2 million in economic assistance. Despite many problems, the Carter Administration suspended aid disbursements only after it became clear that the Sandinistas were supporting the guerrillas in El Salvador.

In October 1980 under President Carter, then again in August 1981 and April 1982 under the Reagan Administration, the United States sought to persuade Nicaragua to renounce its support of the guerrilla insurgency in El Salvador. The Nicaraguans did not respond to our concerns. In October 1982 in San Jose, Costa Rica, eight democratically elected governments made fair and balanced proposals for a regional peace. Nicaragua refused even to receive the Costa Rican Foreign Minister as emissary of this group.

The sources of Nicaragua's intransigence were clear. Internally, the Sandinista leaders had succeeded in removing from influence everyone who disagreed with them. They had built an army four times the size of Somoza's notorious National Guard. And they had developed close military ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union, which included thousands of advisers and a sophisticated joint effort to destabilize El Salvador and other neighboring governments.

The regime in Managua was so arrogantly confident in its ability to impose its will that it refused to listen to either its internal opposition or its neighbors. A former member of that regime, Arturo Cruz, put Nicaragua's situation in a nutshell in the summer 1983 issue of *Foreign Affairs*:

There is . . . an element of self-destruction in the present conduct of the Revolution. Certain Sandinista revolutionary leaders' rejection of pragmatism is puzzling. The allegiance to an internationalist ideology . . . at the expense of the basic interests of the nation-state of Nicaragua, is unacceptable.

Then, last July, on the fourth anniversary of the Sandinista revolution, Junta Coordinator Daniel Ortega offered a six-point peace proposal. The proposal

was one sided. It would, for example, have cut off all assistance to the Government of El Salvador while leaving Cuban and Soviet assistance to the Government of Nicaragua wholly unencumbered. It said nothing about democratization, foreign military advisers, or verification. But for the first time the Sandinistas accepted a multilateral dialogue and hinted at a willingness to suspend their support for the Salvadoran guerrillas. That much was encouraging, and we said so.

Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras quickly seized the initiative. They put forward an eight-point proposal—the "Bases for Peace." On September 9, meeting in Panama under Contadora auspices, Nicaragua joined them in agreeing to the 21 objectives I mentioned earlier. The "Document of Objectives" called for the establishment of democratic systems of government; for the reduction of current inventories of arms and military personnel; for the proscription of foreign military bases; for the reduction and eventual elimination of foreign military advisers and troops; for an end to support for subversion; and for adequate means of verification and control. These were, and are, objectives on which a single, comprehensive, regional treaty could be based.

This agreement was important progress. But what was Nicaragua's next step?

On October 20—that is, just weeks after apparently accepting the 21 objectives—Nicaragua presented four draft treaties based on the July Ortega proposals. These drafts:

- Disregarded the objective of restoring military balance among states of the region;
- Sought again to delegitimize the elected Government of El Salvador by treating it as simply one of two belligerent parties;
- Ignored the Contadora objective to establish democratic institutions; and
- Made no serious proposal for verification and control.

In reverting to its own partial agenda and presenting it at the United Nations, Nicaragua undercut the 21 objectives of Contadora, both procedurally and substantively. Instead of acting to build confidence that it was genuinely seeking accommodation, Nicaragua strengthened the arguments of those who saw its proposals as a renewed campaign of deception designed to *avoid* real accommodation. I repeat: In the guise of "negotiating," Nicaragua was *rejecting* accommodation.

Then, in November, word began to spread that Nicaragua was reducing the Cuban presence; that it was asking the Salvadoran FMLN/FDR [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front/Revolutionary Democratic Front] to leave Managua; and that a new dialogue with the church and internal opposition was beginning. In December, Nicaragua proposed a freeze on arms imports and the reciprocal withdrawal of foreign military advisers.

These signals suggested that Nicaragua recognized it would have to respond to the concerns expressed by its democratic opposition and by its neighbors in Central America.

The United States welcomed these signals. Secretary Shultz said so publicly on December 5. And, you may be confident, we have been exploring them thoroughly in our private diplomacy.

But the Secretary also said that what matters is the reality behind the rhetoric. Look at the evidence:

- Nicaragua claimed it was reducing the Cuban presence. But, as Interior Minister Borge himself admitted publicly, only normal, year-end rotations of teachers were involved. We have seen no evidence that any of Cuba's 2,000 military and security advisers have left Nicaragua. And while they, not teachers, are the main source of concern, we learned from Grenada that even construction workers can beat their shovels into AK-47s pretty quickly.

- Nicaragua had implied it was forcing the Salvadoran FMLN/FDR out of Managua. But although a few FDR leaders did leave Nicaragua, the FMLN's sophisticated command and control headquarters and infrastructure remain intact and operating in Nicaragua.

- Nicaragua claimed it was offering a generous amnesty to the Miskito Indians. Yet just before Christmas, another 1,200 Miskito men, women, and children chose to flee under hostile conditions into Honduras rather than suffer continued Sandinista repression.

Other Nicaraguan measures had a little more substance. Censorship of *La Prensa* has, at least temporarily, been relaxed. And, after the extraordinary crackdown on the church in October, conversations with church leaders were begun. But there has been no easing of restrictions on independent radio stations and harassment of *La Prensa's* advertisers, distributors, and journalists continues.

In short, despite the rhetoric, there is still no *evidence* that the Sandinistas are taking any of the essential measures which, if actually implemented, could help bring about among the states of the region a viable and lasting peace.

What the United States Seeks From Nicaragua

To remove any possible ambiguity, let me say again what those measures are:

- The establishment of a genuinely democratic regime;
- A definitive end to Nicaragua's support for guerrilla insurgencies and terrorism;
- Severance of Nicaraguan military and security ties to Cuba and the Soviet bloc; and
- Reductions in Nicaraguan military strength to levels that would restore military balance between Nicaragua and its neighbors.

Let me comment on these points.

First, none of these measures would be inconsistent with the goals that the Sandinistas publicly set for themselves in 1979. The Sandinistas at that time committed themselves to a policy of non-alignment, nonintervention, and democratic pluralism. We ask only that they respect the principles they themselves proclaimed.

Second, Nicaragua agreed to negotiate a treaty that would implement these goals when it signed the Contadora "Document of Objectives" last September. I repeat, we are only asking Nicaragua to do what it has formally and publicly committed itself to do.

Third, eight other states of the region, including the United States, have signed a public document—the San Jose Declaration of October 4, 1982—making clear that they and we are committed to corresponding actions. As the President told the joint session of Congress last April, the United States will support a balanced and comprehensive regional agreement in Central America that is fully verifiable and reciprocal.

Fourth, Nicaraguan implementation of these four points, whether unilaterally or through negotiations, would remove the causes of the deterioration in Nicaragua's relationship with the United States. A prompt return to a cooperative relationship, including economic assistance and CBI [Caribbean Basin Initiative] beneficiary status, would then be possible.

Fifth, the effect of such measures would be profoundly beneficial to the people of Central America:

- In the absence of the support it receives through Nicaragua, the FMLN in El Salvador would have to reconsider its refusal to consider participating in national elections. Democratic means of internal reconciliation—as opposed to power-sharing contrivances stemming from the barrel of a gun—would thus be powerfully advanced.
- With an end to regional conflicts and the implementation in Nicaragua of genuinely democratic processes, those who have taken up arms against the Sandinistas would have no further cause for fighting.
- With the restoration of regional military balance, countries that desperately need to devote all available resources to economic recovery would be spared the dangerous and debilitating burden of procuring arms. The Central American Common Market and other institutions vital to regional integration and development would receive an important boost.
- Finally, with the end of the Cuban/Soviet military presence, the region would cease being a battlefield in the East-West conflict, a role the region neither wants nor can afford.

U.S. Support for a Verifiable Agreement

Let me repeat: The Central American states—Nicaragua included—are formally and officially committed to negotiating a regional peace treaty to implement these points. The reasons I have just outlined make clear that it is in our interest to help the Central Americans achieve the 21 objectives of Contadora. Our support for regional dialogue is thus based on the most fundamental of foreign policy considerations: enlightened self-interest.

Senator Richard Stone, President Reagan's special envoy to Central America, has made U.S. support for regional negotiations unambiguous. He played a key role in getting the dialogue between the Salvadoran Peace Commission and the FMLN/FDR started. His diplomatic efforts have played a major facilitating role in the Contadora process.

Regional negotiations are now in an intermediate stage. Under the Contadora agreement of January 8, the five Central American governments are creating three working commissions on security, political, and socioeconomic affairs. Working with the Contadora Vice Ministers of Foreign Affairs, each com-

mission will adopt a work plan to be completed by the end of April.

The January 8 agreement also contains norms to guide the work in each of the three areas. The degree of specificity called for on security matters is encouraging. For example, they will prepare a registry, or detailed inventory, of military installations, weapons, and troops from which to negotiate ceilings to restore the military balance disrupted by Nicaragua's military buildup since 1979.

Our own experience in arms control negotiations makes clear that such a data exchange and registry are absolutely necessary to a successfully negotiated agreement. And our experience in negotiation with communist governments underlines the need to carefully verify the accuracy of such a registry, using both technical means and technically qualified observation teams with full authority to make on-site evaluations.

Looking ahead, we believe it will prove necessary to provide for verification of compliance with the obligations of an eventual treaty. Reliable means of enforcement of treaty obligations are equally necessary.

Another element, implicit in the principles agreement of January 8, is balanced implementation. Nicaragua's October proposals deferred issues of interest to the other Central American states while calling for immediate implementation of commitments to benefit Nicaragua. By adopting identical timetables for the three commissions, the January 8 agreement rejects such partiality in prioritizing the fundamental issues.

The Hard Road Ahead

It is certainly too soon to conclude that an effective regional agreement can be achieved. The most difficult negotiations lie ahead. Substantive balance and effective verification and enforcement will be essential to move beyond a document of exhortation and good intentions. But it is encouraging that the Central Americans are pursuing their dialogue with persistence and realism.

As they move from conceptual to practical problems, we will continue to offer whatever assistance will facilitate implementation of the 21 objectives. That is the mission the President has assigned to Senator Stone, a mission

Dick Stone has worked tirelessly to fulfill. It is also a mission that the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America has fully endorsed.

But no one should harbor any illusions that a treaty alone will resolve the crisis. Under the most optimistic of scenarios, we are a long way from an end to the crisis in Central America. Nicaragua has disproportionate military power controlled by a Marxist-Leninist minority operating without democratic checks.

Even if these issues were addressed, there would still be a need to defend against all those—on the right as well as the left—who would exploit underdevelopment for antidemocratic ends. There would still be a need to ensure that political processes are opened to wider and fairer participation. There would still be a need for land and other social and economic reforms. There would still be a need to build effective protection for human rights. There would still be a need to strengthen judicial processes against their ancient enemies of corruption and intimidation.

In short, there would still be a need for political reconstruction and economic recovery. The National Bipartisan Commission report—a remarkable consensus—concluded that the overall crisis is even more acute than they had believed. Dr. Kissinger [commission chairman] and the other commission members describe a crisis too profound to be subject to quick or paper “fixes.”

- Economic resources are essential—in sizable amounts and reliably sustained. And these resources must be put to prudent use.

- Reforms must continue. The Central Americans must continue to attack the local socioeconomic and political sources of the conflict. Abuses of human rights by the violent right and the violent left must stop.

- Security assistance is vital. Guerrilla forces cannot be allowed to spread poverty and destruction or to win a military victory. The United States has both moral and strategic interests in preventing a communist Central America.

- And this help must be in sufficient quantity to get the job done. The bipartisan commission put it this way with regard to El Salvador:

There might be an argument for doing nothing to help the government of El Salvador. There might be an argument for doing a great deal more. There is, however, no logical argument for giving some aid but not enough. The worst possible policy for El Salvador is to provide just enough aid to keep the war going, but too little to wage it successfully.

In concert with these measures, a regional dialogue to implement the 21 objectives, and thereby reduce sources of tension among states, can help to bring a lasting and real peace to Central America. But for that to happen, we will, as Secretary Shultz said in December, need to see actions to match the signals. ■

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October 1988

Washington Times,

Toss out Sandinistas, defector says to U.S.

BY A WASHINGTON TIMES STAFF WRITER

A 24-year-old defector from Nicaragua yesterday called on the United States to help overthrow the leftist Sandinista regime because it cannot be reformed.

Official United States policy supports covert aid to guerrillas, who claim they are trying to create a pluralistic society.

Miguel Bolanos, a Sandinista for five years, said reform was impossible because of the government's totalitarian trends.

"As a communist government, you must overthrow them," Bolanos said at a Capitol Hill press conference. Bolanos also said that Cuban President Fidel Castro exercises control over Sandinista projects. "They won't do anything that doesn't have the OK of Fidel," he said.

Bolanos added that Cuban or Soviet advisers often would be called in to correct or approve Sandinista plans, but he said that does not make the Nicaraguans Soviet agents.


"I wouldn't place them as an agent of the Soviet Union," he said, though the Sandinistas are "exporting revolution every place that they can."

Bolanos said he was a Sandinista intelligence official for three years, responsible for surveillance of the U.S. Embassy and CIA activities. He also said he fought in the final battles to overthrow the government of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza.

In other comments, Bolanos said Nicaragua was prepared to fight a war with neighboring Honduras, that the country now has 80 tanks whereas there were only five during the Somoza regime, and that five Soviet generals have been training top Sandinista officials since 1979.

The East Germans have provided a machine capable of tapping 500 to 700 of the nation's 25,000 telephones, which replaces the model used by Somoza that had only a 50-phone capacity, he added.

The CIA and the State Department have conducted extensive debriefings of Bolanos. A previous Sandinista defector, Orlando Jose Tardencillas, embarrased the Reagan administration in March 1982 by suddenly recanting his previous attacks on the regime during a press conference.



UPI

Defector Miguel Bolanos talks to reporters on Capitol Hill yesterday.

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NYT 7/28/83

A10

Cuba Directs Salvador Insurgency, Former Guerrilla Lieutenant Says

By BERNARD WEINRAUB
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 27 — A former Salvadoran guerrilla who played a key role in anti-Government raids in San Salvador has told United States officials that Cuba has directed the activities of the insurgency since 1980 and that the guerrilla leadership is now operating from bases in Nicaragua.

The former rebel, Arquimedes Canadas, also known as Comandante Alejandro Montenegro, said in an interview here that before 1980 the guerrilla movement was largely "nationalistic," made up of a multitude of political and armed groups. But he said it gradually moved under Havana's influence to the point that Cuban military aides specifically advised Salvadoran guerrillas on tactics to cripple Government forces.

Mr. Canadas, who has been sentenced to death by guerrilla forces and is under United States Government protection here, said he and four other leaders of the People's Revolutionary Army met four Cuban military officials, three men and a woman, in Havana and Managua in July and October 1981. At that point Mr. Canadas, the 28-year-old son of a civil servant, was an underground leader in the "central front," which includes San Salvador, the capital.

"As far as the central front was concerned," Mr. Canadas said, "they said the principal activity should be the sabotage of electric power and telephone lines to prevent the national army from using the telephone as a principal means of communication and force them to use only radio."

Report Has 'Checked Out'

Two State Department officials said Mr. Canadas's background and the details of his report had been checked in recent months by the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. His bona fides have been established, an official said. "We have checked what he's said with other sources and it's checked out."

...concern in validating the report, given the embarrassment last March when a Nicaraguan publicly recanted statements given to the State Department and the C.I.A. about Nicaraguan and Cuban involvement in El Salvador.

Mr. Canadas was seized last Aug. 22 by Honduran security forces at a cafe in Tegucigalpa while on his way to a meeting of Salvadoran rebel leaders in Managua. Since then he has told his story to United States officials, ranging from a teen-ager who abhorred what he called the Salvadoran Government's "military repression" to an underground leader who directed one of the guerrilla movement's major propaganda triumphs, the destruction of seven American-made helicopters and eight planes at the Ilopango Air Base near San Salvador in January 1982.

"The seven soldiers that carried out the operation were trained for six months in Havana," Mr. Canadas said. "In October, when I was in Managua, Villalobos had put me in charge of the mission." Joaquin Villalobos leads the People's Revolutionary Army.

Opposed Cuban Involvement

Although several other guerrilla leaders have been seized and accepted amnesty — and quietly fled to other Latin American countries after privately yielding intelligence information — Mr. Canadas said he had decided to speak publicly for several reasons.

At the time that he drifted into the underground in 1974, after 30 people died when the military opened fire on a peaceful demonstration by students, anti-Government activity was "nationalistic," he said.

our homeland," Mr. Canadas said. "We did not want Communists and Cubans." Even before his arrest, he said, he had made known his dissatisfaction "that the process was being transformed and manipulated by other interests, the Cubans and Nicaraguans." "At the moment," he continued, "we should fight for peaceful political alternatives so that the bloodshed will be stopped. I want to take that message and direct it to my ex-companions."

The Salvadoran spoke in Spanish in the interview, held at the Institute on Religion and Democracy, a foundation and church-supported group.

'People Closed Their Doors'

Mr. Canadas said he grew aware of Cuba's involvement in mid-1980 when the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front was set up as the umbrella organization for Salvador's guerrilla groups, including the People's Revolutionary Army. Overseeing the front was a supreme executive body, the Unified Revolutionary Directorate, or D.R.U., that was formed, he said, at a secret meeting in Havana.

"From the political and military point of view, all the decisions that the D.R.U. took — from the strategic sense, from the military sense — were done in coordination with the Cubans," he said.

For example, in November 1980, when guerrilla leaders met in Havana, the military plan for the final offensive in January '81 was authorized by the Cubans, he said.

That offensive, in which guerrilla forces attacked key points in hopes of a general uprising, fizzled. "There was no popular backing for an insurrection," Mr. Canadas said, adding that the umbrella guerrilla group had "never agreed on a common strategy; there were ideological differences."

He said he was in Soyapango, just east of San Salvador, on Jan. 10 and "the people closed their doors on us."

According to Mr. Canadas, the guerrillas made a crucial mistake in March 1980 when the highly popular Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero, who had advocated social change, was murdered. "There could have been the insurrection then and there," he said. "The people were waiting for the call." But "the Communists in the movement said wait," he said, adding, "it was a major political error."

By June 1980, Mr. Canadas said, after guerrilla leaders, not including him, went to Havana, "arms began coming in and the commanders after that meeting did not return to Salvador." He said that was when the leaders moved...

"They never returned," he said, "with the exception of Villalobos, who was the last one to leave Salvador in February '81."

"Before that we did not have much arms coming in," he said. "After that the majority of arms was given by Vietnamese, American M-16's. The arms came from Vietnam to Havana, Havana to Managua, Managua to Salvador."

Mr. Canadas said that although the guerrillas' umbrella group includes several factions of either nationalist or Communist grouping, it moved into closer alignment with Cuba "because they thought they were going to win militarily; they felt with Cuban aid the success would come more quickly."

Mr. Canadas, a hefty man with an engaging smile, said he now lives in Costa Rica and Panama. He is in Washington for several days and declined to discuss further details about his whereabouts.

On his first visit to Cuba in July 1981, he recalled, he and three other People's Revolutionary Army leaders — Jorge Meléndez of the Morazan area, Juan Ramón Medrano of the "southern front" and Miguel Ramírez of the "western front" — met the four Cubans.

The Cubans "told us what had to be done in the interior of the country," Mr. Canadas said. "They directed the activities. In the case of Morazan, they said the principal activities should be to take the fight from the mountain to the city because we had to get the city population on our side." Morazan Province, northeast of San Salvador on the Honduran border, is a key battleground.

Three months later, in October, he said, the same group of Salvadorans and Cubans met in Managua. "We examined everything that had been done since July," he said. "We analyzed the taking of Villa el Rosario in Morazan. It was a village occupied by the guerrillas. It showed how much we had advanced. As far as the central front, they indicated that the sabotage of the electric power and telephone lines was not enough, not sufficient. We had to make greater efforts in these activities."

Mr. Canadas said he hoped the United States would back away from any military solution in El Salvador and press the Salvadoran Government for "a political agreement among all sectors."

"You have to take into account the guerrilla forces in any settlement," he said.

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DEBRIEFING OF SALVADORAN INSURGENT LEADER MOISES LOPEZ-ARRIOLA

Salvadoran security forces captured Moises Lopez-Arriola, a leader of the Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN), on or about 29 August 1982, after Lopez-Arriola had been involved in a bank robbery in Santa Ana, El Salvador. Lopez-Arriola's most senior position within the insurgent movement had been Chief of the Western Region of the FARN, as well as of the front groups Unified Popular Action Front (FAPU) and National Resistance (RN), a position he held from April 1980 to June 1982. Lopez-Arriola has cooperated fully with his captors, and his debriefing has so far resulted in the arrest of 31 other insurgent leaders as well as abundant information on Cuban and Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran insurgents; insurgent organization, operations, and supply mechanisms; and political infighting within and among the insurgent groups.

Lopez-Arriola is 22 years old. He became active in the insurgency before he left secondary school, after completing the 11th grade. In 1977, at age 17, he became a paid functionary of FAPU, responsible for picking up propaganda material at the University of El Salvador Law School in San Salvador and delivering it to FAPU elements in Santa Ana. Late that year he was placed in charge of FAPU militias (unarmed propaganda and support groups) in Santa Ana, and subsequently of the Western Region militia as a whole. In early 1978 he joined a cell of the FARN, moved up to the regional coordinating level by mid-year, and was a delegate to the FARN Second National Council in early 1979. He attended an infantry platoon leader's course in Cuba from 1979 until January 1980, and after his return to El Salvador was appointed FARN Western Region chief.

Lopez-Arriola lost his command in June 1982 as a result of loss of confidence in his leadership abilities by the FARN National Executive Directorate after a series of tactical reverses beginning with his participation in the January 1981 guerrilla offensive. He was isolated from contact with FARN members and turned to bank robberies to support himself. He was captured by security forces after his third bank holdup, and is currently being held on criminal rather than subversive charges.

During his lengthy debriefing, Lopez-Arriola revealed that in January 1981 Vietnam had delivered 30 tons of weapons to Nicaragua to be forwarded to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Movement (FMLN). The weapons included rifles, automatic rifles, submachine guns and light machine guns. The Nicaraguans control the distribution of all weapons stockpiled in their country and Lopez-Arriola had been told by a fellow FMLN leader that when the FMLN was in need of weapons, the United Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) asked the Nicaraguans for permission to draw from available supplies. In addition to providing weapons, the Vietnamese offered to train members of the FMLN and in June 1981 Lopez-Arriola was told that five FARN members were in Cuba en route to Vietnam to attend a general staff course.

Lopez-Arriola reported that the Government of Nicaragua provided the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) and the FMLN with an extensive base of operations in and around Managua. Representatives to the DRU from the five Salvadoran insurgent groups live in Managua and each of the forces has a command center there. He knew that the FARN group had a commander and deputy in Managua, as well as a representative responsible for guerrilla activities outside of El Salvador, a communications center staff and others. Lopez-Arriola also stated that the other four insurgent groups had similar complements of officials working in Managua. The Nicaraguans provided buildings for the exclusive use of the FARN. In addition, at least two of the FARN leaders were given houses of their own and the Nicaraguans had even provided a school for the children of FMLN officials.

Lopez-Arriola believed that the Nicaraguan help to the FARN may have been especially generous because the FARN contributed money to help insure the Sandinista victory. In 1980, Lopez-Arriola was told of a FARN contribution to the Sandinistas of at least U.S. \$2 million. This money was raised by the FARN from kidnappings and robberies.

In discussing the participation of other radical groups in the struggle in El Salvador, Lopez-Arriola stated that in May 1980 he planned simultaneous attacks against Acajutla and areas of Sonsonate. He was assisted in his efforts and in training the insurgents and militia by two members of the Chilean (Independent Revolutionary Movement) (MIR).

-2-

Movement / El Salvador / FARN (MIR)

Lopez-Arriolo attended a meeting in Cuba in June 1981 which was attended by Fidel Castro, other Cuban leaders, members of the Sandinista Liberation Front and representatives of the FMLN. During the meeting Castro told the Salvadoran insurgents that the FMLN did not seem able to plan intelligently and was not truly a clandestine organization since the Salvadoran and United States governments seemed to be able to acquire much advance information about the insurgents' plans. Castro said that although the FMLN had achieved a propaganda victory and had gained sympathy in some countries, it was on the defensive in El Salvador. Castro said that the Salvadoran insurgents should develop armed conflict in accordance with existing political situations, adding that the FMLN should employ a variety of strategies and tactics. Of major importance was the need for them to select techniques suitable for prolonging the war.

In discussing Cuban support to the insurgent groups, Lopez-Arriolo said that in the spring of 1982 he had been told that some 350 FARN members had received Cuban training by March 1981 and Lopez-Arriolo estimated that an additional 350 members had been trained by mid-1982. Based on his conversations with leaders of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) Lopez calculated that the ERP had sent some 1,400 people to Cuba for training. Lopez-Arriola himself attended a platoon leaders' course from July 1979 to early January 1980. The training was conducted at "Area 74" in a Cuban military installation near Guanabo and included map reading and drawing, tactics (assaults, ambushes, patrolling, encirclements), explosives (theory and formulas for the use of explosives, and practical work with dynamite and "rocamonita" a Soviet explosive), weapons (theory, assembly and disassembly and range firing with FAL, G-3 and AR-15 automatic rifles, Uzi and M-3 submachine guns - time was also devoted to mortars and small arms as well as Soviet 12.7mm heavy machineguns and RPG-2 Chinese rocket launchers), politics (Cuban history, Marxism and political economy), and "The Enemy Army" - a review of the organization and tactics of the U.S. Army. Lopez and his fellow trainees traveled to Cuba by way of Panama and returned via Managua. Lopez used his true name passport departing and returning to El Salvador but was given an alias passport to travel to and from Cuba. His Salvadoran passport was taken from him in Panama by a FARN representative and returned to him in Nicaragua.

#5

Washington Post, 21 September 1983

Base for Ferrying Arms to El Salvador Found in Nicaragua

By Sam Dillon
Knight-Ridder

ESTERO DE PADRE RAMOS, Nicaragua—A radio-equipped warehouse and boat facility, disguised as a fishing cooperative on an island in northwestern Nicaragua, has served for three years as a transshipment point for smuggling arms to El Salvador, numerous residents here say.

Although the Nicaraguan government denies the operation, fishermen and others at several tiny coastal hamlets nearby say that soldiers in military vehicles regularly trucked wooden boxes to the water's edge and loaded them in motor-powered launches bound for El Salvador's coast 40 miles to the north.

Fishermen report occasionally finding similar wooden boxes containing foot-long bazookas—presumably mortar shells or similar munitions—on shore north of the mouth of this estuary where the boats battle the surf to enter the Pacific Ocean.

A 14-boat fleet, including half a dozen large dugout canoes that can carry thousands of pounds of cargo, has been involved in the operation, residents say, with regular departures at two-week intervals.

The Reagan administration has concluded since soon after the inauguration in

1981 that Nicaragua's Sandinista government was supplying arms to the Salvadoran guerrillas. But U.S. officials have consistently refused to provide evidence of the Nicaragua-to-El Salvador arms flow, contending it would compromise intelligence sources. Without the proof, critics have been skeptical of the U.S. allegations.

No U.S. officials were interviewed in connection with this report.

Anti-Sandinista "counterrevolutionaries" attacked the island Sept. 14, blowing up the warehouse and three small boats. A communique from the Honduran-based, U.S.-financed Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) claimed responsibility, calling the site "an important center of logistical supply" for Salvadoran guerrillas.

Sandinista authorities claimed the FDN had attacked the state-financed Mario Carrillo fishing cooperative. Barricada, the official newspaper, condemned the attack as "irrational criminality."

Defense Ministry officials, asked about the details in this account, insisted that no military installation had existed on the island.

Officials in the Fisheries Ministry and the National Development Bank said Monday, however, that the Mario Carrillo co-

operative is not on the island and that no state-recognized cooperative operates in this region.

Indeed, in two visits to La Concha, the swampy island base said by the government to house the Mario Carrillo cooperative, reporters found no evidence the facility was ever used for fishing.

Instead, reporters found a Sandinista Army banner, a makeshift target with dozens of spent rifle shell casings, a radio antenna and three long, empty wooden boxes amid the ruins of the tin-roofed warehouse destroyed in the FDN attack.

Fishermen and other residents who live in huts lining this tangled estuary, and also small farmers and fishermen in Jiquillo, Padre Ramos, Venecia and other nearby hamlets, said La Concha island was not a fishing cooperative but a "military base."

"The island has been off limits to local residents for three years, they said. Reporters were granted government permission to visit the island last week to report the FDN attack.

Some area residents were hesitant to discuss the La Concha activity, calling it a "delicate situation," but others openly talked with reporters.

"I don't get involved in politics, but ev-

eryone around here knows they are carrying the arms to El Salvador," said the wife of Padre Ramos fisherman.

Several residents said they had seen what they described as the arms trafficker in La Concha, and had learned other details through casual conversations with locals involved in the smuggling forays.

To avert potential difficulty for their names of residents who talked about it arms-trafficking have been omitted.

A shotgun-toting guard who lives 20 yards across from La Concha, Vicen Perez Castellon, fired into the air to warn off reporters landing on the island in a rented launch. When presented with a government letter of authorization, however, he consented to show reporters around the destroyed facility. He maintained it was fishing cooperative.

Perez Castellon said the facility's radio had been used to monitor Fisheries Ministry radio reports on fishing conditions. Fisheries Ministry official in Managua said the ministry does not broadcast fishing reports and knew of no fishing cooperative equipped with two-way radios.

Fishermen said departure of the arm-

See NICARAGUA, A31, Col. 1

5 (continued)

Nicaraguans in Fishing Villages Tell of Arms Smuggling Efforts

NICARAGUA, From A29 shipments depended on weather and surf conditions, as well as reports of "vigilance" conditions in the Gulf of Fonseca, which separates Nicaragua from El Salvador. Salvadoran and Honduran gunboats patrol the 20-mile wide gulf.

Soviet-Bloc weapons used by the Sandinista Army have never appeared in the hands of Salvadoran rebels, and there was no indication of where the arms delivered to La Concha had originated.

Neither was there any indication here of how high within the Sandinista military hierarchy the involvement extended.


Nicaraguan officials have never

publicly admitted involvement in the smuggling of arms to El Salvador.

The fisherman said that weeks after the Sandinista-led ouster of president Anastasio Somoza in 1979 military men came to the village looking for experienced smugglers.

Beginning soon thereafter, Andres Lopez, identified by several residents as a smuggler who lived in Venecia on the northern shore of the estuary, emerged as the local leader of the operation, the fishermen said.

Then La Concha's guard, Perez Castellon, began to warn local residents away from the island and several unusually large launches appeared for the first time at the facility, residents said.



By Gail McCrory—The Washington Post

#6

NY

11/11

Salvador Rebels Still Said to Get Nicaraguan Aid

By STEPHEN KINZER

Special to The New York Times

MANAGUA, Nicaragua, April 10 — Western European and Latin American diplomats here say the Nicaraguan Government is continuing to send military equipment to the Salvadoran insurgents and to operate training camps for them inside Nicaragua.

The United States has been making such charges since 1980. Nicaragua, while not explicitly denying all of the charges, say its support is "moral and political."

The diplomats, including some from countries that have criticized United States policies in Central America, said military support to the Salvadoran rebels had dropped over the last year, but remained substantial.

No Nicaraguan Comment

At a news conference last week, President Reagan said Nicaragua was "exporting revolution to El Salvador, its neighbor, and is helping, supporting and arming and training the guerrillas that are trying to overthrow a duly elected government."

Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry officials declined to comment on the issue today. The head of the ministry's Central America Department, Danilo Abud, said he was not authorized to respond to such inquiries.

Western diplomats appear to be convinced of the general accuracy of American intelligence reports on the ties between Nicaragua and the Salvadoran rebels.

"I believe support for the revolutionaries in El Salvador is continuing and that it is very important to the Sandinistas," said a European diplomat. "The Sandinistas fear that if the guerrilla movement weakens in El Salvador, their own regime will become more isolated and more vulnerable to attack."

Salvadoran rebel leaders have in-

Continued on Page A8, Column 3

Diplomats Say Salvadoran Rebels Still Get Supplies from Nicaragua

Continued From Page A1

sisted that they receive only small amounts of aid from Nicaragua, mainly communications equipment, medicine and some ammunition. They say most supplies are bought on the black market or captured from Salvadoran Government troops.

A United States Embassy official in San Salvador said today that the rebels' "pressing need is not for rifles and small arms."


Two weeks ago, Fred C. Iklé, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, said that roughly half of the arms used by the rebels were United States-supplied arms taken from Salvadoran Government troops. Later the Pentagon said the estimate was based on a limited survey in a few rebel areas. Elsewhere, the Pentagon said, the figure is closer to a third to a quarter.

Sources of Most Rebel Supplies.

Mr. Iklé also said the United States believed that 80 percent of the ammunition and explosives used by the rebels are supplied from Cuba and the Soviet Union through Nicaragua.

Administration officials in Washington said today that small planes and boats were transporting supplies from Nicaragua at night. The officials said that command and control of guerrilla operations continued in Managua. In Mexico City, a member of the rebel movement said little of the command structure remained in Nicaragua.

"All the commanders are now living



The New York Times / April 11, 1984

Nicaragua is said to continue to send arms to rebels in El Salvador.

in Morazan," he said, referring to a province in eastern El Salvador.

In Honduras, which lies between Nicaragua and El Salvador, a Western diplomat said last month that despite United States training, Honduran Government troops had interdicted few supply shipments.

Administration officials said the size of the Nicaraguan Army had nearly doubled in the last year to 47,000 soldiers; with the number of Cuban military and security advisers in Nicaragua reaching 2,500 to 3,000, from 2,000, and the number of Cuban civilians dropping to 5,500, from 6,000.

"The Cubans are sending more combat-capable people to Nicaragua," a Pentagon official said, adding that Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa, who once led Cuban forces in Ethiopia and Angola, continued to serve as the Cuban military leader in Nicaragua.

At a meeting with foreign correspondents last month, the United States Ambassador here, Anthony C.E. Quainton, said Salvadoran rebels were being trained in Nicaragua and arms shipments were moving regularly to El Salvador. He said the guerrillas' command center was in Nicaragua.

Several months ago, at Nicaragua's suggestion, a number of Salvadoran civilians affiliated with the rebel cause left Nicaragua in what was described as an effort to remove a possible pretext for American-backed military intervention. However, rebel leaders are believed to visit Managua regularly. Visiting members of Congress have met here with guerrilla commanders, including Ana Guadalupe Martínez of the People's Revolutionary Army.

Western intelligence reports suggest that aid no longer moves overland through Honduras and but is flown daily by light planes to makeshift airstrips in guerrilla-held areas of El Salvador.

Some supporters of the Nicaraguan Government have expressed doubts about these allegations and challenge the United States to produce evidence. Diplomats acknowledge that they have seen no proof, but say they believe that military ties between Nicaragua and the rebels remain strong.

"Maybe not everything the Americans say is true, but logic and common sense support their case," said a Hispanic diplomat. "The Sandinistas' ideology dictates that they help other countries adopt political systems like their own."

7
The Los Angeles Times Sunday March 13, 1983

Salvadoran Rebels Brag of Cuba Ties

Insurgency Part of Regional Conflict, Guerrillas Declare

By DAVID WOOD,
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—El Salvador's leftist guerrilla movement boasted Sunday of its close ties to Cuba and Nicaragua and declared that it sees its struggle against the U.S.-backed government in San Salvador as part of a wider regional conflict.

"A clandestine broadcast of Radio Venceremos, the voice of the five insurgent organizations pressing embattled government troops in El Salvador, declared: 'We are and will continue being friends of the people and governments of Cuba and Nicaragua, and it does not shame us. Completely to the contrary, we are proud to maintain relations with those people—relations of the anti-imperialist struggle.'

"The Reagan Administration is not one to tell the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) who ought to be its friends and who its enemies."

Latin American Interests

The Radio Venceremos broadcast went on to say 'our war is and will continue to be national, but... we view our plans in the framework of a regional conflict in which there are interests of the people of Central America, the Caribbean and Latin America.'

The broadcast, transmitted from a secret location in neighboring Nicaragua—whose Marxist-led Sandinista regime has allowed the Salvadoran guerrillas to establish their headquarters in Managua—also boasted that the rebels have imported arms "through all routes that we could" and that "we have used all of Central America and other countries" for that purpose.

The broadcast appeared to support charges made by the Reagan Administration that the insurgency is at least encouraged and armed, if not directed, by the Soviet Union, Cuba and Nicaragua and is aimed at toppling one moderate government after another throughout the region.

Echo of Domino Theory

The State Department's Latin America analysts could not immediately explain why the guerrilla movement would suggest that the Salvadoran conflict is part of a regional conflict, thus subscribing, in effect, to the "domino theory" embraced by the White House. The analysts indicated that the guerrillas have not previously characterized the conflict as regional in nature.

The broadcast also appeared to undercut congressmen and others critical of the Administration's policy who have argued that the guerrilla movement seeks only the establishment of social justice in El Salvador.

One such critic, presidential aspirant Sen. Gary Hart (D-Colo.), said on NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" Sunday that he is opposed to further U.S. military aid to El Salvador because "we are not going to achieve democracy out of the barrel of a gun."

Hart said he favors negotiations aimed at including guerrilla groups in the government prior to national elections—a position that the Administration has stoutly resisted.

Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, speaking Sunday on CBS-TV's "Face the Nation," said the Soviet Union is seeking to "establish a Communist regime in El Salvador, on the mainland, working its way closer to the United States.

"Their purpose," Weinberger said, "is to attack the United States in this way from the south, knowing that as they got closer, we'd be under strong pressures to pull ourselves out of Europe and out of Japan and Korea and establish some sort of 'Fortress America,' which would serve Soviet purposes very well."

Reagan put it more succinctly in a speech March 5: "We believe that the government of El Salvador is on the front line in a battle that is really aimed at the very heart of the Western Hemisphere—and eventually at us."

Radio Venceremos is the voice of the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front, an umbrella organization comprising five Marxist-led guerrilla groups. The political arm of the opposition to the government of El Salvador, the Democratic Revolutionary Front, is believed by many analysts to be a less hard-line organization. Officials of the front.

Both groups have demanded negotiations for a "comprehensive political settlement" before they would participate in elections in El Salvador.

In defending the Administration's emergency request for \$110 million in military aid to El Salvador, Weinberger said Sunday: "I think progress is being made in the military, political side. But we are not going to be able to do anything if the country is being torn apart by a guerrilla war.

"I don't think there is a crisis down there, but the military situation is not going well at all, and it is vital that the government troops be resupplied as the guerrillas are being resupplied every night."

Weinberger said. "What is essential is to solve this matter at the lowest possible level of participation in conflict by the United States."

In other Salvadoran developments Sunday:

—The country's Roman Catholic Church backed the government's decision to advance the presidential election to December. Magr. Gregorio Rosa Chavez, auxiliary bishop of San Salvador, said during his homily at the Metropolitan Cathedral that the church was pleased with President Alvaro Magana's recent political initiatives "in favor of peace with justice . . . namely, the establishment of a peace commission and the announcement of elections."

—Salvadoran Defense Minister Jose Guillermo Garcia said the army is "preparing an offensive since the terrorist groups (the leftist guerrilla commands engaged in the war against the government) have threatened to continue attacking public services, including electric power, transport, water, bridges and roads."

7 (cont.)

THE WASHINGTON POST

Monday, March 11, 1983

Leftist Guerrillas In El Salvador Defend Cuba Ties

By Christopher Dickey
Washington Post Foreign Service

SAN SALVADOR, March 13—El Salvador's guerrillas, in a defiant response to President Reagan's speech last week urging an expansion of the U.S. commitment to the government they are fighting, have reaffirmed their determination to maintain ties to Cuba and Nicaragua.

In a broadcast last night, they also threatened "within that context" an "open regionalization" of their war if the Reagan administration continued to broaden its support for the faltering Salvadoran government.

In a broadcast over their clandestine Radio Venceremos, the rebels said: "We are and will continue being friends of the people and governments of Cuba and Nicaragua, and it does not shame us. Completely to the contrary, we are proud to maintain relations with those people—bastions of the anti-imperialist struggle. The Reagan administration is not one to tell the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] who ought to be its friends and who its enemies." The statement made no effort to deny receiving Cuban and Nicaraguan support as the rebels have in the past.

The broadcast came as the Reagan administration is planning \$110 million in military and \$168 million in economic assistance this year to help launch some of the most ambitious counterinsurgency training and operations programs of the 2½-year-old war.

Despite major questions about the competence and human rights records of the government here, Reagan justified the emergency support by pointing to the need to defeat "extremists with Cuban-Soviet support" that comes to them by way of "Marxist Nicaragua." He said the leftist forces would threaten U.S. security interests.

The rebels' broadcast defended their "right" to get arms anywhere. While insisting that their main headquarters are inside the country, along with their radio transmitter, they admitted to having "important missions" outside El Salvador.

"We have carried out important logistical operations of a clandestine character with which we have armed and munitioned our forces for a long time. We have carried out these operations by all the courses we could, and we have used all Central America and other countries for them," the broadcast said.

As Washington has raised its commitment in the region during the past month, the Nicaraguans also have reaffirmed their close ties, if not their concrete material support, with the Salvadoran rebels.

The Sandinista leaders in Managua feel under mounting pressure from a rebellion that reportedly receives covert funding from Washington on the basis that such action helps "interdict" arms supplies to the Salvadoran guerrillas. Speaking March 3 at a funeral for 17 adolescent Sandinistas killed by counterrevolutionaries, Nicaraguan commander Bayardo Arce warned that his party's "internationalism will not bend" and that "while Salvadorans are fighting to win their liberty Nicaragua will maintain its solidarity."

The guerrillas here said in their broadcast last night that their war "is and will continue being national, but we are not so naive as not to know that we cannot and ought not fail to place our plans in the framework of a regional conflict" in which the future of Central America is at stake.

They added that they are not closely tied to the Soviet Union but said that is because "unfortunately it is very far away."

The pace of the war here has stepped up dramatically since the guerrillas began a sustained offensive in October. The Salvadoran government and the White House maintain that the rebels use ammunition, if not guns, smuggled in from Nicaragua.

In a response that some military observers here see as virtually a last-ditch effort to reverse rebel momentum, the United States and the Salvadoran government are pushing ahead with an ambitious, coordinated program of military and civic action planned for some of El Salvador's battered, guerrilla-dominated eastern provinces.

Modeled broadly on the program of Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) created in Vietnam during the 1960s, but refined and scaled down for implementation here, it is thus far referred to only as "the plan" and is to be carried out in four stages.

The number of U.S. military advisers required is not likely to remain below the administration's self-imposed limit of 55 men, according to a military observer. He added that the American presence in the countryside probably will grow with the addition of more U.S. Agency for International Development employees.

There is no set timetable as yet, but because of crop cycles in the San Vicente and Usulután areas where the new initiative is expected to be launched, it should be under way no later than mid-summer.

According to military sources, the first stage, planning, is intended to integrate and coordinate the American and Salvadoran personnel working on the program as they hammer out its details. The second stage is a large-scale military sweep to clean out guerrilla concentrations. Salvadoran civilian assistance agencies trained to deal with everything from road repair to refugee assistance and public health are supposed to follow the Army's offensive. The plan calls for the military command staff to be advised by at least five American soldiers while another 10 to

are devoted to the task of "upgrading the training" of the troops in the operations area, a military source said.

In the third phase, the military role is supposed to subside while a renewed civilian infrastructure takes hold in these areas long dominated by the rebels. The fourth stage sees the withdrawal of all but a small contingent of soldiers while the main force moves on to new target areas. The strategy is designed to sidestep longstanding problems with senior Salvadoran military commanders who are ill-trained and ill-disposed to adopt the kind of political, social and military counterinsurgency tactics advocated by the U.S. Embassy.

Military sources here anticipate problems with the paramilitary forces needed to supply security in the latter phases of the program. Such groups have been responsible for many of the atrocities in the countryside that give this government a notorious human rights record.

There are also questions about how effectively the guerrillas can be cleaned out in the first place, since previous sweeps rarely have pushed rebels out of their stronghold for more than a few weeks.

Weinberger links Salvadoran war to global competition

terms, however, Weinberger ruled out more direct U.S. participation in the Salvadoran conflict. "What is essential is to solve this matter at the lowest possible level of participation and conflict by the United States," he said.

He said it is "vital" that Salvadoran troops be resupplied by the United States to match supplies received by guerrilla forces "every night" from Nicaragua, Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Weinberger said U.S. military aid to El Salvador will end when "the democratic effort that is going on in El Salvador is allowed to continue unimpeded and unhampered by adverse, communist-sponsored military activity. Now, I can't give you the hour or the day that's going to happen . . ." But, he said, the administration "is trying to bring that day closer."

Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

PAGE 01 221907Z 2195 ARA9733

ACTION INR-10

221907Z

2195 ARA9733

G. WSN 1652392, SHIPPED TO 241ST ORD SUPPLY CO, IVAMC, VIET NAM

INFO RF-01 ARA-04 OAS-01 RPP1-01 ECP-01 PPC-01 NQCA-01 DCEN-01
PAN-02 ELSA-02 NON-02 RPP2-01 STON-01 REIC-01 REG-01
DIR2-01 /022 A2 KMX

CONTRACT DAAF03-69-C-0021, B/L E-6, 899, 618, ON 16 OCT 1969.

H. WSN 1981721, SHIPPED TO TRANSPORTATION OFFICER, MILITARY OCEAN TERMINAL, FT MCCORMICK LINES, BAYONNE, NJ, M/F US ARMY, GERMERSHEIM, GERMANY, CONTRACT DAAF03-7-C-0001, B/L E-6, 907, 063, ON 8 JUN 1978.

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ARA-00 AMAD-01 PH-00 /036 W
051730 221910Z /44-38

I. WSN'S 1390298, 1634506, 1661419, AND 1679206, NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE.

#3

P 221906Z AUG 83
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHINGTON DC
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
CMC WASHINGTON DC
SAFE

5. THE FOLLOWING M-16 RIFLES WERE MANUFACTURED BY HYDRAMATIC DIV, GENERAL MOTORS CORP, AND ALL RECORDS WERE DESTROYED: 3018055 3030346 3047193 3052165 3058132 3069395 3071030 3081145 3080904 3117011 3119720 3131904 3139515.

P 221430Z AUG 83
FM CDR AMCCOM ROCK ISL IL //DRSNC-MHD-LW (R)//
TO JCS WASHDC
CDR 470THHGP COROZAL PANAMA //IAGPP-AS//
INFO USDAO SAN SALVADOR EL SALVADOR
USDAO TEGUCIGALPA HONDURAS
USDAO PANAMA CITY PANAMA
CDR USAFLDSTA GALETA ISLAND PANAMA
NAVSECGRUACT GALETA ISLAND PANAMA
CDR USAINSCOM FT GEORGE G MEADE MD //IAOPS-M-C//

6. RESEARCH ON M-1 CARBINE WSN'S PRODUCED NEGATIVE RESULTS WITH ONE EXCEPTION: WSN 114485, WAS SHIPPED TO TRANSPORTATION OFFICER, BROOKLYN ARMY TERMINAL, NY, M/F USARYIS ORD DEPOT OKINAWA SPECIAL FORCES AND RESERVE STOCK AND MAINTENANCE FLOAT, CONTRACT DA-11-199-

PAGE 04 RUCIAFB3361 UNCLAS
AMC-508 (Y), B/L C-5, 631, 274, ON 28 SEP 1964.
7. POC THIS COMMAND, HQ, AMCCOM, ATTN: DRSNC-MHD-LW (R), MR. CUNNINGHAM, AUTOVON 793-4678/6420.

EOT

UNCLAS

SUBJ IIR 2 231 #422 SERIAL NUMBERS OF GUERRILLA WEAPONS
A. YOUR 172306Z AUG 83

- SERIAL NUMBERS IN REF A ARE BEING RESEARCHED AGAINST DOD CENTRAL REGISTRY FILES AND OTHER WSN FILES AVAILABLE AT THIS COMMAND. RESEARCH HAS BEEN COMPLETED ON ALL WSN'S AT THE CENTRAL REGISTRY. WE ARE AWAITING RESPONSE FROM ATF AND COLT MFG. THIS INFORMATION WILL BE FORWARDED AS SOON AS RECEIVED BY THIS OFFICE.
- WSN 172813, M-16 RIFLE, WAS DEMILLED AT ANNISTON AD ON 77139.

PAGE 02 RUCIAFB3361 UNCLAS

- WSN 5130165, M-16 RIFLE, IS REGISTERED TO THE NAVY AND HAS BEEN SITE VERIFIED AT SUPPLY CENTER, ALBANY GA.
- COLT INDUSTRIES HAD PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED INFORMATION TO THIS OFFICE ON THE FOLLOWING M-16 SERIAL NUMBERS:

A. WSN 1228134, SHIPPED TO TRANSPORTATION OFFICER, AIR FREIGHT TERMINAL, DOVER AFB, DE, M/F 241ST ORD SUPPLY CO, CAN THO VIET NAM, CONTRACT DAAF03-66-C-0018, B/L E-6, 679, 490, ON 23 OCT 1968.

B. WSN 1149947, SHIPPED TO TRANSPORTATION OFFICER, LETTERKENNY AD, CHAMBERSBURG, PA, M/F DEPOT STOCK CONTRACT DAAF03-66-C-0016, B/L E-3, 605, 717, ON 25 JUN 1968.

C. WSN 1238817, SHIPPED TO TRANSPORTATION OFFICER, AIR FREIGHT TERMINAL, DOVER AFB, DE, M/F 241ST ORD SUPPLY CO, CAN THO VIET NAM, CONTRACT DAAF03-66-C-0018, B/L E-6, 679, 554, ON 29 OCT 1968.

D. WSN 1280942, SHIPPED TO TRANSPORTATION OFFICER, AIR FREIGHT TERMINAL, DOVER AFB, DE, M/F 20TH ORD STORAGE BASE DEPOT TAN OH KHUT, VIET NAM, CONTRACT DAAF03-66-C-0018, B/L F-1, 503, 371, ON 13 DEC 1968.

E. WSN 1475358, SHIPPED TO TRANSPORTATION OFFICER, AIR FREIGHT TERMINAL, DOVER AFB, DE, M/F 230TH ORD SERVICE CENTER, SAIGON, VIET NAM, CONTRACT DAAF03-68-C-0061, B/L F-1, 507, 597, ON 14 APR 1969.

PAGE 03 RUCIAFB3361 UNCLAS

F. WSN 1509680, SHIPPED TO TRANSPORTATION OFFICER, AIR FREIGHT TERMINAL, DOVER AFB, DE, M/F 220TH ORD SERVICE CENTER, BIN II ALC QUY NHON, VIET NAM, BVSKAP-09A9952 ARVN/RYF BVSKAP-9671-9501, PROJ OUX, CONTRACT DAF03-63-C-0061, B/L E-897, 076, ON 6 MAY 1969.

UNCLASSIFIED



BACKGROUND PAPER: CENTRAL AMERICA

Preface

On May 13, 1983, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives issued a report which concluded that "the Sandinistas have stepped up their support for insurgents in Honduras" and that Cuban and Nicaraguan aid for insurgents constitutes "a clear picture of active promotion 'for revolution without frontiers' throughout Central America by Cuba and Nicaragua." The committee also reiterated its earlier finding that the guerrillas in El Salvador "are well trained, well equipped with modern weapons and supplies, and rely on the use of sites in Nicaragua for command and control and for logistical support. The intelligence supporting these judgments provided to the Committee is convincing."


The summary of Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Soviet activities in Central America included in this background paper supports the conclusions of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It is being issued in the interest of contributing to a better public understanding of the history of developments in the region.

This background paper does not attempt to analyze social and economic conditions in the Central American countries. Rather, it describes how politically motivated violence is being used to exploit the demands for more democracy, social justice, and economic development in Central America in order to bring extreme leftist groups to power.

Released by the Department of State and the Department of Defense
May 27, 1983
Washington, D.C.

**BACKGROUND PAPER:
CENTRAL AMERICA**

Mexico and Central America: A Global Perspective



633902 (A01028) 3 83

MAP #1

Introduction

Today, far more than at any time in the past, extreme leftist forces in Central America are supported by an extensive foreign intelligence and training apparatus, modern military equipment and a large and sophisticated propaganda network. With Soviet bloc support, Cuba is using contacts nurtured over more than 20 years to provide political and military training, plus material and propaganda support, to many violent groups in a number of Central American countries. The immediate goals are to consolidate control of the Sandinista Directorate in Nicaragua and to overthrow the Governments of El Salvador and Guatemala. Honduras and Costa Rica also have been targeted (see Map #1).

I. Nicaragua

When Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba, he set the pattern which, 20 years later, the Sandinistas are repeating in Nicaragua. Castro established a dual government. An inner core of trusted guerrillas controlled and built the instruments of power (the army, the secret police, "revolutionary tribunals," and new mass organizations), while his democratic allies were kept busy in formal institutions such as the Council of State and government ministries. This tactic helped him consolidate power and neutralize his democratic allies until they could no longer unite against him. Many of these allies later were executed or imprisoned, or left the country.

In Nicaragua, the democratic opposition to Somoza established a "broad opposition front" in coalition with the Sandinistas, who assured their democratic allies (as Castro had done in 1957-59) of their commitment to democratic elections "after Somoza." The presence of noncommunist elements in the Sandinista-led "broad coalition" served to deceive many Western governments about the true character of the Sandinista Directorate. As in Cuba, two decades earlier, this broad coalition provided a political network that could be used by the extreme left to mislead Western opinion and governments, while obtaining financial support from the West. On June 23, 1979 the OAS gave provisional recognition to the anti-Somoza forces, contingent upon the establishment of a democratic political system including free political parties, free elections, free trade unions, religious freedom and an independent media. On July 12, 1979, during the final bargaining leading to Somoza's departure, the Sandinistas sent a written promise to the OAS that they would hold free elections and guarantee democratic freedoms. The Sandinistas have yet to implement this promise.

During this period, Cuba provided about 500 tons of weapons and other military supplies directly to the Sandinista units. Cuba also trained and deployed an "Internationalist Brigade," whose personnel fought with the Sandinistas. And on July 18, 1979, Julian Lopez Diaz, a leading Cuban covert action operative, flew to Managua from Costa Rica, where he had been the Sandinistas' key adviser. He became, and remains, the Cuban Ambassador.

After their victory, the Sandinistas followed Castro's example and established a dual governing structure. The inner core was headed by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), a nine-person Directorate, which immediately moved with Cuban help to establish a new army, an internal security apparatus and a variety of controlled organizations: neighborhood "defense committees," trade unions, professional organizations and media organs. The Sandinistas also came to dominate the nominally independent executive branch: the Junta, the quasi-legislative Council of State, and most government ministries.

The Sandinistas encouraged their democratic allies to participate in these executive branch institutions, both to use the skills of their allies and their international credibility. This helped obtain more than \$1.6 billion in Western aid from July 1979 to the end of 1982. The United States, along with other democracies, immediately recognized the new government. During the first 18 months of the regime, the United States provided more than \$118 million in direct aid and endorsed more than \$220 million in Inter-American Development Bank credits.

Repression of the democratic political parties, trade unions, and media began within weeks of Somoza's departure. In August and September 1979, the Sandinistas launched a campaign against the social democratic and Christian Democratic trade unions and their national federations, and tried to consolidate organized labor in two Sandinista-controlled groupings. A conference of Sandinista leaders in late September 1979 produced a specific plan for consolidating power. It stated that the democratic groups were to be "isolated" and brought under Sandinista control and that "while political parties must be permitted to exist" because of "international opinion," the Sandinistas would "work within them to get them to support the revolution."

Finally, in August 1980, the Sandinistas declared publicly that elections would not be held until 1985. Even then, these are not to be "bourgeois elections" but rather will serve only to "ratify" the revolution.

As a further measure of internal repression, in December 1981 the Sandinistas began destroying more than 40 villages of the Protestant, English-speaking Indians in northeastern Nicaragua. About 15,000 escaped into Honduras and the remainder were either killed by the FSLN or forceably relocated to detention camps far from their homes. The proof of this cruel activity is undeniable. (Photos 1, 2, and 3 provide photographic evidence of the destruction of these villages.)

This campaign has served to consolidate power in the hands of the Sandinistas; genuinely democratic groups and ethnic minorities have been excluded from real political influence. Although some are permitted to survive under surveillance and pressure, political control is held only by the Marxist-Leninist Sandinista directorate.

Within a week after the Sandinistas' takeover, Cuba had some 100 military and security personnel in Nicaragua. Three months later, by October 1979, this figure had increased to 200. Today, Nicaragua "hosts" 7,000 to 8,000 Cubans, including 1,500 to 2,000 military and security advisers, and many high-level Sandinistas have counterpart Cuban advisers. Cubans have trained virtually all Nicaraguan recruits in the General Directorate of Sandinista State Security, the new State police organization responsible for maintaining Sandinista control over the populace.

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The Sandinista military buildup also began immediately. Somoza's National Guard numbered about 9,000 before 1977, and 15,000 at the height of the fighting. The Sandinistas have increased their military forces to some 25,000 regular troops on active duty, with another 50,000 in active reserve and militia forces. In addition, they have added 36 new military bases and Soviet bloc weaponry, including 45-50 tanks, armored personnel carriers, mobile rocket-launchers and helicopters. Airfields are being constructed or improved which could service military jet aircraft.

For example, construction of a new dual runway airfield at Punta Huete, near Managua, is proceeding at an extremely rapid pace. About 800 meters of the estimated 3,600 meter main runway have been completed and work has begun on a parallel runway-taxiway; large, square area is being leveled for a probable parking apron. The location of Punta Huete strongly suggests that the new airfield, when completed, will be Nicaragua's main military airbase as well as the largest military airfield in Central America. This conclusion is based on: the relatively isolated location near Lake Managua (7 miles northwest of Managua); the estimated length of the runway, as well as the fact it will have a dual runway-taxiway (which could support a volume of air traffic exceeding current levels at Sandino International Airport); and the use of concrete paving (see Photo #4).

II. Castro's Strategy

Fidel Castro brings to his renewed and expanded political-military activism in Central America his own personal experience in achieving power in Cuba, seeking to export revolution in the Western Hemisphere, particularly during the 1960s, as well as nearly two decades of highly effective collaboration with the Soviet KGB and Soviet military. He also has cultivated close ties with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Libya and pro-Soviet factions in Africa and the Middle East in support of terrorism and subversion. Castro has a method of operation with the following principal components:

- Unification of the extreme left;
- Establishment of a "broad coalition"--led by the extreme left but including some noncommunist opposition elements--which makes direct or ambiguous promises of a "broad based" government after victory;
- Use of the "broad coalition" and systematic propaganda and political action techniques in order to obtain noncommunist international support and isolate the target governments from Western political and material help;
- Provision of Soviet bloc, Cuban, and other anti-Western military support as an incentive for extreme left unity.

This approach proved successful in Nicaragua. It was then turned against El Salvador in late 1979. Similar efforts have been made in Guatemala since 1980, accompanied by stepped-up covert activities against Honduras and Costa Rica starting in 1981 and 1982. The rapid expansion of these violent techniques in Central America is illustrated by the fact that while the total armed strength of the extreme left in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica was estimated at about 1,450 in 1978, by 1981 it was nearly 8,000.

III. El Salvador


Soon after defeating Somoza, the Sandinistas began training guerrillas from El Salvador and other Central American countries. This was the beginning of a steadily expanding partnership between Cuba and the Sandinistas in exporting subversion in the region--a partnership that has included the establishment in Nicaragua of numerous guerrilla training camps, the transportation of tons of weapons and the establishment on Nicaraguan territory of guerrilla command and control facilities along with a variety of propaganda and covert activities.

In December 1979, to overcome differences over tactics Castro hosted the leaders of the leftist terrorist groups and the Salvadoran Communist Party in Havana. This meeting produced agreement to form a coordinating committee as was announced publicly in January 1980. It was also at this meeting that Castro reportedly outlined his strategy: El Salvador and Guatemala would be "next," with Honduras to be used as a corridor for the transit of guerrillas and arms.

Three small noncommunist groups in El Salvador formed the "Democratic Front" in April 1980. Shortly thereafter, the Marxist-Leninist leaders and the noncommunist leaders of the "Democratic Front" formed the "Revolutionary Democratic Front" (FDR), thereby establishing the "broad coalition" which has been used to give the impression that the guerrillas are democratic and not Marxist-led. In June 1980, a meeting in Cuba united the military and political components of the extreme left under a "United Revolutionary Directorate" (DRU). In November 1980, a military alliance of the five insurgent factions, the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN), was created. Chart #1 depicts the evolution of this organizational framework.

The DRU became the command structure for the Marxist-Leninist organizations and also the directing authority over the "Democratic Front," for which representatives of three small noncommunist groups often act as spokesmen. The result was an unequal coalition in which the Marxist-Leninist groups controlled the armed units, weapons, intelligence, and covert support from the Soviet bloc/Cuba, while the non-Marxist-Leninist element provided a useful facade for maintaining international respectability.

DEVELOPMENT OF LEFTIST GROUPS IN EL SALVADOR



* Armed guerrilla terrorist groups

CHART #1

Having achieved the unified command for the extreme left, a communist-led "broad coalition," and some noncommunist international support, Cuba moved to increase the military strength of the Salvadoran guerrillas with full but discreet support from the Soviets. In April 1980, Salvadoran guerrilla leaders met in the Hungarian Embassy in Mexico City with representatives of Cuba, the USSR, Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland and Vietnam. In June and July 1980, the Salvadoran communist leaders went to Moscow and then with Soviet endorsement visited East Germany, Bulgaria, Vietnam and Ethiopia--all of which promised them military and other support. The commitment of weapons was estimated at about 800 tons.


The Cuban/Soviet bloc military supply operation used Western weapons (some from Vietnam) for "cover" and covertly shipped some 200 tons of weapons through Cuba and Nicaragua to arm the Salvadoran guerrillas for their intense but unsuccessful "final offensive" in January 1981.

Although the offensive failed, it led President Carter to authorize U.S. military aid for arms, ammunition and equipment for the first time since 1977 to "support the Salvadoran government in its struggle against left-wing terrorism supported covertly with arms, ammunition, training and political and military advice by Cuba and other communist nations."

Throughout 1981, Cuba, Nicaragua and the Soviet bloc aided in rebuilding, rearming and improving the Salvadoran guerrilla forces, which expanded their operations in the fall. By 1982, the Salvadoran FMLN guerrillas had about 4,000 to 6,000 full-time fighters and an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 part-time activists who provided logistical and political support as well as combat services. The FMLN headquarters in Nicaragua evolved into an extremely sophisticated command-and-control center--more elaborate in fact, than that used by the Sandinistas against Somoza. Guerrilla planning and operations are guided from this headquarters, where Cuban and Nicaraguan officers are involved in command and control. The guidance flows to guerrilla units widely spread throughout El Salvador. The FMLN headquarters in Nicaragua also coordinates propaganda and logistical support for the insurgents, including food, medicines, clothing, money and--most importantly--weapons and ammunition.

Although some guerrilla actions take place as targets of opportunity appear, the headquarters in Nicaragua decides on most locations to be attacked and coordinates supply deliveries. The guerrillas themselves have centralized their control procedures. For example, on March 14, 1982, the FMLN clandestine Radio Venceremos, then located near the Salvadoran border, broadcast a message to guerrillas in El Salvador urging them "to maintain their fighting spirit 24 hours a day to carry out the missions ordered by the FMLN general command (emphasis supplied)." The murder and

Major Central American Arms Routes



alleged suicide of leaders of El Salvador's largest guerrilla group (the FPL) residing in Managua in April 1983 provided dramatic evidence of the guerrillas' base in Nicaragua.



After El Salvador scheduled free elections for a Constituent Assembly for March 28, 1982, the Salvadoran Government invited the Social Democrats (MNR) and the Communist-front UDN, both of which support the FMLN, to compete openly in those elections. This offer was rejected and the top priority of the guerrillas became the disruption or prevention of these elections. In December 1981, after meetings in Havana with Salvadoran guerrilla leaders, Fidel Castro directed that external supplies of arms to FMLN units be stepped up to launch an offensive to disrupt the elections.

During the first 3 months of 1982, arms shipments into El Salvador surged. Cuban-Nicaraguan arms flowed through Honduras into El Salvador by sea, air, and overland routes. In February, for example, Salvadoran guerrilla groups picked up a large shipment on the Salvadoran coast, near Usulután, after the shipment arrived by sea from Nicaragua.

In addition to vitally needed ammunition, these supply operations included greater quantities of more sophisticated heavy weapons. Deliveries in 1982 included M-60 machineguns, M-79 grenade-launchers and M-72 antitank weapons, significantly increasing the guerrillas' firepower. One guerrilla unit received several thousand sticks of TNT and detonators from Nicaragua (only five sticks are needed to blow up an electrical pylon). Individual units also regularly received tens of thousands of dollars for routine purchases of supplies on commercial markets and for payments (including bribes) to enable the clandestine pipeline to function. On March 15, 1982, the Costa Rican Judicial Police announced the discovery in San Jose of a sizable cache of arms, explosives, uniforms, passports documents, false immigration stamps from more than 30 countries, and vehicles with hidden compartments--all connected with arms smuggling through Costa Rican territory, and Nicaragua or via third countries, to the Salvadoran guerrillas. Map #2 displays the known major infiltration routes for arms being illicitly infiltrated into El Salvador.

With this support, thousands of Salvadoran guerrillas attempted to prevent the March 1982 election by destroying public buses, blocking highways and attacking villages, towns, and voting places. Nonetheless, with several hundred election observers from democratic countries and about 700 foreign journalists as witnesses, the people of El Salvador repudiated the extreme left by voting in overwhelming numbers. More than 80% of the eligible voters participated.

Following their obvious repudiation in the elections, the FMLN leaders reacted as they had after their failed 1981 "final offensive." They consulted the Nicaraguan and Cuban officials to



plan strategy and to obtain more and better military and communications equipment for their forces. For the next 6 months, they continued terrorist harassment and economic sabotage. In mid-October 1982, they used their expanded capabilities to begin a new series of military attacks. By early 1983 the guerrillas had controlled about a dozen towns for more than 2 months, and their morale clearly had recovered--in part due to the continued Cuban, Nicaraguan and Soviet bloc support, which enabled them to sustain operations despite their rejection by the Salvadoran people. During 1982, guerrilla operations resulted in about 2,500 government forces wounded and 1,300 killed. These intensified attacks have continued through the first 5 months of 1983.

Although Castro has often denied responsibility for shipping weapons to the Salvadoran guerrillas, German Social Democrat leader Hans-Jurgen Wischnewski stated publicly in 1981 that Castro had admitted the Cuban role. Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez confirmed Cuban training of Salvadoran guerrillas in interviews given in the fall of 1981. In an article published in the Toronto Globe and Mail on February 12, 1982, a reporter interviewed a Salvadoran guerrilla trainee who described courses for Salvadoran guerrillas in demolition and intelligence operations, taught by Cubans, and attended by the Salvadorans at that time.

A guerrilla leader told a San Diego Union reporter (March 1, 1981) in El Salvador that "the Salvadoran guerrillas have a permanent commission in Nicaragua overseeing the smuggling of weapons from that country to here." He also said there have been Cuban advisers in the Province of Morazan, and that even Vietnamese advisers had made trips to guerrilla camps in El Salvador.

The use of Papalonal airfield is an example of the smuggling of weapons from Nicaragua to guerrillas in El Salvador. Papalonal is a commercially underdeveloped area 23 miles north of Managua. The airfield is accessible only by dirt roads. In late July 1980, the airfield was an agricultural dirt airstrip approximately 800 meters long, but by early 1981 the strip had been lengthened by 50 percent to approximately 1,200 meters. Hangars were constructed to stockpile arms for the Salvadoran guerrillas. C-47 flights from the airbase were confirmed by photographic evidence and unidentified aircraft were frequently sighted in El Salvador. Several pilots who regularly flew the route into El Salvador have been identified in Nicaragua. This particular route has been closed down, but air infiltration over new routes continues to this day.

In addition to the air infiltration routes, the Salvadoran guerrillas make extensive use of sea and overland infiltration routes through Honduras and Guatemala from Nicaragua. Photo #5 taken in May 1983, in San Salvador, demonstrates that the guerrillas use sophisticated vehicular concealment devices to confound detection by local authorities.

Details of Cuban/Nicaraguan support have been provided by two high-level FMLN leaders captured in mid-1982. One of them, known as "Alejandro Montenegro," was seized on August 22, 1982, in conjunction with a raid on an FMLN safehouse in Honduras. Montenegro's importance is underscored by the fact that the September 1982 taking of 108 civilian hostages in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, was essentially an attempt by a leftist Honduran terrorist group (with close ties to the Salvadoran insurgents) to secure his release. The hostage seizure failed because Montenegro had already been transferred to Salvadoran military authorities. Montenegro provided some significant information:

- He said that the Cubans played a major role in training those who conducted the successful January 27, 1982, raid on the Salvadoran air base at Ilopango, which damaged or destroyed a dozen aircraft.
- Montenegro himself directed the attack, leading an eight-man team that had received 5 months of special infiltration and sabotage training in Cuba.
- He said that he personally had attended two high-level meetings with Cuban officials in 1981--one in Havana and the other in Managua--to review the situation in El Salvador and obtain strategic advice.
- One of the guerrillas captured with Montenegro made five trips to Managua in 1982 to pick up arms for the insurgents, using a truck modified by the Sandinistas to carry concealed weapons.
- The Sandinistas have three repair shops for such vehicle modifications under the direction of a special section at the Nicaraguan Ministry of Defense. Vehicles similarly modified are shown in Photo #5.

Montenegro also confirmed that Nicaragua remains the primary source of insurgent weapons and ammunition, although he added that the guerrillas do capture some weapons and ammunition from the Salvadoran military.

The other captured Salvadoran guerrilla leader, Lopez Arriola, admitted attending a platoon leaders' course in Cuba in July 1979. He said that:

- Hundreds of Salvadoran guerrillas have received military training in Cuba;
- Cubans give special courses for combatants, commanders, staff officers, and intelligence officials;
- He had attended an insurgent strategy meeting in Havana in June 1981, at which Castro himself appeared.

Lopez Arriola also revealed that the Sandinistas control weapons delivered from Vietnam to Nicaragua for the Salvador insurgents and that the guerrillas must ask for permission to draw on the supplies. He added that the Sandinistas give the insurgents an extensive base of operations in and around Managua and provide a school for their children.

IV. Guatemala

In Guatemala, although there was increased guerrilla activity in the months proceeding the elections, this violence failed to disrupt the national elections of March 7, 1982. A widespread, but unconfirmed, perception of extensive electoral fraud by the government together with pervasive and excessive government corruption and international isolation led to a junior officer coup on March 23, 1982. The new President, General Efraim Rios Montt, who had been on inactive duty for four years, acted quickly.

He disbanded various semi-official groups that had taken part in violence against opposition leaders and offered amnesty for guerrillas who surrendered before the end of June 1982. (The Guatemalan Government has since renewed this offer and it is currently in force). From that point on, the Guatemalan Government implemented an intensive counter-insurgency program. This included the establishment and arming of village self-defense forces in the Indian highlands, and the start of programs to provide medical, food and economic assistance.

In April and July 1981, Guatemalan security forces captured large caches of guerrilla weapons at safehouses in Guatemalan City. Traces made on the serial numbers of U.S.-manufactured weapons revealed that 17 of the M-16/AR-15 rifles found had been shipped to American units in Vietnam in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Several vehicles captured at the safehouses bore recent customs markings from Nicaragua.

During 1982, both Cuba and the Soviet Union increased their efforts to bring about a firmly unified guerrilla command in Guatemala. On February 9, 1982, a Guatemalan guerrilla leader called a press conference in Havana to proclaim the unity of the four principal Guatemalan guerrilla groups. The Cubans and the Soviet bloc have continued to provide military training and support to various factions of the Guatemalan insurgency.

V. Honduras

The new democratic government of Honduras--inaugurated in January 1982--increased its cooperation with the United States and neighbors in the region to neutralize the threat posed by the large military buildup in Nicaragua as well as by the guerrillas in the region. Having failed in 1981 to persuade Honduras to be neutral by promising that Cuba and Nicaragua would "spare Honduras" from

the terrorism affecting El Salvador and Guatemala, Cuba now seeks to intimidate Honduras and its leaders into passivity through acts of terrorism. By doing so, the Cubans hope to eliminate a major obstacle to arms shipments to El Salvador and thus to increase the chance that the Salvadoran guerrillas can succeed.

Cuba and Nicaragua have worked actively to keep the Honduran Government from cooperating with El Salvador's efforts to prevent the transit of guerrilla supplies. Increased Cuban/Nicaraguan training and support have been provided to the Honduran extreme left, and Havana has stepped up efforts to promote unity among the Honduran leftist groups as part of a campaign to destabilize the Honduran Government. Examples of extreme leftist actions in Honduras during 1981 included the following:

- In early January 1981, Honduran police caught six persons unloading weapons from a truck enroute from Nicaragua. The six identified themselves as members of the International Support Commission of the Salvadoran Popular Liberation Forces, a part of the FMLN. They had in their possession a large number of altered and forged Honduran, Costa Rican, and Salvadoran passports and other identity documents. One truck contained more than 100 M-16/AR-15 automatic rifles, 50 81mm mortar rounds, about 100,000 rounds of 5.56mm ammunition, machinegun belts, field packs, and first aid kits. More than 50 of the M-16 rifles were traced to U.S units assigned to Vietnam in 1968-69.

- In April 1981, Honduran authorities intercepted a tractor-trailer that had entered Honduras from Nicaragua at the Guasule crossing. Ammunition and propaganda materials were hidden inside the walls of the trailer. The same arms traffickers operated a storehouse in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, with a false floor and special basement for storing weapons.

The link between Cuba/Nicaragua and the regional infrastructure behind the expanded guerrilla activity is evident from information obtained following a raid late in 1981 by the Honduran police on a safehouse for the Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras. This organization was described in the pro-government Nicaraguan newspaper El Nuevo Diario, by "Octavio," one of its founders, as a political-military organization formed as part of the "increasing regionalization of the Central American conflict." The raid occurred on November 27, 1981, in Tegucigalpa. Following a gunfight the Honduran police captured several members of this group. This cell included a Honduran, a Uruguayan, and several Nicaraguans. The captured terrorists told Honduran authorities that the Nicaraguan Government had provided them with funds for travel expenses, as well as explosives.

Captured documents and statements by detained guerrillas further indicated that the group was formed in Nicaragua at the instigation of high-level Sandinista leaders. The group's chief of operations resided in Managua. Members of the group received military training in Nicaragua and Cuba. The documents included classroom notebooks from a 1-year training course held in Cuba in 1980. Other captured documents revealed that guerrillas at one safehouse were responsible for transporting arms and ammunition into Honduras from Esteli, Nicaragua.

Our information shows that Nicaraguan agents and Salvadoran extreme left groups have played a leading role in the Honduran operation:

- The Salvadoran guerrillas have links with almost all Honduran terrorist groups and assist them in subversive planning, training, and operations.
- The December 1982, kidnapping of Honduran President Suazo's daughter in Guatemala was the work of a Guatemalan Marxist-Leninist guerrilla faction.
- Discussions reportedly were held in mid-1982 among the Cubans, Sandinistas and Salvadoran insurgents about terrorist activities against the Honduran Government.
- Captured Salvadoran and Honduran terrorists have admitted that explosives used in bombing attacks in the Honduran capital were obtained in Nicaragua.

IV. Costa Rica

Costa Rica has a long democratic tradition and the highest standard of living and social services in Central America. In 1978 and 1979, some Costa Rican government officials cooperated in the supply of military equipment to the Sandinistas. In May 1982, Luis Alberto Monge, a social democrat strongly opposed by both the extreme right and left, was inaugurated as President.

Because his government has attempted to stop the continued use of its territory for the supply of weapons to the region's Marxist-Leninist guerrillas, Cuba and Nicaragua also have made Costa Rica a target for subversion. During 1982, for example:

- Cuba funded a new leftist political party designed to unify various leftist elements and attract broader popular support;
- The Cubans and Sandinistas provided weapons and training for Costa Rican leftist terrorists;
- Since the beginning of 1982, several guerrilla arms caches and safehouses have been discovered in Costa Rica.

- In March 1982, the Costa Rican Judicial Police discovered a large arms cache in a house in San Jose. Among the nine people arrested there were Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, an Argentine, a Chilean, and a Costa Rican. Costa Rican police so far have seized 13 vehicles designed for arms smuggling and more than 170 weapons, including machineguns, TNT, fragmentation grenades, a grenade-launcher, ammunition and 500 combat uniforms.
- Nicaragua has instigated terrorist actions in Costa Rica, leading to increased tensions between the two countries. Although the Sandinistas denied complicity, the July 3, 1982, bombing of the Honduran airlines office in San Jose took place at Nicaragua's direction, according to a Colombian M-19 member arrested by Costa Rican authorities on July 14, 1982.
- The captured terrorist also stated that the July 3, bombing was part of a broader Nicaraguan plan that included sabotage, kidnappings, bank robberies, and other terrorist acts designed to discredit Costa Rica internationally.
- In November 1982, Salvadoran guerrillas attempted to kidnap a Japanese businessman in San Jose. The attempt was stopped by the Costa Rican authorities. More than 20 other Salvadoran extreme leftist cells continue to work inside Costa Rica to destabilize the government.

VII. Soviet and Cuban Propaganda Activities

Beginning in early 1980, the Soviet bloc and Cuba complemented their subversive activities in Central America by launching a worldwide propaganda and disinformation campaign. Initially the campaign focused on U.S. policy toward El Salvador, in an effort to block U.S. aid, although it also dealt with U.S. involvement in Guatemala and Honduras. The campaign was intended to expose an allegedly U.S.-sponsored plot, "discovered" by Cuban intelligence, to invade El Salvador using the armies of Honduras and Guatemala with assistance from Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia. This "plot" was characterized as a last ditch effort by the U.S. President to transform the situation in El Salvador in favor of government forces prior to the U.S. elections in November 1980.

Captured documents indicate that the FMLN has coordinated the FDR's international activities (in the United States, Canada, and Europe) from Mexico City. The Soviets in Mexico City are also in contact with the Salvadoran guerrillas. Logistics and international relations policy, however, are handled in Havana. The Cuban press agency, Prensa Latina, provides international communications for the FDR and its representatives abroad.

The Soviets and Cubans met in June 1980 with several Salvadoran insurgent leaders in Havana to establish a strategy for an international political campaign on El Salvador. Evidence from captured guerrilla documents indicates that the strategy includes:

- Propaganda: Spokesmen should emphasize that the Salvadoran "revolution" represents the people and is fighting against oppression and for freedom from outside intervention. The United States seeks direct military intervention in El Salvador to keep the "junta" in power.
- International Support: Representatives should gain recognition and support for the insurgents from a broad range of international organizations and political and regional groups.
- U.S. Initiatives: Representatives should strengthen ties with sympathetic American organizations and seek support from American politicians.
- Public Posture: From the outset, representatives should call for a dialogue to seek resolution of the conflict. "The policy of a dialogue is a tactical maneuver to broaden our alliances, while at the same time splitting up and isolating the enemy." Representatives should take up the banner of peace, and maintain that they seek only lasting peace and justice.
- Humanitarian Organizations: The Salvadoran insurgents should establish a front organization to funnel aid and money from humanitarian organizations.

A comparison of the strategy laid out in guerrilla documents with actual events, shows that the Soviets, the Cubans and the Salvadoran guerrilla leadership in Nicaragua have followed it closely. During the past three years, they have engaged in various overt and covert activities designed to influence public opinion in Western Europe, Latin America, Canada and the United States.

Soviet propaganda has been aimed at discrediting U.S. policy in El Salvador, and widespread use has been made of disinformation to substantiate the message. Moscow also has employed its international fronts, such as the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade Unions, in support of the propaganda campaign.

Communist parties in Europe, Latin America, Canada and Australia have participated in the propaganda campaign and helped organize demonstrations. Their publications have continuously printed articles on El Salvador and contributed to disinformation circulating about the situation in that country. For instance, the Communist Party of Spain, in its magazine Mundo Obrero Semanal, amid pictures of blood-covered bodies, accused the United States of

encircling El Salvador with the aid of Honduras and Guatemala, of sending tanks and helicopters "piloted by Yankees," of invading El Salvador, and of murdering Salvadoran Archbishop Romero.

Meanwhile, the FDR-FMLN, with Soviet and Cuban support, has directed the establishment of "Solidarity Committees" throughout Europe and Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These serve as propaganda outlets and conduits for contributions to the guerrillas. These committees also have helped plan, in conjunction with Communist parties and local leftist groups, many of the demonstrations that have taken place in support of the Salvadoran guerrillas. The timing and location of the demonstrations, such as those held worldwide after the failure of the January 1981 FMLN "final offensive" and those to protest the March 1982 Salvadoran elections, show that they resulted from a well-coordinated effort.

VIII. Extent of Outside Support

Since the Sandinista victory in July 1979, both Cuba and Nicaragua have steadily increased the size and quality of their "Revolutionary" military forces. The Soviets have played a major role in this militarization of the region.

Soviet military deliveries to Cuba increased dramatically in 1979 to an average of more than 65,000 tons by 1981. They apparently remain at this level today.

The Soviet bloc, with Cuban support, has been assisting Nicaragua's large military buildup which includes weapons, military equipment, airfields, military bases and extensive military training.

- In February 1982, a Soviet ship delivered about 270 military trucks to the port of Corinto, bringing the total Soviet bloc truck inventory in Nicaragua to more than 800.
- In April 1982, a communist bloc ship delivered four Soviet heavy tank ferries, one small patrol boat, and 12 BM-21 mobile multiple-rocket-launchers.
- The tank ferries provide the Sandinista army with an offensive water-crossing capability, while the mobile rocket-launchers gave them a mass firepower weapon unmatched in the region.
- In mid-1982, the Sandinistas completed a new garrison for their Soviet T-54/55 tank battalion just outside of Managua. They also completed two new infantry battalion garrisons near Managua and have begun work on another major military installation south of the capital.

- As is evident from photos #6-8, all of these military installations have a common layout similar to Cuban garrisons designed and constructed with Cuban assistance.
- It is noteworthy that Cuban Defense Minister Raul Castro visited Nicaragua in mid-1982 with a high-level military delegation, ostensibly to offer aid for flood damage. It was announced later that 2,000 Cuban construction workers were being sent to Nicaragua. Since then, we have detected a spurt in military construction activity.
- In November 1982, a Soviet bloc ship delivered an additional group of 25 T-54/55 tanks, bringing the total to about 50. The delivery followed a visit by Sandinista Directorate member, Daniel Ortega, to Moscow earlier in the year. To enhance the mobility of Sandinista ground forces, the Soviets have delivered MI-8 helicopters. AN-2 aircraft and armored personnel carriers also have been provided.
- During early December 1982, eight new 122mm howitzers were delivered, supplementing the twelve 152mm guns delivered in 1981.
- Finally, in late December 1982, the first delivery was made of sophisticated Soviet electronic gear--a high frequency/direction-finder intercept facility of a type seen previously in Cuba. This type of equipment is able to intercept signals from throughout Central America and would be especially useful in pinpointing Honduran military communication sites.
- The Cubans also have constructed a strategic road between Puerto Cabezas and the interior. This road facilitates the movement of troops and military supplies to the troubled northeast border area.

In Nicaragua, in addition to the 1,500 to 2,000 Cuban military and security advisors there are about 50 Soviet military and 100 economic advisors. About 25 of the Soviet personnel are assisting the security services, and the others are attached to the Nicaraguan general staff and the headquarters of various military services. By mid-1982, they had concluded military agreements with Nicaragua estimated to be worth at least \$125 million.

There are also about 35 military and 200 economic advisors from East European countries in Nicaragua. Most are East Germans, but some Bulgarians, Czechoslovakians, Poles and Hungarians are also present. The East Germans are most active in the Nicaraguan internal security organizations.

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As many as 50 Libyan and PLO advisors have been active in Nicaragua. The Libyan advisors have been engaged mostly in servicing the Polish-built MI-2 light helicopters they provided the Nicaraguans. Last May, the Libyans also provided the Sandinistas with four small Italian aircraft useful in counter-insurgency operations.

In April 1983, Brazil detained four Libyan aircraft transporting large quantities of weapons to Nicaragua, including two jet aircraft. This event, and a high-level delegation to Managua in May, underscores Libyan leader Qadhafi's commitment to the Central American struggle (see photos #9 and 10). (Salvadoran guerrilla leader Cayetano Carpio returned to Nicaragua from Libya immediately before his April 12 purported suicide in Managua.)

PLO leader Yasir Arafat agreed to provide military equipment to Nicaragua, including arms and aircraft, when he was in Managua on July 22, 1980. The PLO has trained selected Salvadorans in the Near East and in Nicaragua. Arafat affirmed to a group of Palestinian journalists in Beirut on January 11, 1982, that "there are Palestinian revolutionaries with the revolutionaries in El Salvador..." About 30 PLO personnel are providing pilot training and aircraft maintenance in Nicaragua.

This level of outside support adds up to far more than merely marginal assistance for essentially indigenous guerrilla activity. It is large-scale intervention in the political affairs of the nations directly concerned, for the clear purpose of bringing to power governments on the Cuban model.

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HISTORY OF U.S. POLICY ON TALKING TO THE NICARAGUANS

The United States has been the target of repeated charges, that it is uninterested in dialogue with the Nicaraguan Government. In fact, the United States has been willing to discuss issues of mutual concern with the Sandinistas since before they came to power in July 1979. We have manifested this willingness to talk with concrete action.

The United States, the Central American democracies, and other members of the hemispheric community have made repeated attempts to engage the Sandinista regime in a dialogue that would address the concerns of every country in the region, including those of Nicaragua.

The following are bilateral and multilateral approaches to Nicaragua in which the United States has participated:

- In 1978, the United States participated in a three-nation mission to Nicaragua of "friendship and reconciliation," under OAS auspices, in an effort to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Nicaragua. This mission supported a dialogue between then President Somoza and the Broad Opposition Front (FAO), a moderate group that included FSLN member Sergio Ramirez (now one of three members of the Nicaraguan Junta of Government). This mission failed because of Somoza's intransigence.
- Fighting between the National Guard and the FSLN increased in 1979. During this time, the U.S. maintained contact with Sandinista leaders, continuing to pressure Somoza to step down in favor of a more moderate coalition, and seeking Sandinista assurances that they would support a democratic pluralist government with respect for opposition political parties, human rights, a free press, and the holding of elections. The Sandinistas eventually made such promises in its July 9, 1979 Basic Statute and in its July 12, 1979 letter to the OAS; promises that have not yet been kept.
- After the fall of Somoza in 1979, the United States for nearly two years used economic assistance and diplomatic support to encourage the Sandinistas to respect their commitments to political pluralism, free elections, a mixed economy, and a non-aligned foreign

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policy; from July 1979 to January 1981, the U.S. had offered \$118 million in economic assistance, and had voted in favor of more than \$200 million in World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank loans to Nicaragua. The U.S. also encouraged other Western nations to provide assistance, and urged U.S. and foreign banks to reach a debt rescheduling agreement with Nicaragua.

- Nevertheless, the U.S. Congress had stipulated that U.S. foreign assistance was conditioned upon the absence of Sandinista support for foreign terrorist. By the close of 1980, there was incontrovertible evidence that the Sandinistas were providing material support, including arms, and training to the Salvadoran guerrillas.
- On August 11, 1981 Assistant Secretary Enders traveled to Managua and offered the Sandinista leaders a five-point peace plan to alleviate mutual tensions. The plan, based upon an end to Sandinista support for guerilla groups, called for public declarations of non-intervention; a U.S. statement on the enforcement of U.S. laws pertaining to the activities of Nicaraguan exile groups in the U.S.; an end to the Nicaraguan military build-up; the re-establishment of U.S. economic assistance, and cultural ties between the countries. The Sandinistas decided not to pursue the U.S. offer.
- On October 7, 1981 GRN Junta Coordinator blasted U.S. policy worldwide in a speech at the United Nations General Assembly.
- In December 1981 Secretary Haig and Foreign Minister D'Escoto talked during an OAS meeting in St. Lucia. D'Escoto denied that Nicaragua was supporting Salvadoran guerrillas or that there were any Cuban military and security advisors in Nicaragua.
- On April 8, 1982 Ambassador Quainton delivered an eight-point peace proposal to the Nicaraguan government in Managua. This plan called for: an end to Nicaraguan support for insurgencies in other countries; a U.S. pledge to enforce laws pertaining to exile activities in the U.S.; a joint pledge of non-interference in each other's affairs or in the affairs of others in the region; a regional, reciprocal ban on imports of heavy offensive weapons, and a reciprocal reduction of foreign military

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advisors in the region; international verification of the above point; the resumption of U.S. economic assistance to Nicaragua; the exchange of cultural groups; the reaffirmation of previous commitments by the Sandinistas to pluralism, free elections, and a mixed economy.

- On April 14, 1982 the Sandinistas responded with a number of allegations and demands. The response was procedural rather than substantive, and suggested that future negotiations were to be held in Mexico with the Mexicans as "witnesses."
- On April 29, 1982 the U.S. responded to Nicaragua's April 14 note in Managua by addressing all of the GRN's allegations and demands in its previous response. The U.S. asked the GRN to address our eight-point proposal.
- On May 7, 1982 the GRN responded with a lengthy document which discussed our eight points within a framework of GRN rhetoric. The document included a great deal of rhetoric, and made no attempt to continue the dialogue in reaching a compromise. The GRN insisted that negotiations be held in a third country, with a third party as witness.
- On July 3, 1982 taking a cue from the May 7 GRN response, in which the Nicaraguan Government (GRN) said that it wished to "fulfill its international obligations," the U.S. asked the GRN to close down the command-control center of the Salvadoran guerrillas located in Nicaragua. If the GRN did so, this would be an indication of its serious desire for peace, and both countries could proceed to more serious talks. The U.S. offered to send down a technical team to help the GRN locate the command-control center.
- On August 13, 1982 the GRN's reply ignored the U.S. suggestion of July 3 regarding the closing down of the Salvadoran guerilla command-control center. The GRN repeated its call for high-level negotiations with a third party present.
- In October 1982, the United States, along with seven other regional democracies signed the San Jose Declaration; which, among other things, underscored The signatories commitment to democracy and respect for self-determination and national sovereignty. The Sandinistas refused to receive the Costa Rican Foreign

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Minister to discuss the Declaration as a basis for regional negotiations.

- On June 10, 1983 Special Presidential Envoy Richard Stone visited Nicaragua, where he met with political party representatives, church, private sector and Nicaraguan officials, including Junta Coordinator Daniel Ortega and Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto. Between June 10, 1983 and January 5, 1984 Ambassador Stone met with the Sandinistas on at least four occasions;
- Since early 1983, the United States has also encouraged the multilateral efforts of the Contadora group to achieve a peaceful political resolution to Central American conflicts.
- Following reports in late 1983, that the Sandinistas were considering more moderate policies, the U.S. stated publicly and privately to the Sandinistas that it welcomed such hints of moderation. The U.S. stated that while it wished to see if there was any reality behind Sandinista rhetoric, the U.S. was willing to respond in kind to meaningful, concrete steps.

While the U.S. has awaited substantive Sandinista replies to our attempts to dialogue, their response has been consistently clear. The Sandinistas have:

- Increased the number of Nicaraguans under arms to about 75,000 (Somoza's National Guard numbered about 14,000 at its peak).
- Received at least 3,000 Cuban military advisers, as well as smaller numbers of Soviet and Eastern European bloc security personnel.
- Expanded their arms inventory with Soviet tanks, rockets, artillery, helicopters and armored personnel carriers and military trucks from Eastern Europe.
- Repressed moderate opposition groups, maintained prior censorship of the media, harassed religious groups, persecuted indigenous indian groups, and initiated the establishment of a state aligned with the Soviet Union and Cuba.
- In concert with Cuba, provided active military support to guerrilla groups in El Salvador, as well as having trained and infiltrated subversive groups into Honduras.

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These four trends were begun during the regime's first 18 months, despite the U.S. policy to achieve an accommodation with the new government. The only ones who pushed Nicaragua into the arms of Cuba and the USSR were the Sandinista leaders themselves.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Executive Registry

84 - 1995

May 3, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO: Distribution List
FROM: S/LPD - Otto J. Reich *OR*
SUBJECT: Resource Book: El Salvador's Runoff Election

Due to the continuing interest in the El Salvador elections, I am enclosing a Resource Book on the May 6 Presidential runoff election between Jose Napoleon Duarte of the Christian Democratic Party and Roberto D'Aubuisson of the National Republican Alliance.

The Resource Book consists of an overview of the election procedure, biographies of the presidential candidates, questions and answers on the election, a summary of AID support for the election, and a background paper on El Salvador.

Enclosure:


Resource Book

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Resource Book

El Salvador's Runoff Election

United States Department of State




RESOURCE BOOK

EL SALVADOR'S RUNOFF ELECTION

CONTENTS

1. Presidential Elections in El Salvador
2. Biographies of Presidential Candidates
3. Questions and Answers on the Election
4. AID Project Support for Election
5. El Salvador: Revolution or Reform?



SUMMARY OF KEY FACTS

The Candidates

Presidential candidates representing eight parties contested the March 25 presidential election. Since no candidate received an absolute majority, in accordance with the Salvadoran constitution, the two leading candidates will face each other in a runoff on May 6. The slates are:

National Republican Alliance (ARENA)

President: Roberto D'Aubuisson
Vice President: Hugo Barrera

Christian Democratic Party (PDC)

President: Jose Napoleon Duarte
Vice President: Rodolfo Antonio Castillo

Voting Procedure

1. The voter's hands and identification are checked for traces of electoral ink indicating he has already voted.
2. The identification is checked against the voting list.
3. The identification is stamped and the name in the registry checked off.
4. The identification is held by an official while the voter takes his ballot to the ballot box, marks an "X" across the symbol of the party of his choice, and deposits the vote in the box.
5. The voter's identification and his finger are stained to show that he has voted, completing the process.

Transmission of Results

Official results will be based on the tallies compiled at the voting place and signed by representatives of both parties and the local election official. They will be sent to the nearest municipality, then to the departmental capital, and finally to the Central Elections Council in San Salvador, a process of several days.

In a departure from the practice in the first round, unofficial results also will be compiled by the Central Elections Council based on telegrams sent from the polling places to San Salvador. This unofficial tally should begin arriving shortly after the polls close.

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Background

On October 15, 1979, a group of reformist military officers overthrew the government of ex-General Romero. The new Salvadoran political process began in 1979 with the announcement of the goals of the coup:

"To create an environment favorable for the carrying out of truly free elections within a reasonable period of time," and

"To permit the organization of political parties of every ideology, in such a way as to strengthen the democratic system."

Several attempts to form a broadly representative interim junta of government followed the coup. All were shortlived. In January 1980, the Armed Forces combined with the Christian Democratic Party to form a government which, with some reshuffling, held power until the 1982 elections for a Constituent Assembly.

This 1980-1982 period saw the implementation of several major reforms, including a land reform, a banking reform, nationalization of foreign marketing of coffee and sugar, development of stronger peasant organizations in farming areas and, most importantly, reactivation of political parties and the holding of free and honest elections.

During that same period, Cuban and Soviet bloc assistance, channelled through Nicaragua, permitted the guerrillas to escalate and intensify their war effort. The capstone of this effort was the so-called "final offensive" of January 1981, in which the guerrillas combined a major military operation with a call for a popular uprising. This appeal for popular support was generally ignored and the offensive collapsed. Since then, the guerrillas increasingly have focused on the tactics of attrition. Although they usually confine their attacks to lightning strikes against static targets, they more recently have employed heavier arms and larger bodies of men in their strike forces. Guerrilla strength is now estimated to be 9,000-11,000 armed combatants.

During 1980, violence against civilians crested. The growing military strength of the guerrillas was expressed in terrorism, which often provoked a violent reaction. Implementation of the reforms of March 1980 also led some formerly moderate conservatives to respond with violence.

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From that point, however, El Salvador began a new consolidation of the political center. The hallmark of this consolidation was the March 1982 elections.

On March 28, 1982, following four months of political campaigning, some 1.5 million Salvadorans went to the polls to elect deputies to the Constituent Assembly. Six parties ranging from the center-left to the far-right participated. The Central Elections Council, over 200 international observers and over 700 members of the international press agreed that the elections were fair and honest, the first such elections in over fifty years. The political front of the guerrilla movement was invited to field candidates but claimed that conditions were not conducive. Instead, the political parties and groups affiliated with the guerrillas attempted to violently intimidate voters and disrupt the elections.

The 1982 voting was as follows:

<u>Party</u>	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Percent of All Votes</u>	<u>Percent of Valid Votes</u>
PDC	546,218	36	40
ARENA	402,304	26	29
PCN	261,153	17	19
AD	100,586	7	8
PPS	39,504	3	3
POP	12,574	1	1
Total Valid Votes	1,362,339	89	
Invalid	131,498	8	
Blank	51,438	3	
Challenged	6,412	0	
Total Votes	1,551,687	100	

As a result of the elections, the 60 seats in the Constituent Assembly were apportioned as follows:

<u>Party</u>	<u>Seats</u>
PDC	24
ARENA	19
PCN	14
AD	2
PPS	1
POP	0

(Note: The PCN subsequently split into two groups: the PCN with five seats and PAISA with nine.)

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Following the March elections, the Christian Democrat-Armed Forces government peacefully transferred authority to a provisional government named by the Constituent Assembly.

The president of the provisional government, Alvaro Magana, is a political independent selected as a consensus candidate because no single party received a majority of seats in the Assembly. There are also three vice-presidents, representing the three largest parties.

Political debate in the Assembly and the provisional government has often been divisive, but the parties have shown themselves capable of reaching important compromises.

The land reform was extended three times past its original termination date, and the ongoing phase of the land reform has redistributed more land under the provisional government than under the old one. More than 550,000 Salvadorans -- about 24 percent of the rural population -- have benefitted from the land reform to date.

Under the provisional government, violence against civilians has been reduced, although by no means eliminated. Although precise statistics are not available, figures taken from press reports and validated by other sources indicate a clear trend. Following are illustrative statistics for the month of December (since data for all of 1980 is not available):

<u>Period</u>	<u>Number of Civilian Deaths</u>
December, 1980	575
December, 1981	349
December, 1982	157
December, 1983	99

In the first three months of 1984, the average monthly number of civilian deaths attributable to political violence is about 88.

The Assembly passed an amnesty, a concrete gesture of national reconciliation, just as the Salvadoran Peace Commission was beginning its efforts to bring the guerrilla left into the 1984 elections.

Most impressively, the Assembly passed a new, liberal constitution and the 1984 elections are taking place within a strictly legal framework.

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The March 25 Presidential Elections: The First Round

Eight parties contested the first round elections. After a prolonged and active period of campaigning, elections were held on March 25.

On April 1, one week later, the Central Elections Council (CCE) officially announced the results of the first round of elections:

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Percent of All Votes</u>	<u>Percent of Valid Votes</u>
PDC (Duarte)	549,727	38.7	43.4
ARENA (D'Aubuisson)	376,917	26.6	29.8
PCN (Guerrero)	244,556	17.2	19.3
AD (Fortin)	43,929	3.1	3.5
Other Four Parties	51,147	3.6	4.0
 Total Valid Votes	 1,266,276	 89.2	 100.0
Blank Votes	41,736	2.9	
Spoiled Votes	104,557	7.4	
Challenged Votes	6,924	0.5	
 Total Votes Cast	 1,419,493	 100.0	

(Note: Blank votes and ballots on which no party was marked. Spoiled votes generally are ballots on which more than one party has been marked. Challenged votes are those to which one or more party poll watchers has raised an objection.)

These results were accepted immediately by all parties and candidates. No protests were filed.

The 1.4 million votes represent more than 75 percent of the electorate of 1.8 million, estimated as follows: 2.5 million names on the electoral registry minus 500,000 persons living outside El Salvador, minus approximately 100,000 deceased persons whose death has not been entered on national records due to guerrilla disruption of civil procedures, and minus the military and others not permitted or able to vote.

The low number of blank ballots and the high vote count, in the face of guerrilla threats and sometimes frustrating procedural impediments, demonstrated Salvadoran enthusiasm for and commitment to a democratic system of government. It is clear that the Salvadoran people were ready for elections, that they viewed the process as important, that they believed a genuine choice was being offered, and that they were willing to put up with inconvenience to participate.

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Administrative problems took four forms: problems with the registry list, problems with delivery of elections materials (ballots, registry list, etc.), ineffective dissemination of information to the voters about the new, more complicated system, and excessive rigidity which prevented local officials from dealing effectively with problems as they arose. The registry list was by far the least significant source of problems.

There is no precise estimate of how many voters were kept from voting by these problems. We believe, however, that more Salvadorans turned out to vote in the March 25 elections than in 1982, suggesting that some 150,000 potential voters were prevented from casting their ballot by these bottlenecks.

More than 240 international observers witnessed the elections. In almost all cases, though noting the administrative problems, the observers acknowledged that these flaws were caused by the Salvadoran commitment to a reliable electoral system in which errors and manipulations could not occur. Observers were virtually unanimous in praising the efforts of the Salvadoran Government to conduct free and fair elections, the apolitical conduct of the Salvadoran Armed Forces in protecting the integrity and the physical security of the elections, and most especially the evident commitment of the Salvadoran people to the democratic process. The comments of the observers sent by the Organization of American States were indicative:

"The people of El Salvador deserve the highest praise for their responsible and civic spirit in seeking a solution to their problems through voting as an expression of faith in democracy, thereby proving their rejection of violence.... The Salvadoran Government deserves praise for its efforts to make possible this event at a time of national anguish.... The Armed Forces deserve praise for the correct manner in which they provided security to the voters and for their cooperation with the citizenry in defending their right to express their political preference without undue influence."

Some 800 U.S. and foreign journalists monitored the elections. In general, their reporting followed the same themes as the comments of the observers.

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The Far Left

In the fall of 1983, the provisional government initiated contact with the guerrillas and the political parties associated with them to try to bring them into the elections and incorporate them into the emerging democratic system. This effort culminated in two meetings between the Salvadoran Peace Commission and the FDR/FMLN, the guerrilla umbrella organization.

The FDR/FMLN repeatedly rejected the government's invitations to participate in elections, insisting on a share of government power and other major reorganizations in advance of any popular consultation.

The Peace Commission has stated its willingness to renew discussions with the FDR/FMLN on its participation in the 1985 local and national legislative elections.

On January 25, Mario Aguinada, an FDR/FMLN spokesman, said in Bogota that the guerrillas would not target the elections, but warned that the war would continue and that "some bridges may fall, or some traffic may be stopped." In 1982, the FDR/FMLN similarly denied that it would target the Constituent Assembly elections but then staged a major offensive to intimidate the populace, halt ground transportation, and physically destroy the elections on voting day.

During the period before and during the first round, the far left intensified its attacks on civilians, including the murder of Assembly deputies (a guerrilla communique called the first murder a "response" to the upcoming elections). The FMLN published a warning to the populace of four towns in the departments of San Miguel and Usulután, prohibiting participation in campaign activities. In other areas, they issued warnings that the roads were mined and that vehicles could not use them on election day. Nighttime bombings of businesses increased dramatically in the last few weeks before the election.

Guerrilla actions were partly responsible for the administrative difficulties encountered on March 25. They successfully blocked delivery of electoral materials to some voting locations, stole thousands of identity documents to prevent citizens from voting, and destroyed electrical switching stations on election eve so that, in some cases, electoral materials had to be delivered in the dark, resulting in missing registry pages and other problems.

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The guerrillas also attempted to block voting on election day. Regular voting could not take place in about 55 of El Salvador's 261 municipalities. Because these towns are small or underpopulated, this is not an index of guerrilla strength. Only about two percent of the electorate was prevented from voting by the guerrilla effort.

The Electoral Law

The Transitory Electoral Law, passed on February 10, defines the procedures for the campaign and the elections and specifies the rights and duties of all participants. It stipulates obligatory voting, the use of an electoral register, and the use of indelible ink to mark voters' fingers and national identity cards. The law also requires that in the future the Central Elections Council be elected by the Legislative Assembly.

There was extensive debate over whether to amend the electoral law to avoid the administrative difficulties encountered during the March 25 election. On April 13, a coalition of ARENA, PAISA and PCN deputies passed a bill amending the electoral law to suspend use of the registry and modifying other voting aspects. On April 24, President Magana vetoed the bill, citing the following reasons:

"The use of the electoral lists in the March 25 elections constituted an effective guarantee that prevented practices which in the past have made Salvadorans lose confidence in the electoral process.... The elimination of the lists would obviously result in a larger number of votes, but at the same time the ability to guarantee an event free of irregularities would be greatly reduced. The confidence of Salvadorans in the honesty of the elections and the prestige of the democratic process in our country won during the last electoral event would be greatly endangered.... Although the law that the Legislative Branch wants to amend is transitory, some stability in the judicial regulations that govern such an important event should be maintained.

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Monitoring by Political Parties

Under the electoral law, each political party contesting the election can name one poll watcher for each voting table and ballot box. Parties can also name one representative to monitor the municipal and departmental electoral commissions and the CCE. Parties can also name one computer technician to monitor activities involving the computer and parties can also assign representatives to guard against tampering with elections materials, wherever they are stored.

Registration of Candidates and Coalitions

The electoral law provides that all candidates had to be registered by February 29. Parties could not change their slates between the first and possible second round of elections, except for reasons of physical or legal incapacity. Following the March 25 elections there was talk of amending the electoral law to permit parties to modify their slates between the rounds. In the end, nothing came of it.

The electoral law permits the formation of coalitions. All coalitions between parties had to be registered before midnight on February 26. No formal coalitions were formed. It is still possible, however, for one of the contending parties to agree to share power at a level below that of president and vice president in exchange for an endorsement. Their alliance, however, could not be depicted on the official ballot.

Only two small parties, POP and MERECEN have formally endorsed any runoff candidate, Christian Democrat Napoleon Duarte. PAISA and the PPS have publicly indicated their support for ARENA.

Public Financing For Political Campaigns

Under the Public Financing Campaign Law, each of the parties represented in the Legislative Assembly can receive 500,000 colones (\$200,000 at the official rate) as a one time grant. In addition, for this election and all future elections, parties receiving more than 5 percent of the national vote will be reimbursed for campaign expenses at the rate of 5 colones for each vote (less in non-presidential elections). Parties that participated in the 1982 elections can receive an advance of up to 50 percent of the amount they would have received if the law had been in effect at that time.

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Access to Media

Under the electoral law, the communications media, both private and public, must treat all registered parties equally with regard to access, time, space, and cost of services. Campaign propaganda is prohibited in the three days preceding and following election day, and on election day itself.

Electoral Registry

The electoral law requires the use of an electoral registry to establish voter eligibility. The registry permits assignment of voters to specific voting locations, thereby inhibiting double voting. The registry will also be used in the legislative and local elections scheduled for 1985 to establish voter eligibility within each voting district.

Each voter will cast his ballot either where he is assigned or at one of a number of special locations where anyone on the national registry can vote. These special locations allow citizens living away from their home districts to vote without having to travel long distances or pass through conflictive areas.

The registry is based on the national identity card system. The Central Elections Council inherited data from that system containing over 2.4 million entries. Data from municipalities was photocopied, microfilmed and then entered into the CCE computer so that the previous data could be checked. As a matter of policy, priority was given to operations which would incorporate more voters over those which would reduce the electorate. When the computer found that a person held more than one identification card, all but the last card were nullified for voting purposes. Elaborate quality controls and security checks have been incorporated.

Since the March 25 elections, some 80,000 corrections and additions have been entered into the system, largely catching up on citizens who have changed districts.

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Obligatory Voting

Salvadoran law obliges each citizen to vote. This practice is common throughout Latin America and other parts of the world. Voting was obligatory in the 1982 elections and the first round of the 1984 elections. Although the law stipulates a nominal fine for failure to vote, this aspect of the law has not been enforced. To our knowledge, no fines were imposed in either 1982 or 1984.

Preparations for Voting Day

The Central Elections Council has met with the departmental electoral commissions to instruct them on electoral procedures. The departmental commissions in turn will instruct the municipal commissions and they the individual poll workers. For the first time, officials at all levels are being provided with written instructions which were recently revised and changed from technical legal language to everyday Spanish.

The Central Elections Council plans to establish about 5,700 ballot boxes and voting tables in some 450 locations. There will be national polling places in most departments.

Registry lists (and ballots) have been printed for distribution to the municipalities on May 3-5. The political parties may have representatives at all places where electoral materials are stored in order to guard against tampering.

Information on where and how to vote was published in the newspapers beginning on May 2. In addition, a 25-man telephone bank will be available twelve hours a day to answer voters' inquiries. Local officials, elections officials, and party workers will help inform voters of their designated voting places.

The Salvadorans have made every effort to organize the elections to run smoothly and effectively. Nevertheless, the complexity of the system arising from their desire to ensure fraud-free elections may lead to minor disorganization in isolated locations. With each successive election, organization has improved and popular confidence in the results has increased.

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Voting Day

The polls will open at 7:00 a.m. and close at 6:00 p.m. where there is electricity and at 4:00 p.m. where there is no electricity so poll workers can tally the votes before sundown.

The procedure at the polls is as follows:

1. First, a voting official checks the voter's hands and identity card for traces of electoral ink to ensure that he has not already cast his ballot.
2. If no traces are found, the identity card is given to the poll secretary who looks up the voter's document number on the voting list (either a municipal, departmental, regional or national list, depending on the type of voting place).
3. Once it is verified that the voter is registered, the secretary stamps the identity card and checks off the name in the registry.
4. The director of the polling place then takes the card and gives the voter a ballot displaying the party symbols -- a fish on a green field for the Christian Democrats and red, white, and blue horizontal bars with a white cross for ARENA. (In their campaigning, the parties emphasize these symbols.) The director retains the identity card while the voter casts his ballot.
5. The voter goes to the ballot box, marks his ballot across the symbol of the party of his choice, folds it, and deposits it in the ballot box.
6. After casting his ballot, the voter returns to the director to recover his identity card. The card and the voter's hand are then stained with indelible ink, completing the voting process.

Except for the marking of the ballot before it is folded, this process takes place in sight of all party poll watchers, who verify that the voter receives only one ballot, casts only one vote, and that the vote is entered into the transparent, plexiglass ballot box.

-13-

Transmission of Results

After the polls close, the poll watchers will physically break open the ballot boxes, count the votes, and fill out and sign the official tallies and standardized telegram forms.

In a departure from the procedures used on March 25, the telegram will immediately be sent to the Central Elections Council, to provide early, though unofficial, results.

The elections officials will then follow the same procedure used in the first round to transmit the official results: They will turn the official tallies and the ballots over to the municipal electoral commission. Once the municipal commission has received all the ballots and documentation from its jurisdiction, they are delivered to the departmental electoral commissions within 16 hours of the closing of the polls. The departmental commission then must deliver them to the CCE within one day.

The official vote count will be done by the CCE, based on the documents completed by the poll workers at each table. Documentation will be completed at every stage in this process and electoral officials will retain copies of the completed documentation. Copies will also be given to the party poll watchers. The actual ballots can be recounted by the CCE if necessary.

The CCE will make the final, official declaration of the election results.

International Observers

The Salvadoran Government invited more than sixty nations and international organizations to observe the March 25 elections and verify their honesty.

In general, El Salvador has invited the approximately thirty nations which sent observers to the first round to observe the May 6 runoff. In addition, El Salvador has issued more than one hundred invitations to prominent individuals around the world, with emphasis on those nations not sending official observers.

The U.S. will send an official delegation, as it did in 1982 and for the first round, composed of Congressmen, Administration officials and prominent private citizens.

-14-

Role of the Military

The 1984 elections will determine which candidate will become president and thus the military Commander-in-Chief.

The Salvadoran Armed Forces have a two-fold task: to support the integrity of the elections and to physically protect the elections from guerrilla attack.

On January 4, 1984, the Minister of Defense ordered that the military be strictly apolitical and non-partisan. Although permitted to vote by the constitution, the Armed Forces High Command has determined that the military will not vote in these elections, in order to further preserve the apolitical role of the military. Regional commanders were ordered to offer "all (possible) support within the framework of the law" to the Central Elections Council to guarantee an electoral process which is "free, legitimate and pure."

Although seriously short of materiel and ammunition, the Salvadoran Armed Forces have made extensive preparations to protect the elections. Their ability to defend the elections adequately, with the concomitant high expenditure of ammunition and risk to other military assets, was made possible only by emergency provision of military articles and services under section 21(d) of the Arms Export Control Act. This section of law permits military sales without payment in advance or interest charges if payment is made within 60 days of delivery.

In defense of the first round of the elections, the Salvadoran Armed Forces conducted extensive offensive operations to prevent the guerrillas from massing for a major display of strength. Shortly before election day, the military withdrew to defensive positions to protect the voting places themselves. A similar strategy is expected for the runoff.

-15-

Contadora Process

Elections are a key element of regional peace negotiations under the Contadora Process. All nine nations participating in these negotiations -- El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia -- signed a 21-point Document of Objectives on September 1983. It identified as one of their principle goals the "... establishment and improvement of democratic, representative, and pluralistic systems that guarantee effective political participation and assure free access to honest and periodic elections."

In January 1984, they agreed on guidelines for implementing this objective, including:

- the promulgation of electoral legislation, including regulations to guarantee the existence and equal participation in the electoral process of political parties representing a range of opinions;
- the creation of independent electoral bodies within each Central American country to guarantee the integrity of elections; and
- the establishment of electoral timetables.

The March 25 presidential elections fulfill the democratization objective of the 21 points. The electoral law prohibits no party, faction or individual from participating and ensures equal access to the media and to public financing for electoral campaigns. The Central Elections Council is an independent government agency responsible for ensuring that the elections are fair and honest. El Salvador's electoral timetable is being realized with direct presidential elections in 1984 and, as mandated by the National Constitution, direct municipal and national legislative elections in 1985.

2. Biographies of Presidential Candidates

José Napoleón DUARTE Fuentes
(phonetic: DWARTAY)

EL SALVADOR

Presidential Candidate

Addressed as:
Mr. Duarte

José Napoleón Duarte, President of the Revolutionary Governing Junta from December 1980 until March 1982, will be the presidential candidate of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in the March 1984 election.

Duarte studied engineering at Notre Dame University in Indiana during 1945-48 and later attended the National University of El Salvador. He subsequently worked as an engineer for several construction companies, and he has said that he was involved in erecting many of the buildings in downtown San Salvador. In 1960 he became a member of the organizing committee that established the PDC, and he has served as the party's secretary general three times. He was mayor of San Salvador during 1964-70. He ran for president in 1972, and it is widely believed in El Salvador that he won the election but that the military subsequently rigged the vote count in favor of his opponent. He was then exiled by the ruling government. He went into business in Venezuela and did not return home until October 1979, when a coup brought a moderate coalition of civilians and military officers to power in El Salvador. He became a member of the ruling junta in March 1980.

Duarte, 58, enjoys art and is himself an oil painter. He has been involved in various social service projects and helped to establish the Salvadoran Boy Scouts and the country's Antituberculosis League. He has also served as a director of the Salvadoran Red Cross. Married to the former Inés Durán, he has six children. He speaks English.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

EL SALVADOR'S RUNOFF ELECTION

- Q. What has become of El Salvador's electoral law and voter registration system?
- A. President Magana vetoed an amendment to the electoral law which proposed abolishing the use of the registry for the May 6 runoff election. The voting process will therefore be the same as on March 25; however, it is expected to be less confusing and better organized.
- Q. What changes have been made to prevent the confusion and disorganization of the March 25th election?
- A. Most difficulties experienced in last March's election were due to logistical errors, not to deficiencies in the registry list itself. Election materials (lists, ballots, etc.) are being distributed to municipalities May 3-5. The Central Elections Council (CCE) has met with the departmental electoral commissions to instruct them further on the electoral procedures. The municipal commissions and the poll workers will have all received similar briefings before the runoff election. Furthermore, written instructions in Spanish have been simplified to reduce confusion among all electoral officials and workers. Starting on May 1, information on voting locations and procedures will be published in local papers to ensure that the voters know where to cast their ballots. Party workers and election officials will assist the voters before and during the election. The registry itself has been updated with approximately 80,000 corrections and additions, and the supplemental lists have been printed to complement the lists employed on March 25.

-2-

- Q. Is it accurate to say that the guerrillas made only sporadic efforts to disrupt the first round of El Salvador's presidential elections?
- A. Despite promises to the contrary, the guerrilla groups launched a significant effort to disrupt the elections. They:

--targeted the nation's electrical grid and succeeded in causing power outages in two-thirds of the country;

--destroyed and confiscated national identity cards, preventing several thousand people from voting;

--halted the electoral process in some 44 small, rural towns but prevented only 2 percent of the electorate from going to the polls.

In a post election communique, the guerrillas asserted that "the elections have been a failure. While the political parties mounted the electoral farce and began fighting each other, the puppet army supported by yankee imperialism tried to stop the FMLN forces and prevent the actions of our glorious revolutionary people's army from obstructing the elections. The combativeness of our people's army did not allow normal elections."

In spite of their claims, the guerrillas had only limited success largely because of the Armed Forces commitment to protect the voting.

With respect to the second round, the FMLN has declared that it will be "another farce," and has reiterated its rejection of the electoral process. They have said that the war will continue before, during and after the elections. And, guerrilla leaders are not making idle threats. Activity has continued in the hiatus between the first and second rounds of El Salvador's presidential elections. A number of towns have been attacked, and the guerrillas have organized political propaganda meetings for the purpose of urging the people to reject what they call the electoral farce. Warnings that the guerrillas again plan to interfere with election day travel and to steal national identity cards have also been issued.

-3-

- Q. Why does the United States insist on elections in El Salvador since they may not resolve anything?
- A. Shortly after the coup of October 1979, the reformist military-civilian junta pledged to carry out elections to install democracy in El Salvador. The 1982 election of a Constituent Assembly and the 1984 presidential elections represent the fulfillment of that pledge. The elections were not imposed by the U.S., but we welcomed them as key steps in forging the institutions on which democracy can rest. In both 1982 and 1984 the Armed Forces were neutral guarantors of the electoral process in the face of armed attacks, sabotage and intimidation of voters by the guerrillas. Despite such attacks, the people voted in overwhelming numbers, thus rejecting the pleas of the guerrillas and demonstrating their faith in democratic government.

While the election may not end war immediately, it does several things: 1) it will give the country its first popularly and freely elected president in more than a half century; 2) it will reaffirm the commitment of the Armed Forces to protect and respect democratic civilian rule; 3) it provides valuable experience in democratic processes and respect for democratic institutions; and 4) it demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of the Salvadoran people want peace and jobs -- not guerrilla war.

- Q. How can the election be called free and democratic if the left cannot participate?
- A. In 1982 and 1984 the government invited the left to put down its arms and join in the elections. Repeatedly, the FDR/FMLN rejected all government offers to discuss their participation in the electoral process. In 1983 the Government of El Salvador offered an amnesty to guerrillas who would lay down their arms. Hundreds did so and were able to vote. This year guerrilla leaders pledged not to disrupt the election. This pledge was not respected, and political leaders were assassinated, the economic infrastructure was sabotaged, electoral documents were stolen, and voters were intimidated. These actions are clear proof that the left fears the free expression of the will of the people and does not want elections, even under the watchful eyes of hundreds of foreign observers. With the election of the new president, the hope is that institutions can be strengthened and that representatives of the left will gradually enter the democratic process in local jurisdictions and eventually at the national level.

-4-

- Q. How can the election be considered democratic when the people are required by law to vote?
- A. Compulsory voting is common throughout Latin America. In El Salvador, while the electorate was required to vote, they could have cast blank ballots in secret and still be certified as having voted. In 1982 and 1984 they were encouraged to do just that by the armed opposition. But so few did so that the impact was negligible. As it turns out, voters had more to fear from the guerrillas by risking their lives to vote. We have no knowledge of Salvadorans being penalized for not voting. The hundreds of international observers present at the elections have reported no coercion, abuse, or reprisals of the electorate by any officials.
- Q. Which of the two candidates is the U.S. backing in the May 6 runoff election?
- A. We have made it unmistakably clear that we are neutral with regard to the outcome of the election. Our strong support is restricted to the democratic process itself, of which we consider free and fair elections to be an essential part.
- Q. Is it possible to hold elections given the growing power and control of the FDR/FMLN?
- A. The guerrilla forces have not improved their position substantially since the 1982 elections, when the Salvadoran armed forces demonstrated the capacity to protect effectively and in which the Salvadoran people participated in defiance of the guerrillas' "Vote and Die" threat. The Salvadoran military and security forces have drawn up a comprehensive security strategy for the May 6 election; the guerrillas can be expected to try to interfere with and disrupt the process, as they did during the March 25 election.
- Q. How much did the U.S. contribute to the election program?
- A. The U.S. contributed \$3.4 million to the election program. This includes support for the creation of an electoral register, an international observer program, and related logistical and administrative costs.

-5-

Q. How will elections make a difference with regard to El Salvador's problems?

A. Elections are an essential part of the democratic process anywhere, but they also represent a key step in the transition in El Salvador from provisional to fully institutional government. Following the elections, El Salvador will have a president who derives his mandate directly from the will of the people. He will thus be able to act with explicit rather than implicit authority, providing a basis whereby a political solution can be sought or, if a political solution remains impossible, the military effort can be pursued with fully legitimate civilian leadership. The elections cannot be viewed only as a response to the immediate crisis. They are also a necessary component in the longer term process of developing a mature democracy that can respond to the political and socio-economic aspirations of the Salvadoran people.

Q. Will a civilian president have any real power? Isn't it true that the Army will retain power?

A. The May 6 runoff election will enhance the democratic process already underway in El Salvador. Elections represent an effort to ensure the permanent transition of ultimate authority to the citizens through their elected representatives. Elections are necessary to move this process forward, to enable the executive and legislative branches to begin to accrue fundamental political authority. The Salvadoran military has sworn to uphold the new constitution, to refrain from influencing the vote, to protect the elections from interference by left and right, and to abide by the outcome of the vote. It has, in fact, excluded itself completely from participation, as it did in 1982 and in the March 25, 1984 election. The military accepts the framework of relations between civil and military authority established by the 1983 constitution, which clearly subordinates the military to the presidency of the republic.

-6-

- Q. Isn't it true that the Catholic Church of El Salvador and most Central American leaders have stated that elections won't resolve anything and that negotiations are what is important?
- A. The Salvadoran Catholic Church has made it clear that it supports elections as part of a process of democratization that can lead to a political solution in El Salvador. The leaders of the Central America nations (excluding Nicaragua) have never expressed opposition to elections in El Salvador, nor do they advocate negotiations with the guerrillas insofar as the latter implies power-sharing. In fact, the essential issue is what the Salvadoran people themselves think of elections: the massive participation in 1982, the March 25, 1984 vote, and the anticipated turn-out for the May 6 runoff election clearly indicate their support.

AID Support for El Salvador Elections

The El Salvador Elections Project was initiated in FY 1983 to provide financial and technical assistance to El Salvador's Central Elections Council (CCE), for the design and implementation of an electoral process permitting open and fair participation by all citizens who wish to vote.

Total project cost is currently estimated at \$10.5 million. AID has provided a total of \$3.4 million in ESF grant funding for computer software and technical assistance for an electoral registry and partial funding for the Salvadoran Government's International Observer program. The GOES has provided a total of 17.7 million colones (U.S. \$7.1 million) in GOES local currency resources of which 10.4 million colones are from its own counterpart funds generated from ESF. Local currency funding was used for the registry as well as for the observer program.

The electoral mechanism for the March 25 election functioned as follows:

Electoral Registry

- The Central Elections Council (CCE) data base, containing each registered citizen's identification number, last name, first name, birth date, birth place, profession, literacy, sex, and the date on which the person registered was transferred into the Council's new mini-computer system. This automated data base permits rapid processing of registry data by department and municipality as well as data comparisons with other data bases.
- Registered voter names and dates of birth were compared to identify duplicate registrations. Approximately 75,000 duplicate registrations were eliminated.
- Birth and death certificates in all municipalities were microfilmed for transfer to the mini-computer.
- All death certificates were entered into the mainframe computer. In addition, the new data base was matched against the CCE's old data base enabling extraction of all duplicates and removal from the registry of names of dead voters and those with false identification cards.
- Printed registeries have been provided to all municipalities in preparation for election day.

International Observers

To enhance the credibility of the elections, invitations were issued to Foreign Ministries in over 50 countries.

5. El Salvador: Revolution or Reform?

El Salvador: Revolution or Reform?

Current
Policy
No. 546

February 1984

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.



This publication is based on oral and written testimony delivered by Langhorne A. Motley, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, before a joint hearing of the Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on January 26, 1984.


The situation in El Salvador is frequently portrayed as a clash between extremes of left and right—the forces of oppression versus the forces of revolution. Examples in the country's history of social injustice, governmental irresponsibility, political repression, militarism, and brutal fanaticism in the name of "order," "revolution," and sometimes plain criminality, might even seem to support such analysis.

Yet this view omits a vital new element: the reformist coup of October 1979 and subsequent coalition governments have created an alternative which, if allowed to continue, offers the prospect of genuinely democratic and progressive reform.

The emergence of this new democratic alternative did not eliminate the power of extremist factions of either left or right. But El Salvador's history since 1979 is fundamentally the story of efforts of change and reform. U.S. economic and military assistance to El Salvador has been directed at bolstering these reformist forces so that a just and democratic society might emerge.

With our help, the Government of El Salvador is implementing important economic, political, and judicial reforms, including a far-reaching land reform. It is increasing the professionalism of its armed forces and is reducing all forms of human rights abuse. The March 1982 Constituent Assembly elections were acclaimed for their fairness and large voter turnout. Direct presidential elections are scheduled for March 25, 1984. These advances have occurred and continue to progress in the face of sustained and violent opposition mounted by those on the right who stand to lose power and those on the left who would be denied the opportunity to seize power.

El Salvador's democratic, reformist alternative has made a steady advance since the coup in 1979, in spite of formidable obstacles: a sharply declining economy, opposition from the recalcitrant and often violent far right, and a



menacing and destructive guerrilla war waged by anti-democratic forces of the far left, supported by Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union.

This report clearly shows the profound changes underway in this troubled country. By contrasting the starting point of these reforms in 1979 with the present situation, it becomes evident that demonstrable change is taking place in El Salvador and that those seeking reform deserve our continued support. This is not the story of a completed effort but of a dynamic movement toward a more democratic society. The charts demonstrate that trend.

Background

In 1979, El Salvador was a country on the eve of a social, economic, and political explosion. The only question was whether that explosion would impel El Salvador toward a more democratic society or toward renewed minority rule, perhaps even a communist dictatorship.

El Salvador's population in 1979 was roughly 4.5 million, almost double the 2.5 million of 1960. El Salvador also is one of the world's most densely populated countries. (See Chart 1.)

El Salvador's economy is based largely on agriculture. There is a critical shortage of farmland to provide for the employment, production, and income needs of so dense a population. Moreover, before the reforms, the distribution of land had been highly skewed. Over 40% of the nation's farmland was controlled by less than 1% of the population. Eleven percent of the land was owned by absentee landlords and worked by sharecroppers or tenant farmers. Fifteen percent was organized into large plantations, worked by hired laborers and, during peak seasons, migrant workers. This inequitable distribution caused rural poverty and sparked social unrest.

At the same time, two decades of high economic growth had contributed to the economic modernization of the country. In fact, between 1960 and 1979, economic growth was so high that, despite rapid population growth, real per capita income rose by roughly 50%.


The manufacturing and service sectors both expanded and were beginning to relieve some of the pressure on the land. Agriculture and mining actually fell from more than 30% of national production in 1960 to some 25% in 1979. (See Chart 2.)

A generation of economic expansion and growth profoundly changed popular expectations, accelerated the erosion of traditional relationships, and set the stage for major social and political transformations.


- The traditional relationship between the economic elite and the military hierarchy, weakening under the pressure of increasing social unrest, was finally shattered by the reformist military coup of October 15, 1979.
- Leftist extremists with strongly Marxist-Leninist leadership, emboldened by the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua and encouraged by Cuba, turned increasingly to violence as the road to total power.
- Rightist extremists, faced with the prospect of losing their privileged position, also began to reorganize for sometimes violent political action.
- And the reformist junta—including representatives of the military, political parties, the private sector, and the left—was formed but broke apart within 6 weeks when the extreme left withdrew to join forces with those who had taken up arms.

In response, in January 1980 the Christian Democratic Party—widely believed to have won the elections of 1972 and 1977 but blocked from taking office—joined with the military leaders who staged the October coup to form a Revolutionary Governing Junta. This coalition—opposed by the far right as well as the far left—embarked upon a program of major reform and restructuring. It decreed land, banking, and foreign trade reforms and carried out political changes leading to Constituent Assembly elections, while reducing violence against civilians and countering the military threat posed by the guerrillas.

1-Population Density, 1982



2-Components of Gross Domestic Product, 1979



Political Developments

Supported by a continuing flow of arms, training, and assistance in command and control from Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union, the guerrillas shifted from political to military action during 1980. The far right also stepped up terrorist activities against both the left and the government's reforms. Consequently, politically motivated violent deaths peaked at over 800 a month in 1980.

The violence, however, did not prevent the reform of the political system or the restoration of elections for a Constituent Assembly in March 1982. Six parties, from the political right to the center-left, fielded candidates for the assembly's 60 seats. In these elections, administered by an independent Central Elections Council, some 1.5 million Salvadorans voted (about 80% of the eligible electorate); only the extreme

left refused to participate. According to eyewitness accounts by invited observers and international journalists, the elections were fair, open, and representative.

The elections produced an assembly in which no party held an absolute majority. A multiparty Government of National Unity, headed by President Alvaro Magana, was named by the Constituent Assembly. It has functioned slowly but successfully by consensus.

In the summer of 1982, President Magana, a civilian independent, brought together the parties in the government in a common program known as the Pact of Apaneca. This program established a framework for progress on land reform, human rights, and social and political dialogue. Within this framework, more than 1,000 political prisoners, guerrillas, and guerrilla supporters were granted amnesty in 1983. And the Salvadoran Peace Commission has met with representatives of the guerrillas to try to arrive at conditions for their participation in democratic elections.

The new constitution, which entered into force on December 20, 1983, establishes a republican, pluralistic form of government; strengthens the legislative and judicial branches; improves safeguards for individual rights; protects the legal bases of the land reform; and provides for presidential elections in March 1984 and legislative and municipal elections in 1985.

The Salvadoran military has had a major role in protecting and defending the reforms of the last 4 years. The land reform would not have been physically or politically possible without armed services support. Similarly, the military's firm commitment to protect free elections this March will be a key factor in ensuring that voters are able to cast their ballots without coercion from either left or right.

Economic Developments


El Salvador's economy faces critical difficulties. The guerrillas have sought to topple the government by targeting the economic infrastructure. In addition, the worldwide recession has had a disastrous impact on the Salvadoran economy.

As a result, since 1978 gross domestic product (GDP) has fallen by 23% in real terms and exports have dropped by 40%. Unemployment, which had been relatively low during the 1960s and 1970s, suddenly began to shoot up in 1979 and now reaches more than 30%. Real gross domestic product per capita, one measure of a nation's economic well-being because it measures the average earnings of each citizen, has declined by about 30%. According to this measure, El Salvador has lost 15 years of economic development in the last four. (See Charts 3 and 4.)


One key element of this precipitous economic decline has been El Salvador's shortage of hard currency to pay for imports. Because of falling prices for its major export commodities—coffee, cotton, sugar, and some manufactured goods—combined with the higher price of borrowed capital, El Salvador was no longer capable of financing needed imports. Even the drop in the price of oil after 1981—a potentially helpful development—did not fully benefit El Salvador because its major exports also were declining in value. It still takes too many bags of coffee to buy one barrel of oil.

The effect of this economic decline is both social and political. Lower incomes and reduced employment mean that many Salvadorans are having to make do with less than before, in spite of the major economic reforms put in place in the last 4 years. Reduced resources also inhibit the develop-

3-Real Gross Domestic Product, 1960-84



4-Estimated Unemployment, 1977-83



ment of a national political consensus by forcing factions and sectors to fight harder for a share of a shrinking economic pie.

By aggravating this situation, the guerrillas hope to set citizen against government; laborer against manager; farmer against manufacturer. In their effort to undermine the national economy, the guerrillas have destroyed buses, bridges, electrical pylons, and places of work and production. The cumulative economic cost of guerrilla destruction from 1979

through 1983 has been estimated at more than \$800 million, an amount greater than the total of U.S. economic assistance during the same period. It is impossible to estimate the human cost. (See Chart 5.)

Human Rights

Continued abuse of human rights remains a central problem, despite efforts to end violence from the terrorist right as well as the guerrilla left.

The Department of State and U.S. human rights organizations are in agreement that there are no fully reliable statistics on the number of civilian deaths attributable to political violence in El Salvador. However, since the State Department began providing reports to the Congress in 1981, it has been using statistics drawn from the Salvadoran press in an effort to determine trends on political violence. The press reports rely on such sources as the Justices of the Peace located in municipalities throughout the country. One of the primary tasks of the Justices of the Peace is the identification and registration of bodies.

The Department's statistics exclude guerrillas killed in battle and civilians killed either because they were with the guerrillas during the fighting or were innocent victims caught between two opposing forces in an ongoing military conflict. When one reads figures such as 30,000 civilians killed over the last few years, it is important to make a distinction between civilian deaths at the hands of left- or right-wing extremists and those casualties resulting from battle; some estimates calculate the battle casualties to be as high as 75% of all civilian victims of political violence.


All of the groups compiling such figures agree that there has been a steady and measurable, if still insufficient, reduction in the levels of political violence. (See Chart 6.)

Major efforts are underway to ensure more effective functioning of the criminal justice system. The United States is assisting the Government of El Salvador in developing programs to improve judicial protection and investigative capacities; to increase the proficiency of jurists, lawyers, and others involved in the legal process; and to modernize penal and evidentiary codes.


There also has been movement in a number of cases involving U.S. citizen victims. Judicial proceedings are underway as a result of investigations into the murders of Ita Ford, Maura Clarke, Dorothy Kazel, Jean Donovan, Michael Hammer, Mark Pearlman, and Michael Kline. The cases of the churchwomen and Michael Kline are now in the final stage of trial proceedings. Investigations continue without result into the death of John Sullivan, the disappearance of Patricia Cuellar, and the murder of Lt. Cdr. Albert Schaufelberger. Chart 7 shows, in simplified form, how these cases have developed.

The Government of El Salvador continues its efforts to curb the violence of the far right and its sympathizers. The armed forces high command has publicly broadcast its opposition to violence by far-right death squads and has issued strict new orders requiring, among other things, that uniforms be worn when arrests are made, that relatives and the Red Cross be notified, and that prisoners be turned over to a judge expeditiously. Civilian and military officials suspected of violent far-right activity have been removed from their positions and, in several cases, stationed abroad.

5-Cumulative U.S. Economic Assistance and Guerrilla Cost to Economy, 1979-83



6-Indicators of Civilian Deaths Attributable to Political Violence, June 1981-December 1983



* Sacorro Juridico (Legal Aid), nongovernmental Human Rights Commission of El Salvador, Central American University, and Tutuola Legal (Legal Aid)—affiliated with the Catholic Archbishopric of El Salvador.

7—U.S. Citizen Deaths and Disappearances, 1979-January 1984

1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
	<p>Four churchwomen killed: Maura Clarke Ita Ford Jean Donovan Dorothy Kazel</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Investigation begins. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Five suspects arrested and charged. Case elevated to trial. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Case returned to investigative stage. Retired U.S. Judge Tyler reviews case. Case re-elevated to trial, defense appeals. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trial expected.
	<p>John Sullivan disappears.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Investigation begins. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Body found. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Body positively identified. 	
		<p>Labor advisers killed: Michael Hammer Mark Pearlman</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ricardo Sol Meza arrested. El Salvador seeks extradition of Hans Christ from United States. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Charges against Lt. Lopez Sibrian, Sol Meza and Christ dismissed. Prosecution appeals. FBI assists investigation. Two National Guardsmen arrested. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Guardsmen ordered to trial. Lopez Sibrian appeal denied, Christ and Sol Meza pending. Capt. Avila arrested. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prosecution seeks additional evidence against Lopez Sibrian.
			<p>Michael Kline killed.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Three soldiers arrested. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trial expected.
			<p>Patricia Cuellar disappears.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Investigation with FBI assistance. Lt. Cdr. Albert Schaufelberger killed. FPL guerrillas claim credit. Investigation begins. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Investigation continues.

The Land Reform


Overall, the land reform now has benefited more than 550,000 persons or almost 25% of the rural population. Where 1% of the population once owned 40% of the land, over one-third of the farmland is now in the hands of the *campesinos* or farm workers, who worked as tenants and sharecroppers on land they could not hope to own before the reforms. These gains were achieved while the nation was under attack by guerrillas supported by Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union.

Phase I was accomplished by decree of the Revolutionary Junta in March 1980 and implemented immediately. The armed forces removed former owners of large farms. Possession was transferred to cooperatives made up of persons working the land. The creation of cooperatives from the larger estates under Phase I has been completed. However, some cooperatives have been abandoned because of guerrilla violence.

Phase II, affecting medium-sized farms, was conceived in March 1980 but was suspended for want of administrative and financial resources. This phase has now been resurrected with the adoption of the new national constitution in December 1983.

Phase III, applicable to smaller farms tilled by tenants, was started in April 1980. Unlike Phase I, beneficiaries must file for title to the land, based on proof that they were working it. Thus, beneficiaries may be at the stage of initial application, provisional title, or—after all surveys have been made and compensation paid to the original owner—final title. Although the period for filing applications was to have ended in 1982, Phase III has been extended three times, most recently by legislation in December 1983 which sets a final filing deadline of June 30, 1984. (See Charts 8, 9, and 10.)

8—“Land-to-the-Tiller” Applications, December 1980–December 1983



Where the government is able to work peacefully to advance the reform, most eligible beneficiaries apply for title under Phase III; where the guerrillas are active, filings are sharply reduced. In some places, where guerrilla violence is limited, almost everyone has filed who is believed to be eligible. But, where guerrilla activity has intimidated potential beneficiaries and blocked government promotion efforts—as in the departments of Chalatenango, San Vicente, Usulután, San Miguel, and Morazan—less than half of the estimated beneficiaries have filed.

Productivity on reformed lands has reached levels comparable to the traditional sector. In almost all cases, differences in productivity were relatively minor. Neverthe-

less, there is still a need for better management of the cooperatives, improved financing, and for increased technical assistance to all beneficiaries. (See Chart 11.)

Final title to land reform beneficiaries can only be transferred upon completion of payment to the former landowners; delays in payment have motivated some former landowners to evict the new beneficiaries under land reform. There is an urgent need to speed up the process of repaying former owners and to end the violent eviction of the "land-to-the-tiller" beneficiaries.

The Salvadoran Government and its Armed Forces have taken the problem of evictions seriously. Of the some 5,000 illegal evictions reported to land reform authorities, more than 3,900 have been resolved by reinstalling the beneficiary on his land. So far, less than 2% of all Phase III beneficiaries who report to the authorities that they have been evicted are not yet reinstalled on their land. And the best available data indicates that at least 85% and probably more than 90% of applicants are working their land without interference.

Security

These economic, political, and social developments have all occurred against a backdrop of intense guerrilla conflict.


Increased weaponry and better training have permitted the guerrillas to transform a large number of their support forces into active combatants. Guerrilla activities since 1980 do not indicate any expansion of their influence among the general population. Indeed, the guerrilla strategy of targeting the economy has hurt the poor the most and has cost the guerrillas popular support. Nevertheless, the guerrillas' training, communications, and armament have improved greatly. This and other evidence disputes recent claims that Cuba and Nicaragua may be reducing direct support for the Salvadoran guerrillas or closing off their command-and-control center in Managua.

An estimated 9,000-11,000 guerrillas are now actively engaged in the field against the Salvadoran Armed Forces. Over recent months, through continued training and access to arms, the Salvadoran guerrillas have managed to provide formerly noncombatant personnel with equipment for combat. While this has increased the number of people with arms, it is not a reflection of increased popular support, and the overall number of people involved in the guerrilla movement itself has not really grown. More of them are simply armed. Their strategy is based on hit-and-run tactics. They capitalize on the Salvadoran Armed Forces' need to protect static positions (cities, bridges, dams, etc.) while simultaneously waging an effective, mobile, offensive campaign.


The Salvadoran military has prevented the guerrillas from gaining and holding ground. Though the guerrillas can stage raids, they cannot remain in any position from which the Salvadoran military wishes to remove them. Nor have they been able to disrupt such key events as the annual harvest or national elections.

The Salvadoran military has significantly increased in size. U.S. training has increased. Nevertheless, a number of serious gaps exist. There are still too few U.S.-trained troops and the size of the Salvadoran officer corps is insufficient to


9- "Land-to-the-Tiller" Cumulative Petitions and Titles, December 1980-December 1983



10- "Land-to-the-Tiller" Applications by Department as of November 9, 1983



11- Comparative Yields of Reformed and Nonreformed Land, 1981-82 Harvest



12—Government and Guerrilla Strengths, 1979- January 1984

Government						
1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	
12,000	16,000	17,000	28,000	32,000	39,000	
Guerrilla						
1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	
2,000	2,000	3,500-4,500	4,000-5,000	4,000-6,000	9,000-11,000	

lead the rapidly expanding army in time of war. The latter has been a particular problem for command and control, military discipline, staff functions, and the general management of the war. (See Chart 12.)

U.S. Assistance

The Administration's original request to Congress for fiscal year (FY) 1984 for military and economic assistance totaled \$282 million, of which some \$260 million was approved under the Continuing Resolution. In the context of the global U.S. assistance effort, this amount is moderate both in view of the U.S. security interest in Central America and the turmoil and human suffering which our aid helps alleviate. The Administration's request for El Salvador is only about 3% of total U.S. assistance worldwide. (See Chart 16.)

U.S. economic assistance has always far exceeded military assistance. In all but 1 year, economic aid has been at least three times the amount provided to assist the Salvadorans defend against guerrilla destruction. (See Chart 14.)


U.S. economic assistance grew from \$57.8 million in 1980 to more than \$240 million in 1983. It is divided into three elements:

- Economic support funds (ESF) to assist the Salvadorans to meet critical import needs, to finance their government's budget, and to pay for priority projects such as land reform and improved machinery for elections;
- Development assistance to finance employment-generation projects and other social needs; and
- PL-480 food donations to supplement shortages in basic dietary needs. (See Chart 15.)

U.S. military assistance has been an important element in preventing a guerrilla victory. In addition to providing arms, ammunition, and logistical support, we have helped train more than 15,000 Salvadoran soldiers and officers in a variety of military subjects, including respect for human rights. By the end of 1983, 33% of U.S.-trained troops and 90% of eligible noncommissioned officers were reenlisting.


Congressionally approved assistance, however, has consistently been below the Administration's requested levels. For example, in FY 1984 the Administration requested \$86.3 million; Congress, through its Continuing Resolution, provided \$64.8 million for military assistance. And because 30% of this amount is withheld by law until a verdict is reached in

13—Total Armed Forces per 1,000 People




SOURCE: THE MILITARY BALANCE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES (U. K.)

14—U.S. Military and Economic Assistance, FY 1980-84



15—U.S. Economic Assistance, FY 1978-84



the churchwomen's case, only some \$45 million is available to address El Salvador's urgent security problems. Over \$25 million of this \$45 million has already been obligated, and requests for an additional \$13 million are currently being processed. Funds will run out soon, possibly on the eve of elections.

Conclusion


The democratic alternative in El Salvador, though faced with powerful opposition from terrorists and guerrillas, has made steady progress since 1979 in building a new, more equitable society and a more democratic and responsive government. Our political support and our military and economic assistance have helped.

In line with the recommendations of the President's National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, we will continue to support the Salvadoran Government. Our moral and strategic interests coincide. In February 1984, we will follow up on the recommendations of the commission to request additional funds from Congress to address the economic, social, and security needs of El Salvador and the other countries of Central America.

Presidential elections are scheduled in El Salvador for March 1984. The Government of El Salvador, through its Peace Commission, has sought direct talks to encourage the guerrillas to participate in the balloting. The Peace Commission remains prepared to meet with the armed left and its political associates to discuss their participation in free elections, including physical security for candidates and access to the media. Elections for the Constituent Assembly and local mayors will be held in 1985. The government is committed to continuing to try to bring the left into participation in these elections.

Nonetheless, there is every indication that the guerrillas will attempt to disrupt these moves toward democracy. It is,

16-U.S. Military and Economic Assistance, FY 1984



therefore, imperative that Congress provide the needed levels of military and economic aid. The commitment of Salvadorans of the democratic center, who are defying both the communist guerrillas and the violence of the reactionary right, clearly justifies the continued support of the United States. ■

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