

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA		X		
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T		X		
9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC		X		
11	IG		X		
12	Compt		X		
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL		X		
15	D/PAO		X		
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	C/LA/DO		X		
20	C/CATF/DO		X		
21	NIO/LA		X		
22					

SUSPENSE _____
Date

Remarks

25X1

Executive Secretary
4 Dec 84
Date

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

December 3, 1984

Executive Registry
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE CHARLES Z. WICK
Director, U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: US and Nicaragua -- Talking Points (U)

The attached talking points on Nicaragua were prepared from input submitted by State, Defense and the Intelligence Community. They have been prepared for use by all Administration officials when discussing Nicaragua in public or with members of the press. These points are being circulated to ensure that we maintain uniformity in our presentation of our policy. Your cooperation in using these points is appreciated. (C)



Robert C. McFarlane

- The Vice President
- cc: ✓ The Honorable William J. Casey
- The Honorable Peter McPherson
- The Honorable Edwin Meese
- The Honorable James Baker III
- The Honorable Michael Deaver
- The Honorable Robert Sims

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The U.S. and Nicaragua - Talking Points

- The Sandinistas began their military buildup immediately after seizing power in 1979 with the arrival of Cuban advisers and equipment. This buildup has exceeded all legitimate defensive needs. Since 1979, the Sandinista army has swollen from about 10,000 to 119,000 (62,000 active duty).
- Since Secretary Shultz's June visit to Managua, the Sandinistas have expanded their active duty forces by about 12,000 men and acquired an additional 50 tanks (total 150) and 75 more armored vehicles (total 200). They have also received 13 helicopters, including at least five MI-24 gunships, the most deadly Soviet assault helicopter; this "flying tank" dramatically increases their firepower and mobility and can strike targets deep in Costa Rica and Honduras.
- The Sandinistas may be preparing to acquire high performance fighters, possibly MIG-21s. They are training pilots, building the region's largest airfield at Punta Huete, and deploying a Ground Control Intercept radar system.
- This Soviet bloc and Cuban-supported surge in Sandinista military expansion, along with Nicaragua's continued support of the marxist-leninist guerrillas operating in neighboring countries, has thoroughly disrupted the balance of power in Central America and is highly destabilizing. The Nicaraguans continue using subversion and their Soviet bloc weapons to intimidate their neighbors.
- The Sandinistas are following the historical example of their mentor, Fidel Castro: promising democracy but establishing marxist-leninist totalitarianism; using Soviet bloc and Cuban help and personnel to subvert neighboring states; and building a military apparatus of unprecedented size in the region.
- The November 4 elections in Nicaragua were seriously flawed and do not constitute implementation of their 1979 commitment to the OAS to hold genuinely democratic elections. The Sandinistas refused to grant the freedom of speech, assembly and organization needed for the democratic parties to compete and thus faced no real democratic opposition on election day.
- The Sandinistas are continuing to provide material assistance to the communist guerrillas trying to overthrow the popularly-elected government of El Salvador.

- In building their unprecedented military capability, the Sandinistas have sacrificed their economy. Cotton and coffee beans go unpicked. Consumer goods are scarce. The Sandinistas' decisions have produced the scarcity and long lines that have become the trademark of Soviet bloc countries and Cuba.
- U.S. policy in Central America includes four basic elements pursued simultaneously: support for democracy, economic aid to improve living conditions; active diplomacy; and, security assistance to friendly governments.
- The U.S. has maintained a continuing dialogue with Nicaragua through our embassy, through a series of bilateral discussions which continue, and through the Special Presidential Envoys who have made more than 28 trips to the region in the last two years to support the Contadora objectives and negotiating process.
- We continue to support the efforts of the regional countries to produce a Contadora treaty which will simultaneously accomplish the 21 agreed-upon objectives with effective verification, including:
 - the implementation of democracy in Nicaragua as promised to the OAS in 1979;
 - the reduction of Nicaraguan military forces to parity with its neighbors;
 - an end to Nicaraguan support for guerrilla groups in neighboring countries;
 - severance of Nicaraguan military and security ties to Cuba and the Soviet bloc (including the removal of the more than 10,000 Soviet and Cuban personnel).
- While the U.S. has supported negotiation, the Soviets have moved additional arms into Nicaragua to help their client intimidate its neighbors and "cut a better deal" in the Contadora talks. These actions seriously hamper the Contadora process.
- Speculation in the press about other measures or ideas about ways to deal with Nicaragua have no official standing.