




Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

APR 16 APR 1984

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Washington, D.C. 20505

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

10 April 1984

Kampuchea: Increased Activity Brings Few Results [redacted]

Summary

Over the past year, there has been a sharp increase in both military and diplomatic activity related to Kampuchea--Communist Democratic Kampuchean (DK) guerrilla attacks have been at the highest level in the five-year conflict; Hanoi has vigorously pursued diplomatic initiatives aimed at developing a "dialogue" with ASEAN; and Chinese troops along the Sino-Vietnamese border have recently responded sharply to Vietnamese military operations along the Thai border. Despite the high level of activity, we see no fundamental shift in the military balance in Kampuchea nor any significant movement toward diplomatic compromise.

[redacted]

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The Resistance: Uncharacteristically Active

For the first time since the Vietnamese invaded Kampuchea in 1978, the Communist resistance has dictated the pace of dry season (November-May) combat. Communist guerrillas followed up last year's vigorous rainy season campaign with stepped up attacks in the interior. From late January onward, guerrillas

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This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] Office of East Asian Analysis. Information available as of 6 April 1984 was used in its presentation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to Chief Southeast Asia Division [redacted]

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attacked government seats, fuel and transportation facilities, market areas, and military installations at widespread locations deep in the interior. [redacted]

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Several thousand of the DK's 35,000 troops participated in an attempt to draw Vietnamese forces away from resistance bases on the Thai border. Although damage to Vietnamese facilities was heavy on only two occasions, the activity forced the Vietnamese to devote more resources to maintaining security in the interior. [redacted]

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Non-Communist forces under Son Sann and Prince Sihanouk also dispatched several hundred guerrillas to the interior, but weak leadership, internal dissension, and material and ammunition shortages continue to inhibit their effectiveness. [redacted]

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- o The Thai have been encouraged by the overall progress of the resistance, but share misgivings with their ASEAN partners that Communist capabilities are outpacing those of the ASEAN-backed non-Communists.
- o We believe, however, that the DK's improved performance is a result primarily of qualitative improvements in such areas as logistics and training, and increased support from Kampuchean civilians in some areas of the interior. We have not detected significant numerical growth of DK forces. [redacted]

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The Vietnamese Approach: Carrot and Stick

Hanoi, meanwhile, assigned priority to diplomatic initiatives through most of the current dry season, forgoing major military operations until last month. [redacted]

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[redacted] Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach visited Jakarta and Canberra in hopes of fostering a "dialogue" on Kampuchea. [redacted]

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- o Hanoi perceives Indonesia as ASEAN's "soft spot" and is trying to draw Jakarta away from the ASEAN consensus on Kampuchea. [redacted]

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But Hanoi increased its emphasis on the necessity to eliminate Chinese and Thai-supported DK forces and also stepped up its public criticism of Thailand. As a result, the visits achieved little, and "diplomatic illness" led Thach to cancel scheduled talks with Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi. [redacted]

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[Redacted]

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- o Vietnamese attacks since early March approach the scale of their aggressive dry season operations last year. But they have been politically less provocative because Communist guerrillas, rather than non-Communist camps with thousands of refugees, have been the targets. [Redacted]

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Thailand and China Respond

Thailand responded firmly to Vietnamese encroachment into its territory. Thai Air Force planes struck suspected Vietnamese positions in Thailand, and artillery forces responded in kind to Vietnamese barrages. As of last week, Thai forces were still clearing out pockets of Vietnamese forces remaining on Thai territory. Bangkok also quickly mobilized international and domestic support for its position. [Redacted]

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- o The threat posed by Vietnamese troops opposite Thailand's border is at the heart of Bangkok's Kampuchean policy, and Prime Minister Prem will probably emphasize his concerns during his visit to Washington this week. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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The Chinese reaction has been more measured. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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- o The Chinese have continually indicated that their actions would be calibrated to the severity of Vietnamese actions along the Thai border, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

The Vietnamese appear confident they can contain all but the largest Chinese attacks. Vietnamese forces hold advantages in troops, armor, and artillery in the border region, and Vietnamese aircraft are qualitatively superior. Vietnam's forces are deployed in depth along all likely invasion corridors. [Redacted]

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- o But the Chinese pressure ties down 60 percent of Vietnam's army, including its elite troops, denying Hanoi the option of significantly reinforcing its units in Kampuchea. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Advantage Vietnam--But at a Higher Cost

Despite the increased guerrilla activity in Kampuchea, the apparent failure of Hanoi's diplomatic initiatives, and the increased pressure along the Sino-Vietnamese border, Vietnam's position in Kampuchea is in no imminent peril. Hanoi's forces still control the populated areas and transportation arteries, and the guerrillas are still too few in number to cut substantially into those advantages. [Redacted]

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- o Nevertheless, the gains made by the resistance have made Vietnam's occupation more costly and painful, and more importantly, they have prevented Hanoi from consolidating its control. [Redacted]

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Because a military victory appears unlikely, Hanoi will continue to seek a diplomatic solution that ratifies its dominant position in Kampuchea. It has not wavered in its fundamental objectives of dominating Kampuchea and eliminating any vestige of Chinese influence. We do not look for significant concessions from Hanoi any time soon. [Redacted]

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