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**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

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16	SA/IA				
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18	C/IPD/OIS				
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20	C/ACIS		X		
21	NIO/SP		X		
22	<i>[Signature]</i>				
		SUSPENSE			
				Date	

Remarks

Executive Secretary

4 Dec 84

Date

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Executive Registry

84 - 9842

November 30, 1984

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As some of your most dedicated supporters, we strongly agree with your alarming statement published in The Washington Times on November 29, 1984:

...We are determined that we're not going to let them (i.e. the Soviets) maintain or enlarge their superiority in weapons... we're determined to not let them maintain or continue that lead...

This is at least the third time that as President you have publicly acknowledged Soviet strategic superiority, but it contradicts campaign rhetoric that the U.S. is now able to negotiate with the Soviets from a position of strength. For budgetary reasons, your Administration has already cancelled the only U.S. strategic weapons being produced for deployment (Trident I SLBM and ALCM-B), unilaterally deactivated 292 missiles and bombers carrying over 500 warheads, and substantially reduced the planned deployment levels for the MX, B-1B, ALCM, and Trident submarine.

Secretary of State Shultz stated on May 14, 1984: "Arms control simply will not survive in conditions of inequality." This is because the U.S. legally established objective in arms control is "equal levels of intercontinental forces," according to the Jackson Amendment to SALT I. The Soviets have repeatedly rejected U.S. arms control proposals aimed at U.S.-Soviet equality. Hence arms control will not solve our problems, although we should continue negotiations.

In Fiscal Year 1981 and 1982, Congress authorized and appropriated funds to deploy 100 stockpiled Minuteman III MIRVed ICBMs to replace Minuteman II ICBMs in existing silos. This deployment would only have cost about 50 million dollars, which would have made it the cheapest U.S. strategic deployment in our history by far. It would have added to U.S. ICBM survivability and capability by about 15%. In military terms, this Congressionally mandated deployment is precisely the same as deploying the planned 100 MX ICBMs in existing Minuteman III silos.

The only difference is the fact that deployment of the stockpiled Minuteman IIIs in existing silos would violate the SALT II ceiling of 1200 MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs. For this reason only, your administration cancelled the highly cost-effective deployment of the stockpiled Minuteman IIIs mandated by Congress.

An additional SALT II constraint on our ICBM modernization program is the fact that even the range of the MX ICBM itself has been reduced. This was done in order to comply with the unratified SALT II Treaty's throw-weight limit for the one allowed new-type ICBM. Thus it is clear that U.S. unilateral compliance with the proposed, unratified SALT II Treaty has already greatly reduced the U.S. deterrent capability.

C134

The President

November 30, 1984

Page Two

We believe that the optimal U.S. ICBM force structure would be:

400 MX ICBMs deployed in the 400 deepest Minuteman III silos already existing.

550 Minuteman IIIs redeployed in existing Minuteman silos.

50 Stockpiled Minuteman IIIs deployed to replace Minuteman IIs in existing Minuteman silos.

Total: 1000 MIRVed ICBMs carrying 5,800 warheads. (Consideration could also be given to rapidly replacing the 450 displaced single warhead Minuteman II ICBMs in a garrison-mobile mode. The 5,800 U.S. ICBM warheads is justified because the Soviets already have more than 8,000 ICBM warheads aimed at our country.

This ICBM force structure would of course violate the SALT II limits of 820 MIRVed ICBMs and 1200 MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, but it would be optimal militarily, and it would be extremely cost-effective. It would strongly bolster our deterrent capability, especially if some sort of local defense for each silo such as gatling guns, or conventional ABM hard site defenses were provided.

We have been informed that you sent a letter to Defense Secretary Weinberger on November 27, 1984, expressing your renewed strong support for deploying 100 MXs in existing silos. We applaud your action in this regard. But we have also been informed that your Administration is planning to begin dismantling in June, 1985 six perfectly serviceable and highly survivable Poseidon submarines carrying 96 MIRVed SLBMs. This Poseidon dismantling is intended to comply with the SALT II ceiling of 1200 MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, as Trident submarines enter sea trials.

But SALT II is a proposed, still unratified Treaty, and it is in any case due to expire at the end of 1985. You yourself certified to Congress on January 23, 1984 that the Soviet Union is already violating SALT in at least four ways. Three of these Soviet SALT II violations are supported by conclusive evidence. There are many more Soviet SALT violations yet to be reported to Congress.

As you know, we have always supported deployment of both the stockpiled Minuteman IIIs and the MX in existing silos. But we have always opposed the unequal, fatally flawed SALT II Treaty, which the Senate Armed Services Committee concluded was "not in the national security interest of the United States." In the face of the unilateral U.S. reductions noted above, the Soviets have added over 3,850 nuclear warheads to their forces since SALT II was signed in 1979. We remind you that in a test vote we sponsored on November 2, 1983, more than one-third (37%) of the Senators present and voting opposed SALT II, and last June 21, 1984, 99 Senators voted unanimously that the U.S. should not comply with SALT II if the Soviets were violating it.

In sum, we do not believe that it is rational on either military or cost-effectiveness grounds, to deploy 100 relatively non-survivable MX ICBMs, when at the same time you are planning to dismantle 96 highly survivable Poseidon SLBMs, in order to comply with an unratified, unequal Treaty which you have confirmed that the Soviets are violating.

Over 18 billion dollars are already invested in these 6 still perfectly serviceable Poseidon submarines, and hundreds of millions of dollars more would be required to dismantle them according to SALT procedures. In contrast, about 21 billion dollars are planned to fund the proposed MX deployment. But deploying 100 non-survivable MX ICBMs while simultaneously scrapping an equivalent number of highly survivable Poseidon SLBMs is ridiculous. Not only is this unsound defense

The President  
November 30, 1984  
Page Three

budgeting, but it is another good example of how arms control has repeatedly resulted in U.S. unilateral disarmament. As Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Perle testified to the U.S. Senate on March 14, 1984, almost 9 months ago:

Arms control without Soviet compliance is nothing more than an exercise in unilateral disarmament...the consequences of Soviet noncompliance and continuing U.S. compliance mean in effect that the assumption of obligations under the Treaty is unilateral, or unilateral disarmament... We are now having unilateral disarmament inflicted upon us...a treaty that is not verifiable and where the Soviets fail to comply becomes in effect, if we are in compliance, unilateral disarmament.

Unilateral disarmament in the face of Soviet violations can only be described as U.S. appeasement of the Soviets, and this appeasement is already widely perceived around the world.

Accordingly, Mr. President, our support for the MX, when it is voted upon in mid-March, 1985, may be contingent upon your Administration taking all the following actions:

1. Sending to us the long-delayed State Department unclassified answers to our questions on the Soviet violations of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement of 1962. The Soviet violations of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement are the most serious threats to U.S. national security, because the Soviets today have about two-times more nuclear delivery capability in Cuba than they had in 1962. (Otherwise, we may have to propose an amendment requiring this report.)
2. Sending to Congress comprehensive, timely, and honest unclassified reports on Soviet SALT and other arms control treaty violations on February 1, 1985 and February 15, 1985.
3. Sending to Congress an unclassified assessment of each of the 17 Soviet arms control violations presented in the "GAC Report" of October 10, 1984. (Otherwise, we may have to propose an amendment requiring this report.)
4. Sending to Congress with your FY 1986 Budget Request in January, 1985, a complete unclassified analysis of the military and budgetary implications of all the Soviet SALT violations. (Otherwise, we may have to propose an amendment requiring this report. You can see how the tardiness in your Administration's reporting to Congress on Soviet arms control violations will already result in unnecessary budgetary disputes in your FY 1986 request.)
5. Sending to the Senate your Presidential request that the unequal, fatally flawed SALT II Treaty be withdrawn from the Senate before March 1, 1985. (Before this can be done, you will have to accelerate your June 1, 1985 report on the interim restraint policy. Otherwise, we may have to propose an amendment.)
6. Sending to Congress an unclassified study of the budgetary and deterrent bolstering merits of deploying 400 MXs, redeploying 550 Minuteman IIIs, and deploying 50 stockpiled Minuteman IIIs in existing silos by March 1, 1985. (Otherwise, we may have to propose an amendment. This study should include the merits and costs of a conventional hard-site ABM defense of each silo, and also the costs of accelerating Trident II D-5 deployment.)
7. Sending to Congress by March 1, 1985 an unclassified report on the status of your Strategic Defense Initiative, and whether the program is being directed

The President  
November 30, 1984  
Page Four

toward urgent deployment of defenses in the near-term (within five years).  
(Otherwise, we may be forced to propose a series of amendments requiring programmatic changes.)

8. Prompt and accurate reports to the Senate on all new U.S. arms control proposals, as is required by the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961.

If all of these actions to safeguard our national security are not achieved, then we may be unable to vote for MX in its current configuration, because it would be a wasteful, non-survivable weapon deployed in the context of U.S. unilateral disarmament and outright appeasement of the Soviet Union.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,



United States Senator



United States Senator

Copies to:

National Security Advisor  
to the President  
Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense  
Director, CIA  
Chairman, JCS  
Director, ACDA


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UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON, D.C.

PUBLIC DOCUMENT

OFFICIAL BUSINESS



*Steve Symms*  
U.S.S.

The Honorable William J. Casey  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

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**Page Denied**



# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 25, 1984

Executive Registry  
84-3011

AH. ACIS 028-84  
ER 84-117  
ER 84-2190

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are your stalwart supporters and always will be. As you know, earlier this month, we reluctantly stated our view that the conduct of Administration officials had bound the United States at international law to an unauthorized Executive Agreement concerning the unapproved SALT II Treaty, and that the agreement was disadvantageous to the United States in that it permitted the Soviet Union to exceed ceilings specified in the SALT II Treaty which itself you had characterized as "fatally flawed." We still agree with your October 30, 1980 debate statement that "SALT II is illegal."

We now understand that the Administration asserts that there is no such Agreement involving SALT II, and although we believe there is a substantial basis for determining otherwise, we are gratified that the present position of the Administration is that no such agreement exists. Since our recent letter, various statements have appeared in the press from spokesmen for the Administration, denying that any Executive Agreement involving SALT II exists.

The statements from the spokesmen further confuse the difference between a "treaty" and an "Executive Agreement." For example, the New York Times of July 7, 1984, stated that "An Administration official said it was absurd to call the decision to comply with the Treaty an Executive Agreement with the Soviet Union." Further, Presidential spokesman Larry Speakes stated on July 11, 1984, that there was "no secret Executive Agreement...it did not exist."

It is ironic, however, that in denying the existence of a SALT II Executive Agreement, Larry Speakes went on to reaffirm the U.S. "interim restraint policy for existing strategic arms Agreements," including the SALT II Treaty. If there is no Existing Agreement, then how can we have a restraint policy based on Existing Agreements?

Unfortunately, the Bumpers-Leahy Amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill also refers repeatedly to the "SALT II Agreement" described in our letter. The Bumpers-Leahy Amendment would, therefore, if enacted into law, tend to give legislative authority for an Agreement which your Administration now insists was never made. Accordingly, we very respectfully urge you to take whatever steps may be appropriate to ensure that the Bumpers-Leahy Amendment is not enacted, since it would codify an international Agreement which under the analysis of your Administration was never consummated.

Even though, Mr. President, we still are of the firm belief that there is substantial evidence that there was a meeting of the minds between the

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The President  
July 25, 1984  
Page Two

Soviet Union and the U.S. concerning the applicability and non-applicability of the provisions of SALT II, we, of course, defer to your better knowledge of the surrounding circumstances of those discussions with the Soviet Union. We feel that in view of the present position of the Administration it is imperative that any legislation giving a contrary interpretation to those events, such as the Bumpers-Leahy Amendment, be vetoed if necessary, to prevent an erroneous statement of fact in the laws of the United States.

Further, in our judgement, such action on your part would be particularly necessary to preserve the Constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, when reviewing in 1982 a resolution similar in content to the Bumpers-Leahy Amendment, found that Congressional action affirming an Executive Agreement based on a pending treaty would be "an unconstitutional exercise in Congressional power." The 1982 resolution, S.J. Res. 212, also referred to a "SALT II Agreement."

Moreover, we also urge that in clarifying the non-existence of any Executive Agreement involving the SALT II Treaty, you should direct Administration officials to cease referring to the proposed treaty in official communication as an "Agreement." We are enclosing as an example a copy of a cable sent by Secretary of State Shultz to all U.S. embassies worldwide in which such "agreement" is referenced as extant.

In sum, the original recommendation of the earlier letter concerning this matter still seems to us to be the best course of action to clarify fully the actual current status of the proposed SALT II Treaty. Since you have notified the Soviet Union that the Executive Branch will not ratify the Treaty, even if given consent to ratification by the Senate, the proper course now would be to request the return of the Treaty papers since continued consideration in the Senate is moot.

Moreover, we again renew our request for all aides memoire, memoranda of conversation, or other documents or records pertaining to commitments by the United States to abide by provisions of the unratified SALT II Treaty. We point out, in that connection, that these materials could be of far greater significance than they might appear, since they might reflect the incorporation by reference of complex terms and procedures embodied in SALT II even though the materials themselves may be brief and appear to lack formality.

Finally, we point out that the 1984 Democratic Party Platform states that:

a Democratic President will pursue deep, stabilizing reductions in nuclear arsenals within the framework of SALT II, observing in the meantime the SALT II limits ourselves and insisting that the Soviets do likewise.

This provision is the same demagogic language that appears in the Bumpers-Leahy Amendment.

The President  
July 25, 1984  
Page 3

We hope that you will not support enacting as law the key Democratic Platform provision, which is based on wholly false premises. It is flawed in four respects:

- 1) The Soviet Union refuses to reduce nuclear weapons and daily adds new nuclear forces;
- 2) According to your spokesmen there is neither a SALT II Agreement, nor a Treaty intended for ratification, which in any event would be unequal and contrary to the national security interests of the United States;
- 3) The United States has already scrapped 5 still serviceable missile submarines, deactivated 5 more, and even plans to scrap 2 perfectly operational Poseidon submarines in order to comply with the expired SALT I Interim Agreement and the nonexistent SALT II Treaty, while the Soviets have a still growing 50% strategic submarine superiority over the U.S. and are illegally converting some of their equivalent submarines into even more lethal missile carriers; and
- 4) The Soviet Union is in blatant violation of the terms of every major arms control treaty, is not observing SALT II, and no amount of U.S. insistence will cause Russia to act otherwise.


After all, former President Carter portrayed the 1980 election as a national referendum on his SALT II Treaty, and he lost.

We consider this issue of such criticality, both in a narrow political sense, and more importantly in terms of our viability as a free country in the future, that we urgently request a meeting with you as soon as possible to outline face to face why we believe these questions must be resolved without any further delay.


With very best personal regards,

We remain,

Very respectfully,



John East  
United States Senator



Steve Symms  
United States Senator

cc: Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense  
JCS Chairman  
CIA Director  
ACDA Director  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Attorney General of the United States

UNCLASSIFIED  
Department of State

OUTGOING  
TELEGRAM

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TAGS: PMUC, PARM  
SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY ON SALT INTERIM RESTRAINT

INTERAGENCY CLEARED GUIDANCE ON U.S. POLICY ON SALT INTERIM RESTRAINT FOLLOWS. THE DEPARTMENT RELEASED THE FIRST O-RND- A ON MARCH 29, THE SECOND ON MARCH 30.

TRIDENT AND SALT LIMITS

O. WHEN WILL CONTINUED TRIDENT SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION PUT THE US ABOVE THE SALT II IRVY SUF-CEILING OF 1209 LAUNCHERS? WHEN WILL THE TRIDENT PROGRAM CAUSE US TO EXCEED THE SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT LIMITS? WHAT IS THE US POSITION ON CONTINUING TO OBSERVE THESE LIMITS? WHEN WOULD THEY HAVE EXPIRED HAD SALT II BEEN RATIFIED?

A. US POLICY ON INTERIM RESTRAINT WAS SET BY THE PRESIDENT IN 1962, WHEN HE STATED THAT, "AS FOR EXISTING STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENTS, WE WILL REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS WHICH UNDERCUT THEM SO LONG AS THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS

EQUAL RESTRAINT." THE US IS CONTINUING TO CARRY OUT ITS OBLIGATIONS AND COMMITMENTS UNDER RELEVANT AGREEMENTS, INCLUDING OUR NO UNDERCUT POLICY ON EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. IN KEEPING WITH THIS POLICY, COMPENSATING DISMANTLEMENTS FOR NEW TRIDENT LAUNCHERS IN EXCESS OF SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT LIMITS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED OR ARE PROGRAMMED USING POLARIS AND TITAN II STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS THAT HAVE BEEN DEACTIVATED, AND WE HAVE PROGRAMMED SUFFICIENT MONEY THROUGH THE END OF FISCAL YEAR 1985 FOR CONTINUED DISMANTLEMENT OF THESE LAUNCHERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALT I PROCEDURES.

THE SALT II TREATY AS WRITTEN WOULD HAVE EXPIRED IN DECEMBER 1985, HAD IT BEEN RATIFIED. IT IS THE SEVENTH TRIDENT THAT WILL BRING INTO PLAY THE POSSIBLE APPLICABILITY OF BOTH SALT I AND SALT II LIMITS. HOWEVER, SEA TRIALS FOR THE SEVENTH TRIDENT SUBMARINE ARE NOT SCHEDULED TO BEGIN UNTIL LATE 1985, I.E., DURING FY 86. THUS, NO DECISION NEED BE TAKEN AT THIS TIME REGARDING COMPENSATION FOR THE SEVENTH TRIDENT. THE US WILL CAREFULLY EVALUATE BOTH THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND OUR OWN NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN REACHING SUCH A DECISION.

SALT INTERIM RESTRAINT

G. IS IT TRUE THAT THE U.S. IS CONSIDERING REVOKING ITS "NO UNDERCUT" POLICY FOR SALT II?

A. -- THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY ON INTERIM RESTRAINT HAS NOT CHANGED. WE ARE CONTINUING TO IMPLEMENT THIS POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE UNRATIFIED SALT II AGREEMENT, AND WE ARE PROCEEDING TO IMPLEMENT THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

-- AS THE PRESIDENT STATED ON JANUARY 23, "THE UNITED STATES IS CONTINUING TO CARRY OUT ITS OWN OBLIGATIONS AND COMMITMENTS UNDER RELEVANT AGREEMENTS."

-- SEA TRIALS FOR THE SEVENTH TRIDENT SUBMARINE ARE NOT SCHEDULED TO BEGIN UNTIL LATE 1985, THAT IS, IN FISCAL YEAR 1986. THE ISSUES THIS EVENT RAISES REGARDING THE SALT I AND SALT II AGREEMENTS WILL BE ADDRESSED AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME.

-- IT WOULD BE MISLEADING TO INFER THAT THE ABSENCE OF A DECISION BEFORE ONE IS REQUIRED IMPLIES ANYTHING ABOUT WHAT COURSE OF ACTION WILL EVENTUALLY BE TAKEN.

-- WHEN THE TIME COMES FOR A DECISION IT WILL, OBVIOUSLY, BE TAKEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. AMONG OTHER THINGS, OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO A CORRESPONDING POLICY WILL BE RELEVANT TO OUR CONSIDERATIONS. SHULTZ

Object US appeasement

Holms-Schultz letter

SALT II was a treaty

new rationale for Titan II deactivation, which is contrary to US ~~strategic~~ pos. in 1972 preserving the right to trade Titan II for 3 more subs.

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
ROUTING SLIP**

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Executive Secretary  
*5/14/84*  
Date

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Exempt  
84-9190

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		Date
		5/11/84
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. Secretary of State		
2. Secretary of Defense		
3. Chairman, JCS		
4. Director, CIA		
B.		
Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> For Your Information	See Me
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Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
Thomas Graham, Jr. - ACDA/GC	5534A State
	Phone No.
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
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C-134



GENERAL COUNSEL

**UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY**

Washington, D.C. 20451

May 9, 1984

Agency Liaison  
Room 91  
The White House

Attention: Ms. Sally Kelly  
Director of Agency Liaison  
Presidential Correspondence

Dear Ms. Kelly:

As you requested, enclosed is a draft response to Senator Symms regarding the verifiability of arms control agreements. It has not been cleared with other agencies, but we have sent copies of this draft to those agencies that received copies of the incoming letter from Senator Symms.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Thomas Graham, Jr.".

Thomas Graham, Jr.

Enclosure

Dear Senator Symms:

It continues to be the policy of this Administration that all arms control agreements to which the U.S. becomes party must be effectively verifiable.

As was demonstrated in the President's January 23, 1984 Report to Congress, "Soviet Non-Compliance with Arms Control Agreements," with regard to several arms control agreements the Soviet Union was found to be in violation, or probable violation, of legal obligations or political commitments. We continue to analyze these and other possible violations in an effort to get the best possible understanding of the scope of Soviet non-compliance related actions and to make the best possible judgments as to appropriate U.S. responses. We will, as appropriate, transmit the results of further analyses of Soviet actions to the Congress.

In parallel with analyses of Soviet actions, we are carefully studying how arms control agreements can be drafted to maximize the clarity of obligations and minimize potential ambiguity.

These analyses are part of a continuing process and we will be submitting reports in the future under Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as appropriate.

Sincerely,



due May 9

**T H E   W H I T E   H O U S E   O F F I C E**

**REFERRAL**

**APRIL 26, 1984**

**TO: U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
ATTN: THOMAS GRAHAM**

**ACTION REQUESTED:**

**DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER**

**DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:**

**ID: 213320**

**MEDIA: LETTER, DATED APRIL 11, 1984**

**TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN**

**FROM: THE HONORABLE STEVE SYMMS  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
WASHINGTON DC 20510**

**SUBJECT: EXPRESS SERIOUS CONCERN THAT THE SALT II  
TREATY MAY NOT BE VERIFIABLE FOR A NUMBER OF  
REASONS INCLUDING THE DEGRADATION OF U.S.  
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION.  
ADD THAT IF VERIFIABILITY OF INF AND START  
MAY BE COMPARABLE TO SALT II, A STUDY SHOULD  
BE CONDUCTED TO ASCERTAIN THIS. INDICATE  
THAT THESE DIFFICULTIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN  
REPORTED TO CONGRESS AND REQUEST A SCHEDULE  
OF REPORTS**

**PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.**

**RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE**

**SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE**

**United States Senate**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

21332  
ACLA  
DRAFT

April 11, 1984

The Honorable Ronald Reagan  
The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On September 16, 1982, we received a letter from the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency which contained two alarming revelations. First, the letter stated:

"The most recent analysis of the verifiability of the SALT II Treaty ... is a 1979 verification study. There are no current plans to carry out a systematic review and updating of these analyses."

We believe that it was a serious misjudgment for ACDA not to have restudied the verifiability of the SALT II Treaty, which even you yourself have stated is unverifiable.

Second, the letter also said:

"With regard to U.S. capabilities to verify Soviet compliance with arms control agreements ... the U.S. has experienced some degradation in the past, however specific programs designed to enhance current capabilities and offset such degradation have been instituted."

This too is a shocking admission. In view of reports that the huge Abalakovo ABM radar had been under construction for over two years before it was finally discovered last July, something must be seriously wrong with U.S. National Technical Means of SALT verification. We seek reassurance that corrective measures are currently effective.

Senior Administration officials have told us that any potential new START or INF treaties are likely to be as verifiable as SALT II. Hence you can understand our concern when we read in the September 16, 1982 letter the third alarming revelation, that:

"The Administration is currently engaged in an intensive study of the verification provisions which will be required for the START and INF proposals on the table in Geneva."

The President  
April 11, 1984  
Page 2

Thus the ACDA has admitted that the U.S. has already proposed negotiating provisions without first establishing if they are verifiable.

Now we read in The Washington Post of January 19, 1984 that:

"Senior Administration officials [have concluded that] future arms agreements must be simpler than in the past, because monitoring of earlier pacts has turned out to be much more difficult than anticipated"

It is reasonable to conclude from this ACDA letter that the unratified SALT II Treaty may not be verifiable due to Soviet concealment measures, the imprecision of many provisions, and the degradation of U.S. National Technical Means of verification. Further, if the verifiability of INF and START may be comparable to SALT II, we believe that a study should be done to ascertain this.

Several possible failures to comply with Section 37 of the Arms Control And Disarmament Act may be involved in these acknowledged verification difficulties. First, the verifiability of SALT II should have been restudied by the Reagan Administration and reported to Congress. Second, any degradations in U.S. National Technical Means of SALT verification should have been reported to Congress, and promptly corrected. Third, the verifiability of the U.S. START and INF proposals should have been studied prior to their submission to the Soviets, and reports should have been made to Congress. Section 37 states:


"It is the sense of the Congress that adequate verification of compliance should be an indispensable part of any international arms control agreement. In recognition of such policy and in order to assure that arms control proposals made or accepted by the United States can be adequately verified, the Director [i.e. of ACDA] shall report to the Congress, on a timely basis ... in the case of each element of any significant arms control proposal made to a foreign country by the United States ... [i.e. and] in the case of any arms control agreement or treaty that has entered into force, any significant degradation or alteration in the capacity of the United States to verify the various components of such agreement or treaty ..." (Emphasis added.)

The President  
April 11, 1984  
Page 3

Please advise us of a schedule of reports on these problems under Section 37 of the Arms Control Act.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,



Steve Seamus  
Chris Hatcher

CC: Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense  
Director, ACDA  
Chairman, JCS  
Director, CIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DDI - 00387/84  
ACIS - 028/84  
17 January 1984

AH. ER 84-117

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM:  Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

25X1

SUBJECT: Comments

25X1

1. Action Requested: None; this is simply for your information.

25X1

2. Background: A few days ago, you received a copy (opposite) of a letter to the President from Senator Symms (R, ID). This letter is the latest in a long series of correspondence to the President from Senator Symms, among others in the Congress, about compliance activities. The letter has nearly thirty attachments (as indicated on page 4 of the letter). I have kept the attachments in my office to save space and xerox paper. The attachments are available if you desire to see them.

25X1

3. Over the last week or so, I have read all of this material and am struck by two major points:

-- The basic ideas of Senator Symms' letter are damaged by the voluminous citations of Soviet cheating, some of which is correct, some of which is partly wrong, and some of which is hopelessly confused.

-- The Administration is doing some of what Senator Symms' seeks (e.g., Congressional briefings) but will not do others (e.g., produce an unclassified report; rather, an unclassified "fact sheet" will be produced--it is being created).

25X1

4. Action Requested: None, but please be sure to read Senator Symms' basic letter.

25X1  
25X1

Enclosure:  
As stated

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VEI-272

STEVE SYMMS

IDAHO

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Executive Registry

84-117

January 4, 1984

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Recent press reports have quoted several Reagan Administration officials as confirming that your Administration is preparing to deliver an unclassified report on Soviet SALT violations to Congress in January. I therefore respectfully wish to congratulate you on your deliberate, careful, and statesmanlike leadership in dealing with the very difficult problem of trying to enforce Soviet compliance with existing arms control treaties. As you well appreciate, this is an extremely complex problem, and its solution will have far-reaching global consequences. A public Presidential accusation of Soviet SALT violations is only the first step in a larger process of dealing with the national security threat posed by the Soviet violations.

I would respectfully like to offer three suggestions on how to proceed with this report. First, I suggest that the Administration conduct a special closed session of the full Senate first, to brief all Senators simultaneously on the classified evidence of Soviet SALT violations. Second, I suggest that the Administration release the unclassified report on Soviet SALT violations immediately following the classified briefing of the full Senate. Third, I strongly suggest that both the classified and the unclassified reports deal with all the important compliance issues that have been raised by Senators over the past three years, including some especially serious recent Soviet SALT violations.

As you know, Senator Jim McClure wrote to you and to Majority Leader Baker on August 1, 1983, requesting an urgent, special briefing of the entire Senate in closed session on Soviet SALT violations. In view of the seriousness of both the old and newly reported Soviet SALT violations, Senators Jim McClure and Jesse Helms (who are in their home states working) have both asked me to renew their urgent request that you arrange a special classified briefing for the entire Senate in closed session as soon as the Senate reconvenes on January 23, 1984.

There are several compelling reasons for a classified briefing of the full Senate to precede the unclassified report. First, the Senate needs to be made aware as a body of the full range of Soviet non-compliance cases and the persuasiveness of the intelligence evidence in each case. Second, this closed briefing will lend greater credibility and impact to the public report. Third, such a briefing will help to preclude Senatorial confusion, and the possibility of



DCI  
EXEC  
REG

The President  
January 4, 1984  
Page Two

distortion or feigned ignorance, because all Senators will have the same information at the same time. Finally, the Senate needs to be told the urgent national security implications of the Soviet SALT violations, and your intended course of action in dealing with these grave Soviet threats to U.S. national security.

There are several equally compelling reasons for the unclassified report following the briefing. The most important is the simple fact that the American people have a clear right to be informed about Soviet SALT violations which gravely threaten our national security. A second factor is the strong likelihood that the unclassified report would pre-empt any selective disclosures. A third factor is the fact that since as early as May 12, 1981, Senators have been writing to you about their concerns over Soviet SALT violations. Indeed, at least 24 such letters have been sent, signed by well over one-third of the Senate (38 Senators), representing a bipartisan group including the majority of Republicans. None of these letters was ever answered in substance, even though one is identical to a letter which even the Carter Administration answered. This group of Senators has the potential voting power to block Senate advice and consent for the ratification of any new arms control treaty. A list of these letters, a list of the signing Senators, together with copies of the letters themselves, are attached. Moreover, 93 Senators voted unanimously on a McClure, Helms, Symms amendment to request a report on Soviet SALT violations, and the legislative history shows clearly that the Senate intended this report to be public. And then, of course, there is another law, Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, the "Derwinski Amendment," which requires violations reports to Congress. Even the Carter Administration issued a public report on Soviet SALT compliance in February, 1978.

Finally, I believe that both the classified briefing and the public report should include analysis of all the significant Soviet SALT violations, instead of only the 7 or 17 Soviet violations which the press reports are under study. My own studies show that there are:

- over 12 serious Soviet violations of the SALT II Treaty. You and several of your top officials have come very close to accusing the Soviets of violating SALT II already;
- over 10 serious Soviet violations of the SALT I ABM Treaty. A former Republican Secretary of State has already conceded one of these Soviet ABM Treaty violations;
- over 10 serious Soviet violations of the SALT I Interim Agreement. A former Republican Secretary of Defense has already made several of these accusations;

The President  
January 4, 1984  
Page Three

- over 6 Soviet violations of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement which you are already on public record twice accusing the Soviets of violating;
- over 50 Soviet treaty and non-aggression pact violations since 1917 according to official U.S. government documentation;
- over 14 cases of Soviet SALT negotiating deception;
- and, according to official U.S. government documentation, over 120 cases of Soviet diplomatic forgeries.

I believe that your classified and unclassified reports should analyze all of these violations. Such extensive and thorough analysis would make it impossible for the Soviets or your other critics to attack any single violation, or short list of cases, or to offer a credible apologia. Moreover, if you do not deal with all the violations now, you will have to deal with them later, because the facts of history will not go away.

In addition, I hope that the Administration will include in both of its reports several completely new and quite significant Soviet violations of the SALT II Treaty, which have been reported recently in the press:

- production of more than 30 Backfire bombers per year;
- Arctic staging of Backfire bombers;
- a new heavy submarine-launched ballistic missile, the SS-NX-23;
- early Soviet deployment of 100 SS-X-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying multiple-independently targetable re-entry vehicles, in single warhead SS-11 silos;
- Soviet official admission of their violations of the 3 SALT II ceilings on MIRVs;
- the seriously increased and now widespread pattern of Soviet camouflage, concealment, and deception.

These reported new Soviet SALT II violations are quite serious enough to deserve urgent attention, especially in view of the fact that both the Washington Post and the New York Times of August 31, 1979 quoted the late Soviet Premier Kosygin as stating to visiting U.S. Senators in Moscow:

...if we build more than 30 (i.e. Backfire bombers) we violate it (i.e. the SALT II Treaty), and we understand that you will react. (articles attached)

UnderSecretary of Defense DeLauer has already testified twice to Congress that the Soviets are producing Backfires at the rate of 36 per year.




The President  
January 4, 1984  
Page Four

On behalf of Senators McClure and Helms, I am also again making the same request for an urgent classified briefing of the full Senate in closed session of Majority Leader Baker.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

  
Steve Symms  
United States Senator

SS/dsc

Enclosures

- 1) List of letters
- 2) List of Senators signing
- 3) Copies of letters
- 4) Copies of articles
- 5) Copy of letter to Majority Leader Baker

cc: Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense  
Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Director, CIA

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
ROUTING SLIP**

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&L				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt	DDY	1/11/84	401 ES	
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OLL			X (w/o enclosures)	
16	C/PAO				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	C/ACTS	X			
21					
22					
SUSPENSE				12 Jan	
				Date	

Remarks: Please comment as appropriate to DCI.

Executive Secretary  
5 January 1984  
Date

10440

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Executive Registry
84-117

January 4, 1984

The President  
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 Washington, D.C. 20500

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C-134  
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The President  
January 4, 1984  
Page Two

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United States Senator

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Secretary of Defense  
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Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
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