

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date
28 March 1984

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REMARKS

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TO
Take this show!
Lead job -

Executive Order
84-464/2

28 March 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

[Redacted]

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SUBJECT: Admiral Murphy's Request for CIA Officer

1. Admiral Murphy sent a letter on 30 January requesting that you assign a CIA officer to the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) Coordinating Staff in the Vice President's office. You asked me to review the requirements with Admiral Murphy, visit the NNBIS staff, survey some of their activities, and then make recommendations to you.

2. I visited Admiral Murphy and Philip Hughes for about an hour to start. Dan spoke with great enthusiasm about the NNBIS mission and in considerable detail about the problems they face in improving the efficient and effective use of USG assets. The main points stressed in that initial meeting were:

a. The DEA is the natural organization to assume a central coordinating role in the narcotics effort but it has shown no inclination to assume that role. In Murphy's view, the DEA has hindered a national coordination effort and resists any involvement in the narcotics arena by any and all organizations except its own.

b. The NSA was praised for putting a highly effective officer in the South Florida Task Force and the NNBIS Southeast Region. It was criticized for being slow to assign officers to the other regions. Murphy stressed the value of SIGINT to the overall interdiction effort and opined that having a NSA officer at each region is essential for receiving and utilizing that SIGINT.

c. COMIREX, NPIC, and other photo-interpretation organizations have been helpful by doing what Murphy and Hughes asked them to do but much more could be done if NNBIS had an intelligence coordinator to lead the way.

d. The intelligence product support from OGI has been "superb" and it must be expanded. Murphy pointed out several examples where these products are not used by the enforcement organizations and he believes a CIA officer could market these products and show how to use them.

e. There is no one in the NNBIS Staff with any intelligence experience. Therefore, there is underutilization of the existing intelligence and no innovation.

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f. Murphy touched lightly on the paucity of CIA intelligence reports and opined that more progress would be made if he had a CIA officer on the NNBIS Staff.

g. The DIA attache system drew some rather sharp criticism along with some judgments that they were neither overtasked nor overworked.

h. The CIA and NSA were the objects of some implied criticism for being too cautious on the legal issues of involvement in law enforcement. Murphy believes that the way is now clear for all elements of the Intelligence Community to become more involved in the narcotics effort.

3. My travels and discussions with NNBIS people and representatives of the enforcement agencies led to these observations.

a. Admiral Murphy's major problem is not with the Intelligence Community, nor is it even with the intelligence function.

b. The major defect in the USG campaign against narcotics is in the organization and management of the enforcement agencies.

c. The NNBIS regional centers and the NNBIS Coordinating Staff can influence but not command. The NNBIS system cannot be more than an interim measure pending a more effective role for DEA and/or a "drug czar."

d. There is a general absence of understanding of the intelligence function as a support to enforcement throughout these organizations. I found little evidence that an awareness of the intelligence function as developed by large metropolitan police forces (NYC, Los Angeles, and Chicago) has spread to the personnel in the federal drug enforcement organizations.

e. There were a few exceptions to the otherwise dismal intelligence function in narcotics enforcement. The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) operated by DEA, with representation from other enforcement organizations, has great promise but I saw little evidence that DEA is nurturing its development. The chief DEA intelligence production officer in Washington appears to be up to his task in terms of intellect but the bureaucratic impediments are formidable. The few FBI officers assigned to NNBIS had a good awareness of the intelligence function but were pessimistic about introducing it into the heterogeneous and unmanaged narcotics effort.

f. There is an immediate requirement for a narcotics intelligence coordinator or advisor in the Vice President's office. This requirement exists whether or not the overall management problems of the narcotics enforcement agencies are resolved. We could expect that the national intelligence community support would be enhanced if Admiral Murphy can develop a management solution, however.

4. The functions of this intelligence coordinator emerging from my discussions are as follows:

-- Serve as a central point for tasking the Intelligence Community on gaps of concern to NNBIS. The intelligence chiefs in the six Centers would contact this man with their information needs, he would sort them out and levy them on the appropriate Intelligence Community organization.

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-- Accelerate the flow of intelligence to NNBIS. This task, although frustrating in its initial stages, has basically been accomplished. Our man will need to monitor the flow and expand it here and there, but the basic job is already done.

-- Train, advise and support the intelligence chiefs in each of the six Centers. This would probably be the core task for our man. It would mean a good deal of traveling to the six Centers and an effort to impose an Ops Center kind of discipline on the intelligence function.

-- Oversee the protection of classified information. This is basically a bureaucratic and security issue. How will NNBIS use a classified intelligence product, such as a CIA report or an NSA intercept? Can it handle overhead? Who will make certain that only the appropriate people use it?

-- If there is a market for it, produce a weekly one or two page intelligence highlight report for Admiral Murphy. This would be a kind of progress report on all of the above.

5. The current NNBIS structure and the bureaucratic contention among the enforcement agencies dictate some considerations in the selection of a CIA officer as NNBIS intelligence coordinator.

a. Title and position: There is a feeling among the NNBIS staff members in Washington, as well as in the regional centers, that no one understands Admiral Murphy when he speaks about the "intelligence function." Also, the Washington NNBIS staff freely confesses little past association with intelligence and little understanding of the function or the organization of the Intelligence Community. Therefore, I recommend that the CIA officer be detailed to serve as Admiral Murphy's National Intelligence Coordinator for the NNBIS rather than be subordinated to the NNBIS staff itself.

b. Rank: The NNBIS Coordinating Staff in the Vice President's office is headed by a Coast Guard Captain. He has USCG, Air Force, Navy, Customs, and INS officers on his staff in the grades of O-5/O-4 and GS-12 through GS-14. The NNBIS regional offices are nominally supervised by USCG admirals or law enforcement civilians but the day-to-day management is at the O-6 or GS-15 level. Therefore, I recommend that the CIA officer be at the GS-15 level. One could make a case for an SIS-1/2 level if the officer had unique capabilities for this assignment.

c. Background and personal traits: The CIA officer must know the organization of the Intelligence Community. He must know where the pressure points are in all the disciplines. The coordinator must be entrepreneurial and have better than average interpersonal skills. Having stated this, I conclude that a suitable officer could be found either in the DO or the DI. I recommend that the DO look for nominees among those officers who have had overseas experience in the narcotics producing areas of Latin America. The most appropriate DI nominees probably would be found with recent or current service in the OGI narcotics area.

6. I have shared these observations and recommendations with several people in the Agency with the objective of speeding up the discussion and nomination process in the event you wish to honor Admiral Murphy's request.

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cc: ExDir
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DDI
C/IAD/DO
C/CMS/DO
D/OGI/DI
NIO/Narcotics

