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MEMORANDUM FOR: ADM Stan Turner

DATE: 31 May 77

FROM: Vince Davis

(may be duplicate)

SUBJECT:

Your 5/27 request for my comments on a memo (from [redacted] to Sayre Stevens) on relationships between CIA and private scholars specializing on the USSR -- requested comments follow

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- 1. [redacted] is RIGHT on the following points (AND his comments apply not only to scholars who specialize on the USSR but also and with even more relevance to scholars who specialize on other parts of the world, on foreign policy, and on international affairs in general):

"...as an institution, CIA is generally uninformed about research... on the Soviet Union currently underway at academic institutions in this country."

"Many academics work on subjects having low priority in our [CIA] research program." BUT: "Several academics are deeply involved in basic research on topics of present or potential interest [to CIA]. It would be quite worthwhile for our [CIA] analysts working on similar problems to establish contact with these people and try to maintain a dialogue." AND: "A number of senior academic Sovietologists, while not current in Soviet affairs, have long experience in dealing with the Soviets and in studying problems of the USSR. It would be of considerable value to us, in my view, to take advantage of that experience and perspective..."

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HOWEVER, virtually no academic people are willing to establish "any kind of formal relationship to CIA," or to "consent to debriefing [redacted]"

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- 2. [redacted] is WRONG, I believe, in thinking that any significant number of these scholars would agree "to participate in Agency-sponsored seminars and conferences on specific substantive topics." The key error here is "Agency-sponsored." BUT IF, as I contended in my Memo #4 to you dated 3 May, the sponsorship could be neutralized across several relevant government agencies including CIA, as a form of initial contact that the CIA could later exploit in direct follow-ups on a gradual basis, the results would be dramatically more successful.

- 3. The CIA would find it relatively more easy to establish useful contacts with academic Sovietologists than with any other category of academic

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specialists on foreign affairs, because:

- Most academic Sovietologists (such as Alex Dallin, Roman Kolko-wicz, Dick Staar, Jan Triska, etc.) are from Central and Eastern European immigrant families, and grew up with strongly conserva-tive anti-Soviet sentiments. Or, the younger professors were trained under these senior professors, and acquired the perspec-tives of their mentors.
- Most of the senior academic Sovietologists, and many of the Russian research centers on various campuses, have had a long history of intimate ties (including the receipt of federal funding) with U.S. government agencies, and therefore do not view this as being quite so abhorrent as do other categories of academic specialists on foreign affairs. Moreover, many of these campus Sovietologists and campus Russian research centers have been starved for new funding in recent years, and might be receptive to new money from otherwise unattractive sources. Hungry folks are typically a little less fussy about sources of support.

HOWEVER, it should be stressed that none of the conditions cited above apply very closely to any other category of academic specialists in foreign affairs, and therefore the CIA would find it far more difficult to establish useful contacts on a direct basis with--for example--those academic people who specialize on Africa, Asia, Latin America and most parts of the Middle East.

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4. The [ ] memo specifically notes that top administrators and professors at the University of California (Berkeley), University of Washington, and Stanford University are very "gun-shy" or "nervous" about "the dangers of outside involvement with the Establishment"--particularly the CIA. He is very correct. But the same problem exists at almost all other major (and most less well known) schools. I could name a large number of professors on almost any campus who would create a massive ruckus if they knew of any significant CIA contacts on their campuses.
- 25X1
5. I commend [ ] (and whomever allowed him to do it) in the effort to fan out across the nation searching out relevant academic people, in contrast to the typical Washington agency effort confined to a few Eastern schools. However,...
    - He passed up the South and Southwest.
    - He missed a number of relevant schools in the general Midwest, such as the Universities of Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Notre Dame, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Syracuse, etc., where there are some very good Soviet specialists.
    - Even on the campuses that he covered, he missed a few relevant people, such as Professor Robert Byrnes at Indiana--who is surely

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one of the top Russian specialists on that Bloomington campus (and a frequent lecturer on the war college circuit, etc.).

Indeed, Bob Byrnes is one of the prime movers in Russian studies in U.S. academic life since World War II.

- He missed some pretty good Soviet specialists who do not happen to be located on large well-known campuses. For example, I am thinking of Professor Roger Hamburg at Indiana University's small satellite campus in South Bend. Roger is not the greatest or best-known Soviet specialist in U.S. academic life, but he's not bad. He spent much of the summer of 1976 in the USSR, talking with Arbatov and all the top people at the Institute for USA Studies in the Soviet Academy in Moscow. He recently declined an offer to join the faculty of Mike McGwire's prestigious Center for Naval Studies at Dalhousie University in Halifax.

POINT TO REMEMBER: Not all the good people in academic life are located on the big famous campuses.

6. MAIN SUMMARY POINTS: My Memo #4 to you from Lexington, dated 3 May 1977, argued that there is a huge canyon of suspicion and ill will (building for about the past 15 years) dividing the government sectors and the academic sectors specializing in foreign policy and international affairs. Your reply to me of 12 May beautifully illustrated precisely this point, from the government side of the canyon, by stereotyping academic people as "silly sheep...irresponsible...lacking leadership...needs spine, not more shirking." On the other hand, from the academic side of the canyon, most government bureaucrats in the defense and intelligence business are viewed as crypto-fascists who would like to run their operations as small elites with little regard for civil liberties, public opinion, or the people at large. I happen to think that these gross stereotypes are wrong in both directions, and injurious to the national interest. I suggested one solution that I thought could significantly improve the situation, but you did not like it. Thus, you will persist with your own preferred solutions, and all I can add at this point is that your highly negative stereotypes toward the academic community will not help you very much in whatever solution you attempt. Good luck!

V. r.,

*— V. r.*

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71-5-19

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

12 May 1977

Dear Vince:

I have just received your compendium of memoranda. I am sorry that I can't possibly do them justice. There's more reading material than I can attempt to absorb on top of the mandatory daily workload.

On Memo #1, I understand your professional commitment, though I really don't see that as a complete obstacle.

On Memo #2, your politics, your professed lack of diplomacy, and your reservations on the President are understandable and acceptable. Your reservations on me are particularly well taken. I appreciate them.

I know that my providing more complete answers to the press and releasing unclassified versions of our work are, and will be, controversial. I have a strong personal conviction that these are not only necessary steps, but quite proper ones in an American intelligence operation.

25X11A

*Davis*

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Your criticisms of my "bull in the china shop" strategy are very well taken. I do have a strong conviction and intuition that some very positive measures are needed here quickly:

- (1) setting a new tone of sensitivity to the ethical issues;
- (2) reorienting the entire intelligence apparatus of the country from a series of independent fiefdoms to a coordinated effort.

On Memo #3, while I certainly don't profess to understand academia, I do despair when Vince Davises and others who know that the current wave of anti-CIA McCarthyism is wrong, will not stand up and be counted. I disagree strongly that nothing can be done to change this. I disagree strongly that if a few people like yourself do stand up, that some impact cannot be made. In my view, the academic community has demonstrated irresponsible lack of leadership in the last decade. The leaders have been sheep. By the same token, if a few good leaders would stand up now, the rest of the silly sheep would follow, even in a new pro-CIA direction. The academic community needs spine, not more shirking. Specifically, I would be ashamed to accept studies who would not apply to the Patterson School just because you had been to the CIA; ashamed to ask distinguished faculty to lecture at the Patterson School if they might decline because you had been to the CIA; ashamed to be the least concerned about those who would not invite you to lecture or not grant you funds if you had been at the CIA. Where in the world does one stand up and be counted in life if we are going to kowtow to people of such narrow and unopen attitudes. Is this the kind of outlook that academia stands for today in the United States? If so, I despair for our future.

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On Memo #4, I can only say that your proposal has lots of appeal, but the terms are simply too high. I do have a very genuine desire to increase understanding and participation with academia. There is some limit on the price I can afford to pay, however, in terms of my own personal involvement and commitment to this important, but subsidiary objective. Your terms, I believe, would require more of me than I can possibly give. Beyond that, I simply will not be a party to any program in which money from the CIA might be funneled to some front organization such as the White House, in order to pay for such an activity. That is simply going backwards and asking for the same kinds of problems that the CIA has come a cropper on in days past. Either we are honest, or we are not. Hence, if you cannot accept CIA funding, I simply cannot take the time to go find \$100,000 and all the other front activities that would be needed.

Beyond all that, Vince, I am not persuaded that a program such as you describe cannot be achieved under CIA auspices. I am going to try, I will probably fail as you would likely predict, but I will have a go at it.

I look forward to seeing you on May 23rd. I think it would be best if we plan on your two-week's active duty training only. From there on, I hope I can call on you for advice and consultation as a friend, and possibly an occasional short-term consultant arrangement.

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Many thanks for your forthrightness and all the time you've taken on this project.



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May 3, 1977

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MEMORANDUM #4

TO: Admiral Stan Turner, USN  
OEOP Suite 347  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

FROM: Vince Davis

RE: An alternative proposal to improve relationships between  
the academic community and the governmental community  
concerned with foreign affairs and international relations

Memorandum #4 here is the final in the series of memos that I have written to you over the past 72 hours, all in response to your cordial and flattering invitation expressed in letters and most recently in your offices last Tuesday, April 26, on the possibility of my working with you in some manner for about a year starting in the summer of 1977.

Memoranda #1, #2 and #3 were written on my Patterson School letter-head. Memorandum #4 is being written on my ISA presidential paper, to help illustrate some points that I will make later on herein. (Note that my year in office as ISA president expired in mid-March.)

1. A history of strained relations between academic people and government people in the international affairs field

At the risk of telling you some things that you already know, let me briefly trace some aspects of the history of the relationship between the academic community and the U.S. governmental community in the area of international affairs. \*

This relationship was strong and cordial as the United States moved out of the World War II experience. Many professors took leaves of absence from their campuses in order to serve in the military or with the Department of State



during the 1941-45 hostilities. After the war, most professors specializing in foreign policy and international affairs accepted the fact of the "cold war" relationship, and willingly did research and teaching in keeping with U.S. policy interests. Much of U.S. cold war strategic thinking actually emerged from civilian intellectuals working as university faculty members or in related "think tanks" such as the RAND Corporation.

The launching of Sputnik I in October 1957 further stimulated the intellectual-academic-scholarly community in civilian life to do more research and teaching consonant with U.S. policy interests. The National Defense Education Act (NDEA) was prompted by Sputnik I, and NDEA poured huge sums into campus efforts. The major private foundations such as Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie added many more millions of dollars to support campus-based research which was designed to support U.S. foreign policy in one way or another.

Most scholars in academic life, particularly those who specialized in foreign policy and international affairs research, strongly supported the 1960 presidential candidacy of John F. Kennedy, and dozens of those scholars soon went to Washington to take positions in the Kennedy Administration. In the early 1960's, the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) and the DOD Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) supported some of the best and most exciting new research underway by campus-based professors in foreign policy and international affairs.

In summary, the period of about 20 years, from about 1945 to about 1965, was marked by close, cordial and cooperative links between U.S. government agencies and civilian professors and other scholars in the foreign policy and international affairs categories.

But those close, cordial and cooperative ties began to break down in the mid-1960's. Indeed, some early signs of strain could be seen in the negative reactions by many professors to President Kennedy's handling of the Bay of Pigs episode, the Berlin Wall crisis, and the Cuban missile crisis. President Kennedy was still largely a hero to most professors at the time of his assassination in November 1963, but some criticisms were growing.

If the academic community had developed a few growing criticisms of President Kennedy and U.S. foreign policy as of late 1963, the scholars were far less friendly toward President Johnson. The reservations toward Johnson grew quickly louder in connection with the Dominican Republic operations in 1965, and the criticisms from the campuses grew to a loud roar of outrage as the Vietnam War got steadily larger in the late 1960's.

Other things happened in the late 1960's that increased the criticisms from the academic community toward Washington. The International Education Act, with Congressman John Brademas as the successful floor manager of the bill in the House, was enacted with great enthusiasm from the campus cheering sections. But the President did not fight for the bill, and the legislation (although technically still on the books to this day) was never funded. For practical purposes, the Act was a dead letter, thus marking the beginning of the end of large-scale federal support for research and teaching about international affairs at American universities and colleges. Similarly, the famous "Project Camelot"--sponsored by a U.S. Army research entity--provoked great outrage in the academic community, on the assumption that the university scholars had been duped into serving as covert intellectual spies to assist U.S. warmongering in the Third World. The fall-out on campuses from Project Camelot produced new university policies designed to strongly discourage if not actually to prohibit professors from doing military-supportive research, and certainly to prohibit any kind of secret research. Ten years earlier, it was perfectly acceptable--indeed, even fashionable--for young scholars to write doctoral dissertations that had to be classified and kept in government vaults. But, by about 1967-68, this was a strong taboo.

Scholars on campus were badly frustrated by the Vietnam War as of the 1968 elections, and relatively few professors got enthusiastic about either candidate. Nixon was certainly not attractive on many campuses. But Nixon convened a meeting in the White House in April 1969, attended by about 35 very prominent scholars and scientists--a meeting that Nixon said was intended to help heal the breach between government on the one hand, and the scholarly-scientific community on the other hand, in the area of international affairs and foreign policy.

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I was one of the approximately 35 people invited to attend that meeting with Nixon in the White House in April 1969 (after I had written the Department of Defense chapter in a review study sponsored by Johnson's White House and the Ford Foundation, in the summer and fall of 1968). Some of the others on hand at that April 1969 meeting with Nixon included Harold Brown and Albert Wohlstetter. But nothing ever came of that one-shot affair. Kissinger grew rapidly in power, and Kissinger did not feel the need of significant assistance from the academic community. Thus, throughout the eight years of the Nixon-Ford period, the civilian scholars in academic life who specialized in foreign policy and international affairs felt progressively more neglected by government people.

Neo-isolationism was a part of the picture too. Ironically and paradoxically, even those scholars who argued for more government attention toward domestic problems such as race relations and the environment--and who therefore were themselves part of the neo-isolationist trend--grumbled about the dwindling federal support for research and teaching on foreign policy and international affairs.

The dwindling federal support for research and teaching on foreign policy and international affairs was matched by a turn-off of private support from the big foundations. As a result, in the early and middle 1970's, the civilian academic specialists in foreign policy and international affairs research and teaching found themselves with almost no sources of support other than what their local universities and colleges could provide--at that very time when universities and colleges were experiencing serious financial problems for other reasons.

A few other things happened in the late 1960's or early 1970's that were initially encouraging to the academic people on campus, but that turned sour. For example, as part of the fall-out from the Project Camelot episode of 1967, Secretary of State Rusk was given new authority by the President, and Rusk issued a tough new set of guidelines governing virtually all (except CIA) government-sponsored contract research in the social sciences dealing with foreign areas. Rusk gave the operational responsibility to an inter-agency

entity called the Foreign Area Research Coordination Group (or FAR as it was called), which had been in existence for about three years already. Sixteen (16) U.S. government agencies were represented on FAR, including the CIA and many DOD components within the DOD representation. FAR was chaired by George Denney of State, although most of the work was actually done by E. Raymond Platig, Director of the Office of External Research in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at State. FAR began to produce a bi-monthly newsletter, called "FAR Horizons," which appeared first in January 1968.

FAR was intended to improve the quality and quantity of government-sponsored research in foreign affairs, but it never amounted to much. The participating agencies were not very interested in cooperating, and the key people at State were relatively ineffectual. In short, FAR failed for many of the same reasons that Maxwell Taylor's "State-prime" SIG/IRG system failed. The big action in Washington was not at the State Department, and State lacked the clout or will to honcho this kind of thing.

Entering the bicentennial '76 election year, therefore, the academic community engaged in foreign policy and international affairs research and teaching was a rather disheartened and dispirited lot. Most of these scholars were able to show some degree of enthusiasm for the Carter candidacy, but partly because very few of the scholars had ever supported Republican candidates in any case, and certainly not after the Watergate scandals. These people on campus hoped that Mr. Carter was serious about being a president of all the people, about taking a fresh new look at U.S. foreign policy substance and organizational structures, and about attracting fresh new talent from all over the nation to work on foreign policy and international affairs issues.

But now, some 100 days into the Carter presidency, most of the academic specialists on foreign policy and international affairs are reverting to pessimism if not cynicism. The appointment of Andy Young as Ambassador to the United Nations has drawn loud applause, because it seems to symbolize a fresh new U.S. policy response toward the

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problems of the Third World. But the handling of the SALT negotiations are getting mixed reviews in academic circles, and many (of the relatively few) Carter appointees in foreign policy and international affairs jobs have not met with great applause among interested professors. Strange as it may seem, many professors are emerging from their dove-like posture of the Vietnam War period, and are becoming more concerned about the growth of Soviet military capabilities, but these professors see no clearcut Carter response. Ideas on foreign aid and many other policy areas have not been clearly enunciated, and academic specialists have not been asked to help.

Indeed, one criticism of Carter that can be heard on many campuses from academic specialists in foreign affairs and international issues is that the President, after having promised to seek fresh new talent, has largely appointed the same old people who work or hang around policy-oriented institutions within the Boston/Cambridge-to-Washington corridor along the East Coast.

Nevertheless, with appropriate strategies, the academic specialists across the land in foreign policy and international affairs fields want to believe in President Carter and want to help. They may appear cynical, but cynicism is usually a mask for idealism. They are not seeking government jobs--indeed, few of them would accept government jobs, because they are genuinely committed to their academic work. But, if asked, they would help in other occasional formats.

In summary, then, the academic-scholarly-intellectual specialists in foreign policy and international affairs enjoyed a close, cordial and cooperative relationship with relevant U.S. government agencies from the end of World War II to the early 1960's, but for about the past 15 years this once-warm relationship has been very strained to the point where it is now virtually broken, but with new possibilities because of the Carter Administration for restoring it to something approximating its earlier cordiality. It won't happen automatically, but it could happen with the appropriate strategies.

2. A proposed strategy for restoring government-scholar cordiality

First, the strategy must not aim for overnight victories. A relationship that was broken over about 15 years may take another 15 years to restore.

Second, the strategy must not be window-dressing. There must be signs of genuine interest and enthusiasm on the part of the government sector. The government, in a sense, must take the lead in the courtship.

Third, the strategy should work with relatively low-visibility programs, not splashy efforts designed to attract media attention.

Fourth, the programs within the strategy should be held on relatively "neutral turf," and should be neutralized in other ways. The White House, for example, would qualify as relatively neutral turf, but so would locations away from Washington such as Wingspread (the Johnson Foundation conference center in Racine) or similar places around the nation. Further neutralization implies that State, Defense and the intelligence community (or, for short, CIA here) should be represented at most program events, but no one of these agencies should be the sponsor or host.

As one format that I feel sure would be successful (although other format devices are well worth considering, for possible addition to this strategy), I propose a series of "policy seminars" to be held at least monthly for about a year as a trial run--or perhaps more often than monthly. For simplification here, let me call these "World Issues Policy Seminars"--or the WIPS program.

Each WIPS would focus on a specific and genuine policy problem, such as (for example) "U.S. Policy Options and Problems in the Marianas and Western Pacific Basin." There should be a structured but relatively flexible agenda, featuring perhaps two or three prepared papers circulated in advance to all participants. Each WIPS should run for about 24 hours, perhaps beginning with a get-acquainted lunch on a Friday, with continuous plenary sessions that afternoon, a working dinner, an after-dinner session, followed by a Saturday morning session and a wrap-up farewell lunch.

Each WIPS should include not more than about 16 or 18 people, which is roughly the maximum number that could sit around a single table and hold meaningful discussions under a firm but friendly chairman. The participants should be about equally divided between government and academic people, as for example:

Government: 2 from the NSC  
2 from Defense  
2 from State  
2 from the CIA

Academia: 8 research scholars/scientists  
from a relevant mixture of  
disciplines and backgrounds

Defense, State and the CIA are emphasized in the little chart above, because the estrangement between the academic sector and the government sector pertains most particularly to these three federal bureaucracies--and most particularly to the CIA. The great value of this kind of mixture on the government side is that the professor who has strongly unfavorable views of any one of these three federal bureaucracies will not necessarily have similar views toward the other two. For example, a professor who would under no circumstances accept a direct bilateral invitation from the CIA to meet at the CIA Building in Washington would almost surely have no hesitation in accepting a "neutral" invitation (perhaps from the White House) for a multilateral meeting where CIA people would be merely some among various government agency officials from different parts of government.

For some topics, the government sector representatives at a WIPS event should include people from agencies other than or in addition to the NSC, Defense, State and the CIA--for example, from Treasury or Agriculture. But those other agencies typically do not have the same severe relationship problems with academia.

Nevertheless, a main point to stress here is the beautiful flexibility of the WIPS format. For some topics, for example, it might be very useful to have two or three corporation executives and/or labor leaders around the table, in addition to the academic and government representatives.

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Indeed, I would argue that it could be very useful to have one or two "wild card" participants at each WIPS event--for example, the dean of a good school of journalism, or a leader in the League of Women Voters. The "wild card" people would help "to keep the others honest," and to prevent the discussions from becoming too narrowly specialized and technical and inbred.

I would discourage inviting very many--if any--of the non-campus research specialists who work for contract research organizations such as RAND, because those people have ample working contacts with most government agencies already.

Finally, a "project manager" should be chosen to manage this overall endeavor designed to restore mutual respect and cordiality between the government sector and the academic sector in foreign policy and international affairs fields. Ideally, this person should come from academic life on a one-year assignment on a leave of absence from his/her campus. To use an academic person in this capacity would convey a critically important symbolic message stressing the government sector's commitment to improve relationships. But, of course, it should be an academic person who, although friendly toward the government and government people, has absolutely no ambition to join the government, and who would not attempt to use this position as a springboard into a longer-range government post.

If this project proved useful and successful after a year, the first "project manager" could be succeeded by a new person similarly invited to take on these responsibilities for a year, on leave from a campus professorship. Obviously, this project manager should be a person enjoying a very good reputation and widespread personal contacts throughout the academic community.

The project should be headquartered on "neutral turf," which could be somewhere within the White House or in one of the Executive Office Buildings nearby. Alternatively, the arrangement could be set up on a contract basis with the project manager, allowing him to use some wholly independent office in midtown Washington working under his/her own name or as a branch office of his/her home campus. But this



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independent office should not be at Brookings or at any of the university campuses in Washington which already have extremely close (maybe incestuous) ties with government, and which therefore are not likely to appreciate the main problem that we are addressing here in the first place.

The first-year budget for this project would be relatively small, at least by Washington standards. I think that the figure should not be over about \$100,000, and maybe well under this. The main costs would be good salaries for two people, in order to attract top talent. The two people would be the "project manager" and an "executive secretary" who would constitute the entire project staff. Each WIPS event would include about eight (8) academic people, and we can assume that about half of those would require travel support covering airfares at an estimated average of \$250 per person. All eight of the academic people would need about \$50 per diem each, covering a hotel room and meals for about 24 hours in Washington. Other miscellaneous costs would probably result in a total layout of about \$2,000 per WIPS event. Assuming about twelve (12) WIPS events per year, we can round off 12 x \$2,000 to \$25,000. A rough budget, not counting office rental or office equipment and supplies, would therefore resemble:

\$55,000	--	Project manager's salary
20,000	--	Executive secretary's salary
<u>25,000</u>	--	WIPS costs (airfares, per diems, etc.)
\$100,000	--	ROUGH TOTAL PER ONE YEAR

If invitations to the academic participants at the WIPS events were issued on some kind of White House paper, this would cut costs, because most professors can easily get their own universities or colleges to cover their costs to travel to participate in a White House event. Otherwise, the project would need to be able to cover more travel costs for the academic participants.

In summary, this basic WIPS idea is very flexible, and is susceptible to many variations. It can be scaled up, down, backwards or sideways. However, if scaled up very much, this would endanger the small-group informality that is desired, and if scaled down very much, this would jeopardize the intended cumulative momentum.

The key goal to be kept uppermost in mind at all times is that this project would be designed to improve cordial working relationships between those government and academic sectors where reciprocal attitudes have become severely strained if not broken over the past 15 years, and this means primarily the relationship between the NSC-State-Defense-CIA network on the government side, and the scholarly specialists on foreign policy and international affairs on the academic side.

### 3. Corollary advantages to the government

The basic purpose of the proposed program is stated in the paragraph immediately above. However, in addition to this general goal, there are important corollary benefits that could accrue to the government side.

One important kind of spin-off advantage would be for the participating government agency representatives to use a WIPS event as an opportunity informally to "audition" professors whom an agency might wish to contact later on for a more specific set of purposes.

Let us say, for example, that the CIA was interested in getting better acquainted with some academic specialists on Subject X. A WIPS event could be scheduled to examine some dimensions of Subject X, and a couple of top CIA people would represent that agency at the WIPS. During lunch, dinner and at other relaxed breaks in the schedule, the CIA people could "mix and mingle," getting better acquainted with the academic participants and establishing friendly first-name face-to-face contacts. Then, several days later or at some point following the WIPS, if the CIA people found that some one or two of the participating professors were particularly stimulating and insightful, the CIA people could place phone calls on a first-name basis and invite those professors to a follow-up event under Agency sponsorship. The contact would have already been made on "neutral turf," and the follow-up phone calls would appear very natural in the course of events. On the other hand, if none of the professors appeared especially relevant to CIA purposes and needs, no follow-ups would occur, and there would be no wasted time, money or embarrassment to any parties concerned. The same "auditioning" function could be utilized by all participating government agencies at a WIPS.

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4. Some serious consequences of allowing the strained government-academia relationship to continue

It is impossible to assure that U.S. foreign policy would be "better" if there were improved relationships between the relevant and interested government agencies on the one hand, and the relevant academic specialists on the other hand.

However, three basic functions performed by the academic specialists can be identified, and the performance of these functions on campus will work against the interests of the U.S. government if the strained relationship is allowed to continue.

The first major function performed by the academic specialists is to teach the citizens of tomorrow about the nature of U.S. government and the nature of the world. It may sound corny and trite, but the kids who sit in our college and university classrooms are going to be the business leaders and professional people tomorrow--they will be the voters who send representatives to Congress, and who put pressure on those Congressmen to do this or do that--they will be the people who respond to public opinion polls, and help to shape public opinion in their communities.

The views toward government and toward the world that these students acquire while on campus can have a marked impact on their behavior as adult citizens later on. Indeed, keep in mind that--with the voting age at 18--most college students are eligible voters while on campus. Therefore, if the professors who teach the classes on campus are cynical and disenchanting toward government, and if the professors have a sense of despair about what it is possible to do to improve the international system, these attitudes of the professors will be transmitted to the students. And if government leaders are indifferent toward helping the professors toward a fuller understanding of the problems of government, and a fuller understanding of world issues, then the government leaders themselves are contributing to widespread public cynicism and misunderstanding.

I can give you one example of this kind of serious indifference on the part of government leaders. About ten years ago I was having a conversation with my old friend Tom Hughes, then the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State (with the rank of Assistant Secretary then--he is now president of the Carnegie Endowment headquartered in Washington). Tom was complaining to me that none of the college textbooks on American foreign policy really understood the problem. I challenged him by replying, "This is a serious allegation, Tom. If you are right--and you may well be right--then join me in writing a new textbook that will avoid the misunderstandings of the existing textbooks. You have some responsibility in this matter, if you seriously think that we professors are mis-educating whole generations of college students about a matter as serious as American foreign policy." And he snorted with contempt, "I don't really care what you teach college kids." End of that conversation. But I regret to say that Tom Hughes is not unique in this regard. Many government leaders allow themselves to become totally isolated from the nation while they sit in Washington, and they become quite indifferent toward what people know or think out in the boondocks of America. The best recent example of the problems which can arise when government leaders make this mistake is the whole Vietnam War business from about 1968 to about 1973.

Bear in mind that the college and university professors also teach the students who will go on to become high school teachers, and bear in mind that most Americans terminate their formal educations with a high school diploma. What do these elementary and high school kids know about the world? Here are a few startling results from a survey taken by the Department of HEW in 1974, from a national sample of students in the 4th, 8th and 12th grades:

- 40% of the 12th graders thought that Israel was an Arab country;
- 50% of the 12th graders could not correctly name the Arab country from these choices: Egypt, Israel, India and Mexico;
- Most of the 8th graders thought that Golda Meir rather than Answar Sadat was President of Egypt.

In another survey taken by my good friend Professor Judy Torney at the University of Illinois in 1974, looking at 14-year-old students in eight (8) different countries including the U.S., the American students ranked near the top in knowledge of local, state and national affairs, but next to last in knowledge of world affairs.

College and university professors in the fields of foreign policy and international affairs, in addition to training the citizens and general public of the future, also provide the specialized training for people who enter government service. Virtually 100% of the staff members at the NSC, at the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the CIA received their educations (often including graduate degrees) from U.S. colleges and universities. These professors therefore provide the "raw material" that the U.S. government recruits for the major agencies involved in foreign policy and international affairs. Therefore, if the professors have cynical attitudes and misunderstandings toward government and toward the world, the recruits entering government careers will not be ideal "raw material." This, then, is the second major function performed on campus that should be of interest to government people.

The third major function is research. College and university professors specializing in foreign policy and international affairs do a great deal of research, writing articles and monographs and books that sometimes are widely read in government circles in Washington. In this sense, the research output from the campus people constitutes a significant part of the "intellectual capital" drawn upon by the government people. The academic researchers are therefore a precious resource to the government, further stressing the importance of cordial contacts between the government sector and the academic sector.

All of the things that I am saying here may be so trite and obvious to you that you are bored in reading this (if you are reading it at all). But, take it from me, having dealt with these problems for at least the past 15 years, there are damned few government people who are actively concerned and doing anything about these problems. The "Tom Hughes syndrome" is far from unique--indeed, it's the norm.

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5. My qualifications as a candidate to be "project manager" and related considerations

Let me stress again, in the strongest possible terms, that I have no desire to work in government for anybody anywhere. I have declined various attractive proposals for government work consistently over the past 18 years. My only personal commitments to government-type work are connected with my obligations as a Naval Reserve officer. This desire not to be in government is certainly not because I am hostile toward government. On the contrary, in an old-fashioned patriotic way, I am strongly committed to improving the quality of government, and I admire the many good people who work in government at all levels. My desire not to be in government service stems from my overriding commitment to continue "doing my thing" in academic life, contributing to improved government by performing those three major functions described on pages 12-14 of this Memo #4.

However, I have been crusading in various ways over the past 20 years for improved relationships between government people and academic people concerned with foreign policy and international affairs. This is my strongest single extra-curricular commitment. Therefore, if I could contribute to this "cause" by performing in the role of "project manager" as described starting on page 9 of this Memo #4, I would give such a proposal my most earnest and probably favorable consideration, for the 1977-78 year starting in summer 1977.

I could name for you several dozen prominent people in academic life who would be well-qualified to perform in this role of "project manager" as I have outlined the project. However, since you have raised this matter with me, allow me to suggest some of my own qualifications.

I think that I am perhaps the only person in the fields of foreign policy, military policy and international affairs in American academic life who possesses all five of the following characteristics:

- (a) Executive Director of the most prominent professional society in the field, the International Studies Association (ISA)--for six years, 1964-70

- (b) Later, President of this same professional society, ISA, 1976-77, with about 4,000 members and affiliates worldwide
- (c) Dean or Director of one of the eleven (11) specialized international affairs graduate schools in American academic life
- (d) Holder of one of the very few distinguished endowed-chair professorships in this field in American academic life
- (e) Executive Editor of a major publications series (Sage Professional Papers in International Studies, distributed worldwide from Los Angeles and London) in the field, with about 60 paperback books in print starting in 1971

I used my old ISA presidential letterhead for page 1 of this Memo #4 merely to stress that my work for the International Studies Association over the past 15 years has given me widespread contacts through academic life. ISA is an interdisciplinary organization, meaning that these contacts extend into all of the social sciences--anthropology, business administration, geography, history, journalism, psychology, sociology, etc.--beyond my own training in political science and economics. Note that my successor as the new incoming ISA president, Professor Herb Kelman at Harvard, is a distinguished psychologist. My immediate predecessor as president was Professor Dick Rosecrance, a noted political scientist at Cornell who served on the Department of State's Policy Planning Council in the late 1960's. Dick's immediate predecessor as ISA president was Professor Ken Boulding, an economist so distinguished that he is often mentioned as a candidate for a Nobel Prize (and he is one of the "five top economists in the world" as described in the new book by Leonard Silk of the New York Times). Ken's wife, Elise Boulding, also very active in ISA, is a prominent sociologist. ISA also includes within its membership many area specialists on regions such as Asia, Africa, Latin America, etc.

In summary, my ISA work has given me extensive contacts throughout academic life, in the U.S. and worldwide. I think

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that I have first-name friends or acquaintances on at least 1,000 college and university campuses in the U.S. (or about half of the accredited colleges and universities in the nation), and I can indirectly make contact with people on all of the others. Many know me by first name but I cannot always recall their names when I see them at meetings--I am not a very good politician in this regard (and other regards too). These people range the spectrum--old established professors and youngsters, males and females, prominent people and obscure people, hawks and doves, rightwingers and leftwingers and middle-of-the-road types--the whole spectrum.

I am active in some other contexts too. I founded one of the two most respected professional organizations specializing in military policy research--the Section on Military Studies (SOMS). The other one, chaired by Professor Morris Janowitz at the University of Chicago, is the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUSAFS) for which you spoke after dinner a few years ago (because of my recommendation to Morris), and I have been a member of the IUSAFS Executive Council for about the past decade. I am a member of the Society for the History of American Foreign Relations, and a member of the smaller Committee for the Study of Diplomacy.

Since so much of my work has been within the International Studies Association (ISA), I will enclose here a few ISA documents. But let me add some other kinds of situations.

I have been a consultant and guest lecturer for all five of the major U.S. senior war colleges, and for some of the command and staff schools. I was once even a consultant and guest lecturer for the old U.S. Department of Agriculture "Executive Development Seminars" program, and some more or less similar work for Defense and State over the years.

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Perhaps my most challenging work as a consultant began in January 1968 when President Johnson, with the cooperation of McGeorge Bundy at the Ford Foundation, decided to sponsor a major study of the NSC-State-Defense-CIA network. I was originally used as an outside consultant, but later was invited aboard actually to write the chapters on the Defense Department. [redacted] of the CIA was also a key figure on that project.) I was later invited, but declined, to serve in a somewhat similar capacity as "Director of Studies" for the recent Murphy Commission.



A few years ago I agreed to serve as Chairman of the "Civilian Advisory Panel" for the so-called Clements Committee on Excellence in Military Education in the Pentagon. Although the overall advisory panel was never actually formed, I was used fairly frequently as an individual consultant on that matter (but little if any of my suggestions were taken).

In February 1976, I was used as the featured wrap-up speaker at the first conference held by the RAND OSD Manpower Project in Santa Monica, and project director Rick Cooper continues to call me occasionally for advice on that matter. (See attached letter copy from Rick.)

Last week I was phoned by Dr. George Tanham, vice president and the man in charge of RAND's Washington operations, asking me to be a key person in helping him to launch a new academic-type journal to be called International Conflict. I had to tell him OK as a quid pro quo--because he is writing a major book in a series that I am publishing here at the University Press under the overall title "The U.S. and the World in America's Third Century."

In February 1977, I was one of the relatively few academic people on hand for the first big meeting of the Civilian/Military Institute (C/MI) in Colorado Springs. Others on hand included five 4-star officers (among whom were C/JCS General George Brown and VCNO Admiral Harold Shear), 14 3-star officers, and 14 1-and-2-star officers, plus many former assistant secretaries of State and Defense (such as Paul Nitze), many former or active ambassadors (such as George Kennan), and numerous other dignitaries. (See attached copy of a New York Times report on the C/MI meeting.) The C/MI people have asked me to continue helping them to develop their programs.

A few days ago I received a letter inviting me to be a key member of a committee of consultants to evaluate the New York State University System Regents Doctoral Programs in political science. (See attached letter copy.) Other key members of the evaluation group include Professor Sam Beer at Harvard, current President of the American Political Science Association (APSA), and Professor John Wahlke of Iowa, the APSA President-elect. In short, this is a real

blue-ribbon group, and it has a very large assignment: To evaluate Ph.D. programs within one of the biggest and most prominent state university systems in the nation. It looks as if my specific assignments will include evaluating the Ph.D. programs at Columbia and Cornell, perhaps also Syracuse.

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Stan, I have not said these things about myself here "to toot my own horn." I would have an incentive to toot my horn only if I were seeking a job in Washington, when in fact I am trying to avoid precisely that. Therefore, I have mentioned all of these matters about myself because I was not sure that you were fully up-to-date on my various professional activities, and for some related reasons as follow below.

First, if I worked in government for a year, I could not simply go into isolation from the academic community as if I had dropped off the edge of the earth. I have continuing commitments and responsibilities which could mean, if I were working in Washington, an occasional trip (maybe once a month or so) away from Washington. Among other things, I would need to make maybe three or four short trips back to my Patterson School here in Kentucky, to make sure that operations were still securely afloat.

Second, for better or worse, I am a "public person" in my profession, with high visibility (which I often wish that I did not have). Several months ago when I was considering Bob Gard's invitation for me to join him at NDU during 1977-78, I was having a separate conversation with some of the most prominent and respected senior professors in my academic field. One of these old boys said to me, "Vince, why would you want to go work for a freshly-minted 3-star Army officer, when you are already the equivalent of a 4-star officer in our academic community?" Whether or not that was an accurate observation (and, thank goodness, we don't have that kind of military rank-consciousness in the academic community), I am a sufficiently "senior officer" that whatever I do tends to get discussed and attracts some attention across the academic community nationwide. Senior officers, as I don't have to tell you, send important symbolic signals merely because of where they are located and what they

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are doing. BUT this could be an asset if I were to serve in the role of "project manager" as described in this memo, because my work in that role would carry useful symbolism about improved government-academic relationships.

Third, because of my various professional endeavors, I do have extensive contacts throughout the academic community (and many places in government) which could be very useful in launching the kind of project that I have outlined in this Memo #4. Indeed, perhaps I ought to mention one particular program for which I served more or less as the "father," and that can be viewed in some respects as a pilot model for the WIPS idea that I have outlined here. Back in about 1967, when I was Executive Director of the International Studies Association (ISA), I approached the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) about creating an ISA-AFSA joint committee designed to improve relationships between the academic community and the Department of State. The joint committee was in fact created, it was very active for about two years, and we (the joint committee) sold Secretary Rusk on three out of four major proposals that we made to him. One of these three that has been most successful (and is still in operation) is State's "Scholar-Diplomat Seminars" program.

6. Some specific terms and requests

If I were asked to be "project director" or program manager" for the kind of ideas outlined herein, I would hope to receive an annual salary in the \$50,000 to \$55,000 range. This kind of figure would not earn me any "profit" over my ordinary financial situation here--in fact, it would maintain me at roughly the same situation that I have here in terms of standard of living, disposable income, etc. The detailed figures on the costs to me involved in a one-year move to Washington were worked out when I was talking to Bob Gard earlier. If you want these detailed figures, I can certainly provide them to you.

As suggested above, it would need to be understood that I would have to make occasional short trips (24-to-48 hours, maybe once per month on average) away from Washington on my other academic community business (at no cost to the government) Approved For Release 2006/10/18 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000300080015-5 meetings

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would afford me further opportunities to publicize my government-academia "good-will ambassador's role" for 1977-78.

I would like to be given some reasonable assurance against purely political/personal dabbling by others in my work. Of course, I am not naive enough to think that any job in Washington is ever wholly free from political considerations. But here is the kind of situation that I would want to avoid. Some guy on the NSC staff says to me, "Hey, Vince, on that seminar you are organizing next month, please invite my old friend Professor X---he and I were college roommates." And some guy at State says to me, "Vince, I sure hope you can invite Professor Y---he and I were in the Foreign Service together in the Antarctic back in '37, and he is really a top expert on penguins." And some guy at DOD or CIA says to me, "Vince, for your seminar invitees, be certain to include Professor Z---he and I were in the Army and in the OSS together in War II and, besides all that, his wife's third cousin is the brother of President Carter's cook." ----- Needless to say, I would welcome inputs from all participating government agencies for any events that I might be organizing, but I would prefer to have suggested invitees described in terms of professional qualifications rather than by individual name. I certainly do not plan to invite any "old buddies" of my own merely because they are old buddies. What I am proposing is a top-quality operation, with invitees chosen purely on their records and qualifications. This means that, for many if not most of the seminars, the academic invitees could well be people known to me only by reputation and not personally--although I would make detailed preliminary checks to make sure we were getting the kind of people we desired.

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Eventually, if anything comes of this proposal here, I would want to receive a formal appointment letter originating from some place other than State, Defense or the CIA. I would want my paychecks and my budget account on somebody's ledger other than at State, Defense or the CIA, although it would be immaterial to me if the money originally came via a fund transfer from one of the departments or agencies. I could begin a year (or 13 months) of work as early as June 6, 1977, immediately after finishing my Naval Reserve duty with you, but I would need the month of August to wrap up affairs here.

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I have suggested at several points herein that the White House would be a wholly suitable (and in some respects advantageous) overall sponsor and contracting entity for the proposed year-long project. However, if the White House desired merely to serve as the contracting entity, but with no overt or publicized White House sponsorship, I would be more than willing to let you trade on the good name of the Patterson School, and my own name. In other words, the contract could provide for me to operate out of a new Patterson School "branch office" to be established in Washington for the purposes of carrying out the contract, and I could have printed an appropriate variation on my basic letterhead here--which I think is pretty well known around the academic community. In the business world, you get charged a special additional fee if you want to use somebody's logo or trademark. I offer you this as a "freebie," and nothing about the White House would be printed on the letterhead. In this case, however, for reasons that I could explain, I would probably need the use of a good IBM "mag-card" typewriter, and a fairly good phone budget.

Finally, here is a major request--not a condition--but a MAJOR REQUEST. To do this job well, as I have described it, I would need one (and only one) super-assistant. I have such a person in mind. She is Mrs. Lilliam "Lil" Pancorbo, who has been my Executive Assistant here at the Patterson School. She is the most extraordinarily talented person who has ever worked with or for me. She has been a key figure with me in building the Patterson School from relative obscurity into a position of growing prominence nationwide and worldwide. She is perfect in all matters ranging from routine office work to major executive-managerial work. She is beautiful in handling all of the VIP's who visit us here, and these have included Dean Rusk; Denis Healey, Henry Cabot Lodge, Gerald R. Ford, and a good many people now in the Carter Administration such as Dick Holbrooke and Don McHenry. Because of her work for me, she has almost as many good first-name friends<sup>4</sup> and acquaintances in academic life and in government as I do. Thus, she is truly my alter ego.

Lil and her husband Dr. Sal Pancorbo are a very close couple. They are dear personal friends of Anne and myself, aside from the professional connection. Lil is leaving my staff here (an irreplaceable loss) because Sal has accepted

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an extremely attractive position as Professor of Clinical Pharmacology at the University of Minnesota Medical School. Thus, Sal and Lil will move to Minneapolis over the summer. However, I have tentatively discussed a Washington possibility with Sal and Lil, involving her working with me there. They are willing, if the situation should materialize in an appropriate fashion, to consider an arrangement whereby Lil would commute from Minneapolis to Washington work with me during the five-day working week, returning to Minneapolis virtually every weekend. This would be a strain. It would take a substantial chunk of money too, particularly if the weekly roundtrip airfares had to come out of about a \$20,000 annual salary (\$25,000 would be much more comfortable), plus the costs of a small efficiency apartment for Lil to live in during the workweeks in Washington.

Stan, when you went to the Naval War College, you insisted on taking with you Rusty Williams (plus a few other people) on the grounds that Rusty was your invaluable assistant. I am saying that Lil Pancorbo is equally valuable to me, particularly in the kind of work that we are discussing here. If she were with me in this assignment, it would at least double my own output capacity, thus probably leaving me enough surplus time to spend perhaps two or two and a half days per week helping you and Bob Bowie at your McLean address.

If it proves impossible for you to include Lil Pancorbo in the package, then please let me know as soon as possible. Among other things, this factor will be important to Lil and Sal in planning their Minneapolis move over the summer. But it will also be a key factor in my own thinking. If it is impossible for Lil to be involved in Washington work with me, please advise what you have in mind for an assistant for me. (I can think of one or two pretty good people already in the Washington area whom I might be able to get.) I have planned, organized, hosted and chaired literally hundreds of meetings and conventions of various kinds in academic life, but it is more than a one-man job. If you take the two people whom I am suggesting (i.e., Lil and myself), I think you would be getting the most successful team of its kind in American academic life--the team that has put the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce on the academic map.

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Feel free to share this memorandum with any people whom you consider appropriate, including President Carter and/or Zbig Brzezinski. I should add that I have had only casual contacts with Zbig over the years. He might or might not recognize my name. (Enclosed is the most recent letter that I have in my files from him, merely declining an invitation to lecture for us here.) As I said elsewhere in these memos, Zbig's orientation was always toward Washington, and perhaps to one or two New York organizations such as the Council on Foreign Relations. As far as I am aware, he never held any significant offices or roles in professional societies in academic life. My own orientation was always the reverse, toward the academic community and its work within professional societies. In short, Zbig and I operated in separate orbits.

[End of Memo #4]