Commentary
February 1975

A New International Order?

Robert W. Tucker

I

IT IS A MATTER of general agreement that traditional patterns of inequality in international society are widely challenged today. Differences may and do persist over the lengths to which this challenge can be expected to go in the years ahead and the consequences it will have if permitted to run its logical course. These differences do not affect the view that for the present, at any rate, we are in a period when inequalities once accepted as part of the natural order of things are no longer so accepted. Nor do they affect the judgment that many of the inequalities endemic to international society in the past are no longer sustainable.

The contemporary challenge to inequality has been almost as sudden as it has been pervasive. It is of course the case that we may find harbingers of the opposition to inequality we experience today not only in the interwar period but in the years preceding World War I. The egalitarianism of nation-states that is a commonplace today was not unknown at the turn of the century. Nor was the logic of this new egalitarianism obscured to its adherents. The 20th-century equation of the nation and the state not only invested the state with a legitimacy it has not previously possessed; that equation also gave to the claim of state equality an appeal and force it had never before enjoyed. For the equality of nation-states evoked, if nothing else, a far more persuasive analogy with the ideal of individual equality than had the analogy earlier drawn between states and men. The ideal of the nation carried with it a quality of "naturalness," hence a quality of individuality, that could be attributed only with considerable difficulty to the state alone. Once the implications of this ideal were accepted, it followed that nation-states need be no more identical than men to claim that they had an equal value by virtue of their individuality. And as in the case of individuals, so in the case of nations, it was argued that equality was violated when individuality was suppressed, through denial of political independence, or when it was robbed of self-respect by the disabilities—political, legal, and economic—which effectively deprive a collective from full participation in international society.

But if the new egalitarianism of nations was eventually to serve both as a prime factor in the creation of new states and as a powerful rallying cry for the removal of inequalities held to deprive peoples of self-respect, these were consequences that largely materialized only in the years following World War II. They are indeed the consequences that form part of the basis for the present challenge to inequality. Prior to World War II, however, they appeared as little more than the first winds that herald the possibility of a coming storm. On balance, the interwar period conformed to traditional patterns of inequality. Although the legitimacy of the more extreme manifestations of self-help—above all, armed force—was no longer accepted with the equanimity characteristic of an earlier era, the historic functions of military power remained largely unchanged. The current view taken of the "disutility" of military power was clearly not the view taken in the interwar period.

Nor was it only with respect to the use made and expected of military power that the world of the 1930's was still very much a traditional world. It is instructive to remind ourselves that demands for equality in the interwar years were, in the main, the demands of states now, as indeed then, comprising the powerful and wealthy of international society. What was then popularly termed the struggle between the "haves" and the "have-nots" was in reality a struggle among the haves. In this respect as well, the interwar period clearly followed a traditional pattern. A majority of the have-nots of today had yet to achieve independence. With rare exception, they were not in a position to press for equalities that, for better or worse, are achievable only through the institution of the state. Of the have-nots of today that did enjoy independence then, the claims to equality, when heard at all by the haves, seem quite modest by comparison with the claims of the developing states today. What is increasingly taken as a commonplace today, that the division between

---

ROBERT W. TUCKER, professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins, here continues the analysis inaugurated in his much-discussed article in last month's COMMENTARY, "Oil: The Issue of American Intervention." Professor Tucker's books include *A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise?* and *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy*.

the rich and the poor nations poses a grave danger to peace and stability, was then no more than the musing of a few seers. The contemporary persuasion that this division is morally repugnant was the possession of perhaps an even more select group. The conviction that justice requires the rich nations to help all peoples obtain a "minimum subsistence" could scarcely be seriously entertained by nations that had yet to recognize the precept of minimum subsistence in their domestic lives.

It is no more plausible to find the promise of a new egalitarianism in the wartime declarations of the United Nations or in the institutions established to order the postwar world. Certainly, one may find repeated reaffirmation of the principle of the "sovereign equality" of all states. But the homage paid to this principle broke no new ground. What is significant in the wartime declarations is the extent to which they reflect, rather than break from, the experience of the interwar period.

Similarly, the structure of the institutions to govern the postwar world can scarcely be interpreted as a departure from traditional patterns of inequality. The Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) closely reflect, in their voting arrangements as well as in other ways, the economic inequality of the participant states (an inequality that separated the United States from all other participants). In the structure of the United Nations Charter the reality of inequality is no less, despite the affirmation of the "equal rights . . . of nations large and small," the pledge to respect "the sovereign equality of all the members of the United Nations," and the voting provisions for the General Assembly. In the charter's original design of order the feature of fundamental importance is the practically exclusive power and almost unlimited discretion conferred upon the Security Council—that is, upon the great powers—in providing for international peace and security.

The charter afforded no assurance that the powers accorded the Security Council would be so employed as to give equal protection to all interests of all member states. The charter's design of order was made dependent on the condition that the great powers retain a basic identity of interests (a design which in itself clearly did not preclude acknowledgment of great-power spheres of influence). So long as this basic identity of interests was maintained, if the price of order was deemed by the great powers to necessitate the sacrifice of what otherwise would be regarded as the legitimate interests of states, there was little in the charter to prevent this sacrifice. Given the role and powers of the Security Council, the chief difference between the traditional balance-of-power system and the system of the charter is that the latter sought to make explicit and to legitimize what the former left rather obscure and never quite dared to legitimize.

II

If we are to find in the United Nations the principal institutional expression today of the demand for greater equality, we must do so in terms of what the organization has become and not in terms of what it was initially intended to be. The change from an instrument of the great powers to a forum for the new states to press their claims begins in the 1950's and coincides with events that suddenly gave the weak of the world unexpected significance. In part, this significance may be traced simply to the impact of the rapid decolonization that marked the years from the late 1940's through the early 1960's and to the very novelty of an international system that had achieved universality. Even in the absence of the cold war, this sudden appearance of a large number of new states would have aroused exaggerated expectations of their effect on world politics and, particularly, great-power relations. In part, however, what gave special significance to the emergence of these states was a bipolar power structure and a concomitant hemegonial conflict that soon became coextensive with what was for the first time a universal international system. The pervasiveness of the cold war was matched by its intensity. A characteristic feature of the conflict was the tendency to make almost any discrete issue into a symbol of the whole and to relate almost any conflict of interest to the underlying and ultimate conflict of interest.

In these circumstances, the states of the Third World took on an importance for the superpowers they would not otherwise have enjoyed. Although almost any feasible shift in the political allegiance of Third World states could not have decisively altered the respective power positions of the United States and the Soviet Union, it was nonetheless assumed that the global balance of power might well depend upon the ultimate disposition of the underdeveloped nations. In fact, once the cold war moved from Europe to Asia and to the Third World generally, conventional balance-of-power calculations became increasingly irrelevant to the major protagonists. What moved the latter was not so much a fear for their conventional security interests—though this fear was never absent—as a fear that they might become irrelevant to the majority of humanity comprising the Third World. It was this prospect of a diminishing influence that led to the vision (or nightmare), which persisted for more than a decade, of an America beleaguered in a hostile world that had chosen the example of Communism.

Although the cold war gave many of the states of the Third World a salience and leverage they would never otherwise have enjoyed, it also limited considerably their independence and freedom

of action. Conversely, while the decline in intensity of the cold war after the mid-1960's increased the level of independence of these states, it did so largely because the great cold-war protagonists attached a decreasing significance to an interest they had earlier deemed crucial. In part, they did so simply for the reason that in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, and the dangers that crisis illuminated, they had partially and almost imperceptibly turned away from a view of their rivalry which previously had given it an almost completely hegemonic cast. In part, perhaps, they did so out of a sense of fatigue as well as out of a growing realization that the contest could not have a decisive outcome, particularly in the area that the cold war had increasingly centered on. The struggle over the status of the Third World had been primarily a struggle for political allegiance and influence, not territorial control or conquest. But the reliability of political allegiance and influence in the absence of more traditional means of control was increasingly placed in question. Thus what had once appeared as a vital and manageable stake in the cold war took on an elusive and questionable character.

It is not without irony that the decrease in the significance to the two great powers of the Third World states coincided with the rise in the demands of the latter for a greater measure of equality. Although by the middle to late 1960's the restraints imposed upon the states of the Third World by the cold war had clearly begun to recede, the burdens an increased measure of independence imposed upon political leaders of these states had just as clearly not receded. However persistent many Third World governments had been in their criticism of the cold war, the attention they had received as a result of that conflict had assuaged deep anxieties over their very viability as states. If the cold war restricted their freedom of action, it also gave them a much needed sense of importance and worth. This latter sense was probably of greater moment to governing elites than fears—real or simply professed—that the cold war threatened their independence, for despite the restraints it imposed, the cold war provided a psychic confirmation of independence.

III

IN RETROSPECT, then, the cold war may be seen as having afforded not only the occasion for an otherwise unexpectedly rapid decolonization but as having provided a marked stimulus to demands for greater equality on the part of the new and developing states. Nevertheless, the common view at the close of the 1960's was that the Third World formed, for the most part, an area of marginal significance in world politics. Even those who objected to this view, and to what they saw as its manifestations in the Nixon foreign policy, did so more out of hope that the developed and capitalist states might be induced to acknowledge a responsibility to improve the lot of the developing nations than out of conviction that the latter might somehow compel the former to do so. No doubt, this view was an exaggerated reaction to what appeared as an excessive preoccupation in the 1960's with the Third World, a preoccupation that was held largely responsible for the disastrous intervention in Vietnam. We had failed to see that the world—developed and underdeveloped alike—had become pluralistic. Although a pluralistic world might be far more complicated than the world of the classic cold war, it was nevertheless held to be a much safer world. Interpreted in essence as the triumph of nationalism, pluralism in the prevailing view meant that Communist expansion no longer carried the threat to America it once carried. Pluralism also meant that the prospect of Communist expansion had dramatically declined. With that decline, the importance of the Third World declined as well. Contrary to the radical explanation that we were in Vietnam because the greater stake in the conflict was access to indispensable raw materials on Western terms, the prevailing view was that we were in Vietnam because we had misunderstood the changes that had taken place in the world. Indeed, the argument went, we had never really understood the Third World at all. John Kenneth Galbraith summarized the new understanding of Third World states in these terms:

> They are poor and rural. . . . For the appreciable future they will so remain. Even by the crudest power calculus, military or economic, such nations have no vital relation to the economic or strategic position of the developed countries. They do supply raw materials. But even here the typical observation concerns not their power as sources of such supply, but rather their weakness as competitive hewers of wood in the markets of the industrially advanced countries.*

With the advantage of hindsight, we can see what Galbraith passed over, that the supply of raw materials might not always be in excess of demand, that at least some of the "hewers of wood" might choose to combine rather than to compete, and—above all—that the heretofore weak might achieve a "vital relation" to the strong should the latter, for whatever reasons, prove unable or disinclined to make use of their strength. Moreover, this estimate of the relations between the developed and underdeveloped states not only underestimated the progress in development that marked the efforts of a number of Third World states; more importantly, it neglected the rising demands throughout the underdeveloped world for a greater measure of equality. During the

* John Kenneth Galbraith, "Plain Lessons of a Bad Decade," *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1970-71), p. 37.

trauma of Vietnam these demands had been, perhaps understandably, overlooked. In fact, the challenge to inequality had slowly but steadily gathered momentum throughout the 1960's. It had done so in international forums where the increasing acceptance of the "one state, one vote" rule gave the small and weak an influence they had never possessed in the traditional system dominated as it was by customary practices that reflected a consensus of the strong. On a number of significant issues requiring international agreement, novel constraints were thereby introduced by virtue of the need of the powerful to obtain legitimation of their interests through the consent of majorities often made up of Third World states. An emergent political equality has been attended by the demand for a greater measure of protection for the economic interests of the underdeveloped states and by the insistence that the historically disadvantaged be given preferential treatment. Nor have these claims fallen on deaf ears in the developed and capitalist states. Among Western elites, at any rate, many are responding, if not over-responding, to what they suddenly see as an urgent need to reduce international inequality, if for no other reason than that of vital self-interest rooted in an ever-growing interdependence.

IV

WHAT are the characteristics of the new egalitarianism that are expected to determine the future international system? In part, it is clear that the new egalitarianism resembles nothing so much as the old equality. If international society is on the threshold of a new era, it is not apparent in the commitment of the new states to an interdependence that precludes a freedom of action states have habitually claimed in the name of their sovereign equality. Westerners increasingly find a contradiction between the new egalitarianism, which is held to result largely from a growing interdependence, and the state's insistence upon its undiminished freedom of action, but the elites of the new states do not share this outlook. On the contrary, for the latter it is precisely the complete independence and sovereignty of the state that forms the most important—certainly the most emphasized—part of the new egalitarianism. It is the new states which with unwearying insistence have reiterated that the international order, based on the sovereign equality of states, must accord to every state the unrestricted right to determine its own course of political, economic, and social development. Thus the "full permanent sovereignty of every state over its natural resources and all economic activities," to use the words of the UN General Assembly's 1974 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, is an "inalienable right," the exercise of which is not to be subject to any external "economic, political, or other types of coercion." More generally, the principle of sovereign equality is interpreted to give every state the right to define its legitimate interests and, subject to limitations which remain uncertain, to take such measures as may be necessary for their defense. Save perhaps for the self-consciousness with which these claims to equality are made by the new states, there is little that is novel about them.

Nor is there any novelty in the insistent claim that the subjects of the new egalitarianism are states and states alone. There is no warrant for seeing in the new egalitarianism the precursor of a growing equality *within* states. The growth of equality among states may prove quite compatible with a continuing, even a deepening, inequality among individuals within states. Whatever the meaning we may give to the equality of states, the assumption that the consequences of state equality need not be clearly distinguished from their consequences for individual equality can only lead to confusion and worse. The almost wholly abortive attempts since World War II to secure the effective internationalization of basic human rights afford a clear illustration of the point at issue. To the extent that the human-rights movement has made any progress—and such progress has been minuscule—it is not unfair to say that it has been made despite the insistent assertion by states of their rights—among which the right of equality has been paramount. The central thrust of the claim to equality in international politics and law not only remains a claim to the equality of states, it is a claim that serves today—as in the past—to reaffirm the view of the state as the exclusive guardian of the interests of, and sole dispenser of justice to, the human beings who comprise it. This claim shows few signs of receding today. Certainly, the new egalitarianism in no way challenges it. If anything, the new egalitarianism has given this claim renewed strength.

In some respects, therefore, the new egalitarianism is little more than a refurbished version of the old equality which was quite compatible with almost any and all forms of inequality. In other respects, though, the new egalitarianism is indeed new. The powerful are not to employ their power, certainly not their military power, against the weak on behalf of interests whose defense would have evoked the threat or use of force only a short time ago. Intended primarily to deny the legitimacy of armed intervention in response to action a government may take within its territorial jurisdiction, the prohibition has also been extended to cover so-called issues of "global management" (e.g., conflicting claims over the use and exploitation of the oceans and space). At the same time, the developed states are to acknowledge a duty to assist the underdeveloped states in

the great task of reducing the material disparities among them. The prevention of nuclear war apart, this task forms the most important purpose of the new international order. Here again, the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order may be cited as representative of the new egalitarianism. The principal purpose of the new order, the Declaration reads, is to alter a system wherein the developing countries "which constitute 70 per cent of the world population, account for only 30 per cent of the world's income." A substantial reduction of inequality in the global distribution of income forms the collective responsibility of the developed states. The framework within which this duty is to be implemented, however, must be one designed by the "whole international community," the collective decisions of the community reflecting the principle of political equality.

The logic of the new egalitarianism therefore requires discrimination on behalf of the materially disadvantaged. This logic has been given expression in the preferential standard by which the developing countries, through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), have sought to replace the most-favored-nation standard. There is no question that the UNCTAD scheme is discriminatory. In place of equality of treatment between the rich and poor, UNCTAD substitutes a standard of equity. Its well-known rationale is that among developed nations equality of treatment (in the form of the most-favored-nation principle) is equitable, whereas among developed and underdeveloped nations equality of treatment is inequitable and, along with other consequences, promotes further inequalities of wealth. Among unequals, the undeveloped nations have argued, equality of treatment leads to discrimination in favor of the stronger. Hence the conclusion that the discrimination shown in favor of the weaker, by virtue of the preferential standard, is equitable because it serves to reduce inequality.

ARE the claims of the new egalitarianism, as articulated by Third World spokesmen, to be taken seriously? I see no reason why they should not. It is easy to show that they often combine two different standards: one for the developed states of the North, another for a largely undifferentiated South (comprising the very poor states, the emerging class, and the nouveaux riches). Thus the insistence that *every* state has exclusive control over its own resources cannot logically be reconciled with the insistence that *some* states have a duty to share their resources with others. Whereas the former claim risks nullifying the basis for an "international welfare order," the latter claim attempts to save such basis by proclaiming it the special duty of the favored few. It is for this reason that a detached, though not unsympathetic, Western observer of the new states' position can voice concern over the possibility that these states have "constructed needless barriers to some of their central needs for the future—namely the acceptance by more affluent states of some level of duty to transfer resources to other states to meet the direst material needs of great sections of mankind."* But logical consistency here could be maintained, and supposedly "needless barriers" removed, only by the concession in principle of a claim that responds to anxieties which are the result of a long history of domination and formal inequality. Rather than make such a concession, the new states find little difficulty in advancing logically inconsistent positions, or, more to the point, in insisting upon a double standard of conduct. Besides, this double standard can always be justified by invoking a past in which material disparities presumably arose because of what is seen as a double standard imposed on developing peoples.

If the claims of the new egalitarianism are not to be dismissed because they proclaim a double standard, they are also not to be dismissed because they gloss over divisions separating the countries of the South. The juxtaposition of Southern rhetoric with Southern realities has been undertaken many times. But what does the exercise prove apart from what we already know: that there are many conflicts of interest among the countries of the South and that, given normal expectations of state behavior, a number of these conflicts will persist and even deepen if for no other reason than as a result of markedly different rates of development? We did not need the oil crisis to demonstrate this, though it clearly has provided a very vivid demonstration. The devastating effects of current oil prices on many developing countries have been met with relative indifference by the major OPEC countries, thereby putting to rest the romantic notion that the new states would lead the way to humanity's moral regeneration. The most telling comment on this notion has come from a Senegalese official who is reported as having said about the world's response to the West African drought that while the United States "gives enough to allow itself an easy conscience," the infinitesimal assistance given by rich fellow Muslims in the Arab countries indicates the latter "have not reached the state of conscience."†

The oil crisis affords apparent vindication of the view that "the South" does not exist in the sense that it was widely seen to exist only a decade ago. At the same time, if the major OPEC countries have not set the kind of example that many vainly expected of them, the all-important point remains that to date thay have set an example that others will attempt to emulate, even

* Julius Stone, *Of Law and Nations*, p. 361.
† New York *Times*, November 10, 1974, p. 34.

though on a considerably more modest scale. Communal solidarity is not a prerequisite to common grievances that express themselves in claims to greater equality. Nor, for that matter, is the presence of conflicting interests a bar to the pursuit of interests that are still perceived as shared by most governments of the South. The rather disconcerting truth is that the reactions of Southern victims of present oil prices have been almost as astonishing in their way as the reactions of Northern victims. A large literature on what sociologists term "relative deprivation" would have led us to expect the Southern countries to show intense resentment toward the sudden riches and new status of the major OPEC states, and particularly in view of the lack of concern the latter have shown over the effects their actions have had on the world's poor. It may be a mixture of fear and hope that prevents this resentment from becoming manifest. Then again, however, it may be the persistence of grievances and interests that are still held in common despite feelings of resentment. To the extent that it is the persistence of commonly held grievances and interests, the response of the developed states to OPEC actions has clearly not served to discourage the claims of the new egalitarianism. If anything, this response has given such claims new impetus.

V

WHAT is extraordinary about the contemporary challenge to international inequality is not so much the challenge itself, however, as the response it has elicited and the expectations it has generated among liberal elites in the developed and capitalist states. It is quite true that in theory at least liberalism has always been far more egalitarian than is commonly recognized, and that this egalitarianism did not stop at the boundaries of the state. Nor did liberalism rest with the promise of legal and political equality for those peoples that met the standards of civilization and, accordingly, were deemed capable of directing their own destiny. The liberal credo not only held out the promise of legal and political equality but the further promise that free trade, besides being proportionately beneficial to all, would promote a gradual equalization in international income distribution.

Even so, until very recently it would have seemed incongruous to hear from liberal lips that material inequality in international no less than in domestic life must be justified and that, at the least, such justification must fail if it does not encompass the provision of a minimum level of subsistence to all peoples. That a just society must insure a minimum subsistence for all is a principle accepted within most Western societies only in this century, and within the United States only in the past generation. Even now, the controversy over what constitutes minimum subsistence continues to evoke widespread and deep disagreement. That what has been accepted as a precept of justice only so recently within historic national societies may—indeed, must—also be regarded today as a precept of justice in international society deserves, one would think, to be treated with some skepticism.

The point remains that this response is increasingly taken for granted by Western elites. It is apparent in the view that finds a "logical inconsistency" in the disparity of effort made to alleviate poverty at home and abroad. It is equally apparent in the persuasion that not only the same moral case may be made for the redistribution of wealth among states as for such redistribution within states, but substantially the same peacekeeping case as well. The appeal of and need for greater global equality, it is held, must grow with the growing awareness of the vast gulf between conditions of domestic life (in developed societies) and those of international life. Thus the growth of equality within the state forms the precursor of the movement toward the growth of equality among states. In this view, the dynamic of equality cannot and will not be contained at the boundaries of the state. Reflecting the development of the more influential domestic societies, the world community will become a welfare community in roughly the manner that Western states have become welfare states.

Still, the question persists: what will induce the powerful in international society to yield what has only so recently and often so reluctantly been yielded in domestic society? Clearly, if the inequalities that have traditionally marked state relations are to decline, the institution that has afforded the primary means for maintaining inequality must also decline. The effective challenge to inequality requires, at the outset, that the more extreme forms of self-help—especially military force—no longer perform their time-honored functions. Provided that physical coercion of the weak by the strong has largely lost its former utility, as many now believe, nothing would appear to be of comparable moment in altering the hierarchical structure of international society. It is in the assumption that the rising material and moral costs of employing force now effectively inhibit—or very nearly so—the strong from resorting to force against the weak that we must find one of the root sources, if not *the* root source, of the challenge to inequality.

Nor is it reasonable to expect that a growing disutility of military power will have no effect on the economic power wielded by the strong. Although disparities in economic power remain in a world where military power is presumed to be increasingly at a discount, the effects of these disparities must surely be altered as well and in the same direction. Power may not be indivisible,

utility of military power has markedly declined, there need be no devaluation in the efficacy of economic power. Recent experience has shown that even against a very small state, and one with a vulnerable economy, the effectiveness of economic coercion alone may prove surprisingly limited. In part, this is so for the evident reason that economic coercion permits the weak alternatives that physical coercion does not. Then, too, the limited effectiveness of economic coercion may in some measure be attributed to the same sources that limit the effectiveness of physical coercion. While the legitimacy of the former has not been subject to the same standards as has the latter, economic coercion has been called increasingly into question even when employed by the wealthy country to protect interests that are the result of undertakings the weaker (underdeveloped) state consented to.* This argument draws added force once it is recognized that economic coercion can only have its full effects to the extent it leaves open the option of physical coercion. In this respect, it is quite understandable that many who reject serious economic confrontation in the oil crisis do so in part on the ground that this may lead eventually to military confrontation. Finally, as in the case of physical coercion, so in the case of economic coercion, the same argument will be, and has been, employed: the costs may well outweigh the gains, whether economic or political, in a world where the poor and weak have displayed increasing sensitivity to any form of coercion.

The erosion of military and, in some measure at least, economic power as instruments of the strong must clearly have, if continued, a profound impact on the hierarchical nature of international society. Even so, this erosion cannot of itself confer the kind of leverage needed to effect a significant redistribution of the world's wealth. The reduction of material disparities among states is affected by the new constraints on force largely to the extent that these constraints permit the weak to take measures within their territories that in an earlier day would have invited armed intervention. In this sense, a restricted scope afforded to forcible measures of self-help may diminish, and for one select group of countries spectacularly so, disparities in wealth. Yet it is only in this sense that the new constraints may do so. In consequence, their effects—again, the case of oil apart—would appear to be rather peripheral in reducing material disparities.

In a broader perspective, however, the leverage Third World states are expected to enjoy by virtue of their possession of natural resources indispensable to the industrialized states is only one feature of a more general vision in which the vulnerabilities of the strong will become increasingly apparent. The dependence of the rich on the raw materials held by the poor is only the most recent and dramatic manifestation of this vision. The vision would persist in the absence of concern over continued supply of raw materials at less than exorbitant prices. It is to be found in the repeated admonition that we cannot begin to solve the many environmental problems we face without the cooperation of the Third World states. It is also to be found in a host of economic issues other than natural resources—investments, markets, monetary reform, trade liberalization—in which the Third World is considered to have the power to "hold us up."†

STILL, it is not these and related issues that form the crux of the conviction that the present inequalities of nations—above all, material inequalities—must somehow be reduced. Instead; the essence of the challenge to inequality is the presumed danger that these inequalities hold out to international peace and stability. The power of the weak that is most to be feared, on this view, is the power to transmit misery in the form of chaos and war. Whether this transmission takes an active or a passive form is held to be less important than the vulnerability of the rich to whatever form it takes. We have become familiar with the metaphors that are intended to convey this sense of the vulnerability of the world's favored peoples to conditions that may one day prompt the less fortunate and their governments to desperate behavior. The United States, Samuel Huntington writes, "is a tenant occupying the largest, most elegant, most luxuriously furnished penthouse suite in a global apartment house." As such we have "a clear interest in insuring that the structure as a whole is sound and that minimum conditions for decent human existence prevail in the building."** Robert L. Heilbroner puts the matter more generally, as well as more ominously, in these terms: "Even the most corrupt governments of the underdeveloped world are aware of the ghastly resemblance of the world's present economic conditions to an immense train, in which a few passengers, mainly in the advanced capitalist world, ride in first-class coaches, in conditions of comfort unimaginable to the enormously greater numbers crammed into the cattle cars that make up the

* It serves no useful purpose here to enter into extended discussion of what constitutes "consent" as between parties greatly unequal in power. If the fact of inequality *per se* is held to invalidate the consensual nature of an undertaking, then almost any bilateral agreement between developed and underdeveloped countries may be regarded as devoid of validity. An apparently more plausible attack on the validity of agreements entered into between the rich and the poor holds that the test must turn on exploitation rather than inequality *per se*. In fact, the alternative turns out to reveal almost as many difficulties as the test it replaces.

† Cf. C. Fred Bergsten, "The Threat Is Real," *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1974), pp. 84 ff.

** Samuel P. Huntington, "Foreign Aid: For What and For Whom," *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1971), pp. 130-31.

bulk of the train's carriages."* Eventually, in the absence of a greater equality, the world's apartment house or train will be subject to dangers that may threaten all of the inhabitants or passengers. But it is the rich among them who are presumably the more vulnerable, if only for the reason that they have a great deal to lose.

Thus in what almost appears as a reversal of the "natural" order of things, it is the weak of the world who are considered to hold out grave peril to the strong. Moral obligation apart, it is the world's interdependence--indeed, its indivisibility—that compels us out of self-interest to reduce present material disparities between the world's rich and poor. The appeal to self-interest resulting from an inescapable interdependence need not and should not be understood only in the narrow sense of avoiding material injury. Even if the poor could be safely left to their suffering, the prospect of living in a prosperous enclave that is surrounded by a despairing world would prove unwelcome. More than that, it is argued, this prospect must eventually prove morally debilitating, especially given our awareness today of conditions from which it was once possible and rather easy to divert our attention.

It is in this manner that a view initially based upon calculations of self-interest moves almost imperceptibly to one based upon moral obligation. The sentiment of sympathy or pity may not appear in unalloyed form, but it is clearly there even though combined with anxiety over the actions to which the poor may finally be driven in the attempt to alter their condition. Since the same combination is a commonplace in arguments for greater equality today within Western societies, there is no cause for surprise that it should form the basis for appeals to reduce inequalities in international society. What is surprising is the rather casual manner with which a collective moral responsibility that encompasses humanity is increasingly viewed almost as self-evident.

VI

The oil crisis enables us to see with a clarity we could not have before some of the consequences of the new egalitarianism. One consequence is that if permitted to run its logical course the new egalitarianism will lead, as it is leading today, to a growing disjunction between power and order, that is, to an international society in which the principal holders of power—at least among the developed and capitalist states—may no longer be the principal creators and guarantors of order. And since nature abhors a vacuum, the new equality is also likely to lead to an international system in which the relative power position of the Soviet Union will be considerably enhanced, for the Russians are neither dependent in any significant way on the new states nor disposed to view their claims in the manner of Western elites. The disjunction between power and order will accordingly be largely one-sided in its effects. Whether this prospective outcome is to be welcomed or decried is not at issue here. What is at issue is the problems it must raise to the degree it is realized.

There are many who will take exception even to this manner of formulating the consequences of the movement toward greater equality in international society, let alone to what they sense to be the implications of the formulation. Why speak of a growing disjunction between order and power, it will be asked, rather than of a changing power? Moreover, why speak of the principal possessors of power that are no longer the principal creators and guarantors of order, if it is admitted that order implies power? True, convention sanctions the loose usage whereby one speaks of power that is no longer usable or effective. This manner of speaking is misleading, however, since power that is no longer usable or effective is no longer power in any meaningful sense.

Thus, it is argued, no useful purpose is served by pointing to the markedly declining utility of traditional forms of power as creating a separation between power and order. What is happening instead is that a new and more egalitarian order is emerging, in part because a form of power that was once decisive and pervasive is no longer so, or, at any rate, no longer nearly so decisive and pervasive. On this view, then, to point to a growing disjunction between power and order betrays a retrogressive outlook and a yearning to return to the traditionally hierarchical system ordered primarily on the basis of relative military capability.

There is some merit to these considerations, if for no other reason than what may appear as order to one observer may yet appear as disorder to another. So it has always been, and we have no persuasive reason for believing contemporary judgments are somehow free of this perennial bias. Unless the concept of order is reduced to the mere effectiveness with which power—whatever its ingredients and application—secures such behavior as its holders ordain, there is an unavoidable element of preference implicit in all judgments on what constitutes order. If this is true with respect to civil society, it is for obvious reasons all the more true with respect to international society.

It is not these qualifications, however, that form the principal objection to the position which holds that there is a growing disjunction between power and order in state relations. Instead, objection centers on the alleged failure to recognize what Pierre Renouvin has termed the "underlying forces" at work in contemporary world poli-

* Robert L. Heilbroner, *An Inquiry into the Human Prospect*, p. 39.

ities. For it is these forces which are presumably constantly eroding the old order and the forms of power that maintained it. There is neither space nor need here to review once again what by now a large, and still burgeoning, literature has elaborated. Suffice it to say that an increasingly interdependent world is found to result from weapons that can no longer protect, let alone aggrandize, the state; from a technology that no longer permits the "separate" state; from transnational economic and social actors that have come to function largely independently of the state; and from a process of industrial growth which creates problems that cannot be resolved in isolation by the state. In almost all its variations, then, the theme of interdependence points to the state's growing loss of autonomy.

But what is of relevance in this context is not so much the state's loss of autonomy as the egalitarian implications this loss conveys. Marked inequality—certainly radical inequality—is seen to threaten an interdependent society for the reason that interdependence is considered but a synonym for vulnerability. A society made up of increasingly interdependent units is a society made up of increasingly vulnerable units. If the great moral imperative of the age is equality, as we are constantly told, an interdependent world that does not respond to this imperative is evidently a world with a very bleak future.

Interestingly, however, the by now pervasive theme of interdependence is only seldom applied to the Soviet Union (or, for that matter, China), and with good reason. By this very omission we may conclude that interdependence is largely irrelevant to the state that will assuredly continue to play a major, and increasing, role in world politics. For the purpose of conventional political analysis, this qualification alone may well be regarded as critical. Still, one need not press this point. The qualifications to interdependence are considerable even when kept to the rather abstract level its advocates appear to prefer. If in one sense modern weapons make all states vulnerable as never before, in another sense these weapons confer a security on their possessors that states seldom enjoyed in the past. If in one sense technology—particularly communications—no longer permits the "separate state," in another sense technology gives the state making full use of it powers it previously rarely possessed. Moreover, the same technology that confers these powers also makes possible—at any rate, for the favored few—a policy akin to autarchy. It is of course the case that whether states pursue a policy of independence or interdependence, they must eventually face the problems attendant upon growth. But there is no compelling reason for believing these problems can only be resolved through the methods of interdependence and, indeed, there are a number of reasons for believing quite the contrary.

EVEN if one accepts the view of an ever-rising interdependence occurring at the expense of the state, the prospect of a growing disjunction between power and order is not thereby excluded. It is excluded only if one assumes that interdependence itself is largely constitutive of order and that this order is self-maintaining, at least in the sense that its maintenance does not depend upon the threat or use of physical coercion. In fact, however, such interdependence as we have in international society today, while creating the need for a greater measure of order, provides no assurance this need will be met, whether by a supposedly declining state or by some alternative institution (s). Indeed, if the state is being slowly but surely drained of its autonomy, as the believers in interdependence would have it, then in the absence of effective alternative political institutions, what order international society has heretofore enjoyed must be jeopardized. Surely the order of the past generation must be jeopardized, since the state that has presided over it is presumably no longer capable of doing so.

If the interdependence advocates do not see matters in this light, it is because they do assume that interdependence itself is largely constitutive of order, that an interdependent world must establish its own set of rules and constraints, and that this order does not include force, the *ultima ratio* that characterized and defined the traditional system. Obviously, the new system will still be one largely dominated by self-help. What else could it be in the absence of supranational institutions? But the self-help of interdependence will show a far more benign face than the self-help of the traditional system, and it will do so because the threat or use of force is destructive of interdependence. Is this apparent circularity of the argument a fundamental flaw? No, provided a sufficiently high value is attached by *all* participants to those consequences held to follow from interdependence.

To be sure, the more cautious prophets of the new order of interdependence readily concede that the emergence of this order is both complicated and threatened by the persistence of "obsolete" forms of power (and, of course, by the persistence of equally obsolete attitudes that have yet to adjust to the requirements of an interdependent world). But this admitted tension between the old and the new is seen as unavoidable in a period of transition. It can, and in all likelihood will, be overcome as the forces of interdependence continue to erode the already weakened position of the state.

What is the basis for believing that this tension between the old and the new will be resolved in favor of the new? It will not do to respond by pointing once again to "underlying forces" the significance of which are, as noted, quite ambiguous. At best, these forces leave one on uncertain grounds and, if anything, suggest that the ten-

sion, rather than being resolved in favor of the new, may only become more pronounced. If this is so, it serves to strengthen the view of a growing disjunction between power and order with all that this disjunction must portend. Even in the new order of interdependence, it seems only reasonable to assume that conflicts of interest will arise and that, as the oil crisis has demonstrated, a growing interdependence will itself be productive of many very serious conflicts of interest. How will such conflicts be resolved if the traditional means for resolving them are to be neither employed nor meaningfully threatened? To respond that the means of conflict resolution will increasingly approximate the means of resolving conflicts within the state assumes a degree of consensus international society has not known in the past and clearly does not know at present. But this in turn assumes a formative agent of consensus—and, indeed, of conscience—that heretofore at least has invariably been the state (and not, as a still regnant liberal outlook insists, an elusive "society").

VII

If we are plainly not already in a consensual world, is there plausible reason to believe that we are moving toward one? Interdependence cannot of itself provide such reason, since it is as much a source of conflict as of consensus, if not more. Can development provide what interdependence cannot provide? Many apparently think so and find in the very universality of commitment to the cause of development the consensus that may serve as the foundation of a new order. But the issues that interdependence raises are also in large measure the issues development must raise, however widespread the approval development elicits in principle. This is so if only for the reason that the commitment to development, if taken at all seriously, is evidently a commitment to a greater measure of equality. Although development may and does mean many things, one thing it surely means to its legions of supporters is a world in which material disparities will be less marked than they are at present. No doubt, those who go so far as to equate development with equality exaggerate. The exaggeration is a pardonable one, however, in view of the importance equality occupies in the development imperative.

Unless we assume that the greater measure of global equality expected to attend development will result from the indigenous efforts of the developing countries themselves, the development of the latter evidently entails a steady and very substantial transfer of wealth from the rich to the poor countries. Is it reasonable to expect such transfer to occur voluntarily as a consequence of some transcendent consensus on the desirability of development? It would not seem so. Certainly, it would not seem so if we take as our point of reference the only experience we have. Within major Western democratic states, the efforts that have been made to achieve a greater measure of socioeconomic equality have met with considerable resistance, and this despite their relative modesty in both intention and result. Yet these efforts have been undertaken within nation-states that have a long history and enjoy some measure of cohesiveness and solidarity.

The paradox, and the difficulty, attending all movements toward achieving greater equality are that in large measure they must presuppose the very conditions they seek to achieve. The great end ultimately sought through equality is fraternity, in Tawney's expression, the society of fellowship. Yet the achievement of this end remains unattainable without that preexistent measure of cohesiveness and solidarity which safeguards against the conflicts that demands for greater equality raise, conflicts that may well prove destructive of fellowship. No major Western state has yet managed to resolve this paradox satisfactorily, and for the reason that none has enjoyed the moral resources, the degree of consensus and sympathy, requisite for its resolution. Instead, the quest for equality has been met by the promise of equal opportunity, by the expectation that everyone's material condition may be constantly improved through growth, and by the recognition that everyone must at least be insured a minimal level of subsistence. Whether one regards this record as commendable or deplorable, a substantial realization of equality or a betrayal of it, is not at issue here. Of relevance is the point that this, in rough approximation, is the historic response Western democratic states have made to demands for greater equality. In part, this response—the provision of a minimal standard of subsistence—was made only after a relatively high level of development had been achieved. Even so, its recognition has come slowly and, to many, quite inadequately.

If this experience has any relevance for the problem of global inequality, we can only expect that the development imperative, whatever the degree of consensus it elicits in principle, will in reality provide an acute and continuing source of conflict. Given the notorious lack of cohesiveness and solidarity of international society, the demand to reduce present disparities of income and wealth would prove productive of conflict even in quite favorable circumstances. For even in quite favorable circumstances, international economic relationships would still be relationships of equity with their clearly redistributive overtones. Moreover, the prime movers in the demand for equality will be states. Is there reason to expect that the claims of underdeveloped states to greater equality will be moderated with a steady improvement in their standards of living? Here again, if the experience of domestic society is at all rel-

evant, the answer cannot prove comforting in its implications for international conflict.

It is a well-known theme of conservatives that the issue of equality grows more acrimonious and demands for greater equality more insistent as the poor begin to improve their living standards and to see the possibilities heretofore hidden from them. But the theme also happens to be borne out by experience, and candid egalitarians have always acknowledged, while defending, the growth of resentment against inequality that attends the growth of equality. It is one of the great egalitarians of the century who wrote that the determination to end disabilities deemed needless and advantages deemed preferential "has its source, not in material misery, but in sentiments which the conquest of the grosser forms of poverty has given room to grow."* Recently, a champion of greater global equality has warned in unequivocal terms against the belief that a modest rise in living standards among the underdeveloped nations will moderate their claims and thereby promote a world with less conflict.† Nor is the reason for the sharpened intolerance of inequality that attends the growth of equality to be found simply in the sentiments that rising expectations bring, sentiments which readily make remaining inequalities appear intolerable. In part, this rising determination to end inequality is to be explained by the conviction that the position of the privileged is no longer secure once concessions have been wrested from them by whatever means. The significance of this conviction will of course vary according to circumstances. In international society it is bound to prove quite significant, given the circumstances normally marking the concession of interests by states—let alone the concession of vital interests. It was entirely to be expected that the major OPEC states should view the manner in which concessions were wrung from the developed and capitalist states as indicative of a power position no longer secure. And it is to be expected that if the latter states continue to behave as they have behaved to date, the former, acting on this view, will press for a still greater measure of "equality."

These considerations suggest that the development process—as interdependence—holds out the promise of far more conflict than consensus, and this even accepting the assumption of relatively open-ended growth. It is this assumption that provided the foundation for Western-inspired postwar development programs, just as it is this assumption that accounted for the optimism placed in these programs. Given a moderate amount of competence and will on the part of governments of developing countries, a convergence of per-capita growth rates was expected to result in the not-too-distant future from modest aid infusions and technology transfers. Convergent per-capita growth rates, in turn, would eventually lead to per-capita income levels that, if not equalized globally, would still exceed the levels of income prevailing at the time in the developed states.

This view persists in some quarters even today, but it is clearly a rapidly declining faith. Population growth alone has dealt it a very severe blow. The goal of converging per-capita growth rates has been moved from the not-too-distant to the indefinite future and levels of per-capita income once entertained have simply been abandoned. In the meantime, disillusionment within Western countries over the results of development efforts in many Southern states has been met by rising resentment of the poor over what is seen as a commitment by the rich that is at once no more than of token significance and yet increasingly unbearable for the interventionist pressures it is often felt to bring.

In retrospect, it is apparent that the favored solution for international inequality was a variation of the favored solution for domestic inequality. Even if the rather elusive, though ubiquitous, "gap" was not substantially closed, it would not matter terribly, it was believed, if the standard of living of all rose dramatically. This proposition is far from self-evident, again as domestic experience has shown. What Charles Frankel has observed in the domestic context ("a man does not have to be poor to be disadvantaged; he merely needs to be poorer than somebody else") may prove no less relevant in the international context.

At any rate, the favored solution of an open-ended growth process has been called into question and, in consequence, the faith that found in development the promise of a new order has been shaken. For the appearance of constraints on growth changes the entire setting in which development and the reduction of global inequalities were to have taken place. What once appeared as not only a plausible but a painless goal no longer does so. Nor is it enough to respond that present constraints on growth will not prove to be lasting, that what we are confronted with is a short-to-medium term problem likely to be resolved, depending upon the particular constraint, over the next ten to thirty years. The long term may produce catastrophe. On the other hand, the long term may find solutions to problems that appear next to insoluble today. We cannot know. But it is not the long term that concerns us. It is the near term, for that is the only term statecraft responds to, if indeed it responds to that.

VIII

GIVEN the circumstances likely to prevail in the near term, the need for order will not prove less but greater than in the

* R. H. Tawney, *Equality*, p. 225. Of course, what constitutes "needless disabilities" and "preferential advantages" varies with the growth of equality itself.

† Gunnar Myrdal, "The World Poverty Problem," *Britannica Book of the Year 1972*, p. 34.

past. It will prove greater because interdependence creates relationships and development gives rise to claims which, if not somehow resolved, may easily lead to chaos. The oil crisis strikingly illustrates this need without affording any assurance it will be met. If anything, the course of the crisis to date indicates that it may well not be met. If it is not, the reason will be that the strong among the developed and capitalist states are no longer willing to enforce the order of the past, while the weak who have challenged this order are incapable of creating a new order. Even so, the failure to enforce the order of the past will still mean, on balance, the relinquishment of interest by the strong.

Is it plausible to expect this anomalous situation to persist? If not quite plausible, it is still possible, if only for the reason that this situation will remain critically dependent upon political and moral perceptions which may yet transform today's possibility into tomorrow's reality. To be sure, these perceptions are not of equal moment. Nor are they directly relevant to each and every conflict of interest between the developed and capitalist states of the North and the states of the South. Moreover, they are identified much more with elite groups in the North than with the publics at large. Still, their general significance today for the response the new egalitarianism has evoked cannot be in serious doubt. Implicit throughout the preceding discussion, they are: a rising disinclination to use or to threaten force, whether from the belief that force is no longer expedient or from the conviction that force is no longer a legitimate instrument or, more likely, from a combination of the two; an exaggerated view of the sources of strength of the Third World which is, in large measure, a function of the view that the developed states are in many respects highly vulnerable; a persuasion that growing interdependence is threatened by inequalities which, if allowed to persist, will result in generalized chaos or war; a commitment generally to reducing international inequalities, though without a clear idea of—or, for that matter, interest in—the effects a redistribution of wealth would have on the redistribution of world power; and, finally, a sense of guilt over a past for which we are now thought to be paying the inevitable price.

It is against this outlook that the response to OPEC actions may largely be understood. This response could scarcely condemn the ends presumably sought by the oil-producing states, for these are the very ends (interdependence, equality, development) to which Western liberals have long been committed. It may of course be argued that however unexceptionable the professed ends sought by OPEC states, the means employed to these ends are to be condemned. But such condemnation is less than persuasive if it is made simply on the ground that the present oil price is an administered price of a cartel. Quite apart from the consideration that pre-OPEC oil prices were also the administered prices of a cartel, the prices of a number of industrial goods developing states must import are, in effect, administered prices. If the OPEC oil price today were one-third its actual price, it is doubtful that much weight would be given to the fact that the price is administered by an oil-producer cartel. It is very late in the day for Western liberals to object to price-fixing simply because it is undertaken by states. Equally, it is very late to object to international transfers of wealth which result from state action when the need for a positive role for the state in the form of aid-giving has long been taken for granted.

It is another matter to condemn the means to otherwise laudable—or, at the very least, unobjectionable—ends because of the effects these means have on others. Although OPEC actions affect both the rich and the poor, it remains the case that the effects are very different. The rich, *if* they are lucky, may only be made marginally poorer. The outlook for the poor is of a different order. Suppose, however, that the major OPEC states were to show an unexpected degree of wisdom and self-restraint and to offer the poor states a concessional price for oil. Suppose, further, that the Arab oil producers decided to share a very substantial portion of their huge revenues with their Arab brothers and to grant large loans on soft terms to predominantly Muslim countries. In these circumstances, what petrodollars might remain for recycling in the West would be modest and of manageable proportion. Indeed, the price of oil levied on the developed-country importers might be markedly raised. What would the objection be, then, to the actions of the oil exporters? Clearly, objection would have to be taken simply to the sheer magnitude of the transfer of resources involved. Yet this would prove no easy case for Western liberals to make. Though perhaps still objecting to the means, their objection would seem almost trivial when set alongside the approved ends.

Since these circumstances do not obtain, those committed to the new egalitarianism are saved from having to face the consequences of their commitment. The point remains that the oil crisis is the clearest indication we have to date of the way the new egalitarianism may be expected to work if given free rein. It is not easy, however, to see it being given free rein in the future. A political-moral outlook that once proved not only relatively costless but congenial to our interests is bound to be challenged once it is apparent that if acted upon the result will mean a world over which we will have decreasing control at increasing cost. For if a large portion of Western liberal elites finds no more difficulty in distinguishing between the United States and Bangladesh than it does between California and Mississippi, it is safe to say that the general public

continues to find a great deal of difficulty and that democratic governments will continue to prove responsive to the distinction the public draws between its collective welfare and the welfare of those outside the state.

There are even reasons for believing that this distinction may be drawn more sharply in the future than in the recent past. One reason, paradoxically enough, is the growing demand for greater equality within many of the developed states. That in America this demand may be expected to mount in intensity is forecast alike by champions and critics of equality.* Yet a more egalitarian America need not mean a greater willingness to reduce global inequalities of wealth, and this all the more so to the extent that egalitarianism takes place within the cultural and value setting of "traditional" America.† In these circumstances, a case may be made for an America that shows no more, and perhaps even less, disposition than today to concern itself with poverty abroad. We may expect that those experiencing improved material well-being will, despite their improvement, insist upon defining "needs" in terms of "wants." This being so, the demands for further material improvement are, if anything, likely to increase. These considerations, moreover, are only underlined by the prospect that industrial growth within the developed countries may decline in the years ahead, however modestly. For even a modest slowdown in industrial growth will intensify the problem of equality for domestic societies whose social stability is so centrally dependent upon economic expansion.

In retrospect, the present concern over reducing disparities of wealth among the developed and underdeveloped nations may yet appear not as the beginning of a new era but as a brief interlude that is followed by a restoration of attitudes not essentially dissimilar from those which preceded it. This is not to say that traditional patterns of inequality will be or should be restored. It is to say that the claims of the new egalitarianism will either be moderated or we will have a period which by comparison will make the postwar period seem almost benign.

* For the former, see Herbert J. Gans, *More Equality*. For the latter, Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*. Gans writes (p. xii) that "more equality must come because Americans favor it and because America cannot function in the long run without more equality." Bell finds (p. 425) the redefinition of equality—from equality of opportunity to equality of result—"the central value problem of post-industrial society."

† As Herbert J. Gans is so persuaded. He writes that egalitarianism in the future America "will not be based on altruism," that "it will be individualistic," and that "it does not presuppose that people are ready to stop competing for material or nonmaterial gain." *More Equality*, pp. xvi, 25.

All That Glitters Is Not Guilt

THE INEQUALITY OF NATIONS. By Robert W. Tucker. Basic Books. 214 pp. $10.95

By DANIEL YERGIN

WHEN THE IDEA of the "haves" and the "have-nots" first was clearly stated in the 1930s, the "haves" were the United States, France, and Britain, and the "have-nots" limited to Germany, Japan, and Italy. It was a decidedly European-centered view, but, at the time, the political world was centered in Europe. Then came World War II and then decolonization.

By now, the "have-nots" of the 1930s have joined the "haves" of the 1970s, and the real split today is usually described in geographic terms, between the North and the South, that is, between the developed and the developing nations—while the Soviet bloc rather stands aside.

According to what by now has become the conventional wisdom in both North and South, this split requires the construction of a new international order, one in which the new nations of the South will have much greater say. In the industrial democracies of the North, the dominant voice has become that of the "accommodationists," who clearly make such a case. Indeed, so strong has this wisdom become that some spokesmen for the Carter Administration will say that the "global issues" have become even more important than our relations with the Soviet Union.

Less articulate, for the most part, have been the "rejectionists," those who see no particular reason for the new order, and even less reason why we should rush to cooperate in constructing it.

Now there is a most effective rebuttal to the accommodationists, in the form of this slim volume by Robert W. Tucker, a political scientist at Johns Hopkins who has proved a skilled lacerater of conventional wisdom. Several years ago, he wrote an equally short book criticizing the Vietnam War on the very reasonable grounds that a much too expansive doctrine of national security was at the basis of the American involvement.

His new book, though dense and austere and uncompromising both in style and point of view, is one of the most

(Continued on page F3)

DANIEL YERGIN, the author of *Shattered Peace: the Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*,, is on the faculty of Harvard University.



UNCERTAIN GREATNESS: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. By Roger Morris. Harper & Row. 312 pp. $10.95

By DON OBERDORFER

IT WAS BOUND to happen. One of Henry Kissinger's former aides has marshalled his ammunition, taken aim and opened fire. The erstwhile wizard of diplomacy is vulnerable to those behind the curtain who saw the methods of his mastery and knew of his abundant secret

DON OBERDORFER is a reporter for the national staff of The Washington Post.

dealings,
Morris'
ger with
force of
great m
Kissinge
der. In a
shots fin
A forc
Johnson
tained h
three Ki
staff sho
It was a
ously, i
who sai
Morris t
himself

The Inequality of Nations

(Continued from page F1)

important and penetrating contributions to the discussion about what should U.S. policy be toward the Third World. Indeed, it will do much to crystallize the issues in the debate.

Tucker's starting point is the character of international politics—that by nature, the international community is an anarchic world, in which the inequality and hierarchy of states is inevitable. States are not people living under a constitution that grants them equal rights. Rather, they are inherently different. Some have longer coastlines than others, some more oil, some more power.

The current international order, shaped and maintained to a considerable degree by the United States, is now under sustained attack.

But one of Tucker's most central points is that while the calls for a new order may be similar, the impulses in the First World and the Third World are very different.

The Third World countries are *not* arguing that the nation is *not* the basis of international politics. Indeed, they are emphasizing the role of the state. *Their* aim is to shift power to *themselves*. This impulse Tucker labels the "new egalitarianism." There is nothing surprising in the fact that the Third World countries should seek greater power, for that is what nations usually seek.

More startling is the second category —what he calls a "new political sensibility" among liberal elites in the West. This sensibility—and the very word suggests an element of romanticism—is motivated, he argues, by a sense of guilt, an unhappiness with their own societies, and by a sense of shared humanity no less expansive than the once unchallenged doctrine of national security.

Tucker is not arguing that "shared humanity" should be denied. "What is novel," he says, "is the insistence that men now act upon this assumption in a manner they have not acted in the past, that they draw positive duties of distributive justice from it that they had not heretofore drawn, and that they give a scope to those duties they have never before been willing to give. The simple, though decisive, claim of the new political sensibility is that we no longer differentiate, *for certain purposes*, between fellow citizens and mankind."

This sensibility is Tucker's real target. He finds little real basis for the Westerners' sense of guilt toward the Third World, or for the assumption that Third World nations can claim some special moral superiority. The sensibility is based, he writes, "upon a mistaken—at the very least, undemonstrated—view of what self-interest requires in today's world. It does not require that the rich must make concessions to the poor because in a confrontation with the poor the rich are, by virtue of their riches, vulnerable in a way the poor are not. The power of the poor that has been made so much of in recent years is either largely a piece of romantic nonsense or—more likely—a reflection of an underlying, if largely unexpressed, conviction that the patrimony of the developed and capitalist states is, after all, hardly worth defending—either because it was largely achieved through the exploitation of others . . . or because the affluence that has been created is itself a form of corruption."

Further, he suggests, this sensibility is based upon a second delusion, a mistaken belief that the state's power is being eroded. Rather the new egalitarians emphasize the key role of the state.

But these two points of view have converged to make heavy demands upon the Western world, and the inability or reluctance of the West to resist them leaves Tucker most gloomy. He foresees a new international order not more stable or just or humane, but even more unstable and dangerous, because there will be such a sharp disjunction between power and force.

This "rejectionist" case, so effectively expressed here, can obviously be criticized in turn. Perhaps Tucker has overstated the challenge. Maybe the talk of a "new world order" is only a game; what is really involved is not much more than a tinkering with tariffs and a stabilizing of export prices. Perhaps.

At a deeper level, a critic could say that Tucker is really rejecting the force of industrialization as it spreads around the world. After all, once upon a time, Britain was the world's only industrial power. The difficulties encountered in trying to accommodate other emerging industrial powers, most clearly Germany, helped precipitate the two world wars. That analogy *might* suggest an accommodationist course.

But Tucker's basic question cannot be evaded. Why? Why give away so readily the power? Will we be better off, or will the anarchic international world become even more unpleasantly anarchic? This deeply pessimistic book is asking those in the West to avoid the easy course of slogans and vast, vague appeals, and rather to think clearly about what we would do and for what purpose.

I

WILL INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY become increasingly egalitarian? Are we only at the beginning of a movement toward greater equality that will eventually carry us to the international welfare society many now envisage? Or are there rather sharp limits to the equality we can project, even in principle, without assuming a qualitative transformation of the international system?

These questions cannot be usefully addressed without reminding ourselves of the sources of inequality in international society. The inequality of states stems in the first instance from their varying natural endowments. In a reversal of Rousseau's claim respecting individuals, we may say that political collectives are born unequal and that in consequence of their different natural endowments they are destined to remain unequal. These "natural" inequalities, it is true, have not given rise to uniform consequences; they have not determined in unvarying manner the character of the international hierarchy. The degree to which physical extent, geographic position, natural resources, and population determine collective inequalities of power and status has varied considerably. This is so because the significance of these characteristics depends upon the techniques available in a given period for exploiting them and, of course, upon a collective's capacity and will for doing so. Still, there are limits beyond which natural inequalities cannot be compensated for by states that share the same civilization and a roughly comparable level of devel-

opment. This has been particularly true of states that have shared industrial civilization.

By far the most striking inequalities that have marked the international system have been those resulting from unevenness of socioeconomic development. It was this unevenness of development that by the late nineteenth century gave rise to disparities of power that had never before been reached yet once reached were to prove shortlived. There are no persuasive reasons for believing that in time inequalities resulting from unevenness of development cannot be narrowed sufficiently to dispel the special sense—and all too often the reality—of vulnerability stemming from the juxtaposition of developed and undeveloped. If an inability to participate in industrial civilization is presently seen by the elites of most of the new states as the critical manifestation of inequality, it is one that will eventually be altered. The attitudes, motivations, and institutions that are so important in determining material progress cannot be acquired overnight. But they can be acquired by elites intent upon achieving a material progress that will insure their recognition as equal participants in industrial civilization.

To what extent are inequalities consequent upon unevenness of development imposed by the international system? And what is the character of these external constraints? These questions have long been a source of controversy. Today, they appear to elicit more controversy than ever. Nor is this surprising, given the failure of reality to conform to the optimistic projections of rapid growth in the Third World that were commonplace until the middle 1960s. Disappointment over the outcome of these earlier projections gave unexpected popularity and considerable persuasiveness to radical analyses of the causes of underdevelopment that stressed the external constraints on development imposed by a capitalist world economy. At the same time, disappointment over the failure of earlier growth projections prompted many Western observers to shift the emphasis they had once placed on the internal impediments to development. Although the record of the developing countries was by no means uniformly poor, it could easily and most reasonably be read to mean that internal obstacles to development—not least of all, those rooted in cultural patterns—would prove much more resistant than had been supposed. But this conclusion was, for a variety of reasons, quite unpalatable. Unwilling to accept the view that the principal constraints on development were still to be found within the backward countries themselves, rather than in the relationships between the latter and the developed states, Western liberals—when not emphasizing population growth—came increasingly to focus their criticism on an international economic system held to exacerbate the plight of the underdeveloped. To these critics, the system could nevertheless be corrected by rather modest reforms that would remove the principal external constraints on development. To the radical critic, the constraints a capitalist world economy places on the developing countries could be removed only with the virtual disappearance of this economy.

There is no need here to review the radical critique. What is necessary to emphasize in the present context is simply the insistence of this critique that a global capitalist economy must be held primarily responsible for the inequalities resulting from unevenness of development. Are these inequalities distinctive to capitalism, however, or would most of them form a part of any international system other than one in which the component units were autarchic (and, accordingly, formed no system at all in the strict sense)? The corollary of the radical thesis that an international capitalist system inevitably produces and sustains the inequalities we find in the present system is that an international economy dominated by socialist states would be free of these inequalities.

The basis for this position is familiar ground. It is contended that the characteristics distinguishing a global capitalist economy would not characterize an international economy dominated by socialist states. Thus the inequalities consequent upon foreign investment would be absent from the latter system. So, too, the inequalities attending trade relations between developed and developing economies would disappear. More generally, and by definition, the needs presumably inherent in and distinctive to capitalist economies—for

markets abroad to compensate for inadequate demand at home and for investment outlets to absorb surplus capital—would not characterize an international system presided over by socialist states.

But even if the alleged basic drives of capitalist systems are accepted without question, it is not apparent why wide disparities in development would not also mark a world economy dominated by socialist states. Unless we assume that virtually all significant inequalities due to unevenness of development are the result of external constraints generated and maintained by capitalist systems—a patently absurd assumption—inequalities resulting from internal constraints will persist in a largely socialist system as well. At least they may be expected to persist unless the then-dominant states in the international system attempt to facilitate their disappearance by intervening in the domestic affairs of developing countries. Though ostensibly undertaken for "progressive" ends, such intervention would still be undertaken against the will of governments and very likely of peoples. It may be argued that in an international system dominated by socialist states interventions of this sort would not occur because the circumstances that might occasion intervention would not arise. But there is no more guarantee of this than there is that socialist governments will not arise and persist among developing countries in the present system.

Although there will be differences in the structure of inequality characterizing a system dominated by socialist states, these differences will not be such as to do away with unevenness of development. For an indefinite period, then, it is only reasonable to expect that this form of inequality will persist. This being so, is it also reasonable to expect that all of the consequences presently attendant upon this form of inequality will disappear? Obviously, some will disappear. It is not at all apparent, however, that others will do so. Thus developed states, even though socialist, will still have need to insure access to vital raw materials. The consequences of that need should not prove markedly different from today, unless it is assumed that socialist states would not only consume far less raw materials than capitalist states but, much more importantly, that they would

pay a "just" price for these imports rather than a price determined by the market.* The former assumption, even if it is granted, would not necessarily result in the improvement of the position of the suppliers of raw materials to developing countries. On the contrary, it might well worsen their position. The latter assumption presupposes, in effect, the disappearance of the market. But the market determination of the prices of primary goods—indeed, of all goods exchanged—will not disappear simply becuse the international system is dominated by socialist states. What will disappear is the private entrepreneur, his place being taken by the state. A market economy of sorts will nevertheless persist as long as the state system itself persists. If the exchanges between advanced and backward economies are regarded as unequal, largely because of unevenness of development, these exchanges will be unequal whether undertaken within the context of a capitalist or socialist international economy. The difference will be that whereas exchanges occurring within a capitalist international economy may only indirectly involve state interests and power, exchanges occurring within a global economy dominated by socialist states will of necessity directly involve state interests and power.

A predominantly socialist international system would still be a system marked by great inequalities. For an indefinite period it would be a system made up of the rich and the poor. Moreover, to the inequalities consequent upon unevenness of development there would also remain inequalities of wealth and power resulting from varying natural endowments. What are the grounds for believing that this system, in contrast to a capitalist dominated system, would drastically reduce present international inequalities of wealth and power? It will not do to answer by evoking the egalitarian ideal of socialism. For the question is not addressed to the ideal nature of socialism but to the manner in which a socialist society may in fact be expected to behave toward other societies, whether socialist or not. Is it unrea-

* A "just" price must be taken here to mean a price that will appear just to both consumers and producers. A price considered just by producers may appear otherwise to consumers, even socialist consumers dealing with socialist producers.

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2

sonable to expect that as long as the international system persists, states—socialist states included—will continue to draw a distinction between their own welfare and the welfare of others? Whether socialist governments will draw a sharp distinction between the welfare of their own and the welfare of others cannot be made to depend upon the extent to which these governments achieve "real" democracy in contrast to the "formal" democracy of liberal-capitalist societies. The responsiveness of governments to the will of the governed tells us nothing about the character of that will. If the governed feel little sense of obligation to those outside the state, a government responsive to the will of the governed has no choice but to act accordingly.

It may be argued that a socialist society cannot act justly at home while acting unjustly abroad, that it cannot be egalitarian in its domestic life while remaining largely indifferent to a world divided between rich and poor. Yet as long as men's sympathy—their capacity for identification—remains bounded by the collective to which they belong, there is every reason to expect that socialist societies as well will draw a distinction between the welfare of their own and the welfare of those to whom they have but a very limited sense of obligation. Nor is this all. The distinction between the (collective) self and others may be quite sharply drawn by socialist governments precisely because the latter will be committed to maintain as high a welfare standard for all as possible. Even if it is assumed that in an international system dominated by socialist states there will be fewer occasions for conflict, this is not to say that there will be no occasions. The causes for conflict between states might diminish, but the remaining causes might still be very significant. Put in other terms, the threshold for conflict might be higher in the new system than in the old. Still, once reached, the resulting conflicts might prove even more serious.

There is, moreover, no reason to restrict the conflicts that may arise in the new system to those rooted in inequalities of income and wealth. There will surely be other inequalities even in a predominantly socialist state system. Not all of these inequalities need pro-

vide the occasion for conflict, though some will. As long as the state system itself persists, inequalities of power are likely to constitute, as they have constituted in the past, the prime source of conflict. They are likely to do so not only because security will remain an important concern of governments but because even socialist states may be expected to aspire to influence their external environment, however well-intentioned and progressive their aspirations may be. Given a world that will continue to be marked by great disparities of wealth and power, the occasions for exercising such influence will not be lacking.

A radical analysis refuses to acknowledge these prospects attending a change from a capitalist- to a socialist-dominated international system. It refuses to do so because it assumes that a "humane and democratic" socialism will lead to the transformation of men, to a new beginning in history. That new beginning would remove the constraints of a system that perpetuates unevenness of development. "A socialist transformation of the advanced west," one expression of this view reads, "would not only open to its own peoples the road to unprecedented economic, social and cultural progress, it would at the same time enable the peoples of the underdeveloped countries to overcome rapidly their present condition of poverty and stagnation." * But it is not simply the removal of external constraints that would hold out this prospect for poor countries. Instead, it is the promise that with "a socialist transformation" there would no longer be a significant distinction drawn by the materially favored between their welfare and the welfare of the less favored. The inequalities attending great disparities in development would be rapidly overcome not by—certainly, not primarily by—the abandonment of a system that leaves the disfavored largely to their own devices, even when not inhibiting their progress, but by the emergence of a system in which men's identification with a discrete collective either has disappeared or no longer constitutes a significant limit to the concern felt for those beyond the collective. A socialist transformation of the in-

* Paul A. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957), p. 250.

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2

ternational system would quickly redress the inequalities arising from unevenness of development to the same extent that this transformation in turn heralded the transformation—in effect, the demise—of the international system itself. It is not in an international system dominated by socialist states, but in a transformation of this system into a cohesive society of global compass, that men's sense of sympathy would, at long last, know no boundaries. In the absence of this utopia, the significance of the external constraints placed on development must be found primarily in the state system itself, rather than in the particular social structure of states that dominate this system.

The gradual attenuation of inequalities consequent upon unevenness of development would not alter the collective inequalities of wealth and power that persist among states sharing, nevertheless, a roughly comparable level of material advancement. The latter inequalities are inherent in the state system; they could be removed only by the wholesale recasting of states (so as to make them approximately equal) or by the transformation of international society. Inequalities of wealth and power may be reduced, but disparities of size alone guarantee the persistence of inequalities in collective wealth and power.

A clear distinction must be drawn, then, between inequalities rooted in unevenness of development and inequalities rooted in the very nature of the international system. Similarly, a clear distinction must be drawn between the demand to reduce collective disparities of wealth and power and the demand to alter the consequences such disparities have regularly implied in the past.* The challenge to inequality posed by the new states is most clearly directed against

* These consequences, it is necessary to recall, were such as to render meaningless almost any conception of equality. Thus E. H. Carr's trenchant conclusion on equality in the traditional system: ". . . If we assume that equality of rights or privileges means proportionate, not absolute, equality, we are little advanced so long as there is no recognized criterion for determining the proportion. Nor would even this help us much. The trouble is not that Guatemala's rights and privileges are only proportionately, not absolutely, equal to those of the United States, but that such rights and privileges as Guatemala has are enjoyed only by the good-will of the United States" (*The Twenty Years Crisis* [London: Macmillan, 1939], p. 166).

inequalities, whether real or imagined, rooted in unevenness of development. In lesser degree is it directed against collective disparities per se of wealth and power. Least of all is this challenge directed against the consequences brought about by disparities per se of wealth and power in the traditional system.

Indeed, it may be doubted whether the new egalitarianism is seriously interested at all in altering the consequences that have followed from inequalities inherent in the state system. For these consequences could be substantially changed only by the imposition of severe limitations upon the state's claim to sovereign independence. Yet, as we have repeatedly observed, the new states have clearly placed themselves against such limitations. It is not basic structural change in the system that they seek but a changed position within a system whose structure remains essentially unchanged.* Now as in the past, this system is to be characterized by the absence of effective collective procedures. Accordingly, now as in the past, this system is to be characterized by the "right" of the state to determine when its legitimate interests are threatened or violated and to employ such measures as it may deem necessary to vindicate those interests.

Yet it is the primordial institution of self-help that, along with the "natural" inequalities of states, guarantees that the international system will remain highly oligarchical. The consequences that have so regularly followed from natural inequalities may be sharply altered only if the manner in which these inequalities are employed and the uses to which they may be put by states are also altered. It is the institution of self-help that must be changed if international society is to become increasingly egalitarian. But whereas the decline of self-

* Although the meaning given to the term "structure" should be apparent from the discussion in the text, it may be useful to state explicitly that structure denotes here the manner in which power is organized and applied. The distribution, or pattern of distribution, of power, though of obvious significance, is not critical for the determination of structure. Thus the structure of the international system is essentially determined by the fact that the organization and application of power inheres primarily in the state and not in institutions independent of the state. Should that condition change, or even substantially alter, the structure would change and the system would undergo transformation. The same cannot be said, however, of shifts in the distribution of power among states, though such shifts are the epochal events of international relations.

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2

help would signal a markedly more egalitarian international society, it would not necessarily promise a more *orderly* one. The erosion of self-help need not give rise to effective collective procedures. Presumably it would not do so in the absence of what would be the virtual transformation of international society. Nor need the erosion of self-help by attended by those conditions generally providing a stable order within domestic society. In the absence of those conditions that give cohesiveness to domestic society, and that permit order without tyranny, the decline of self-help may only bring increased disorder. For if it is the institution of self-help that makes the "order" of international society difficult to distinguish from anarchy, it is also this institution—together with the natural inequalities of states—that gives international society what order it does possess. The hierarchical character of this society is the indispensable precondition for an order of sorts, defective though that order may be. A more egalitarian international society, though one that continues to lack the institutions characteristic of civil society, also promises to be a more disorderly one than the international society we have generally experienced in the past.*

II

If the above considerations are accepted, it will be apparent that an international system holding the promise of reasonable order and stability can become more egalitarian only within rather closely circumscribed limits. Those who assume otherwise, and refuse to place virtually any limits on the extent to which the challenge to inequality

* Kenneth Waltz reminds us of the virtues of inequality by noting that: "In an economy, in a polity, or in the world at large, extreme equality is associated with instability. . . . The presence of social and economic groups, which inevitably will not all be equal, makes for less volatility in society. . . . The inequality of states, though not a guarantee of international stability, at least makes stability possible" ("International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of World Power," *Journal of International Affairs* 21 [1967]: 224).

may ultimately be carried, must also assume something tantamount to the transformation of the international system. If collective disparities of wealth and power, together with the consequences these disparities have had, are no longer to determine the structure of the international system and, in consequence, the limits to equality, it is because the system itself will have been transcended.

Thus to the question, will the international system become increasingly egalitarian, one response is to alter the very sense of the question by projecting a world in which this system will be qualitatively transformed. This is the inescapable meaning of the parallel drawn between the growth of equality within the domestic societies of the West and the greater society of states. If "the world community is bound to become a welfare community, just as the nation state became a welfare state," * it will become so only if the state no longer occupies the role it does today. This is the meaning of those who speak of loyalties to parochial national interests becoming steadily displaced by loyalties to planetary interests, just as it is the meaning of those who find it morally inconsistent to war on poverty at home while remaining passive and indifferent to its depredations abroad. It is not the growing equality of *states* that is foreshadowed by this view but the growing equality of *individuals*. The state may serve—at least, for an interim period—as one institution among others to effect this growing equality of individuals. But it will no longer serve as the principal, let alone the exclusive, guardian of the interests of the human beings who comprise it. As long as it does, there can be no "international welfare community" that is relevant to individuals in a sense analogous to national welfare communities. Nor does this conclusion follow from the inequalities of states. It would hold true whatever the disparities among states, since it is not so much these disparities as it is the continued role of the state in men's lives that precludes the emergence of a world community, welfare or otherwise.

The view that finds a parallel between the growth of equality

* Cf. p. 56.

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2

within domestic societies and international society does not address itself to the fundamental dilemma of a society of states in which the progression of equality is nevertheless marked by the absence of the elementary conditions that have attended, and made possible, the progression of equality within civil society. Since that dilemma remains unresolved, it is not surprising that such equality as exists today in international society remains a structure largely without a foundation. It is only by assuming that this dilemma has been resolved, or very nearly so, that the parallel drawn between the development of equality in the national and international community appears at all plausible. And it is only by assuming that the international system has already been transformed, or very nearly so, that the projection of an increasingly egalitarian global community appears at all plausible.*

A more "moderate" and representative view of the changing character of the international system gives greater plausibility to the prospect of an increasingly egalitarian system, if only because it does *not* project the imminent transformation of the system. This view ac-

* The matter is otherwise for those who do not share this sanguine view of the contemporary world, but who are nevertheless persuaded that we are moving toward an international welfare community of sorts. Thus it is one of the difficulties of Julius Stone's position that whereas he is hopeful with respect to the movement toward achieving a global welfare commitment, undergirded by a new sense of "international economic justice," he does not see this change serving "as a sufficient lever for transforming the international 'system' " ("Approaches to the Notion of International Justice," in *Future of International Legal Order, vol. 1*, Falk and Black, eds. [Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1969], pp. 459–60). By this he presumably means that we must look forward not only to the persistence of the paramount role of the state in men's lives but, more to the point, to the persistence of the problem of regulating the use of coercion in state relations. Yet the critical question that arises, then, is this: what are the grounds for believing that although the system will persist, men and states will nevertheless acknowledge a duty toward one another that has only recently been acknowledged within domestic societies (and by no means within all)? The question can be put aside by those who are persuaded that the international system has already changed, at least with respect to the use of force, and that men's loyalties are already transcending the state. Stone clearly does not share this view. It is for this reason that his optimism with respect to an emergent enclave of "international economic justice" is not easily reconciled with his continued skepticism over the prospects for transforming the international system. If that enclave were really to be won, it would signal, in all probability, a degree of solidarity and willingness to sacrifice that in turn would herald the transformation of the system.

knowledges that for the foreseeable future we are destined to live in a world where the principal actors will remain states intent on preserving as much of their traditional independence of action as is possible. This being so, the international system will remain one characterized by self-help, just as the inequalities that will remain of primary importance to the stability of the system will be collective inequalities.

But if the vision of an imminent transformation of international society is set aside, it is clearly not in this view set aside in favor of an "unchanging" society of states. Whereas an international welfare order, with all that this must imply, forms little more than a distant aspiration, the traditional system nevertheless represents a now-abandoned past. Self-help persists in the absence of effective collective procedures, but the scope and significance of self-help, so central to the traditional system, are being steadily and substantially altered. The system remains hierarchical, yet the hierarchy no longer has the salience and the solidity it once had. Although the major states are still the most important repositories of power, the emergence of many new actors—national, transnational, international, and private—no longer permits the state the concentration of power the traditional system permitted.

Nor does this steady diffusion of power permit states, even the major states, to pursue a strategy of independence without paying an ever greater, and even now for most a near prohibitive, price. Instead, the present system increasingly compels states to form relationships of mutual dependence that, once entered into, can normally be broken only at exorbitant cost. These relationships of interdependence, moreover, are for the most part not susceptible to the arbitrament of force. Though interdependencies may and do breed conflicts of interest, the threat or use of force to resolve these conflicts is likely to prove more injurious to the user than non-forcible means (even if the latter should frequently prove quite limited in their effectiveness). Thus the sanctions of the traditional system, the principal expression of which was forcible self-help, no longer respond to the "logic" of the present system. Instead, novel methods of conflict resolution are called for that will respond to a

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2

system in which the actors are not only many but of diverse character and the relationships they entertain are at once more numerous, complex, and "compromising" of the state's former independence of action than were the relationships characterizing the traditional system.*

What are we to make of this now familiar view? Does it suggest a system that remains essentially the same despite its many changes? Or does it suggest, notwithstanding its apparent moderation when compared with the view projecting a clear and imminent transformation of international society, that the changes summarized above form the basis for what is likely to prove, after all, a transformation of sorts? The answer is unclear, if only because the view itself is unclear in many respects. Then, too, its expression is regularly attended by qualifications that, if taken seriously, reduce what are initially boldly put forth as radical changes to what are, in the end, quite modest ones. What, for example, are we to make of assertions that although in the "new" system physical coercion has eroded dramatically, if even a very few instances of serious military coercion nevertheless occur the result might well be a return to the traditional system?† Is it particularly enlightening, to take another example, to be told that although the new system implies a new kind of structure, the nature of this structure is neither readily apparent nor, for that matter, need it become so in the foreseeable future?‡

* In a vast literature, Stanley Hoffmann has perhaps best articulated the view summarized above. Cf. "Notes on the Elusiveness of Power," *International Journal* 30: (Spring 1975): 183–206.

† (Seyom Brown, "The Changing Essence of Power," *Foreign Affairs* 51 [January 1973]: 294). According to this view, we must act in accordance with the new imperative of pacific interdependence or else we "engender a retrogressive chain-reaction of coercive diplomacy" (p. 294).

‡ Thus Stanley Hoffmann, though asserting that "many more actors, a new type of game [interdependence], also brings with them a new kind of structure," does not delineate the character of the new structure. Instead, he succeeds in increasing skepticism over whether a new structure will emerge to replace the old. "Interdependence may mean a *basic* or ultimate solidarity, but it puts no permanent premium on 'constructive' cooperation. It does not eliminate competition, precisely because the key questions of politics (who commands, who benefits) have not ceased being asked. The fluidity of games without any single minute of truth or clear cut boundaries, played by many players, over many issues allows for multiple strategies" ("Notes on Elusiveness of Power," p. 195). But this is not the description of a new kind of structure. It is, rather, an indication of the absence of any clearly delineated structure.

The Future of Inequality

Still, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that whatever the ambiguities and qualifications attending the more moderate view of a changing international system, it does project a transformation of sorts. An international system in which national force has become increasingly counterproductive to its users, in which mutual dependencies increasingly limit the freedom of action even of great states, and in which new actors increasingly challenge the once preeminent position of the state may nevertheless be characterized as only a change in degree, not in kind. The characterization is unavoidably suspect, however, if the various changes described are even approximately correct. At the very least, these changes suggest that for the time being we have entered a *systeme mixte:* one that is roughly equidistant from the world we have known and a new world, a new world as yet dimly perceived perhaps but one promising to be radically different from the world of the past. And if the egalitarian consequences of this *systeme mixte* are also difficult to discern, it is apparent that these consequences cannot be circumscribed by the limits imposed by the traditional system. At the very least, the decline in the significance of the state will be attended by the decline in the significance of collective inequalities of wealth and power.

Even a "moderate" transformation of the international system promises, then, a markedly more egalitarian system. It also promises a less orderly system. For the dominant characteristic of the new system will be a decline of power, a decline for which such phrases as the "changing essence" or the "elusiveness" of power are but elegant euphemisms. Power will presumably decline because its heretofore principal form will be increasingly at a discount. At the same time, there is no persuasive reason to believe that economic power will fill the gap left by military power. In some measure, it may do so. But unless the experience of the past proves largely irrelevant to projections of the future, we may expect a system in which the once powerful exercise markedly less control and influence, whether over "others" or over the "system" as a whole.*

* In analyzing the American position within an increasingly interdependent system, Joseph S. Nye distinguishes between the power we may still exercise over "others" and the "erosion of our power to control outcomes in the international sys-

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2

The moderate transformation promises a less orderly system not only because the once dominant form of power will presumably decline, leaving no equivalent substitute, but also because its decline will be attended by the many conflicts of interest that normally mark the relations of states, conflicts that a growing interdependence does not diminish but, if anything, increases. Interdependence increases the potential for conflicts in that it renders the interests of each increasingly vulnerable to the actions of others (though, of course, in varying degree), while failing to provide institutions endowed with sufficient legitimacy to adjudicate effectively between conflicting interests by reference to some larger common good.* Interdependence does not insure that mutually dependent units, because of their mutual dependence, will agree upon a common good. On the contrary, it may only place in sharper relief divergent claims to justice and, in the process, exacerbate these claims while failing to provide the means for resolving them. For the growth of interdependence will be attended by increased awareness among the unequal of their condition. This increased awareness is not likely to be appeased by the argument that when among mutually dependent units all may gain from their mutual dependency all must have, despite their competitiveness and inequality of gain, a transcendent interest in preserving the web of interdependency. The condition of "positive interdependence" is precisely the condition that has so regularly led to revolutionary challenge to social orders marked by great inequalities. It has done so because the gains of the still disadvantaged, though perhaps

tem as a whole. The main reason is that the system itself has become more complex. There are more issues, more actors, and less hierarchy. We still have leverage over others, but we have far less leverage over the whole system" ("Independence and Interdependence," *Foreign Policy* 22 [Spring 1976]: 145). The distinction is not an easy one to grasp. Less power over the system has normally been synonymous with less power over others. What appears to be at the bottom of this distinction is simply the conviction that the emerging system of interdependence will prove refractory to the hierarchical ordering of the past. When hierarchy decreases, equality must increase.

* The point is acknowledged by many who remain moderately optimistic over the prospects held out by interdependence. Raymond Vernon writes: "So far as the international economy is concerned, nowhere can one see on the horizon a set of institutions with the legitimacy and power capable of speaking and acting for the collective interests of mankind" ("The Distribution of Power," *Daedalus* 104 [Fall 1975]: 256).

quite substantial by previous standards, create expectations that the principal beneficiaries of a social order are unable or unwilling to satisfy.

In the instant case, moreover, there is evidently no real prospect that an "order of interdependence" will effect a substantial equalization of material conditions. At least, there is no real prospect of this for several generations. The meaning that some read into interdependence may encourage expectations of substantial equalization of material conditions, but these expectations, to the extent that they depend upon interdependence, will remain no more than that. What may be expected is that the resentments and conflicting interests that result from present inequalities of wealth and power will simply go largely unresolved in a system marked by the progressive erosion of the principal traditional institution of order yet without new institutions capable of filling the void.

Thus if the visionaries who see the imminent and radical transformation of the international system hold out the promise of utopia, those who project a "moderate" transformation of the system hold out the promise of growing disorder. The principal basis for order in the traditional system will atrophy. Yet the conflicts that mark the present system will grow, if only because to the conflicts that have always marked the international system must now be added those arising from interdependence as well as from the proliferating demands for an ever greater measure of collective equality. Force will no longer be employed to promote or sustain the formal inequalities of status that characterized the traditional system. At the same time, force will not be employed to promote the realization of collective personality in substantive terms. To achieve the latter, reliance will be placed largely on the politics of interdependence, though the latter is no more constitutive of justice than it is of order. Instead, the politics of interdependence requires, if it is not to degenerate into chaos, a minimal consensus on the principles of distributive justice that will determine the outcomes of the games of interdependence. That consensus, however, is nowhere in sight.

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2

III

It is only on a superficial reading of the challenge to inequality posed by the new states that this challenge is seen to herald a transformation of the international system. The demand for a new and more equitable international order is not to be confused with a change of the system. Instead, it is a demand for a changed position within a system whose essential structure is not only taken for granted but, if anything, highly desired. The outlook of the new states is, with few exceptions, nothing so much as the outlook of those who wish to preserve a system while securing a more independent and advantageous role in its operation. The egalitarianism of the elites of the new states cannot be taken literally. It is not primarily directed against collective inequalities per se, just as it is not directed against the principal institution through which natural inequalities have always been expressed. Accordingly, it is not—and cannot be—directed against the hierarchical character per se of international society but against the particular hierarchical ordering that characterizes the present system.

In contrast to those who project a more egalitarian world by virtue of the transformation of the international system, the elites of the new states project on the whole a more egalitarian system than the present system but one that nevertheless remains unchanged in its essential structure. It remains unchanged because the role and importance of the state remain as central in the system of the future as they were in the system of the past. Indeed, the state is expected to take on an ever greater significance in the new international order. It will do so, if only because the state is looked upon almost everywhere as the principal architect and engineer of development. This is the case even where the conditions for rapid development appear quite favorable. It is all the more true where these conditions appear clearly unfavorable and change, if it is to come at all, must be imposed by governments upon apathetic and perhaps resistant populations. Even in the absence of other circumstances that contribute to the dominant

role of the state, and to an emphasis on collective values, the imperative of development is likely to insure that for the indefinite future the state will be regarded as *the* primary source of value in almost all of the developing countries. It is the enhancement of the collective's wealth and power—and status—that must be expected to take clear precedence over the cultivation of individual values.

Given this expectation, it is little more than rhetorical to ask whether the elites of the new states will retain a traditional view of the international system. The demand for a more equitable international system is in no way found to contradict an insistence upon the state's sovereign independence. In turn, the state's sovereign independence—the essence of its equality in both the old system and the "new"—is largely identified with the right of self-help to defend the collective's vital and, of course, legitimate interests. Those restraints on self-help the Southern states have nevertheless championed do not detract from this proposition, for such restraints are transparently designed to deprive the developed states of grounds for intervention against the developing countries and not to restrict the latter in the pursuit of their interests, even if this pursuit must be undertaken by forcible means. The position, common to all the new states, that measures—including forcible measures—of self-help are not illegitimate when taken to vindicate the principle of self-determination, or to liquidate the vestiges of colonialism (which may or may not be consonant with vindicating self-determination), is only the most notorious manifestation of an outlook that affords ample scope for the ancient pursuit of *raison d'état*. Nor, for that matter, is it only against the developed states that these principles may be invoked when interest so requires. They may prove equally useful, as experience has shown, in disputes—territorial and other—arising among the new states themselves.*

* The above remarks deserve at least brief elaboration. The possible conflict between vindicating the principle of self-determination and liquidating the vestiges of colonialism arises because what was originally a colonial arrangement may nevertheless come to conform to the wishes of the inhabitants (thus satisfying the principle of self-determination). Even if it should do so, it is regarded as illegitimate by the new states. Martin Wight notes that a limit to the right of self-determination "was that it

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2

A traditional outlook toward the means of statecraft extends as well to the ends for which a new order is sought. Clearly, the end common to the developing countries, whatever their size and natural endowments, is a greater measure of substantive independence, an end to be sought primarily through development. Beyond this, however, their aspirations may be expected to vary in roughly the same manner that the aspirations of states have varied in the past. The small states will entertain the aspirations small states have normally entertained: their security and independence will be given the modest definition that circumstances impose upon them. These states will constitute, as small states have usually constituted, the true egalitarians of the system. In the case of the large countries, by contrast,

---

should not perpetuate a colonial arrangement. Colonial arrangements were, *ex hypothesi*, illegitimate, even illegal" ("International Legitimacy," *International Relations* 4 [May 1972]: 20). If self-determination cannot be invoked in order to maintain "colonialism," then it was only right for Indonesia to seize Portuguese Timor in 1976 without waiting to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants. So, too, it is right for the non-aligned countries to call, as they insistently do, for the independence of Puerto Rico. The right of self-determination is also limited by the need to preserve the integrity of the new states. This need is expressed in the prevailing principle of international legitimacy which asserts the rights of territorial integrity and majority rule. "Territorial integrity" is identified with the boundaries of the state at the time of independence. "Majority rule" may be ascertained in a number of ways and need have little, if any, relation to democratic processes. In a survey of the behavior of the new states, Wight concludes: "The principle *cujus regio ejus religio* was restored in a secular form. The elite who held state power decided the political allegiance of all within their frontiers; the recusant individual might (if he were fortunate) be permitted to emigrate. Minorities had no rights, or only such rights as majorities cared to concede" (p. 14). The prevailing principle of international legitimacy is presently being tested in Africa. In the case of the Spanish (Western) Sahara, Spain turned over administration of the area to Morocco and Mauritania. With the Spanish departure, however, a liberation movement (Polisario) arose that was backed by Algeria. In justifying their attempt to take over the area, despite the wishes of the inhabitants, Morocco and Mauritania advanced the ingenious argument that recognition of liberation fronts should be extended (in this case, by the Organization of African Unity) only to groups fighting colonial powers, which, by definition, Morocco and Mauritania could not be. The Algerians, on the other hand, have reminded the O.A.U. that if its commitment to the principle of respecting the borders of former colonies should be cast aside in this instance, a dangerous precedent affecting the fate of all African countries would be set. A similar dispute is in progress between Ethiopia and Somalia over the French territory of Afars and Issas on the Horn of Africa. In these and other instances, we find that contemporary principles of international legitimacy afford ample scope for justifying forcible self-help among the new states, despite the norms of the United Nations Charter.

security and independence will take the same protean qualities that large states have given their security and independence in the past. There is no persuasive reason for assuming that the progressive extension of the collective self, which has formed part of the "natural history" of large states, will not similarly characterize the statecraft of the larger among the developing countries. The "equality" the larger and stronger may be expected to seek is the equality the larger and stronger have always sought. It is not the end of hierarchy but the emergence of a new hierarchy that may be projected in the form—initially, at least—of regional hegemonies.

There are many observers, perhaps a majority, who disagree with this summary analysis of the nature and ends of the contemporary challenge to international inequality. But even among those who do not seriously dissent from the analysis there is considerable controversy over the extent of the charge made today—and likely to be made in the medium term future—against the industrial countries by the developing countries. Equally controverted are the prospects held out to the Southern states for achieving the demands addressed primarily to the developed and capitalist states of the West, particularly those demands that go beyond modest and peripheral reforms of the present system (and, in consequence, reforms that leave substantially unchanged the present distribution of wealth and power). Are the more far-reaching and dramatic expressions of the new egalitarianism to be taken at anything even approximating face value, or as merely the rhetorical excesses of a position that on critical examination turns out to be altogether modest in leaving virtually intact the dominant position of the developed and capitalist states? To take the most salient example of the programmatic demands set forth by the developing countries: is the New International Economic Order as outlined in the May 1974 U.N. General Assembly declaration and subsequently elaborated in the December 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States to be regarded as expressions of a maximalist position its advocates have no real illusions about achieving? Or are the demands set forth roughly indicative of a position that will not be abandoned even in the face of determined opposition by those

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2

who are asked to sacrifice many of the benefits they presently enjoy by virtue of their dominant position? And if these demands are much more than mere posturing on the part of the developing countries, are there meaningful prospects of their realization, even in part?

A decade ago these questions were only seldom raised in the insistent form they are raised today. A decade hence it is possible they will no longer command anywhere near the attention they do at present, even if they are still raised. Enough has been said of those in the West who view the demands of the new states with the utmost seriousness and who believe that if these demands are not substantially met we face the almost certain prospect of an increasingly chaotic and dangerous world. This is, however, not the only response. There is also the view that the contemporary challenge to international inequality has been exaggerated by most of its Western interpreters, that the more sweeping formulations given this challenge in recent years are largely rhetorical and designed to serve internal purposes, and that if the so-called rebellion against inequality does become more than a readily containable demand for marginal change it will be because of a lack of statesmanship on the part of the developed countries—above all, the United States. That a challenge has been made is not disputed. What is disputed are the nature and scope of the *real* challenge (as distinguished from the exaggerated declaratory forms it has taken), the relative strengths and weaknesses of the contestants, the proper strategy to be pursued in containing (or managing) the challenge, and the price entailed by its implementation.

In this view, then, what the principal beneficiaries of the international system are confronted with is a challenge—and, indeed, a need—to reform the present system. Among the demands seriously put forth by the developing countries, almost none is found to suggest systemic change. Whether in the regimes of trade, aid, investment, or monetary reform, what is presumably being demanded would, with few exceptions, result in only modest reforms of the system. For the most part, moreover, the meeting of these demands may be seen to strengthen the present order rather than threaten it. Thus the removal of tariff and nontariff barriers to developing countries' exports would only conform to our professed goal of trade

liberalization. So, too, the granting of tariff preferences where such preferences respond to claims of infant industry status would merely accommodate a legitimate need of developing countries at marginal cost to the developed countries. The same may be said for making a positive response to the demand for agreements providing more stable commodity prices, agreements that are consistent with economic growth while meeting the developing countries' need for economic security. In these and other respects, accommodation of the demands of developing states presumably strengthens the system, if only by reducing the grievances of those who otherwise feel they are denied equality of opportunity.

There are, to be sure, demands that are not found "reasonable" in that, if accepted, they would either jeopardize economic growth or promise to effect a redistribution of existing wealth or, finally, threaten to deprive the developed states of their position as guardians of the rules that define the system. In any or all of these contingencies, the vital interests of the industrial democracies would evidently be threatened. Proposals for indexation must therefore be opposed, since their acceptance might well jeopardize economic growth through institutionalizing inflation. Similarly, demands for the recognition of a thinly disguised *right* of expropriation in conditions that are tantamount to confiscation, as well as claims to a *right* to impose exorbitant primary commodity prices through the instrument of producer cartels, cannot be accepted as means of transferring, or redistributing, existing wealth. Nor can the developed and capitalist states permit the control by developing states of those key economic organizations that give institutional expression—whatever the inadequacies of this expression—to the present system.

But these boundaries to the legitimate demands of the developing countries, it is argued, are not only a matter of common agreement among the developed states; claims that push beyond them are largely put forth by the new states as bargaining counters for obtaining much more modest and reasonable reforms that, if granted, would leave the present system quite intact. The demand for indexation and the claim to a right of expropriation virtually without condition are therefore seen as bargaining counters for commodity stabili-

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2

zation agreements and for the exercise of greater control over foreign investment—goals that are no more unreasonable than is the insistence upon greater representation in key international institutions for states comprising some 70 percent of the world population. And to the extent those demands that, if acted upon, would bring systemic change to the present international economic system are seriously put forth by the developing countries, they may be effectively resisted.

The basis for this optimism over turning back "unreasonable" demands is rooted in what are seen as the inherent weaknesses of the developing world, weaknesses that would quickly become apparent in a serious and prolonged confrontation with the developed states. These weaknesses cannot be compensated for by the one trump held by the developing countries; that is, their control over raw materials vital to the Western states and Japan. At least, they cannot be compensated for given the modicum of statesmanship needed to devise and implement a strategy of accommodation. For the weaknesses of the developing countries might be largely overcome only by maintaining a high degree of solidarity both in word and in action. Yet the prospect for realizing such grand solidarity, and preserving it over a substantial period, must be judged very slight given the many disparities of circumstance and interest among the Southern states. If these disparities are nevertheless subordinated to the necessities of a common front, it will only be by virtue of a monumental failure on the part of the dominant industrial powers. Even then, the outcome would probably remain uncertain short of a clear decision on the part of the latter to go their separate ways in dealing with the South.

In the absence of what comes close to a "worse case" analysis, then, the prospects for accommodating the Southern challenge while preserving the present system are considered very strong. Indeed, to the extent there is today a serious challenge posed by the developing countries, it is seen as one that is largely of our creation. It is the obduracy of the principal upholders of the status quo—and above all, the United States—that has brought on the prospect of a serious confrontation by refusing to make concessions that are, quite apart from their intrinsic merit, no more than marginally significant. This refusal to respond to modest demands for change is presumably im-

measurably worsened by the inability to accept such change as has occurred. Thus the continued American unwillingness to come to terms with the OPEC countries, particularly its Arab members, leaves these states in a position where they may find themselves with no real alternative to the role of leadership in the Third World. Instead of coming to terms with this "leading edge" of the South, we have chosen a policy of near confrontation. Rather than pursuing a strategy of co-opting the *nouveaux riches*, we have almost by design forced them to pose as liberators of the world's downtrodden.

The means of our deliverance from an unnecessary and unwanted confrontation with the developing countries are therefore apparent. We must begin to distinguish between demands that are not only legitimate by our own standards but imply no more than reforms of a system that remains essentially unimpaired and demands that clearly go beyond the limits of reform (the decisive test of their "reasonableness" or "legitimacy"). To grant the former is not a sign of weakness, as both the Left and the Right would have us believe, but of strength. Once made, the rejection of the latter demands—if they are still pressed with any seriousness—will not prove difficult. For the preponderance of power and advantage will remain with the developed and capitalist states provided only that they retain a basic unity of purpose and action. That basic unity will in part be assured precisely through the grant of reforms that markedly reduce the prospect of serious North-South confrontation. And they will markedly reduce this prospect because they will deprive the South of the most compelling reason for maintaining solidarity. In the absence of this compulsion, the gradual co-operation of the principal Southern beneficiaries of a reformed system becomes not only a viable strategy but one that is very nearly self-implementing.

IV

This, in outline, is the view that has become increasingly attractive to those in the West who reject the projections of growing North-South confrontation—whether of the Left or the Right—yet who also

JACKET DESIGN BY WILLIAM DAVIS

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2

reject the prospect of an emergent global welfare community resulting from the contemporary challenge to inequality. In contrast to a vision that transcends the collective struggle over wealth and power by assuming the transformation of the international system itself, the view considered here finds the challenge to global inequalities one that is made by states and that will be resolved by states. In its identification of the challenge, as in its strategy for dealing with the challenge, the requirements of a realistic statecraft are ostensibly met. At the same time, in prescribing what purports to be a meliorative solution, this view also vindicates its essential liberalism.

Clearly, we have here a view that is in many respects appealing. It is so even if it is neither as realistic nor as meliorative as it claims. Indeed, its meliorative quality must be found largely in the promise to reduce the prospect of inter-state conflict rather than in the promise to improve the wretched conditions of those who comprise a majority of the population of the developing world. It may of course be argued that reducing the prospect of international conflict in which all may lose is itself a meliorative goal. It may be further argued that as long as a state system persists, efforts to improve the conditions of deprived peoples must be undertaken—to the extent they are undertaken at all—through the agency of the state. Whatever the merits of these arguments, the point remains—and it is central—that we are dealing here with a view that is addressed to claims made by states on behalf of states. The reforms urged are those intended to respond to collective inequalities. Even then, the inequalities that evoke a positive response are those designed primarily to placate the elite among the new states. The claims that are to be listened to are the claims of states whose power places them in a position to threaten international stability and, in consequence, the viability of the present system. There is little difficulty in answering the question: who will chiefly benefit from the reforms this view puts forth? The principal beneficiaries are evidently those who already enjoy a substantially increased measure of equality while continuing to insist that the system remains biased to their disadvantage. Greater equality will be accorded to those states that are already well on the way to achieving equality.

Whatever its shortcomings in dealing with the "world poverty" problem and in responding to individual inequalities, does a view that prides itself on its realism indeed respond to the imperatives of power and self-interest? Does it respond even to its initial premise of the deep grievances entertained by the new states? These grievances, usefully termed by one writer the "anticolonialist amalgam," presumably will be satisfied only by the "eradication of all the conditions and insignia of inequality and humiliation associated in the minds of the Southern elites with the epoch of European domination." * Taken at face value, this objective would appear to encompass a great deal. Yet the prospect is held out of accommodating it through what are, after all, quite modest concessions on the part of the privileged nations. Is this not to make trivial those grievances whose depth and intensity we are constantly warned about? If it is not, we must conclude that the recalcitrance of the privileged—above all, the United States—to meet these grievances reflects an obtuseness that is altogether oblivious to elementary considerations of self-interest.

At issue here is of course the question: what do the developing states really want? This question cannot be answered, however, with anything approaching the clarity that many apparently believe. It cannot be so answered because the basic demand of the new states is a demand for a redistribution of power. As such, it does not yield to the rather tidy and modest formulations most Western observers are only too disposed to give it. The "eradication of all the conditions and insignia of inequality" is, in effect, the eradication of dependence. But the eradication of dependence can only come through a redistribution of power. That redistribution will be facilitated by concessions on economic issues. At the same time, such concessions cannot be seen as being somehow isolated and self-contained. They are not sought as ends in themselves but as means for effecting a new structure of power that, like all structures of power, possesses an economic as well as a military dimension. This being the case, there is no apparent reason for assuming that the new states will be satis-

* Tom J. Farer, "The United States and the Third World: A Basis for Accommodation," *Foreign Affairs* 54 (October 1975): 79.

fied by what are little more than marginal changes in the present order. Nor is it apparent why they should be satisfied with such changes if the result is to leave them—if only in their eyes—substantially dependent upon the principal custodians of the present order.

These considerations need not be read as support for a policy of resisting concessions, however modest, to the South. An accommodationist policy that follows the general lines sketched above may well be the course of wisdom for those who are asked to do the accommodating. If it is, however, it is not because those calling for change are asking for so little. Instead, it is presumably because those calling for change can exact a heavy price if such change is not granted, a price that is disproportionate in its cost to the price of change. There is something inherently implausible in the commonly voiced charge that although the new states want so little, we will nevertheless not grant them what little they want. We will not do so, moreover, though the price for not doing so must prove quite disproportionate to what we were asked to concede. The argument is implausible not because it assumes greed but because it assumes that we have magnified—indeed, created—a conflict that easily might have been avoided by the minimal display of enlightened self-interest.

It is another matter entirely to argue that although the conflict arising from the demand for a redistribution of power is deep-rooted, it may nevertheless be contained through a strategy that combines firmness with a willingness to accommodate. The reality of the conflict is not spirited away by the assumption, however inarticulate, of an underlying harmony of interests between defenders of and challengers to the status quo. The seriousness of the grievances entertained, as well as the scope of the demands made, by the new states is not in effect denied by the insistence that only marginal issues are at stake. As long as these assumptions are held to, it is difficult to understand why the prospect of North-South conflict should occasion serious concern. Even if they are dropped, though, is there still reason for finding in an accommodationist strategy the means of our deliverance from the prospect of serious confrontation?

In large measure, the answer is seen to turn on the effects an accommodationist strategy is expected to have in eroding the ties that to date have preserved a residual measure of solidarity among the developing countries. Indeed, the issue of Southern solidarity is commonly regarded as *the* issue that must be addressed above all others. For the promise of an accommodationist strategy is to be found primarily in the success it is expected to have in co-opting the elite of the Southern states into the present—though, of course, reformed—system. Co-optation necessarily assumes that the ties rooted in a shared past will yield to more rational calculations of self-interest, that the inducements held out to the favored few among the new states will soon be found to outweigh the sympathetic involvement that reflects the "anticolonialist amalgam." But if the memories and grievances forming this amalgam are anywhere near as strong as many apparently believe, it will not prove easy to break bonds forged by a common past. Certainly, the prospects for doing so appear slight if the means are limited to modest gestures on the political level and equally modest reforms of the international economy. Moreover, as one shrewd observer of North-South relations notes, what appears as "irrational" behavior of Southern states may nevertheless be expected to last "as long as it is *perceived as rational* behavior by its practitioners. The period is likely to vary with each issue and with the environmental factors encompassing each negotiation." *

Will this perception become increasingly artificial and difficult to sustain, given the increasing heterogeneity of the Southern states? Will growing disparities in wealth and power and, of course, the ambitions and interests that attend rising power strain beyond endurance even a residual Southern solidarity? The answer remains unclear. It remains so even if confined within the bounds of conventional calculations of state interest. No doubt, the disparities that increasingly mark the respective positions of the developing countries will be, and indeed even now are, reflected in the divergent interests enter-

* Roger D. Hansen, "The Political Economy of North-South Relations: How Much Change," *International Organization* 29 (Fall 1975): 930.

tained by these countries. It is another matter, however, to conclude from this that the capacity for meaningful confrontation with the developed states must virtually disappear—at any rate, in every sense save the purely rhetorical. For the cohesiveness of the new states in confronting the developed countries is not in the first place a function of their similarity of interests in general but of their similarity of interests with respect to the developed countries. And even this way of putting the matter may overstate the basis required for cohesiveness in confronting the developed countries, since it suggests that this basis is a similarity of interests that, though it may not obtain in many instances, is not really needed. Instead, all that must be shown is that the abandonment of solidarity holds out little if any promise of gains in excess of the losses—however modest—resulting from desertion of a common position.*

The example afforded to date by the events resulting from the actions of the oil-producing countries of OPEC illustrates the point at hand. What accounts for the support given OPEC by those among the developing countries—middle income and poor alike—that have suffered from the actions of the oil-producing countries? Many have pointed to the motives of fear and hope—fear that open hostility to OPEC would invite retaliation and hope that support would bring relief in the form of OPEC aid to those seriously affected by increased oil prices. In fact, it is now apparent that the aid programs of the OPEC countries will not in any significant manner relieve the distress caused to most non-oil developing countries by the rise in oil prices.† If hope is vain for many, fear also appears largely unwarran-

* The argument in the text may be put too baldly. It assumes a degree of rationality in the calculation of interests that may prove unwarranted. Even if the abandonment of solidarity holds out little promise of positive gain, some may nevertheless take this course whether out of a sense of frustration or, more likely, out of a sense of relative deprivation. Then, too, the solidarity of the developing countries need not be seen to preclude divisions arising among them. A broader consensus in confronting the developed states may well be attended by conflict over the strategy of confrontation and, of course, the distribution of the respective gains and perhaps losses resulting from confrontation. In a word, cooperation may be expected, here as elsewhere, to coexist with conflict; the larger game does not preclude smaller games.

† For a recent and careful survey of aid programs of OPEC countries cf. Maurice J. Williams, "The Aid Programs of the OPEC Countries," *Foreign Affairs* 54 (January 1976):308ff. Williams confirms what others have surmised: that OPEC aid is heavily concentrated on a very few recipients.

ted, since it is difficult to see what measures of retaliation might be taken by the OPEC countries against those who refuse to support the oil producers. The latter, it is true, might respond to rising opposition of other non-oil developing countries by abandoning their role as the vanguard of Third World demands. But this step would also pose certain risks for the OPEC countries in that it would deprive them of whatever domestic support, and international legitimacy, they receive from their present ties with the other developing countries.*

In a broader context, it may still be argued that OPEC support in the Third World does largely stem from a mixture of hope and fear. The hope is that OPEC will not only serve as a model others may emulate but that the oil producing countries will eventually succeed in wringing various concessions from the developed states that will generally benefit the position of the developing countries. The fear is that the co-option of OPEC—or, at least, of the major producers—by the North would leave many remaining Southern states as dependent and powerless as ever. These broader considerations are undoubtedly at work. At the same time, what gives them particular force and persuasiveness is the simple conviction that there is nothing to be gained by abandoning a position of common support for OPEC. Clearly, it is not enough to remind the non-oil producing countries of the distress that higher oil prices have caused them if the altogether likely prospect is that this distress will remain essentially unchanged after breaking with OPEC.

* The risks the OPEC countries would run if no longer supported by other developing countries may be questioned. Certainly, these risks vary from state to state. Hansen (*op. cit.*, p. 942) notes that: "For some of the smallest and richest, the threats are likely to originate from outside their borders and may come in such disparate forms as a radically-oriented struggle for Arab unity or straightforward regional hierarchical struggles. For other OPEC states, the dangers may take the form of radical domestic political challenges to leadership which appear to be joining the 'old rich' of the world too rapidly." It is difficult to assess the significance the OPEC countries place simply on the diplomatic support of their position by other developing states. Probably a good deal less significance is read into this support today than in 1974, when the acquiescence of the West to the actions of the oil cartel was in doubt. It is apparent that some significance is still attributed to continued support by non-oil developing countries.

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2

A not dissimilar reasoning applies to the calculations of the OPEC countries. What do they stand to gain by abandoning their chosen position as champions of the developing world? Is the promise of co-option by the West such as to outweigh the risks, even if counted as modest, entailed by sacrificing the support of other Third World states? It would not seem so. What co-option holds out to the oil-rich countries is by and large what they are getting, or are likely to get, in any event. It would be another matter if the major OPEC states were indeed confronted with a choice between co-option into the club of the developed and capitalist states and the threat of serious countermeasures by the West. But that is not their choice today and in all probability will never be their choice. There is no evidence that they have ever taken seriously the prospect that the developed states—or, rather, the United States—might undertake to use force against them, and with good reason. Nor is there much evidence that the oil-rich countries have taken seriously the prospect that the security of their investments in the developed states may one day be threatened, whether as a result of the oil prices they may exact or as a result of their continuing to champion the claims of the Southern states in the manner they have to date. Despite endless warnings against the folly of America's policy of confrontation with OPEC, this country has remained the principal arms supplier to the major OPEC states. And just as it has not denied these states access to the most modern weapons, neither has it denied them access to the technology needed for rapid development. The confrontation the United States is so regularly accused of pursuing against OPEC has been exaggerated beyond any reasonable measure. In reality, what confrontation we have had has been carried on within the framework of a larger understanding and agreement.*

* Within the framework of this larger understanding and agreement, differences of course persist and the jockeying for position goes on. Thus American policy has sought to limit, if not to break, the OPEC role of leadership of the developing world by pointing to the effects higher oil prices have had on developing economies and by calling attention to the "inadequate" aid OPEC has afforded to the poor states. It may be argued that opposition to this role is the functional equivalent of opposition to—indeed, confrontation with—OPEC, since its abandonment would mean abandonment

In these circumstances, there has been no need for the principal OPEC countries to choose between North and South, a choice that for obvious reasons they will continue to resist for some time to come.* Today, admission to the circle of developed and capitalist states can only be undertaken, if at all, on terms designed by the circle's members. The reality of inequality will therefore persist despite the appearance of equality. Moreover, it is very doubtful that this appearance might compensate for those advantages gained by continuing to play the leadership role on behalf of the oppressed. Eventually, of course, the choice that is resisted today will have to be made. But by the time it must be made, the likelihood is that we shall be witness to the creation of centers of economic and military power that are quite capable of admitting themselves into the charmed circle.

The experience to date with OPEC may nevertheless prove misleading in its implications for the prospects of maintaining Southern solidarity. It may be that this solidarity, never very great in any event, will soon fall apart under the strains introduced by the many and growing differences marking the circumstances and interests of

---

of OPEC. But this is surely to exaggerate the importance of Southern solidarity to OPEC's very survival. In attempting to sow dissension between OPEC and other developing states, American policy has sought to contain OPEC, not to break it by open confrontation. There is every reason to believe that American policymakers have come to fear the consequences of "breaking" OPEC much more than the consequences of preserving it (even while containing its actions). For the breaking of OPEC is seen as ushering in radical regimes in the major, and still conservative, oil producing states. And even apart from this vital consideration, American interests are not found, on balance, to have suffered from higher oil prices. Quite the contrary, these interests are now seen to have been benefitted. Why, then, should the United States seek OPEC's demise, as long as the effects of OPEC's example and role as champion of the South can be limited? Moreover, there is every reason to assume that the prime movers in OPEC—Saudi Arabia and Iran—appreciate American policy. Although refusing to forego the role they have cast themselves in, they are only too careful not to push that role too far.

* Hansen writes. "Given the risks to these countries—especially those located in the Middle East—of opting unambiguously for *either* the 'North' or the 'South,' the most likely goal of most OPEC countries will be to keep both bridges open" ("Political Economy of North-South Relations," p. 943). The gradual *embourgeoisement* of OPEC is seen as the probable result of growing power, though only occurring over a period of time.

the developing countries. Eventually, it seems bound to do so, if only because differential rates of development will be expressed, particularly in the case of the larger states, in aspirations for regional hegemony. A semblance of Southern solidarity may nevertheless survive emerging conflicts for local supremacy. Certainly, the aspirants for such supremacy may be expected to justify their goals in terms of opposition to the "old" order, much as rising and ambitious powers have done in the past. Even so, the appearance of states in the South with clearly hegemonic aspirations would effectively put an end to the post-colonial era and, with it, whatever reality Southern solidarity may possess today.

In the meantime, the promise of an accommodationist strategy that is designed to leave the present order essentially intact will depend not only upon the cohesiveness of the South but upon the cohesiveness of the developed and capitalist states as well. Although it is Southern solidarity that has been generally seen as the critical variable in determining the course of North-South relations in the years ahead, there is a growing suspicion that this emphasis may well be misplaced. An accommodationist strategy presupposes that conflicts of interest among the industrial democracies will be contained and that a basic unity of purpose and action will be preserved. There is no assurance of this basic unity, however. Not that a serious threat to it is likely to arise from what are primarily divergent economic interests internal to the developed economies. Although such conflicts may put the consensus of the developed countries under considerable strain—as they did in the years of the early 1970s—there seems little prospect that in and of themselves these conflicts might lead to a fundamental break and the subsequent attempt by Western Europe and Japan to create largely self-sufficient regional blocs. Unless we are to assume that traditional security concerns are no longer relevant in state relations, these regional blocs would be viable if the developed state(s) forging them proved able and willing to provide not only for its security but for the security of region. There is no evidence today of such willingness on the part of either Western European or Japan to undertake the necessary sacrifices—and risks—to create indepen-

dently viable regional blocs. If anything, there appears less willingness than ever to undertake a course leading to strategic independence from the United States. Speculation may persist over the prospects of a Euro-Arabia, but it is meaningless as long as Europe is unable to provide for its own security, let alone for the security of its putative Middle Eastern partners. Even in Africa, recent events have strikingly demonstrated the shallowness of regional pretensions where there is no effective power to give substance to those pretensions when needed. It is not to Western Europe that the African states have directed their hostile or friendly attention, first over Angola and subsequently over Rhodesia, but to the United States.

If these considerations are once accepted, however, how might a serious threat to the cohesiveness of the developed and capitalist states arise? Those who assume it might yet arise through an American policy of confrontation with the OPEC states have not made and can scarcely make a persuasive, or even a plausible, case. Even if we assume a "failure" of American policy toward the Third World as a whole—that is, continued American resistance to most of the demands embodied in the New International Economic Order—it is difficult to see the consequences of this failure leading to the breakup of the present order. No doubt, a replay of American policy in the 1960s, only this time on a still larger scale, would threaten such a breakup. But the prospects for this appear altogether negligible. The fear of an American counter-reaction to the rising assertiveness of the new states, a counter-reaction that would take a military expression, may be set aside.

What appears more plausible is the prospect that there may be a gradual erosion of American power throughout the world and that the credibility of such power as does remain will correspondingly decline. A sharply reduced American role might also be expected to signal a turn toward greater protectionism on the part of this country, since an increasingly protectionist America would form the logical economic counterpart of a policy of political-strategic contraction. Even without a sharp turn toward greater protectionism, the atrophy of American power would surely remove the principal means of

American leadership among the developed non-Communist states of the North. In these circumstances, Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, Japan would no longer have the incentive to retain the essential solidarity that has heretofore characterized their relations with this country. Indeed, in these circumstances, Western Europe and Japan would be increasingly confronted with the choice of either attempting to establish relatively tightly controlled regional systems in which they would play the dominant political-military and economic roles or of remaining politically and militarily passive while trying to strike the best possible deals with those developing countries on which they will remain dependent for raw materials. The former alternative cannot be excluded. It is extremely unlikely, however, since it assumes an assertion of political will that seems quite at odds with the present character of these societies—certainly of the Western European states and most likely of Japan as well. Instead, the far more likely outcome would be a period of prolonged uncertainty and instability during which the developing countries would press whatever advantages they could while the then-fragmented democratic capitalist societies would perforce yield on many issues that the presence of the United States today saves them—or, in the eyes of many of their apologists, prevents them—from yielding.

It is unnecessary to speculate on the more detailed consequences of this choice that would likely follow a marked erosion of American power. Even if we set aside entirely the role of the Soviet Union in such a world, though it would be critical, it is clear that the character of North-South relations would undergo considerable, perhaps even radical, change. The disjunction between order and power, already apparent in the present international system, would be magnified many-fold. Indeed, that disjunction might be rapidly resolved in favor of the contenders for a new order who have few of the reservations about the maintenance and employment of military power that mark the outlook of the states of Western Europe and Japan. The disutility of military power is not a Southern obsession. It is one thing to reject romantic notions about the power of the poor and desperate among the new states and quite another to dismiss the prospect

that the rising and ambitious among these states would refrain from exploiting their growing military power in an increasingly fragmented international system.

These considerations point to the continued significance of American power in preserving the basic unity of the industrial democracies and in shaping the course of North-South relations. It may be argued that in the medium term, at any rate, the likely prospect is that this power will be maintained and, with its maintenance, the solidarity of the developed states assured. If this argument is accepted, we are back to the issue of Southern solidarity and to the prospects held out by a strategy of co-optation through accommodation. It is this strategy, we have earlier noted, that is seen to afford the principal opportunity for blunting the Southern challenge to the existing order. It is through co-optation that the hope is held out not only of breaking a solidarity that, for all its weaknesses, is acknowledged to threaten the present international system but of strengthening this system by giving it a broader measure of consensus.

Is a strategy of co-optation through accommodation feasible and would its consequences prove desirable? A positive response has drawn upon the earlier experience of class accommodation within the Western democracies. "Is the present struggle between the classes of nation-states," Tom J. Farer asks, "not susceptible to mitigation by the employment of an analogous strategy of accommodation?" * He answers by arguing that, on balance, the effort to apply an accommodationist strategy to North-South relations seems no more difficult, and perhaps even easier, than the prior case of class confrontation. The basis for this optimism rests on the belief that with respect to the "political axis of confrontation" the new states are in reality asking for very little. Even over economic issues, the conflict may be readily managed not only because here as well the demands are modest but because those to be co-opted are small in number, less committed

* Farer, "United States and the Third World," p. 92. The analogy between class confrontation and interstate conflict has been drawn by many writers in the past. On the eve of World War II, it was put forth by E. H. Carr as the most useful way of considering the problem of peaceful change in international society. Cf. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939* (London: Macmillan, 1939), pp. 212ff.

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2

to human equality as a general condition than we are, and quite capable of delivering their huge constituencies. It is with the governing elites of a very few states that we must come to terms. Accommodation will be facilitated, Farer concludes, by the "very small number of representatives that have to be co-opted into senior decision-making roles in the management structure of the international economy. In Africa, only Nigeria. In Latin America, Brazil and Venezuela, and perhaps Mexico. In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Iran. And in Asia, India and Indonesia." *

The persuasiveness of this analogy cannot be made to turn upon the feasibility, as such, of co-option. No doubt, co-option is, in some sense, feasible. But the relevant issue is the deeper meaning, the more lasting consequences, of co-option. This issue cannot be usefully addressed without acknowledging that there are different kinds of co-option and that the significance of the process depends upon the nature of the system in which it occurs and the differences that separate the would-be co-opters from those to be co-opted. Even if we neglect for the moment the differences separating co-opters from co-opted, we cannot neglect the fact that in the instant case co-option is prescribed for what remains in essence an anarchical system. Within domestic society, the promise of co-option is one of mitigating the struggle for wealth and power. That promise has not always been realized. When it has been, it is not only because of the "reasonableness" of the contending parties but also because the process of co-option has occurred within an order that sets reasonably well-defined and effective limits to social conflict.

It is the absence of such order in the greater society of states that necessarily gives rise to the prospect that co-option, even if successful in the immediate sense, may eventually serve only to increase, rather than to allay, the struggle for wealth and power. At least, this prospect must always prove to be very real unless one assumes the emergence of forces that are capable of setting effective limits to the perennial conflicts of states. In the present period, such limits are

* Farer, "United States and the Third World," p. 93.

commonly found in the interdependencies that characterize the international system. But these interdependencies, we have argued, are themselves as much—if not more—a source of conflict as they are a source of order and constraint. If the more lasting consequences of co-option are made to turn largely on the "reality of national interdependence," * these consequences must raise all of the questions that interdependence raises. Co-option, like interdependence, may only create in the end a greater need for order without providing any assurance this need will be met; it may only serve to exacerbate the struggle for wealth and power rather then mitigate it.

As applied to North-South relations, the difficulties attending a strategy of co-option through accommodation arise in part because international society is not domestic society. It does not follow that the success of such a strategy is precluded in international society, only that it is made more difficult and uncertain. Its difficulty today, moreover, is due not only to the absence of a social framework that provides some stability to the process of accommodation but to the markedly heterogeneous character of the parties involved in this process. This pervasive heterogeneity finds no meaningful parallel to the differences that earlier separated classes within the state. Where class conflict issued in successful accommodation, it was because adversaries ultimately shared the same values. However much one side may have denied these values in practice, in the end this common commitment—even though attended by the threat or actuality of force—provided the balm of compromise. In the international society of today, it would be ludicrous to attempt even the vaguest articulation of those values common to the participants in the struggle over a new distribution of wealth and power. Instead, we are thrown back on the all too ambiguous reality of interdependence and, of course, the presumably common desire to avoid serious international conflict.

* They apparently do so for Farer (Ibid., p. 97), who declares: "One of the potential strengths of the present international system is the reality of national interdependence which creates an objective need for cooperation and consequently for accepting sharp restraints on the competitive aspects of interstate relations. The principal danger is an irrational assessment of risks and opportunities."

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200120006-2

It is chiefly for these reasons that a strategy of co-option through accommodation must be viewed with a substantial measure of skepticism. It may be argued that despite the hazards of this strategy there appears no viable alternative. Even if true, those hazards ought to be recognized for what they are. No useful purpose is served by viewing co-option as a strategy in which all may gain rather than one in which the gains of some occur only at the expense of others. This view is misleading even as applied to the experience of class confrontation within states. It is particularly misleading as applied to the conflicts between states. Nevertheless, it is given an apparent plausibility in the present context by the penchant for interpreting the challenge to international inequality as primarily a challenge to an economic system. Given favorable prospects for continuing growth in the global product, there seems no apparent reason why changes in that system may not be made to the ultimate gain of all parties. At the deepest level, however, it is not inequalities of wealth but of power that are being challenged; and whereas inequalities of wealth may be altered—and even narrowed—to everyone's gain, the same may not be said of inequalities of power. This is above all the case where the uses to which power will be put are left entirely to the discretion of each power holder.

Will the present beneficiaries of the international system prove able to control the power aspirations of those who will sooner or later seek no more, though no less, than what others have sought before them? Is a strategy of co-option through accommodation at best of little more than marginal relevance here? One may doubt that it is. Co-option can only promise that the disaffected will come to view the international system as do those who presently play a dominant role in the system. But even if that promise were to be realized, it would not preclude the potentially stronger among the disaffected from also aspiring to play an ever increasing role in the system. In order to do so, it will be necessary to achieve the capability of supplying one's own weapons, including eventually nuclear weapons. For those who are able to pursue it, the logic of the challenge to inequality is ultimately the logic of nuclear proliferation. In turn, the logic of nuclear proliferation is one of decreasing control over the international system by those who are its present guardians.

It is banal to conclude that the power structure of the future will evolve in a manner largely independent of our wishes and designs. Yet it is probably no less true for being banal. We can also be reasonably sure that the challenge to the present system will eventually give rise not so much to a new system but to a new hierarchy. That the new hierarchy will prove more benign than those of the past can be little more than a profession of hope in a world that seems destined to repeat the cycle of nation-state development we have already witnessed in the West.