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Executive Registry

85- 2770

19 July 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DDA
Deputy Director, Management, Planning and Services, DI
Chief, Career Management Staff, DO
Executive Officer to the DDS&T
Administrative Officer, DCI

FROM: Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Inputs for the DCI re Excellence

1. Recall that the DCI, in his 13 June 1985 address on Excellence in the Auditorium, said "Every three months, or as frequently as it emerges as appropriate, we will make available to you a more comprehensive listing of initiatives taken and outstanding performances turned in than I have been able to give you today. I hope and expect this will stimulate new ideas and practical initiatives, as well as inspire by example."

2. During our 14 June post-mortem we discussed and came to agreement on two separate, but related, issues deriving from our collective experience leading up to the DCI's 13 June speech:

- What it was the Director had in mind for his periodic calls for "examples of excellence."
- Establishing a common data base for maintaining information relating to employee recognition (through cash awards, certificates, etc.)

3. At this meeting, we set 1 October as the date the uniform data base should be able to provide information (if called upon) in a common format for all Directorates (this is taking place under DDA lead). It was also anticipated that we would solicit Directorate "examples" at the same time.

4. The Director, however, does not want to wait until then; he has asked me to obtain your inputs next month. So, what is wanted? I will leave each Directorate to determine the maximum number of examples sent forward, but would hope to obtain at least five from each of you.

- a. As to the format, one should provide information in a descriptive paragraph noting the name(s) of the individual(s) concerned, what was involved and why the example is worthy of recognition. Included as a separate paragraph should be a statement noting what, if any, recognition was made of this event (realizing that in many cases, such examples do not merit specific cash awards, etc.).


DCI
EXEC**Administrative - Internal Use Only**

0-106

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- b. The examples that will be determined by each of your organizations should be along the lines of, and written up like, those used by the DCI in his speech. In many cases, such examples will simply be instances of "someone just doing their job."

5. Please have your inputs to me by Wednesday, 14 August.
(Remember, as we discussed, we are not now seeking any data re who got awards, statistical info from the computer, etc.)



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Executive Registry
85- 2929

25 July 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
 Director of Logistics

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Excellence in the Office of Logistics

25X1

Congratulations on the splendid work in the Office of Logistics
 in supporting



William J. Casey

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0-106

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DDA

FROM: [redacted]
Director of Security

25X1

SUBJECT: The Excellence Program

[redacted]

25X1

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 19 July 1985, requesting "examples of excellence" which might appropriately be forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence. [redacted]

25X1

2. Attached herewith is a package of material which I believe reflects a cross-section of "excellence" on display within the Office of Security over the last few months. I have taken the liberty of providing examples showing the initiatives of individual officers as well as those by specific components where there has been a strong collective effort by a number of people. [redacted]

25X1

3. I considered it appropriate in several instances to cite the specific cases which were being addressed. This included [redacted] If these examples are forwarded for the use of the DCI in a public presentation, you may possibly wish to sanitize the write-up by deleting the names. [redacted]

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4. If any additional information is required in connection with this matter, please do not hesitate to contact us. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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80-JUL 1985

*Paul H. Nitze***SDI: The Soviet Program**

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NO. 17



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters, before the Chautauqua Conference on Soviet-American Relations, Chautauqua, New York, June 28, 1985.

Soviet commentary on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program has been strongly negative. The Soviets have accused us of expanding the arms race into a new area by initiating "the militarization of space." In Geneva, they have demanded a ban on research, development, testing, and deployment of what they call "space-strike arms" and have conditioned progress in the negotiations on offensive nuclear force reductions on prior U.S. acceptance of this ban.

One might conclude from this Soviet commentary that the Soviet Union has no program comparable to our SDI. Such a conclusion would be far from correct.

Soviet Strategic Defense Efforts

Soviet military doctrine stresses that offensive and defensive forces must interact closely to achieve Soviet aims in any conflict. Accordingly, the Soviets are heavily involved in strategic defense, with programs that go far beyond research. In fact, over the last two decades, the Soviet Union has spent roughly as much on strategic defense as it has on its massive offensive nuclear forces. As part of this huge effort, the Soviets have deployed around Moscow

the world's only operational antiballistic missile (ABM) system, a system they are currently upgrading with a projected completion date of about 1987. They also have an indepth national air defense force, a vast political leadership survival program, and nationwide civil defense forces and programs.

Further, they have been conducting a number of activities that are inconsistent with and tend to undermine the ABM Treaty. For example, their deployment of a large phased-array ballistic missile tracking radar near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia constitutes a violation of the treaty. We are concerned that, in the aggregate, Soviet ABM-related activities could provide them the basis for deployment of an ABM defense of their national territory, which would also violate the treaty.

Soviet strategic defense programs are not restricted to the more traditional approaches. The Soviets have also been pursuing, since the 1960s, research into advanced technologies for strategic defense. These technologies include high-energy lasers, particle-beam weapons, radio frequency weapons, and kinetic energy weapons. These are the same types of technologies being researched in the U.S. SDI program. Moreover, during this same period, the Soviets have had an active and expanding military space program.

The Soviet version of SDI has been overlooked in the recent public debate. Indeed, taking advantage of the closed nature of Soviet society, Soviet strategic defense efforts have proceeded com-

pletely free from debates of the sort that are occurring now in the West over the utility and implications of our program.

Let me address the Soviet version of SDI in some detail. While some of the material I will cover is quite technical, I hope it will give you a better appreciation of the extensive efforts the Soviets have been conducting for years.

Soviet Progress in Advanced Defense Technologies

High-Energy Laser Research. The Soviet Union's high-energy laser program began in the mid-1960s and has been much larger than the U.S. effort. The Soviets have built over a half-dozen major research and development facilities and test ranges, including some at the Sary Shagan missile test center where they also do traditional anti-ballistic missile work. They have over 10,000 scientists and engineers associated with the development of lasers for weapons.

The Soviets have conducted research on the three types of gas lasers that the United States considers promising for weapons applications: the gas-dynamic laser, the electric discharge laser, and the chemical laser. They have also been working on other types of lasers that the United States had not seriously considered for weapons applications until very recently. These include excimer and free-electron lasers.

The Soviets are also pursuing related laser weapon technologies, such as efficient electrical power sources and high-quality optical components. U.S. experts believe the Soviets are generally capable of supplying the necessary prime power, energy storage, and auxiliary components for most laser and other directed energy weapons. As evidence of this capability, the Soviets have developed a very powerful rocket-driven generator, which has no counterpart in the West. The Soviets may have also achieved the capability to develop the necessary optical systems for laser weapons.

The Soviet program has now progressed beyond technology research, in some cases to the development of prototype laser weapons. For the antisatellite—or ASAT—mission, the Soviets already have ground-based lasers at the Sary Shagan test site that could be used to interfere with U.S. satellites at low altitudes. Soviet programs have reached the point where they could begin con-

struction of ground-based laser ASAT facilities at operational sites. These facilities could be available by the end of the 1980s and would greatly increase Soviet ASAT capabilities. Moreover, they could test prototype space-based laser ASAT weapons by the early 1990s, and, if their technology developments prove successful, they could deploy operational space-based lasers for ASAT purposes in the mid-1990s.

For the ballistic missile defense—or BMD—mission, the Soviets could have prototypes for ground-based lasers by the late 1980s. Testing of the components for a large-scale operational system could begin in the early 1990s. With high priority and some significant technological risk, the Soviets could skip some testing steps and be ready to deploy a ground-based laser BMD system by the early to mid-1990s. The many difficulties associated with fielding an operational system would normally require much development time, however, and initial operational deployment is not likely in this century. The Soviets can be expected to pursue development of a space-based laser BMD system for possible deployment after the year 2000.

The Soviets have also begun to develop several high-energy laser weapons for air defense. These include lasers intended for air defense of high-value strategic targets in the Soviet Union, for point defense of ships at sea, and for air defense of theater forces. Following past practice, they are likely to deploy air defense lasers to complement, rather than replace, interceptors and surface-to-air missiles, or SAMs. The strategic air defense laser is probably at least in the prototype stage of development and could be operational by the late 1980s. It most likely will be deployed in conjunction with SAMs in a point defense role. The shipborne laser will probably not be operational until the early 1990s. The theater air defense laser may be operational sometime sooner and is likely to be capable of structurally damaging aircraft at close ranges and producing electro-optical and eye damage at greater distances.

Finally, the Soviets are developing an airborne laser. Such a laser could have several missions, including ASAT operations, protection of high-value aircraft, and protection against cruise missiles. Assuming a successful development effort, limited initial deployment could begin in the early 1990s.

Particle-Beam Weapons. Since the early 1970s, the Soviets have had a research program designed to explore the technical feasibility of a particle-beam weapon in space. For the ASAT mission, they may be able to test a prototype space-based particle-beam weapon intended to disrupt satellite electronic equipment in the mid- to late 1990s. One designed to destroy satellites could be tested by the year 2000. Early in the next century, the Soviets could have a prototype space-based BMD system ready for testing.

Radio Frequency Weapons. The Soviets have conducted research for decades on sources of high-power radio frequency—or RF—signals and the antennas that would be required to direct and focus the signals on distant targets. These signals have the potential to interfere with or destroy components of missiles, satellites, and reentry vehicles. In the 1990s, the Soviets could test a ground-based RF weapon capable of damaging satellites. A space-based RF antisatellite weapon will probably not be tested until after the year 2000.

Kinetic Energy Weapons. In the area of kinetic energy weapons, the Soviets have a variety of longstanding research programs underway. These weapons use the high-speed collision of a small mass with the target as the kill mechanism. As early as 1966, the Soviets had an experimental gun that could shoot streams of particles of a heavy metal, such as tungsten, at velocities of over 60 kilometers per second in a vacuum. Current Soviet efforts include research and development of electromagnetic railguns to accelerate projectiles to ultrahigh velocities, as well as other advanced systems. These programs could result in the near term in a short-range space-based system useful for satellite or space station defense or for close-in attack by a maneuvering satellite. Longer range space-based systems could be developed as early as the mid-1990s.

The Soviet Military Space Program

In addition to their huge and comprehensive program of research into advanced strategic defense technologies, the Soviets have the world's most active military space program. This program dominates the Soviet Union's overall space effort. For example, in 1984 the Soviets conducted about 100 space launches. Of these, some 80% were

purely military in nature, with much of the remainder serving both military and civil functions. By way of comparison, the total number of U.S. space launches in 1984 was about 20.

The Soviets believe in the combined arms concept of warfare in which all types of forces are integrated into military operations to achieve the desired goals. Space systems play a major role in this equation. Soviet space systems dedicated to military missions include satellites that perform reconnaissance, missile launch detection and attack warning, command and control, and ASAT functions. Dual-purpose satellites that perform some civilian functions are used for communications, navigational support, and weather prediction and monitoring.

In the reconnaissance area, the United States has no counterpart to the Soviet ocean reconnaissance satellites, the EORSAT [electronic intelligence ocean reconnaissance satellite] and the nuclear-powered RORSAT [radar ocean reconnaissance satellite]. These Soviet satellites have the mission of locating and identifying U.S. and allied naval forces in open ocean areas and targeting them for destruction by Soviet antiship weapons. Four such satellites were launched in 1984.

In the ASAT area, the Soviets have had the capability since 1971 to attack satellites in near-earth orbit with a ground-based orbital interceptor. Again, the United States has no comparable operational capability. Using a radar sensor and a pellet-type warhead, the interceptor can attack a target in orbit at various altitudes during the interceptor's first two revolutions. An intercept during the first orbit would minimize the time available for a target satellite to take evasive action.

The interceptor can reach targets orbiting at altitudes of more than 5,000 kilometers, but it is probably intended for high-priority satellites at lower altitudes. It is launched from the Tyuratam space complex, where launch pads and storage space for interceptors and launch vehicles are available. Several interceptors could be launched each day. In addition to the orbital interceptors, the Soviets could also use their operational ABM interceptors in a direct-attack against low-orbiting satellites.

Should the Soviets decide to deploy in space extremely large payloads, including components of a space-based ballistic missile defense, they would require space boosters capable of placing in orbit thousands of tons per year. The two new boosters they are developing—a medium-lift vehicle comparable to our Titan and a heavy-lift vehicle comparable to our Saturn V—will meet this requirement. These boosters should be available as early as the late 1980s.

Finally, the Soviets have ambitious plans for their manned space programs: They plan to replace their current Salyut space stations with large space complexes, which could support 20 or more cosmonauts on a permanent basis. Such a complex would enhance their space-based military support and war-fighting capabilities. Missions could include military research and development, reconnaissance, imagery interpretation, ASAT support operations, and BMD support operations. To ferry cosmonauts to this complex, as well as to place large payloads in orbit, the Soviets are developing their own version of the U.S. shuttle orbiter. They are also experimenting with a test vehicle that is apparently a scale model of a large, manned space plane. This plane's possible missions include reconnaissance, crew transport, and ASAT operations. It also could be used as a manned space station defender.

Soviet Disingenuousness

Considering all of the foregoing, it becomes apparent just how preposterous Soviet criticisms of the U.S. SDI program are. The United States is not expanding the military competition into new areas; the Soviets have been researching the same technologies for two decades. Likewise, the United States is not initiating "the militarization of space"; space has been militarized for many years, primarily by Soviet systems and programs.

This Soviet disingenuousness becomes even more evident when one considers those who are taking advantage of our open society by leading the attack in the Western public arena on the U.S. SDI program. Within a month of President Reagan's 1983 speech that initiated SDI, a letter signed by a large group of Soviet scientists was published in the *New York Times* denouncing the

program. A number of the signatories of this letter have, in fact, been instrumental in Soviet programs researching both conventional and advanced ballistic missile defense technologies. Among these are Mr. Y. P. Velikhov, the Deputy Director of the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute, who is a central figure in Soviet laser and particle-beam weapon efforts; Mr. N. G. Basov and Mr. A. M. Prokhorov, who are both scientific advisers to laser weapon programs; and Mr. Avduyevskiy, who is responsible for a number of projects researching the military use of space, including a space-based laser weapon. Other signatories have spent their careers developing strategic offensive weapons and other military systems.

Soviet Motives

Why are the Soviets conducting this propaganda campaign? Clearly, they see the potential applications for advanced defensive technologies; otherwise they would not be investing so much effort and so many resources in this area. It is not unreasonable to conclude that they would like to continue to be the only ones pressing forward in this field. At a minimum, they want to keep the United States from outstripping them in such technologies.

In this vein, the Soviet propaganda line against SDI is as predictable as it is hypocritical. The Soviets hope to foster a situation in which we would unilaterally restrain our research effort, even though it is fully consistent with existing treaties. This would leave them with a virtual monopoly in advanced strategic defense research; they see this as the most desirable outcome.

Such a virtual monopoly could be most dangerous for the West. Both sides have recognized for many years that offense and defense are vitally related to each other, that it is the balance between the offense-defense mixes of the sides that is essential to keeping the peace. Unilateral restraint by the United States in the defense area would jeopardize this balance and could, therefore, potentially undermine our deterrent ability.

If the United States proves unwilling to restrain itself unilaterally, the Soviets are prepared to impose an agreed ban on research "designed to

space-strike arms." At worst, a fully observed ban would leave them where they are today, unthreatened by potential U.S. technological advances and maintaining the only operational ABM and ASAT systems. The Soviets are already positioning themselves, however, to avoid having such a ban apply equally to the research of both sides. They currently deny that any of their efforts fall within their definition of research "designed to create space-strike arms," while asserting that all of the U.S. SDI program fits within that definition. Moreover, even were a research ban to be applied equally to the sides, given its inherent unverifiability and the closed nature of the Soviet Union—and particularly its scientific community

compared to ours—the Soviets very well might be able unilaterally to continue their research on a clandestine basis.

Conclusion

We can expect the Soviets to continue to protest strongly and publicly about SDI and alleged U.S. designs to "militarize space," all the while denying that they are conducting similar programs. We must recognize this propaganda for what it is—the key element of an overall strategy to divide the United States from its allies and elicit from us unilateral concessions. By making clear to the Soviets that we have the political will to maintain the necessary military capabilities effectively to deter them—that is, that their propaganda campaign

will not succeed in causing us to exercise unilateral restraint—we can establish the necessary conditions for the Soviets to consider a more forthcoming approach to the negotiations in Geneva. In that event, the United States will be prepared, as it is now, for a serious discussion of how—should new defensive technologies prove feasible—our two sides could move jointly to a more stable strategic relationship, building upon the research efforts of both. ■

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DDA 85-0024/38

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary

FROM:

[Redacted]

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
Executive Officer to the DDA

SUBJECT: Excellence Initiatives for the DCI

REFERENCE: ER 85-2770 memo to DDA/EXO dtd. 19 July 1985;
Subject: Inputs for the DCI re Excellence

The attached Directorate of Administration (DA) Office submissions are considered special examples of achievement which we believe encompass the elements emphasized by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in his 13 June 1985 address on Excellence. These examples contain the names of DA personnel concerned and indicate special initiative or accomplishment, both collectively and individually. Also, where appropriate, we have noted any special recognition awarded for their efforts. As requested, in some cases, the examples are instances of "someone just doing their job." Attempts have been made to follow the same format used by the DCI in his June speech. 25X1

Attachments



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DDA 85-0024/33

2 AUG
1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director

FROM: Harry E. Fitzwater
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Excellence Suggestions

REFERENCE: Memo for EXDIR fm DDA, dtd 29 January 1985, Same Subject
(DDA-85-0024/22)

1. In January 1985 the Directorate of Administration (DA) prepared a response to suggestions on Excellence submitted by the Deputy Director for Science and Technology (DDS&T). These suggestions were imaginative observations relevant to the entire Agency community and covered a wide range of administrative issues. Although a portion of the items forwarded for evaluation already had some form of DA action underway, many of the DDS&T concepts required further research. Consequently, DA Offices were tasked to follow up as appropriate. I would like to take this opportunity to inform you of these follow-ups and illustrate additional accomplishments relative to the 12 topics originally submitted for consideration.

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
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
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2. I believe the above examples illustrate the individual effort DA Offices have expended in lending themselves to the spirit and concept of "Excellence." New and better ways of providing administrative support are continuously being evaluated and thought-provoking suggestions or recommendations such as those submitted by the DDS&T are always welcome. Whether it be under the term excellence, quality, superiority or merit, I am particularly proud of the Offices' achievements in recent months. Their follow-up comments on these specific issues indicate the ability to do a job well and the desire to do it better. If required, I will be happy to discuss in further detail any of the comments on the topics contained above.



Harry E. Fitzwater

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ORIG: DDA/MS [redacted] (2 August 85)

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85-0024/34

2 AUG 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: Henry P. Mahoney
Director of Logistics

SUBJECT: Inputs for the DCI re Excellence

REFERENCE: Routing Sheet to DA components fm EO/DDA, dtd 22 Jul 85, same subject (DDA 85-0024/31)

1. In his speech of 13 June, the DCI noted several "examples of excellence" which enabled the Agency to better serve its consumers; i.e., the President and other officers of our Government. We in the Office of Logistics, as one of the primary support arms of the Agency, view other CIA components as our "consumers"; and we strive to provide them the best possible service in terms of timeliness, responsiveness, and professionalism. A summary of our participation in the [redacted] was forwarded to the DDA by my memorandum of 3 July (copy at Attachment A). 25X1

2. I am proud to offer additional examples (Attachment B) of special initiative and achievement by Logistics personnel, both collectively and individually. They are but a few of the many such instances of excellence within OL. I believe that these -- as well as numerous others not mentioned in this report -- encompass the elements the DCI listed in his speech: i.e., the alertness to recognize a need or a potential improvement and the will to move on it; the bringing together of various experience, knowledge, and skills; and an understanding of the needs of our "consumers." 25X1

[redacted]

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Henry P. Mahoney ✓

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OIT-0651-85
14 August 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer
Deputy Director for Administration

VIA:

[Redacted]

25X1

FROM:

Acting Chief, Management Group, OIT

SUBJECT:

Inputs for the DCI re Excellence

REFERENCE:

Your memo, dated 19 July 1985, Same Subject,
DD/A-85-00241

Attached are OIT's contributions for the DA's Excellence Report to the DCI as requested in the reference. If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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DS&T-710-85

15 AUG 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary

FROM: R. E. Hineman
Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Inputs for the DCI re Excellence

REFERENCE: Your memo dtd 19 July 1985, Same Subject


Forwarded herewith are contributions from the Directorate of Science and Technology to the DCI's list of "initiatives taken and outstanding performances turned in".

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R. E. Hineman

Attachments:
As stated



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DDA 85-0024/33

2 AUG
2 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director

FROM: Harry E. Fitzwater
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Excellence Suggestions

REFERENCE: Memo for EXDIR fm DDA, dtd 29 January 1985, Same Subject
(DDA-85-0024/22)

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Executive Registry

85- 3657

23 September 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DDA

FROM: Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: DCI's Quarterly Report on Excellence

1. The DCI has reviewed the examples of excellence forwarded by the four Directorates and the independent DCI Area Offices. Having done so, he would like to proceed with the preparation of the interim report he promised to provide employees when he met with them on 13 June in the Bubble.

2. Please take the lead in establishing a task force to review the candidate examples, pull out the most constructive and impressive initiatives, and develop them into a draft publication to be sent around. The DCI would like to review the entire package (draft and data from which it was drawn) and then sign it out. He would like this done as quickly as possible.

3. Please contact recipients of this memorandum directly re their candidates for such a task force. (Because, in the initial submissions, some examples in the Directorates' submissions were considered especially sensitive, I am returning the Directorates' submissions to each organization with their copy of this memo.)

4. Please let me have your draft package for DCI review no later than Monday, 30 September.



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Attachment:
As stated

cc: EA/DDI
SA/DDO
EA/DDS&T
AO/DCI



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DDA 85-0024/38

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary

FROM:

[Redacted]

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
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REFERENCE: ER 85-2770 memo to DDA/EXO dtd. 19 July 1985;
Subject: Inputs for the DCI re Excellence

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Attachments



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DD/A Registry
85-0024/36

9 August 1985

NOTE FOR: EXO/DDA
FROM: C/OC-OPS
SUBJECT: Excellence
REFERENCE: DDA 85-0024/31

[Redacted]

25X1

Attached are the three examples of excellence within OC that we believe are worthy of DCI comment.

[Redacted]

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Attachments

[Redacted]

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85-0024/34

2 AUG 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: Henry P. Mahoney
Director of Logistics

SUBJECT: Inputs for the DCI re Excellence

REFERENCE: Routing Sheet to DA components fm EO/DDA, dtd 22 Jul 85, same subject (DDA 85-0024/31)

1. In his speech of 13 June, the DCI noted several "examples of excellence" which enabled the Agency to better serve its consumers; i.e., the President and other officers of our Government. We in the Office of Logistics, as one of the primary support arms of the Agency, view other CIA components as our "consumers"; and we strive to provide them the best possible service in terms of timeliness, responsiveness, and professionalism. A summary of our participation in the [redacted] was forwarded to the DDA by my memorandum of 3 July (copy at Attachment A). 25X1

2. I am proud to offer additional examples (Attachment B) of special initiative and achievement by Logistics personnel, both collectively and individually. They are but a few of the many such instances of excellence within OL. I believe that these -- as well as numerous others not mentioned in this report -- encompass the elements the DCI listed in his speech: i.e., the alertness to recognize a need or a potential improvement and the will to move on it; the bringing together of various experience, knowledge, and skills; and an understanding of the needs of our "consumers." 25X1

[redacted]

Henry P. Mahoney ✓

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DD/A Registry
85-0024/42

OIT-0651-85
14 August 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer
Deputy Director for Administration

VIA:

[Redacted]

25X1

FROM:

Acting Chief, Management Group, OIT

SUBJECT: Inputs for the DCI re Excellence

25X1

REFERENCE: Your memo, dated 19 July 1985, Same Subject,
DD/A-85-00241

Attached are OIT's contributions for the DA's Excellence Report to the DCI as requested in the reference. If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on [Redacted]

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DD/A Registry
85-0024/39

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DDA

FROM: [Redacted]
Director of Security

25X1

SUBJECT: The Excellence Program

[Redacted]

25X1

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 19 July 1985, requesting "examples of excellence" which might appropriately be forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence. [Redacted]

25X1

2. Attached herewith is a package of material which I believe reflects a cross-section of "excellence" on display within the Office of Security over the last few months. I have taken the liberty of providing examples showing the initiatives of individual officers as well as those by specific components where there has been a strong collective effort by a number of people. [Redacted]

25X1

3. I considered it appropriate in several instances to cite the specific cases which were being addressed. This included [Redacted] If these examples are forwarded for the use of the DCI in a public presentation, you may possibly wish to sanitize the write-up by deleting the names. [Redacted]

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4. If any additional information is required in connection with this matter, please do not hesitate to contact us. [Redacted]

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[Large Redacted Area]

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30 JUL 1985

Paul H. Nitze**SDI: The Soviet Program**

STAT



United States Department of State
 Bureau of Public Affairs
 Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters, before the Chautauqua Conference on Soviet-American Relations, Chautauqua, New York, June 28, 1985.

Soviet commentary on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program has been strongly negative. The Soviets have accused us of expanding the arms race into a new area by initiating "the militarization of space." In Geneva, they have demanded a ban on research, development, testing, and deployment of what they call "space-strike arms" and have conditioned progress in the negotiations on offensive nuclear force reductions on prior U.S. acceptance of this ban.

One might conclude from this Soviet commentary that the Soviet Union has no program comparable to our SDI. Such a conclusion would be far from correct.

Soviet Strategic Defense Efforts

Soviet military doctrine stresses that offensive and defensive forces must interact closely to achieve Soviet aims in any conflict. Accordingly, the Soviets are heavily involved in strategic defense, with programs that go far beyond research. In fact, over the last two decades, the Soviet Union has spent roughly as much on strategic defense as it has on its massive offensive nuclear forces. As part of this huge effort, the Soviets have deployed around Moscow

the world's only operational antiballistic missile (ABM) system, a system they are currently upgrading with a projected completion date of about 1987. They also have an in-depth national air defense force, a vast political leadership survival program, and nationwide civil defense forces and programs.

Further, they have been conducting a number of activities that are inconsistent with and tend to undermine the ABM Treaty. For example, their deployment of a large phased-array ballistic missile tracking radar near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia constitutes a violation of the treaty. We are concerned that, in the aggregate, Soviet ABM-related activities could provide them the basis for deployment of an ABM defense of their national territory, which would also violate the treaty.

Soviet strategic defense programs are not restricted to the more traditional approaches. The Soviets have also been pursuing, since the 1960s, research into advanced technologies for strategic defense. These technologies include high-energy lasers, particle-beam weapons, radio frequency weapons, and kinetic energy weapons. These are the same types of technologies being researched in the U.S. SDI program. Moreover, during this same period, the Soviets have had an active and expanding military space program.

The Soviet version of SDI has been overlooked in the recent public debate. Indeed, taking advantage of the closed nature of Soviet society, Soviet strategic defense efforts have proceeded com-

pletely free from debates of the sort that are occurring now in the West over the utility and implications of our program.

Let me address the Soviet version of SDI in some detail. While some of the material I will cover is quite technical, I hope it will give you a better appreciation of the extensive efforts the Soviets have been conducting for years.

Soviet Progress in Advanced Defense Technologies

High-Energy Laser Research. The Soviet Union's high-energy laser program began in the mid-1960s and has been much larger than the U.S. effort. The Soviets have built over a half-dozen major research and development facilities and test ranges, including some at the Sary Shagan missile test center where they also do traditional anti-ballistic missile work. They have over 10,000 scientists and engineers associated with the development of lasers for weapons.

The Soviets have conducted research on the three types of gas lasers that the United States considers promising for weapons applications: the gas-dynamic laser, the electric discharge laser, and the chemical laser. They have also been working on other types of lasers that the United States had not seriously considered for weapons applications until very recently. These include excimer and free-electron lasers.

The Soviets are also pursuing related laser weapon technologies, such as efficient electrical power sources and high-quality optical components. U.S. experts believe the Soviets are generally capable of supplying the necessary prime power, energy storage, and auxiliary components for most laser and other directed energy weapons. As evidence of this capability, the Soviets have developed a very powerful rocket-driven generator, which has no counterpart in the West. The Soviets may have also achieved the capability to develop the necessary optical systems for laser weapons.

The Soviet program has now progressed beyond technology research, in some cases to the development of prototype laser weapons. For the antisatellite—or ASAT—mission, the Soviets already have ground-based lasers at the Sary Shagan test site that could be used to interfere with U.S. satellites at low altitudes. Soviet programs have reached the point where they could begin con-

struction of ground-based laser ASAT facilities at operational sites. These facilities could be available by the end of the 1980s and would greatly increase Soviet ASAT capabilities. Moreover, they could test prototype space-based laser ASAT weapons by the early 1990s, and, if their technology developments prove successful, they could deploy operational space-based lasers for ASAT purposes in the mid-1990s.

For the ballistic missile defense—or BMD—mission, the Soviets could have prototypes for ground-based lasers by the late 1980s. Testing of the components for a large-scale operational system could begin in the early 1990s. With high priority and some significant technological risk, the Soviets could skip some testing steps and be ready to deploy a ground-based laser BMD system by the early to mid-1990s. The many difficulties associated with fielding an operational system would normally require much development time, however, and initial operational deployment is not likely in this century. The Soviets can be expected to pursue development of a space-based laser BMD system for possible deployment after the year 2000.

The Soviets have also begun to develop several high-energy laser weapons for air defense. These include lasers intended for air defense of high-value strategic targets in the Soviet Union, for point defense of ships at sea, and for air defense of theater forces. Following past practice, they are likely to deploy air defense lasers to complement, rather than replace, interceptors and surface-to-air missiles, or SAMs. The strategic air defense laser is probably at least in the prototype stage of development and could be operational by the late 1980s. It most likely will be deployed in conjunction with SAMs in a point defense role. The shipborne laser will probably not be operational until the early 1990s. The theater air defense laser may be operational sometime sooner and is likely to be capable of structurally damaging aircraft at close ranges and producing electro-optical and eye damage at greater distances.

Finally, the Soviets are developing an airborne laser. Such a laser could have several missions, including ASAT operations, protection of high-value aircraft, and protection against cruise missiles. Assuming a successful development effort, limited initial deployment could begin in the early 1990s.

Particle-Beam Weapons. Since the early 1970s, the Soviets have had a research program designed to explore the technical feasibility of a particle-beam weapon in space. For the ASAT mission, they may be able to test a prototype space-based particle-beam weapon intended to disrupt satellite electronic equipment in the mid- to late 1990s. One designed to destroy satellites could be tested by the year 2000. Early in the next century, the Soviets could have a prototype space-based BMD system ready for testing.

Radio Frequency Weapons. The Soviets have conducted research for decades on sources of high-power radio frequency—or RF—signals and the antennas that would be required to direct and focus the signals on distant targets. These signals have the potential to interfere with or destroy components of missiles, satellites, and reentry vehicles. In the 1990s, the Soviets could test a ground-based RF weapon capable of damaging satellites. A space-based RF antisatellite weapon will probably not be tested until after the year 2000.

Kinetic Energy Weapons. In the area of kinetic energy weapons, the Soviets have a variety of longstanding research programs underway. These weapons use the high-speed collision of a small mass with the target as the kill mechanism. As early as 1966, the Soviets had an experimental gun that could shoot streams of particles of a heavy metal, such as tungsten, at velocities of over 60 kilometers per second in a vacuum. Current Soviet efforts include research and development of electromagnetic railguns to accelerate projectiles to ultrahigh velocities, as well as other advanced systems. These programs could result in the near term in a short-range space-based system useful for satellite or space station defense or for close-in attack by a maneuvering satellite. Longer range space-based systems could be developed as early as the mid-1990s.

The Soviet Military Space Program

In addition to their huge and comprehensive program of research into advanced strategic defense technologies, the Soviets have the world's most active military space program. This program dominates the Soviet Union's overall space effort. For example, in 1984 the Soviets conducted about 100 space launches. Of these, some 80% were

purely military in nature, with much of the remainder serving both military and civil functions. By way of comparison, the total number of U.S. space launches in 1984 was about 20.

The Soviets believe in the combined arms concept of warfare in which all types of forces are integrated into military operations to achieve the desired goals. Space systems play a major role in this equation. Soviet space systems dedicated to military missions include satellites that perform reconnaissance, missile launch detection and attack warning, command and control, and ASAT functions. Dual-purpose satellites that perform some civilian functions are used for communications, navigational support, and weather prediction and monitoring.

In the reconnaissance area, the United States has no counterpart to the Soviet ocean reconnaissance satellites, the EORSAT [electronic intelligence ocean reconnaissance satellite] and the nuclear-powered RORSAT [radar ocean reconnaissance satellite]. These Soviet satellites have the mission of locating and identifying U.S. and allied naval forces in open ocean areas and targeting them for destruction by Soviet antiship weapons. Four such satellites were launched in 1984.

In the ASAT area, the Soviets have had the capability since 1971 to attack satellites in near-earth orbit with a ground-based orbital interceptor. Again, the United States has no comparable operational capability. Using a radar sensor and a pellet-type warhead, the interceptor can attack a target in orbit at various altitudes during the interceptor's first two revolutions. An intercept during the first orbit would minimize the time available for a target satellite to take evasive action.

The interceptor can reach targets orbiting at altitudes of more than 5,000 kilometers, but it is probably intended for high-priority satellites at lower altitudes. It is launched from the Tyuratam space complex, where launch pads and storage space for interceptors and launch vehicles are available. Several interceptors could be launched each day. In addition to the orbital interceptors, the Soviets could also use their operational ABM interceptors in a direct-ascent attack against low-orbiting satellites.

Should the Soviets decide to deploy in space extremely large payloads, including components of a space-based ballistic missile defense, they would require space boosters capable of placing in orbit thousands of tons per year. The two new boosters they are developing—a medium-lift vehicle comparable to our Titan and a heavy-lift vehicle comparable to our Saturn V—will meet this requirement. These boosters should be available as early as the late 1980s.

Finally, the Soviets have ambitious plans for their manned space programs: They plan to replace their current Salyut space stations with large space complexes, which could support 20 or more cosmonauts on a permanent basis. Such a complex would enhance their space-based military support and war-fighting capabilities. Missions could include military research and development, reconnaissance, imagery interpretation, ASAT support operations, and BMD support operations. To ferry cosmonauts to this complex, as well as to place large payloads in orbit, the Soviets are developing their own version of the U.S. shuttle orbiter. They are also experimenting with a test vehicle that is apparently a scale model of a large, manned space plane. This plane's possible missions include reconnaissance, crew transport, and ASAT operations. It also could be used as a manned space station defender.

Soviet Disingenuousness

Considering all of the foregoing, it becomes apparent just how preposterous Soviet criticisms of the U.S. SDI program are. The United States is not expanding the military competition into new areas; the Soviets have been researching the same technologies for two decades. Likewise, the United States is not initiating "the militarization of space"; space has been militarized for many years, primarily by Soviet systems and programs.

This Soviet disingenuousness becomes even more evident when one considers those who are taking advantage of our open society by leading the attack in the Western public arena on the U.S. SDI program. Within a month of President Reagan's 1983 speech that initiated SDI, a letter signed by a large group of Soviet scientists was published in the *New York Times* denouncing the

program. A number of the signatories of this letter have, in fact, been instrumental in Soviet programs researching both conventional and advanced ballistic missile defense technologies. Among these are Mr. Y. P. Velikhov, the Deputy Director of the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute, who is a central figure in Soviet laser and particle-beam weapon efforts; Mr. N. G. Basov and Mr. A. M. Prokhorov, who are both scientific advisers to laser weapon programs; and Mr. Avduyevskiy, who is responsible for a number of projects researching the military use of space, including a space-based laser weapon. Other signatories have spent their careers developing strategic offensive weapons and other military systems.

Soviet Motives

Why are the Soviets conducting this propaganda campaign? Clearly, they see the potential applications for advanced defensive technologies; otherwise they would not be investing so much effort and so many resources in this area. It is not unreasonable to conclude that they would like to continue to be the only ones pressing forward in this field. At a minimum, they want to keep the United States from outstripping them in such technologies.

In this vein, the Soviet propaganda line against SDI is as predictable as it is hypocritical. The Soviets hope to foster a situation in which we would unilaterally restrain our research effort, even though it is fully consistent with existing treaties. This would leave them with a virtual monopoly in advanced strategic defense research; they see this as the most desirable outcome.

Such a virtual monopoly could be most dangerous for the West. Both sides have recognized for many years that offense and defense are vitally related to each other, that it is the balance between the offense-defense mixes of the sides that is essential to keeping the peace. Unilateral restraint by the United States in the defense area would jeopardize this balance and could, therefore, potentially undermine our deterrent ability.

If the United States proves unwilling to restrain itself unilaterally, the Soviets are prepared to impose an agreed ban on research "designed to

space-strike arms." At worst, a
ally observed ban would leave them
ere they are today, unthreatened by
potential U.S. technological advances
and maintaining the only operational
ABM and ASAT systems. The Soviets
are already positioning themselves, how-
ever, to avoid having such a ban apply
equally to the research of both sides.
They currently deny that any of their ef-
forts fall within their definition of re-
search "designed to create space-strike
arms," while asserting that all of the
U.S. SDI program fits within that defini-
tion. Moreover, even were a research
ban to be applied equally to the sides,
given its inherent unverifiability and the
closed nature of the Soviet Union—and
particularly its scientific community

compared to ours—the Soviets very well
might be able unilaterally to continue
their research on a clandestine basis.

Conclusion

We can expect the Soviets to continue to
protest strongly and publicly about SDI
and alleged U.S. designs to "militarize
space," all the while denying that they
are conducting similar programs. We
must recognize this propaganda for
what it is—the key element of an overall
strategy to divide the United States
from its allies and elicit from us uni-
lateral concessions. By making clear to
the Soviets that we have the political
will to maintain the necessary military
capabilities effectively to deter them—
that is, that their propaganda campaign

will not succeed in causing us to exercise
unilateral restraint—we can establish
the necessary conditions for the Soviets
to consider a more forthcoming ap-
proach to the negotiations in Geneva. In
that event, the United States will be
prepared, as it is now, for a serious
discussion of how—should new defensive
technologies prove feasible—our two
sides could move jointly to a more stable
strategic relationship, building upon the
research efforts of both. ■

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14 August 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary

FROM:
Administrative Officer, DCI

25X1

SUBJECT: Input for the DCI re Excellence

As requested, attached are responses from the Offices in the DCI Area concerning examples of employee excellence or initiative. Eleven examples are submitted from the four offices listed below.

National Intelligence Council	6
Office of General Counsel	2
Office of Legislative Liaison	2
Office of the Comptroller	1

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC 04027/85

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary
THROUGH : Administrative Officer, DCI
FROM : Robert M. Gates
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT : Reporting Significant Personnel Performance and
Initiatives
REFERENCE : AO/DCI Memo to Multiple Addressees, dtd 22 July
1985; Same Subj.

In response to your request to provide examples of employee excellence and initiatives, the National Intelligence Council is pleased to report six instances of outstanding performance by its employees, descriptions of which are set forth in the attachments.



Robert M. Gates

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Attachments



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ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

29 July 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Administrative Officer/DCI

FROM: Charles A. Briggs
Director, Office of Legislative Liaison

SUBJECT: Employee Excellence

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum of 22 July 1985, Reporting
Significant Personnel Performance and
Initiatives

The Office of Legislative Liaison has the following recent examples of employee excellence. None of these examples has been of such a nature or duration so as to warrant a cash award or a formal commendation. But each typifies action by an employee that goes well beyond the standards of acceptable work behavior. And in each case the employee has been motivated to provide something extra in energy, thought, judgment, and dedication.

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DS&T-710-85

15 AUG 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary

FROM: R. E. Hineman
Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Inputs for the DCI re Excellence

REFERENCE: Your memo dtd 19 July 1985, Same Subject


Forwarded herewith are contributions from the Directorate of Science and Technology to the DCI's list of "initiatives taken and outstanding performances turned in".



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R. E. Hineman

Attachments:
As stated



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15 AUG 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary

FROM:

[Redacted]

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Executive Officer, DO/Career Management Staff

SUBJECT:

Examples of Excellence

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[Redacted]

✓ Attached per your request are the DO's latest examples of excellence. Please note that while the examples have been sanitized to a degree, some include sources and methods information which should be used with caution and discretion in any public form of recognition.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Executive Registry
85- 3776/1

21 October 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Excellence Task Force Members:
Executive Officer, DDA
Executive Assistant, DDI
Executive Officer, Career Management Staff, DDO
Executive Assistant, DDS&T
Administrative Officer, DCI

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Excellence

1. I appreciate very much your selection and presentation of the 27 examples of unusual initiative and achievement. I will send a personal letter to each of the individuals involved along the lines of the sample you have drafted. I would also like to meet with some of those involved in the more significant of your selections. I would find this very satisfying personally and I think it would be well if this indication of my interest got around.

2. I think I would like to talk with some people involved in examples 1, 2, a small group in 5, and 7. I would like to see the target studies indicated in 11 and the work plan for analysts indicated as the second item in 9. I would like to see the paper today if possible and talk to the individuals later. I would like to see the Intelligence Assessment in example 22. I would like to either hear or read about examples in 13 and 14. In addition, I want to send out a one or two page bulletin to the organization about this review indicating very briefly the substance of those selections which can be discussed without security or other damage in their being known about. It should be presented in a manner which highlights the initiative represented by these examples and the cross-fertilization between different units and disciplines in the organization. You might stress this as one of the important factors of our activity which has developed out of this excellence program.

3. This message might be keyed timewise to the laying of the cornerstone of the new building and refer to the value this will have in bringing more of our people and activities together and in closer touch with each other. It should incorporate more of this cross-fertilization, etc.

- Distribution:
- 1 - Ea Addressee
 - 1 - DDCI
 - 1 - EX DIR
 - 1 - ER
 - 1 - ES

William J. Casey
William J. Casey
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Chairman, E Career Service

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Excellence

1. At the conclusion of my remarks on Excellence to CIA employees in the Auditorium on 13 June 1985, I said that about every three months or as frequently as appropriate, we will make available to you a more comprehensive listing of initiatives taken and outstanding performances turned in than I was able to give you at the time. As I had hoped and expected, this stimulated new ideas and practical initiatives as well as inspired by example. When the spirit of Excellence takes hold, whole groups resonate, reflecting a real harmony of purpose and new heights of effectiveness and production. I have selected specific items from among the many examples of Excellence you sent me on 14 August and have attached them for dissemination to your employees.

2. I regret that I cannot share with you some of the best examples of Excellence, but there is a very good reason why I cannot. We are the best intelligence outfit in the world because we are a silent service; we have, for over 35 years, maintained the highest standards of security and compartmentation. Many of our colleagues have performed tasks which have set new standards for Excellence, but their achievements are celebrated privately, within the small circle of coworkers who share a stake in their accomplishments. They know who they are and they have my highest respect and appreciation. I commend them just as I do those responsible for the accomplishments I want to share with you in this report.

3. Excellence at CIA is a product of teamwork at all levels. It is part of our culture. One of the principal responsibilities of the leadership, from section chiefs to the very top, is to create an environment in which all of our people feel encouraged to take the initiative to improve the quality of our work. This includes recruiting agents, planning covert action, designing sophisticated collection systems, doing analysis and providing support. I would like each of you to share these examples of Excellence at a forthcoming staff meeting with your office directors and, in the DDO, with the division chiefs. I would like you to ask them, in turn, to present these examples at their staff meetings. They, in turn, should pass the word on down the leadership chain so that the examples can reach all Agency employees. I hope and expect this will stimulate new ideas and practical initiatives, as well as inspire by example.

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William J. Casey

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Executive Registry
85- 4392/5


12 November 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Excellence Task Force
FROM: Executive Secretary
SUBJECT: Examples of Excellence

Each of the letters to individuals submitted by your respective Directorates has been signed. These are being returned so that presentations can be made in the appropriate forum.

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The Director was pleased with the results of your efforts.



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85-	4392/5


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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

Executive Registry
05-3295/2

26 November 1985

Office of the Executive Director

For:
OGC

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Just a note to let you know that we have scheduled the next two of our series of presentations on Agency management issues.

The first of these will be on 10 December in Room 1E78 (note room change) at 1600. Dick Kerr, the ADDI, will be discussing the impact of technology on the DI. His Directorate is feeling the presence of an ever-growing information flow which will become a flood

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over the next few years. This is forcing some critical management decisions regarding how best to meet the challenge.

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The second session is scheduled for 7 January and will be held in Room 1A07 at 1600. It will be devoted to discussing how an individual worked the system to resolve an "impossible" requirement. The individual, from the Office of Communications, will be the guest speaker. who is presently on a PCS assignment overseas, will be returning TDY for this presentation.

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Please let us know if you will be able to attend by contacting

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Central Intelligence Agency

CLASSIFIED
REF ID: A66501
OS- 3295/1

Washington, D.C. 20505

29 August 1985

Office of Executive Director

FOR:

[Redacted]

OGC

) 25X1

Just a note to remind you that the third in our series of presentations exploring selected Agency management issues is scheduled for 17 September.

[Redacted]

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As usual, this session will be held in Room 1A07, Headquarters, from 1600 to 1800.

[Redacted]

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

EX-100
85- 3295

29 August 1985

Office of Executive Director

FOR:

[Redacted]

OIG

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Just a note to remind you that the third in our series of presentations exploring selected Agency management issues is scheduled for 17 September.

[Redacted]

25X1

As usual, this session will be held in Room 1A07, Headquarters, from 1600 to 1800.

[Redacted]

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