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London attack linked to Khadafy order

U.S. agency monitored Libyan Embassy

By John P. Wallach
Herald News Service

WASHINGTON — Reagan administration officials who disclosed that U.S. intelligence had monitored a Libyan government communication last Tuesday ordering its diplomats to fire directly into a British crowd were critical of Britain for agreeing to free everyone inside the Libyan Embassy.

But the White House sources said there might be a silver lining in Britain's latest experience with international terrorism, a high priority of Reagan policy-makers these days. "For the first time, the United States is no longer on the cutting edge of this business by itself," a key official said.

The official disclosed that there also now is hard evidence that the bombs placed inside three suitcases — and the suitcases — that injured innocent passengers at London's Heathrow Airport came from Libya.

The key Reagan adviser said the international community should take the back-to-back incidents as a lesson to crack down more stringently. For a start, the official said: "We should take hijacking a step further and start to ban Libyan airliners and ships."

White House sources said that although the monitored telephone call from Tripoli to the Libyan People's Bureau, or embassy, in London was not made by Col. Moatammar Khadafy, there was no doubt whatsoever that the order to fire machine guns into the crowd of protesters came from the Libyan government.

It was the first time the White House pinned the blame directly on Khadafy's regime and offered evidence that the gunfire that killed 25-year-old British policewoman Yvonne Fletcher last Tuesday had been ordered by officials close to the Libyan ruler.

The British decision to expel everyone in the besieged Libyan Embassy by this Sunday means the unidentified gunman will be given safe passage back to Libya along with about 50 people inside. "This is the most serious flouting of international law since the Iran hostage crisis," one U.S. official said.

The White House has deliberately avoided any public comment on the terrorist incident to avoid providing a pretext for similar terror-

communications

ism here. But National Security Council officials privately said the British solution sets a precedent that has dangerous implications for international order.

"It means that anyone can use the sanctuary of an embassy to conduct a terrorist act with complete immunity," one key adviser said. He pointed in particular to the fact that in addition to the 30 accredited Libyan diplomats, Britain had agreed to free another 20 Libyans who had no diplomatic immunity.

Britain decided to expel the Libyans because of concern for the safety of more than 8,000 British citizens living in Libya.

The Libyans are members of the Libyan People's Bureau, so-called because Khadafy refuses to call any of his diplomatic missions "embassies," and are believed by U.S. intelligence sources to include a number of "hit men" conducting a vigilante campaign of terrorizing exiled opponents of the Khadafy regime.

U.S. intelligence sources recently identified the targets of these "hit squads" and the names of the Libyan agents in Paris and London believed to be chiefly responsible for coordinating the new campaign.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1WASHINGTON POST
25 April 1984

Libya Sent a Signal on Defense of Embassy

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

Several hours before a gunman in the Libyan Embassy in London opened fire on demonstrators and police last week, the Libyan government sent a coded radio message to the embassy ordering the staff to defend the building, fire on the demonstrators and create disturbances, including bombings, in public places, according to informed sources.

The sources said the government of radical ruler Muammar Qaddafi has sent many strident messages to its embassies, which the Libyans call "people's bureaus," but that the one

sent hours before the London shooting was particularly grim.

The message was intercepted by western electronic intelligence-gathering methods, the sources said. But it was apparently not decoded and translated in time to be distributed to British security authorities before the shooting began at midmorning on Tuesday, April 17.

A British policewoman was killed and 11 Libyan exiles among a crowd of 70 anti-Qaddafi demonstrators were wounded in the shooting. American specialists also said a bombing at London's Heathrow Airport three days later also was "al-

most certainly" linked to Qaddafi's agents.

Contrary to some newspaper and television reports here and in Britain, knowledgeable sources said the coded message was not intercepted by American intelligence and passed to the British. The Americans, these sources said, were "not involved" in

the intelligence-gathering and received their information from the British after the shooting.

American specialists said the message and the subsequent shootings are part of an escalating campaign by Qaddafi to try to eliminate exiles opposed to his regime around the

world. Qaddafi's campaign against dissidents abroad began four years ago and has spawned violence in several countries. In the last six months, however, Qaddafi has become "completely paranoid," one source said. "He is going after everybody," another said, adding that "Libya is going to be a big problem."

Qaddafi's campaign against the dissidents apparently is spurred by increasingly daring attempts on his life and a number of bombings in Libya, an American specialist said.

The Libyan dissident movement is growing, he added, and some dissidents have begun to slip back into Libya.

Last December, the military barracks where Qaddafi lives were hit by an explosion soon after 1,000 pounds of dynamite were reported stolen, the specialist said.

Britain has provided refuge for many of the thousands of Libyans who have gone into exile.

In March, U.S. sources said, London's Scotland Yard, acting on tips from Libyan dissidents, was successful in preventing terrorist incidents planned by the Libyan regime. But on March 10, two bombs exploded in London and Manchester, wounding some two dozen Arabs. Five Libyans, described as "students," were deported by the British government.

British authorities have noted some apparent similarities between these bombings and the Heathrow explosion last Friday. London has not accused Libyans of responsibility for the airport attack.

Officially, neither American nor British officials will comment on reports of the coded message intercept. British foreign ministry spokesmen have only said "no specific information which would lead us to believe that an incident of this kind would occur was in our hands before the incident itself."

Confirming that description, American officials said the intercepted message was not decoded and distributed in time. They said how fast this can be done is usually a function of the computers used in sophisticated intelligence-gathering operations.

ARTICLE APPEARED
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29 April 1984

Qaddafi's Authority Said to Be

By Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writer

TRIPOLI, Libya—Col. Muammar Qaddafi is still publicly hailed as "The Leader" of this North African revolutionary state, but there are signs that his regime faces potentially serious trouble.

Often under the influence of sleeping pills, constantly fearful for his life, at times a near hermit and unpredictable to his subordinates and allies, Qaddafi appears to have lost the once fervent support of some of his countrymen, according to several Libyan officials who have personal contact with Qaddafi.

During my week-long visit here, many of the western-educated officials and bureaucrats who try to run the country on a daily basis said in private that they have become increasingly frustrated by the internal and foreign chaos their leader has stirred. Some refer to him jeeringly as "God."

"The country is in turmoil," one official said. "We expect something."

Another official, in a rage, called Qaddafi "small, out of it . . . a pinhead."

By no account is Qaddafi, who has ruled Libya for nearly 15 years, losing all of his political instincts. There are times when he appears in public, gives speeches and shows his lucidity and flair. But these periods are interspersed with longer times of withdrawal and public utterings that two Libyan authorities here separately described with the same word: "gibberish."

Qaddafi has always left aides and visitors waiting for hours or days for meetings with

him, but some Libyan officials said it has become much worse in recent months. He has trouble sleeping, they said, and wanders around day and night making morbid remarks. They said he is not in good health and either is incapable of making some key decisions or unable to communicate his thoughts. There is an irregularity in his daily schedule that is transmitted through the entire government and country.

Highly classified CIA reports circulating

in the U.S. government confirm this evaluation, including evidence that Qaddafi takes an excessive amount of sleeping pills,

Weakening

according to American sources. One U.S. official said that Qaddafi is "burning the candle at both ends . . . high anxiety, high energy."

During this month's crisis at the Libyan embassy in London, which led to the British decision to break diplomatic relations with Libya, it was apparent here that government authority was almost hopelessly spread among Qaddafi, the Foreign Ministry and the so-called people's committees

that theoretically rule the country. The result was bungled negotiations that many here had hoped to resolve without a break in diplomatic relations.

If a dictatorship controls either by co-opting or crushing, Qaddafi has been crushing more than co-opting, stepping up a campaign of internal terror and repression. This may be in response to an attack on one of his most trusted aides, a shadowy but key figure in the Libyan government named Said Qadaf Dam. According to U.S. intelligence, Dam, a military officer and Qaddafi relative, is the second most powerful man in Libya and has been in charge of a series of attacks against the Libyan opposition abroad, including dissidents and unfriendly foreign governments.

In March, it was learned here, a car bomb injured Dam, and officials said he may lose his legs as a result. Foreign Minister Ali Treiki said Dam had been hurt in an automobile accident, but brushed off questions about the incident. Another well-placed official in Libya confirmed that it was an attack and said the bombing had substantially increased Qaddafi's fear that the CIA or Libyan dissidents were going to kill him.

Libyan officials also confirmed that a government ammunition dump had recently been blown up by a dissident group based in Rome, reportedly called The Volcano.

One Libyan dissident, Omar Abdullah Muhayshi, a one-time Qaddafi intimate who left the country in 1975 after a dispute with the ruler,

recently returned and, according to one reliable account, was kidnaped by Qaddafi's agents. In 1983, former CIA agent Edwin P. Wilson, who had been imprisoned for selling explosives to Libya, was acquitted by a U.S. District Court jury in Washington of charges of plotting the assassination of Muhayshi.

All this attention on real or imagined enemies has disillusioned many officials here, as have Qaddafi's various military adventures in Africa—as in Chad, where he has about 5,000 troops—and his attempts to overthrow enemies in Egypt and Sudan. His designs to forge a greater Arab revolutionary state, unifying Libya with Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, Egypt or Sudan, have, in the words of one Libyan official, "cost billions and got us nowhere."

The internal repression has left a deep mark. The public hangings of two students for treason at Tripoli University on April 16 contributed to the anti-Qaddafi demonstration at the Libyan Embassy in London the next day. It was at that demonstration that a British policewoman was killed by shots fired from the building and 11 other persons were wounded. Five days later Britain broke diplomatic relations.

During that week, several Libyan officials urged me to write about the hangings. It was obvious from the tone of their remarks, and the fear expressed in their eyes, that the public executions greatly troubled them. The public hangings are a frequent subject of whispered conversations on the streets and in government offices.

One report circulating among Libyans was that a total of 23 persons had been publicly executed for treason in April alone. An official said that number was an exaggeration; he placed the total at 10. But he added: "It is impossible to know because there is no certain information, only rumors and maybe one hanging becomes 10 as [the report] circulates and is repeated."

This official said there were thousands of political prisoners in Libya, people who had spoken out against

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Qaddafi or some revolutionary principle and were jailed for doing so. Questioned about such a high number, the official repeated: "Thousands. I tell you thousands." He said he knew names but refused to provide any, insisting that even to know about the alleged political prisoners or to discuss them was dangerous.

He then told a story about someone who reportedly disappeared suddenly after making a derogatory comment about green tea. Green is the national revolutionary color of renewal: the Libyan flag is green, and Qaddafi's three-volume revolutionary manifesto is called "The Green Book."

The official acknowledged that the story might be apocryphal, at least an exaggeration, but he insisted

that it had taken on the weight of truth on a larger and more revealing scale.

"People believe it," he said, "because it could happen. Things like that happen." Carrying the thought further, perhaps in another exaggeration, he said, "No one is happy here."

Qaddafi's peculiar and sometimes contradictory statements and actions in foreign affairs have troubled some of his countrymen. In a speech a month ago he publicly suggested that "to vex the United States," Libya could provide the Soviets with bases along the country's 1,300-mile Mediterranean coastline.

"We can change the balances [between the superpowers] a thousand times and turn the tables upside down," Qaddafi said.

But later in an interview here, Foreign Minister Treiki dismissed the idea.

"We are against any foreign troops in any other country . . . whether it is the United States in Grenada or West Germany or the Soviets in Afghanistan." Treiki added: "We don't accept communism and we will never accept communism and they know it."

Qaddafi seemed to be sending another perplexing signal to an African ally recently. Sam Nujoma, leader of the South-West Africa People's Organization, which is fighting to end South African rule in Namibia, came here earlier this month to see Qaddafi and get more money to supplement the millions of dollars Nujoma said the Libyan leader has supplied

to his rebel forces. For six days Nujoma was stranded at a seaside hotel, ignored by Qaddafi. As of last Tuesday he still had not seen him.

One Libyan official, distressed by his boss's unavailability, said that Nujoma would someday be the leader of Namibia and it was a measure of Qaddafi's shortsightedness that he had been kept waiting so long.

Nujoma laughed off the long wait, but one of his aides and a Libyan official said it was insulting and humiliating, almost an unforgivable slight in the revolutionary brotherhood. By contrast, when Maurice Bishop, the late leader of the Caribbean island of Grenada, came to see Qaddafi in 1982, Bishop stayed at his guest house and spent four days with the Libyan leader.

The Libyan handling of its crisis with Great Britain, from the April 17 shooting outside the Libyan People's Bureau, or embassy, in London to the time five days later when the British decided to break relations with Libya, was botched from beginning to end, according to some officials here. One called it "a metaphor for our pathology about dissent."

There were many voices in the Libyan government for accommodation.

"What possible, what conceivable advantage would we have in broken relations with [the] British?" one frustrated official asked. Fuad Zaiteni, who is one of Qaddafi's regular interpreters, said that the British move was a blow, a kind of international seal of disapproval.

It was clear that no one here had the authority to conduct the negotiations from the Libyan side, although Foreign Minister Treiki had the assignment in name. Several hours after the announcement that relations would be broken, British Ambassador Oliver Miles said of Treiki in an interview: "Half his ministry is against him. He has no authority."

The day after the shootings in London, the people's committee of the Foreign Liaison Bureau (the name given the foreign ministry) issued a statement blasting the British for aggression against the embassy, for "arrogance and barbarism," and promising "revenge." Treiki said the next day, "The British are very reasonable people, people we can deal with."

Qaddafi placed himself between the two voices of his revolutionary government—the people's committees and the bureaucrats and senior officials, like Treiki, who are for the most part western-educated professionals. The committees, which theoretically run everything, are dominated by younger Libyans dedicated to revolutionary principles and full of rhetorical zeal. At the Foreign Liaison Bureau, the committee is made up of 10 members, many of whom have no diplomatic training or qualifications—"street bureaucrats," according to one official.

Qaddafi, either unwilling or incapable of resolving disputes between the two factions, often lets them argue and contradict each other. The results are chaotic.

Treiki has a deputy in the foreign ministry. But according to rules set up by the people's committee, when he is absent the acting foreign minister comes from the committee, rotating each month among the 10 members. Several foreign diplomats in Tripoli say it is nearly impossible to do business when Treiki is out of town.

To make the Libyan actions during the British crisis even more confusing, according to officials here, Qaddafi was sending personal messages of "revolutionary encouragement" to those manning the people's bureau in London during the siege by British police.

So negotiations were conducted on four fronts by the Libyans—Treiki, the people's committee here in Tripoli, the people's bureau in London and Qaddafi.

The point seems to be that the revolution is more important than the government. The revolutionary

principles and drumbeat of anger at old authority don't die very easily and Qaddafi feeds the fires regularly. The British were a perfect target, a symbol of the imperialist, colonial past. One committee member even suggested that the march to revolutionary purity must necessarily entail diplomatic disengagement with the British.

At the foreign ministry officials saw all this as a loss. Several experienced observers here noted that the situation resembled the Iranian revolution in 1979 when the radicals would articulate, then initiate, a course of extreme action—such as

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the seizing of the hostages in the American embassy—and the moderates had no other choice than to go along.

The thin, expert fingers of the soldier moved effortlessly over the release springs of the Soviet-designed AK47. Out on the blacktop of the vast parade ground the soldier hurriedly field-stripped the weapon, laid out the final part and leapt up, black combat boots clicking. The soldier shouted in Arabic, "It is ready, sir!" and came to attention, a slight smile of pride rising and then quickly snuffed out. The time was about 30 seconds, faster than anyone else in the class.

A long, braided pony tail flopped over the small, red shoulder boards denoting the lowest rank, coming to rest at the back of the green fatigues. She was 14 years old, a female volunteer in Col. Qaddafi's new cadre. Women have been training here at the Women's Army College since 1979, according to Maj. Abdul Razak.

Qaddafi has tried to institute universal compulsory military training for women, but the People's Congress which he set up in the 1970s has so far thwarted him, so all women are volunteers. By the hundreds, some hardly 4 feet tall, aged 13 to 17, they march and learn about machine guns, pistols and larger weapons.

During one morning of drill, while watching the gangly adolescents wield the weapons, in some cases the bayonets as long as the teen-agers' thighs, an official whispered: "Look at this, what kind of life is this for these girls?"

Military training for men is not popular. Work normally stops here at about 2 in the afternoon, but men undergoing military training must keep their regular jobs and then spend three to four hours, five days a week, with their military unit. They must do this for six months to one year at different intervals every several years.

Qaddafi set up a universal education system that now costs about \$1.5 billion a year. But Abdul Hafiz Zallitali, chairman of the People's

Education Committee, said in an interview that the system is undergoing dramatic revision.

"We have been so concerned in the last 13 or 14 years to expand and solve the literacy problem," said Zallitali, a heavy-set, well-dressed man smoking Rothman cigarettes.

"This means we had to build classrooms and train teachers . . . We inherited a traditional system with no specialties, no emphasis on practical and technical skills. We [educated] people to put them on the doorsteps of a university . . . This system was irrelevant to the needs of the country.

"We poured enormous sums into this, [but] the people who work here do not need a university education. So we needed serious rethinking and we've been doing so in the last three years and now we're settled on a general course."

That course, he said, will emphasize the "manpower needs of the future." That means about 40 percent of the students, those with lower academic achievement levels, will get vocational training and another 30 to 35 percent will get various types of technical training.

The practical effect of the old educational system is that much work is done by outside laborers and technicians; about 40 to 50 percent of the labor force in the entire country is foreign. They do everything from waiting on tables in hotels to the most technically sophisticated work in the oil fields.

One official said, "So we have thousands of university-educated people who are too educated to do [vocational or basic labor] and have nowhere to fit in . . . and we wind up with thousands sitting around being revolutionaries."

Others interviewed said there is bound to be some resistance to the education department's efforts to tell the low achievers they are going to solder circuit boards or repair refrigerators for a living. The expectations raised by the Qaddafi socialist revolution are greater.

Libya's economy is not in very good shape, according to information provided by Libyan officials and government reports.

Oil revenue, which accounts for about 99 percent of the country's income, has been cut as much as half by comparatively low prices and reduced quotas set by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. In addition, the economy is not structurally sound. Although some officials tried to convince a reporter that many industries were springing up, others said this claim was exaggerated.

"We can't make even a needle to sew a shirt," said one. "All labor and equipment come from outside . . . We cover everything with money.

Take away the money or the oil and we have nothing."

Nonetheless, travel around Tripoli and its outskirts revealed a land that appears to be one vast construction site, with housing, factories and nearly every imaginable building being erected. Billions of dollars of the work is being done by foreign subsidiaries of American companies, much more than either the Libyans or U.S. government would like to acknowledge. Libyan officials say the U.S. role is critical and accounts for the generally good treatment that the hundreds of Americans who work here receive.

Libya has spent billions of dollars for arms from the Soviet Union and is currently negotiating to buy another \$5 billion to \$10 billion worth, but many officials, including Foreign Minister Treiki, made it clear that they would rather buy arms from the United States.

U.S. relations with Libya have grown increasingly cool since Qaddafi took power. All U.S. diplomats were withdrawn from Libya after an attack on the embassy in December 1979 and Libyan diplomats were expelled from the United States in May 1981. In August of that year, U.S. planes shot down two Libyan jets over the Gulf of Sidra and there have been other tense encounters in the same area since.

Fawzi Shakshuki, the minister of planning, said in an interview that the only nonmilitary project with the Soviet Union was a small agricultural contract to study the soil.

"There are no big projects with the Soviet Union," he said, "because they can't give us the best prices and conditions."

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The largest development project in the country, the first stage of which will cost \$3 billion, is a desert irrigation plan that was awarded to a South Korean company; \$100 million of that goes to the Texas-based construction firm of Brown and Root for managing the project.

One visible success of the Qaddafi revolution is that the oil wealth has been distributed widely and poverty has been virtually eliminated. Food, most of which is imported, is heavily subsidized. Rent has been abolished and ownership transferred to those who occupy a house or apartment.

The lavish, ostentatious wealth of the oil-rich Persian Gulf states cannot be found. I did not see a single limousine during a week's stay in Tripoli.

Despite the strict fundamentalist Moslem laws here, there are several large television antennas in the Tripoli area, which reportedly are used, among other things, to pick up sexually oriented broadcasts from Italy.

On Friday, the day of worship, Foreign Minister Treiki arrived at my hotel in the driver's seat of a dark green, 1982 government Chevrolet. He drove me to a friend's farm south of Tripoli.

Libyan and U.S. sources described Treiki, 45, as smooth and ruthless. Said one analyst: "He is the man that has carried out the policy of Qaddafi. During the Chad [invasion] Treiki was the guy who appeared with the money in one bag and threats in the other."

After we arrived at the farm, Treiki regularly tuned in the news on a three-band radio-cassette player. This was in the third day of his negotiations with the British ambassador over the siege at the Libyan Embassy in London.

Treiki seemed relaxed, took off his shoes and socks and lay down. Covering relations and policy from the Soviet Union to Nicaragua, he kept to the line that Libya wants peace and the United States is the aggressor.

For nine hours he laughed, asked questions, shrugged, gave half-hearted denials but provided little new. Before sunset he drove to the coast and the Roman ruins of the large city of Lepcis Magna and walked though the remains of the forum, theater and baths for an hour.

He kept trying to turn the discussion to the United States, saying it had no real foreign policy in the Middle East, rather just a series of incoherent actions that change direction almost daily.

"You should write a long article about this city instead of the other things . . . President Reagan should give up the billions he spends for armaments to rebuild this city."

ON PAGE A-1

NEW YORK TIMES

8 April 1984

U.S. SAID TO DIRECT MINING OF HARBORS AROUND NICARAGUA

INVOLVEMENT IS ASSAILED

Americans on Ship Reportedly Oversee Latin Commandos Who Place the Devices

By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 7 — Americans working for the Central Intelligence Agency on a ship off Nicaragua's Pacific coast have been supervising the mining of Nicaraguan harbors in recent months, according to Reagan Administration officials and members of Congress.

The sources say the mining operation marks the first time since the United States began supporting Nicaraguan rebels three years ago that Americans have become directly involved in military operations against Nicaragua.

The actual placement of the mines inside Nicaraguan territorial waters, they said, is handled by an elite group of Latin American commandos who use small, high-speed boats to penetrate shipping lanes close to shore.

'Closer to Direct Confrontation'

The officials said that unlike ground operations inside Nicaragua conducted by rebel forces, which American advisers monitor from Honduras but do not control, the planting of the mines in Nicaraguan waters directly involves Americans and is under their immediate control.

Members of the Senate and House intelligence committees said the role of the Americans constituted a significant change in C.I.A. operations against Nicaragua and, as one Democratic Senator said, "crosses a threshold that brings us closer to a direct confrontation with Nicaragua."

A spokesman for the C.I.A., Dale Petersen, said today that the agency would not comment on the mining operation or the involvement of Americans. Intelligence officials said privately that Americans involved in the mining activity do not enter Nicaraguan territorial waters.

Territorial Limits Are Disputed

Nicaragua claims territorial waters up to 200 miles off shore, but the United States respects only a 12-mile limit. The intelligence ship that carries Americans operates outside the 12-mile limit but well within the 200-mile boundary, Administration officials said. The high-speed boats travel within a mile or two of the Nicaraguan coast.

Based on the 12-mile limit respected by the United States, intelligence officials contended that Americans are not directly involved in military operations against Nicaragua but instead serve in an advisory capacity in international waters similar to the role of Americans based in Honduras who train and continue to help supervise rebel ground forces inside Nicaragua.

Members of Congress, including Democrats and Republicans, said the fact that Americans remain outside the 12-mile limit does not lessen their responsibility for the operation.

"We have carefully monitored these activities to insure that, whatever else happened, Americans didn't get into combat-type operations against Nicaragua," a Republican member of the Senate intelligence committee said.

'Involved Directly'

The Senator, who asked to remain anonymous, added: "That distinction has now been lost. When an American is on the mother ship in a mining operation, he's involved directly in military activities. It's irrelevant whether the ship is in international waters."

Neither the Senate nor House committees were informed about the mining or the participation of Americans until recent weeks, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York and vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said in an interview Friday. "The mining must be stopped and it will be stopped." He said the Senate committee has scheduled a meeting next week with senior C.I.A. officials to discuss the mining operation.

French and British Opposition

Mr. Moynihan, who earlier this week voted in favor of giving the C.I.A. an additional \$21 million to support Nicaraguan rebel activities this year, said he opposed the mining on the grounds that it violates freedom of the seas and

places the United States in "the absurd position of laying mines that Western European nations may come and remove."

Mr. Moynihan was referring to an offer by France, made public on Thursday, to help Nicaragua clear the mines. Britain told the Reagan Administration earlier this week that it disapproved of the mining as an interference with international shipping.

The House Select Committee on Intelligence was briefed about the mining operation within the last two weeks, according to members. There is widespread opposition among House Democrats to the \$21 million increase in covert aid to the Nicaraguan rebels approved by the Senate this week, and the mining issue is expected to play a major role in House debate on the measure.

Mining Began 2 Months Ago

The mining of three Nicaraguan harbors, Puerto Corinto and Puerto Sandino on the Pacific coast and El Bluff on the Atlantic, began two months ago without notification of Congress, according to members of the Senate and House intelligence committees. The mines have damaged vessels from six nations, including a Soviet freighter, since March 1.

The C.I.A., under federal law, is required to keep Congress informed about the intelligence operations. Members of Congress, although irritated by the delay in this case, said the agency could reasonably have concluded that Congress implicitly approved an operation such as the mining when it authorized financing for the covert activities against Nicaragua.

Administration officials said American technicians were involved in supervising the mining because relatively advanced equipment was involved. They said three kinds of mines, ones that respond to direct contact, sound waves and water pressure, have been planted in Nicaraguan waters.

The mines, according to the Administration officials, were assembled in Honduras and El Salvador with the help of Americans. For the mining of Puerto Corinto and Puerto Sandino, they said, the mines and small, high-speed boats used to place them in shipping lanes were transported to waters off Nicaragua aboard a larger vessel that serves as the nerve center for the operation.

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Ship Modified by C.I.A.

The ship, which was modified by the C.I.A. to support mining operations, carried both Americans and an elite unit of Latin Americans who were trained to plant mines by the United States, according to the Administration officials.

The actual planting of the mines in harbor approaches was done by the Latin Americans, the Administration officials said, following plans prepared by Americans aboard the headquarters ship.

Administration officials said that if the mining operation is suspended because of Congressional opposition, the mines already planted would not pose an indefinite threat to shipping because they are programmed to become inoperable after several months.

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6 April 1984

U.S. Role in Mining Nicaraguan Harbors Reportedly Is Larger Than First Thought

By DAVID ROGERS

STAFF REPORTER OF THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—The Reagan administration's role in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors is larger than previously disclosed, according to sources who say that units operating from a ship controlled by the Central Intelligence Agency in the Pacific participated in the operation.

Though anti-Sandinista insurgents have claimed credit for the mining, a source familiar with CIA briefings on the operation said that the units operating from the ship are self-contained, and are composed of Salvadorans and other Latin Americans from outside Nicaragua.

The mines were described as acoustic devices, triggered by the sounds made by ships traveling in the port and planted from small boats operating from the larger mother ship.

The mining operation, which has targeted two Pacific Coast ports, Corinto and Puerto Sandino, has been bitterly protested by the Nicaraguan government, which has accused the U.S. of playing a major role.

President Reagan, questioned about the matter at his news conference Wednesday, refused to comment, but the issue has provoked concern in Congress, even among those supporting CIA aid to the anti-Sandinista insurgents.

Many in Congress have feared escalation of the conflict if economic, as well as military targets, are attacked. Also, there is concern about the threat to non-Nicaraguan ships using the same ports.

Corinto is the port most affected by the mining, according to government statements in Nicaragua, and as many as seven ships, four of them foreign, have been described as having hit mines since late February. Two more vessels reportedly have hit mines in the smaller ports of Puerto Sandino and El Bluff on the eastern Caribbean coast, and ships at Puerto Sandino have come under attack from high-powered speedboats, according to news reports from Nicaragua.

Two anti-Sandinista groups, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force in the North and the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance in the South, have claimed responsibility for the mining and speedboat attacks, but Nicaragua says the U.S. is directly responsible because of the equipment used and skill of those involved.

The CIA is currently operating under a \$24 million appropriation to fund the anti-Sandinista insurgents, and the administration is seeking an additional \$21 million for

the remainder of the fiscal year ending Sept. 30. These funds, as well as \$61.8 million in military aid for El Salvador, won final Senate approval yesterday, but Mr. Reagan faces continued opposition in the House, which has twice voted to cut off funding for the Nicaraguan war.

Without further funding, the administration estimates that aid for the insurgents

will be exhausted by May, but there doesn't appear to have been a cutback in operations to date. Though there are fewer armed and trained fighters, the total insurgent force is estimated between 12,000 and 15,000, according to sources, and the revised limit approved by the administration is as high as 18,000.

Though the president enjoys bipartisan support in the Senate for at least limited funding for the insurgents, such moderate Republicans as Sen. William Cohen of Maine have questioned the mining in light of the threat to economic targets.

The Senate Intelligence Committee hasn't had a full briefing on the operation, but CIA Director William Casey recently appeared before the House Intelligence Committee, where details of the mining were apparently first disclosed to members of Congress.

During Senate debate this week, the Intelligence Committee chairman, Barry Goldwater, (R., Ariz.) surprised other senators by openly referring to a document or paper indicating that the administration had directly authorized the mining. Mr. Goldwater's remarks were dropped from the published record made available yesterday, and while an aide to the senator dismissed the matter, two other sources indicated that such a paper or staff memo did exist.

The House briefing was, in any case, more detailed, according to a source familiar with the presentation made by the CIA. According to this source, the units operating from the ship were described as separate from the "contras," or insurgent faction of native Nicaraguans whom Mr. Reagan has described as "freedom fighters" being helped by the U.S.

The administration has denied that it seeks to overthrow the leftist Nicaraguan government, and in an effort to reassure senators, the president sent a letter to Majority Leader Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) Wednesday night pledging that the U.S. "does not seek to destabilize or overthrow" the Sandinista regime.

The letter appeased Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York, the ranking Democrat on the Intelligence Committee, but Mr. Moynihan said yesterday that he remains concerned about the mining of the ports, both because of the threat to economic targets and potential violations of international laws of the sea.

There was unusually strong support among members of the Intelligence Committee yesterday for an amendment to prohibit any aid to an individual or group seeking the violent overthrow of a government in Central America. Of the panel's 15 members, six Democrats, including Sen. Moynihan, and one Republican, Mr. Cohen, backed the proposal, but it was tabled by the GOP leadership on a 51-44 roll call.

The Senate action came as Secretary of State George Shultz met privately with the bipartisan leadership of the House on the Central America aid package. Speaker Thomas O'Neill (D., Mass.) remains opposed to any funding for the CIA operation, and he later met with liberals pressing for a strong stand against the administration when the two houses meet in conference to work out the final form of the aid bill.

ON PAGE E-1

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

6 April 1984

The contradiction in U.S. support of rebels

By R. Gregory Nokes
Associated Press

WASHINGTON — The mining of Nicaraguan ports by U.S.-backed guerrillas is succeeding in damaging shipping and hurting the Central American nation's economy, but it is raising questions about what the United States is trying to achieve in its support of the anti-government insurgency.

It appears to contradict U.S. condemnations of so-called state-sponsored terrorism elsewhere in the world. It also appears to violate the charters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

At least seven ships were damaged by rebels' mines last month, including Soviet and Japanese vessels. Crew members of both nations were injured, and Moscow asserted that Washington was responsible because of its support for the guerrillas who mined the mines.

Nicaragua acknowledges that the mining is hurting its economy because it comes at time when it needs ships to transport its exports of cotton.

Without Washington's support, the guerrillas would not be able to conduct their insurgency on its current scale and almost surely would lack the expertise and facilities to mine Nicaragua's harbors.

There is little doubt that the United States bears at least some responsibility for the mining of Corinto and other ports. Washington is the chief financial supporter of the guerrillas, known as contras, providing money, arms and training through the CIA.

The Reagan administration is asking Congress to urgently approve \$21 million more in aid for the contras, in addition to the millions provided previously. On Wednesday night, the United States vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning the mining of Nicaragua's ports. Thirteen of the council's 15 members supported the Nicaraguan resolution. Britain abstained.

Because the administration does not publicly discuss details of its involvement with the contras, who now number about 15,000 operating from bases in Honduras and Costa Rica, its aims are unclear.

Analysis

John Hughes, a State Department spokesman, was asked Wednesday how the administration could rationalize its support for the terrorist activities of the contras in Nicaragua while condemning terrorism elsewhere. He said the two situations were "very different."

"I think you have a situation in Nicaragua where you have an insurgency on the part of people or action on the part of people who feel that they have been betrayed by their government and by their ideals which they subscribe to — is a very different situation to state-sponsored terrorism," Hughes said.

Another State Department spokesman, Alan Romberg, when asked about the Soviet protest over the damage to its ship, responded that "it was well known from previous incidents that there were dangers in the area." He refused to say whether Washington had provided the mines.

Nicaragua also has lodged an official protest contending that the CIA planted the mines. The CIA refused comment on the ground that the allegations concerned "intelligence activities."

The most frequently stated goal of the administration in assisting the contras is to stop the suspected smuggling of arms from Nicaragua to guerrillas who are seeking to topple a U.S.-supported government in El Salvador. The Sandinistas — Nicaragua's leaders, named after a 1920s guerrilla hero, Cesar Augusto Sandino — admit their sympathy for the Salvadoran guerrillas but deny they

are providing them with arms.

President Reagan blurred U.S. aims last week when he said the administration has made clear to the Sandinista leaders that support for the contras "would stop when they keep their promise and restore the democratic rule and have elections."

And in a letter to Congress, Reagan said the United States is "trying among other things to bring the Sandinistas into peaceful negotiations" for a regional peace settlement in Central America.

The administration appears resigned to live with the contradictions between its support for the contras' terrorist actions and its general condemnation of terrorism.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz, in a speech Tuesday, issued an impassioned plea for the world community to take urgent steps to defend itself against state-sponsored terrorism, which he called "a weapon of unconventional war against democratic societies."

But when asked during a recent television interview whether the United States was participating in state-sponsored terrorism by assisting the contras in mining the harbors, Shultz said simply that the leftist Sandinista government was getting what it deserves.

He said the Sandinistas had "stolen" the 1979 Nicaraguan revolution that toppled right-wing dictator Anastasio Somoza. "So they have created a problem for themselves, and they are having to live with it," he said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1NEW YORK TIMES
30 March 1984

U.S. Aides Say Iraqis Made Use Of a Nerve Gas

Assert Lab Gear Came From West Germans

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 29 — United States intelligence officials say they have obtained what they believe to be incontrovertible evidence that Iraq has used nerve gas in its war with Iran and is nearing completion of extensive sites for the mass production of the lethal chemical warfare agent.

Pentagon, State Department and intelligence officials said in interviews this week that the evidence included documentation that Iraq has been buying laboratory equipment from a West German company, purchases that are believed to be linked to Iraq's nerve gas production plans.

The intelligence also shows, the officials said, that Iraq has as many as five dispersed sites for the storage, production and assembly of nerve gas weapons. Without intervention, these officials said, Iraq is estimated to be weeks or months away from the ability to mount major chemical attacks against Iran's far more numerous troops.

Deep Underground Bunkers

Each of the sites, the officials said, has been built in deep underground bunkers, heavily fortified by concrete, that are reported to be six stories below the surface. Officials said the Iraqi concern appeared to be protection from an air attack.

Neither the White House nor the State Department would formally comment today on the intelligence information.

If full-scale chemical war develops, one senior American official said, "the genie is out of the bottle." He added: "Arms control is down the drain. And we've got our forces completely at risk." The official warned that because of the nature of chemical weapons, huge doses of which can be transported

in small canisters, it would be virtually impossible to effectively monitor the spread of such weapons to other countries.

In 1969 the United States reaffirmed its renunciation of the first use of chemical warfare, and it later reduced its preparations to defend against a chemical war. The United States has accused Iraq of using chemical weapons in the war with Iran, but Baghdad has denied the charge.

A senior official said this week that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been asked to provide what he termed a "preliminary look" at the feasibility of an American air strike on the fortified sites, but concluded there were not enough American aircraft in appropriate locations.

This official went on to say that there were many in the Government who, recalling the successful Israeli air attack in 1981 on what was determined to be an Iraqi nuclear plant, would like to see the Israeli Air Force attack again. Some sensitive high-level conversations on the issue between the United States and Israel have already taken place, the official added.

This information could not be confirmed, although many American officials, in interviews, volunteered their personal judgment that such an attack would be one welcome solution to the problem.

A senior State Department official described his frustration over the issue. "It's not lack of knowledge at high levels," he said. "It's been in all the high-rollers' briefing books. The Iraqis appear to be ready to do anything. The question is what do we do? Should we cast a major air strike? That's a big move." The official acknowledged hearing "speculation" that the Israelis might be "ready to move," but added that such talk was in his view only talk.

The intelligence, which was provided from sources depicted as being "better than on-site," has been repeatedly and forcefully presented to President Reagan in the last week, the officials said, with the White House not yet providing any policy guidance.

Officials said that on three occasions within the week the Central Intelligence Agency, to dramatize its concern over the intelligence, had emphasized, or "red lined," the relevant information on Iraq's chemical war abilities in the President's daily intelligence brief, one of the most highly classified documents in the Government. This information is prepared overnight by the C.I.A. and presented early each morning to the President.

Praise for C.I.A. Director

One official, reflecting the frustration of many in the intelligence field, praised William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, for having "the guts to stand up and fight," adding, "He's given the correct information to the White House and it's up to them."

The State Department said on March 5 that the United States had concluded that the available evidence indicated that lethal chemical weapons were being used by Iraq against Iran, in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which Iraq agreed to adhere to in 1931. At the time of the statement an Administration official said the chemical weapon being used by the Iraqis seemed to be mustard gas, a blistering agent. At that time Iran accused the Iraqis of using nerve gas and nitrogen mustard, but the Administration said there was no evidence Iraq had used nerve gas.

One reason for hesitation over the issue, a White House official acknowledged, is the traditional concern of intelligence officials for the protection of "sources and methods." The specific information about the extent of Iraqi nerve gas development is said to have been derived from unusually sensitive sources.

A major diplomatic complication confronts the Administration, officials say. American intelligence agencies have identified Karl Kolb, a scientific and technical supply company in Dreieich, West Germany, as being responsible for the sale and shipping of sophisticated laboratory equipment that, intelligence officials say, has been used — apparently without the company's knowledge — to aid the Iraqi Government in its clandestine ability to develop a nerve gas. Sales of equipment considered by American officials to be essential to the Iraqi effort were said to have taken place over a period of at least two years, with the chemical company obtaining all of the required export licenses from the West German Government before shipment.

Evidence Presented to Bonn

Sometime within the last month, officials said, intelligence officials obtained evidence directly linking the company's shipments to Iraqi development of nerve gas.

The C.I.A. relayed some of its information and its concern directly to the United States Embassy in Bonn, an official said, which in turn made a diplomatic representation to the West German Government. The official American

Continued

can representation was said to have been at a relatively low level, not involving Arthur F. Burns, the American ambassador.

"We don't want to be screaming and shouting at them," one State Department official said, in explaining the low-key American approach, "because we don't have the answers ourselves to the problem" — that of determining whether a seemingly ordinary shipment of chemical and laboratory equipment is secretly intended to produce chemical warfare agents.

"Of course they're sensitive," the official said of the West German Government. "They're perfectly aware of their own history. They have a problem and they have to scramble to figure out how to deal with it. Meanwhile, we're friends of theirs and we have to help them figure it out."

"It's a tough question, with no good answers," one State Department official said. "It's fair to say that the German Government has not been sitting back for the last two years, although it's perfectly true that none of these people knew what is going on. Now we come up with new information and we tell them and they go 'Yecch — what a mess.'"

"What can we do?" the official added, noting that the private company in West Germany had obtained appropriate export licensing. "How can we put a stop to it? This isn't the sort of thing you can solve overnight. That may sound sort of callous," the official added, "but to get up on a high moral ground doesn't solve anything. In practical terms, we want to put the genie back in the bottle. What is troubling is the potential."

Serves as a Broker

The Karl Kolb company, which does serve as a broker or agent for various manufacturers, is reported to have been under observation for an extended period by American intelligence officials. Intelligence officials said that the Reagan Administration now had evidence that the company had made large-scale sales of laboratory equipment, all appropriately licensed, to many third-world nations.

Peter Hermes, the West German Ambassador in Washington, said in an interview that the Kolb company had been delivering what he termed "certain facilities" to Iraq. "They have agreed to deliver a regular plant for the production of pesticides," the Ambassador said, adding that such equipment was not subject to special export licensing in West Germany.

"Equipment for the plant," the Ambassador said, "is not yet delivered and assembly is not completed. The whole plant is not ready for production. This is all I know."

In Bonn today, a spokesman for the Economics Ministry said an investigation had determined that a pesticide plant, scheduled to go into operation in September, had been sold to Iraq by the Kolb company. But a senior executive of the company denied such a sale had taken place.

American officials, in the interviews this week, depicted their information as being conclusive. The evidence is "overwhelming," a senior official said. He complained about what he termed the failure of the White House to assume an aggressive role in dealing with the new intelligence on Iraq. "This demonstrates," he said, "that the Administration has no staff capable of reaching decisions in areas as critical as this."

Note of Caution From Aide

One Administration official did caution that the intelligence he had seen had yet to be formally confirmed, saying: "If anything, the Iraqis might have a testing lab, but I'm not convinced by the evidence. The intelligence might be proven right; it might be proven wrong. I don't think anybody knows." This official acknowledged that he had perhaps not seen the most recent intelligence reports provided in the last week to the White House.

One as yet unresolved issue revolves around the amount of time Iraq would need actually to begin the large-scale production of nerve gas. The agent under development, the officials said, is Tabun, developed as the first lethal gas of its kind in late 1936 by German scientists, and made in large quantities by the Germans in World War II. Experts depict Tabun as the agent closest in chemical makeup to certain powerful insecticides and describe its production as being relatively simple, given the proper raw chemicals and equipment.

The most critical stage in production, experts said, is the assembling and loading of artillery shells, bombs and other munitions. A senior State Department official cautioned that there was still time to deal with the issue. "It may be the case that Iraq is not as advanced today as being able to manufacture" gas weapons, he said. Intelligence officials agreed that Iraq might not be able immediately to mass-produce Tabun, but depicted that stage as being only "months away."

In a report made public Monday, a United Nations team said it had found samples of Tabun as well as mustard gas during an on-site inspection two weeks ago in the war zone. The report did not specifically charge Iraq with

using the weapons, but did conclude that chemical weapons had been used recently in areas being contested by Iran and Iraq.

Astonishing Success Reported

These officials said the C.I.A. had concluded Tabun was used this month against an Iranian mass ground assault, causing heavy casualties. The Tabun used in that attack, one official said, apparently came from Iraq's research and development stockpile, which had previously been used only on animals in tests.

The success of the nerve agent was astonishing, the official said. "Military analysts, looking at how the Iranians retreated after what seemed to be an insignificant attack, could not understand it," the official added. "They pulled way back. As far as our military people are concerned, it's only a question of production capacity before they attack further."

One White House official, after cautioning that he was speaking without official sanction, described the issue of how to respond as far more complicated. "What would you do?" he asked. "How do we handle our own technical transfer" of goods — such as the few chemicals used in nerve gas production — which also have legitimate commercial uses?

"It's a very frustrating experience for a government," the official added.

Defense Department officials said that in recent months there had been a tightening of the licensing procedures for certain chemicals that could have alternate uses in warfare. At least one fully licensed shipment of chemicals bound for Iraq, scheduled to be shipped by an American company, was stopped after it was concluded the chemicals could be used in the production of mustard gas. "It was the urgency of the shipment that troubled us," the official said, explaining that the chemicals were to be air-freighted to Iraq.

Another official, noting that there was an urgent need for expanded authority to monitor overseas shipments of chemical and laboratory goods, said the Government had no legal authority to intercept the shipment of chemicals, but did so only because the air freight company agreed not to forward the goods. "We got the shipment stopped because he was a nice guy," the official said.

FRIDAY, MARCH 30, 1984



United Press International

An Iranian soldier, believed to be a victim of mustard gas, being treated at a hospital in Vienna.

WASH. TIMES 3/27/84

Soviet navy completing four tunnels to hide subs

By Ted Agres
WASHINGTON TIMES STAFF

The Soviet Union is believed to be "within months" of completing construction of four giant underwater tunnels in which to conceal and launch its strategic nuclear missile-carrying submarines, The Washington Times has learned.

According to sources familiar with the development, the tunnel project has the potential of making the Soviet nuclear submarine fleet "virtually invulnerable." This is because Soviet submarines could be fitted with nuclear missiles and deployed without detection. The tunnels also could afford the fleet greater protection against counter-

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SUBS

From page one

attack in times of military conflict.

The sources, who requested anonymity, said existence of the Soviet submarine tunnels has been known for some time but has not been made public. Knowledge of the project is tightly compartmentalized and carries a top-secret code-word classification, the sources said.

The tunnels have been under construction in various parts of the Soviet Union for approximately 10 years, the sources said. One of the tunnels is said to be operational and the other three are very near completion.

One source added that completion of three tunnels appeared to be timed with the final construction of three giant "Typhoon"-class submarines, which could be housed in and launched from the shelters.

The tunnels are actually underground but are entered through an underwater opening. Inside, the tunnels are said to be similar to large-dry docks, where submarines and other vessels are constructed and serviced.

While exact dimensions could not be obtained, the tunnels were described as being "massive," capable of allowing giant nuclear submarines to turn around, passing alongside other submarines being serviced.

The exact locations of the four tunnels were not revealed.

However, a likely location is the large Soviet naval base at Severomorsk or Sayda Guba, which is located near the city of Murmansk, just slightly east of Sweden and Norway.

It is from this northern naval headquarters at Severomorsk that part of the Soviet fleet is directed against Western Europe.

Of major concern, the sources said, is that the tunnels would allow the Soviets to protect strate-

gic submarine fleet from counter-attack in wartime. The Soviets have approximately 70 ballistic-missile nuclear submarines (SSBNs). During wartime, about half of these SSBNs are expected to be deployed. The tunnels could shield the rest.

Of equal if not greater importance, the sources said, is that the tunnels would allow the Soviets to install intercontinental ballistic missiles aboard the submarines and to launch these subs without observation.

At present, the Soviet Union and the United States both use dry dock facilities that may be covered to construct and launch submarines and other vessels. At the time of launching, the vessels are easily detected by satellite or other means.



The United States, for example, operates large naval facilities at Groton, Conn., and elsewhere, which are believed to be under surveillance by the Soviets and other foreign powers.

Another concern is that the Soviets could place ICBMs in canisters on nuclear-powered attack subs. In time of high alert, these subs could exit the tunnels, jettison the canisters and proceed on their regular missions. The ICBMs, meanwhile, could be launched from the jettisoned canisters.

This, in effect, could allow the Soviets to increase secretly the number of SLBM launchers available to them and could constitute a violation of the unratified SALT II treaty.

Additionally, the mere ability to fit missiles onto submarines without detection might impede U.S. ability to monitor Soviet compliance with SALT, the sources said.

The Soviet Union has been engaged in a rapid submarine-building program since the early 1970s, according to Pentagon officials. It is known to have more than 200 nuclear-powered submarines in its fleet, including 49 guided missile submarines (SSGNs), 58 nuclear-powered attack subs (SSNs) and the 70 SSBNs.



There are at least three and possibly four "Typhoon" class SSBNs in the Soviet fleet. The Typhoon is the largest submarine ever built, measuring some two football fields in length. It is fitted with 20 SS-N-20 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, each equipped with six to nine independent nuclear warheads (MIRVs) capable of reaching U.S. cities from Soviet ports.

In addition, at least 14 "Delta 2" class submarines have been deployed, each carrying SS-N-18 submarine-launched ballistic missiles with three or seven warheads. The SS-N-18 can likewise hit U.S. targets from Soviet waters.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 15APHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
23 March 1984

STAT

CIA pay to official is alleged

Salvadoran accused of death-squad ties

By W. Dale Nelson
Associated Press

A high-ranking Salvadoran police official who has been tied to rightist death squads was paid by the CIA for about five years, according to a U.S. government source. The officer yesterday denied receiving any CIA payment.

The U.S. source, who spoke on condition he not be named, said that the officer, Col. Nicholas Carranza, head of El Salvador's powerful Treasury Police, was paid \$8,000 to \$10,000 a month by the CIA.

The source, who provided no details, had access to material on the CIA's dealings with Carranza that the agency supplied to congressional oversight committees.

The source also was familiar with material provided about Carranza by a former Salvadoran military officer who has been interviewed by several members of Congress and was interviewed Wednesday on "The CBS Evening News."

In that interview, the former Salvadoran officer said Carranza had received up to \$90,000 a year from the CIA. The former officer has been reported as receiving payment from a private Washington group after identifying leaders and members of Salvadoran death squads.

Carranza, interviewed yesterday at his office at Treasury Police headquarters in El Salvador's capital of San Salvador, said he never had received any money from the U.S. government.

Nothing but friendship

"I have never received anything from the Americans except friendship," he said.

Carranza said that he had talked with U.S. Embassy officials and U.S. military officers assigned to the embassy but that he did not know whether any of them worked for the CIA. Carranza said his dealings with the Americans began more than a decade ago.

Speaking in English, he said the allegations were "an attempt to destroy me by means of accusation. My enemies ... are trying to make several accusations to destroy my image in El Salvador."

While not specifying who his "enemies" were, he said the attacks were intended to limit his ability "to fight against the terrorists."

He said that in his 10 months as head of the Treasury Police, he has tried to improve its treatment of prisoners. "I have encouraged [the police] to treat them as human beings," he said.

The New York Times reported yesterday that Carranza had been recruited by the CIA in the late 1970s while he was deputy minister of defense to provide information on power struggles within the Salvadoran military and on political and military developments in the country.

The CIA would not acknowledge or deny that Carranza had been on its payroll.

Rep. James Shannon (D. Mass.) pointing to what he called a "dark picture" of U.S. activity in Central America, filed a resolution yesterday asking the CIA to turn over any documents involving Carranza. A spokeswoman for Shannon said his resolution asks the CIA to relinquish the material in the next 14 legislative days.

The former military officer who linked Carranza to death-squad activities also has implicated other top-ranking officials.

D'Aubuisson mentioned

In the CBS interview, the former officer said Roberto d'Aubuisson, right-wing candidate in El Salvador's presidential election on Sunday, had been in charge of the death squads and had taken orders from Carranza.

Asked if the CIA knew of any specific slayings, the former officer, who was filmed in shadows and spoke to correspondent Walter Cronkite through an interpreter, said, "No, I don't think so."

At the White House, deputy press secretary Larry Speakes quoted an executive order that says "no person employed by or acting on behalf of the U.S. government shall engage in or conspire to engage in assassinations."

Speakes said, "The CIA abides by that provision scrupulously and does not employ people whom it believes have been or currently [are] engaged in assassination activities. Death-squad activities in El Salvador fall within this category of prohibited participation." He said the CIA has testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that it adheres to the executive order.

The former Salvadoran officer reportedly has been promised \$50,000 and already has received \$29,500 after making the accusations. The payment came from a private, Washington-based organization, the Center for Development Policy, which opposes the Reagan administration's policy in Central America. The center's director, Lindsay Mattison, said the informant is getting the money because he "is a courageous man — risking death for himself and endangering his family."

Mattison, who commented after the payment was disclosed, said, "We are optimistic that the Salvadoran officer's revelations will convince the administration and the Congress to investigate these issues more closely and review current U.S. policy."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE I-6LOS ANGELES TIMES
22 March 1984

STAT

Soviets Assail Mine Blast, Protest to U.S.

By ROBERT GILLETTE, *Times Staff Writer*

MOSCOW—The Soviet government formally protested to the United States on Wednesday over the explosion of a mine that damaged a Soviet oil tanker as it entered a Nicaraguan harbor Tuesday, calling the incident a crime and an act of piracy, banditry and terrorism.

Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko handed the harshly worded protest to Warren Zimmermann, the U.S. charge d'affaires, after summoning him to the ministry Wednesday afternoon. The U.S. Embassy confirmed that a Soviet protest was filed, but a spokesman refused to comment on its contents, which were published in full by the official Tass news agency.

Tass said earlier that five Soviet sailors were injured when the tanker Lugansk struck a mine near the Nicaraguan port of Puerto Sandino. The Soviets accused anti-government rebels supported by the United States of laying mines in the area and said they have damaged two other foreign ships this month.

In Managua, the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry said, "This is part of a *de facto* blockade against the government as part of the undeclared war of the United States against the Nicaraguan people."

The Soviet ship suffered "considerable damage" when it struck the mine but "despite the terrorist action, the ship is unloading oil at the installations at Puerto Sandino," the Nicaraguans said.

Gromyko's protest said, "The Soviet government holds the U.S. government responsible for that grave crime, an act of banditry and piracy."

'Gangs of Mercenaries'

It said the United States has financed, trained and equipped "gangs of mercenaries and terrorists" who have planted mines in the sea lanes approaching Nicaragua as well as in Nicaragua's territorial waters "and even in its ports."

"In this way, the United States is carrying out in practice a policy of state terrorism," it said.

In Washington, presidential spokesman Larry Speakes noted that "anti-Sandinista forces have widely advertised that certain Nicaraguan ports have been mined." He added, "It would appear that the Soviet tanker struck one of these mines," but he avoided further specific comment on the incident.

When asked if the U.S. government or the CIA helped provide or place the mine, Speakes refused to comment, saying he did not know personally of any U.S. involvement in the incident.

State Department spokesman Alan Romberg expressed regret over any injuries suffered by the crew, and also noted that anti-Sandinista forces had "widely advertised" the mining of Nicaraguan ports. Romberg rejected Moscow's allegations of U.S. "state terrorism."

The Soviet Union has provided large-scale military and economic aid to the Marxist-led Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, which in turn is supporting anti-government rebels in neighboring El Salvador. Gromyko's protest accused the United States of interfering in Nicaragua's internal affairs by its support of anti-Sandinista insurgents, but he did not mention Moscow's and Nicaragua's role in El Salvador.

The note said American actions in the region are creating a dangerous situation and that they show "the true worth" of U.S. statements about its readiness to work for reduced international tension.

Gromyko added that the Soviet Union reserves the right to demand compensation for damage to Soviet property and injury suffered by its citizens. Moscow has rejected out of hand similar claims for compensation filed by several governments in behalf of citizens killed after a Soviet fighter plane shot down a South Korean airliner last September with the loss of 269 lives.

Soviets blame U.S. for mine that blasted ship, injured 5

From combined dispatches

MOSCOW — The Soviet Union accused the United States yesterday of planting the mine in a Nicaraguan harbor that blasted a hole in a Soviet oil tanker and injured five sailors.

Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko handed a protest note Tuesday to U.S. Chargé d'Affaires Warren Zimmermann, the official news agency Tass reported. It was the second time in seven months the Soviet Union accused the United States of violating sea law around Nicaragua in cases involving Soviet ships.

Nicaragua's government also accused the Reagan administration of pursuing "a policy of terrorism."

According to a text distributed by Tass, the protest note said "the Soviet government holds the U.S. government responsible for that grave crime, an act of banditry and piracy."

Tass charged the mine was

planted by U.S.-backed Nicaraguan rebels with "the direct participation of agencies and persons controlled by the U.S. government."

The CIA backs rebels fighting to oust Nicaragua's leftist Sandinista rulers.

A State Department spokesman in Washington, Alan Romberg, rejected the Soviet charges of U.S. responsibility for the mining.

To a great extent, he said, "these regional dangers and tensions result from Soviet encouragement of conflict in Central America and the Caribbean, and therefore the Soviets are hardly in a position to blame others for an increase in violence there."

Asked whether the United States supplied the mines to the rebels, Mr. Romberg said he could not comment on alleged intelligence activities. He said the United States regrets any injury to mariners or shipping.

At the White House, presidential

spokesman Larry Speakes said he was unaware of any U.S. naval involvement in the planting of mines in Nicaragua's harbors and answered, "No comment," when asked if the CIA was involved.

In the past month, all three of Nicaragua's major ports have been mined by U.S.-backed rebels trying to oust the Sandinista government. Two foreign ships and three Nicaraguan vessels have collided with the mines.

Adolfo Calero Portocarrero, leader of FDN rebels in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, blamed the Nicaraguan government for the incident, saying the Sandinistas had been warned that the waters of the port had been mined.

According to official Soviet reports, the protest note threatened to seek compensation for the damaged freighter and injured crewmen and accused the United States of "creating a threat to peace and international security."

U.S.-SOVIET CONFRONTATION LOOMS AFTER TANKER BLAST

STAT

By NILES LATHEM
Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON — The U.S. and the Soviet Union were braced for an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation in Central America yesterday as the crippling of a Nicaraguan-bound Soviet oil tanker by a mine placed by CIA-backed rebels exploded into a major international incident.

The Kremlin, in a protest, the State Dept. accused the U.S. of piracy and state terrorism for sponsoring the Tuesday incident in which the Soviet tanker Lugansk struck a mine planted by Nicaraguan rebels in the port of Puerto Sandino.

The White House and State Dept. angrily rejected the protest.

"The Soviets are hardly in a position to blame others for an increase in violence there," said State Dept. spokesman Alan Romberg.

Pentagon officials, meanwhile, were anxiously watching the progress of a three-ship Soviet naval flotilla headed by the aircraft carrier Leningrad as it sailed into the Caribbean.

The battle group, which also includes a guided-missile carrier, is due to make a port of call in Cuba before touring the perilous waters off Nicaragua and El Salvador.

Officials said the Soviet mission is designed to demonstrate its muscle in vital U.S. Navy sea lanes.

Also in the area of El Salvador and Nicaragua are at least two U.S. naval battle groups staging maneuvers designed to show support for the governments of El Salvador and Honduras, which are facing strong challenges by insurgents backed by Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union.

Some White House and Pentagon officials fear there may be a confrontation with the Soviet flotilla — especially since ten-

sions are abnormally high as voters in El Salvador prepare for elections in the wake of the mining of Nicaraguan harbors and in the face of guerrilla threats to mount a major spring offensive.

The Soviet oil tanker that hit a mine Tuesday was the third ship damaged by a stepped-up rebel campaign to disrupt Nicaraguan trade and the flow of Soviet and Cuban arms to Central America.

At least five casualties were reported, but the ship managed to reach the port of Chinandega, 78 miles northwest of Managua, the Nicaraguan capital.

The campaign to mine

Nicaraguan ports is being supported actively by the CIA, and sources say the mines were provided by the U.S. government.

At the White House and State Dept. spokesmen told reporters it was "widely advertised" that certain Nicaraguan ports had been mined, and therefore the Soviet seamen should have taken precautions.

"We regret any injuries to mariners, but it was well known from previous incidents that there were dangers in the area," Romberg said.

He added that it was the Soviet campaign to create Marxist states in

America's backyard that created tension in the area.

"To a great extent these regional dangers and tensions result from Soviet encouragement of conflict in Central America and the Caribbean, and therefore the Soviets are hardly in a position to blame others for an increase in violence there," Romberg said.

White House spokesman Larry Speakes added that Moscow's continued support of revolutionary movements in Central America is the source of much greater tension than the mining of Nicaragua's harbors.

STAT

Moscow Holds U. S. Responsible For Mines Off Nicaragua's Ports

U.S. Denies Responsibility

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 21 — The State Department denied today that the United States was responsible for the tanker incident.

A statement read by Alan Romberg, a spokesman, said:

"We note that anti-Sandinista forces have widely advertised that certain Nicaraguan ports have been mined. We have no further information on the incident.

"We have received a protest from the Soviet Union charging U.S. responsibility, and we reject that charge."

The statement said the United States regretted "any injury to mariners or shipping," but asserted that regional tensions had arisen mainly from "Soviet encouragement of conflict in Central America and the Caribbean."

Later Lawrence S. Eagleburger, an Under Secretary of State, summoned Oleg M. Sokolov, the Soviet minister-counselor, to reject the note along the lines of the public statement.

At the White House, Larry Speakes, the spokesman, said the incident should not affect relations with the Soviet Union. He declined to respond to questions about whether United States funds had been used to purchase mines for the Nicaraguan insurgents.

An Administration official said privately that mines for use by the rebels against ships had recently been manufactured in Honduras. He said the mines were "relatively sophisticated," considering that they were "handmade." He said the number was limited by the fact that only several men were making them.

The mining of the sea approaches to Nicaragua appears to be a part of the efforts undertaken by the United States through the Central Intelligence Agency to disrupt the Nicaraguan Government, the official added. The use of "handmade" mines is intended not to have them linked by markings to the United States Government, he said.

Reports circulated here this week that Nicaragua had asked the Soviet Union for minesweepers to clear the approaches to the ports.

U.S. NAVY
MISSIONS

MCWETHY: ABC News has learned that American submarines are repeatedly violating the territorial waters of other nations while gathering intelligence. Most of the top secret missions are into the waters of the Soviet Union, but according to both active duty and retired military sources, some missions have been run into the territorial waters of those nations considered friendly to the U.S. Even friendly countries, sources say, sometimes do things they don't want the U.S. to know about, things that could inadvertently threaten American security. The missions are conducted by specially equipped nuclear-powered attack submarines, and in some cases, by a nuclear powered mini-sub called NR1. It has a seven-man crew, wheels on its underside for crawling along the bottom, and is described by the Navy as a research vessel. Why does the U.S. knowingly violate other countries territorial waters? Military sources say there are three primary reasons: one, to gather information on underwater coastal and harbor defenses, thus gaging a country's ability to detect intruders; two, to plant listening buoys in key water ways; and three, to gather first-hand intelligence on new ships, particularly submarines and missile launches from the sea. It would not be considered unusual, according to one source, for an American submarine to be lying on the bottom of the White Sea near Murmansk, well inside Soviet waters, when a new Russian submarine was making its maiden voyage, or for a U.S. submarine to be in the Sea of Okhotsk when the Soviets were test-firing a new submarine-launched missile. Military sources say the U.S. submarines are rarely detected by the Soviets during these secrete missions, but several sources indicated that on at least one occasion in the last five years, an American submarine was apparently detected, that it was attacked by depth charges but escaped undamaged. On other occasion, perhaps 10 years ago, a U.S. submarine accidentally tried to surface under a Russian warship. Both vessels were damaged. The submarine got away. The U.S. and its NATO allies have repeatedly criticized the Soviet Union for running its submarines into the territorial waters of Sweden and Norway, something U.S. submariners say they have not done, even on the secret missions. But the U.S. does take similar risks in the waters of other countries in a high stakes game that both superpowers have been playing for years. John McWethy, ABC News, the Pentagon.

STAT

U. S. Technology in Space

Washington—Soviet development of new manned and unmanned heavy boosters combined with extensive space station work is an effort to project Soviet power in space to a level the Soviets hope will outpace the relative technological advantage held by U. S. space systems.

Several large new Soviet systems should be operational within five years.

The Soviets are engaged in a space program buildup as large, if not larger, than the U. S. Apollo effort, with the key elements involving:

- A Saturn-5-class launcher designed to place 300,000-400,000-lb. payloads into orbit.

- A heavy manned space shuttle development with a vehicle comparable in size to the U. S. shuttle orbiter.

- A heavy space station development designed to place as many as a dozen cosmonauts in orbit on the same facility by the end of the decade.

- A winged spaceplane development that is expected to be used for light cargo transport and crew replacement activities in connection with the large Soviet space station.

- A new medium booster development capable of placing about 30,000 lb. in orbit and expected to be teamed with the spaceplane.

- Continuing development in the existing Salyut program, including more extensive use of the heavy Soviet station tug equipped with a Gemini-sized reentry vehicle for return of materials processed on the station.

The Soviets have as many as nine aerospace and heavy machinery design bureaus working on this space buildup.

Tyuratam Construction

U. S. reconnaissance satellite photography of construction at the Tyuratam launch site shows not only large new launch pads under construction for the shuttle and Saturn-5-class vehicles but the construction of extensive support facilities indicative of those required to maintain a long-term high level of activity with both the Soviet Saturn-5-class and heavy shuttle vehicles.

A large space vehicle assembly building, comparable in size to the VAB at the Kennedy Space Center, Fla., has been constructed at Tyuratam, and large cryogenic fuel storage facilities also are under construction there.

Reconnaissance satellite images of the cryogenic rocket fuel storage areas show them to be much larger than the storage capability at Kennedy now used for shut-

tle but built originally for the Saturn 5 program nearly 20 years ago.

The three Soviet manned and unmanned heavy booster developments all have coordinated designs enabling the same or similar propulsion hardware to be involved in all three programs.

The Soviets are on the verge of flying liquid oxygen and hydrogen high-energy propulsion stages, a development they have not pursued as early as has the U. S., which has been operating cryogenic stages since the mid-1960s.

'Breakout Capability'

U. S. analysts believe the Soviets are striving for a "breakout capability" in space systems that by its sheer size and scope will leapfrog the technological superiority of the U. S. This superiority is afforded by the U. S. space shuttle and other new U. S. space developments such as advanced geosynchronous orbit electronic intelligence spacecraft and systems such as space-based radars capable of seeing targets through clouds.

Ground test activity with the Soviet heavy shuttle and heavy unmanned booster stages is under way, and the new medium booster has been moved to its Tyuratam launch pad for initial fit and function checks prior to first flight.

Flight test activity on a subscale version of the Soviet spaceplane progressed in 1983 to two flights. The initial mission was flown in 1982.

The first flight in 1983 involved Cosmos 1,445, which was launched Mar. 15 from Kapustin Yar. The flight ended in a parachute landing in the Indian Ocean 1.25 orbits later. Royal Australian Air Force photography of the Soviet subscale vehicle showed it to have lifting body aerodynamics with a raised cockpit area. Portions of the fuselage were protected by thermal protection tiles.

Another flight test of the vehicle was made Dec. 27 but with this landing made to a point in the Black Sea, indicating a more precise vehicle maneuvering and pinpoint landing capability than that tested during the initial two missions.

In the Salyut station program the Soviets in 1983 succeeded in only one of three attempts to send crews to the Salyut 7 facility but demonstrated resourcefulness in rebounding from failures that affected their original manned flight planning for the year.

The launch in March of the Cosmos 1,443 station tug, with a Gemini-sized reentry vehicle, and its later automatic docking to Salyut 7 was a significant Sovi-

et manned program success. That achievement was marred by the failure of the Soyuz T-8 crew to achieve a rendezvous with the enlarged station because of a Soyuz radar deployment problem shortly after launch.

The Soviets recovered from the failure quickly, however, and successfully launched the two-man Soyuz T-9 crew to the station June 27.

That crew later encountered difficulty on the station, however, when the solar array electrical system began to degrade and a main oxidizer line on the vehicle ruptured, reducing the station's attitude maneuvering capability.

On Sept. 27, 1983, the Soviets were attempting to launch a new crew to the station when they had one of the worst failures in the history of the Soviet space program. What was to have been the Soyuz T-10 crew had to use their launch escape system on the pad at Tyuratam after their booster caught fire in the final 90 sec. of the countdown.

The crew that had to abort was expected to assist the crew on Salyut 7 with repair tasks, including an extravehicular activity to install an additional solar array area to improve the vehicle's electrical power situation.

When that repair crew failed to reach the station, the crew already on board was able to conduct an EVA themselves to install new arrays. They also overcame the propellant leak and continued a mission that lasted 149 days.

After the Soyuz booster failure, the Soviets reacted within 18 days to get the SL-4 launch vehicle model flying again in an unmanned mode. In early February, the Soviets were able to reman Salyut 7 with a new crew.

The Soviets also resupplied Salyut 7 twice last year with Progress tanker spacecraft. In addition to this extensive flight activity, the Soviets achieved a new record launch rate for heavy Proton boosters in 1983.

Proton Launches

During the year they flew 11 missions with the vehicle, which is comparable in size to the U. S. Titan 3D or Saturn 1B. In previous years they had been running 6-9 launches with the Proton, but last year expanded that to apply their heaviest operational booster to a greater number of missions, including communications, astrophysics, navigation and the launch of Venus planetary spacecraft.

This willingness to commit the heaviest Soviet booster capability to a variety of missions could be an even more important trend if applied to the new Saturn-5-class vehicle yet to be flight tested.

The U. S. Defense Dept. is concerned that the new heavy booster will be used for more than the launch of space station elements, possibly also being employed for

the launch of massive new unmanned Soviet military spacecraft.

The aggressive Soviet launch pace is continuing with 98 space missions launched in 1983 to place at least 116 payloads in Earth orbit. The total is down only slightly from 1982 when a total of 101 missions placed at least 119 spacecraft in orbit.

A large part of the 1983 total were 37 Soviet film-return imaging spacecraft launched during the year. Twenty-seven of these were military intelligence spacecraft, and the remaining 10 were Earth resources film-return spacecraft.

Mission Milestones

New Soviet space reconnaissance milestones were achieved in these missions, according to a Soviet space report prepared by Nicholas L. Johnson of Teledyne Brown Engineering at Colorado Springs, Colo.

"The Soviet photographic reconnaissance space program enjoyed its most active and diverse year of operations in the 22-year history of the program," Johnson said.

The number of Soviet mission days accumulated, he said, by the film-return spacecraft reached 830 in 1983, an all-time high made possible by the increased use of longer lived spacecraft without diminishing the number of flights.

"The lifetimes of the new generation of high-resolution spacecraft introduced in the mid-1970s have been stretched from 28 days to a new record of 53 days set by Cosmos 1,504 in the fall of 1983," Johnson said. "The mean lifetime of all Soviet photographic reconnaissance satellites has increased over 50% during the past five years. In 1983, the mean lifetime of satellites in this Soviet class exceeded three weeks for the first time."

The Cosmos 1,426 reconnaissance flight launched in late 1982 that continued into 1983 was particularly significant, according to Johnson. "This satellite apparently was orbited by an SL-4 [Soyuz] launch vehicle and weighed up to 7 metric tons. The spacecraft remained in orbit for 67 days before being recalled to Earth.

Orbital Maneuvers

"During its stay in space, Cosmos 1,426 performed 10 major orbital maneuvers while maintaining an orbit highly reminiscent of photographic reconnaissance missions—i. e., an elliptical orbit with a perigee near 200 km. and apogee varying between 300 and 400 km. Cosmos 1,426 appears to be the first of a new class of photographic reconnaissance satellites. No similar missions were launched in 1983. The increased longevity and substantial maneuver capabilities of Cosmos 1,426 are wholly in line with the steady evolutionary approach that the Soviets apply to all their space programs," Johnson said.

He noted that the maneuvering of Soviet reconnaissance spacecraft illustrated how the Soviets practiced space reconnaissance in 1983.

"One of the early photographic reconnaissance flights of the year was Cosmos 1,446," Johnson said. "After two days in space, Cosmos 1,446 maneuvered into a low circular orbit, where it stayed for the duration of its two-week mission. The spacecraft's inclination and altitude combined to restrict the drift of the ground track." He said the spacecraft's ground track throughout the mission was particularly suited to observe the Iran-Iraq battlefield.

He also noted Soviet space reconnaissance activity that would support the acquisition of imagery over Lebanon and surrounding areas of the Middle East.

"Cosmos 1,454, a long-duration, high-resolution satellite, was maneuvered three times to provide extended observation opportunities over the Middle East," Johnson said. "Cosmos 1,454 returned to Earth May 22, and that same day a maneuver by Cosmos 1,457, another high-resolution satellite, resulted in its lingering over the region between May 23 and May 26."

Johnson also noted similar Soviet reconnaissance satellite maneuvering to observe the region in both September and December.

The U. S. military action on Grenada also was followed by in-orbit maneuvering of Soviet reconnaissance satellites.

Grenada Surveillance

"Cosmos 1,504 also was apparently drafted to provide Soviet surveillance of Grenada after the American invasion Oct. 25," Johnson said. "On the day of the Marine landing on Grenada, the ground track of Cosmos 1,504 was 1,500 km. to the east. The satellite's orbit was raised the following day to accelerate the drift of the ground track to the west. Two days later, Cosmos 1,504, dropped to a nearly ground stabilized orbit, allowing passages [over Grenada] near noon from Oct. 28 to Nov. 1."

In addition to the military reconnaissance activity, the Soviets have increased the use of film-return imaging spacecraft for Earth resources missions.

During 1983 there were 10 flights of film-return Earth resources spacecraft compared with seven per year in 1980-82. In addition to the three more film-return spacecraft over the yearly average, the Soviets launched another radio image transmission spacecraft into a Sun-synchronous orbit similar to that used by U. S. Landsat radio image Earth resources spacecraft. The flight has characteristics of a development mission to achieve a spacecraft similar to the U. S. Landsat.

A comparison of the Soviet 1983 launch activities with previous years provides an

indication of launch trend by discipline:

■ **Communications**—The flight rate for 1983 was nearly identical with the previous two years. Six Soviet spacecraft were placed in geosynchronous orbit with the missions involving two each of the Ekran, Raduga and Gorizont spacecraft. Seven Molniya spacecraft also were placed into highly elliptical orbits. Four of the Molniya spacecraft were Molniya 1 versions that handle Soviet military communications traffic.

■ **Tactical communications**—The Soviets launched a total of 19 payloads, compared with 20 in 1982. Of the new launches in 1983, two involved the launch of eight satellites on one booster. Three single payload missions also were launched.

■ **Meteor weather spacecraft**—Only one spacecraft, an advanced Meteor 2 version, was launched in 1983 compared with two each in the previous three years. The Soviets routinely keep three or four of these spacecraft operational in orbit, and the need for only one launch suggests an improving Soviet orbital lifetime.

■ **Electronic ferret**—Six spacecraft were launched in 1983, with two of these ocean surveillance spacecraft. The four standard ferret spacecraft are the same launched every year since 1980 when the Soviets began a trend to fewer but larger spacecraft. The Soviets in 1983 did not launch any radar ocean surveillance spacecraft following the failure of the Cosmos 1,402 nuclear-powered radar ocean surveillance spacecraft that reentered the atmosphere in early 1983.

■ **Navigation**—The Soviets launched 13 spacecraft in 1983, two more than in 1982 and eight more than in 1981. Six of these spacecraft were new Glonass navigation spacecraft.

■ **Early warning**—Three early warning satellites were launched in 1983 compared with five per year in 1980-82. Two of the new missions were failures, however. Analysis by Johnson shows that one spacecraft failed in orbit within two days of launch, and the second failed after only four months of service.

■ **Science and applications**—Several large new spacecraft were launched in the space science and applications class.

An Astron X-ray/ultraviolet astrophysics telescope was launched as was a large Prognos radio astronomy mission.

The Soviet Venera 15 and 16 Venus imaging radar missions were launched and returned radar images of large Venus surface areas.

In addition, the Cosmos 1,500 oceanographic spacecraft carrying a synthetic aperture radar was launched and returned ocean surface images and images of Arctic ice conditions that aided in the rescue of several Soviet ships that became stranded in unexpectedly severe ice conditions in late 1983. □

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM CBS Evening News

STATION WDVM-TV
CBS Network

DATE February 25, 1984 6:30 P.M. CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Spy from Space

BOB SCHIEFFER: Reported cost overruns of up to one billion dollars allegedly are jeopardizing this country's ability to spy from space.

Bill Lynch has a report.

BILL LYNCH: This is the kind of satellite photo the public sees, a Landsat image of Washington in which the Pentagon, the world's biggest office building, is little more than a blur. Nice for geographers but of little intelligence value.

These are the kind of spy-satellite photos the military can use, a prototype Soviet fighter plane seen from more than 100 miles in space. This top secret picture was inadvertently released by Pentagon censors.

Here's another one giving U.S. intelligence one of its first looks at a plane American pilots may one day go up against.

This Pentagon art, copied from spy photos, shows how clearly big Soviet weapons can be seen and counted to verify arms control agreements. But:

JOHN PIKE: There are some other things that we're going to have a little more difficulty seeing in the next couple of years?

LYNCH: Such as?

PIKE: Well, particularly prototype aircraft and prototype missiles that would be sitting out on a runway or something.

LYNCH: Recently, Pentagon officials griped about the lack of photo intelligence on the latest battles between Iran and Iraq. The fear of some intelligence experts is that the number and quality of such satellite photos will decline because of reported cost overruns, mismanagement, and delays in launching the next-generation satellite.

Launching of that satellite, the KH-12, is still two and a half years off. It will resemble NASA's space telescope, but instead of looking at stars it will scan Soviet territory, with thermal imagery to penetrate darkness. It may also carry special radar to see through clouds.

The KH-12 is designed to replace all three current satellite types. The most advanced flashes its electronic images back almost instantly. Some develop their own film on board and can transmit it by television or eject film capsules for pickup by Air Force planes. The Russians still rely on that slow method for their spy pictures.

JEFFRE RICHELSON: I certainly think we have better systems than the Soviets, far better systems. And I think if we look at it in terms of cost-effectiveness, we're probably far superior to them.

LYNCH: Still, some intelligence professionals are disturbed at what one called the horror stories of reconnaissance failures, including an 18-month delay in discovering a huge radar, like this, under construction in Siberia that the White House now believes may violate the ABM treaty.

Congress may now inquire more deeply than ever into how this multibillion-dollar program is managed. Otherwise the nation could face gaps in vital satellite coverage of world trouble spots and of the vast Soviet fortress.

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WHAT'S AHEAD (Cont.)

applauded the statement as "evidence of a more pliable attitude on the part of the Japanese," and added, "It's definitely a concession." For some time, the Reagan Administration has wanted the Japanese "not to act in a protectionist manner" on the question but "respect free market forces," a congressional staffer said. Nakasone spoke to a visiting delegation of Department of Commerce and other U.S. trade officials last week.

DPA EXTENSION: Government sources consider chances "very good" for getting Congress to extend the Defense Production Act, including Title III which would expand U.S. strategic and critical materials capability, but are less confident what the level of appropriations will be under this title. The Pentagon succeeded in winning a six-month extension of the Act on Nov. 18, the last day of the last session, but had to agree not to fund any Title III projects prior to April 1 (DAILY, Nov. 28). The Act continues the priority system for contractors to get scarce materials.

PLSS TEST: The Air Force is planning a March or April test of its new Precision Location/Strike System (PLSS) using a single Lockheed TR-1 platform, U.S. officials said. In a test last month at Palmdale, Calif., the Air Force, using three TR-1s, successfully interfaced the system with the TR-1 avionics, verified the system in an airborne environment and tested the sensor and data link systems.

GAMP SELECTION: The Army expects to pick two companies in late March or early April for engineering development of the 4.2-inch Guided Anti-armor Mortar Projectile (GAMP). At the end of the five-year engineering development phase, one of the companies will be chosen as prime contractor. General Dynamics, which is basing its GAMP proposal on the terminally guided submissile (TGSM) work it did in the Assault Breaker program, says the mortar-launched weapon is being designed to "destroy or immobilize enemy armor beyond the range of direct fire" and would be used "against either point or massed armor targets, including defiladed targets."

DECOYS: The Air Force's Armament Div., Eglin AFB, Fla., is looking at the idea of building decoys of F-4, F-15 and A-10 aircraft for use at forward tactical air bases. "The basic objective of the program," it says, "is to deploy inexpensive aircraft replicas of such fidelity that an area of confusion is presented to an enemy air attack on a forward tactical air base." The decoys, among other things, must, "depending on operational mode, resemble the (real) aircraft in visual, X-ray, thermal, IR and/or radar signatures."

BUDGET DATE: Congressional sources say the latest word they have from the Pentagon is that the fiscal 1985 defense budget will be sent to Congress on Feb. 1, although they add that the date could slip a few days.

KH-11 OVERRUNS SAID TO SLOW DEVELOPMENT OF FOLLOW-ON SPACECRAFT

A new generation of U.S. reconnaissance spacecraft that would use thermal imaging and other techniques to observe the Soviet Union during darkness and bad weather is not getting adequate development money because of cost overruns on the current KH-11 digital imaging satellite, U.S. officials said.

The slow-down comes at a time when the Soviets are shifting "more and more to night movements, night testing" and "elaborate concealment" in trials of new missiles like

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KH-11 (Cont.)

the SS-X-24 and SS-X-25, sources said. The Soviet actions are said to make the KH-11 less effective.

According to various specialists, cost overruns on the KH-11 began in the mid-1970s and are due to three causes:

—The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which runs the Keyhole (KH) program, is "incredibly secret" and is never "properly monitored."

—The NRO is "mission oriented," which means that "results are all that count, not the costs."

—Aerospace contractors have a tendency "to promise technology that is not available," so that once a program begins, contractors start "crash programs" which raise costs.

The KH-11 overruns are said to total \$1 billion, with overruns for this fiscal year thought to be \$400 million or more.

And, as a result of Air Force funds being diverted to cover KH-11 overruns, not only has development of new all-weather systems been retarded, but the KH-8 and KH-9 film return vehicle programs have been "starved of funds" to the extent that there are only two KH-8s remaining, no KH-9s and no future production planned for either vehicle, sources said.

"Our satellite reconnaissance capability has been cut in half," a U.S. official said.

The KH-8 and KH-9 are described as "close-look, high resolution" vehicles that can record data at altitudes as low as 70 miles. This cuts into orbital life, however, and apparently is done only when necessary. There is even greater reluctance to lower the orbit of the KH-11 because it is so expensive.

Soviet reconnaissance satellites generally "don't come as low as their American counterparts, one observer said, although, he added, there are exceptions.

Sources told The DAILY that present U.S. satellite coverage of the Soviet Union is so inadequate that "it took two years" to discover a huge radar being built at one location. One source said the U.S. had to be told just where to look for it. "It's a mammoth construction job and it was three-quarters finished when we found it," he said.

Another source said that "putting all our eggs in one basket" and relying almost entirely on the KH-11 also means that many violations of the SALT I and II arms control agreements had "probably" gone undiscovered. "The violations we know about are just the tip of the iceberg," he said.

Some violations have come to light "thanks to other means," he said.

One critic of the NRO said, "You can't have an office so secret that it never is monitored and expect its programs to stay on the track."

* * *

NASA PLANS RFP FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINES

NASA plans to issue a request for proposals to solicit industry ideas on ways to improve the life and operational margin of Space Shuttle main engines. The agency is "actively working" on the RFP, which could be issued before March or April, and result in the award of one or more contracts, a NASA official said.

Although the agency has been "very satisfied" with the life demonstrated by the current engines on the ground, the high pressure pumps are apparently requiring more maintenance and overhaul than is cost-effective. Rockwell International's Rocketdyne Div., Canoga Park, Calif., is prime contractor for the Shuttle main engines.

"We have had dialogue with several contractors over the past year," centering on methods of improving the engines, particularly the pump and powerhead. Approaches under consideration include a modification to the Rocketdyne powerhead and a new powerhead design. Both would be helpful in terms of life and operational margin of the engines, he said.

Rocketdyne, as part of the agency's baseline program, has received funds for developing improvements to the pump, powerhead, and main combustor. There is thinking that "we may be able to reduce the back pressure or work" on the turbines by opening the throat of the main combustor, the official said.

The outside or additional effort the RFP represents is to "assure that we use the national resources to get the best operational engine for the Shuttle," he said.

Satellite Intelligence—and Its Limits

An exotic and sensitive technology is shaping up as a sleeping issue with explosive potential in the 1984 U. S. elections. Specifically, the issue is reconnaissance satellite technology and capability—what the politicians and diplomats in both the U. S. and the USSR euphemistically call national technical means—and what they can do and what they cannot.

A good deal of hyperbole, of public relations flummery, has surrounded reconnaissance satellite imagery in the past. Claims that license plate numbers on a parked car could be resolved from orbital altitudes served an obvious political purpose in the era of Henry Kissinger, Jimmy Carter and the pursuit of detente. If the all-seeing eye in space could detect anything anywhere on the ground, or so the public was led to believe, it followed that an arms control agreement was safely verifiable.

Space photography is very good. The Skylab large format camera a decade ago, using a special film developed originally for space reconnaissance, gave the world a taste of what optics in orbit could do. The problem with this is satellites in being. The U. S. has just about run through its inventory of film-return satellites—the KH-8 and KH-9 series—and there are no more in production. No program is in place to build any more.

Reliance on Digital System

Now the U. S. is relying on the KH-11 and its digital imagery, a system whose cover was blown unequivocally in the late 1970s when a Central Intelligence Agency clerk sold a user manual to the Soviets. What was not revealed at that time was that a massive overrun of almost \$1 billion had induced the National Reconnaissance Organization to strip away the funds from film-return satellites and put the money into the KH-11 to keep that program alive. Overruns continue to plague follow-on development.

KH-11 imagery has the advantage of availability in near real time. Sometimes the imagery is good and sometimes it is not so good. While the U. S. has been playing balance-the-books with its reconnaissance satellite program, the Soviets have been sharpening their classic skills in building Potemkin villages. They are using concealment. They are using decoys. Simplest of all, they are operating at night when digital or optical imagery is out of business.

Irrespective of how good or bad satellite imagery is, there is the matter of coverage. If the satellite is not in the right place at the right time, high resolution is academic. The numbers of reconnaissance satellites the U. S. is flying now are not nearly enough to verify an arms control treaty with a nation that has a special high-priority department to mastermind concealment.

There is a parallel between prospecting for intelligence by satellite and prospecting for mineral wealth by satellite. Both have their strong points, as in covering vast amounts of territory to find targets of interest. Ground truth for confirmation and detail is essential. Complete dependence on any one information-gathering technique is a delusion.

How this figures in the 1984 election is with the issue of peace. The Democratic opponent of President Reagan will obviously have a big peace plank in his platform. Pressures from within the White House also exist for the President to don a toga of peace of his own. The climate is ideal to encourage the U. S. to abandon its tough stance on a new arms control agreement and settle for what it can get for a piece of paper to wave on the hustings.

Playing Catchup

When the President took office, he virtually ignored arms control. That was a political error. He lost the peace initiative to the Russians. He regained lost ground by beginning the START talks, by making proposals. Neither the Soviets nor the U. S. had any real ideas on where to go next with arms control as the talks wore on, but good intentions were being demonstrated. Then the Soviets made the mistake of breaking off negotiations because of cruise missile and Pershing 2 deployment. Now the U. S. can take the initiative.

With the onus on the Soviets for walking away from the conference table, the Administration has the opportunity to lay the truth on the line with the public. An arms control agreement must be verifiable. Verification solely by the satellite system the U. S. has in being is not possible. The Eisenhower Administration plumped for open skies and on-site inspection in the 1950s, and the Soviets have never accepted the latter. Why the Soviets have never done so is lost in arms control noise.

Ten years of SALT treaties have bought the Soviets valuable time that they have used to develop their arsenal. They are now at the point of kicking over the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, as AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY senior military editor Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., reports in this issue (p. 14).

The Administration itself is beginning to lay out the dimensions of the problem piecemeal. An opportunity is emerging for the President to organize the impending eruption, to level with his constituents about what has to be done to clean up the reconnaissance satellite mess, to lay on the line the broader elements in what the quest for peace with security is all about and what has to be done technically, strategically and politically to get there.

—William H. Gregory

Soviets Accelerate Missile Defense

CIA notifies President of heightened activity, which comes as U. S. reconnaissance satellites face funding shortage

By Clarence A. Robinson, Jr.

Washington—President Reagan has been given evidence by the Central Intelligence Agency that the Soviet Union is producing components for and has in place or under construction the major elements of a nationwide ballistic missile defense system.

"The CIA's position on Soviet ballistic missile defense activities is unusual in its strength and clarity—an alarm bell that we must watch the situation very closely," a White House official said.

"The U. S. could be witnessing a Soviet move to place itself in a position to abro-

gate the Antiballistic Missile Treaty and rapidly deploy a system to defend key areas such as intercontinental ballistic missile fields," the official added.

The USSR is permitted by the treaty to operate a ballistic missile defense system with up to 100 interceptor missiles and six radars to protect Moscow. It also is permitted research and development for defensive systems and to apply advances in technology to upgrade that system.


The U. S. has elected not to deploy the defensive system permitted it under the treaty. Either the USSR or the U. S. can

withdraw from the treaty with six months' notice to the other nation if extraordinary events jeopardize its interests.

Factors focusing U. S. attention on Soviet ballistic missile programs include:

- Construction of new Pushkino phased-array antiballistic missile defense battle management radars. One site is north of Moscow, and others are under construction. The radar has four faces with phase shifters to provide 360-deg. coverage. It is 120 ft. high and 500 ft. wide (AW&ST Mar. 14, 1983, p. 26).

- Pechora-class ballistic missile detection radars located at sites around the periphery of the Soviet Union, except for one new radar located internally at Abalakova in the vicinity of SS-18 interconti-



Rockwell International Mating Sections of First Production B-1B Bomber

Five fuselage sections of the first production Air Force/Rockwell International B-1B bomber, in addition to the vertical stabilizer, are in place at Rockwell's new B-1B final assembly facility in Palmdale, Calif. Swing wings for the aircraft are in foreground. B-1B assembly operations began at Palmdale Nov. 14 when sections of the fuselage were placed in mating fixtures. Rollout of the first production aircraft is scheduled for Oct. 6.

Efforts

mental ballistic missile fields. These phased-array radars are positioned for early warning, detection and tracking.

- Production of SH-04 and SH-08 nuclear armed interceptor missiles with deployment of the weapons in silos around Moscow as part of improvements to the system there. The SH-04 is an exoatmospheric missile, and the SH-08 a hypersonic endoatmospheric missile that together provide weapons for a layered defense.

- Tests at Saryshagan of the SH-08 interceptor in a rapid reload configuration, firing two of the missiles from the same silo within 2 hr.

- Production of the Flat Twin tracking and Pawn Shop missile guidance radars for the SH-08 and SH-04 to form the ABM-X-3 defense system. The radars are designed modularly so that components can be produced and stored until required. They can be concealed and assembled rapidly for use in the system.

- Testing of the SA-12 surface-to-air missile against ballistic reentry vehicles. The SA-12 is called a strategic air defense ballistic missile defense system because of the inherent dual-mode capability in the weapon.

- Netting of command, control, communications systems, air defense and ballistic missile defense radars with battle management radars to tie together elements of a national defense system.

"It took a variety of sources and methods to piece together the mosaic the agency presented," the official said.

Evidence presented clearly shows that the mutual assured destruction (MAD) concept may be on the way out, a White House official said. The President wants, as an optimist, to offer the nation a way out of mutual assured destruction through a U. S. ballistic missile defense system. But the President concluded that the Soviets are doing everything they can with ballistic missile defense to bring the U. S. to its knees, the official said.

The President offered the hope of a damage denial ballistic missile defense system last year, the official added, "but the bureaucracy is not responding to what he wants."

The official said the Administration is equally as concerned over a lack "of national technical means to accomplish first-look reconnaissance of Soviet ballistic missile defense developments."

National technical means is a euphemism for electronic ferret satellites and photographic reconnaissance spacecraft used to monitor the Soviet Union, including compliance by that nation with arms control agreements.

Soviets Deploy New SS-20 Missile Battery

Brussels—Soviet Union has completed work on another battery of nine SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles since North Atlantic Treaty Organization ministers met last month in Brussels, according to U. S. officials.

A battery of the missiles had been deployed earlier, just prior to the meeting in December and shortly after the Soviets had walked out of arms control talks in Geneva Nov. 23. NATO's special consultative group on nuclear weapons said 108 SS-20 missiles carrying 324 warheads have been declared operational since the Geneva arms control talks began in November, 1981. The latest battery is in the eastern portion of the Soviet Union.

U. S. and NATO officials said there is no evidence any of the Soviet deployments have been offset by reductions in other nuclear weapons. U. S. cruise and Pershing 2 missile deployments in Germany and Britain have been offset by equal reductions in the numbers of Pershing 1-A and nuclear Nike air defense missiles, according to James F. Dobbins, chairman of the special consultative group (AW&T Jan. 9, p. 25).

The group continues to support a resumption of the Geneva negotiations, but said it is the Soviets' responsibility to make the next move.

U. S. and European officials said delivery of equipment and training of personnel for future Pershing 2 and cruise missile sites in Germany, Britain and Italy continues at a steady pace. Schedule of operational dates for additional flights and batteries of missiles has not been made public, but U. S. officials said they will be spread approximately evenly throughout the five-year deployment period. That would mean the next set of Pershing 2 missiles would be operational in Germany in May, and the next flight of cruise missiles in Britain in June.

U. S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko are scheduled to meet in Stockholm Jan. 18 at the opening of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE). Foreign ministers of all NATO countries also are scheduled to attend.

The meeting is the only remaining forum for East-West negotiations since the Soviets have refused to set dates for resumption of arms reduction talks in Geneva.

"Clearly, this conference does loom larger on the world scene than otherwise would have been the case," James Goodby, U. S. ambassador to the CDE, said. He added, however, that the CDE will not focus directly on disarmament.

Main effort will be to negotiate agreements to increase the amount of information available to each side about the other's military activities so war is not started accidentally, he said.

It took the U. S. more than 18 months to detect and photograph the large phased-array radar at Pechora, and more than a year after construction began at Abalakova to detect construction of the radar there. Neither radar was detected until the U. S. was told to conduct reconnaissance of those areas.

Cost overruns in developing and producing reconnaissance satellites such as the KH-11 digital imaging system, which can relay its imagery via satellite data system spacecraft within an hour to Washington, has damaged the U. S. capability.

USAF is developing new, improved reconnaissance spacecraft, and the service already is facing an approximately \$400-million cost overrun this fiscal year.

Development of the KH-11 resulted in an overrun of approximately \$1 billion, forcing the Defense Dept. to halt production in film return spacecraft, such as the KH-8 and KH-9, with their higher resolution capability, to free the funds for application to the KH-11.

As a result, the U. S. has only two film-return reconnaissance spacecraft remaining in its inventory. The high-resolution KH-8 dips to altitudes as low as 75 naut.

mi. over the target area to obtain imagery.

Because of the expense involved, the Defense Dept. and Central Intelligence Agency are limited in the numbers of KH-11s that can be maintained in space. The U. S. is unable to obtain adequate reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. "This was demonstrated when we failed to discover construction of the large radars at Pechora and Abalakova," the official said.

He added that a massive effort also is under way in the USSR to counter the KH-11's capability. "The Soviets have formed a camouflage, concealment and deception program called Maskirovka [translation: concealing/masking]," he said. "Until recently, it has been controlled by Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, first deputy minister of defense and chief of general staff (AW&T Dec. 12, 1983, p. 21).

"From various sources, we have been able to determine that the Soviets have a large-scale production capability for the components of a ballistic missile defense system, and with continued production of weapons such as the SA-12, within a year or so they will be able to alter U. S. strategic targeting."

The SA-12 system has a truck-mounted radar with a 150-naut.-mi. range. A sec-

ond truck carries the missile launcher and missiles, which can engage targets at altitudes as low as 300 ft. and as high as more than 100,000 ft.

Tests with multiple SH-08s fired from the same silo make deployment of the interceptor a difficult situation for the U. S.

The Soviets are permitted by the treaty to deploy the missile around Moscow to upgrade the capability there. The treaty prohibits multiple launches, including testing in that mode. If a rapid reload capability is perfected, the number of missiles defending Moscow could be doubled.

Balance of Power

The Soviets have a fundamentally different view of strategic weapons and the balance of power, according to the official. The USSR is building a war-fighting capability, starting with its offensive strategic forces by modernizing them over the past 10 years. "The U. S. has essentially limited itself to research and development with ballistic missile defense technology while the Soviets bought the time they needed to develop a layered defensive system with the ABM Treaty," the official said.

He added that the system now unfolding in the USSR is not only one with overall improvements in each segment, but one largely based on new technology.

Before the U. S. could declare that the Soviet Union is in the process of breaking out of the ABM Treaty, evidence would be required that serial production of interceptor missiles is taking place at high rates, that radars are in full-scale production and that construction of hard stands for phased-array radars in the ABM-X-3 system is taking place, another Administration official said.

"Clearly the agency is not prepared to go that far," he said. "What seems clear, however, is that there is in progress a pattern that places their activity very close to the line in terms of a breakout," he said.

Breakout in arms control community lexicon means that a national ballistic missile defense system is being covertly deployed in violation of a treaty. "It appears that the Soviets are close to that point, but that they are positioning themselves to withdraw from the treaty and then deploy the layered system," he said.

"We already see the long-lead-time items such as the Pechora and Pushkino radars taking shape all over the nation," the official continued. "The SA-12 missile has been tested against reentry vehicles, and with the dual-mode capability of the SA-10, and SA-11 surface-to-air missiles netted into a system, tactical antiballistic missiles assume real importance."

There is still disagreement within the U. S. intelligence community over whether the SA-12 is designed to destroy nuclear-armed reentry vehicles from inter-

Payload Specialists

Washington—National Aeronautics and Space Administration has selected four payload specialist candidates to begin training for shuttle Mission 51-D scheduled for January, 1986, to fly Spacelab 4, which is dedicated to life sciences.

The candidates are Dr. Millie Hughes Wiley Fulford, assistant professor of biochemistry, Veterans Administration Hospital, San Francisco; Dr. Francis Andrew Gaffney, assistant professor of medicine and cardiology, Southwestern Medical School, University of Texas Health Science Center, Dallas; Dr. Robert Ward Phillips, professor of physiology, College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, Colorado State University, Ft. Collins, and Dr. Bill Alvin Williams, research scientist group leader/toxicology, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Corvallis, Ore.

Two of the candidates will be selected to conduct experiments on board the spacecraft during the seven-day mission, and the other two will be flight alternates and function as part of the mission management and sciences team responsible for controlling experiment operation on the ground.

continental ballistic missiles or Pershing 2 reentry vehicles, making it a theater defensive weapon.

Production of the Flat Twin radar, the system that takes its NATO code name from the two flat faces with phase shifters, is considered the essential element in whether the Soviet Union is preparing to deploy a nationwide defensive system, U. S. officials said. The Flat Twin radar provides the final tracking of ballistic missiles at reentry.

The Pawnshop radar in the system takes its name from three spherical radar antennas mounted side by side.

There is some evidence that the Flat Twin is in production with its modular components, but the hard stands for the radar have not yet appeared across the Soviet Union in large numbers.

The Pushkino radar assigns targets and ties together all of the elements of a BMD system. Additional Pushkino radars will be required before a full system is operational.

"This is a terribly important issue, and a breakout or the potential for a breakout is acute," another Administration official said. "They [Soviet Union] are building more large phased-array radars, but strictly speaking this may not be a violation. And testing the SA-12 against reentry vehicles may not be a violation, if the reentry targets have the characteristics of a Pershing 2. The violation here is one of intent, if not one of the letter of the treaty. It must be viewed in terms of what the impact is on the overall strategic balance."

Members of the National Security Council are calling for a major evaluation of both Soviet offensive and defensive strategic weapons systems combined and how they affect the balance between the superpowers. "The arms control treaties tended to divide offense and defense, and we have not accomplished a study linking the two. This gives us the perfect opportunity to take a close look at the impact of linking them," the official explained.

The Soviet Union is building the infrastructure for a multitiered defensive program, including the capability to deploy space-based, directed-energy weapons for boost-phase intercepts. The USSR also has a ground-based beam weapons program that could be integrated with the program.

There are three separate directed-energy weapons complexes, each with a different type laser device, at Saryshagan where weapons tests against targets are being conducted, including tests against reentry vehicle targets.

Useful Defense

The Defense Dept. contends that a U. S. ballistic missile defense system is not useful unless it can destroy 99.9% of the hostile warheads fired by intercontinental ballistic missiles. "The Soviet Union, on the other hand, believes that a system that can engage and destroy 40% of the attacking force is worth deploying," the official said.

"The U. S. would have trouble now getting its missiles to all of the targets around Moscow, and with deployment of SA-12 in the vicinity of ICBM fields the capability to respond, making a deterrent credible, would be diminished," the official added. "What makes it even more worrisome is that we know that other systems that have not yet shown up are in research and development."

Politics in an election year make it difficult for the President to call attention to the Soviet Union's ballistic missile defense program, and what appear to be violations of the treaty—testing a dual-mode air defense/ballistic missile defense weapon such as the SA-12 and deployment of the radar at Abalakova where it can protect ICBM fields.

"Arms control is a growth industry in the U. S., and we can sell anything in the name of arms control, especially this year. The U. S. tends to view the world in the prism of arms control agreements and neglect threats not specifically covered by some arms control agreement," the official said.

"We might find this year that we have zero time to respond to an ABM Treaty breakout by the USSR with no way to provide in a timely way a parallel capability. There is no way to accelerate a defensive initiative in the U. S. to duplicate the Soviet capability." □

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7 April 1984

U.S. objects to French offer on mines

By Alfonso Chardy
Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The United States has expressed its concern to France concerning its offer to help remove mines placed in Nicaraguan ports by CIA-backed rebels, administration officials said yesterday.

The officials also said France did not consult the United States in advance. Since February, the mines have damaged at least seven foreign ships, including a Soviet tanker and a Japanese freighter.

France's offer was contained in a letter, disclosed Thursday in Managua, Nicaragua, from French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson to Colombian President Belisario Betancur. It said France would help Nicaragua remove the mines for "purely humanitarian" reasons if "one or several friendly European powers" cooperated.

The incident renews friction between Washington and Paris over Central America. In 1982, the administration sharply criticized the French Socialist government for delivering military equipment to Nicaragua, a country the Reagan administration systematically denounces as the source of much of the trouble in the region.

"We have raised our concerns with the French," State Department spokesman John Hughes told reporters. "We have, all along, been concerned with the large Soviet and Cuban military relationship with Nicaragua, and we would not favor any nation's contributing to Nicaragua's ability to export revolution with impunity."

Hughes indicated that a French decision to remove the mines would run counter to U.S. interests, adding that the United States was still uncertain how far the French were prepared to go.

"There are still some areas of doubt about what the French involvement might be and what the French are prepared to do, and, indeed, what they are being quoted as saying," he said.

Hughes did not say how U.S. concerns were conveyed to the French, but other administration officials said U.S. diplomats in Paris and State Department officials here discussed the matter with French officials.

Asked whether the United States would oppose France "directly or militarily" if it disregarded U.S. wishes and removed the mines, Hughes declined to comment. "We are now delving into the hypothetical," he said. "Let events occur and mature."

Although the CIA's covert assistance to the rebels, known as contras, is widely discussed and was the subject of intense debate this week in the Senate, administration officials refuse to comment on it directly, saying it belongs in the realm of classified intelligence.

Sources close to the congressional intelligence committees said yesterday, in response to questions, that CIA Director William J. Casey recently briefed the House Select Committee on Intelligence on the mining operation.

According to those sources, Casey and other CIA officials said at a closed session that the mines were placed at the approaches to Corinto and Puerto Sandino ports on Nicaragua's Pacific coast and El Bluff on its Caribbean coast.

The sources said it was their un-

derstanding that the mines were placed by a special counterrevolutionary unit made up mostly of people not from Nicaragua, though they were Latin Americans or of Latin American origin. They said the unit operated from a ship believed to cruise off the Nicaraguan coast.

During the Senate debate this week about an additional \$21 million for the *contras*, which was approved Thursday, Sen. Barry M. Goldwater (R., Ariz.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, inadvertently referred to a document apparently confirming that the administration had directly authorized the mining.

Goldwater later said such a document did not exist, but a source within his committee confirmed that staff aides had prepared a classified paper apparently linking the CIA to the activity.

Goldwater's remarks did not appear in the Congressional Record, which publishes transcripts of floor debate. Congressional sources indicated that on a request from the intelligence committee, the remarks were deleted.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
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7 April 1984

CIA Helped To Mine Ports In Nicaragua

By Fred Hiatt and Joanne Omang
Washington Post Staff Writers

The CIA has played a direct role in the laying of underwater mines in Nicaraguan ports that have damaged at least eight ships from various nations during the past two months, according to congressional and administration sources.

A combination of U.S.-financed guerrillas fighting the leftist Sandinista government of Nicaragua and more highly trained Latin American employees of the CIA operating from CIA-owned speedboats have laid the crude bottom-lying mines in Corinto and other ports, according to the sources.

They said that the mining operation is part of a effort that began late last year to redirect the "contras," as the anti-Sandinista guerrillas are known, away from futile attempts to seize territory and toward hit-and-run economic sabotage.

The handmade acoustic mines, which explode noisily but are unlikely to sink a ship, reportedly are intended to harass and discourage shipping rather than blockade the harbors. Officials said that they are having the intended effect, with Nicaraguan coffee and other exports beginning to pile up on piers and imported oil running short.

The harbor mining began about two months ago without advance notification of congressional intelligence committees but probably with the general knowledge of President Reagan, according to sources close to the intelligence community.

At the same time, the sources said, the CIA began to assume a more direct role in training and guiding the anti-Sandinista rebels, shouldering aside the Argentinians and Hondurans who had been playing a middleman role.

The increased activity coincided with a growth in the strength of the contras from about 15,000 to closer to 18,000. The increase in strength, which one knowledgeable source said was carried out without congressional notification, came particularly among the forces of Eden Pastora in Costa Rica, to which an entire Sandinista battalion of about 250 men reportedly defected.

News of the more direct CIA involvement in the "covert" war against Nicaragua came as the Senate approved an additional \$21 million in CIA support for the contras. The administration says the funds are intended to discourage Nicaragua

from supporting leftist rebels in El Salvador. The appropriation faces a stiff fight in the Democratic-controlled House, which last year twice rejected the request.

The \$21 million appropriation is attached to legislation that includes \$61.7 million in military aid for the government of El Salvador to fight leftist insurgents there. Rep. Dante B. Fascell (D-Fla.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said yesterday that he believes the House will be inclined to approve the El Salvador aid, but that the attached money for the contras "may make it very difficult to pass it in the House."

Some officials indicated that there is concern within the administration that the mining, which Nicaragua has attacked as state-sponsored "terrorism," will alienate U.S. allies and be seen as contrary to international principles of open seas. There is also concern that sabotaging the Nicaraguan economy may alienate Nicaraguans whom the CIA hopes the contras will win over.

"There is always a delicate balance that any insurgent movement has to strike," one senior official said.

There is evidence that U.S. allies in Europe have become increasingly unhappy about the mining and the reported U.S. role in it. It was disclosed Thursday that the French government offered to help Nicaragua, which has no mine-sweeping equipment, to clear its harbors if other European nations join in.

Diplomatic sources confirmed yesterday that the British government, in informal but regular contacts with the State Department, has made clear that it, too, deplors the threat to international shipping that mining harbors represents. The British did not claim that the CIA is involved and did not offer to help remove the mines. But British officials, stressing that they are a seafaring nation, said they communicated their concern as a matter of principle.

State Department spokesman John Hughes said yesterday that Washington has "raised our concerns" diplomatically with the French government about the reports that France has offered to help

the Nicaraguan government clear away the mines. He said that the United States was not notified in advance of the French offer.

"We have all along been concerned with the large Soviet and Cuban military relationship with Nicaragua. And we would not favor any nations contributing to Nicaragua's ability to export revolution," Hughes said.

Hughes suggested that there is some doubt about the French intention to aid Nicaragua, despite the offer contained in a letter from Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson to Colombian President Belisario Betancur. The letter was made public Thursday in the Nicaraguan newspaper Barricada, the voice of the Sandinista National Liberation Front.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz was questioned about the mining of Nicaraguan harbors during a luncheon meeting Thursday with reporters and editors of The Washington Post.

Asked whether Washington has any control over the mining operations, Shultz said, "I don't have any comment to make about that." Asked what the purpose of the mining is, he said, "You have to ask the contras about that . . . It looks like the purpose must be somehow to interrupt the commerce of the country."

Although the official purpose of the CIA-supported war is to discourage Nicaraguan support for the leftist rebels in El Salvador, administration officials have suggested from time to time that they also are interested in making the Sandinista government in Nicaragua more "democratic" and less tied to Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Critics have charged that the administration is aiming to overthrow the Sandinista government, which replaced a right-wing dictator in 1979. Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) called the administration's aid bill "shameful and dangerous."

Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.), a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, told his colleagues that they would vote against the bill "if you knew what I know."

Continued

"You are right in opposing this money going for the purposes allegedly stated here because they ain't the real reasons," Biden said.

Nicaraguan officials have said that ships from the Netherlands, Japan, the Soviet Union, Britain and elsewhere have been damaged by mines in ports on both the Caribbean and Pacific coasts in recent months. Nicaraguan radio said that the mines are "highly sophisticated and manufactured by the arsenals of the U.S. armed forces."

But sources here said that they are simple devices that can be manufactured from easily obtained, "off-the-shelf" materials. The mines are triggered by the sound of a ship on the surface and explode with a loud bang that can cause extensive damage but—unlike a floating mine—is unlikely to sink a ship.

Although Miskito Indians and both major contra groups have been involved in mining and attacking Nicaraguan ports, Latin American contract agents of the CIA with skills in fusing weapons and piloting boats also have been involved, sources said. The sources said that the mines can be heaved over the side of speedboats.

One congressional source close to the intelligence community said that Reagan probably gave the mining "a broad-brush kind of approval... with no concern with the details." Another said, "If the president didn't approve it, then you'd have a real story, and I don't think you have a real story there."

One official said the mining has caused concern among Reagan supporters in Congress as well as the administration, but added, "The goal of this has been to put as much pressure on them [the Sandinistas] as possible."

The CIA became concerned late last year, in part due to congressional pressure, that "very basically the progress wasn't going forward at a rate that was going to give us any chance of success," one official said. At that time, the Argentinians, who were pulling out anyway, and Hondurans increasingly were supplanted by CIA employes in training and directing the contras.

In particular, the U.S. urged the rebels to stop massing in large groups to strike from Honduras and capture territory, a tactic that gave the Nicaraguans inviting targets for retaliation. The rebels were encouraged to have small sabotage operations instead.

Staff writers Michael Getler and Don Oberdorfer contributed to this report.

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8 April 1984

U.S. SAID TO DIRECT MINING OF HARBORS AROUND NICARAGUA

INVOLVEMENT IS ASSAILED

Americans on Ship Reportedly Oversee Latin Commandos Who Place the Devices

By PHILIP TAUBMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 7 — Americans working for the Central Intelligence Agency on a ship off Nicaragua's Pacific coast have been supervising the mining of Nicaraguan harbors in recent months, according to Reagan Administration officials and members of Congress.

The sources say the mining operation marks the first time since the United States began supporting Nicaraguan rebels three years ago that Americans have become directly involved in military operations against Nicaragua.

The actual placement of the mines inside Nicaraguan territorial waters, they said, is handled by an elite group of Latin American commandos who use small, high-speed boats to penetrate shipping lanes close to shore.

'Closer to Direct Confrontation'

The officials said that unlike ground operations inside Nicaragua conducted by rebel forces, which American advisers monitor from Honduras but do not control, the planting of the mines in Nicaraguan waters directly involves Americans and is under their immediate control.

Members of the Senate and House intelligence committees said the role of the Americans constituted a significant change in C.I.A. operations against Nicaragua and, as one Democratic Senator said, "crosses a threshold that brings us closer to a direct confrontation with Nicaragua."

A spokesman for the C.I.A., Dale Petersen, said today that the agency would not comment on the mining operation or the involvement of Americans. Intelligence officials said privately that Americans involved in the mining activity do not enter Nicaraguan territorial waters.

Territorial Limits Are Disputed

Nicaragua claims territorial waters up to 200 miles off shore, but the United States respects only a 12-mile limit. The intelligence ship that carries Americans operates outside the 12-mile limit but well within the 200-mile boundary, Administration officials said. The high-speed boats travel within a mile or two of the Nicaraguan coast.

Based on the 12-mile limit respected by the United States, intelligence officials contended that Americans are not directly involved in military operations against Nicaragua but instead serve in an advisory capacity in international waters similar to the role of Americans based in Honduras who train and continue to help supervise rebel ground forces inside Nicaragua.

Members of Congress, including Democrats and Republicans, said the fact that Americans remain outside the 12-mile limit does not lessen their responsibility for the operation.

"We have carefully monitored these activities to insure that, whatever else happened, Americans didn't get into combat-type operations against Nicaragua," a Republican member of the Senate intelligence committee said.

'Involved Directly'

The Senator, who asked to remain anonymous, added: "That distinction has now been lost. When an American is on the mother ship in a mining operation, he's involved directly in military activities. It's irrelevant whether the ship is in international waters."

Neither the Senate nor House committees were informed about the mining or the participation of Americans until recent weeks. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York and vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said in an interview Friday. "The mining must be stopped and it will be stopped." He said the Senate committee has scheduled a meeting next week with senior C.I.A. officials to discuss the mining operation.

French and British Opposition

Mr. Moynihan, who earlier this week voted in favor of giving the C.I.A. an additional \$21 million to support Nicaraguan rebel activities this year, said he opposed the mining on the grounds that it violates freedom of the seas and

places the United States in "the absurd position of laying mines that Western European nations may come and remove."

Mr. Moynihan was referring to an offer by France, made public on Thursday, to help Nicaragua clear the mines. Britain told the Reagan Administration earlier this week that it disapproved of the mining as an interference with international shipping.

The House Select Committee on Intelligence was briefed about the mining operation within the last two weeks, according to members. There is widespread opposition among House Democrats to the \$21 million increase in covert aid to the Nicaraguan rebels approved by the Senate this week, and the mining issue is expected to play a major role in House debate on the measure.

Mining Began 2 Months Ago

The mining of three Nicaraguan harbors, Puerto Corinto and Puerto Sandino on the Pacific coast and El Bluff on the Atlantic, began two months ago without notification of Congress, according to members of the Senate and House intelligence committees. The mines have damaged vessels from six nations, including a Soviet freighter, since March 1.

The C.I.A., under federal law, is required to keep Congress informed about the intelligence operations. Members of Congress, although irritated by the delay in this case, said the agency could reasonably have concluded that Congress implicitly approved an operation such as the mining when it authorized financing for the covert activities against Nicaragua.

Administration officials said American technicians were involved in supervising the mining because relatively advanced equipment was involved. They said three kinds of mines, ones that respond to direct contact, sound waves and water pressure, have been planted in Nicaraguan waters.

The mines, according to the Administration officials, were assembled in Honduras and El Salvador with the help of Americans. For the mining of Puerto Corinto and Puerto Sandino, they said, the mines and small, high-speed boats used to place them in shipping lanes were transported to waters off Nicaragua aboard a larger vessel that serves as the nerve center for the operation.

Continued

Ship Modified by C.I.A.

The ship, which was modified by the C.I.A. to support mining operations, carried both Americans and an elite unit of Latin Americans who were trained to plant mines by the United States, according to the Administration officials.

The actual planting of the mines in harbor approaches was done by the Latin Americans, the Administration officials said, following plans prepared by Americans aboard the headquarters ship.

Administration officials said that if the mining operation is suspended because of Congressional opposition, the mines already planted would not pose an indefinite threat to shipping because they are programmed to become inoperable after several months.

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8 April 1984

The World

A Reagan Victory In Senate on Central America

The Reagan Administration got its emergency aid package for Central America through the Senate last week after two weeks of debate and a dozen Democratic attempts to reduce, delay or place conditions on it. The provision for \$61.75 million in military funds to El Salvador and \$21 million to rebels fighting the Nicaraguan Government may have an even rougher time in the Democratic-controlled House.

Unswayed by the Administration contention that the Salvadoran Army was dangerously low on supplies, House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. said he opposed further aid. In any case, he was in no hurry to schedule debate, putting it off until after the Easter recess ends April 23. There is a split among Democrats, some favoring aid to El Salvador, others seeking at least a delay until they see who wins El Salvador's presidential runoff, tentatively scheduled for May 6.

However short the Salvadoran Army may be of such things as bullets, it reported stepped-up activity and some success last week. In an offensive in northern Chalatenango province, the Defense Ministry said, 19 guerrillas were killed and 15 wounded. In the east, a guerrilla commander named Carmelo Garcia Guevara and eight of his men were reported killed in an ambush.

Much of the Senate debate reflected fear of direct United States military involvement in Central

America. The Administration was reported to have drawn up a contingency plan to send American troops into combat if the Salvadoran Army proves unable to defeat the rebels. Talk of direct intervention may be intended to elicit more cooperation on Salvadoran aid from Congress.

According to Congressional and Administration sources, the United States is already playing a direct role on another Central American front. The Central Intelligence Agency was said to be supervising and providing equipment for the laying of mines in Nicaraguan ports as part of a strategy of economic sabotage. This was believed to be a shift from the thus far vain attempts by Nicaraguan rebels to capture and hold on to territory.

Henry Giniger
and Milt Freudenheim

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1LOS ANGELES TIMES
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U.S. Didn't Mine Ports: Weinberger

Avoids Comment on Possible CIA Role in Nicaragua Blasts

By DOYLE McMANUS,
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger denied Sunday that the United States is responsible for mining Nicaragua's harbors, but he refused to comment on other officials' reports that the CIA directed the mine-laying operation.

The United States is not mining harbors of Nicaragua," Weinberger said. Asked about reports that the CIA was involved in the mining, he responded, "I'm not talking about anything the CIA is doing or not doing." He added that nothing should be read into his refusal to comment on intelligence activities.

Other Reagan Administration officials and congressional sources have acknowledged that the CIA directed the mining, although the actual operation was apparently carried out by Central Americans rather than U.S. citizens.

CIA 'Mother Ship'

Nicaragua has charged that the mines were laid by commandos dispatched in small boats from a CIA "mother ship" outside the 12-mile territorial limit.

The mining, which has been condemned by France and Britain, as well as the leftist Nicaraguan regime, is intended to cut off Nicaragua's military and economic supplies by frightening merchant ships away from its ports, officials said. At least six ships, including a Soviet tanker, are reported to have detonated mines in ports on both the Pacific and Caribbean coasts.

In a related development Sunday, the State Department, expressing concern that Nicaragua might try to use the International Court of Justice as a propaganda forum, announced that the United States will not accept the court's jurisdiction in Central American disputes.

U.N. Leader Notified

The court, familiarly called the World Court, is a U.N. body based in The Hague. State Department spokeswoman Kathleen Lang said U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar was notified Friday of the U.S. decision.

"We believe that, as evidenced by their appeal to the United Nations Security Council, recent Nicaraguan behavior has shown a lack of serious interest in addressing regional issues," the State Department said in a statement. "We do not wish to see the court abused as a forum for furthering a propaganda campaign."

"This step has been taken to preclude the court's being misused to divert attention from the real issues in the region and to disrupt the ongoing regional peace process by protracted litigation of claims and counterclaims."

A White House official told the Associated Press that the action was taken in anticipation of Nicaragua's presenting "some kind of case" to the World Court.

Weinberger, appearing Sunday on ABC-TV's "This Week With

David Brinkley," said the Defense Department has drawn up no contingency plans for possible U.S. military intervention in Central America.

"There is no plan of that kind, nor is there any necessity for it," Weinberger said.

"You plan for the kinds of things that you may have to do, and for the things that are part of the strategy of the United States and our strategic priorities and objectives—and this is not one of them," he said.

Disagreement on Statement

Another Administration official, however, said that the Pentagon does have such plans—and has similar plans covering most parts of the world—but that none of them is considered "active."

He indicated that this was what Weinberger apparently meant.

"We've got plans for almost everything," the official said. "But there's no active planning for use of U.S. troops in a combat role in Central America."

The official, who asked not to be identified by name, said Pentagon planners would normally review and update the contingency plans on a regular basis, as conditions in the area changed.

But he said none of the Administration's inter-agency planning groups had requested any plans for combat involvement in Central America, a step that would indicate that intervention was being actively considered.

"The whole thrust of the President's policy is to enable the Central Americans to take care of themselves," the official said. "There's a recognition in the White House that, politically, it would be a very difficult thing to convince the country (that U.S. intervention) is needed."

"Of course, for that policy to work requires the support of Congress," he added.

The Administration has asked Congress for sharply increased military and economic aid for El Salvador and other U.S. allies in Central America, but the Democratic-led House of Representatives has so far refused to provide most of the money.

Administration officials have said the Salvadoran army could turn the tide of its war against leftist guerrillas in two years—if it gets the requested funds.

Reagan has refused to rule out the use of American troops in case the Salvadorans do not succeed.

'Can Never Say "Never"'

"Presidents can never say 'never,'" the Administration official noted Sunday.

Nevertheless, some officials worried that even noting the existence of the routine contingency plans—as The New York Times did in an article Sunday—might make it more difficult for the Administration to persuade the House to approve requests for new military aid to the Nicaraguan rebels and the Salvadoran government.

Already, Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), the Senate minority whip, has said he will ask the Senate Foreign

Continued

Relations Committee to investigate the contingency plans.

The Senate, which approved \$62 million in immediate new aid to El Salvador last week, rejected a measure that would have prohibited the use of U.S. troops in combat there without explicit congressional approval.

The Senate also approved an officially secret \$21 million for the Nicaraguan rebels, despite complaints from some powerful Democrats that the mining of Nicaragua's ports by CIA-financed rebels may be a violation of international law and that the Administration appears to be "destabilizing" Nicaragua's Sandinista regime despite promises that it would not do so.

Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said that the mining was undertaken without full notification of Congress and that he will seek explanations from the Administration this week.

Weinberger's flat denial that the United States is involved may further annoy members of Congress, a congressional aide said, since Administration officials have admitted in closed-door hearings that the CIA directed the operation.

WALL STREET JOURNAL
9 April 1984

Reagan Snubs World Court Over Nicaragua

U.S. Rejects Tribunal's Role In Central America; Foes Point to Mining of Ports

By DAVID ROGERS

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—The Reagan administration, in an effort to blunt legal action by the Nicaraguan government, is withdrawing from the jurisdiction of the World Court regarding any actions in Central America.

Papers notifying the United Nations were late Friday without any public announcement. The action is unprecedented in the U.S. and is certain to raise controversy, given recent disclosures that the U.S. has been directing the mining of Nicaraguan ports.

State Department officials, who confirmed the action yesterday, said the withdrawal for a two-year period represents only a tactical legal move. But it is seen by critics as further evidence that the mining operation is in violation of international law.

"Every sophisticated analyst of international affairs will conclude that the United States is confirming that what it is doing is illegal," said Alfred Rubin, professor of international law at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

News disclosures of the Central Intelligence Agency's role in the mining have come as the administration is seeking another \$21 million for the war in Nicaragua. The operation is certain to harden opposition in the Democratic-controlled House, which twice voted last year to cut off aid to the anti-Sandinista insurgents.

Within the Republican-controlled Senate, Intelligence Committee Chairman Barry Goldwater (R., Ariz.) was angered that he hasn't been better informed of the operation. And Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D., N.Y.), the committee vice chairman, says mining must stop or the administration is losing Senate support for the larger Nicaragua program.

"I believe from what I know that what has now happened is not legal," said Mr. Moynihan, and he described the decision to withdraw from World Court jurisdiction as an "outrage."

"It is shameful," he said. "Backward reels the mind."

According to sources, American personnel are supervising the mining operation from a mother ship controlled by the CIA in the Pacific. Anti-Sandinista insurgents have claimed credit for the mining. But sources say that self-contained "Latino" units comprised of Salvadorans and Latin Americans from outside of Nicaragua are participating in the mission, using smaller, high-speed boats operating from the larger craft.

Since late February, the Sandinista government has complained bitterly about the mining. Two ports on the Pacific coast, Corinto and Puerto Sandino, as well as El Bluff on the Caribbean coast, have been affected.

A Nicaraguan Embassy official in Washington listed as many as eight cases of the mines being set off in Corinto in the past month, and foreign-registered vessels including Dutch, Panamanian, Liberian, Soviet, and Japanese flagships have been reported to have been involved in incidents.

Britain complained after a Liberian tanker carrying British subjects hit a mine last month. While the British Embassy didn't file a formal protest, it did express concern to the State Department.

Since the U.S. isn't formally at war with Nicaragua, the CIA's role raises broader questions about American involvement in what could be construed as an illegal blockade. President Johnson's administration went through a similar internal dispute in the mid-1960s when it considered but decided against mining harbors in North Vietnam. Mining was carried out years later by President Nixon, but the Vietnam War had long since become a major conflict.

Mr. Rubin, who served as a Pentagon lawyer under Mr. Johnson, said a clear state of belligerency is a requisite for an internationally legal blockade, which he said also must be announced and clearly outlined. "A blockade is a belligerent right only," he said. "To be legal, a blockade has to be declared and it has to be effective." It has to be effective.

Officials at the World Court, known formally as the International Court of Justice, said in the Netherlands yesterday they weren't aware of the filing yet. But the State Department said a complimentary notice had been filed with the court late Friday as well. After inquiries were made by The Wall Street Journal, the State Department's news office released an official statement explaining the action and saying the withdrawal was necessary to preclude the court's being "misused."

The withdrawal applies to disputes "with any Central American state or any dispute arising out of or related to events in Central America," the statement said.

"Obviously some people may take it that way but it is not an admission of guilt," said a State Department counsel familiar with deliberations leading up to the decision. Britain, Australia, and India have taken similar steps in the past, he said, but it marks the first time for the U.S., which only a few years ago itself went to the court seeking recourse in the Iranian hostage crisis.

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House to Block Aid for Rebels, O'Neill Asserts

By PHILIP TAUBMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 9 — The Speaker of the House, Thomas P. O'Neill Jr., said today that the Reagan Administration's request for \$21 million in new aid to Nicaraguan rebels would not be approved by the House.

"I can't conceive of it passing the House," Mr. O'Neill, a Massachusetts Democrat, said at a news conference.

Mr. O'Neill and Representative Jim Wright, the majority leader, said that reports of the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors had killed any chance that the financing measure would be approved. The Republican-controlled Senate approved the bill last week.

Money Reported Running Out
Reagan Administration officials, agreeing that the measure was unlikely to gain House approval, said that the C.I.A. would have to begin reducing support for the Nicaraguan rebels by the end of the month. Administration officials have said that without the additional \$21 million, financing for the covert activities against Nicaragua would run out before summer.

In Miami, a Cuban-American told a gathering of Central American Government and business figures that they should begin a publicity campaign to correct what he called the media-distorted picture of the situation in Central America. He was responding to what appeared to be the deep concern of many of the group's predominantly conservative members that Congress might delay or cut appropriations for economic and military aid to the region.

Administration officials, saying they were disappointed and angered by the collapse of legislative support for the Nicaraguan rebels, blamed Congress for unauthorized disclosures about the mining that appeared in published reports in recent days.

A Warning on Guerrillas

They warned that a cutoff of funds would leave an estimated 12,000 rebel troops in disarray and bring to an end the Reagan Administration's three-year effort to press Nicaragua to abandon its support for guerrillas in El Salvador.

The United States, in anticipation of the Nicaraguan suit, notified the World Court on Friday that it would not accept the court's jurisdiction in disputes involving Central America for the next two years.

Mr. O'Neill said the United States position on court jurisdiction undermined "38 years of U.S. support for peaceful resolution of disputes between nations."

Mr. O'Neill said that the reported involvement of the C.I.A. in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors removed any vestige of justification for the covert activities. "Up to this point," Mr. O'Neill said, "I have contended that the Reagan Administration's secret war against Nicaragua was morally indefensible. Today it is clear that it is legally indefensible as well."

No Aid in House Bill

Mr. O'Neill and other House Democratic leaders were considering the possibility today of refusing to meet with the Senate to resolve differences in the supplemental appropriation bill that, in the Senate version, contains \$21 million for the rebels. The House bill includes no money for the insurgents. A decision to boycott such a meeting would kill the bill.

Normally, when the two houses pass differing versions of the same legislation, representatives from each meet in a conference committee to try to work out a compromise. House leaders said that if a conference committee was formed and the Senate insisted that the \$21 million be included in the final bill, the House would not approve it. The House voted twice within the last year to end financing for the Nicaraguan rebels, but \$24 million in aid for the current fiscal year was subsequently approved as part of an omnibus spending bill.

In an effort to reverse the Senate vote in favor of the \$21 million, Senator

Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, introduced a sense-of-Congress resolution today that would bar the use of funds for mining Nicaraguan harbors and require the Administration to accept World Court jurisdiction over American activities against Nicaragua. In an effort to attract more support, Senator Kennedy divided the resolution so there would be separate votes on the mining issue and on the World Court. The Senate is expected to vote on both issues Tuesday.

The latest wave of opposition to the once-covert activities developed in recent days as the mining of Nicaraguan harbors became a major issue. Details about the operation, based on information provided by both Administration officials and members of Congress, appeared in news reports during the last week.

The mining, which began about two months ago, has been supervised by Americans working for the C.I.A. on an intelligence ship off Nicaragua's Pacific coast, according to the officials and members of Congress.

The actual placement of the mines inside Nicaraguan territorial waters, they said, was handled by an elite group of Latin American commandos who use small, high-speed boats to penetrate shipping lanes close to shore. The mines have damaged vessels from six nations, including a Soviet tanker.

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10 April 1984

Democrats Assail Reagan's Policy On Nicaragua

U.S. Mining of Ports Creates Strong House Opposition To Funding for Guerrillas

By DAVID ROGERS

And ROBERT S. GREENBERGER

Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — The Democratic-controlled House moved toward a bitter confrontation with President Reagan over Central America policy following the disclosure that the U.S. helped to mine Nicaraguan ports.

Led by House Speaker Thomas O'Neill, Democrats of different philosophical stripes assailed the Reagan administration's policy yesterday. Rep. O'Neill called the policy morally and legally "indefensible" and predicted that the House will kill an administration request for \$21 million to fund covert guerrilla operations against Nicaragua's Marxist government.

Mr. O'Neill said he hoped to complete action on the Nicaragua funding this week. But the whole Central America package was thrown into doubt late yesterday when House Appropriations Chairman Jamie Whitten (D., Miss.) asked to delay action on the measure.

Apart from the Nicaragua request, the White House is seeking \$61.8 million in military aid for El Salvador. But unless Mr. Whitten's objections are met, the entire bill is likely to be shelved until after the spring recess beginning at the end of this week.

Even some earlier Democratic supporters of the administration's Central America policy were raising objections to the mining operation and to the White House decision on Friday to withdraw the U.S. from the jurisdiction of the World Court on Central America matters. But administration spokesmen brushed off these attacks, and insisted current U.S. policies are both sound and legal.

The White House policy faces additional scrutiny, however, even in the Republican-controlled Senate. William Casey, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has been summoned to appear before the Senate Intelligence Committee this afternoon for questioning regarding the CIA's role in the mining of Nicaraguan ports.

Sources say American personnel aboard a ship controlled by the CIA in the Pacific Ocean are overseeing the mining operation, which began late in February and has targeted three Nicaraguan ports. Though anti-Sandinista insurgents aided by the CIA have claimed responsibility for the mining, sources say the operation is being carried out by self-contained units of Salvadorans and other Latin Americans from outside Nicaragua.

According to sources, the mining operation was the subject of a National Security Planning Group meeting within the Reagan administration in February, yet the Senate committee was uninformed of the matter weeks later at a hearing March 12. Under a 1980 law, the president is required to "fully inform" congressional intelligence committees of operations abroad in "a timely fashion." And the failure to notify the panel has infuriated senators embarrassed by the news disclosures on the mining and CIA role.

"I think the fur will fly," said a senior senator on the committee. While the president has enjoyed broad bipartisan support in the panel, there is serious opposition to the mining because of the direct role reportedly played by the CIA and the question of whether the U.S. is violating international law.

On the Senate floor, the controversy surrounding the mining operation has prompted liberals to reopen debate on the Nicaragua war. Sen. Edward Kennedy (D., Mass.) seized the floor in the midst of deliberations on a tax bill last night to offer an amendment opposing the mining and the decision to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the World Court. Sen. William Cohen (R., Maine) and Sen. David Durenberger (R., Minn.), both members of the Intelligence Committee who backed funding last week, indicated they would support Mr. Kennedy. Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) said the vote on the amendment could be close.

Mr. Kennedy said: "This policy defies all logic, it defies all reason, and it defies all law. I am convinced that the only way we are going to halt this military escalation is with Congress."

Soon after the first disclosures of CIA activity last Friday, the administration gave notice to the United Nations that it was withdrawing from jurisdiction of the World Court for any disputes arising from its actions in Central America.

And Nicaragua announced yesterday that it filed suit against the U.S. in the court, asking the court to declare illegal all U.S.-backed insurgent activities against Nicaragua. The Sandinista government also asked the court to order an immediate end to U.S. support of the insurgents, known as "contras."

Miguel D'Escoto, Nicaragua's foreign minister, said at a news conference here that U.S.-sponsored covert activities have "already cost Nicaragua more than 1,300 lives, injures to many times that number and hundreds of millions of dollars in damage and destruction." He added that the U.S. effort to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the World Court is a "clear manifestation of nervousness" that it would lose a court case.

At the State Department, senior officials indicated that if the court rules that the U.S. hasn't given adequate reasons for withdrawing, Washington could try another approach. These officials said that under a U.S. declaration made in 1946, when the U.S. joined the court, Washington stated that the court's authority doesn't apply to disputes deemed to be within "the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United States of America." One official suggested this clause might be used to avoid the court's jurisdiction.

The two-year U.S. withdrawal has provoked sharp criticism in Congress. "I think Shakespeare had a phrase, 'You protest too much,'" said Sen. Daniel Inouye (D., Hawaii), of the State Department's stated worries that the Nicaraguans would misuse the court. "It sounds like a guilty man."

Mr. O'Neill described the withdrawal as "shocking," and a long line of Democrats, running from such Southern moderates as Rep. Sam Gibbons of Florida to more traditional liberals such as Rep. Mike Lowry of Washington condemned the decision in speeches on the floor.

"I think it hurts us as a nation," said Mr. Gibbons of the withdrawal from the court, an unprecedented step for the U.S. "I think we have more to lose on this than any other nation on earth."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1WASHINGTON TIMES
10 April 1984

Controversy heated over World

By Timothy Elder
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Court suit

The Reagan administration found itself in a heated public debate yesterday with Nicaragua and congressional leaders over whether it should recognize World Court jurisdiction in the conflict between the Sandinista regime and rebels seeking to topple it.

At the same time, it also faced attacks from both quarters over charges that the United States played a part in the mining of Nicaraguan waters.

Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto interrupted talks with Reagan administration officials to announce that his country

had, as expected, filed suit in the World Court, now known as the International Court of Justice, to seek an end to U.S. support of anti-communist rebels in his country.

The Nicaraguan action followed published reports over the weekend from administration and Congressional sources as saying that the CIA had supervised the mining of three Nicaraguan ports by anti-Sandinista guerrillas.

Even before the Nicaraguan suit was filed, however, the Reagan administration informed the court, which is based in The Hague in the Netherlands, that it would not recognize its jurisdiction in cases involving Central America for the next two years.

Congressional sources yesterday condemned both the CIA involvement in the mining and the exclusion of the World Court from the Central American conflict.

They predicted that the developments had killed any chance that the House might approve administration requests for additional funds for the CIA's activities in support of the rebels.

State Department spokesman John Hughes said the administration action with the World Court was intended to prevent Nicaragua from turning the court into a "próvida forum."

Mr. Hughes also indicated that the administration did not want to have to answer questions from the court about alleged U.S. intelligence activities in Nicaragua.

"We think there are other, more appropriate avenues. The Contadora process for settlement of the dispute on a regional basis is where we would like to see this activity take place," he said.

"Contadora is not a court of law and the U.S. is not a part of the Contadora process," Father d'Escoto countered while speaking at a news conference at the Nicaraguan Embassy. He vowed that the Managua government would go forward with its court action even without U.S. participation.

The Contadora group, including Panama, Venezuela, Mexico and Colombia, has been attempting to negotiate peace and the end of outside interference in the affairs of the Central American isthmus.

House Speaker Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill called the administration move to exempt its activities in Central America from the World Court's jurisdiction "shocking" and said it undermined "38 years of U.S. support for the peaceful and lawful resolution of disputes between nations."

Mr. O'Neill and House Majority Leader Jim Wright, D-Texas, predicted that the House would reject an administration request for \$21 million to help finance covert operations in Nicaragua.

Sen. Charles H. Percy, R-Ill. and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called a closed meeting of the committee today for a briefing on the mining, the World Court action and reports of a contingency plan for sending U.S. troops into Central America. Public hearings may be held later, he said.

"I just don't know where the sensitivity is in a case like that," Mr. Percy told James Michel, deputy assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, who was testifying on proposed U.S. aid to Central America.

"I think we are all put in an extraordinarily difficult position," Mr. Percy said. "I will certainly expedite the hearing on this, and I assume it will be a warm hearing, to put it mildly."

Mr. Michel told the committee that while other countries, including Canada, India, Britain and Australia had previously exempted themselves from World Court jurisdiction in certain cases, this was the first time for the United States to do so.

Rep. Michael D. Barnes, D-Md. and chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, said his subcommittee will hold immediate hearings on what he called "this shameful episode" regarding the World Court.

Seven ships, including a Soviet oil tanker and a Japanese freighter, have been damaged by the mines in recent weeks. Crewmen from the Soviet and Japanese ships were injured in the explosions.

Administration officials have cited Nicaraguan support of Marxist guerrillas in El Salvador since 1979 in defending CIA activities in support of the anti-Sandinista guerrillas in Nicaragua.

White House spokesman Larry Speakes denied published reports that contingency plans had been prepared for sending U.S. troops to Central America if events there continued to deteriorate and threatened U.S. vital interests.

"We don't have any contingency plans that would involve U.S. troops in Central America," Mr. Speakes said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-2WASHINGTON TIMES
10 April 1984

House defeat forecast for Reagan bid to aid rebels in Nicaragua

By Thomas D. Brandt
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Defeat is certain for President Reagan's pending request for \$21 million in aid for Nicaraguan rebel activities, according to leaders of the Democratic-controlled House.

Weekend news accounts that earlier allocations of funds were used by the CIA to mine Nicaragua's main harbor "adds fuel to the fire," said Majority Leader Jim Wright, D-Texas.

"I can't conceive of it passing the House," said House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, D-Mass., who pointed out that the House has defeated a similar funding request on two earlier occasions. Rep. Edward Boland, D-Mass., chairman of the Intelligence Committee that has CIA oversight, also opposes the funds, according to Mr. O'Neill who said he talked with Mr. Boland about the matter twice over the weekend.

Last week the Senate rejected two amendments which would have killed or limited use of the \$21 million.

The funds for CIA covert operations are contained in a conference report that also includes \$61.7 million in military aid for El Salvador.

Mr. O'Neill said he hopes to bring the report to the House floor before Congress adjourns for Easter on Friday.

The level of House support for the Salvadoran aid is uncertain, and opposition to the Nicaraguan part of the package could be strong enough to sink both if they are tied together, according to several congressional sources. However, the conferees could send them to the House floor under conditions that allow them to be voted on separately.

Mr. Wright, who supports the Salvadoran aid, said several members have told him over the last few days that they will no longer support the Salvadoran funding request because of the recent

criticism by President Reagan of congressional involvement in foreign affairs.

The mining of Nicaraguan waters and the Reagan administration's decision to remove its Central America policies from World Court jurisdiction provoked a furor in Congress yesterday, as Nicaragua appealed to the international community to halt U.S. support for anti-government guerrillas.

Even before Nicaragua petitioned the International Court of Justice in The Hague for assistance, the United States announced it would not recognize the court's right to rule in any cases involving Central America for the next two years.

House and Senate hearings into the Nicaraguan situation were scheduled. Seven House members introduced a resolution demanding an immediate end to the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, which congressional sources say was carried out by CIA agents. The State Department refuses to comment on the CIA's reported involvement.

Sen. Charles H. Percy, R-Ill., called a closed meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee today for a briefing on the mining, the World Court action and news reports of a contingency plan for sending U.S. troops into Central America. He said public hearings may follow.

Mr. Percy, the committee chairman, said he was "surprised and shocked" to read of the developments in his newspaper without first being notified by the administration.

"I just don't know where the sensitivity is in a case like that," he told James Michel, deputy assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, who was testifying on proposed U.S. aid to Central America.

"I think we are all put in an extraordinarily difficult position," Mr. Percy said. "I will certainly expedite



Rep. James Wright, D-Texas

the hearing on this, and I assume it will be a warm hearing, to put it mildly."

Mr. Michel told the committee the United States had never previously moved to exempt itself from World Court jurisdiction, but that Canada, India, Britain and Australia formerly had done so.

Senate Minority Leader Robert C. Byrd, D-W.Va., denounced the mining as an act of terrorism and said he probably would oppose any future assistance to the Nicaraguan rebels because of the CIA's reported involvement in the mining.

Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker, R-Tenn., yesterday said he wants an administration briefing on the harbor mining situation.

Senate Votes End to Mining In Nicaragua

Resolution, Approved 84-12,
Expected to Force Reagan
To Stop CIA Operation

By DAVID ROGERS

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — The Republican-controlled Senate, in an embarrassing defeat for President Reagan, voted to end U.S. support for the mining of ports in Nicaragua.

Forty-two Republicans joined 42 Democrats to pass the non-binding resolution in an 84-12 roll-call vote. The large margin reflects the widespread opposition in Congress to the covert operation, which is being directed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

A senior Republican on the Intelligence Committee said the administration will be forced to stop the mining given the size of the vote. "I'm convinced they'll have to stop from the size of this."

The action came after a series of closed-door briefings by CIA Director William Casey on the mining operation. Faced with certain defeat, the White House late yesterday afternoon released Republicans to vote for the resolution, which the administration previously had hoped to kill.

Sen. Edward Kennedy (D., Mass.) agreed in turn to temporarily withdraw a second provision opposing the administration's decision to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the World Court regarding any actions in Central America. The legal action was taken last week in anticipation of Nicaragua's suit filed Monday to block the mining and attacks on its territory by U.S.-backed insurgents financed by the CIA.

"I would think that's about as clear a statement as can be made by the U.S. Senate," said Mr. Kennedy. The vote represented a personal triumph for the Democratic liberal, who had been beaten badly on a series of previous Central America amendments.

White House Criticism

The White House, playing down the vote, issued a statement shortly before the roll call criticizing the "shrill and often confusing" debate on its Central American policy. The Reagan administration denied any plan to send U.S. combat troops to the region or escalate military aid after November's elections, but no comment was made on the mining.

According to sources, the mining operation began in late February and was authorized after a meeting of the National Security Planning Group, representing the president and his highest-level advisers. Three harbors have been mined, and sources said American personnel aboard a ship controlled by the CIA in the Pacific have been supervising the operation. Though anti-Sandinista insurgents aided by the CIA have claimed credit for the attacks, sources said that self-contained units consisting of Salvadorans and other Latin Americans from outside of Nicaragua have participated in the mining, using high-speed small boats operating from the mother ship.

The direct CIA role and the presence of these units from outside the Nicaraguan insurgency made the operation highly sensitive. Within Congress there also is concern about the operation's impact on non-military targets and potential violations of international law.

"I told Mr. Casey that this is no way to run a railroad," said Chairman Barry Goldwater (R., Ariz.) of the Senate Intelligence Committee, furious to be caught unaware of a significant change in the three-year Nicaragua program. "The committee and Congress were left holding the bag."

Embarrassed Republicans

Last night's Senate vote was striking both for the renewed unity it showed among Democrats and for the erosion it demonstrated among Republicans. Members of Mr. Reagan's party backed the administration's Central America policy in repeated votes last week, but they have been plainly embarrassed because of the disclosures about the mining.

"Some of us wished we had stood up and made the amendment instead of Kennedy," said Sen. David Durenberger (R., Minn.), after what was described as a stormy caucus following the briefing by Mr. Casey.

House Minority Leader Robert Michel (R., Ill.), who sits as an ex-officio member

of the House Intelligence Committee, said he is disturbed by the mining. And Rep. William Goodling (R., Pa.), a member of the panel, said he will oppose further funds for anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua.

Within both parties, there is an institutional resentment toward the anti-Congress rhetoric in the president's recent foreign policy statements. House and Senate GOP leaders also were annoyed with the tone taken by the administration. As the House majority, Democrats are more sensitive to the attacks. In the Senate, where the president last week had bipartisan support for much of his policy, he has been badly hurt in a matter of days.

"They're saying, 'We're going to shove it to you, Congress,'" Rep. Leon Panetta (D., Calif.) said of the administration. "And to some extent this place is reacting."

Published statements by administration officials indicating that an escalation is planned in Central America after the November election have further irritated Congress and undercut Republicans committed to salvaging some bipartisan policy in Central America.

"It's a life-and-death struggle. What we lose now will be that much more difficult to recoup," House Minority Leader Michel said bitterly. "One step forward and two steps backward."

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WASHINGTON POST
11 April 1984

Senate Votes, 84-12, To Condemn Mining Of Nicaraguan Ports

President Approved 'Harassment' Plan

By Lou Cannon
and Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writers

The CIA decision to mine harbors in Nicaragua was approved by President Reagan on the recommendation of White House national security affairs adviser Robert C. McFarlane and the Pentagon, despite "misgivings" expressed by Secretary of State George P. Shultz, informed administration officials said yesterday.

These officials said that the proposal was presented to Reagan as part of a "scaled-down" CIA plan of "harassment" to cripple the economy of Nicaragua and make it more difficult for its Sandinista government to aid leftist rebels in nearby El Salvador.

"As presented to the president, the whole plan was one of harassment of the Sandinistas," said one official. "It did not focus on the mining."

The official declined comment on the extent of Reagan's involvement in or knowledge of the mining decision, saying only that it was "part of a package" that was discussed with the president.

Other parts of this package included increasing from 15,000 to 18,000 the U.S.-financed "contra" guerrillas opposing the Sandinistas and redirecting their activities to emphasize attacks on power plants, bridges and other economic targets.

Administration officials gave conflicting signals yesterday about whether the mining of Nicaraguan ports would continue.

One official said the question of whether to continue the mining was "under review at high levels." A Republican congressional source, who was highly critical of the administration for jeopardizing Capitol Hill support for additional aid to El Sal-

vador, said of the mining operation, "They have no choice except to abandon it."

But another official said that the contras consider the handmade acoustic mines, which explode noisily but are unlikely to sink a ship, to be "highly cost-effective."

"They're a small force facing a large Nicaraguan army," said this official. "The mines are like a sign that says, 'Beware of the dog.'"

Nonetheless, the prevailing view within the administration seemed to be that there at least would be a pause in the controversial mining operations.

In Rome, Alfonso Robelo, leader of the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance, one of the principal anti-Sandinista groups, said that the mining would be stopped if the Sandinista government lifted news censorship.

The mining operation was discussed in a National Security Planning Group meeting chaired by Vice President Bush in February, according to one official. White House and State Department officials who asked not to be identified said that Shultz was initially skeptical of it, apparently because of the possibility of diplomatic protests like those that have been made by France and Great Britain.

According to another official, after a mine laid by the CIA-backed rebels damaged a Soviet tanker in the Nicaraguan port of Puerto Sandino on March 20, Shultz expressed "very profound misgivings" but never made a formal objection to the policy.

Continued

One source suggested that the discussion of options may have been inhibited because the administration does not formally acknowledge that the CIA is backing the forces fighting the Sandinistas.

At his news conference last week Reagan declined to comment on specific tactics being tried to undermine the Sandinista regime.

But he said Nicaragua was "exporting revolution to El Salvador" and added, "As long as they do that, we're going to try and inconvenience that government of Nicaragua until they quit that kind of action."

The laying of mines in Nicaraguan harbors was controversial even within the CIA, according to one official in the agency, who said there was "not a consensus" on whether to support it during the planning stage.

The CIA views its involvement as a "holding action" until the covert war could be stepped up if Reagan is reelected in November, according to a senior administration official.

The White House yesterday disclaimed any such political strategy, but Reagan has said on several occasions to senior officials that he does not intend to "lose any country to communism on our watch."

Last week a Republican political strategist discussing the upcoming presidential election cam-

paign said that a "tight case" can be made for the administration policy of supporting the government in El Salvador and harassing the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. "This isn't Central Europe or Central Asia or Central Africa," he said. "It's Central America."

His point, which has been made at other times by administration strategists and pollsters, is that the American people think that the United States has vital interests in Central America, even if they would not accept the same argument for U.S. involvement in Vietnam or Lebanon. The strategist said that he expects that administration policy in Central America will be debated in the fall election and that the issue is, on balance, "a plus" for Reagan.

While Shultz was the only senior official known to have voiced objections to the mining operation, the administration's subsequent maneuver to avoid consideration of the action by the International Court of Justice also was questioned by White House chief of staff James A. Baker III and White House counsel Fred F. Fielding, according to one official.

Nevertheless, this official said, Baker and Fielding agreed to go along with the administration's announcement that it would not abide by decisions by that body, known as the World Court, concerning Central America for the next two years.

Baker reportedly wound up directing the strategy under which guidance was hastily prepared for the State Department last Friday in anticipation of questions about a decision by the Nicaraguan government to take its case against the mining operations to the World Court.

The State Department legal office, informed at mid-week that Nicaragua would take its case to the World Court, quickly came up with four precedents for nations saying that they would not accept World Court decisions in particular matters.

While the State Department cites this as sound legal precedent for its action, some administration officials and Republican members of Congress were critical of the administration's decision to mine the harbors and then declare its indifference to the court.

One official said that the administration was in the position of both "advocating the rule of law and showing little respect for it."

The criticism was directed primarily at CIA Director William J. Casey for proposing the mining activity and at national security adviser McFarlane and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger for supporting it.

"Nobody likes to oppose the CIA on a matter like this, but there should have been more discussion about the diplomatic consequences with the president," said one official in an implied criticism of McFarlane.

Staff writer Bob Woodward contributed to this report.

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12 April 1984

U.S. Says Port Mining Has Ceased

Hill Votes Oppose Covert Support of Nicaragua Rebels

By Don Oberdorfer
and Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writers

The Reagan administration sought to save its covert operations against the Nicaraguan government by telling members of Congress yesterday that mines are no longer being laid in Nicaraguan harbors. There were increasing signs that Congress will refuse to provide more money for CIA anti-Sandinista operations.

If additional funds are not approved quickly, according to administration sources, the CIA will have to cease its support of "contra" guerrillas fighting the Nicaraguan government. Laws tightly drafted by Congress to control CIA covert operations there rule out use of the usual contingency accounts set up to deal with emergencies.

"If there is no money soon, we've got to get out of there, and that is going to be very, very difficult," said an administration source familiar with the thinking of CIA officials.

Another source said that more than 9,000 U.S.-supported guerrillas are reported inside Nicaragua and will have to begin making their way out around the end of this month if financial support ends.

Despite administration explanations, dissatisfied lawmakers took new votes yesterday opposing the delaying and the administration's leader program of secretly financing and directing the "contras."

Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam, briefing the House Foreign Affairs Committee in a closed session, is reported to have

said that the administration is not directly or indirectly sowing new explosive devices in Nicaraguan waters.

Committee members said Dam did not say the mining would not be resumed. And an administration official said the executive branch has not decided that question.

Administration and congressional sources said that the sowing of several hundred advanced acoustical mines with CIA assistance and direction had been completed several weeks ago and that these mines will remain active in Nicaraguan harbors until they decay in several months.

Several well-informed members of Congress predicted that it is highly unlikely that laying of mines will be resumed because of strongly adverse congressional reaction and that the House is unlikely to approve administration requests for more money for CIA support of the guerrillas.

House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dante B. Fascell (D-Fla.), expressing a widespread sentiment on Capitol Hill about the adminis-

tration's performance, said, "They've got both feet in their mouth, and they're biting down very hard."

In a flurry of developments, Congress dealt blow after blow to the administration's Central America policies:

- After hearing Dam's explanation, the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted 31 to 3 for a non-binding sense-of-Congress resolution forbidding the use of U.S. funds to "plan, direct, execute or support the mining of the territorial waters of Nicaragua."

An identical resolution was adopted by an 84-to-12 vote in the Senate Tuesday. The full House is expected to pass the anti-mining resolution today.

- The House intelligence committee voted to delete all funds for supporting rebel forces around Nicaragua from the fiscal year 1985 Intelligence Authorization Bill. A Republican effort to include the reportedly more than \$40 million was defeated, 7 to 4.

- The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out an \$11.1 billion foreign aid bill for fiscal year 1985 without providing for aid to El Salvador in its war against insur-

gents. An administration official said the Capitol Hill storm over the mining of Nicaraguan harbors "has given Congress a smoke screen behind which to hide and a perfect excuse for not coming to the aid of El Salvador."

Administration officials said President Reagan is likely to decide before the end of this week whether to bypass Congress and continue military aid to El Salvador through a special emergency funding mechanism. Another option would be to seek congressional permission to transfer money scheduled to go to another country.

The problem of congressional support for the government of El Salvador and the anti-Sandinista rebels had been compounded, officials said, by a series of events in which Reagan tried to blame Congress for undercutting U.S. foreign policy in Lebanon and Central America. This accusation was one of the president's themes last week at a news conference, a foreign policy speech and his weekly radio broadcast.

"How the hell do you ask the Democratic leadership to come to your aid on matters where you need their support after you kick them like this?" one administration strategist asked.

For the moment, the battle centered on covert operations against Nicaragua and on CIA Director William J. Casey, who was reportedly determined "to fight like hell in every conceivable, legitimate way" to win congressional support for continuing the U.S.-backed guerrilla effort.

Senate Minority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) charged that Casey had violated the law because "we were not told" about the mining operations in Nicaraguan waters. Byrd said he will introduce legislation to require that Casey and 19 other top administration officials be confirmed by the Senate a second time if Reagan is reelected.

In an unusual action, the CIA issued a public statement several hours after Byrd spoke, saying that it "strictly adheres" to requirements "to keep appropriate congressional committees fully and currently informed." It is "untrue" that the CIA has violated these directives, the agency said. A CIA source said, "The only thing more we could have done is install a teletype down there [in the Senate] and let them see the daily cables."

Continued

Congressional sources said Casey's notice of the mining to the Senate intelligence committee was in very short references in March 8 and 13 briefings to the effect that "mines have been placed" in Nicaraguan harbors by U.S.-supported groups. One source said Casey listed three harbors.

None of the lawmakers asked Casey to explain or amplify the sentence in his oral statement dealing with mining, sources said.

"There was no indication from him that this was an American operation from a ship, that about 600 mines were involved or that 'cigarette boats' [small boats often used for smuggling] would be used to plant the mines," a congressional source said.

Lawmakers learned later that Reagan had given specific approval to the mining operation in mid-February after deliberations by the National Security Council. Members of the intelligence committees said the offhand disclosure made by Casey did not meet their interpretation of the requirement for full consultation on important operations.

A Republican senator on the intelligence committee said the mining is "an indiscriminate, general act of belligerency . . . The

mines could hit any ship. If they [the CIA] wanted to send a frogman and target specific ships that are involved in the resupply [of the El Salvador rebels] there would be support on the committee . . . There still is support . . . for helping the contras."

A Democratic committee member said the committee's tradition of bipartisan support has dwindled substantially because Casey failed to make explicit that the covert war includes the risk of harming neutral shipping. But he said the Senate vote condemning the mining should not be overread.

Casey has reportedly spent more than 100 hours briefing the congressional committees and reportedly has insisted that questions would be answered.

When Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), a member of the intelligence committee, asked specific questions of the CIA a week or two ago about the mining, the agency gave him full information. Last week, a special CIA briefing on the mining was held for intelligence committee staff members.

Staff writers Lou Cannon and Joanne Omang contributed to this report.

12 April 1984

For Moynihan, a Search For the Middle Ground

By JANE PERLEZ

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 11 — Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, said today that he had tried to position himself in the political center on the question of aid to Nicaraguan rebels.

But the New York Democrat, who recently wrote a book on the need for international law in the conduct of foreign policy, appears, after reports of American involvement in the mining of Nicaraguan waters, to be finding the middle increasingly uncomfortable.

"I've not been an enthusiast for covert aid," Mr. Moynihan said in an interview in his Senate office. "I have not been the point man. My concern has to be that if it's going to be done — and a majority has always existed — that it be a defined, legal and limited program. I've worked very hard and feel betrayed."

Mr. Moynihan said he was aware only after voting for the \$21 million aid program last Thursday of the scope of American involvement in the mining.

'It Didn't Sink In, Obviously'

On Tuesday Mr. Moynihan said it was "possible that there was a reference to this in one of our briefings." The Senator said his senior aide on the Intelligence Committee, Gary Schmitt, "seems to remember it." Mr. Moynihan said, "It didn't sink in, obviously."

In the interview today, the Senator said that during a briefing with the committee Tuesday, William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, pointed to two pieces of testimony last month when he referred to the mining.

The Senator added that the word "mining" had been used in the committee in connection with the contras, the United States-backed Nicaraguan rebels. "The contras had been doing a certain amount of sporadic harassment of harbors, which we knew about," he said. "But nothing of the order of American vessels offshore."

Early last week, at Mr. Schmitt's request, staff members on the committee who monitor the operation were briefed by a senior official of the Central Intelligence Agency on the scope of the mining in Nicaraguan waters.

Mr. Schmitt said he had asked for the fuller briefing after a Soviet tanker struck a mine.

C.I.A. Aide Answered Questions

The C.I.A. official answered all questions put to him by the committee staff, Mr. Schmitt said, and afterward a memorandum was written on the briefing for circulation to members of the committee.

Mr. Schmitt said the briefing by the senior official had made him fully aware of the extent of American involvement. But, because of the "crunch of time" during the debate, Mr. Moynihan's priority last week to get the Administration to define the goals of the aid program and the "massive effort to keep the public record straight," the memorandum was hazily circulated, he said.

Mr. Moynihan did not see the memorandum but "got a quick brief before the vote" from Mr. Schmitt, the aide said.

Last week, just before voting for the \$21 million aid program on the Senate floor, Mr. Moynihan, when asked how the mining of the Nicaraguan ports squared with an adherence to international law, said: "I don't know that it does square. I don't know that it doesn't. I do not think that this is an easy thing." He said he had asked for a legal opinion on the question from Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam.

Asked if he still supported the aid program that he helped define and voted for last week, Mr. Moynihan said today, "I'm sitting here wondering what is really going on."

PHOTO APPEARED
 IN THE
 NEW YORK POST

NEW YORK POST
 12 April 1984

WHITE HOUSE: DEM REPS UNDERMINED NIC MISSION

By NILES LATHEM
 Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON — The Reagan administration believes Democrats on the House Intelligence Committee undermined U.S. efforts to pressure the government of Nicaragua by leaking sensitive details about the CIA's covert operation in Central America to the press.

Senior administration officials told The Post last night that they believe committee members leaked secret details of a briefing CIA Director William Casey gave them about the mine-laying operation in Nicaraguan harbors.

They believe the motivation behind the leaks was to score political points against President Reagan during an election year.

White House officials announced yesterday that the mining stopped earlier this week after the administration came under heavy fire from Congress and U.S. allies.

Officials are hoping that, by stopping the mining, Reagan can convince the House to approve a bill which would give \$21 million of emergency aid to CIA-backed guerrillas for other activities.

A senior White House official said yesterday that a CIA ship, registered in Panama, which is orchestrating the mining, left Nicaraguan waters two days ago.

Harbor mining secrets leaked

But the ship left after elite CIA-employed commandos from Argentina and Chile made another run in the Nicaraguan harbors to plant a series of acoustic mines.

"I wouldn't run a speedboat by there," the official said, implying there are still some mines in the water.

The Post reported in Monday's edition that the Administration was forced to back down after members of Congress became enraged that the mining operation was going on without formal notification from the CIA.

But, while the Administration has backed down, it remains furious with members of Congress who may have jeopardized the key element in its efforts to stop the spread of revolution in Central America.

White House officials noted yesterday that the existence of the mining operation was reported in the press as early as January.

But members of Congress did not make an

issue of it until last weekend.

It is no coincidence, say officials, that the criticism came after Casey briefed members of the House Intelligence Committee two weeks ago.

White House officials believe that someone on that committee leaked secret details of the operation to the press for political gain.

"There may have been some laws violated," said an official, adding that the FBI may be called to investigate the matter.

The House and Senate Intelligence Committees were formed in 1975 to oversee the operations of the U.S. intelligence agencies.

The CIA and other agencies were required to disclose all details of their operations to the committees, but committee members and staffers are sworn to secrecy about what is discussed.

The Senate on Tuesday night voted 84-12 to condemn the mining operation — a move which is non-binding.

The administration is expected to launch a lobbying campaign to

get passage for the \$21 million aid package for the rebels.

The Senate approved the aid before the mining furor erupted last week, but House Speaker Tip O'Neill has predicted that it will not pass the House.

O'Neill yesterday called the mining operation "terrorism at its worst."

And he added that Casey has done "very, very poorly as head of the CIA."

"He has taken liberties that no other member of the CIA has ever done before," the Speaker said.

Administration officials said that if Congress fails to approve the funding, the CIA may be forced to halt the entire anti-Sandinista operation as early as next week.

But other intelligence experts noted that the anti-Sandinista rebels, who have been operating out of bases in Honduras for two years, still may continue their campaign with aid from Latin American countries like Argentina.

Israel is also known to be assisting the rebels.

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FILE ONLY

U.S. May End Port Mining in Nicaragua

Fears Cutoff of Aid but Won't Rule Out New CIA Operation

By DOYLE McMANUS,
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—The Reagan Administration, fighting to save its covert war against Nicaragua from a threatened cutoff of funds, is considering an end to further mining of Nicaragua's harbors but has made no final decision, officials said Wednesday.

Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam and other Administration officials told Congress that the CIA-directed mining was completed in a month, according to congressmen who attended a closed-door session on the issue.

But Administration officials refused to rule out new mining operations in the future, angering some moderate Republicans as well as Democrats, the congressmen said.

"The operation has been stopped," one Democratic congressman who attended the briefing said. "But they made no commitment about what they might do in the future."

House Vote Due Today

Administration officials confirmed his account and said the initial phase of the mining, which began in February, was completed well before Tuesday, when the Senate voted by an overwhelming 84 to 12 to condemn the action. On Wednesday, the House Foreign Affairs Committee passed an identical, non-binding resolution, 31 to 3. The full House is expected to vote on the resolution today.

Meanwhile, Senate Democratic leader Robert C. Byrd accused CIA Director William J. Casey of breaking the law for failing to tell Congress that mines were being laid

in Nicaraguan waters.

He also told the Senate that he will sponsor a bill to require Senate reconfirmation of Casey and 19 other high-ranking members of the Reagan Administration if President Reagan wins reelection in November.

Byrd said the law "requires that we be told about these (mining) operations. . . . We were not told. The director of the Central Intelligence Agency has failed to act—in violation of the law."

Although Byrd charged that Casey failed to inform the Senate Intelligence Committee, members of the panel said that the CIA chief had, in fact, briefly mentioned mining in testimony before them, but few had pursued the matter.

Questioned by Leahy

One of those who did question CIA officials further on the issue, Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), said he had believed that all members of the panel had been informed of the CIA role in the mining but that he then had learned that he was "one of a smaller number than I thought who had been briefed."

Byrd also said he was "concerned" about the President's role in the mining. "If he didn't know, it scares me. If he did know, it scares me," Byrd said. "Who's in charge if he didn't know? If he did know, why did he enter into an act that is in violation of the international laws?"

Rep. Larry Smith (D-Fla.), who

attended the briefing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said Dam told the panel that the mines were laid "some time ago," that another Central American nation was involved in the operation and that some of the mines have been removed, apparently by the Nicaraguans.

Dam, who acknowledged in the closed session that the United States directed the mining, justified the operation as an act of "collective self-defense" with the unnamed Central American nation, he said.

Congressional sources said Dam was apparently referring to either El Salvador or Honduras, both of which have accused Nicaragua of aiding leftist guerrillas in their countries.

Both Republicans and Democrats in the House said they were angry that President Reagan had authorized the mining without consulting Congress and predicted that the House will block the Administration's request for \$21 million in new support for rebels fighting Nicaragua's leftist regime.

"It doesn't have a chance," said House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill Jr. (D-Mass.), who also called the mining "terrorism at its worst." The mines have damaged at least six merchant ships and caused at least five injuries, but no deaths.

"I think it's down the drain," Rep. Olympia J. Snowe of Maine, a moderate Republican member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said.

However, the House appeared unlikely to take any definitive action before its two-week Easter recess begins Friday, congressmen said.

Rep. Michael D. Barnes (D-Md.), chairman of the Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Latin America, said he expects the House to approve the resolution condemning the mining today but to put off the funding issue until as late as May. The House resolution is identical to the measure passed by the Senate on Tuesday. One committee Republican dissented in the House Foreign Affairs Committee vote on the measure.

Two Strategies Considered

President Reagan reacted to the Senate action by telling reporters: "As long as it's not binding, I can live with it."

Administration officials said the crucial test will be the congressional debate over their \$21-million funding request. U.S. intelligence officials have warned, in an unusual "background" statement to reporters, that if those funds are not approved, the CIA's covert support for the rebels could run out as early as next week.

The Senate approved the appropriation last week, when many members said they were unaware of the CIA role in the Nicaraguan mining.

The money is in the Senate version of an appropriation bill that must now go before a joint House-Senate conference committee. Congressional sources said House Democrats are considering two strategies to knock the money out of the bill—either by barring any agreement in the conference or by bringing the \$21 million separately to the House floor, where it would almost surely be voted down.

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However, several Democratic congressional aides said a delay might help the Administration's case by cooling the anger that flared when legislators decided they had been kept in the dark about the covert program.

Administration officials have privately justified the mining as part of a general campaign of military pressure against Nicaragua, intended to force the regime to meet U.S. demands that it stop supporting leftist guerrillas elsewhere in Central America.

Another aide predicted that House Democrats would be satisfied for the moment with passing the non-binding resolution condemning the mining.

"That'll give them something to take home to their constituents over the recess and tell them how tough they're being," he said.

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13 April 1984

Reagan Policy Now Embarrassingly Overt

Covert War--A Strategy Backfires

By DOYLE McMANUS, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—When President Reagan authorized the CIA to launch a secret guerrilla war against Nicaragua in 1981, one of his concerns was to avoid the angry public debate and diplomatic protests that overt military intervention would have sparked, Administration officials say.

"The beauty of covert action," one senior official said, "is that it permits a government to avoid dealing with the consequences of open support."

Now, however, that strategy has boomeranged. After two weeks of snowballing revelations about the CIA's role in mining Nicaragua's harbors, the covert war is embarrassingly overt—and the Administration appears to be suffering the worst of both worlds.

Congress, up in arms because many members believe they were kept in the dark about the mining of Corinto and Puerto Sandino on the Pacific and El Bluff on the Caribbean, is threatening to kill the entire guerrilla operation by cutting off funds. Even staunch Administration supporters such as Senate Majority Leader Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) and Sen. Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.), a close friend of the President, voted to denounce the mining.

'Winning War . . . Losing Washington Battles'

U.S. allies, including British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and leaders of other Central American countries have condemned it, as well.


The screen of secrecy that was intended to shield the campaign from public criticism has collapsed, but frustrated Administration officials say they are hamstrung in defending the policy—because officially it is still covert.

"We've been winning the war in Central America," one State Department official said, "but losing all our battles in Washington."

For the Administration, the stakes are far greater than whether more small mines will be dropped into Nicaragua's harbors by Latin American commandos financed, equipped and instructed by the CIA.

Senior officials privately describe the estimated 15,000 U.S.-funded rebels as a vital part of a campaign to pressure Nicaragua's leftist regime to move toward internal democracy and stop exporting revolution to other countries in the region.

"The *contras* are an important positive factor," one



Los Angeles Times

Key figures in the Nicaraguan controversy, clockwise from right: CIA Director William Casey, Sen. Barry Goldwater and U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick.



Continued

said, using the Nicaraguan term for the counterrevolutionaries. "They represent an incentive for the government to move in the direction of reasonableness, both domestically and internationally."

The Administration still hopes to win a requested \$21 million for the contras when Congress returns from its Easter recess, despite the warnings of House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill Jr. (D-Mass.) and other Democratic leaders that the funding is "dead."

Officials are making no predictions. "Not now, when you've got mass hysteria on Capitol Hill," one said.

The Administration, which initially pressed for quick action on its money requests for both the Nicaraguan rebels and El Salvador, now views the recess as a reprieve during which it can try to change the tenor and subject of the debate.

"We think people should focus on the real threats to democracy in the area, the problems of El Salvador, the disruptive role of Nicaragua," Robert Sims, a White House spokesman, said.

U.N. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick fired the first salvo in that campaign Thursday, telling a meeting of the American Society of International Law that Nicaragua is the aggressor in Central America, a country "which regularly employs deceit as an instrument of national policy."

Lawyers Deplore U.S. Refusal

Her audience of several hundred lawyers appeared unmoved, though, and later voted a resolution deploring the U.S. refusal to allow the World Court, a U.N. body, to rule on the mining.

Still, the Administration hopes to persuade Congress and the public that the rebels should not be cut off because of protests over a small part of their guerrilla war, namely, the involvement of U.S. intelligence agents in directing the mining that damaged at least six merchant ships, officials said.

The Reagan Administration has mounted a slow, steady and largely secret escalation of the U.S. military role in the area ever since it came into office in 1981, vowing to halt the spread of leftist rebellion from Cuba and Nicaragua to other parts of the Americas.

Not only are CIA officials directing the commandos who operate in Nicaragua's waters, they are also training guerrillas who place mines in the roads of northern Nicaragua and are flying airborne supply missions to rebels inside the country. In Honduras and El Salvador, U.S. troops are overtly—but discreetly—training Central American soldiers and flying observation planes over battles between the Salvadoran army and its guerrilla foes.

That deepening involvement creates a domestic political dilemma, for Congress and public opinion polls have consistently displayed strong opposition to direct participation by American forces in Central America's wars.

Until this week, Administration officials believed that the covert war in Nicaragua, using mostly Nicaraguan guerrillas with U.S. money and advice, was working well. Congress, including the Democratic-led House, had twice extended funding for the program.

Little Reaction at First

Even the mining of the harbors—which had worried the State Department because of its possible impact on the countries whose ships might be damaged—appeared to go without a hitch. Most major newspapers reported the mining, as well as the damage to a Soviet fuel tanker that hit one of the mines last month, but there was remarkably little adverse reaction either in the United States or abroad.

Some officials privately exulted in the dismay that they believed Soviet officials felt when they discovered their arms shipment routes blocked. Last Thursday, the Senate confirmed their optimism by voting 76 to 19 to approve both the \$21 million for the contras and \$62 million in new military aid for El Salvador.

Then, last weekend, a string of disclosures about the details of the mining appeared, and Congress' mood shifted abruptly. Senators who had voted in favor of the funding declared that they had not realized Americans were directing the mining and blamed the CIA for failing to make it clear to them. Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), the conservative chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, wrote an emotional letter to CIA Director William J. Casey declaring: "I am pissed off!"

Continued

Casey, summoned by angry senators, explained that he had mentioned mining briefly during testimony before the committee in March. Some senators, like Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), a strong opponent of the program, pursued the matter further in later briefings and learned the details of the mining. However, others, such as Goldwater, apparently failed to realize the significance of what they had been told until they read about it in the newspapers. And still others, some senators charge, understood what they had been told and chose to ignore it.

'Congress . . . Didn't Want to Know'

"Congress frankly didn't want to know what was happening," one State Department official charged. "As long as they thought we were getting the job done, they didn't want to have to take any responsibility for the way we might be doing it. But as soon as it was pointed out that the mining was going on and that Congress might have some complicity, they all had to get outraged about it."

Regardless, the Administration also made some unmistakable blunders in dealing with Congress. Casey, whose relationship with the intelligence committees has never been warm, was unrepentant when senators complained that he had failed to make the dimensions of the mining operation clear. In a long, closed-door briefing, according to one congressional source, "he told them if they didn't ask the right questions, they wouldn't get the right answers."

The confrontations on Capitol Hill were not limited to the mining. In the House, Democrats cut the request for El Salvador from \$62 million to \$32 million, an amount Administration officials had vowed they would never accept. In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Administration's proposal for a five-year program of economic aid to Central America—the centerpiece of the Kissinger commission report, which was supposed to establish a bipartisan consensus—bogged down in bipartisan deadlock.

On both sides of the Capitol, legislators complained about a series of statements by President Reagan blaming Congress for any failures in foreign policy.

"We just haven't been managing our dealings with Congress well," one White House aide admitted. "There's been no real leadership—not from the State Department, not from here."

The Administration's problem is more than tactical, said I. M. Destler, a political scientist who has written several books on Congress and foreign policy:

"The President keeps making an appeal—almost a demand—for a consensus of support, at the same time as he pursues policies for which there is no consensus," Destler said. "As long as the Administration seems to be getting into more direct involvement in Central America—for which there is clearly no consensus—the critics will have the upper hand."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-24NEW YORK TIMES
13 April 1984**Central Intelligence Agency*****In the Feud With Congress,
No Quarter Is Given***

By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 12 — The relationship between Congress and the Central Intelligence Agency, never one of the warmer partnerships in Washington, has suddenly deteriorated into a bitter feud over the issue of whether lawmakers were adequately informed about the mining of Nicaraguan harbors.

The quarrel, according to both intelligence officials and members of Congress, has poisoned relations more severely than any dispute in memory and is likely to have long-term consequences for the conduct of intelligence activities and the role of Congress in monitoring the C.I.A.

"The whole system of Congressional oversight has broken down," a senior intelligence official said today. "Right now, there's anarchy."

He added: "Nobody's ever seen it this bad. Frankly, I'm not sure it will recover, at least not under the current leadership on the Hill and in the agency."

Anger on Both Sides

The level of anger and mutual distrust was, if anything, muted in the scathing letter that Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, sent earlier this week to William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence. Complaining that the committee had not been told about the mining, Mr. Goldwater wrote that "this is no way to run a railroad."

Intelligence officials, who usually try to be diplomatic when discussing Congress, have abandoned any pretense of patience. "If we don't hear from them again it will be too soon," another C.I.A. official said today.

Neither side appears willing to give much ground on the basic question of whether the C.I.A. abided by Federal laws that require the intelligence agency to keep Congress fully and currently informed about its activities. Mr. Goldwater and many of his colleagues have insisted that they were not informed, certainly not in any detail, about the agency's role in the mining of three Nicaraguan harbors.



The New York Times

Senator Barry Goldwater**Senators Recall Briefings**

Intelligence officials said Congress was first told about the mining on Jan. 31, when C.I.A. aides briefed the House Select Committee on Intelligence. They said that the Senate panel was notified, although not in detail, in meetings on March 8 and March 13 and that staff members from the committee were given a detailed account on April 2.

Several senators recalled in interviews this week that the mining had come up in briefings but said the intelligence agency had not made clear that Americans were involved and that the operation, rather than receiving indirect support from the United States, was directly organized and supervised by the C.I.A.

Committee staff members confirmed that they had been briefed in full on the operation on April 2 and said a written memorandum on the mining operation was prepared for distribution to members of the committee. It is not clear how many, if any, senators read the report before the issue blew up into a major dispute this week. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, the deputy chairman of the intelli-



United Press International

William J. Casey

gence committee, said he had not seen the memorandum last week when he voted in favor of \$21 million in new funding for C.I.A. covert operations against Nicaragua.

Last weekend, before the recriminations began, Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, a member of the intelligence committee, said:

"One advantage of a covert operation is that it allows an awful lot of people who knew about it to say they didn't. It will be fascinating to see the number of senators who will object to the mining during the coming week when virtually the whole Senate had a chance to vote on the issue of covert operations against Nicaragua last week and most members knew the mining was part of it. It was one reason some of us voted against the bill."

\$21 Million for Rebels

The Senate voted, 76 to 19, last week to approve \$21 million for the intelligence agency to support Nicaraguan rebels. The vote came after a floor debate in which the mining was mentioned, according to a transcript of the discussion. On Tuesday, as the furor over the mining grew, the Senate voted, 84 to 12, in favor of a non-binding sense of the Senate resolution that would forbid financing of the mining.

Continued

The dispute over the mining is, in part, an outgrowth of tensions that are built into the relationship between Congress and the C.I.A. Beginning in 1976, in the wake of disclosures about foreign assassinations, illegal domestic spying and other abuses by American intelligence agencies, the Senate and the House formed special committees to make the intelligence agency accountable to Congress.

Although the two intelligence committees lack direct authority to approve covert operations, they do re-

view the intelligence agency's budget and can use the power of the purse to modify intelligence operations. The committees hold meetings several times a week and deploy their staffs to pursue specific issues.

To insure the cross fertilization of information, in both the Senate and the House at least two members of the intelligence committee must also serve on the armed services committee and two members must be drawn from the foreign relations committee.

Scrambler Phones for Members

To enhance security, committee offices have scrambler telephones for sensitive conversations with C.I.A. officials, and meetings are held in conference rooms that are routinely checked for eavesdropping devices.

As a secretive organization that long operated with only minimal Congressional control, the C.I.A. has, at best, an ambivalent attitude toward the two committees. Intelligence officials routinely blame members of Congress and committee staff members for leaks of classified information and complain about Congressional interference in intelligence affairs.

Much of the criticism stems from Congressional resistance to plans for specific covert operations. Last year, for example, the intelligence committees balked at a plan to try to overthrow the leftist Government of Suriname, a former Dutch colony in South America.

Despite the tensions, however, most intelligence officials and members of Congress agreed that in recent years the two committees played a crucial role in expanding the size and operations of the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies.

Both Sides Affected

The imbroglio over the mining, intelligence officials and lawmakers said, is likely to make the C.I.A. more skittish about sharing information with the committees and leave the committees more distrustful of the intelligence agency.

For the C.I.A., they said, the result could mean reductions in planned budget increases, tighter scrutiny by Congress of intelligence operations and a growing skepticism about the usefulness of covert operations.

From the standpoint of Congress, members said, there has already been a serious erosion of support for the intelligence agency and a revival of doubts about the agency's good faith. "When you take the trust out of this relationship," a member of the Senate committee said, "there's not much left."

CIA said to be planning for Nicaragua pullout

By Alfonso Chardy
Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The CIA has begun preparing contingency plans for a withdrawal of most of the estimated 6,000 counterrevolutionaries, or *contras*, operating inside Nicaragua, according to congressional sources, because of serious problems facing President Reagan's two chief Central America programs.

"We have been advised that the CIA already has begun to look at the option of pulling out the *contras*," a source in one congressional intelligence committee said yesterday.

"It is possible that this means that the CIA has concluded that the Congress simply won't release any more money and that it's best to be ready to get those people out of there so they're not killed."

The House prepared last night to join the Senate in denouncing the CIA-backed mining of principal Nicaraguan seaports. It also was expected to kill a request for \$21 million in emergency covert military aid to the Nicaraguan insurgents and cut the \$62 million in Reagan's El Salvador program in half.

The Senate voted Tuesday to approve a nonbinding resolution calling for a halt to the minelaying. On Wednesday, the House Foreign Affairs Committee overwhelmingly approved a similar nonbinding resolution.

House Democratic leaders also said yesterday they would seek deep cuts in new aid to the region.

The committee source said that if Congress did not approve more money for the covert operation, the current operational fund of \$24 million would be exhausted by the end of May or early June.

Only a week ago, Reagan had scored a major victory for his Central America policies when the Republican-led Senate voted 76-19 to approve the funds for the *contras* in Nicaragua and for El Salvador.

But the atmosphere of bipartisan-ship on Central America was poisoned over the weekend by disclosures of direct CIA involvement in the mining.

The House Democrats yesterday said they wanted to cut emergency

aid to El Salvador to \$32 million — little more than half the \$62 million Reagan said was absolutely essential for the war against leftist rebels — and end United States assistance to the *contras*.

In addition, 13 Democrats on the House Judiciary Committee asked Attorney General William French Smith to appoint a special prosecutor to determine if the administration violated the law by sending covert aid to the *contras*.

Led by panel Chairman Peter W. Rodino (D., N.J.), the Democrats said Reagan and other high officials might have violated the Neutrality Act in aiding the rebels. The law forbids U.S. citizens from supporting or taking part in a military action against a foreign country with whom the U.S. is not at war.

It was not expected that the request would be honored at the Justice Department, which has 30 days in which to reply.

Congressional sources said yesterday that if Congress did not provide the \$21 million for the *contras*, the entire covert operation would have to be shut down. The CIA, under current agreements with Congress, is prohibited from dipping into contingency funds to continue financing the program.

However, one administration source said earlier in the week that Reagan was so committed to the Nicaraguan operation that it was conceivable that such a rule could be circumvented, either by simply using contingency funds, regardless of agreements with Congress, or by channeling covert money to the *contras* through a third country, such as Honduras, El Salvador or even Israel.

The 6,000 *contras* are part of an estimated total of 15,000 rebels, operating in Nicaragua but also from bases in neighboring Honduras and Costa Rica, who receive U.S. support.

As for El Salvador, administration officials hinted strongly yesterday that if Congress did not provide the \$62 million for the Salvadoran armed forces, Reagan would declare an emergency and dip into discretionary funds to dispatch the aid.

Senate Majority Leader Howard H. Baker Jr. (R., Tenn.) supported the anti-mining resolution, but said yesterday that he favored continued U.S. assistance to the Nicaraguan insurgents and believes a majority of the Senate agreed with him. The Senate voted against an amendment last week to reject the \$21 million requested by Reagan for the *contras*.

House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. (D., Mass.) said, however, that he and other Democratic leaders in the House were determined to eliminate further aid to the Nicaraguan guerrillas and sharply reduce emergency military aid to El Salvador.

When reporters in Dallas, where President Reagan spoke yesterday shouted that the Senate was against him, he replied, "What else is new?"

In other developments, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee postponed until after Congress returns April 23 from its Easter recess any action on the administration's five-year economic and military aid plan for Central America. The committee is deadlocked over proposed conditions for regional aid.

The looming battle between the House and Senate over whether to continue covert U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan guerrillas will be fought in a joint conference committee assigned to draft the final compromise of a spending bill that includes funds for Central America.

Continued

The Senate grafted onto the bill the emergency money for Nicaraguan rebels and the military aid to El Salvador, which is battling leftist insurgents which the United States charges are supplied with arms by the Nicaraguan government.

"I think it [the bill] can be salvaged," Baker said, but "I don't think we are going to mine any more harbors."

O'Neill said he and senior Democrats on the Appropriations and Foreign Affairs Committees had agreed

to try to eliminate the Nicaraguan rebel funds and cut Salvadoran aid to \$32 million. That figure would include \$20 million for ammunition and \$12 million for ambulance and medical evacuation helicopters.

The speaker said this would be enough to keep the Salvadoran army operating through 1984 in its battle against Marxist-led guerrillas.

However, O'Neill said Secretary of State George P. Shultz, when told about the decision to cut aid, expressed opposition and said he doubt-

ed that Reagan would accept it.

House Majority Leader Jim Wright (D., Texas) said that although he personally wanted more money for El Salvador, "realistically speaking the \$32 million is the most we can get from the House." He said he had urged the administration to accept it.

Originally the administration sought \$93 million for El Salvador but agreed to \$62 million to secure Senate approval.

The Associated Press also contributed to this article.

ARTICLE APPEARED
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NEW YORK TIMES

14 April 1984

House Unit Says Report on Mines Arrived Jan. 31

Asserts Panel Watched Actions in Nicaragua

By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 13 — The House Select Committee on Intelligence was informed about United States involvement in the mining of Nicaraguan ports in late January and it later monitored the operation closely, according to the committee's chairman.

The chairman, Representative Edward P. Boland, Democrat of Massachusetts, said during House debate late Thursday that the Central Intelligence Agency informed the panel about the mining on Jan. 31 after some of the explosive devices had been planted at Puerto Sandino on Nicaragua's Pacific coast.

Reported by Managua on Jan. 3

Although Mr. Boland has been a leading opponent of the C.I.A.'s covert activities in Nicaragua, and his remarks on Thursday were highly critical of the mining, he did not fault the C.I.A. for failing to notify Congress.

His comments added to growing evidence that Congress was informed about the mining by the Reagan Administration well before a flurry of reports last week about the C.I.A.'s role in the operation.

Although most members of Congress were presumably aware that Nicaraguan harbors were being mined — Mr. Boland said the mining was first revealed by the Managua radio on Jan. 3 — the current furor in Congress developed after the extent of direct American involvement was disclosed in news reports last week.

Goldwater Letter

Mr. Boland made his comments during debate about a nonbinding resolution that opposed the use of Federal funds to mine Nicaraguan waters. The House approved the resolution late Thursday by a vote of 281 to 111. Mr. Boland supported the resolution, which was overwhelmingly approved earlier this week by the Senate.

Several members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence have accused the C.I.A. of failing to inform the panel about the mining. Earlier this week, the chairman of the Senate committee, Senator Barry M. Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, sent a scathing letter to William J. Casey, the director of Central Intelligence, complaining about the lack of notification.

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, the vice chairman of the committee, said earlier this week that he had not seen the report before voting on April 5 in favor of \$21 million in new funding for the covert activities in Nicaragua. Mr. Moynihan said, however, that he had received a "a quick brief before the vote" from Gary J. Schmitt, the committee's minority staff director.

Other committee members, including Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, have said that the committee was informed about the mining.

Mr. Boland, in an apparent reference to the Senate committee, said, "There's been some complaint that some other body was not keeping pace with what was happening." He added: "That's their responsibility. I knew what my responsibility was."

The House and Senate committees, while ostensibly sharing responsibility for overseeing the intelligence community, often concentrate on different issues and frequently disagree about intelligence matters. During the last year, the House committee has twice voted against providing aid to Nicaraguan rebels while the Senate committee has supported the program.

Mr. Boland, according to colleagues, made his remarks on Thursday, in part, to show that the House committee was more attentive to following the C.I.A.'s covert activities. Mr. Boland, according to the colleagues, also thought the C.I.A. was being unfairly blamed for keeping Congress ignorant of the mining.

Considered a Moderate

Because of his visibility in recent months as a critic of the covert activities, Mr. Boland may also have wanted to show some support for the agency, the colleagues said. Mr. Boland, a moderate Democrat from Springfield, is known in the House as a cautious lawmaker who prefers to avoid confrontations with the C.I.A.

Mr. Boland's description of the C.I.A.'s talks with Congress about the harbor mining generally conformed with accounts given by intelligence officials.

Mr. Boland said that in the first briefing on the mining, on Jan. 31, intelligence officials said the waters off Puerto Sandino had been mined. Apparently pressed by the committee to justify the mining of a Nicaraguan port, C.I.A. officials, according to Mr. Boland, said Puerto Sandino "was not a harbor, it's an anchorage." Mr. Boland, dismissing the characterization, told the House, "Of course, they're wrong."

'Enough to Warn Other Ships'

The remainder of the mining, which was concentrated at Puerto Sandino and Puerto Corinto, also on the Pacific coast, took place in February, Mr. Boland said.

The House committee held a second briefing about the mining on March 27, Mr. Boland said. "The indication then was that they were mining other harbors and had mined them before that briefing," Mr. Boland said. He said the C.I.A. reported that the mines had "hit some seven ships between the dates of March 7 and March 24."

"What kind of ships?" he asked, answering, "Japanese ships — freighters — loading cotton, Panamanian ships with molasses, a Russian ship with oil, some other, small shipping boats hit by mines, not lethal, but enough to warn other ships coming into those waters that there was a real danger."

Administration officials have said the actual placement of the mines in Nicaraguan territorial waters was handled by a team of Latin American commandos trained by the C.I.A.

Intelligence officials reiterated today that the Senate intelligence committee was notified about the mining in briefings on March 8 and March 13, although they said the subject was not discussed at length. On April 2, they

Continued

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said, committee staff members were given a detailed account of the mining. Staff members have confirmed that a written report on the mining was prepared after the April 2 briefing, but they do not know how many, if any, members read it.

In another development today about the mining, John N. McMahon, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, denied a report in The Washington Post that he had opposed the operation.

"While Director Casey encourages lively debate on all our intelligence proposals," Mr. McMahon said in a prepared statement issued by the C.I.A., "he and I are of one mind when it comes to agency programs, including those to counter the threat of the Sandinistas to the stability and peace of Central America."

15 April 1984

NICARAGUAN REBELS MAY HALT MINING OF PORTS
BY NANCY NUSSER
TEGUCIGALPA, HONDURAS

An anti-Sandinista rebel leader said Sunday his group will "reconsider" the mining of Nicaraguan ports following a resolution in the U.S. Senate condemning the CIA-funded operation.

Alfonso Callejas, one of the leaders of the directorate of the Honduras-based Nicaraguan Democratic Force, known as the FDN, arrived in Tegucigalpa from Miami Sunday to meet with other FDN leaders.

Callejas told United Press International that the rebel leaders will hold a series of meetings next week to "re-evaluate" the mining.

"It's self-evident that the mining hasn't had any good results militarily, and on a political level the results have evidently been negative," he said. "We're not gaining anything and we risk losing support."

He said the meetings are a response to concern over the Senate's 84-12 vote that condemned the mining in a non-binding resolution. He said he feared the upshot of the criticism could be a cut off in U.S. funding for the rebels fighting to overthrow Nicaragua's leftist Sandinista government.

"We have to re-evaluate" the mining, he said. "If it might hurt our overall struggle, we may reconsider."

The FDN claimed responsibility for mining Puerto Sandino, on Nicaragua's Pacific coast some 36 miles west of Managua. Other ports that have been mined are Corinto on the Pacific coast and El Bluff on the Caribbean coast.

Twelve vessels, including a Soviet tanker, a Dutch dredger and a Japanese freighter have been damaged by the mines in the past two months.

Callejas said the Costa Rica-based rebel group, the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance, or ARDE, was responsible for laying mines in the two other ports.

The New York Times and Washington Post quoted congressional sources last week saying agents employed by the CIA operated a freighter from which rebel commandos laid the mines in speedboats.

Although the Reagan administration would not publicly confirm the reports, U.S. officials said the mining would be justified to prevent Nicaraguan arms from reaching rebels trying to topple the Salvadoran government.

Moynihan Quits Panel Post as Rift Widens Over Reagan's Policy on Central America

By GERALD F. SEIB

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—The Reagan administration's rift with Congress over Central American policy widened yesterday when Sen. Daniel Moynihan (D., N.Y.) resigned in anger as vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Sen. Moynihan said he quit to protest the Central Intelligence Agency's failure to adequately inform his committee about the U.S. role in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors. Sen. Moynihan will remain a committee member, but the vice chairmanship will be passed to another Democrat.

The resignation could create serious problems on Capitol Hill for the administration if the job of vice chairman is taken by Sen. Patrick Leahy (D., Vt.), who has long been harshly critical of administration policy in Central America. Congressional aides say Sen. Leahy is eager for the job.

Sen. Moynihan's resignation came just two days after the administration chose to bypass Congress to send emergency military aid to El Salvador. President Reagan announced late Friday that he would send the aid under an emergency provision of the Arms Export Control Act because Congress left for its spring recess without approving an administration request to quickly provide military aid for the Salvadoran army.

Under the emergency provision, the administration can send military aid to a country without demanding payment for 120 days; even then, the U.S. can absorb the cost if the country can't pay. But the aid that will be sent using this procedure isn't nearly as much as the administration hopes to send.

To limit congressional criticism of its tactics, the administration plans to hold down its emergency assistance to \$32 million. The amount essentially is the same as what has been offered by the House Democratic leadership. Initially, the president wanted \$93 million in emergency assistance. Two weeks ago, he reduced the request to \$62 million.

Democratic leaders and the administration negotiated into Thursday night in hopes of reaching an accommodation whereby funds would be reprogrammed or moved

from accounts of other countries receiving U.S. assistance.

Such action needs only the approval of the House and Senate appropriations subcommittees for foreign operations, and Majority Leader Jim Wright (D., Texas) said late Thursday that the House was prepared to act promptly if such a reprogramming request was submitted by the administration Friday. In choosing to act unilaterally, however, the president gave himself more freedom in managing the funds for El Salvador.

The administration also hasn't been able to secure congressional approval for a request for \$21 million in covert aid for counterrevolutionaries fighting the Nicaraguan government with the help of the CIA. Sen. Moynihan's resignation may make it even more difficult to win votes to aid the Nicaraguan rebels.

Sen. Moynihan, who announced his resignation in an appearance on ABC-TV's "This Week With David Brinkley" and in a statement, said he was upset that the Intelligence Committee wasn't told that the CIA was supervising the mining. "This appears to be the most emphatic way I can express my view that the Senate committee wasn't properly briefed on the mining of Nicaraguan harbors with American mines from an American ship under American control," his statement said.

Although the House Intelligence Committee was briefed on the mining operation on Jan. 31, most members of Congress weren't aware of the U.S. role until newspapers reported it two weeks ago. The news reports followed a reference on the Senate floor by Sen. Barry Goldwater (R., Ariz.), chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, to a document indicating the Reagan administration directly had authorized the mining.

Sen. Goldwater, like Sen. Moynihan, was angry that the Senate panel hadn't been told about details of the operation. Before news of the U.S. involvement became public, the Senate had approved the \$21 million in new aid for the covert operation against Nicaragua, although the House hadn't yet voted on

the funds. The Senate also had approved \$61.8 million in emergency military aid for El Salvador.

Congressional aides said that President Reagan approved the mining operation Feb. 17. The CIA first mentioned the operation to the Senate committee March 8, the aides said, but that reference consisted of only one sentence in a two-hour briefing that didn't specify the U.S. role. The vague sentence essentially was repeated in a March 13 briefing, the aides added.

The administration has since conceded in closed congressional briefings that the mining, designed to disrupt the Nicaraguan economy and stop arms imports, was carried out from a control ship operated by the CIA.

"The fact of the matter is that it was important enough for the administration to have the president sign off on it but not important enough to tell the (Senate) committee," one Senate source complained yesterday.

ARTICLE APPEARS
ON PAGE A-3WASHINGTON TIMES
16 April 1984

Reagan makes deal to save Salvadoran aid

By Jeremiah O'Leary
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

President Reagan has been having his troubles with Congress over his Central American policy but just before the legislators went home for their 10-day Easter recess, the president and his aides negotiated with them a means for the United States to keep up to \$32 million in military supplies flowing to El Salvador.

The deal is good for 120 days or until Congress completes action on the administration's original request for supplemental military assistance to El Salvador. The \$21 million request by President Reagan for continuing covert assistance to the anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua is left in limbo because of the continuing flap over the non-lethal mines supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency for use off the Pacific ports of Puerto Sandino and Puerto Corinto.

The aid for El Salvador was arranged in a series of late-night discussions Friday between the administration and congressional leaders. The president in February originally had asked for \$178 million for the embattled Salvadoran government for the rest of this fiscal year but early in March he asked Congress for immediate action on half that amount, \$93 million, until there is action on the entire so-called "Jackson Plan" produced by the Kissinger Commission.

To get things moving as the Central America debate continued heating up in the election year atmosphere in Congress, the president two weeks ago further reduced the request to El Salvador to \$62 million to meet what he called "minimal medical, supply and ammunition requirements." The president had foremost in his mind that the presidential runoff election in El Salvador will be held on May 6 at the same time that the armed forces trying to protect the democratic process would be running out of ammunition.

The White House statement Friday said it was a "tragic irony" that the people of El Salvador are turning out in massive numbers to register their hope and belief in democracy while their armed forces are run-

ning out of the means to defend against Marxist violence.

For 10 days, administration sources said, they tried to avoid a confrontation with House Democrats in a situation where the president had two alternatives — to use \$32 million from funds already approved for other countries, as the Democrats suggested, or use his own executive authority to approve delayed payment under the Arms Export Control Act when it is in the national interest.

The U.S. law requires advance payment for arms under normal circumstances but permits the president to waive payments for up to 120 days. The imbroglio is an effort by Mr. Reagan to give Congress a chance to vote on Salvadoran aid rather than exercise his authority to send whatever supplies he sees fit for 60 days before becoming accountable to Congress.

Mr. Reagan does not want a shoot-out with Congress, where the Senate has approved both the \$62 million for El Salvador and the \$21 million for the Nicaraguan contras. The House has approved neither. Much of the controversy was generated over the initial confusion over whether the CIA's role in the mining of Nicaraguan coastal waters had been made known to the Senate and House intelligence committees as the law provides. It is now pretty clear that Rep. Edward Boland, D-Mass., chairman of the House panel, knew of the operation as early as January. Some Senate and Senate committee staffers also have acknowledged they were kept informed by the CIA about the mining.

Somehow this seems to have escaped the attention of Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., who wrote a blistering letter to President Reagan for being left out. There still has been no satisfactory explanation of whether some senators either forgot they knew, didn't attend the CIA

briefings or in some fashion were overlooked. But the net result was the same. Both houses resoundingly passed non-binding resolutions opposing the mining operations, which apparently have damaged at least seven ships.

Over the weekend, President Reagan got in a few blasts of his own in his national radio broadcast. He said much of the debate has ignored the most relevant facts that Central America has "become the stage for a bold attempt by the Soviet Union, Cuba and Nicaragua to instill communism by force throughout this hemisphere."

Mr. Reagan charged that more than \$300 million has been invested by the Soviet bloc and Cuba in more than 40 new military bases in Nicaragua. Along with money and guns, he said there are more than 2,500 Cuban and Soviet military personnel in Nicaragua and another 5,000 "civilian" advisers. The president said all of Nicaragua's neighbors, not just El Salvador, have suffered from terrorist violence and export of subversion from Nicaragua.

"The region contains millions of people who want and deserve to be free," the president said. "We cannot turn our backs on this crisis at our doorstep." He cited the late President Kennedy, who said nearly 23 years ago: "I want it clearly understood that this government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of our nation."

President Reagan said, "We can do no less today.

By his action to keep the ammunition flowing to El Salvador, Mr. Reagan has merely delayed a resumption of the confrontation with the Democratic-dominated House of Representatives next week. These congressmen have a dilemma of their own. Most are up for re-election and do not want to be vulnerable to charges that it was they who lost El Salvador.

In the present lull in Washington, the administration is marshaling its forces for a post-Easter pre-election shootout on the floor of the House. The outcome probably depends on what House members hear from constituents while they are at home until April 24.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1WASHINGTON POST
16 April 1984

Covert Aid Salvage Try Under Way

By Charles R. Babcock
and Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writers

The Reagan administration is trying to salvage faltering congressional and public support for its secret war against Nicaragua by attempting to focus new attention on the size of the Soviet and Cuban military buildup in Central America and playing down the controversy over U.S.-directed mining of Nicaraguan harbors.

In an effort to rescue \$21 million in funding for the covert operations, CIA Director William J. Casey told the Senate last week that the controversial CIA-directed mining of Nicaraguan harbors was not an integral part of the program. President Reagan and intelligence officials also began giving stronger emphasis to specific figures about the scope of the threat they see in the region.

CIA officials have said that their intelligence collection shows:

- The Soviet Union is spending between \$4 billion and \$4.5 billion each year in Cuba and \$250 million to \$300 million elsewhere in Central America.

- The Soviets have about 10,000 personnel in Cuba; 8,000 of these are technicians and 2,000 are military. About 100 Soviets are in Nicaragua.

- The Cubans have between 7,000 and 10,000 personnel in Nicaragua, of whom between 2,500 and 3,000 are military. Casey has said that the Cuban military personnel in Nicaragua have shaved their Castro-style beards, discarded their

Cuban uniforms and been integrated into many units of the regular Sandinista army.

The president cited similar, but slightly lower, figures on the Soviet-Cuban presence in Nicaragua in a radio address Saturday in which he said, "We cannot turn our backs on this crisis at our doorstep."

Others in and out of the administration are skeptical of the CIA figures. One congressional source familiar with the intelligence estimates said yesterday, "My fear is that in the effort to save the program they will overstate their case and undermine the truth, which is that there has been a very substantial buildup" by Soviets and Cubans.

This source noted that the Soviets have sent new generations of air defense missiles, planes and maritime equipment to Cuba.

Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), a member of the Senate intelligence committee who has supported the administration's requests for covert funding, said yesterday that he questioned the Soviet-Cuban troop numbers being used by administration officials.

"The Sandinistas are supposed to be moving Cubans out," he said. "There are probably substantially fewer there than there were six months ago."

Durenberger also criticized the administration for making no real attempt "to sell" Congress or the public on the Kissinger commission's recommendations to fund long-term economic growth in the region.

"The really frustrating thing is the president has got to lift this out of mining and covert operations, and lift it into the larger context and get it out to the American people," he said.

Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), an intelligence committee member who voted against the \$21 million in covert aid, said yesterday that the administration has been trying "to substitute a covert operation for a foreign policy." He said on ABC-TV's "This Week With David Brinkley" that "there is no real military solution short of sending in U.S. troops."

Administration officials made themselves available to reporters over the weekend as part of the new public relations offensive; and former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger and U.N. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, also appearing on ABC, urged the president to be more forceful in telling the public about the importance of U.S. interests in Central America.

Kissinger criticized Reagan for letting the debate "degenerate into \$50 million increments" and added that, "at the present level of effort, pro-

duced in large part by our domestic division, [the policy] is a recipe for disaster."

Kirkpatrick echoed the need for more aid to head off what might become a "really major threat" to U.S. national security. She said the biggest threat was not combat troops on U.S. borders.

"It is in fact nuclear missiles, it's chemical weapons, which are another really important threat looming on the horizon," Kirkpatrick said. She said she did not have evidence that the Soviets planned to use chemical weapons in Central America but said there had been no warning that they would use them in Southeast Asia, as the administration has alleged.

Casey told U.S. News & World Report in an interview published today, "I think that people in the long run are less concerned about reports of mining Nicaraguan harbors than they are about the danger of creating a wave of immigration into this country if Central America or any part of it fall under Soviet-Cuban domination."

Last week's mining controversy clearly damaged the administration's support in Congress for the covert war, however. Sources said, for instance, that Casey acknowledged to a group of senators last Tuesday that the mining was not an integral part of the U.S. effort in opposing Nicaragua. This distressed some intelligence committee members who had voted the week before to approve \$21 million in additional funding for covert operations in Central America without realizing the extent of the U.S. role in the mining.

Continued

"He seemed to say we had committed an act of war for the hell of it," said one person who attended the briefing.

"He said, in effect, that in the overall scheme of things [the mining] wasn't all that important. I couldn't believe what I was hearing," Durenberger said.

Later that day the Senate voted 84 to 12 to condemn the mining.

Casey and his deputy, John N. McMahon, visited Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) late Friday trying to shore up support for the covert funding. Casey also called several GOP senators Friday, trying to placate some who had called for McMahon's resignation after reading in that day's Washington Post that he had opposed the covert operations. McMahon issued a denial, but congressional sources said he had lobbied discreetly against the funds.

A senior administration official outside the intelligence community said that Casey's influence with the president remained high despite the controversy over the mining.

Among Reagan's circle of national security advisers, this official said, "Casey can still get the president's ear, particularly on some project that appeals to the president's natural anti-communism." Overall, the official said, any senior national security adviser generally is successful in the administration if he proposes action.

"Those who wanted to get us into Lebanon won," he said, adding, "Casey was not in favor of sending troops, but when he was in favor of more action, in withdrawing—even if it was a contradiction of the current administration policy—he was listened to It is a very action-oriented group. Proposals to invade Grenada, get in and then out of Lebanon, open a covert war in Nicaragua, even get rid of [former secretary of state] Al Haig, all seem to win out."

Proposals for long-range consistency in policy tend to get ignored, he said.

One CIA official familiar with Casey's thinking said last week, "Whatever you think of Casey, he truly believes that there is a problem down there in Central America. And there is If this doesn't work . . . there will be [U.S.] troops down there soon."

Intelligence reports point to a fall offensive by the Salvadoran rebels who are being assisted by Nicaragua.

Casey is known to believe that every U.S. action sends a message to the Soviets and Cubans. He strongly favored the U.S. invasion of Grenada last October because he felt that it sent the message "that we might strike in Nicaragua," a source said. After the Grenada invasion, CIA intelligence showed that the arms flow to Salvadoran rebels declined somewhat. It is now back up.

Casey, the source said, accepts the overall CIA analysis that the Soviets are cautious in the Western Hemisphere and that their short-term actions are meant merely to divert U.S. attention. Casey reportedly has said, "The real battle ground is the Middle East and its strategic position and those oil fields."

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
16 April 1984

Sandinista Foes Turn Toward Israel for Aid

By DOYLE McMANUS,
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—The largest Nicaraguan rebel group plans to ask Israel for aid because Congress has failed to authorize any further CIA expenditures for the rebels' fight against the leftist Sandinista government, a rebel official said Sunday.

The official, a member of the Honduras-based Nicaraguan Democratic Force, said the leaders of his organization are scheduled to meet with U.S. intelligence officials today to discuss their options for finding new funds.

The Reagan Administration has requested \$21 million to continue its covert aid to the rebels, known as *contras*, but the Democratic-led House of Representatives postponed action on the issue last week amid an uproar over the CIA-directed mining of Nicaragua's har-

bors.

"We can do without the mining, but we cannot wage a war without resources," said the rebel official, who asked not to be identified by name.

He said that without substantial aid soon, the estimated 15,000 rebels grouped in three rival organizations would begin shutting down their military operations. "We will survive as a movement, but we won't be able to do anything that will have a real effect on the Sandinistas," he said.

The CIA has warned in unusually open statements that the last congressional appropriation for the covert war—\$24 million approved last November—"is running out quickly," in the words of one intelligence official.

One intelligence official said this could happen as early as this week, but congressional sources and rebel officials said the guerrillas could probably continue operations for another month.

The House is expected to debate the \$21-million request as soon as it returns from Congress' Easter vacation, but Democratic leaders, including Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill Jr. (D-Mass.), have pledged to block the funds.

The leader of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, Adolfo Calero, appealed publicly last week for help from the Administration.

Says 8,000 Rebels Face Slaughter

"We have 8,000 people inside Nicaragua," he said then in a telephone interview from Miami. "I don't think the United States would abandon those people. I don't think the United States would permit them to be slaughtered."

Another rebel official said that Calero began searching for alternative sources of funding as it became clear that the House might delay new CIA funding indefinitely.

"We have looked for private money, but there isn't enough," he said. "We need a government. We think the Israelis would be the best, because they have the technical experience."

Israel has already supplied arms to another Nicaraguan group, the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance, led by former Sandinista hero Eden Pastora, rebel sources said.

Continued

A spokesman for the Israeli Embassy in Washington, Victor Harel, said that he has no knowledge of any rebel requests for funding and denied that any aid is currently being given. "We are not involved in any activity to overthrow any government in this part of the world, even if it is a very unfriendly government," he said.

Both the House and the Senate last week passed resolutions condemning the CIA-directed mining of Nicaragua's harbors. Much of the congressional anger was directed not at the covert aid program itself but at CIA Director William J. Casey, who was accused of failing to provide Congress with clear advance warning of the operation.

Moynihan Resigning Intelligence Post

Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) announced Sunday that he is resigning as vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee because he believes the CIA chief deliberately kept the panel in the dark. His term on the intelligence panel was scheduled to end later this year in any event.

"This is the most emphatic way I can express my view that the Senate committee was not properly briefed on the mining of Nicaraguan harbors with American mines from an American ship under American command," Moynihan said in a statement released by his office. "If this action was important enough for the President to have approved it in February, it was important enough for the committee to have been informed in February."

Casey told the committee of the mining in two hearings in March, but did not explicitly say that CIA personnel were aboard the ship that reportedly carried the mines to Nicaragua's coastline. Other members of the committee have said, however, that CIA officials informed them of those details in private briefings, and two senators have said they believe Moynihan knew the details as well.

"There were senators who voted one way the week before (and) in a different way the following week, who knew about the mining in both instances," Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) said on ABC's "This Week With David Brinkley." He added, "I think (they) were influenced solely by public opinion."

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16 April 1984

MOYNIHAN TO QUIT SENATE PANEL POST IN DISPUTE ON C.I.A.

HARBOR MINING AT ISSUE

New Yorker Says He Acts to Protest Agency Failure to Make U.S. Role Clear

By **BERNARD GWERTZMAN**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 15 — Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan announced today that he was resigning as vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The New York Democrat said he was protesting what he said was the failure of the Central Intelligence Agency to inform the committee "properly" about the scope of United States involvement in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors.

The C.I.A., which is charged by law with keeping the House and Senate intelligence committees "fully informed" of its current and future activities, has insisted that it briefed the committees about the mining.

The agency said it told the House committee on Jan. 31, and the Senate group on March 8 and again on March 13. In addition, it said the Senate committee staff received an extensive briefing on April 2.

Agency Cites Directives

"In accordance with existing statutes, and Presidential directives, the C.I.A. has the specific responsibilities to keep appropriate Congressional committees fully and currently informed of agency activities," a spokesman said today. "The agency strictly adheres to these directives. Reports that the C.I.A. has violated those directives in connection with Central America are untrue."

Mr. Moynihan, the ranking Democrat on the committee, echoed a complaint made by Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, the committee chairman, who said he had not been informed of the mining.

Senator Goldwater, who is traveling in Taiwan, could not be reached for comment on Mr. Moynihan's resignation.

Funds Approved by Senate

Mr. Moynihan said in an interview today that if he had known about United States involvement in directing the mining from an American-run mother ship outside Nicaraguan waters, he would have voted on April 5 against providing the C.I.A. with \$21 million in additional funds for covert activity in Nicaragua.

The money was approved overwhelmingly in the Senate, but the matter has not been taken up by the House.

The New York Senator said he first learned of the American role in the mining in an article in The Wall Street Journal on April 6.

As a result, he said, he voted last week with the majority of both houses on a nonbinding resolution calling for an end to American financing of mining. Administration officials have said in recent days that the mining had ceased and would not be resumed because of the Congressional opposition.

Senator Moynihan said he felt his resignation would be the best way to put pressure on the Reagan Administration to improve its relations with the intelligence committee.

Last week Senator Goldwater wrote a stinging letter to William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, protesting what he said was a failure to inform Congress of the American role in the mining.

Asked why a similar public protest would not have been sufficient, Mr. Moynihan said: "It might have brought public attention. I don't think it would have brought the attention from the executive branch."

'Not an Easy Thing to Resign'

He added: "I would ask that they recognize that it was not an easy thing for Barry Goldwater to write that letter and it was not an easy thing for me to resign the vice chairmanship. We were trying to make a point."

In Senator Moynihan's view, the Administration brushed aside the protest leveled by the Goldwater letter. "After Barry sent his letter and it was in effect rejected," he said, "it seemed to be the one thing I could do to say that we are still of that opinion."

Mr. Moynihan asserted that relations between the committee and the Administration had worsened in the last few months.

"When the invasion of Grenada was about to take place, we were informed," he said. "We knew that. We were told and didn't tell, that was our arrangement. They know what this relationship can be."

Casey Met With Panel Twice

Mr. Moynihan, who will remain on the committee through the end of the year even though he will give up the vice chairmanship, acknowledged that it was factually correct, from reading the transcripts of the committee's meetings on March 8 and 13 with Mr. Casey, that the mining was mentioned. But he contended, as have some others on the committee, that it was too slight a reference to something as sensitive as the mining of another country's harbors.

He said in the interview that there was only "a single sentence of 27 words," in a 138-minute briefing that ran 84 pages. At the March 8 session, he said, it was mentioned that "magnetic mines have been placed" but the implication was that this was being done by the Nicaraguan rebels by themselves.

"This sentence was substantially repeated in a meeting on March 13," he said.

"Nothing occurred which could be called a briefing on the mines," he said.

In a prepared statement, Mr. Moynihan said he was resigning as vice chairman because "this appears to me the most emphatic way I can express my view that the Senate committee was not properly briefed on the mining of Nicaraguan harbors with American mines from an American ship under American command."

Successor Not Yet Known

He said he would formally submit his resignation to Mr. Goldwater when the Arizona Senator returned from his trip to the Far East. It was not known who would replace Mr. Moynihan as the vice chairman. The select committee is different from other committees since members are limited to eight-year terms, and Mr. Moynihan's term would have come to an end at the end of this year anyway. He said the Democratic caucus in the Senate would choose his successor as ranking Democrat.

It is likely to be either Senator Daniel K. Inouye of Hawaii, who was the committee chairman until the Republicans took control in 1980, or Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., Democrat of Delaware.

Another committee member, Senator Patrick Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, contends he was fully informed of the mining. He says that many others were too, and that they voted for the covert aid in the Senate, but because of the public outcry against the mining had since switched their position.

Continued

An aide to Senator Biden said Mr. Biden shared Mr. Moynihan's feeling that the group was not properly briefed in March. But the aide said that after an inquiry from the press in late March, Mr. Biden asked the committee staff on April 3 for further information. By coincidence the staff had a lengthy briefing at its own initiative with the C.I.A. on the evening of April 2, a staff aide said today.

The staff then produced a memo for Mr. Biden on the details of the American involvement in the mining. That memo was given to Mr. Biden, who showed it to other senators, but apparently not to Mr. Moynihan.

Mr. Moynihan was briefed orally on April 5 by a staff aide, however, about several intelligence developments, including the mining, but the aide said it was quite possible the Senator did not perceive the mining to be anything special at that time.

Mr. Moynihan said today that he had not known about the extent of the American role in the mining until April 6. On April 5, when the Senate voted for the \$21 million in covert aid for Nicaraguan rebels, the memo was discussed by Mr. Biden with Senator William S. Cohen, Republican of Maine, on the floor of the Senate, and Mr. Cohen showed it to Mr. Goldwater. This was apparently the first time the Arizona Senator learned about it.

Some staff aides to senators on the committee said that since Mr. Goldwater assumed control of the committee, the committee's staff work had been much less aggressive than it was under the Democratic leadership. One aide said that neither Senator Goldwater

nor Senator Moynihan gave the impression that they wanted to know everything that was going on, and that a "certain passivity" set in in the staff, and covert actions were not followed up the way they used to be.

Mr. Moynihan said today that if Mr. Casey had said last week something like, "I'm sorry, we goofed, we won't do it again," that "that would be acceptable." But he said he was very angry at the intelligence agency's insistence that it had briefed the senators fully, when he believed it had not.

"In no event was the briefing 'full,' 'current' or 'prior,' as required by the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, a measure I helped write," he said in his statement.

Mr. Moynihan said President Reagan approved the mining in February, something Mr. Goldwater also asserted. But Administration officials said again today that Mr. Reagan had done so in December. The first mines were laid in early January, according to statements made at the time by Nicaraguan rebels.

Representative Edward P. Boland, chairman of the House intelligence committee, said Thursday that the C.I.A. had informed his group on Jan. 31 about the mining and he had no complaints about C.I.A. compliance with the reporting requirements of the law, even though he opposes the covert aid.

When asked why the Senate committee was not briefed at about the same time, a C.I.A. spokesman said Mr. Casey planned to brief both committees soon after Congress returned from its recess in late January. A meeting was set for Feb. 20 with the Senate group, which was after the holidays of that month, but the committee postponed it until March 8 because it wanted Secretary of State George P. Shultz to be present too, and that was the first mutually convenient date.

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C.I.A. NOW ASSERTS IT SOUGHT DELAYS IN SENATE BRIEFING

REVERSAL ON NICARAGUA

Agency Said on Sunday It Was
Senate Panel That Put Off
a Meeting in February

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 16 — The Central Intelligence Agency reversed itself today and acknowledged that earlier this year, it delayed for six weeks a response to a request by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for a briefing on covert activity in Nicaragua.

A C.I.A. spokesman, George Lauder, said he gave an incorrect account Sunday when he told The New York Times that William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, had been ready to brief the committee in January, but had not done so until March because the committee asked for delays.

The retraction was made after Robert R. Simmons, the committee's staff director, told The Times today that he asked Clair George, the C.I.A.'s liaison officer, in late January for a briefing in early February. Mr. Simmons said the C.I.A. sought two delays and did not brief the committee until March 8.

Senators' Complaints Recalled

Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, committee chairman, and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, vice chairman, have said that the C.I.A. did not keep the committee "currently" informed, in particular on the scope of American involvement in the mining of harbors starting in early January.

The Senators have also said that when there were briefings, March 8 and 13, Mr. Casey did not "fully" disclose the United States' role.

The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 says that intelligence committees of Congress will be kept "fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities" and of "any significant anticipated intelligence activity."

Moynihan Is Asked to Reconsider

Senator Moynihan said Sunday that he was resigning as vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee to draw attention to what he said was the failure of the C.I.A. to inform it properly.

Mr. Simmons said today that Senator Goldwater, who is in Taiwan, had asked him to urge Mr. Moynihan to reconsider his resignation. Mr. Moynihan said in a telephone interview that he was not inclined to change his mind.

The C.I.A., in seeking to demonstrate that it had kept committees informed, acknowledged publicly for the first time today its involvement in harbor mining. A statement said that "the subject of mining of Nicaraguan ports" had been discussed 11 times this year in Congressional briefings.

Mr. Simmons, the Intelligence Committee's staff chief, filled in additional details on briefing arrangements.

In a telephone call that he initiated, Mr. Lauder said that on Jan. 12, Mr. Casey told Senators Goldwater and Moynihan in a letter that the C.I.A. wished to "withdraw the full amount of money" — \$24 million — in funds approved for Nicaraguan activities.

"I was a little surprised," Mr. Simmons said. "I spoke to Clair George around Jan. 23 and told him that, on the basis of this request, the members would probably want a meeting with Mr. Casey before the February recess." The recess was for the Lincoln and Washington birthdays.

Goldwater Accommodated C.I.A.

Continuing his account of discussions with Mr. George, Mr. Simmons said:

"He called me back and said the Administration was still trying to make a decision on the issue of supplemental funds over and above the \$24 million, and could the committee wait until after the recess for the hearing. He also said that, because the Nicaraguan program was part of the President's foreign policy, he felt Secretary of State Shultz should be the lead witness."

Mr. Simmons said Senator Goldwa-

ter had agreed to accommodate the C.I.A., and a meeting was set for Feb. 29. Meanwhile, unknown to the Senate committee, the C.I.A. had briefed the House Intelligence Committee Jan. 31.

On Feb. 24, Mr. Simmons said, he was called by Mr. George and told that the agency did not want to brief on Feb. 29, as scheduled; because Mr. Shultz would be "unavailable." Mr. Simmons said he told Mr. George that there was pressure from many committee members for a briefing and he refused the request to postpone the meeting.

But on Feb. 27, Mr. Simmons said, Mr. Casey telephoned Senator Goldwater to seek a delay, and Senator Goldwater agreed to a March 8 meeting.

Today, when Mr. Lauder, the C.I.A. spokesman, was informed of Mr. Simmons's rebuttal, he said he had to check. He called back and said that, on the basis of his conversations with C.I.A. officials, "Rob Simmons is 100 percent correct."

"I am truly sorry," Mr. Lauder said. "We regret any misunderstanding on this matter."

Mr. Lauder, in a subsequent telephone conversation, was asked why the C.I.A. had briefed the House commit-



The New York Times

Senator Barry Goldwater appealed to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan to reconsider his resignation.

tee on Jan. 31; but had sought a delay in the Senate committee. He said the C.I.A. was under the impression that some senators wanted Mr. Shultz to

Continued

testify and that the agency sought to accommodate Mr. Shultz's schedule.

Mr. Simmons said Mr. Casey was told Feb. 27 that the committee wanted the briefing without delay whether or not Mr. Shultz was there.

The specific issue of harbor mining, Mr. Simmons said, was mentioned by Mr. Casey in the context of accomplishments of the Nicaraguan rebels. According to Mr. Simmons, Mr. Casey said mines had been laid in three harbors, but his comments were phrased in such a way that it seemed as if the rebels had done it by themselves.

Mr. Simmons said the committee had been told in 1983 that the rebels were being trained in minelaying and it was assumed that the mining of ports was a result of that training.

The March 8 briefing was, in fact, dominated by a dispute that had arisen a day earlier when it was disclosed that the Administration had asked the Senate Appropriations Committee to approve \$21 million in supplemental funds for Nicaragua, without first obtaining the intelligence committee's authorization. Mr. Shultz apologized for bypassing the Intelligence Committee.

On March 13, Mr. Casey met again with the committee and won its backing for the additional \$21 million, which was eventually approved by the Senate on April 5. Mr. Casey gave no further details on harbor mining.

The first indication the committee had that the mining involved not just Nicaraguans came March 30, Mr. Simmons said. Senator Claiborne Pell, Democrat of Rhode Island, who is not on the Intelligence Committee, but is the ranking minority member on the Foreign Relations Committee, had been disturbed by reports of ships being damaged by mines and asked the Intelligence Committee for information.

Gary J. Schmitt, the committee's minority staff director, passed on the request to the C.I.A. and, on March 30, received a letter that mentioned "unilaterally controlled Latino assets."

Mr. Simmons, who said he had worked for 10 years for the C.I.A., knew that this meant the United States was in charge of Latin Americans doing the mining.

That letter led Mr. Schmitt to seek a full staff briefing on April 2, Mr. Simmons said, and this resulted in the disclosures about a C.I.A.-leased ship, carrying Americans, that was transferring mines to speedboats operated by non-Nicaraguan Latin Americans working for the agency.

ARTICLE APPEARED
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17 April 1984

Nicaragua policy furor

Congress, wary of 'Americanization' of covert tactics, seems likely to restrict aid, demand more accountability

By Daniel Southerland
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington
President Reagan's secret aid plans for Nicaraguan guerrillas have been slowed by congressional opposition. It is now possible that within weeks, the Congress will blow those plans completely out of the water.

The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is reported to have suspended its mining of Nicaraguan harbors. Given the uproar in the Congress, it now seems unlikely to resume them.

Congressional specialists say that even if Congress agrees to continue funding CIA-backed guerrillas fighting in Nicaragua, it is likely to place tighter restrictions on how the money is used. Congress is also expected to demand fuller reporting to congressional intelligence committees on the supposedly secret operations.

But with Congress in recess, the legislative process is fraught with uncertainties. Perhaps the only certainty is that some form of Senate-House conference on covert aid will take place.

On April 5, the Senate approved an additional \$21 million for the Nicaraguan rebels. But the House is now in less of a mood to compromise on the issue. The Democrat-dominated House has voted twice along party lines to suspend aid to the Nicaraguan rebels. Also voting along party lines, the House Intelligence Committee on April 11 rejected President Reagan's request for additional aid.

The most-heavily publicized criticisms of the administration's handling of the CIA-sponsored mining operations have come from the leading Republican and leading Democrat on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Both have charged that they were not fully informed of the operations, as required by law. On

Sunday, Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a New York Democrat, resigned in protest from his position as vice-chairman of the committee.


The Republican committee chairman, Sen. Barry Goldwater of Arizona, in a now famous "Dear Bill" letter to CIA Director William J. Casey, denounced the mining of harbors as "an act violating international law" and "an act of war." Senator Goldwater told Mr. Casey that his guess was that the House of Representatives would defeat the administration's supplemental aid bill and that the Senate committee "will not be in any position to put up much of an argument after we were not given the information we were entitled to receive."

Congressional specialists on the House side tend to support Goldwater's statement. As one aide to a key Democrat put it, "The House will simply not go along with the Senate on this."


Where the disclosure of the controversial mining operations appears to have done the most damage to the administration is among senators and congressmen who only reluctantly went along with funding for the Nicaraguan rebels, or "contras," as they are often called. As a congressional aide put it, "Some people are going to start saying, 'Wait a minute. This far, and no farther.'"

Among those who had provided backing for "limited" covert operations was Sen. David F. Durenberger, a Minnesota

Continued



PAUL S. CONKLIN



PAUL S. CONKLIN

Moynihan quit Intelligence Committee post

CIA chief Casey: losing Congress's trust

Republican serving on the Senate Intelligence Committee. More than a year ago, Senator Durenberger played a key role in trying to get the administration to move away from what looked like an "open ended" Nicaragua program to something more carefully defined. Durenberger thought he had assurances on that issue. He also thought the administration was pledged to consult at least once a month with the committee on the Nicaragua program, which it apparently did not do.

According to Senate staff members, a more than 80-page report presented by the CIA to Senate committee members in

March concerning Nicaragua programs contained only a short reference to mining, which was "buried" in the report in such a way as to make the mining seem unimportant. There was no indication, staff members say, that the CIA was running a "mother ship" and supervising the mining, as now appears evident.

Congressional objections to the mining have been for the most part twofold:

1. The mines are "indiscriminate" — they do not single out Soviet arms-supply ships. They have damaged not only a Soviet vessel but also ships from Western nations.

2. The mining represents more of an "Americanization" of the fighting in Nicaragua, with a more direct CIA role.

"I think the Senate could live with a program supporting Nicaraguan frogmen who are attaching limpet mines to arms-carrying ships," said one Senate staff specialist.

As best one can gather from congressional sources, meanwhile, CIA Director Casey's attitude toward the mining blowup in Congress can be summed up by the words: "What's all the fuss about?"

Casey reportedly described the mining to senators last week as a nonvital part of the CIA program against Nicaragua.

In Casey's view, the mining should be regarded as a matter of harassment — one more means of deterring Nicaragua's Sandinistas from "exporting revolution" and arms to El Salvador and other Central American nations. As he explained it, the mines are "nonlethal." They are designed not to sink ships, but to frighten others away from Nicaragua's harbors.

What Casey and other administration officials appear to have underestimated was the degree to which the Congress is leary of more direct American involvement in the Central America fighting — an outgrowth in part perhaps of the so-called Vietnam syndrome.

But interestingly, the loss of congressional trust in Casey does not necessarily extend to the CIA as a whole. Many senators and congressmen are apparently convinced the CIA is operating strictly within its orders from the administration. The CIA is not a "rogue elephant," they say.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 62WALL STREET JOURNAL
18 April 1984

CIA Participated In Nicaragua Raids In '83, Sources Say

By GERALD F. SEIB

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—The Central Intelligence Agency participated in an attack on oil facilities in a Nicaraguan port last fall, before it helped direct the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, intelligence sources said.

A CIA ship served as a base for speedboats that carried out an Oct. 10 raid on oil tanks at Corinto, a port on Nicaragua's Pacific coast, the sources said. Earlier, they indicated, the boat apparently also played a part in a Sept. 8 guerrilla raid on an oil pipeline at Puerto Sandino, another Pacific port.

A CIA mother ship also directed the mining of Nicaraguan harbors early this year. The disclosure of that activity two weeks ago in news reports touched off angry protests in Congress and helped stall a Reagan administration request for \$21 million in additional covert aid for rebels fighting Nicaragua's leftist government.

Until now, the debate has focused on the CIA's direction of mining operations. The disclosure of the extent of the CIA's involvement in the attack on oil facilities is sure to heighten the congressional protests.

The latest disclosures aren't the first reports of CIA involvement in the attacks on oil facilities last fall. News reports at the time asserted that the CIA had recommended and helped plan the raids. But those reports didn't disclose the direct CIA participation.

The attack on oil refineries in Corinto touched off spectacular fires in five oil-storage tanks and forced Nicaraguan authorities to evacuate the town temporarily. As many as four million gallons of gasoline, diesel and other fuels reportedly were lost in the attack, which was carried out by commandos using mortars and grenades.

In the earlier attack on the pipeline at Puerto Sandino, near the capital of Managua, guerrillas damaged underwater pipes that carried oil to onshore storage tanks.

The Honduras-based Nicaraguan Democratic Force, an organization of Nicaraguans fighting the country's Sandinista government, claimed it carried out both attacks. But intelligence sources indicate the

raids were performed by CIA-hired Latin Americans.

Congressional sources said the Senate Intelligence Committee hasn't been told about the direct CIA role in the attacks. Both the committee's chairman, Sen. Barry Goldwater (R., Ariz.), and vice chairman, Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan (D., NY), have complained that the CIA didn't inform them of its role in the mining operation in February. Sen. Moynihan announced his resignation as vice chairman in protest Sunday.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1WASHINGTON POST
18 April 1984

CIA Directly Oversaw Attack in October on Nicaragua Oil Facility

By Charles R. Babcock
Washington Post Staff Writer

CIA officers aboard a "mother ship" off the coast of Nicaragua directly supervised commando raids from speedboats that heavily damaged Nicaraguan port facilities last fall, months before they supervised the controversial mining of the country's harbors in January, administration and congressional sources said yesterday.

The CIA leased the ship last summer, according to the sources, and American agents aboard it furnished the speedboats, guns and ammunition and directed the raid by anti-government rebels in the port city of Corinto last Oct. 10. The CIA officers stayed on the ship in international waters beyond the 12-mile limit, while CIA-trained Latin commandos piloted the speedboats into the harbor and shot up an oil terminal, the sources said.

The raid heavily damaged oil storage tanks and forced thousands of inhabitants to flee. At the time, the Nicaraguan government charged that the "criminal attack" was part of a CIA plan, but the U.S.-supported "contras" of the Honduras-based Nicaraguan Democratic Front (FDN) claimed credit for the raid.

A senior White House official confirmed that CIA agents supervised the attack, saying their role was necessary because "they [CIA officers] had the speedboats."

The Associated Press quoted a source as saying the CIA had directed a series of such raids on Nicaraguan ports, including one on oil and pipeline facilities at Puerto Sandino on Sept. 8.

A CIA spokesman declined to comment yesterday, except to say that Congress had been informed of its covert operations as required by the intelligence oversight laws.

But, as in the case of the mining, congressional sources said the House and Senate intelligence committees were not told of the direct involvement of Americans in the port raids until recently.

CIA Director William J. Casey already is under fire from congressmen for his alleged lack of candor in informing intelligence committees of the details of the Reagan administration's supposedly secret war against Nicaragua. That controversy has threatened congressional support for continued funding of the rebels fighting Nicaragua's Marxist Sandinista government.

One congressional source said staff members of the House intelligence committee first "got wind of the mother ship about mid-October," but didn't get a full briefing on either the ship's role in the raid or the mining until Jan. 31 and then only after persistent questioning from members.

But another source said that some House committee members didn't know until yesterday that the CIA had directed the raid, as well as the mining.

"We were directly misled," he said. "They led us to believe it was the contras, but as it turns out it was CIA personnel on the mother ship, directing the operations, picking the targets and the whole business."

A Senate committee source said the agency had told the committee in general terms last summer that it was training the anti-Sandinista forces in laying mines, but not that Americans would be directly supervising their actions. "When you get agency officers directly involved, that's really a high-stakes game," he said.

The Senate committee staff learned about the U.S.-directed raids from House staffers and then began asking questions on the "mother ship" at an April 2 briefing, one source said.

A few days earlier, in answer to a query about mining by Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), the ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee, the CIA's legislative liaison, Clair George, sent minority staff director Gary J. Schmitt a two-sentence letter that said "unilaterally controlled Latino assets" were involved.

Continued

The April 2 Senate briefing with Casey "was so heated," a committee source said, that full answers on the role of the CIA officers on the "mother ship" were never received. "We still don't know when it was acquired, how many CIA officers were on it, many of the details," a Senate committee

staff aide said. Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), a member of the committee who has supported funding for the "covert" war but has been a harsh critic of Casey's trustworthiness, said in a telephone interview that he had not been informed about the CIA's role in the port raids last fall:

"I don't know if I would have thought it was the same as the indiscriminate nature of the mining," he said. But he added, "What bothers me the most is that I don't know we've had the opportunity to even draw the line between direct control and indirect control" of covert operations.

"The best thing the agency could do is tell us all about their covert operations. They'd get a sense of how the 16 of us [members of the intelligence committee] view their actions. We're their sounding board. If we're together and are told about this, we can't bitch. It would be in their best interest to insist on regular briefings so we'd be so bored we'd stop going."

In a statement defending its actions in informing the intelligence committees, CIA spokesman George Lauder said Monday that "The obligation to keep the committees fully informed has, as it has evolved in practice, been met by briefings of the staff, responding to their oral and written questions, and by providing updates on developments and answering any and all questions at meetings called by the committees."

Robert R. Simmons, the staff director of the Senate committee and a former officer in the CIA's clandestine service, said in a telephone interview yesterday that the law requiring the committees be "fully informed" called for more than answering if the right questions were asked.

He said the provision of full information to the two intelligence committees had been a tradeoff for allowing the agency to cease its reporting of sensitive operations to six other congressional committees.

"What Casey and his adviser [George] are doing, in taking this stand, is precipitating a crisis that may lead the CIA back to briefing eight committees It's putting the agency back where it was five years ago," Simmons said.

He noted that the CIA's legislative liaison, George, was a 30-year veteran of the agency's covert branch and "has the same mindset as Casey," a veteran of secret operations in World War II. "That match is a prescription for disaster," he said.

Staff writers Lou Cannon and Joanne Omang contributed to this report.

ON PAGE A-1

NEW YORK TIMES

18 April 1984

Oct. 10 Assault On Nicaraguans Is Laid to C.I.A.

It's Called Agency's First Direct Entry Into Fight

By The Associated Press

WASHINGTON, April 17 — Three months before the mining of Nicaragua's harbors, the Central Intelligence Agency directed a sabotage raid against the Nicaraguan port of Corinto, destroying 3.2 million gallons of fuel and forcing the town's evacuation. Congressional sources say.

The sources said that like the mining, the Oct. 10 raid on Corinto was carried out by Latin American mercenaries hired by the C.I.A. They reached the port by speedboat from an offshore ship where American C.I.A. agents directed the operation, the sources said in interviews on Monday and today.

The C.I.A. declined to comment today on the report of its role in the operation.

"This was totally a C.I.A. operation," one Congressional source said, adding that the raid, not the mining, which began in January, was the first time the C.I.A. had directly entered the fighting against the leftist Nicaraguan Government.

Rebel Leader Tells of Raids

Another source said the Corinto raid was one in a series of attacks on seaports directed by the C.I.A. dating back to an attack on oil-storage and pipeline facilities at Puerto Sandino Sept. 8. Both Corinto and Puerto Sandino are on Nicaragua's Pacific coast.

In an interview today, Adolfo Calero, head of the the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, said Nicaraguan rebels from his group carried out the raids, but he added that he did not know the degree of the American agency's involvement or whether saboteurs from other Latin American countries took part.

Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, who said last week that they were not adequately informed about the mining, also appeared not to have known about the agency's direct role in the Corinto raid, according to sources close to the panel.

How the Committee Learned

One source said the C.I.A. provided no information on the Corinto attack and told the committee in September that the Puerto Sandino operation was carried out by Latin American scuba divers who worked for Mr. Calero's Honduras-based rebel group.

The sources said the committee staff learned on March 30 that the special paramilitary team worked for the C.I.A. when the agency sent a letter on the mining that mentioned "unilaterally controlled Latino assets," meaning agents directed exclusively by the agency.

On April 2 the C.I.A. told the Senate committee staff that those agents were used in the seaport mining operations, a disclosure that one source said led to the panel's discovery that the Corinto raid and other port attacks also were directed by the C.I.A.

In those raids, the sources said, American agents remained on a mother ship more than 12 miles off the Nicaraguan coast, the territorial waters recognized by the United States, although Nicaragua claims territory extending 200 miles from its shores. The Latin American mercenaries then reached the coast in speedboats supplied by the C.I.A.

Before the seaport raids and mining, the C.I.A. controlled the rebel groups primarily through allocation of military supplies, the sources said. By threatening to withhold supplies and training, the agency could press the groups into accepting its advice, but

the C.I.A. did not direct specific military operations, the sources said.

Corinto residents said that on the night of Oct. 10, the attackers positioned their speedboats behind a South Korean ship, then opened fire on oil-storage tanks. The residents said the shells set one oil tank ablaze, touching off a chain of fires at nearby fuel tanks that raged out of control for two days. The Nicaraguan Government says 112 people were injured, including three South Korean sailors, and more than 20,000 residents were evacuated from Corinto, the nation's chief oil port.

Nicaragua Condemned Attack

A day after the Corinto raid, Nicaragua's Sandinista Government charged that the "criminal attack" was "part of the plans of the Central Intelligence Agency." The rebel group, however, took responsibility for the attack, saying it was intended to "paralyze the war apparatus of the leftist regime."

President Reagan has accused the Sandinistas of supporting leftist guerrillas in nearby El Salvador and working with the Soviet Union to "install Communism by force throughout this hemisphere."

Mr. Reagan is seeking \$21 million from Congress to continue two and a half years of C.I.A. support for the anti-Government rebels. The Senate approved the money late last month, but after the mining disclosures, both the House and Senate passed a nonbinding resolution opposing the mining of Nicaragua's harbors.

On April 9, Nicaragua filed suit against the United States before the International Court of Justice, saying that "its territory has been invaded by a military force organized and directed by the United States." The attacks on Corinto and Puerto Sandino were two of the incidents cited.

But the Reagan Administration has announced that it will not accept the Court's rulings on cases involving Central America for two years.

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CHICAGO TRIBUNE
 22 April 1984

Top spy Casey at eye of CIA's storm with Congress

By Terry Atlas

WASHINGTON—Six months ago, William J. Casey was awarded the CIA's highest medal for, the citation said, restoring the agency's credibility and "bringing imagination to our operation."

Now there may be some at the Central Intelligence Agency who wonder whether it should recall its medal from the nation's top spy-master whose very secretiveness, ironically, has drawn the agency into its potentially most damaging confrontation with Congress in a decade.

The uproar over what congressmen claim they weren't told about the CIA's role in mining Nicaraguan ports has provoked the kinds of troubling questions about covert operations last heard in the mid-1970s amid disclosures that the agency spied on Americans and plotted to kill foreign leaders. And it raises doubts about the effectiveness of the congressional oversight process, which may lead to new restrictions on how the CIA is permitted to go about its cloak-and-dagger business in Central America and elsewhere.

"The recent furor is hurting the CIA, and I think that's really too bad," observes Lt. Gen. [ret.] Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser during the Ford administration and an informal adviser to President Reagan.

BESIDES COSTING the administration congressional acquiescence for its not-so-secret war against Nicaragua's Sandinista government,

the controversy is endangering support for its broader policies for Central America, including action on emergency military aid to El Salvador.

At the center of all this is Casey—wealthy businessman, Reagan confidant and manager of his 1980 presidential campaign, cold warrior and spymaster. His roots go back to the Office of Strategic Services, the CIA's predecessor, where he directed American spies dropped behind Nazi lines in World War II.

Seen emerging from a black limousine wearing a dark raincoat and hat, he looks like he could have been dispatched to the CIA's headquarters in nearby Langley, Va., by central casting for the part of the nation's top "spook."

Gruff and abrasive, his tendency to mumble when he speaks reinforces the impression that he is being less than forthcoming, which indeed is often the case. Friends and critics alike joke that he is the first CIA director who doesn't need a telephone voice scrambler to protect his conversations.

"HIS PERSONALITY tends to turn a lot of people off," says one Capitol Hill staff member privy to Casey briefings.

Since taking over as CIA chief three years ago, Casey has achieved his aims of getting more money for the agency, rebuilding its covert operations side and making it an active tool in Reagan's aggressively anti-Soviet foreign policy. He clearly continues to have the confidence of the President and his closest White House advisers. But his determined style has seriously hurt CIA relations

with many in Congress, who blame him for keeping them largely in the dark about the mining and the CIA's role in the previous attack on Nicaragua's oil supplies.

For his part, Casey makes little effort to conceal his scorn for Congress, which he feels has unfairly questioned his qualifications, his judgment and his integrity since his appointment in 1981.

Members of Congress faulted his selection as inappropriate because he had run the President's campaign. Later his judgment was challenged when the man he put in charge of the agency's clandestine operations was accused by a busi-

ness associate of violating securities laws and resigned (although he was never charged with violating any laws). And he was attacked for his personal financial dealings while head of the CIA.

MOST RECENTLY he has been interviewed by the FBI as part of its investigation of how the 1980 Reagan campaign obtained documents from the Carter White House.

In appearances before members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, Casey has proven a most reluctant, sometimes hostile, often arrogant witness who offers information only sparingly and grudgingly.

"He tells us the bare minimum," complains a staff member on the House Select Committee on Intelligence.

His problems reflect style as much as substance, appointing, for instance, a 30-year veteran of the CIA's clandestine operations, Clair George, to oversee congressional relations. "He is a full-fledged spy where, in my judgment, openness and communication are the skills that you want," says a staff member on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. "Instead, they've got somebody with a 30-year career for secrecy."



William Casey

Caricature by Kerry Waghorn

Continued

IN CONTRAST, Stansfield Turner, head of the CIA in the Carter administration, recognized the political necessity as well as the legal requirement to keep Congress informed about covert activities in order to avoid just the kind of clash that is now occurring. As a practical matter, he says, it is no longer possible for the CIA to undertake a covert operation over the opposition of the congressional committees "for the simple reason that it won't remain covert for long."

But Casey has promoted what is undeniably a contentious program to support the Nicaraguan Contras, who have grown into an army of more than 10,000 fighters, seemingly excluding his congressional friends and foes from many of the details. The administration has supported the Contras in principle as necessary to slow the flow of Cuban and Soviet arms from Nicaragua to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador and to pressure the Sandinistas to move toward democracy at home.

The House Intelligence Committee learned about the mining of Puerto Sandino on Nicaragua's Pacific coast Jan. 31, three weeks after the Contras announced the action. But it wasn't until nearly two months later, March 27, that the committee was told for the first time that CIA personnel operating from a mother ship offshore directed the mining of that port and two others—and then only after persistent questioning, according to Rep. Edward P. Boland [D., Mass.], committee chairman.

CASEY MADE only a single-sentence reference to the mining operation in a March briefing for members of the Senate panel, the significance of which apparently escaped notice of members and staff until they subsequently read about it in the newspapers. Sen. Patrick Leahy [D., Vt.] was one of the few senators who realized what was going on, after missing the main briefing and getting a report later from CIA officials.

All this was particularly bad form, according to the Senate panel's two senior members, Chairman Barry

Goldwater [R., Ariz.] and Vice Chairman Daniel Patrick Moynihan [D., N.Y.], who said Casey had an obligation to more fully inform them about the covert actions. Through a spokesman, Casey has countered that he complied with his legal obligations to notify Congress of covert actions in a "timely fashion."

Nonetheless, Moynihan said he intends to resign as vice chairman of the committee this week to protest Casey's behavior, and the committee has scheduled further closed-door hearings next week to discuss, in part, whether to impose new restrictions on the CIA. The Senate committee staff has drafted recommendations aimed at settling the objections of some members by requiring more frequent reports from the CIA, putting Casey and other CIA witnesses under oath when they testify, and replacing congressional liaison George, who they say has been uncooperative in meeting the requests for information by senators and their staffs.

If that fails, some see support for proposals already introduced by Rep. Wyche Fowler [D., Ga.], a member of the House Intelligence Committee, which would require the CIA to obtain approval in advance from the two committees before undertaking covert actions.

The more immediate problem facing the White House is that without some improvement in relations between the CIA and Congress, there is little chance for the \$21 million in aid to the Contras sought by the administration. That may force the President to choose between his old friend Bill Casey and the Nicaraguan rebels he has encouraged.

Terry Atlas is a member of The Tribune's Washington Bureau.

CIA returns to cloak-and-dagger

By James McCartney
Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — A new anti-terrorist policy adopted by the White House includes plans for infiltration of secret operatives into terrorist organizations on a large scale in the Middle East, Central America and the Caribbean, according to sources in the U.S. intelligence community.

The new, aggressive plan to fight terrorism, these sources said, is part of a major administration effort to give the cloak and dagger back to the Central Intelligence Agency by rebuilding the agency's clandestine services.

The United States is going back into the spy business in a way that was largely abandoned during the Carter administration, using what the CIA calls "human collection" techniques — as opposed to technological intelligence-gathering through such means as spy satellites — the sources said.

The CIA's role in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors and attacks on facilities, exposed in recent days, illustrate part of the rebuilding program — but only part — according to several sources, some of whom have participated in secret briefings.

New agents have been hired by the score: more than 800 clandestine positions cut by Carter have been restored. New CIA offices have been opened around the world. And new plans have been laid for supersecret projects built on human intelligence techniques, involving spies, saboteurs, guerrilla warfare experts and many other kinds of secret operatives.

Some details of the get-tough policy on fighting terrorism came to light during interviews with present or former officials who have directed or monitored U.S. intelligence activities. They agreed to discuss the topic on the condition that they not be identified.

Aided in part by the close friendship of CIA Director William Casey with President Reagan, the CIA has become the fastest growing part of the federal government, expanding at a rate even faster than the Penta-

gon budget, according to sources.

Casey, 71, who was Reagan's 1980 campaign manager, has said that "the government turned its back on intelligence, and the process of gathering it" in the Carter administration. "I want to restore the earlier, good days," he has said.

Under Casey, the CIA budget now soars over \$1.5 billion, a substantial increase, and the amount apportioned to clandestine services increased from about 2 percent or 3 percent to about 10 percent, according to sources who helped draw up the budget.

The exact amount of the CIA budget has always been a closely held government secret. The CIA money is buried in the Pentagon budget, and only a handful of top administration officials know how much it is.

Today, the major projects are the secret war against Nicaragua, to which about 150 agents have been assigned, and the new anti-terrorist campaign.

The key to anti-terrorism, say several current or former officials, will be infiltration, even though problems raised may skirt the edges of the law and raise new controversies for the frequently embattled CIA.

"It is the only way you can penetrate," one longtime intelligence specialist said.

"You've got to get your own people on the inside of terrorist organizations to find out what plans for terrorist action are. That means they may have to participate in some pretty hairy activities to establish their credentials. They'll have to go along on the small stuff so that they can be around when big action is planned. Some of our people may have to be a part of low-level assassinations and will have to keep their mouths shut to protect their cover."

A congressional source suggested another possible indirect U.S. role in assassinations.

Castro may be target

For example, this source said, Cuba's President Fidel Castro — once a specific target of CIA assassination attempts — may again be a potential target, this time of non-Americans

but possibly with the unspoken acquiescence of the CIA.

Asked about this possibility, a CIA spokeswoman, Pat Volz, said the CIA would adhere strictly to a presidential executive order signed by Reagan on Dec. 4, 1981, which says: "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the U.S. government shall engage in or conspire to engage in assassinations."

Casey said in a recent interview: "We don't engage in assassinations."

The administration's anti-terrorist campaign will include pre-emptive strikes and direct reprisals, and has been modeled on Israeli techniques, according to both administration and congressional sources.

"President Reagan has studied the Israeli approaches and likes what he sees," a source said. "He likes it because he thinks it works."

"The next time there is a terrorist attack on the U.S. we'll handle it like the Israelis handle theirs. We'll strike back."

A counterterrorism strike force, of about 100 to 150 people, has been built on the Israeli model and set up in the Defense Department.

Team for terrorism

The CIA also has established small teams to deal with terrorist incidents. Casey all but openly acknowledged the U.S. plan in a recent interview with U.S. News and World Report.

"There's a question of deterring terrorism by sending the message that if the terrorists attack there will be retaliation," he said. "The Israelis, for example, send the message: 'If we're hit from your territory, that's your responsibility and we're going to kick you in the teeth somehow.'"

"I think you will see more of that — retaliation against facilities connected with the country sponsoring the terrorists, or retaliation that just hurts the interests of countries which sponsor terrorism."

The secret war against Nicaragua, as one former high CIA official describes it, started out as a small operation and got out of control. No one

Continued

foresaw in the beginning that it would lead to direct U.S. support for the mining of Nicaraguan harbors or for attacks on Nicaraguan oil facilities, according to the former official as well as congressional sources.

"In the beginning they told us that it would be small 'hit teams' to harass the Sandinistas and interrupt arms traffic to El Salvador," a congressional source said. "It was supposed to be a 'surgical' approach."

'Low-key' efforts

Casey has described the CIA's tactics in similar terms. He has said that the agency planned "low-key, low-level efforts" with "small numbers of people ... in support of other governments, closer to the area of operation, with a bigger stake in it and ready to take the main responsibility."

Nor was the anti-Sandinista operation supposed to be traceable to the United States. Funds and U.S. expertise were to be channeled to Argentina, which was to take a lead role.

Then came the Falklands war, in which the United States sided with Great Britain. Argentina backed out, and CIA officials decided to support the *contras* directly in their battle against the Sandinista regime.

First there were a few hundred U.S.-armed *contras*, then a few thousand. Today the United States is supporting between 15,000 and 18,000.

"It began to become obvious that we were arming everybody who could carry a gun," the congressional source said.

The former high CIA official observed: "Once a covert action gets started, it takes on a life of its own." In covert actions of this type, he said,

"you aren't in command if those who you are supporting have a separate agenda."

Leaders of the *contras* have acknowledged that their objective is to overthrow the Sandinista government. Reagan has repeatedly insisted that this is not the objective of the United States.

Congressional sources say that a president can use the CIA in almost any way he wishes in covert operations, and that although Congress is supposed to be kept informed, it actually has little control.

The president, they point out, has control of CIA contingency funds, which can be used to launch covert operations. Congress often is not informed until the next budget cycle.

Some former CIA officials are appalled at the U.S. support of *contras*, but not because they oppose covert action. Instead, they believe the program has been so botched that it has given the CIA a new black eye, at a time when it was beginning to make a comeback after the scandals exposed in the mid-1970s.

One of these is William Colby, a former director. He presided over the CIA during the initial cleanup period after the scandals, which ex-

posed that the CIA had attempted assassinations of several foreign heads of state, had bought elections and politicians and sometimes had had dealings with the Mafia.

"We'll always have covert action, and we should," Colby said. "But our top priority should not be to harass Nicaragua. It should be to build strength in El Salvador. If you build strength, you will exclude the enemy."

Colby argues that the exposure of the "secret war" has caused the agency, and the government, far more damage than it was worth.

Another former high-ranking official who asked not to be identified agreed. He said covert operations were only a small part of the CIA's budget, and were not the most important function of the CIA.

The two most important functions of the CIA, he said, are foreign intelligence — "what's going on in the world" — and counterintelligence, spying on the Soviets.

While covert operations are not nearly as important, he said, when one is exposed "it impacts on the credibility of the entire administration."

REMEMBER THE MINE

After the humiliation in Lebanon, the United States might at least have allowed a decent interval to pass before again making itself foolish in the eyes of the world. Yet we were back at it again with the Nicaraguan mining fiasco, a misadventure from its clumsy conception through its abrupt demise. And again, the display of incompetence was bipartisan, initiated by the Republican Administration and compounded by members of both parties in Congress. The C.I.A. apparently could not resist going beyond its role of providing assistance to anti-Sandinista rebel groups fighting in Nicaragua. It had to get its very own piece of the action, so it concocted schemes to involve itself directly in raiding a Nicaraguan port and then in laying mines in Nicaraguan harbors. The operations risked discovery, risked accusations that the United States was violating international law, risked arousing the indignation of countries whose shipping might be damaged. Yet the C.I.A. persuaded the President's national security adviser to walk its ideas into the Oval Office for approval, and he walked right out again with Mr. Reagan's O.K.

Congress's two intelligence oversight committees should have warned the Administration to drop its plans, but they didn't. Both were informed—in the case of the mining, the House's committee was told in January, the Senate's in March—but if the members were listening to what they were being told, they did not focus on the implications of a direct C.I.A. operation. Senators Barry Goldwater and Daniel Patrick Moynihan protest that out of more than 130 pages of hearing transcript only two sentences referred to the mining, and did not mention the C.I.A.'s role. The Administration counters that its written submissions—as opposed to oral summaries—described and justified the operation in detail. If the C.I.A. was hiding, the Senate was not seeking. After Murphy's Law was fulfilled with its customary reliability in matters covert and American, Congress panicked—much as it did when the going got rough in Lebanon—and not only condemned the mining operation by lopsided margins in both Houses but also threatened to cut off funding for aid to the *contras* entirely. That move, if actually carried through

when Congress returns from recess, would be at least as mindless as the mining itself.

We do not support aid to the *contras* with any relish. And in many respects we do not support the Reagan Administration's goals and methods in supplying aid. For example, the bulk of U.S. assistance goes to the rightist, Honduras-based Nicaraguan Democratic Force (F.D.N.), many of the field commanders of which were officers in Anastasio Somoza's brutal and justifiably detested National Guard. A far better prospect for winning the support of Nicaragua's people is the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) headed by the former anti-Somoza guerrilla leader Edén Pastora ("Comandante Cero"). Mr. Pastora's force has just captured a coastal town in southern Nicaragua, has been bolstered (according to news reports) by the defection of an entire battalion of Sandinista soldiers, and is planning to set up a government in exile. ARDE apparently does now receive C.I.A. help, but much less than the F.D.N.

The Administration's purposes in aiding the guerrilla groups are also suspect. ARDE has proposed a plan whereby antigovernment military activity would cease if the Sandinistas agree to hold fair elections this November—that is, if opposition candidates are guaranteed security from Sandinista toughs and the right to have their views heard free from censorship, and if the election is internationally supervised. The Reagan Administration has failed to endorse the ARDE proposal, leading to the suspicion that democracy in Nicaragua is not one of its primary goals. Indeed, there seems to be a split within the Administration over Nicaragua much as there was in Lebanon. One group, said to include Secretary of State Shultz, believes (sensibly, in our view) that aid to the *contras* should be designed to pressure Nicaragua into halting subversive activity against El Salvador and into entering serious peace negotiations with its neighbors. Another school of thought within the Administration—reportedly led by Secretary of Defense Weinberger and the C.I.A. director, William Casey—regards the very existence of a leftist Nicaragua as an intolerable menace to vital interests of the

Continued

United States, and wants it expunged. In other words, there is agreement on means but not on ends. The result is confusion of policy, as the covert war goes forward without any clear idea of what it is meant to accomplish. The immediate danger is that the Administration will fail to press convincingly for negotiations and peace, will arouse fears at home and abroad that the United States intends to send American troops into the region, and will encourage Congress to force an end to American activities in Central America. That could lead to an unpalatable choice between a regional Communist victory and the introduction of American troops.

AIDING THE *contras* is not, by itself, a policy. But helping rebels, especially democratic rebels, with a view toward negotiations leading to some sort of regional settlement, is a policy, and a far better one than either letting the Sandinistas spread revolution or sending in U.S. troops. Could the Sandinista regime be won over with kindness, as all three Democratic Presidential candidates seem to propose? Something like that was tried by the Carter Administration after the new regime took power, and it didn't work. According to Alfonso Robelo Callejas, once a Somoza political prisoner, later a member of the Sandinistas' revolutionary junta, and now political director of ARDE, "It's possible that the United States pushed Castro to the arms of the Soviet Union, but that's not the case with the Sandinistas. The Carter Administration did everything possible to be friendly. It gave us \$120 million in aid. It wanted to send a Peace Corps delegation until it was refused. On the other side, the Sandinistas had a secret defense agreement with Cuba from the beginning. That was the original foreign intervention. No government office when I was there was without a Cuban officer. The Cuban Ambassador sat at the table with the junta when it made its decisions."

Not much change in that department. According to both Administration and Congressional sources, there are now about eight thousand Cubans in Nicaragua, including three thousand military advisers installed in the Sandinista army of seventy-five thousand men, which is the largest army in Central America. From the outset the Sandinista regime has been dedicated to a "revolution without frontiers" in Central America, and has tried to destabilize not only El Salvador but also democratic Costa Rica. The

Reagan Administration has failed to convince the American people and Congress with its evidence of Nicaragua's subversive activities, but a respected *New York Times* correspondent, Stephen Kinzer, reported on April 10 that European and Latin American diplomats based in Managua—including some whose governments have been critical of U.S. policy—now share the view that Nicaragua does indeed send military supplies to left-wing insurgents in El Salvador and provides training bases for them.

We believe that American policy toward Nicaragua must be one of both pressure and persuasion. To the extent that U.S.-aided forces tie down Nicaraguan forces and win popular support, the Sandinista regime will have to concern itself with its own security and cannot concentrate on making mischief across its borders. At the same time, the United States should make it clear that its goal is negotiation and political compromise both within Nicaragua and among the nations of Central America.

The trouble with the C.I.A.'s mining harbors, aiding ex-Somocistas, and ignoring opportunities for negotiation is that they undermine America's credibility as a respecter of international law, a promoter of democracy, and a partner in peacemaking. However, for Congress to cut off aid to the *contras* in reaction to the mining fiasco also would damage America's credibility. It would mean—once again—that the United States had embarked on a policy that it would not follow through on, in the process encouraging people to fight for the freedom of their country and then abandoning them. The collapse of American policy in Lebanon was a nasty blow to American credibility. Either a Marxist-Leninist takeover of Central America or an American invasion would be far worse.

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WASHINGTON

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 19Protection of Classified National Security Council
and Intelligence Information

Unauthorized disclosure of classified information under the jurisdiction of the National Security Council and of classified intelligence reports is a problem of major proportions within the U.S. Government. The Constitution of the United States provides for the protection of individual rights and liberties, including freedom of speech and freedom of the press, but it also requires that government functions be discharged efficiently and effectively, especially where the national security is involved. As President of the United States, I am responsible for honoring both Constitutional requirements, and I intend to do so in a balanced and careful manner. I do not believe, however, that the Constitution entitles government employees, entrusted with confidential information critical to the functioning and effectiveness of the Government, to disclose such information with impunity. It is precisely the situation we have. It must not be allowed to continue.

To this end, I hereby establish and direct implementation of the following policies.

Contacts with the Media

All contacts with any element of the news media in which classified National Security Council matters or classified intelligence information are discussed will require the advance approval of a senior official. An administrative memorandum will be prepared as soon as possible after the contact, recording the subjects discussed and all information provided to the media representatives.

Access

The unauthorized disclosure of classified National Security Council information, documents, and deliberations requires further control to limit access and to ensure an accurate record of those who have had access. The number of officials with access to documents relating to NSC matters will be kept to the minimum essential to the orderly conduct of the government's business.


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Investigations

The government's lack of success in identifying the sources of unauthorized disclosure of classified National Security Council information and documents of classified intelligence information must be remedied and appropriate disciplinary measures taken. Henceforth, in the event of unauthorized disclosure of such information, government employees who have had access to that information will be subject to investigation, to include the use of all legal methods.

Applicability and Implementation

The provisions of this directive shall be effective immediately and shall apply to all employees of, and elements within, agencies participating in the National Security Council system, including the Executive Office of the President. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is directed to establish the detailed procedures to implement policies.



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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
 THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
 THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
 THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
 THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
 THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
 AND BUDGET
 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
 UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
 UNITED NATIONS
 UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
 CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
 AGENCY
 DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
 ADMINISTRATOR, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
 ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
 SPACE ADMINISTRATION
 DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
 AGENCY

SUBJECT: Implementation of NSDD-19 on Protection of
 Classified National Security Council and
 Intelligence Information

The President has signed NSDD-19 (attached) on protection of sensitive information and has directed that I establish procedures to implement its policy guidelines. This memorandum (1) establishes procedures for protection of classified National Security Council information, (2) directs agency heads to issue instructions in conformity with these procedures, and (3) directs the Director of

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Central Intelligence to develop similar procedures for protection of sensitive classified intelligence information.

National Security Council Information

National Security Council information includes (1) all information prepared or intended for use by the NSC, its interagency groups as defined in NSDD-2, or its associated committees, and (2) information considered, or pertaining to decisions taken, by these entities. This definition applies to both classified and unclassified information.

Contacts with the News Media

All officials of the Administration below the rank of Deputy Secretary will require advance approval for all contacts with the news media that involve subjects that are planned to be, are, or have been considered by the National Security Council, interagency groups as defined in NSDD-2, or their associated committees and groups and that have some aspects which are classified. Prior approval will be obtained from an official not below the Assistant Secretary level. Approval authority may not be delegated below that level. Approval, of course, will only be granted for the unclassified aspects of the subject. Subsequent to the approved interview, an administrative memorandum describing the interview will be forwarded to the approving official. To protect the confidentiality of the exchange, the approving official will retain or disseminate the memorandum only if it is required for the further conduct of official business.

Access and Investigations

Agencies that handle NSC information will keep the number of individuals with access to such information to the absolute minimum, and they will strictly control document dissemination and reproduction. In order to enforce this requirement, a numbered cover sheet bearing the notation below will be affixed to NSC information at the point that it is first considered at the Assistant Secretary level. By February 1, 1982, the NSC staff will circulate cover sheets to the departments and agencies who will be responsible for further distribution and administration of the cover sheets.

Notice

The attached document contains sensitive National Security Council information. It is to be read only by individuals with a strict need to know. As a condition of access to this document (including access for administrative purposes), individuals agree by their signature below (1) that they will not discuss the information herein with unauthorized individuals and (2) that they will, in the course of an investigation into unauthorized disclosure, submit to a polygraph examination limited to matters concerning the investigation.

Implementation

Agency heads will forward draft implementing instructions on the subjects above to the NSC no later than February 15, 1982.

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WASHINGTON

March 11, 1983

National Security Decision
Directive Number 84

Safeguarding National Security Information

As stated in Executive Order 12356, only that information whose disclosure would harm the national security interests of the United States may be classified. Every effort should be made to declassify information that no longer requires protection in the interest of national security.

At the same time, however, safeguarding against unlawful disclosures of properly classified information is a matter of grave concern and high priority for this Administration. In addition to the requirements set forth in Executive Order 12356, and based on the recommendations contained in the interdepartmental report forwarded by the Attorney General, I direct the following:

1. Each agency of the Executive Branch that originates or handles classified information shall adopt internal procedures to safeguard against unlawful disclosures of classified information. Such procedures shall at a minimum provide as follows:

a. All persons with authorized access to classified information shall be required to sign a nondisclosure agreement as a condition of access. This requirement may be implemented prospectively by agencies for which the administrative burden of compliance would otherwise be excessive.

b. All persons with authorized access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) shall be required to sign a nondisclosure agreement as a condition of access to SCI and other classified information. All such agreements must include a provision for prepublication review to assure deletion of SCI and other classified information.

c. All agreements required in paragraphs 1.a. and 1.b. must be in a form determined by the Department of Justice to be enforceable in a civil action brought by the United States. The Director, Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), shall develop standardized forms that satisfy these requirements.

d. Appropriate policies shall be adopted to govern contacts between media representatives and agency personnel, so as to reduce the opportunity for negligent or deliberate disclosures of classified information. All persons with authorized access to classified information shall be clearly apprised of the agency's policies in this regard.

2. Each agency of the Executive branch that originates or handles classified information shall adopt internal procedures to govern the reporting and investigation of unauthorized disclosures of such information. Such procedures shall at a minimum provide that:

a. All such disclosures that the agency considers to be seriously damaging to its mission and responsibilities shall be evaluated to ascertain the nature of the information disclosed and the extent to which it had been disseminated.

b. The agency shall conduct a preliminary internal investigation prior to or concurrently with seeking investigative assistance from other agencies.

c. The agency shall maintain records of disclosures so evaluated and investigated.

d. Agencies in the possession of classified information originating with another agency shall cooperate with the originating agency by conducting internal investigations of the unauthorized disclosure of such information.

e. Persons determined by the agency to have knowingly made such disclosures or to have refused cooperation with investigations of such unauthorized disclosures will be denied further access to classified information and subjected to other administrative sanctions as appropriate.


3. Unauthorized disclosures of classified information shall be reported to the Department of Justice and the Information Security Oversight Office, as required by statute and Executive orders. The Department of Justice shall continue to review reported unauthorized disclosures of classified information to determine whether FBI investigation is warranted. Interested departments and agencies shall be consulted in developing criteria for evaluating such matters and in determining which cases should receive investigative priority. The FBI is authorized to investigate such matters as constitute potential violations of federal criminal law, even though administrative sanctions may be sought instead of criminal prosecution.

4. Nothing in this directive is intended to modify or preclude interagency agreements between FBI and other criminal investigative agencies regarding their responsibility for conducting investigations within their own agencies or departments.

5. The Office of Personnel Management and all departments and agencies with employees having access to classified information are directed to revise existing regulations and policies, as necessary, so that employees may be required to submit to polygraph examinations, when appropriate, in the course of investigations of unauthorized disclosures of classified information. As a minimum, such regulations shall permit an agency to decide that appropriate

adverse consequences will follow an employee's refusal to cooperate with a polygraph examination that is limited in scope to the circumstances of the unauthorized disclosure under investigation. Agency regulations may provide that only the head of the agency, or his delegate, is empowered to order an employee to submit to a polygraph examination. Results of polygraph examinations should not be relied upon to the exclusion of other information obtained during investigations.

6. The Attorney General, in consultation with the Director, Office of Personnel Management, is requested to establish an interdepartmental group to study the federal personnel security program and recommend appropriate revisions in existing Executive orders, regulations, and guidelines.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in dark ink on a light-colored background.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Executive Registry
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November 8, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Comments on Intelligence Matters (U)

The President has asked me to reaffirm the longstanding policy that we will not comment on intelligence matters. Efforts to clarify public reports of intelligence information, no matter how well intended, generally prove to be counterproductive. The resultant cycle can lead to the compromise of extremely sensitive information and grave damage to our national security. Exception to this policy can be granted only by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs based on the recommendation of the DCI. (C)

The President is determined that all officials of this government understand this policy clearly and comply with it fully. Please take appropriate steps to brief your subordinates and subordinate elements. (U)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark
William P. Clark

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information

Recent unauthorized disclosures of classified information concerning our diplomatic, military, and intelligence activities threaten our ability to carry out national security policy. I have issued a directive detailing procedures to curb these disclosures and to streamline procedures for investigating them. However, unauthorized disclosures are so harmful to our national security that I wish to underscore to each of you the seriousness with which I view them.

The unauthorized disclosure of our Nation's classified information by those entrusted with its protection is improper, unethical, and plain wrong. This kind of unauthorized disclosure is more than a so-called "leak"--it is illegal. The Attorney General has been asked to investigate a number of recent disclosures of classified information. Let me make it clear that we intend to take appropriate administrative action against any Federal employee found to have engaged in unauthorized disclosure of classified information, regardless of rank or position. Where circumstances warrant, cases will also be referred for criminal prosecution.

The American people have placed a special trust and confidence in each of us to protect their property with which we are entrusted, including classified information. They expect us to protect fully the national security secrets used to protect them in a dangerous and difficult world. All of us have taken an oath faithfully to discharge our duties as public servants, an oath that is violated when unauthorized disclosures of classified information are made.

Secrecy in national security matters is a necessity in this world. Each of us, as we carry out our individual duties, recognizes that certain matters require confidentiality. We must be able to carry out diplomacy with friends and foes on a confidential basis; peace often quite literally depends on it--and this includes our efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear war.

We must also be able to protect our military forces from present or potential adversaries. From the time of the Founding Fathers, we have accepted the need to protect military secrets. Nuclear dangers, terrorism, and aggression similarly demand

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that we must be able to gather intelligence information about these dangers--and our sources of this information must be protected if we are to continue to receive it. Even in peacetime, lives depend on our ability to keep certain matters secret.

As public servants, we have no legitimate excuse for resorting to these unauthorized disclosures. There are other means available to express ourselves:

- We make every effort to keep the Congress and the people informed about national security policies and actions. Only a fraction of information concerning national security policy must be classified.
- We have mechanisms for presenting alternative views and opinions within our government.
- Established procedures exist for declassifying material and for downgrading information that may be overclassified.
- Workable procedures also exist for reporting wrongdoing or illegalities, both to the appropriate Executive Branch offices and to the Congress.

Finally, each of us has the right to leave our position of trust and criticize our government and its policies, if that is what our conscience dictates. What we do not have is the right to damage our country by giving away its necessary secrets.

We are as a Nation an open and trusting people, with a proud tradition of free speech, robust debate, and the right to disagree strongly over all national policies. No one would ever want to change that. But we are also a mature and disciplined people who understand the need for responsible action. As servants of the people, we in the Federal Government must understand the duty we have to those who place their trust in us. I ask each of you to join me in redoubling our efforts to protect that trust.

Ronald Reagan

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