

SECRET

15 November 1984

NOTE FOR: DCI

SUBJECT: Leaks

Attached are the following:

- The one-page summary of your memo to the President that you dictated to Debbie.
- Bob Gates' talking points on what the DI has done subsequent to your memo to both him and Clair.
- Clair George's response re what the DO has been/is doing.

cc: DDCI



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
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LEAKS

1. Nearly a year ago CIA significantly tightened controls on the National Intelligence Daily. Retention was allowed only for 48 hours; individuals who had not returned past copies received a letter from the DCI and visit from CIA's Office of Security until all copies were accounted for. We have continued this monitoring.



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5. These efforts will have some impact over time in reducing some leaks and unauthorized access to sensitive assessments. But these or even more stringent methods cannot solve or even begin to address the leaks problem.
6. It is a fact that many of the most damaging leaks come from senior officials who "know not what they do" in terms of endangering both human source lives and multi-billion dollar collection systems. We could cut dissemination of many documents to fewer than a dozen copies and you in this room all know that the leaks would not stop.
7. We must augment limits on dissemination with dual program of education of senior policymakers as to the damage they do but also measures that will enable us to carry out more successful investigations of leaks and punishment of those responsible -- regardless of their position.

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**MEMORANDUM FOR:** DCI

Re SIG(I) on Leaks Next Tuesday:

Attached is  draft memo to SIG(I) members, offering a strawman of options to be discussed at Tuesday's meeting. After review by you, changes to be incorporated. This should be sent to SIG(I) principals today.

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*Also attached is N.Y. Times piece Bob  
wasn't sure if you'd seen.*

Date 16 Nov 84

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Senior Interagency Group (Intelligence)  
SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Intelligence  
Initiatives and Options

At our meeting on 20 November, I want to formulate, for presentation to the President, proposals for dealing with the problem of unauthorized disclosures to the media of classified intelligence information. Attached for your consideration in preparation for that meeting is an extensive list of initiatives and options for trying to alleviate this problem and the accompanying damage to the U.S. intelligence effort and American foreign and defense policy. Any suggestions you may have for new initiatives or additional options will be welcome at the 20 November meeting.

William J. Casey  
Chairman

Attachment: a/s

CL BY SIGNER  
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NEW YORK TIMES 14 November 1984 P. 9.  
**U.S. Faulted at Talks** Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/22

**By ALAN RIDING**  
 Special to The New York Times

BRASILIA, Nov. 13 — The regional bloc known as the Contadora group worked today to keep alive its two-year-old mediation effort in Central America amid growing concern over Washington's attitude toward a regional peace treaty.

In an apparent reference to the United States, Mexico's Foreign Minister, Bernardo Sepúlveda Amor, criticized "maneuvers aimed at weakening or frustrating" the group's peace efforts.

Addressing the Organization of American States, which is meeting

here, Mr. Sepúlveda also warned that proposed changes to a draft peace treaty presented in September should not become a pretext for turning negotiations into "an interminable process."

The changes suggested last month by Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica echoed concerns expressed by Washington about inadequate procedures to verify the gradual demilitarization of the region. Nicaragua accepted the original draft treaty, while Guatemala proposed only minor amendments.

Diplomats said the Contadora group of nations — Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Panama — were also dis-

turbed by a recent National Security Council document that said Washington had successfully "trumped" Mexican-Nicaraguan moves toward a quick signing of the original draft.

The diplomats said that, in meetings Monday with Secretary of State George P. Shultz, both Mr. Sepúlveda and Colombia's Foreign Minister, Augusto Ramírez Ocampo, had expressed concern about the implications of the "leaked" document for the entire peace process.

"I tried to establish just what is the United States position," Mr. Ramírez said. "I feel discouraged by the recent rise in tensions, but I don't believe

the last hope of avoiding a regional war.

In his address to the O.A.S. General Assembly on Monday, Mr. Shultz reiterated the United States support for a "workable" Contadora agreement. He later told reporters that all parties involved agreed that the original draft could be improved.

**Issue Dominates Meetings**

Although the O.A.S. has played no direct role in mediating the regional crisis, this week's conference has been dominated by behind-the-scenes meetings among Contadora group nations and Central American republics.

In their public speeches, most foreign ministers — including those of Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica — have strongly endorsed the Contadora initiative, in several cases identifying


group nations expressed concern that some of the treaty amendments proposed by Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica seemed aimed at affecting the substance and balance of the existing draft.

The Mexican Foreign Minister said that the group would accept only those amendments "that preserve the spirit of the treaty and contribute to the efficiency of its principles."

The Contadora group is to meet here Wednesday to plan moves to reconcile their original draft with the proposed changes, although further negotiations are planned with individual Central American governments before a new meeting of all nine foreign ministers is convened.

In private, officials from Contadora

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New York Times 19 Nov 1984 p. 10

# U.S. Seeks to Sway Opinion on Nicaragua Policy

By PHILIP TAUBMAN  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 — By comparing Nicaragua to Cuba and talking about the possible delivery of advanced fighter aircraft to the Sandinistas, the Reagan Administration has tried in the last week to portray Nicaragua as a direct threat to the security of the United States.

Administration officials said today that presenting Nicaragua as a potential base for the projection of Soviet power in the hemisphere was part of an effort to persuade Congress and the public that the United States should resume support to Nicaraguan rebels and continue to apply diplomatic and military pressure on Nicaragua to change its behavior.

That effort, they said, began spontaneously last Tuesday with the unplanned disclosure that Soviet MIG jet fighters might be aboard a Soviet freighter headed toward Nicaragua.

Since then, despite the announcement Friday that no high-performance planes appeared to be aboard the ship, the effort has gathered force. In the process, the officials said, information and news have been used as forms of leverage in an interagency struggle over the direction and tone of United States policy toward Nicaragua during President Reagan's second term.

### Public Opinion Is Target

The United States and other nations have often tried to use information and, by extension, news coverage to promote their interests at home and abroad. Both the United States and the Soviet Union, according to intelligence officials, spend millions of dollars in covert efforts abroad to influence public opinion through the dissemination of information.

Although the Administration has repeatedly denied that it is planning to invade Nicaragua, the Sandinistas have rallied support in Nicaragua by saying an invasion was imminent.

The Administration continued its effort today to portray Nicaragua as a serious threat. A senior White House official compared the flow of Soviet bloc weapons to Nicaragua to the military buildup in Cuba that preceded the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. He said that while there was no plan to block arms shipments to Nicaragua at sea, "we're not going to rule out any contingency there."

A Defense Department spokesman, Michael Burch, said the accumulation of arms in Nicaragua exceeded any defensive needs. "We just don't feel that Nicaragua wants to be a peaceful neighbor," he said.

### Comment by Weinberger

On Sunday, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger said, "It is apparent that Cuba is a big problem and a second Cuba would be twice that kind of problem."

The effort to focus attention on Nicaragua, according to Administration officials, began inadvertently on Nov. 6 when a Government official informed a

television correspondent that a Soviet freighter nearing Nicaragua might be carrying advanced fighter aircraft.

The report, broadcast that night on the CBS Evening News, touched off a flood of news reports about the arrival of the ship, Administration warnings to Moscow and the possibility that the United States might use military force to disable high-performance planes if they were delivered to the Sandinistas.

When interest faded last Friday after officials said it was almost certain that no MIG fighters were aboard the ship, Defense Department and White House officials began talking about the threat posed by the overall accumulation of weapons in Nicaragua.

Like many developments in Washington, the unfolding of this one over the last week involved more than was apparent on the surface, according to Administration officials.

News of the arrival of the ship, and later the military buildup in Nicaragua, they said, was used by different officials for different ends.

### 2 Groups With Different Aims

Although alliances among officials are informal and fluid, in this case one group, centered primarily at the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency and in the White House National Security Council staff, tried to use the developments to build support to heighten diplomatic and military pressure on the Sandinistas.

Another group, including officials at the State Department, tried to use the situation to send a message to the Soviet Union and Nicaragua about the high level of United States concern about arms shipments.

New organizations were interested in the arrival of the ship because if there were MIG fighters aboard, that would have been news. But as is often true in Washington, the way officials provided information to the news organizations, including The New York Times, to keep the story alive showed a good deal about the role the press plays in the policymaking process.

The Administration officials in-

volved violated one of the Government's most forcefully stated objectives — preserving the secrecy of intelligence information — in making their disclosures to news organizations, which protected their sources of information in return.

### Immediate Impact Unclear

The immediate impact of the reports on Administration policy toward Nicaragua was unclear. Concerned about what they said was an increasing flow of offensive weapons to Nicaragua from the Soviet Union, officials at the Defense Department and Central Intelligence Agency circulated proposals last week that the United States withdraw its ambassador to Nicaragua, use the Navy to block arms shipments at sea, increase the size and frequency of military maneuvers in Central America and, if Congress is willing, resume aid to Nicaraguan rebels.

These proposals were the subject of an article in The New York Times on Sunday that quoted senior Administration officials as saying a major stepping up of diplomatic and military pressure on Nicaragua was under discussion at high levels.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz said on Sunday he was unaware of any such plans and his aides suggested this week that there would be no shift in Administration policy, which has mixed pressure on Nicaragua with diplomatic efforts to resolve differences between the two countries. Other Administration officials said the interagency debate over policy had just begun.

In Congress, even the most vocal critics of the Administration's policies in Central America, including Senator Christopher J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut, and Senator Jim Sasser, Democrat of Tennessee, did not rule out the use of United States military force to deal with advanced jets if they were delivered to Nicaragua.

Reports of the possible delivery of high-performance fighters had their beginnings in late September when a United States surveillance satellite

passing over the Black Sea port of Nikolayev showed 12 crates of a kind that usually contain MIG-21 planes on a pier next to a Soviet freighter, the Bakuriani.

Surveillance was hindered for several days because of cloud cover, and when the port was next visible, the crates were gone and the freighter had set sail, according to Administration officials.

No one in the Government paid much attention to the intelligence information until several weeks ago when the Bakuriani rounded the tip of South America, steamed past Peru, which had been considered her probable destination, and headed toward the Nicaraguan Pacific port of Corinto.

An aide to a senior Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee said Monday that when he visited the State Department on Oct. 11, several officials there told him that after the election the Administration planned to focus attention on the flow of Soviet-bloc weapons to Nicaragua.

"They told me that there might be MIG's on the way," the aide said.

### Source Not Disclosed

David Martin, the CBS News correspondent who first reported on the freighter last Tuesday, declined to comment on how he had learned about it.

Most Administration officials involved in formulating policy toward Nicaragua said that the information had probably been given to Mr. Martin by an intelligence analyst or military officer who did not appreciate the potential impact.

The report gained more attention on Wednesday when the State Department said the United States had reiterated warnings to Moscow that it would not tolerate the delivery of advanced fighter planes to Nicaragua because they would upset the balance of military power in Central America.

However, a State Department spokesman, John Hughes, told reporters to be "scrupulously careful as you proceed with this story," noting that it was not known whether MIG fighters were actually aboard the Bakuriani.

### Military Action Suggested

Despite Mr. Hughes' advice, other Administration officials, primarily at the White House and Defense Department, talked about possible United States military action to disable planes if they were delivered.

Many of these officials talked about the satellite coverage of Nikolayev before the freighter departed. Intelligence information based on satellite reconnaissance is among the most sensitive and highly classified in the Government.

On Friday, as intelligence analysts concluded that there had probably not been any fighter planes aboard the Bakuriani, a senior White House official told reporters that MIG fighters were probably stowed below deck and had not been unloaded because of the United States warnings to Moscow.

## Nicaraguan Vows to Resist U.S.

Special to The New York Times

MANAGUA, Nicaragua, Nov. 13 — The Minister of Defense said today that Nicaragua would not alter its policies in the face of pressure from the Reagan Administration.

The official, Humberto Ortega Saavedra, characterized the flurry of news reports last week suggesting that Nicaragua was about to receive Soviet jet fighters as "ridiculous and false." But he said American threats to attack Nicaraguan airfields if the jets arrived had not changed the Government's desire to obtain them.

"We cannot accept that the United States will bomb Nicaragua if we take certain steps," Mr. Ortega said at a news conference. "How is it right for

the United States to bomb Nicaragua if Nicaragua does or does not do a certain thing?"

American officials have expressed concern that further upgrading of the Nicaraguan Army could upset the balance of military power in the region. Mr. Ortega made clear today that the Government would continue to seek all the arms it deemed necessary.

Asked if Nicaragua would try to shoot down American SR-71 Blackbird spy planes that have apparently flown over the country recently, he replied, "When we say we need means for our defense, it is specifically so that the Blackbird will not return as it has been."

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