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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

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17 September 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for USSR

SUBJECT: Update on Reagan-Gromyko Outlook

1. The weekend has produced new developments which stir up the waters and leave the outlook for Gromyko's visit more uncertain. On balance, however, the outlook is still pretty negative.

Soviet solicitation of a meeting with Mondale is an effort to mute the political benefit to the President of his meeting with Gromyko. It would not seem realistic to an American observer, but the Soviets may harbor some illusion, or at least, hope that they can help the challenger in some way. Over the past year they have repeatedly underestimated the backfire potential of their own tactics.

The very unusual TASS story about the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939 has been incompletely, and probably mistakenly read in our media as heralding a "deal with the devil." The parallels between the language used in the article to describe Nazi Germany and Soviet rhetoric on the Reagan administration invites this reading. Yet the opening message is different: "Exactly 45 years ago, on September 15, 1939, the newspaper Pravda wrote in its leading article devoted to a call up of Soviet citizens to the Red Army: 'The Soviet Union, its armed forces should be in full combat readiness so that rapidly developing events should not take us unawares.' A fortnight later...the German-Soviet treat[ies were] signed... Many international observers at that time overlooked Pravda's warning and concentrated the attention exclusively on the two treaties..." The allegorical implication would seem to be that a softening of Soviet policy is not to be expected.

Meanwhile, an extremely nasty piece in Sovetskaya Rossiya appeared on 16 September linking Washington and German "revanchism" and claiming "a third world war is coming to a head."

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The Soviet public has still not been informed about the Reagan-Gromyko meeting.

2. The Ogarkov story has gotten more complicated. [redacted] that he's been assigned to head the Voroshilov General Staff Academy sounds convincing; [redacted] It's a demotion for sure, but still a prestigious post that keeps Ogarkov in Moscow able to pronounce on doctrinal matters, and possibly on hold for a resumption of his career. Victor Louis now adds his voice to those claiming Ogarkov will head a new Western Military Theater command. Whatever the future fate of Ogarkov, some powerful people in both the military and the KGB want us to believe that Ogarkov is down, but not out. Somebody may be protecting him for a future turn of political fortunes.

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
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3. The only indication [redacted] about new things Gromyko might raise at the UNGA is a Lomeiko press conference statement giving somewhat unusual attention to the nuclear non-proliferation theme. He mentions Israel as a proliferation threat. But this coincides with a new and especially heavy air attack on Pakistan at a time when the Paks are clearly worried about an Indian attack on their facilities, and the Soviets have knowledge that the US has been concerned. This suggests to me that Gromyko may unveil some new "plan" to address Indo-Pak tensions on the nuclear front, to seize a diplomatic initiative before the US does, and to put pressure on Pakistan's Afghan policy. The Soviets might go this route if they had reason to believe the Indians would not attack Pakistan but know everyone is worried that they might.

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4. Finally, Soviet custody of the American ship Frieda-K and its crew on Chukotsk gives some elements in the Soviet leadership, including the KGB which apprehended them, leverage over the course of US-Soviet relations in the next several weeks.

5. Any comprehensive interpretation of all this is bound to be mostly guesswork. But my hunch is that Soviet foreign policy and control over it are falling victim to the top-priority concern of all Soviet leaders: the succession struggle.


Fritz W. Ermarth

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SOVIET STRATEGIES IN THE "SOUTHERN THEATER"

The future of the Soviet Union as a superpower, the East-West power balance, and the chance of a major US-Soviet conflict in the next two decades are likely to be determined, more than anywhere else, in the region south of Soviet borders stretching from India to the Eastern Mediterranean.

Does the USSR have a coherent strategy in this theater? There is no question that the men in the Kremlin today, as did their predecessors, have keen ambitions to dominate this region. It presents them with compelling vulnerabilities as well as obstacles; they are clearly active or trying to be active throughout it. Their strategy in the region is in some ways analogous to their military doctrine. Pressing on a broad front, they seek to "break through" on key "axes of advance" which can be turned to decisive advantage throughout the theater. Simultaneously applying several operational tools, they are tactically opportunistic and will try to reinforce success as it comes.

The Strategic Importance of the Southern Theater.

This region is potentially the key to overturning the East-West geopolitical balance that has emerged since 1945. Its strategic importance to the USSR is vastly understated by defining it as access to warm water ports. The single most important element in the region is its oil, which promises to be vital to the health of West European and Japanese societies, as well as to many LDCs, for the rest of this century and beyond. The region is also the heart of the Islamic world, potentially able to exert a cultural and spiritual influence which, like European civilization, may come to undermine essential parts of the Soviet system at home if the Soviets do not eventually control it.

The geography of the region is itself of strategic importance. Soviet dominance of all or additional parts of it would greatly ease the ability of the USSR to project power in Africa and Southeast Asia. No doubt Soviet controlled port facilities on the Arabian Sea, especially if linked by secure land routes to Soviet territory would be of great military value. By the time the Soviets were able to create such facilities, however, the political effects of the process would have long since revolutionized the whole environment.

The Southern Theater is by far the most important major region of the Third World to the Soviets, rivaling the strategic status of East Asia and even Europe in some ways. This is because its dominance, or the high likelihood of its dominance, by the USSR would help extend Soviet influence in the other Eurasian regions.

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Despite several decades of persistent effort, the Soviets have not expanded their influence in the Southern Theater steadily or with ease. Barriers of culture, countervailing Western and local power, tactical clumsiness on the Soviet part, and the sheer unpredictability of the region have all posed obstacles.

Nevertheless, several "megatrends" in the region on balance favor the long-term expansion of Soviet influence. Political volatility within and among the region's states continues to afford penetration opportunities. The political and economic development of the Islamic countries of the region could strengthen over time the obstacles to lasting Soviet penetration. But development is equally likely to produce social turmoil that encourages it.

The Soviet military buildup has made the USSR the strongest military actor in the region, greatly outweighing with its regional forces on Soviet territory any combination of quickly available local and Western forces and also undermining the ability of the US to offer credible strategic guarantees. Soviet military forces are not capable of simply walking over the regions to the south; its distances and terrain are more difficult than Europe. The US may try to put in place forward military capability to deter Soviet power projection, such as bases and small deployments. Yet theater equivalence between Soviet military power and that of the West and its partners is even less likely in Southwest Asia than in Europe. A key task for Soviet regional strategy is to turn their military preponderance "in being" into an effective geopolitical lever at acceptable risk. As elsewhere, the USSR has lacked the political, economic, and cultural appeal that could ease this task.

Among the "megatrends" which could eventually attenuate the pressure of Soviet power on the Southern Theater, perhaps the most important in the long run is the development of the Soviet system itself. Before the region witnesses a decisive expansion of Soviet power, it is possible that stresses within Soviet society combined with Soviet failures in international affairs could lead to a turning inward of Soviet policy which reduces the challenge. This is an exceedingly long shot prospect. It cannot be taken for granted. It depends on sustained and coherent resistance to Soviet power by the US, by its allies, and by local states.

Soviet strategy in the Southern Theater can best be addressed in terms of Soviet policy toward several sub-regional problems or relationships, each of which links to others, often in contradictory ways. The one which weighs most heavily on the Soviet leadership today is the war in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan

As of now, the USSR aims to win the war. Its strategy is to keep at bay and grind down the resistance, to isolate it from the mass of the population or drive larger numbers out of the country, and to slowly build up a

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civil-military infrastructure through training, indoctrination, and cooption. We do not know how long the Soviets believe this strategy will take. Its composition suggests a 5-10 year time horizon.

In the meantime, although the Soviets may believe that vast national power and proximity guarantee their ultimate success, they cannot point to impressive progress on the ground. On the contrary, numerous reports suggest a mood of mounting anxiety and frustration about the war in the Soviet leadership, especially within the Soviet military leadership. They have the physical strength, but they may doubt that they have the time and political staying power to make their protracted strategy victorious. The low morale of Soviet troops clearly has adverse operational consequences; and we see more evidence of Soviet popular and elite discontent about the war than in past years.

If the Soviets do win in Afghanistan, or are seen to be on the road to ultimate victory at costs they can easily bear, the political and strategic impact on the region will be considerable. The countries of the region will increasingly be persuaded that Soviet power must be accommodated; and the Soviets will gradually assemble new assets for intruding upon the region, such as military bases and points of local political-economic contact. It is unlikely that a gradual Soviet victory will itself galvanize regional resistance since the drama of the original invasion did not do so.

To the extent the Soviets face a "no-win" situation, however, there are two possibilities. They may be persuaded to escalate their military campaign and forces inside Afghanistan and also to increase significantly their pressure on Pakistan. Evidence of Soviet frustration in Afghanistan, reporting of Soviet pressures on Pakistan, and evidence of Soviet efforts to stimulate Indian initiatives against Pakistan all raise the near-term probability of this development to a very dangerous level.

If neither patience nor escalation get the Soviets out of a "no-win" predicament in Afghanistan, the longer term implications could be in the opposite direction. Prosecution of the war could increasingly distract the Soviet leadership from other initiatives in the region, as it seems to have in recent years. And, most important, popular -- and especially professional military -- displeasure with the war could join other internal problems to pose more serious challenges to the regime's policy priorities and, ultimately, to its stability.

Because Soviet power is so heavily engaged, the war in Afghanistan is today the keystone of future Soviet power in the region. Failing some dramatic and easily exploited new opportunity elsewhere, such as a pro-Soviet regime emerging "naturally" in Iran following Khomeini, the Soviets must win, rapidly or slowly, but steadily, in Afghanistan to progress elsewhere. Alternatively, unless a phalanx of strong US-supported states, including Iran, arises to oppose them, the Soviets must lose in Afghanistan if the long-term expansion of their power in the region is to be prevented. The outcome is still in question.

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India and Pakistan

Size and prominence in the Third World give India an importance to Soviet foreign policy quite apart from regional considerations. Although to a much lesser extent, Pakistan is also important in its own right to Moscow. India is the model of a real alliance relationship between the USSR and a major noncommunist (some Soviet documents say capitalist) Third World country.

India has long been a part of Soviet strategy for the containment of China. Now India is increasingly a part of Soviet strategy toward Southwest Asia because of Pakistan's involvement in the Afghan war.

The Soviets can never be completely at ease about their relationship with India, Afghanistan implications aside. Indian domestic politics are not controllable or easily influenced by the Soviets. India could well intensify its efforts to improve relations with China. It can always turn more to Western sources for high quality military systems. India's tolerance toward the Soviet position in Afghanistan is grounded primarily in its aims to dominate Pakistan, its anti-US attitudes, and its need for the Soviet alliance. But India does not give unequivocal applause to Soviet expansionism in South Asia.

The critical question here is whether the Soviets can make India party to a decisive squeeze play against Pakistan which substantially alters the geopolitics of the region and gives the Soviets the possibility of winning the Afghan war quickly by cutting off the resistance and thoroughly discrediting the US as a regional ally. The Soviets very much want Pakistan's support of the Mujahedin to be stopped. They appreciate that saber rattling and an occasional bombing of a border village will not change Zia's policy. Direct Soviet military threats on the border are most likely to bring in additional US support and conceivably US military presence. Getting Pakistan out of the Afghan war equation requires internal destabilization or an Indo-Pakistan war or both to bring down Zia, change his policies, or, in the extreme, dismember Pakistan.

India would rather dominate than dismember Pakistan. It is not so clear that India would rather tolerate an independent Pakistan than see it dismembered. The Soviets would prefer a unified but friendly Pakistan, and would tolerate Indian domination if that is required to achieve the desired result. There is limited but convincing evidence that the Soviets would prefer Pakistan's dismemberment to a hostile, unified Pakistan allied with the US, even though the latter serves Soviet-Indian ties.

Could Soviet need to win the Afghan war quickly and Indian desires to dominate Pakistan, and specifically to terminate the Pak nuclear program, lead to concerted Indo-Soviet action? The current trend of events raises this probability. In any event, the Soviets would surely prefer to persuade India to attack Pakistan in some way than to do so themselves because of the

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political difficulties posed for Washington by Indian initiative. At this moment, however, we cannot exclude the possibility that the Soviets will take action against Pakistan entirely on their own, even though this would be easier for Washington to react to.

The Baluchistan Option

Baluchistan is frequently cited as some kind of key to Soviet strategy in the region -- which it probably is not. It is, however, an example of one facet of Soviet strategy in the "great game" of playing on tribal rivalries within primitive states of the area, a subject which deserves a lot more attention than it normally gets. The Soviets have long cultivated ties to political and regional groups in Pakistan that might be mobilized to overthrow the regime or dismember the state. Afghanistan gives them both a motive and a place from which to operate. Baluchistan is one target of Soviet attention.

Amidst much uncertainty as to what the facts are, there is controversy about the significance of Soviet interest in Baluchistan. The inflated claims of some that it is the USSR's final stepping stone to the Indian Ocean are often countered by an less founded insistence that "there is no evidence" of a Soviet penetration effort. A clearly incomplete body of evidence supports the following:

- Since well before the Afghan war the Soviets have sought influence with all manner of Baluch, from traditional tribal leaders at home and in exile to radical urbanized students. These efforts have included supplying arms and military training for separatist elements.
- Some Baluch elements have reportedly been useful in interfering with Afghan Mujahedin operations and supplies. The extent of this help to the Soviets is probably very limited, however. Most Baluch elements appear to have a very healthy suspicion of Soviet activities, and they tend to be regarded by Afghan resistance as allies.
- Soviet ability to exploit Baluch separatism has probably been reduced by Zia's more tolerant policies since 1977. But the Baluch factor could become significant again if Pakistan goes unstable for other reasons.
- The slow outmigration, urbanization, and economic development of Baluchistan's people probably increases, rather than decreases, Soviet potential for troublemaking at Pakistan's expense.

More generally, Soviet interest in Baluch separatism should not be viewed as a fifth column ready at some point swiftly to open the road to the Indian Ocean coast. It reflects rather, and in a particularly strategic place, a Soviet tactic of buying into the separatist forces which could abet the destabilization of two vital barrier states of the region, Pakistan and Iran. Other cases of comparable interest are the Azeris and the Kurds.

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Against both Pakistan and Iran the Soviets simultaneously seek a) to exert influence on the central government; b) to cultivate potential alternatives to the central government, e.g., oppositions; and c) to penetrate and stimulate separatist movements.

Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf

Iran and the Gulf are the prizes of the region. The Soviets have long believed that they should, by right of proximity and historically "objective trends", exert a dominant influence over the area's security affairs and its resources. The withdrawal of British influence, the fall of the Shah, and the difficulties the US faces in positioning countervailing power should, the Soviets believe, give them opportunities to advance their long-standing interest. But their advances have not been commensurate with the apparent opportunities. They are wrestling with how to shape a more effective strategy for this critical part of the theater.

Khomeini's Iran has not afforded the Soviets great opportunities to advance at the government level. Yet the Soviets do maintain diplomatic and varied economic ties to Iran. Twenty percent of Iranian imports come via Soviet territory and Soviet allies/clients are an important source of Iran's arms. Tehran does not treat the "second (Soviet) devil" with quite the disdain and hostility reserved for the "first (US) devil." Moreover, in recent weeks Tehran, after some internal dispute, actively sought to plead its case on the Gulf war with the Soviets at a high level; hence the Gromyko-Sadr talks. We don't believe either side achieved much, but we can conclude a) the diplomatic relationship is not without some promise, b) there are elements in Khomeini's regime likely to survive him who are ready to treat with the Soviets, and, therefore, c) the Soviets tactic of playing both sides still works to some extent, despite the pronounced tilt to Iraq. We have recent reporting to the effect that the Soviets now regard the Iran-Iraq war as tending to play into their hands because the security problems it has engendered encourage Iran and other Gulf states to seek Soviet favor, including Soviet arms, permitting the Soviets to penetrate politically without jettisoning their tie to Iraq.

The decimation of the Tudeh and the leftist Mujahedin in Iran have sharply reduced Soviet prospects for developing a congenial alternative to the Khomeini regime at the center. But it's very hard to tell what Soviet influence assets are still available. [REDACTED] they never were very abundant, but his knowledge may be incomplete. He is demonstrably ill-informed on Soviet efforts to penetrate non-Persian nationalities. Moreover, as indicated above, some Iranian leaders today are more willing to entertain ties to Moscow than is Khomeini.

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There is ample evidence that, over the years, the Soviets have sought to penetrate and, occasionally, support potential separatist groups in Iran, notably the Azeris of "southern Azerbaidzhan", probably the Khuzistan Arabs, the Kurds, and the Baluch. We have enough evidence to detect activity, not enough to establish the magnitude or strategic direction of Soviet involvement. Up to now, it is probable that Soviet investments have

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represented a fairly routine hedge for the future. Soviet priorities have been on those ruling at the center and on the central opposition in Iran. There is some evidence to suggest that the Soviets may increase their attention to the minorities, especially in Azerbaidzhan. We don't yet see a shift of Soviet strategy toward exploiting the minorities to destabilize the country. But this is a possibility. Present and expected gaps in our intelligence make it likely our detection of such a shift will be tardy and uncertain. And there is strong resistance on the part of many analysts to the idea that the Soviets would follow a destabilization strategy toward Iran or any other major state of the region.

Although it still offers them strategic opportunities, the Iran-Iraq war has been a net negative for the Soviets so far. They have tried, but not yet succeeded in parlaying their relations with both sides into a major advance in Iran or the region as a whole, and they still fear that the US will exploit the war to establish a permanent military presence in the Gulf area. As suggested above, however, the Soviets may be getting more optimistic about their prospects.

The Soviets would surely like to preside over a settlement of the conflict along the lines of their mediating role between India and Pakistan at Tashkent in 1965. The basic political requirement for such a role has been absent, namely, a shared interest between the belligerents in compromise. That interest could possibly arise fairly suddenly, however. Khomeini's death could lead to a reduction of Tehran's demands. The Soviets might be willing to promote the removal of Sadam Huseyn if they can identify a successor regime in which they have confidence.

While probably not committed for all time to Sadam Huseyn, the Soviets do not want to jeopardize their Iraqi connection seriously for uncertain gains with Iran. Iraq is their one substantial entree into the affairs of the Gulf now, and it usefully diversifies their engagement on the Arab side of the conflict with Israel, notwithstanding Iraqi-Syrian tensions.

In the rest of the Gulf and with the Saudis, the current Soviet formula is very quiet diplomacy -- which is all they can get away with. Basically, they are trading on Gulf awareness that, sooner or later, the Soviet Union is going to be a bigger factor in the area which must be taken into account. Meanwhile, the most discreet reception to Soviet approaches gives the Gulf states some leverage with Washington. This formula is unlikely to carry the Soviets very far beyond their current relations with Kuwait, however, barring some other change in the politics of the area, e.g., some development which dramatically discredits the protective role of the US (e.g., our leaving Pakistan in the lurch), and builds the image of the USSR as very powerful but sufficiently benign to work with.

What, then, will be Soviet strategy toward this sub-region? The odds seem to favor continuation of present policies because they are not without promise and the present Soviet leadership appears disinclined to try major policy departures in the face of risk and uncertainty. At the same time, we see a significant increase in Soviet political activity recently. They are clearly working harder on the opportunities they think they have.

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A significant shift of Soviet strategy cannot be ruled out. One possibility would be substantially increased aid to Iraq coupled with severe pressure on Iran, including military pressure in the north, to force a new consensus in Tehran for ending the war under Soviet sponsorship. Success at this surely risky venture could leave the USSR the dominant superpower protector of the Gulf. Failure could bring in the US and lead to much deeper Soviet-Iranian hostility. On balance, it seems unlikely that the Soviets would use this approach unless the Iranians look like they are enjoying dramatic military successes against Iraq -- an unlikely prospect according to most analysis.

Another option would be a longer-term Soviet shift toward reliance on minorities to promote destabilization and fragmentation of a post-Khomeini Iran. This course might seem less risky in the short term because it could be explored gradually. But if it begins to prove successful, the risks start rising sharply. Iran might at some point begin to fall apart; but it won't happen quickly and cleanly. The Soviets would have to threaten intervention on behalf of their favored minority, the Azeris probably. The worst outcome would be a still unified Iran, nudged closer to the US by Soviet actions.

Recitation of these uncertainties and risks should not be taken to mean that, after all, the Soviets have no prospects around the Gulf. The "megatrends" of superior military power, deep strategic interest, and local instability continue to favor them. And the outcome in Afghanistan (and closely related Pakistan), so critical to everything else, is still up for grabs.

Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan

Israel's attack on Lebanon and defeat of Syria's forces inflicted a major setback to the Soviets. But they have recovered through persistence in rearming the Syrians and US inability to sponsor a settlement in Lebanon.

The visits of Politburo member Gaydar Aliyev to Syria and Central Committee expert Karen Brutents to Lebanon and Syria earlier this year suggested that the Soviets might be reconnoitering for new diplomatic initiatives in the area. After the US pullout from Beirut, the opportunity seemed inviting. Until very recently the Soviets have been in somewhat of a waiting posture, rather like the US at present. They have acted to protect their position in Syria against the vagaries of political intrigue in Damascus, particularly Rifat Asad's unreliability. They appear to be leaving Lebanon largely to the Syrians, but the impending Polyakov visit and other signs indicated that they want to play a hand of their own there as well. They are making sustained, but low key, efforts to restore some degree of cohesion to the PLO; here too they have left the initiative to the Syrians and noticeably distanced themselves from Yasir Arafat.

Moscow is clearly pressing for movement in relations with Jordan, exploiting King Husseyn's need for arms and his desire to pressure Washington with a live Soviet option. A tie to Jordan is always of value to

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the Soviets because it diversifies the Soviet position in the Arab-Israeli confrontation and could open doors to the conservative states of the Peninsula.

It is not apparent at present that the Soviets have a longer-term political strategy for this portion of the region other than sticking with clients they have, cultivating new relationships where possible, and waiting to see what happens. Something new is bound to happen before long, however, and the Soviets are positioning themselves to act on new opportunities.

The formation of a new government in Israel may be the next break point for Soviet policy in the Arab-Israeli nexus. Should a coalition government in Israel start casting about for new paths of compromise, the resulting fluidity may give the Soviets new diplomatic opportunities, even the prospect of relations with Israel. Although there is not much novelty in it, the latest Soviet proposal for "comprehensive peace" in the region represents, at a minimum, a marker for a Soviet role in the near future, and an effort to appeal to Arab moderates frustrated by the inability of the US to get any movement. If prospects for movement on Arab-Israeli issues do reappear, however, the main Soviet problem will stem from the US resuming a much more active role on the basis of its superior political position as Israel's guarantor and the security partner of many Arab states. The Soviet Union can only deliver arms; the US just might be able to deliver Israeli concessions. Should a revival of the peace process take place, the Soviets may concentrate, as in the past, on backing the most radical Arab demands and even pushing events toward another confrontation.

The problem for Soviet diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli context, as elsewhere in the region, is that the USSR's great military muscle "over the horizon" to the north and its local instruments of subversion and intrigue are not easy to use constructively, to build political order among and within nations who have autonomous political vitality. To exploit its military power effectively for political ends in a region constantly beset by war, the Soviets must credibly threaten to use direct force. This is risky. In countries with a very unformed internal environment, the Soviets try to build a disciplined Marxist-Leninist core on which to rely. But most nations of Islam resist this. Short of direct military intervention, the Soviets must exploit arms supply and the myopic tenacity of local conflict to insinuate their influence. When the region's governments begin to think seriously about ways out of their age-old conflicts, the US tends in the end to be the more congenial partner. Should policy blunders or strategic retreat from the region reduce US leverage, or renewed confrontation magnify the relative disparity of US and Soviet military capabilities in more extreme scenarios, then the Soviets will have new prospects to advance.

Egypt

Egypt deserves special treatment, apart from the Arab-Israeli context, not only because it assumed at Camp David a special stance toward that conflict, but because, unlike the other Arab states, Egypt is a nation. It

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has a national heritage and future more cohesive and substantial than any other Arab country.

The Soviets would certainly like to return to a position of influence in Cairo. They sought the recent exchange of ambassadors toward that end. But they probably have no illusions that this step alone puts the relationship even tentatively on a course back to the status they enjoyed under Nassar. No doubt they expect that an improved diplomatic relationship with Egypt will enhance their bargaining leverage throughout the region, although perhaps not as much as it will enhance Cairo's leverage in Washington and Jerusalem. They probably also expect that it will give them increased access to Egypt's internal politics, which are sure to face turbulent times.

A return to the past Egyptian dependency on Moscow for arms is highly unlikely given the US supplier role that has developed in the last decade. Nevertheless, the cost and political uncertainty of relying on the US for arms may encourage the Egyptians to turn again in a limited way to the USSR for less sophisticated weapons.

The Soviets probably look to a limited arms supply relationship, increased diplomatic influence, and the possibility of internal discontinuities in Egyptian political and economic development to provide them new opportunities downstream. In any case, the location, size, and long-term political gravity of Egypt in the Arab world makes the investment worthwhile.

The Yemens and the Horn of Africa

The Soviet positions in Ethiopia and the PDRY, to a lesser extent also in North Yemen; offer the potential of backdoor access to the Middle East. They offer physical advantages in terms of basing for military, paramilitary, and various covert activities against neighboring states such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Sudan. They also present to the governments of the region an image of encircling Soviet power which, if it cannot be contained reliably, must be accommodated.

Soviet policy toward Ethiopia is at present aimed primarily at consolidation and stabilization of the Soviet position. The Mengistu regime is beset by serious insurgencies and severe economic problems. At the same time, it is not eager to build a strong Marxist-Leninist party apparatus Moscow has long been lobbying for because it could eventually challenge the power of Mengistu's military junta and give the Soviets a more viable base of support inside the country without him. In short, making sure that the Soviet position in Ethiopia is not reversed gets more Soviet attention now than efforts to exploit that position regionally. Nevertheless, the Soviets continue to develop and use the military base access they have in the country.

[REDACTED] more pro-Soviet figures have advanced their power in the PDRY recently. This may give the Soviets new tactical options. Some

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fear that the Soviets may step up their subversive activity against Oman and Saudi Arabia from the Yemens. But there is no strong evidence on this as yet. Since these outposts of Soviet influence are more means than ends in themselves, future Soviet policy toward them probably turns on developments in the vital sub-regions of the Gulf, the Arab-Israeli neighborhood, and Afghanistan.

Turkey

Geography and culture make Turkey an important target of Soviet policy toward the Southern Theater. Historic animosities and its membership in NATO obstruct Soviet influence. Turkey's sense of vulnerability, the Ottoman political tradition of evading confrontational relationships where possible, and the enduring potential for internal instability give the Soviets recurrent prospects.

The military significance of Turkey to Soviet strategic planning is enormous. It controls Soviet maritime access to the Mediterranean, notwithstanding the permissive conditions of the Montreaux Convention. It lies astride the most direct air routes into the Middle East. Depending on the fulfillment of plans for its air and land force modernization, it is potentially one of the most formidable military powers in NATO. And it is a potential base from which US military power can act to interfere with Soviet operations toward the Gulf region. Whether Turkey would permit US access to its bases during a Gulf or Iranian contingency involving the Soviets is uncertain. That very uncertainty must weigh heavily in Soviet strategic calculations, however. If Turkey could somehow be dislodged from NATO the potential for Soviet military access to the region would be vastly improved and the political impact would be revolutionary.

During the 1950s and 1960s the Soviets pursued a policy of diplomatic and economic detente toward Ankara. In the 1970s the Soviets activated the "second path" of destabilization through wholesale and indiscriminate terrorism. While some find the evidence inconclusive, the role of Bulgaria as source of arms for sustained domestic violence in Turkey makes Soviet complicity apparent.

Because the organizational base of terrorism in Turkey was so anarchic, the military which seized power in 1980 was able to quell it very effectively. Whether the Soviets might at some time in the future be able to reopen this path to destabilizing Turkey depends a great deal on the political and economic effectiveness of the present Turkish regime. Given the picture only five years ago, the present outlook for Turkish stability and development is promising, but not conclusive.

Meanwhile, the Soviets have returned to the first path of seeking government-to-government detente, inhibited by their tilt toward Greece on Cyprus, their occasional badgering of Turkey about INF and other NATO initiatives, and, above all, the deep cloud of suspicion left by the era of

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mass terrorism. The present Turkish government is strongly committed to NATO and to the US tie. It enjoys wide public support for this stance. Yet, like other NATO members, Turkey has its own reasons for a more nuanced policy toward the USSR than the US might wish to see it pursue. US support for Turkish interests in Cyprus and for military modernization has been disappointing to Ankara. Turkish interests in the Middle East frequently oblige a certain distance from US policies. Underlying is Turkey's persistent sense of exposure with insufficiently reliable backing. The Soviets can be expected to exploit any opportunity these circumstances might give them to increase their influence in Turkey.

Conclusion

The hallmarks of the Soviet posture toward the Southern Theater are:

Abiding ambitions to dominate the region for both offensive and defensive reasons.

The military potential for strategic dominance created by the buildup of Soviet regional and intercontinental forces over the past twenty years.

Multilayered tactical tools -- from arms supply to terrorism -- for exploiting the internal and interstate instabilities of the region.

Persistent and severe obstacles to the expansion of Soviet influence arising from the limits of Soviet political and cultural appeal, the risks of using military power, and the desire of the region's people to avoid domination by a real imperialist.

To the extent the Soviets can be said to have a region-wide strategy it is opportunistic and flexible: defend what you have, press where openings appear, and keep a variety of options simultaneously in play. Specific policies toward the major sub-regional issues addressed above will probably continue to dominate Soviet strategy toward the region as a whole.

How hard can the Soviets be expected to press in the years ahead? The foregoing discussion has tended to focus on Soviet policy problems and obstacles. Will they persist? Or will favorable "megatrends" of the regional power balance and local instability play into Soviet hands?

In retrospect, Soviet behavior during the early 1980s represents a kind of strategic underachievement. Given what appear to have been their opportunities after the fall of the Shah, they did not move very decisively or actively to exploit them, but appeared to adopt more of a defensive or holding posture. The obstacles already discussed account for this only in part. Other factors weighing on Kremlin decisionmaking also played a major role:

-- The unexpectedly high cost of the Afghanistan commitment.

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- The distracting effect of turmoil in Poland.
- The high degree of US commitment to the region after 1980.
- The onset of conditions within the top Soviet leadership conducive to risk avoidance and indecision.

The total effect of these factors on Soviet policy may persist for several years, but is unlikely to last indefinitely. Even now Soviet diplomacy in the region is getting more active, and the results of a crisis over Pakistan -- especially whether it magnifies Soviet power or underscores US credibility as an ally -- will resonate powerfully throughout the region. Sooner or later and perhaps quite suddenly given the volatility of the region, the historic Soviet aim to dominate it is very likely to be pressed with increased determination and initiative. It is next to impossible that the countries of the region will, by themselves, become united and strong enough to pose an insurmountable obstacle to Soviet advances in the long run. Those advances are most likely to be thwarted if the next generation of Soviet leaders, now in the process of emerging, is persuaded that the "great game" in the Southern Theater is not worth the candle of cost and risk. What will persuade them is a combination of failure in Afghanistan, an unfavorable regional correlation of forces based on US commitment, and their own pressing internal priorities. Otherwise the next phase of the struggle over this strategic region is likely to be more lively and potentially more explosive than the recent past.

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14 September 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Science & Technology
Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Douglas George
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

SUBJECT: Tuesday's NSPG Meeting

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1. This joint ACIS-NIO memorandum transmits your briefing book for next Tuesday's NSPG meeting at 1100.

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2. This meeting, as best I can determine, is intended to address several interrelated issues:

- Next steps by the US for ASAT arms control and, conceivably, other US initiatives. (This earlier had been scheduled for an NSC meeting on 7 September.)
- The President's speech at the UNGA.
- The Schultz-Gromyko meeting and the President-Gromyko meeting.

The operational issues are whether and how any policy decisions can be introduced into the speech and/or the two meetings. The thrust of this meeting is strategic; specific tasking will flow from decisions made during or after the meeting.

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3. Talking points (Tab A), and the remainder of the Table of Contents, are listed on the left.

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4. If there is more we can do to help you here, please call.

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Enclosure

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TALKING POINTS FOR NSPG ON ARMS CONTROL/GROMYKO VISIT, 18 September 1984

Soviet Calculations, Objectives

Gromyko is probably coming to the US to continue the policies of the recent past, to try once again to put the Administration on the defensive, to air the Soviet indictment of its policies, and possibly to set up events that will hurt campaign prospects.

There is some chance that he's under instructions to explore for some beginning of a better relationship to be developed after November. But the burden of evidence is against this.

Gromyko is more influential now than ever in shaping the Politburo guidance he'll be operating from. He's unlikely to have an interest in repudiating his recent policies.

We have reporting that the Soviets are lining up their Pact allies for a common effort at the UNGA to discredit Administration policies to the extent that it will tell in November.

If the Soviets were planning a positive tack in US-Soviet relations, they would be preparing various constituencies for it, especially in East Europe. We see no evidence of this; the Zhivkov and Honecker cancellations run in the other direction. So far, they haven't told their own people about a Gromyko-Reagan meeting [Look out that this has changed by 18 September].

There is some possibility that a positive tack is planned.

Chernenko has hinted at the wider progress some movement on space might stimulate.

In discussion with a number of our Soviet watchers, we came to a rough calculation of the odds:

70% that Gromyko will emerge from the meeting with the President with a downbeat story.

20% that he'll cancel the Washington visit on some pretext or other.

10% that the whole scenario will end on a positive note.

In his UNGA speech and discussion with the Secretary, Gromyko is likely to present the complete, but familiar recitation of all Soviet arms control and regional security proposals. The Soviet Middle East Plan will get prominent mention. He'll offer an elaborate indictment of US positions and insincerity.

[redacted] that Gromyko will offer a new arms proposal, but no evidence on what it might be. One guess is that a US INF deployment moratorium would restart the nuclear weapons talks.

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Soviet Leadership

The current state of the Soviet leadership has to be a factor in shaping the Gromyko game plan, but we do not have a clear view as to how.

Chernenko and Gorbachev have a recent record of slightly more positive statements on US-Soviet relations if the US makes concessions. But there is an overall tendency for all the members of the Politburo to seek political safety in a hard line.

Gromyko's personal authority over the shaping and execution of Soviet foreign policy is great. But he has to operate from a Politburo consensus, and, given the succession struggle, has to be wary of uncleared initiative.

The removal of Ogarkov remains to be convincingly explained. We doubt he was removed over policy, although policy dispute may have contributed. More likely he was suspected of embodying the possible threat of future military intrusion into succession politics. We know he'd acquired the image as the USSR's leading professional soldier. At the same time, we have evidence that the Soviet military are unhappy with the internal state of the USSR and possibly with its weak leadership. In any case, the Politburo has to worry about military attitudes.

Protecting Sources and Methods

Negotiating limitations on ASAT and other space weapons will present sources and methods problem. In principle, it is possible to minimize the risks through the exercise of extreme care and discretion. Social steps would have to be taken to accomplish this.

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BackgroundUN

Foreign Minister Gromyko normally visits the UN General Assembly each autumn and gives a major speech. This year's visit to the UN and to Washington will be unusual because last year's annual visit did not take place. US public reaction to the Soviet downing of the Korean air liner was such that state authorities in New York and New Jersey refused to allow Gromyko's plane to land. The Soviets refused to accept alternative arrangements offered by the US Government. [REDACTED]

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Arms Control

In late-1983, the Soviets suspended bilateral arms control negotiations following the deployments of US Pershing II and GLCM in NATO countries. Their current position is that negotiations on offensive arms can resume only if the US removes these weapons from Europe. [REDACTED]

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On June 29, the Soviets proposed to begin negotiations with the US in Vienna on September 18 on banning weapons in space. They also proposed a moratorium on space weapons tests commencing with the beginning of the talks. Although the US indicated its willingness to meet in Vienna to discuss the Soviet proposal, the US also proposed broadening the talks to include offensive systems. The Soviets rejected the idea of meeting to discuss, rather than negotiate limitations, on space weapons. They also have insisted on a moratorium on testing and refused to discuss offensive systems. [REDACTED]

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Subsequently, Chernenko has stated that proceeding with negotiations on space weapons (as proposed by the Soviets) could provide the basis for resumption of talks on offensive arms reductions. [REDACTED]

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Meetings

C/ACIS was told that the idea for a Reagan-Gromyko meeting was given to the Soviets through Assistant Secretary Burt a few weeks ago along the lines of "if Gromyko would be interested in such a meeting . . . , Secretary Schultz would try to set it up" About a week later, the Soviets told Burt that Gromyko was interested in such a meeting. The US has taken that for a yes, but my sense is that the record, in fact, does not support an explicit invitation and an explicit "yes". [REDACTED]

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C/ACIS was told on Thursday privately that the White House Staff has already pretty much decided that the President's UN speech would not contain any significant US initiatives or concessions. We were also told that the present attitude of the White House Staff is one of willingness to conduct a meeting with Gromyko, readiness to be flexible, desire to be cordial, with the US being prepared to broadly talk with the Soviets on how the US and the Soviet Union can make our arms control negotiating fora active again.



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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #05299-84
14 September 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for USSR

SUBJECT: Assessment of Gromyko Visit for NSPG Meeting,
18 September 1984.

1. This memo recaps the arguments and evidence about why Gromyko is coming to Washington and the outlook for his meetings with the President and Secretary of State.

Does Gromyko's acceptance mean the Soviets are trying to pave the way to a better relationship in the next term?

Or is it another tactical twist in the hardline policy we've seen since last winter, possibly aimed at creating a "failure" to hurt the President in November?

2. As of now the evidence is not conclusive and the Soviets may not have settled finally on how to play these meetings. But the weightier evidence and arguments are on the negative side.

3. It cannot be excluded that Gromyko will come under instructions to attempt laying the ground work for an improved dialogue.

The Soviets probably see Reagan as the almost certain winner and would want to make some effort now to assure that his current interest in a better relationship -- which the Soviets ascribe to short-term politics -- will persist into a second term.

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Even if he's favored to win, the Soviets probably see that the President and his political advisors would like a positive note on the US-Soviet front and may be willing to pay for it with some arms control concession, especially in the space area.

There have been several points in the last year where it appeared the Soviets were trying to get out of their nasty, inflexible posture toward the US, most recently for a very brief period following their space weapons initiative in June. We may be seeing another such attempt. Chernenko has recently referred to the positive developments overall which could follow movement on the space front.

Although Gromyko is primarily responsible for Moscow's dominant hardline, he may feel his authority over foreign policy has reached the point where he can sponsor an attempt at flexibility.

In any case, he has to work from a Politburo consensus which may now finally appreciate that Soviet negativism has not gained much or hurt the Administration decisively.

Finally, the Soviets remain deeply concerned about the technical and strategic threat from emerging US space/SDI programs, and they may be willing to shift their short-term tactics to have another shot at thwarting them either through agreement or a political process that inhibits them.

4. The evidence and arguments on the other side are stronger. It is more likely that Soviet acceptance of the invitations and the way they play the visit are intended to continue the recent policy of trying to put the Administration on the defensive, of burdening the White House with the fact of and blame for frigid US-Soviet relations and the arms control deadlock, and, at a minimum, showing that the President cannot successfully reconcile basically anti-Soviet defense and foreign policies with arms control and reasonable bilateral relations.

✓ We have reporting that the Soviets are organizing their Warsaw Pact allies for a UNGA performance designed to discredit the Administration's foreign policy.

✓ The Soviets are not laying the propaganda groundwork to prepare their political constituencies at home and in East Europe for the slightest positive tack in US-Soviet relations. A divided and indecisive leadership especially would feel the need to do this. They have not yet revealed to Soviet publics that Gromyko is scheduled to visit the President.

✓ There are a few hints [REDACTED] that the visit to Washington may not come off.

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It is hard to see how Gromyko would favor or gain politically from a significant shift of diplomatic tactics now away from those he's sponsored over recent months, although he does stand to gain politically from coming to New York and castigating the US.

However hedged, US acceptance of Moscow's June proposal for space talks gave the Soviets an opening for further maneuver which they quickly rejected. It is unlikely that something has changed in Moscow to shift this calculus in the direction of flexibility. In fact, Chernenko's weakness would probably strengthen the hand of those favoring tougher tactics.

The President's political strength has become more vivid in recent weeks. But the Soviets have long thought him favored to win, yet persist in the line that the election remains open and that the Democrats are the lesser evil. They have not given any evidence of thinking now is the time to start doing business.

On the contrary, the dominant view in Moscow seems to be that, precisely because the President may win big, he -- and the Congress, publics, and allies -- must not be allowed to believe throughout a second term that Washington pressure tactics, as the Soviets see them, eventually bring flexibility and concessions from the USSR.

The experiences of Gromyko and other Politburo members would not lead them to the view that a nasty phase in US-Soviet relations, for which they take some blame, necessarily precludes any progress in a second Reagan term. They believe they are more patient than we and there will be opportunities for movement in a second term no matter what happens now.

The Soviet concern about US space programs is serious and durable. But it is long term. Even if we test ASAT systems, they know that development and deployment of all the threatening technologies must go through many political wickets which they can influence in the years ahead.

5. The prognosis for Gromyko's performance in New York and Washington may be shaped by new evidence over the next ten days. There could be hints from the US side which affect it, such as the delay of ASAT tests and release of the GAC report on Soviet noncompliance in arms control, although I do not believe these, by themselves, swing the prognosis in a positive direction.

6. In his UNGA speech Gromyko will certainly lay out a broad and vigorous defense of Soviet policy and an indictment of US behavior on all fronts. We should be prepared for a pretty sarcastic tone. Whether and how he mentions the President personally will be a good clue as to what happens next.

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7. He will recite the whole menu of Soviet arms related proposals: No first use, nuclear free zones, freeze, INF and START positions, prevention of space militarization, etc., as evidence of Soviet reasonableness, and describe US positions as unfair or mendacious. He will review Soviet positions on regional security issues, with special emphasis on the Middle East plan recently revived.

8. We still have no evidence about a "new arms control proposal" [redacted] Gromyko would make. If there is one, my bet is that it will be some version of an INF deployment moratorium as the price of restarting the nuclear talks. In the charged political environment, there will be a lot of press and allied pressure on us not to reject it out of hand. But you can expect Gromyko to react very quickly and critically to a US response that says we'll consider it in principle in the context of resumed dialogue on the whole arms agenda.

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9. The meeting with Shultz will be a critical point if the Soviets have not yet made up their minds on how exactly to play the rest of the scenario. In any case, this is the point at which Gromyko might possibly cancel his trip to Washington. I have a hunch that a cancellation is already precooked, but it's only a hunch. If Gromyko judges that the Administration is defensive and very hungry for some sign of progress, I believe it will tend to increase the likelihood of a downbeat visit to Washington and perhaps cancellation, because the Soviets will conclude they can do the Administration real harm.

10. Gromyko's line with the President is likely to follow the script of his performance in New York, although he is likely to be less pugnacious than in public or with the Secretary. If he comes, he will want to take a personal and political measure of the President, especially as to how likely he is to stick to his basic policies in a second term versus his susceptibility to being drawn off those policies by the desire for a more positive legacy in US-Soviet relations and arms control. It is unlikely, in my view, that Gromyko will offer concessions in private not broached in his public speech. Even if every step has been vetted with the Politburo, there are too many back in Moscow who might jump on him should any hint of "uncleared" moves emerge subsequently.

11. As we discussed in our meeting, the most likely pattern is for Gromyko to emerge from these meetings with a sour look, possibly articulated in a press conference where this old warrior can sometimes be pretty effective (recall how his March 1977 performance embarrassed Vance and rocked the Carter SALT policy back on its heels).

12. The question has to be addressed as to whether any proposal or concession the President might offer -- in the next ten days, at the UN, or in the private talks -- could guarantee a positive meeting. The Soviets must have some price. Certainly our offer of an INF deployment moratorium or an ASAT test moratorium would whet their appetites. Yet despite the fact

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
that these would be major concessions indeed, I believe the Soviets are in a frame of mind where they would read such concessions as 1) signs of tactical weakness and vulnerability, and at the same time 2) as only temporary, retractable offers designed to get us through November.

13. What this assessment means from a policy point of view, it seems to me, is that we should do the following:

Make sure that US policies and priorities are clearly aired in public and private so neither Gromyko nor his colleagues can be confused about them. ✓

Consider all proposals and offers on their intrinsic merits for the long term, to the extent possible not in the light of short-term political calculations about the US or the USSR. ✓

Remember that the odds of actually doing anything constructive with the USSR at present are very poor. Inevitably we are talking through Gromyko and the present Politburo line-up to a successor generation. If I understand the objectives of this Administration toward the USSR, it seeks to encourage a significant shift of Soviet priorities away from international power outreach. It has a better chance of doing this than any Administration in the past generation if it stands firmly on its original mandate, especially in the midst of a reelection campaign it is strongly favored to win. ✓


Fred W. Ermarth

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Central Intelligence Agency

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Washington, D. C. 20505

14 September 1984

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: What To Expect From Gromyko

Andrey Gromyko will come to Washington at the peak of his political career and with 45 years of experience in negotiating with the United States. Neither his increasing influence in the Kremlin nor his long exposure to US leaders--he has met every President since Hoover--has mellowed the Soviet Foreign Minister. Westerners who have met with him over the years report that, if anything, he has grown more suspicious of the United States. [redacted]

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Gromyko will come as an emissary of the Soviet leadership as a whole and will report fully to his colleagues on his meeting with the President. At the same time, he personally is a principal architect of the tough Soviet line toward Washington and has a stake in proving that it will lead eventually to more moderate US policies. His strong-minded instincts will color his presentation and his perceptions of what the President will tell him. His recommendations upon returning to Moscow will do much to shape the Soviet approach to bilateral relations for months and even a year or so to come. [redacted]

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Operating Style

He does not like small talk and prefers a no-nonsense approach in negotiating situations. He rarely couches his comments in ideological terms or engages in discussions about the relative merits of the Soviet and American political systems. He is a dour, sober-sided person and delivers his remarks without enthusiasm. He is cagey about starting a substantive discussion and likes for his adversary to show his hand first. As in previous conversations with recent US Presidents, Gromyko is likely to be tough--even abrasive--in presenting Soviet positions. He has long been unwilling to make even small concessions in the interest of getting to the heart of an issue or finding common ground. [redacted]

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Soviet Motives for Agreeing to Visit

Gromyko will be intent especially on making a personal assessment of the President and gauging how his personality and convictions affect US policies. He will probe in various ways to estimate the prospects for doing business during his second term. [REDACTED]

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He may seek to evoke the President's reactions both by delivering a strong presentation of Soviet views and by occasionally hinting at flexibility. He is unlikely to use the meeting with the President, however, either to provoke a further deterioration in relations or to offer a quick deal. [REDACTED]

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He may expect the President to raise the possibility of a summit. Given Chernenko's health, he is likely to hew to the standard Soviet position that such a meeting must be well prepared and based on some degree of mutual understanding on fundamental issues. [REDACTED]

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Bilateral Issues

Gromyko's remarks probably will home in on bilateral issues, particularly arms control. He will criticize US defense and arms control policies, harping on two major allegations:

- That the United States seeks to upset an existing military balance and achieve superiority through a massive buildup of arms. To support this charge, he will refer to US defense programs for strategic and space systems, reject any notion that the USSR has upset the military balance, and staunchly assert that sufficient Soviet military programs will be undertaken to offset US defense efforts. [REDACTED]
- That the United States is not serious about arms control and puts forward proposals deliberately designed to be unacceptable and to camouflage a continued arms buildup. He may charge that the United States is setting preconditions for space talks, holding up ratification of existing nuclear testing treaties, and refusing to resume negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. [REDACTED]

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Gromyko probably will devote a substantial portion of his remarks to the issue of space talks. He is likely to argue strongly for a moratorium on the testing of space weapons, claiming that talks would be meaningless if such tests continue. He may reiterate the statement in Chernenko's early September Pravda interview that progress in the area of space talks could "facilitate" progress on limiting and reducing "other" strategic arms, possibly hinting that US agreement to a moratorium on ASAT testing might lead to a resumption of

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strategic arms talks. He probably will reject any suggestion, however, that space talks be combined with INF and START talks in a single-negotiating forum. In broad terms, Gromyko is likely to argue that US ASAT and ABM testing threatens to undermine the basis of strategic arms agreements and that it will create a new strategic, political, and psychological climate. [REDACTED]

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Gromyko will maintain that arms control agreements are needed by the United States no less than by the Soviet Union and must be based on the principle of equality and equal security. He may complain that US charges of Soviet SALT violations demonstrate US ill will, and he is certain to claim the USSR is fulfilling all its obligations under past agreements. He is likely to assert that US questions regarding treaty compliance should be addressed confidentially. If pressed on this issue, he will lay out counter-accusations of US violations. In an effort to probe US intentions, he may ask about US willingness to continue to abide by SALT limitations, particularly the ABM Treaty. [REDACTED]

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He is likely to claim that preventing nuclear war is the cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy and refer to a laundry list of Soviet proposals. In this regard, he may:

- Reiterate the standard Soviet pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and criticize US reluctance to assume a similar obligation.
- Call for a mutual freeze of the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

He also likes to recall the 1946 Soviet proposal to ban nuclear weapons--a proposal he tabled while Ambassador to the United Nations. [REDACTED]

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Regarding Moscow's position on reductions in nuclear arms, Gromyko probably will highlight the Soviet proposal at START that called for a 25 percent reduction of the strategic armaments of both sides. Concerning INF, he probably will contend that US missile deployments in Europe have created a new situation and maintain that negotiations cannot resume while such deployments continue. He may hint that a moratorium on further US deployments in Europe might be sufficient basis for resumed negotiations. In meetings this summer with UK Foreign Secretary Howe and Senator McGovern, he avoided an explicit call for the removal of US missiles already deployed in Europe. He will continue to insist, however, that British and French missiles be taken into account in any agreement. [REDACTED]

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Gromyko probably will refuse to discuss the situation of dissident Soviet physicist Andrey Sakharov although he may state that he is alive, well, and working. In May, when Australian Foreign Minister Hayden brought up Sakharov's treatment, he cut

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off conversation on the subject and said that Moscow would not talk about Sakharov with "anybody." [REDACTED]

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Public Followup

Gromyko's public comments after the meeting are likely to be reserved or downbeat, designed to defeat any expectation of a breakthrough in relations. Moscow is well aware of the impact of this meeting on the US elections. Gromyko's public comments are likely to be carefully crafted to maintain pressure on the President from domestic constituencies eager to see an easing of US-Soviet tensions and tangible progress toward a renewed arms dialogue. We consider it somewhat less likely that Gromyko will assail the Administration in harshly critical terms in an effort to embarrass the President. Gromyko personally is clearly capable of such a performance, but Moscow's agreement to the meeting and the apparent Soviet assumption that the Kremlin will be dealing with the President for the next four years suggest that Gromyko will adopt a more measured public posture. [REDACTED]

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Foreign Policy Issues

Although Gromyko will concentrate in substantive discussions on exploring the President's intentions on bilateral issues, he probably also will raise a number of global issues that have been irritants in relations. In addition to Arab-Israeli issues, there are other possible areas of dispute:

- He will reject criticism of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and rule out the possibility of Soviet withdrawal until external assistance to the insurgents is terminated and the Communist regime in Kabul is accepted as legitimate. He may repeat the proposal that a political resolution must be fashioned by the states in the region (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran) with appropriate guarantees of non-interference by the United States and the USSR. [REDACTED]
- On the Iran-Iraq war, he will argue the USSR has regional interests it must protect and might insist on international guarantees of freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. He will reject any US claim of special interest in the area. [REDACTED]
- Moscow has argued consistently that Nicaragua is not an East-West issue, but should Central America come up in the talks, he would condemn US military activity in Central America and the Caribbean and question whether Washington is serious about negotiations with Managua and the Contadora group. [REDACTED]

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-- The Soviets have signaled privately that Southern Africa need not be a cause of Soviet-US conflict, but he may choose to raise the subject, portraying South Africa as the cause of the region's troubles and berating Washington for encouraging Pretoria to take an "aggressive policy" in the area. [redacted]

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He is likely to be most defensive in those areas where he perceives US exploitation of Soviet weakness, particularly the Sino-Soviet dispute. He might attempt to probe US intentions toward Beijing and might warn against providing the Chinese with modern technology and military equipment. [redacted]

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United States Department of State

Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20520

September 7, 1984

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Memorandum To: See Distribution
Subject: Recirculation of Interagency Paper on
Preparing for Vienna: Category II Paper

As the principal reference for an NSC discussion meeting now scheduled for next Friday, September 14, 11:00 a.m., and in view of subsequent coordination (which permits the deletion of previously bracketted material in the first Con tic of page 3) I am recirculating the attached September 4, 1984 paper entitled "Next Steps in Preparing for Vienna".

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John T. Chain, Jr." with a stylized flourish at the end.

John T. Chain, Jr.
Lt General, USAF

Attachment:
As stated.

Distribution

CIA -
OSD - Mr. Perle
JCS - MGen Aldridge
ACDA - Dr. Cooper
START Negotiator - Amb. Rowny
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International: Key Issues at 39th UN General Assembly

The *Daily* today presents a look at issues likely to come up during the 39th United Nations General Assembly session opening on Tuesday.

Issue	Background	Prospects
Arms control	[redacted] hints Gromyko will announce an "important" new arms control proposal. No reporting available on subject matter.	Soviets may again repackage ban on weapons in space, nuclear freeze, or ban on CW. Anything new on INF is more likely to be saved for bilateral meetings.
Arab-Israel initiative	Gromyko certain to press Soviet proposal resurrected earlier this summer. Proposal designates Security Council—or at least its permanent members—as guarantors of settlement and calls for international conference on Middle East. PLO said to be planning to request Security Council meeting on initiative later this month or in October.	Similarity to Arab Fez plan probably guarantees widespread support, although General Assembly members recognize conference is unlikely.
Third World debt	Argentina will push for political dialogue between debtors and industrial countries. Aim is to keep alive process begun at Cartagena in June.	Bound to attract sympathetic audience in General Assembly.
International monetary conference	Developing countries will push for conference with universal participation and decisions through consensus rather than weighted voting.	Most countries have little interest in issue and few will choose this one to challenge the US.
Credentials	Iran will again spearhead the effort to expel Israel. Cuba may challenge Grenada.	No chance of Israeli expulsion. Grenada also appears safe.
Pacific Trust territories	Soviets likely to resume urging General Assembly to consider the Pacific islands entrusted to the US. Soviets contend the US plans to annex the islands and use them as military bases.	Most countries have little interest in issue and few will choose this one to challenge the US.
Puerto Rico	Cuba may call for self-determination, but avoid anti-US rhetoric that cost it votes in past.	Most Third World nations will see move as an effort to embarrass the US.
Antarctica	Malaysia pushing to scrap treaty and consider Antarctica as "common heritage of mankind."	Treaty members, including US and USSR, should be able to block action.

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